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CANON 20

A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.

Rule 20.01 - A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) the time spent and the extent of the service rendered or required;
(b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the
proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client
from the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

Rule 20.02 - A lawyer shall, in case of referral, with the consent of the client, be entitled to a division of fees in
proportion to the work performed and responsibility assumed.

Rule 20.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the full knowledge and consent of the client, accept any fee, reward, costs,
commission, interest, rebate or forwarding allowance or other compensation whatsoever related to his
professional employment from anyone other than the client.

Rule 20.04 - A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial
action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.

Case: VALERIANA U. DALISAY, complainant, vs. ATTY. MELANIO MAURICIO, JR., respondent. (A.C. No. 5655.
January 23, 2006)

FACTS:
Valeriana U. Dalisay engaged respondent’s services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044. Notwithstanding his
receipt of documents and attorneys fees, respondent never rendered legal services. As a result, she terminated the
attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money, but respondent refused. The Supreme Court in its
Decision, found respondent guilty of malpractice and gross misconduct and suspended him from the practice of law for a
period of six months.
Upon learning of the Court’s decision, respondent verified the status of Civil Case No. 00-044. He learned of the
trial court’s Decision holding that the tax declarations and title submitted by complainant are not official records.
Thereupon, respondent filed a Sworn Affidavit Complaint against complainant alleging that complainant offered tampered
evidence. The respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration for the Supreme Court Decision and argued that
complainant did not engage his services as counsel, and that complainant offered tampered evidence in Civil Case No.
00-004, prompting him to file falsification cases against her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the motion for reconsideration should be granted.
HELD:
The respondent’s motion for reconsideration is denied. The Court explained that once a lawyer accepts money
from a client, an attorney-client relationship is established. Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsified
documentary evidence, it will not be sufficient to exonerate the respondent. Consistent with the mandate of Canon 19 that
a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal and only within the bounds of the law, Rule 19.02 of the same Canon
specifically provides that a lawyer who has received information that his clients has, in the course of the representation,
perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and failing which he
shall terminate the relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court.
As a lawyer, respondent is expected to know this Rule. Instead of inaction, he should have confronted
complainant and asked her to rectify her fraudulent representation. If complainant refuses, then he should terminate his
relationship with her.
Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 39
Facts:
A case was filed against De Dios Marikina Transportation Company Inc. filed by the herein petitioner for
the damages the latter sustained from the physical injuries resulted from the dragging of the petitioner along the
asphalted road by the bus operated by the transport company. The incident occurred when the bus driver bolted
forward at high speed while petitioner was still clinging on the bus door’s handle bar that causes the latter to lose
his grip and balance. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but lowers the attorney’s fee. An appeal for the decision of the CA
was filed but then denied. Thus, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the reduction of attorney’s fee by the appellate court is an error on latter’s part.

Held:
Yes, the reduction of attorney’s fee by the appellate court is an error on latter’s part. The Supreme Court
found the trial court’s reward of attorney’s fee reasonable due to the time difference from the initiation of the
complaint to the rendering of decision which took four years and six months. Also, the appearances, no less than
twenty, is considered.

IMPORTANT:
Criteria determining the reasonableness of attorney’s fees:
a. The quantity and character of the services rendered;
b. the labor, time and trouble involved;
c. the nature and importance of the litigation;
d. the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the controversy;
e. the novelty and difficulty of questions involved;
f. the responsibility imposed on counsel;
g. the skill and experience called for the in the performance of the service;
h. the professional character and social standing of the lawyer;
i. the customary charges of the bar for similar services;
j. the character of employment, whether casual or for established client;
k. whether the fee is absolute or contingent (it being the rule that an attorney may properly charge a higher
fee when it is contingent than when it is absolute); and
l. the results secured.
PNB v. Pardo y Robles Hermanos, 67 Phil. 570
Facts:
On January 28, 1930, plaintiff's share or interest in the firm was liquidated and found to be P80,000 and
the method of payment was agreed upon as set forth in Exhibit B. Later, the form of payment was changed as
shown by Exhibit E. Payments not having been made, this suit was duly brought, and after trial it was given for
plaintiff, and defendants bring this appeal.
It is claimed that the settlement of January 28, 1930, was not a final settlement but was contingent upon
securing a loan. This is based upon the fact that the managing partner was authorized at the same meeting where
the share of plaintiff was determined, to negotiate a loan if possible: But the value of plaintiff's interest in the
partnership was not contingent upon whether the loan was secured or not. The securing of the loan might have
made it easier for the partnership to liquidate the share of the retiring partner, but his rights as of that date were
not contingent upon the future action of the partnership. Nor would he have to wait three years after the settlement
then made before he was entitled to payment, which would mean an amendment to the articles of incorporation
that a partner could not enforce liquidation of his account for six years. His right of action accrued as provided
for in the contract. Nor is Exhibit E invalid because one of the defendants signed it "Salvo mi opinion". Nor would
such a statement relieve the signer from his responsibility, which had become fixed on January 28, 1930.

Issue:
Whether or not PARDO Y ROBLES HERMANOS et al has a right to appear in court

Held:
Yes. The present contention of some of the defendants that they at all times had a right to have served on
them individually a copy of all motions and decisions of the trial court, is entirely without foundation. They
received summons and they had a right to appear in court if they saw fit. They did appear in court in a possibly
irregular way, but they cannot take advantage of their own action to defeat or thwart the legal rights of plaintiff-
appellee. The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed with costs against appellants.
Ulanday v. Manila Railroad Co., 45 Phil. 540
FACTS:
Sixty-eight cases were brought about by more than two hundred plaintiffs to recover damages from the
Manila Railroad Company, who opened the dam when an unusual heavy rainfall occurred to prevent destroying
the bridge that led to the damages of the surrounding properties.
There were a lot of cases filed, represented by Atty. E. G. Turner for the property owners. The first case
was filed under consolidated complaints, Turner vs. Manila Railroad Co. This demurrer was interposed for the
railroad company alleging that it is not permissible for an attorney to accumulate distinct causes of action in
himself, and to sue in his own name for the benefit of the clients directly interested. This was sustained by the
trial Judge and the order was affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court. In this regard, seventy-one separate actions
were instituted against Manila Railroad Company.
The first case to be tried was that of Ambrosio Erfe vs. Manila Railroad Company, but decision was in
favor of the defendant railroad company. After which, the second case won against Manila Railroad Company.
Sixty-nine cases won and one was dismissed because of failure of the plaintiff to appear.
The plaintiffs, issued an agreement with Erfe, authorizing him to secure lawyers to prosecute the claims
and to pay them fifty per cent of the proceeds and to retain twenty per cent for Erfe’s services. Ambrosio Erfe got
the services of Atty De las Alas to represent the plaintiffs using the special power of Attorney given and authorized
by the plaintiffs to Erfe. Atty Turner, contended and said that the power of attorney given to Erfe was fraudulent
and has been dressed up, added to and change in many ways. That the substitution of lawyer, from Atty Turner
to Atty De las Alas as well as the special power of Attorney is to be declared null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty De las Alas can be recognized as the substitute lawyer by the special power of
Attorney?

HELD:
Yes, after all the investigation and confessions of the petitioner’s, the special power of attorney was valid.
The power of attorney created the relation of principal and agent. It was a contract which should be enforced
unless vitiated by fraud or found to be an agreement contrary to public policy. It attempted, among other things,
to dismiss the lawyer and substitute another, which may be done at any time by the client with or without cause
(Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 32). The power of attorney further attempted to compromise pending cases, and in
this connection, it is well to recall that, as provided by section 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, lawyers "cannot,
without special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of the client's claim
but the full amount in cash."
The Supreme Court concluded this distasteful ul and arduous task by making the findings which follow.
We find that the power of attorney of June 21, 1923, in connection with the prior authorization in favor of
Ambrosio Erfe-Mejia and subsequent ratification, is valid and controlling. We find further that as the power of
attorney is valid and controlling, there has been a proper substitution of attorneys in this court, and that Attorney
Antonio de las Alas must be recognized as counsel f or the plaintiffs.' We find f urther that Attorney E. G. Turner
and associate counsel have liens on the judgments for professional services the reasonable value of which we fix
at P30,000. Inasmuch as there only remains a balance of P20,000 available for the purpose of paying Attorney
Turner and associate counsel, inasmuch as this happened through no fault of Attorney Turner, and inasmuch as
to make him look to the plaintiffs for further payment would be unfair, the compromise agreement is modified
and approved as of the amount of P100,000. Subject generally to the conditions above stated, and subject
specifically to proof by the Manila Railroad Company that Attorneys Turner, Rheberg, and Sison have been paid
P30,000 in satisfaction of their liens, the motion to dismiss the appeals in these sixty-eight cases, is approved. So
ordered.
CANON 21
A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN
AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.

Rule 21.01 - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except;
(a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the
disclosure;
(b) When required by law;
(c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates
or by judicial action.

Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of
employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with
full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.

Rule 21.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the written consent of his client, give information from his files to
an outside agency seeking such information for auditing, statistical, bookkeeping, accounting, data
processing, or any similar purpose.

Rule 21.04 - A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of the firm to partners or associates thereof unless
prohibited by the client.

Rule 21.05 - A lawyer shall adopt such measures as may be required to prevent those whose services are
utilized by him, from disclosing or using confidences or secrets of the clients.
Rule 21.06 - A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet conversation about a client's affairs even with members of his
family.

Rule 21.07 - A lawyer shall not reveal that he has been consulted about a particular case except to avoid
possible conflict of interest.

Alcantara v De Vera A.C. 5859 November 23 2010


FACTS:

It is a review for a Resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) that fould Atty.
Eduardo C. De Vera liable for professional malpractice and gross misconduct and recommending his disbarment. 1. De
Vera is a member of the bar and was the former counsel of Rosario Mercado in a civil case in 1984 filed in RTC Davao
and an administrative case before Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 2. A Writ of execution pending appeal
was issued in favor of Mercado. De Vera garnished the bank deposits, but did not turn over proceeds to Rosario. The
latter demanded the proceeds but De Vera claimed that the money was used to pay the judge and for attorneys fees.
Rosario then filed a disbarment case against De Vera 3. March 23, 1993, the IBP Board of Governors in a resolution held
De Vera guilty of infidelity in the custody and handling of client’s funds and recommended thathe be suspended for 1 year
from the practice of law 4. De Vera then filed several lawsuits against (Total Law Suits: 12): 1) Mercado family except
George Mercado 2) Family corporation 3) Corporation’s accountant

4) Judge who ruled against the reopening of the case for the collection of the balance of his fee from Mercado 5)
Chairman and members of the IBP Board who recommended his suspension 6) Present counsel of his former client **He
also re-filed cases that were previously dismissed (6 Criminal Cases) 5. Petitioners allege that De Vera committed
barratry, forum shopping, exploitation of family problems, use of intemperate language. They claim that the cases filed
was to harass and revenge his 1 year suspensios. They pray that De Vera be be disbarred for malpractice and gross
misconduct under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. 6. De Vera DENIES charges:
1)Barraty

: Denies that he instigated George Mercado to file the law suits and that the suits were filed in good faith and was based
on strong facts.

2)Forum shopping

: He merely exhausted remedies allowed by law and that he was constrained to seek relief elsewhere because of the
denial of the RTC to reopen the civil case.

3)Expoitation

: The case he and George filed arose from their perception of unlawful transgressions committed. They must be held
accountable for public interest.

4)Intemperate, vulgar, or unprofessional language

: He asserts that it wasthe petitioners who resorted into such in accusing him of “extorting

from Rosario shocking and unconscionable attorney’s fees.”

ISSUE:

1. W/N Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera is liable for professional malpractice and gross misconduct. 2. W/N De Vera should be
disbarred

HELD:

Yes. They are in agreement with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors

Practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law. Membership is a privilege burdened with conditions such as good behavior. A lawyer has
the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct declared by
judgment of the court. Purpose of suspensions and disbarment is to remove those who are proved unfit to be entrusted
with the duties to protect the public rather than punishing the attorney.

Maligsa v. Cabanting:

An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor,
which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Because they should maintain
a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing as they should bring honor to the profession De
Vera committed professional malpractice and gross misconduct in his acts against his former clients.In the present case
the barrage of cases filed by the respondent against his former client and others close to her was meant to overwhelm
said client and to show her that De Vera does not fold easily after he was meted a penalty of one year suspension from
the practice of law. The nature of the cases filed (re-filing, timing, conspiracy, foul language used shows that De Veras
acts are beyond justice and fairness-- it is of revenge, hate, anger, and frustration.

Prieto v. Corpuz

: the Court said that it is professionally irresponsible for a lawyer to file frivolous lawsuits. Atty Prieto must be sanctioned
for filing an unfounded complaint in bad faith. As officers of the court, it is their responsibility to assist in the proper
administration of justice. Lawyers should should avoid unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent
their realization. Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is very explicit that lawyers must exert every effort
and consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. De Vera not only filed frivolous and
unfounded lawsuits that violated his duties as an officer of the court but also went against a former client to whom he
owes loyalty and fidelity. The cases involved matters and information aquired by De Vera during the time that he was still
Rosario's counsel and must have been protected by the attorney-client relationship priviledges. Which is a direct violation
of the Canons. Canon 21 and Rule 21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

[19]

that provides: CANON 21 - A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client
relation is terminated. Rule 21.02

A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he
use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances
consents thereto.

DECISION

: Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera is hereby

DISBARRED

from the practice of law effective immediately upon his receipt of this Resolution.
CANON 22
A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE
APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Rule 22.01 - A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following case:
(a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with the matter
he is handling;
(b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules;
(c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the client;
(d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the
employment effectively;
(e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply with the
retainer agreement;
(f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and
(g) Other similar cases.

Rule 22.02 - A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien, immediately turn
over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperative with his successor in the
orderly transfer of the matter, including all information necessary for the proper handling of the matter.

Tumbagahan v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 485


FACTS:
The records show that the petitioner filed two cases with the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte,
Branch II,namely: (1) for declaration of ownership and reconveyance of lots of the IliganCadastre; and (2)for the
review of the decree of registration issued by the Land RegistrationCommission in favor of Timotea Lasmarias
and cancellation of her titles to the same lots. When the cases were called for joint trial on April 10, 1968, the
petitioner relieved Atty. Salise as his counsel. Atty. Salise filed his withdrawal ofappearance which was approved
by the court. On April 15, 1968, the cases were again called for trial. This time, the petitioner personally appeared
and filed a written motion for postponement on the ground that he still had no counsel and was not ready for trial.
Upon motion of the other party, the motion for postponement was denied and the court issued an order dismissing
the two cases. A copy of the order was sent to Atty. Amarga which he received on April 26, 1968. The petitioner
received his copy of the order on May 17, 1968. Thereafter, he filed his motion for reconsideration. After the
motion was denied, he filed a notice of appeal and record on appeal which the Court dismissed for being filed out
of time, counting the period to appeal from the day Atty. Amarga received a copy of the order of dismissal. The
petitioner alleges that he had neither engaged the services of Atty. Amarga nor authorized the latter to represent
him in his two cases.

ISSUE:
The issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner validly terminated the services of his counsels of
record -Attys.Melvyn Salise and Jose Amarga — such that service on them of processes and notices would no
longer bind him.

HELD:
NO There is a need to observe the legal formalities before a counsel of record may be considered relieved
of his responsibility as such counsel. The withdrawal as counsel of a client, or the dismissal by the client of his
counsel, must be made in a formal petition filed in the case. In this case, the termination of the attorney-client
relationship between the petitioner and Atty. Salise does not automatically severe the same relations between
the petitioner and Atty. Amarga. Only Atty. Salise's dismissal was made of record. None was made with regard
to the other counsel. The attorney-client relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal made of
record; at least so far as the opposite party is concerned, the relation otherwise continues until the end of the
Unless properly relieved, the counsel is responsible for the conduct of the case.
Quilban v. Robinol, 171 SCRA 768
FACTS:
The Colegio de San Jose, a Jesuit corporation, (Colegio, for short) used to own a parcel of land at the
Seminary Road, Barrio Bathala, Quezon City. Through its administrator, Father Federico Escaler, it sold said land
to the Quezon City Government as the site for the Quezon City General Hospital but reserved an area of 2,743
square meters as a possible development site. Squatters, however, settled in the area since 1965 or 1966. Sometime
in 1970, the Colegio, through Father Escaler gave permission to Congressman Luis R. Taruc to build on the
reserved site a house for his residence and a training center for the Christian Social Movement. Seeing the crowded
shanties of squatters, Congressman Taruc broached to Father Escaler the idea of donating or selling the land cheap
to the squatters. Congressman Taruc then advised the squatters to form an organization and choose a leader
authorized to negotiate with Father Escaler. Following that advice, the squatters formed the a Samahang
Pagkakaisa ng Barrio Bathala" (Samahan, for brevity), with Bernabe Martin as President, who was entrusted with
the task of negotiating on their behalf for the sale of the land to them. But instead of working for the welfare of
the Samahan, Martin went to one Maximo Rivera, a realtor, with whom he connived to obtain the sale to the
exclusion of the other Samahan members. On 28 March 1971, the land was ultimately sold to Rivera at P15 per
square meter or a total consideration of P41,961.65. The prevailing price of the land in the vicinity then was P100
to P120 per square meter. It was evident that Father Escaler had been made to believe that Rivera represented the
squatters on the property.
In 1972, thirty-two heads of families of the Samahan filed a case against Rivera with a prayer that said
defendants be ordered to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of said plaintiffs after reimbursement by the latter
of the corresponding amount paid by Rivera to the Colegio.
To prosecute the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Samahan members hired as their counsel Atty. Santiago
R. Robinol for which the latter was paid P2,000.00 as attorney's fees on 8 October 1975. Atty. Robinol was also
to be given by the members a part of the land, subject matter of the case, equal to the portion that would pertain
to each of them. What was initially a verbal commitment on the land sharing was confirmed in writing on 10
March 1979.
On 18 May 1979, the sum of P68,970.00 was turned over to Atty. Robinol by the officers; on 31 May
1979 the amounts of P1,030.00 and P2,500.00 respectively; and on 2 June 1979, the sum of P2,500.00, or a total
of P75,000.00. After almost a year, the five officers discovered that no payment had been made to Rivera. When
queried, Atty. Robinol replied that there was an intervention filed in the civil case and that a Writ of Execution
had not yet been issued by the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. However, it turned out that the motion for
intervention had already been dismissed. After confronting Atty. Robinol with that fact, the latter gave other
excuses, which the officers discovered to have no basis at all.
The officers of the Samahan thereafter approached Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor, who agreed to be their
counsel, after he was shown the document of 6 March 1980 containing the consensus of the Samahan members
to change Atty. Robinol as their lawyer. Upon Atty. Montemayor's advice, the officers sent Atty. Robinol a letter
dated 17 March 1980 informing the latter of their decision to terminate his services and demanding the return of
the P75,000.00 deposited with him. Atty. Robinol turned deaf ears to the demand. A subsequent letter of the same
tenor, dated 31 March 1980, was similarly disregarded by Atty. Robinol.
On 15 April 1980 the Samahan officers filed this Administrative Complaint before this Court requesting
the investigation of Atty. Robinol for refusal to return the P75,000.00 and praying that the Court exercise its
power of discipline over members of the Bar unworthy to practice law. The details of their Complaint were
embodied in their Joint Affidavit executed on 14 April 1980 describing what had transpired between them and
Atty. Robinol.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Robinol should be disbarred.
RULING:
Atty. Robinol has, in fact, been guilty of ethical infractions and grave misconduct that make him unworthy
to continue in the practice of the profession. After the Court of Appeals had rendered a Decision favorable to his
clients and he had received the latter's funds, suddenly, he had a change of mind and decided to convert the
payment of his fees from a portion of land equivalent to that of each of the plaintiffs to P50,000.00, which he
alleges to be the monetary value of that area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right to unilaterally appropriate his
clients' money not only because he is bound by a written agreement but also because, under the circumstances, it
was highly unjust for him to have done so. His clients were mere squatters who could barely eke out an existence.
They had painstakingly raised their respective quotas of P2,500.00 per family with which to pay for the land only
to be deprived of the same by one who, after having seen the color of money, heartlessly took advantage of them.
Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that since he was unjustly dismissed by his clients he had the legal
right to retain the money in his possession. Firstly, there was justifiable ground for his discharge as counsel. His
clients had lost confidence in him for he had obviously engaged in dilatory tactics to the detriment of their
interests, which he was duty-bound to protect. Secondly, even if there were no valid ground, he is bereft of any
legal right to retain his client's funds intended for a specific purpose — the purchase of land. He stands obliged
to return the money immediately to their rightful owners. The principle of quantum meruit applies if a lawyer is
employed without a price agreed upon for his services in which case he would be entitled to receive what he
merits for his services, as much as he has earned. In this case, however, there was an express contract and a
stipulated mode of compensation. The implied assumpsit on quantum meruit, therefore, is inapplicable.
Inevitable, therefore, is the conclusion that Atty. Robinol has rendered himself unfit to continue in the practice of
law. He has not only violated his oath not to delay any man for money and to conduct himself with all good
fidelity to his clients. He has also brought the profession into disrepute with people who had reposed in it full
faith and reliance for the fulfillment of a life-time ambition to acquire a homelot they could call their own.
ACCORDINGLY, In Administrative Case No. 2144, Atty. Santiago R. Robinol is hereby DISBARRED
for having violated his lawyer's oath to delay no man for money, broken the fiduciary relation between lawyer
and client, and proven himself unworthy to continue in the practice of law. By reason of his unethical actuations,
he is hereby declared to have forfeited his rights to attorney's fees and is ordered to return the amount of
P75,000.00 to the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433 through the complainant in the aforementioned
Administrative Case
MARIA EARL BEVERLY C. CENIZA vs. ATTY. VIVIAN G. RUBIA
FACTS:
Complainant sought the legal services of the respondent in regard to the share of her mother-in- law in the
estate of her husband Carlos Ceniza. Respondent made the complainant to sign a promissory note for P32,000.00
which was lent by Domingo Natavio and was later paid by the latter’s mother-in- law. Then, respondent furnished
them a copy of the complaint for partition and recovery of ownership/possession representing legitime but with
no docket number on it. It was only after three months that respondent informed them of the filing of the complaint
and gave them a copy of the complaint with Civil Case No. 4198 and a rubber stamped RECEIVED thereon. But
upon verification with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, she was informed that no
case with said title and docket number was filed.
Complainant charged respondent with grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and falsification of
public documents. Upon the IBP investigation, it recommended that respondent be found guilty of falsification
of public document and be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three years.
The other allegations in the complaint about ignorance of the law are found to be without factual basis. In a
resolution by the Board of Governors, it recommended that the disbarment of the respondent be reduced to five
(5) years of suspension from the practice of law.
A perusal of the records shows that complainant’s evidence does not suffice to warrant the imposition of
administrative sanction against the respondent. However, the Court finds that respondent committed some acts
for which she should be disciplined or administratively sanctioned. She suggested that complainant borrow money
from Domingo Natavio for the payment thereof. Furthermore, she severed the lawyer-client relationship due to
overwhelming workload demanded by her new employer Nakayama Group of Companies, which constrained her
to return the money received as well as the records of the case, thereby leaving her client with no representation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not he violated Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:
Yes. Respondent violated Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall
withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. Heavy workload is
not sufficient reason for the withdrawal of her services. When she accepted to handle the complainant’s case, she
undertook to do her duties with utmost attention, skill and competence, despite other workloads to do with other
client. The client has the right to expect that a lawyer will discharge his duties diligently and exert his best efforts
to defend or prosecute his client’s cause. Failure of such duties will render him administratively liable. In the
instant case, respondent is found guilty and suspended from the practice of law for six months.

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