Analysis
September 17, 2010
Summary: The outcome of the
September 12 referendum
reflects Turkey’s deeply divided
politics, with the conservative
and highly religious voters on one
side of the divide, and the more
secular and modern voters on
the other. The result means that
the leaders of the last military
coup can be tried, new appoint-
ments on the High Courts will
perpetuate struggles between
the government and the opposi-
tion, and the AKP can once again
voice the possibility of a change
from parliamentary democracy
to a presidential system. This is
perceived in the secularist camp
as the AKP’s attempt to establish
an elected sultan. The ideas the
party seems to be toying with do
not bode well for the prospects of
either a form of elite consensus
or convergence over the nature
of democracy in Turkey. Turkey
has entered a new phase of
the campaign for the 2011
elections in which the coun-
try’s democratic culture will be
fiercely debated and eventually
voted upon in an environment
dominated by intense conflict
between two distinct cultural
camps. A familiar pattern of crisis
surrounding the legitimacy of
the constitution will continue to
resurface periodically, as it has
since 1961. Only now the two
sides will be reversed.
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Turkish Referendum: Divided We Stand
by Ersin Kalaycıoğlu
Now that another referendum on
changes to Turkey’s constitution has
passed on September 12, 2010, two
basic questions about Turkish politics
seem worthy of attention. First, what
is the political outcome of the refer-
endum of 2010? Second, what will
happen in Turkey now? This paper
addresses briefly these two questions
in the following pages.
The Outcome of the Referendum
The referendum of September 12, 2010
was a resounding victory for all those
behind the “Yes” campaign, namely the
ruling Justice and Development Party
(AKP), the political Islamist Felicity
Party (SP), the ultra-Turkish nation-
alist and Islamist National Unity Party
(BBP), the political Islamist Kurds,
and the political Islamist movement
(Islamcılık Cereyanı) in general. It
is similarly a letdown for the “No”
campaign headed by the Republican
People’s Party (CHP) and the Nation-
alist Action Party (MHP). The Kurdish
nationalist Peace and Democracy
Party (BDP), which campaigned for
a boycott, seemed to be successful in
some provinces, such as Diyarbakır,
Hakkari, and Şırnak, but failed in
Bingöl, Bitlis, and Elazığ in the south-
east. The results have boosted the
morale of the AKP leadership and its
supporters and similarly failed to help
the political career of the new leader
of the CHP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. Past
referendum results have not neces-
sarily demonstrated an association
with the outcome of the general elec-
tions that followed them. Therefore,
drawing far-reaching conclusions
about the approaching 2011 general
elections from the referendum results
should be avoided.
The cartographic image of the refer-
endum results presented on the
website NTVMSNBC.com.tr reveals
the main characteristic of the vote: a
picture of the West versus the Rest.
The voters of the northwestern (Thra-
cian) provinces overwhelmingly voted
“No,” while the mostly Kurdish voters
of the southeastern region of Turkey
voted overwhelmingly “Yes” in spite
of the calls for a boycott by the BDP.
The northwestern and the south-
eastern parts of the country seemed to
be diametrically opposed and worlds
apart from each other in their interpre-
tations of what the referendum stood
for. In general, all of the provinces
along the Aegean and Mediterranean
coasts also had a majority of voters
rejecting the constitutional amend-
ments, while the provinces in the Black
Analysis
Sea coast, central Anatolia, and the east seemed to have the
majority of voters supporting it. The eastern city of Tunceli,
the birthplace of Kılıçdaroğlu, had a huge majority of
voters who rejected the amendments as well. The majority
of voters in Eskişehir, one of the most industrialized and
modern towns of central Anatolia, and neighboring Bilecik
also rejected the constitutional amendments. Among the
four most populous provinces of Turkey most voters in
Istanbul and Ankara supported the amendments, whereas
most voters in Izmir and Adana turned them down.
The outcome reflects Turkey’s deeply divided politics, with
the traditional, conservative, and highly religious voters
of Sunni central Anatolia, the Black Sea, and the Kurdish
regions on one side of the divide, and the more secular and
modern inhabitants of the country in the Thracian, Aegean,
and Mediterranean provinces on the other. The referendum
seems to have helped reinvigorate the kulturkampf between
those who believe in an image of a society built around
secular, scientific, and modern values and lifestyles versus
those who believe in a counter-image of a society built
around tradition, Sunni Islam, and conservative values and
lifestyles. The 42-58 percent vote would indeed represent
the relative sizes of the secularist and conservative cultural
camps in Turkey.1
The overall outcome has not created a general feeling of
democratization but rather one of reinforcing the ongoing
kulturkampf between the forces aligned with the govern-
ment and those backing the opposition. It is a confrontation
rather than a compromise over the image of Turkish society.
The government was extremely successful in mobilizing
and uniting its traditionally-minded, conservative, Islamist
supporters, and the opposition was likewise successful
in mobilizing the opposite secular, scientifically-minded,
modernist camp through its campaigns. Both sides appear
to have failed to reach out to the other camp. Therefore,
the outcome is best interpreted as the victory of one side
and the loss of the other, which indicates that the vote was
1
We have no reliable data that can help us examine the impact of the campaigns of the
warring “Yes” and “No” camps in the referendum campaign. The opposition campaigned
by pointing to the corruption of the government, the racism of Prime Minister R. Tayyip
Erdoğan and his associates, and indictments against the PM and other AKP deputies,
which cannot be put forward as a motion in the Grand National Assembly due to the
scope of the parliamentary immunities that protect them. The AKP not only tried to fire
up anti-military, anti-state, and anti-establishment emotions and tout the democratizing
influences of the proposed amendments, but also provided huge handouts to relatively
poor neighborhoods across the country and leveled threats against those interest groups
that did not campaign for the “Yes” vote.
2
The opportunity for a genuine
national compromise on the
kind of democracy that Turkey
should have has once again been
squandered.
not about rallying around democratic sentiments in the
country. The evolving constitution still seems to be repre-
sentative of one image of an ideal society, not a national
compromise on a democratic constitution that both sides
of the cultural divide can agree upon. The opportunity for
a genuine national compromise on the kind of democracy
that Turkey should have has once again been squandered.
Instead, a majoritarian solution to democratic consolida-
tion seems to have been promoted. Such a style and strategy
does not address the many problems of democratic consoli-
dation, but only postpones them.
What Lies Ahead?
The immediate outcome of the referendum will be soul
searching within the CHP and MHP party organizations.
The result of the referendum means that the leaders of the
military coup of September 12, 1980 will be interrogated, a
debate about the legal procedure to be followed will occupy
the agenda, and the coup leaders may even be tried eventu-
ally. New appointments on the High Courts of the country
will create new controversies, debates, and clashes between
the government and the opposition. The AKP will push
for a campaign on a new constitution. The ideas the party
seems to be toying with do not bode well for the prospects
of either a form of elite consensus or convergence over the
nature of democracy in Turkey. The PM has once again
begun to voice the possibility of a change from parliamen-
tary democracy to a presidential system. This is perceived
in the secularist camp as the AKP’s attempt to establish
an elected sultan, and thus sow the seeds of a version of
Russian Putinism on Turkish soil. The AKP may calculate
that it can sell this idea both to the United States, which
it considers a strategic partner, and to its Islamist camp,
Analysis
as a way of revamping Ottoman grandeur and ultimately
increasing the efficiency and the effectiveness of the govern-
ment.
Would a regime of popular despotism be accepted as
presidential democracy within and outside Turkey? Would
it diminish political corruption and promote good gover-
nance if Turkey adopts an invincible elected sultan? Would
press freedom, freedom of association, individual liberties,
and freedom of opposition in general be augmented or
threatened? Turkey has a heavily centralized administra-
tion and political culture. Can a presidential system work
in such an environment? These and many more questions
of a similar nature will instigate debate in Turkey, but will
probably serve more to reinforce the ongoing kulturkampf
than to reinforce democracy. Nevertheless, one thing is
certain: Turkey has entered a new phase of the campaign
for the 2011 elections in which the country’s democratic
culture will be fiercely debated and eventually voted upon in
an environment dominated by intense conflict between two
distinct cultural camps.
Conclusion
The strategy of the AKP is clear: clash with the opposition,
the military, and the courts; help the traditionalist, Islamist,
and conservative voters rally around the AKP flag; and,
eventually, impose the stamp of its cultural identity upon
the constitution. The reaction of the other camp is also not
difficult to predict. It will resist and question the legitimacy
of the new constitution from day one. A familiar pattern
of crisis surrounding the legitimacy of the constitution
will continue to resurface periodically, as it has since 1961.
Only now the two sides will be reversed. In 1961 it was the
secular-modernist camp that was supportive of the consti-
tution and the traditionalist-conservative-Islamist camp
that questioned its legitimacy. The challenge of establishing
a nationally accepted democratic consensus will still be
hanging over the heads of Turkish politicians and voters
alike.
Dr. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Professor, Sabancı University
Dr. Kalaycıoğlu is a Full Professor of Political Science at Sabancı Uni-
versity Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Between August 2004 and
September 2007 Prof. Kalaycioglu functioned as the Rector (President)
of Işık University, Istanbul, Turkey. Prof. Kalaycioglu is a student of
comparative politics and specializes in political representation and
participation. Dr. Kalaycioglu co-edited Turkey: Political, Social and
Economic Challenges in the 1990s, authored Turkish Dynamics: A
Bridge Across Troubled Lands, co-authored Turkish Democracy Today:
Elections, Protest and Stability in an Islamic Society and Rising Tide
of Conservatism in Turkey with Ali Carkoglu of Sabanci University,
as well as editing and writing other publications in Turkish. Currently,
Prof. Kalaycioglu is carrying out studies of sociopolitical orientations
and attitudes toward politics and voting behavior in Turkey in col-
laboration with Ali Carkoglu of Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey, and
conducting annual national social surveys as part of the International
Social Survey Program.
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