CASE #1
Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs. Public Service
Commission,
70 Phil., 221, No. 47065 June 26, 1940
Facts:
Pangasinan Trans. Co. (Pantranco) for 20 years, is in
the business of transporting passengers coming and
going to Pangasinan, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija and
Zambales, by means of TPU buses. On August 26,
1939, the Pantranco filed with the Public Service
Commission (PSC) an application for authorization to
operate 10 additional new Brockway trucks. The petition
was denied by the PSC including Pantranco’s motion for
reconsideration. Hence this petition for a writ of
certiorari.
Petitioner’s argument:
1. The legislative powers granted to the Public
Service Commissionconstitute a complete and
total abdication by the Legislature of its
functions, therefore such is unconstitutional and
void.
2. Assuming there is a valid delegation of power,
such is void because:
a. The law applies only to future certificates
and not to valid and subsisting
certificates issued prior to its effectivity,
and
b. The Law, as applied by the Commission,
violates constitutional guarantees.
Issue:
Whether or not the PSC has the power and authority to
approve and deny the application of Pantranco.
Ruling:
Yes. Statutes enacted for the regulation of public
utilities, being a proper exercise by the state of its police
power, are applicable not only to those public utilities
coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to
those already established and in operation.
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 are not only the
organic acts of the Public Service Commission but are
"a part of the charter of every utility company operating
or seeking to operate a franchise" in the Philippines.
The business of a common carrier holds such a peculiar
relation to the public interest that there is super induced
upon it the right of public regulation. When private
property is "affected with a public interest it ceases to be
jurisprivati only." When, therefore, one devotes his
property to a use in which the public has an interest, he,
in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and
must submit to be controlled by the public for the
common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus
created. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the
use, but so long as he maintains the use he must submit
to control. Indeed, this right of regulation is so far
beyond question that it is well settled that the power of
the state to exercise legislative control over public
utilities may be exercised through boards of
commissioners.
This right of the state to regulate public utilities is
founded upon the police power, and statutes for the
control and regulation of utilities are a legitimate
exercise thereof, for the protection of the public as well
as of the utilities themselves. Such statutes are,
therefore, not unconstitutional, either as impairing the
obligation of contracts, taking property without due
process, or denying the equal protection of the laws,
especially inasmuch as the question whether or not
private property shall be devoted to a public use and the
consequent burdens assumed is ordinarily for the owner
to decide; and if he voluntarily places his property in
public service he cannot complain that it becomes
subject to the regulatory powers of the state. This is the
more so in the light of authorities which hold that a
certificate of public convenience constitutes neither a
franchise nor a contract, confers no prop-erty right, and
is a mere license or privilege.
On the issue that Pantranco was not afforded by due
process:
Whilst the challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act
No. 454 are valid and constitutional, Held: That the
decision of the Public Service Commission should be
reversed and the case remanded thereto for further
proceedings for the reason now to be stated. On the
matter of limitation to twenty-five (25) years of the life of
its certificates of public convenience, there had been
neither notice nor opportunity given the petitioner to be
heard or present evidence. The commission appears to
have taken advantage of the petitioner to augment
petitioner's equipment in imposing the limitation of
twenty-five (25) years which might as well be twenty or
fifteen or any number of years. This is, to say the least,
irregular and should not be sanctioned. There are
cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
proceed-ings of this character. The first of these rights is
the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of
Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan vs. U. S., "the liberty
and property of the citizen shall be protected by the
rudimentary requirements of fair play." Not only must the
party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which
he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.
CASE #2
Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co.,
57 Phil,. 600, No. 37878 November 25, 1932.
Facts:
The Manila Electric Company, requesting the members
of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to
fix the terms upon which certain transportation
companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of
the Manila Electric Company and the compensation to
be paid to the Manila Electric Company by such
transportation companies, and to the legal right of the
members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, to act on the petition. A franchise was
granted to Charles M. Swift to construct, maintain, and
operate an electric railway, and to construct, maintain,
and operate an electric light, heat, and power system
from a point in the City of Manila in an easterly direction
to the town of Pasig, in the Province of Rizal. Which was
question by Manila Electric Co. in this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court can sit as a board of
arbitrators.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents
one of the three divisions of power in the Philippine
Government. It is judicial power and judicial power only
which is exercised by the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court and its members should not and cannot be
required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or
to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with
the administering of judicial functions.
The Supreme Court exercises jurisdiction as a court and
this jurisdiction does not include the exercise of
jurisdiction by the members of the Supreme Court sitting
as a board of arbitrators.
A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper
sense of the term and possesses none of the jurisdiction
which the Organic Act contemplates shall be exercised
by the Supreme Court.
Arbitration represents a method of the parties' own
choice. A submission to arbitration is a contract. A
clause in a contract providing that all matters in dispute
between the parties shall be referred to arbitrators and
to them alone is contrary to public policy and cannot
oust the courts of jurisdiction. However, unless the
arbitration agreement is such as absolutely to close the
doors of the courts against the parties, the courts should
look with favor upon such amicable arrangements.
Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims
which guide the operation of a demo-cratic government
constitutionally established.
It would be improper and illegal for the members of the
Supreme Court, to sit as a board of arbi-trators the
decision of a majority of whom shall be final.
Case No. 3. Noblejas vs. Teehankee, 23 SCRA 405,
No. L-28790 April 29, 1968
The issue before this Court is whether the
Commissioner of Land Registration may only be
investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the
conferment upon him by the Statutes heretofore
mentioned (Rep. Act 1151 and Appropriation Laws) of
the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First
Instance. In this case Noblejas was the commissioner of
land registration. Under RA 1151, he isentitled to
thesame compensation, emoluments, and privileges as
those of a judge of CFI. Heapproved a subdivision plan
covering certain areas that are in excess of those
covered by the title. The Secretary of Justice sent a
letter to Noblejas, requiring him to explain why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Noblejas answered, arguing that’ since he has a
rankequivalent to that of a judge, he could only be
suspended and investigated in the same manner as an
ordinary judge under the judiciary act. He claimsthat he
may be investigated only by the Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, he was suspended by the executive
secretary. Noblejas filed this case claiming the lack of
jurisdiction of the Executive secretary and his abuse of
discretion.
The law or jurisprudence provides that if Congress had
really intended to include in the general grant of
“privileges” or “rank and privileges of Judges of the
Court of First Instance” the right to be investigated only
by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed
upon its recommendation, then such grant of privileges
would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the
fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by
charging this court with the administrative function of
supervisory control over executive officials, and
simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the
Chief Executive over such officials. In this spirit, it has
been held that the Supreme Court of the Philippines and
its members should not and cannot be required to
exercise any power or to perform trust or to assume any
duty not pertaining to or connected with the
administration of judicial function.
In this case, the grant by Republic Act 1151 to the
Commissioner of Land Registration of the “same
privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First
Instance” did not include, and was not intended to
include, the right to demand investigation by the
Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only
upon that Court’s recommendation; for otherwise, the
said grant of privileges would be violative, of the
Constitution and be null and void.
Therefore, the writs of prohibition and injunction applied
for are denied, and the petition is ordered dismissed.
Case No. 4. Garcia vs. Macaraig, Jr., 39 SCRA 106,
Adm. Case No. 198-J May 31, 1971
The issue in this case is whether or not Judge Catalino
Macaraig is guilty of dishonesty, violation of his oath of
office as judge ... gross incompetence, violation of
Republic Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, (particularly) Sections 5, 55 and 58.
Petitioner alleged that respondent judge collected or
received salaries as judge when in fact he has never
acted as such, since the date he took his oath up to the
filing of the complaint and has not submitted his
certificate of service. Respondent judge also applied for
an extended leave, however the Secretary of Justice
prevailed upon respondent to forego his leave and
instead to assist him, without being extended a formal
detail, whenever respondent was not busy attending to
the needs of his court.
Circular No. 10 dated February 6, 1952 of the
Department of Justice and Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the
Judiciary Act, as amended, apply to, and contemplate
of, judges who are actually holding trials and hearings
and making decisions and orders. They do not apply to
a judge who although has taken his oath, has not
started performing any judicial functions.
In this case, the court provides that after taking his oath
and formally assuming this position as judge,
respondent had a perfect right to earn the salary of a
judge even in the extreme supposition that he did not
perform any judicial function for he could, while
preparing himself for his new job or for any good reason,
take a leave, as in fact, he had planned to do, were it
not for the request of the Secretary of Justice for him to
forego the idea and, instead, help the Department in
whatever way possible which would not, it must be
presumed, impair his position as a judge. This is more
so, when, as in this case, the government officials or
officers in duty bound to furnish him the necessary place
and facilities for his court and the performance of his
functions have failed to provide him therewith without
any fault on his part. That respondent took it upon
himself to personally work for early action on the part of
the corresponding officials in this direction and, in his
spare time, made himself available to the Department of
Justice to assist the Secretary, what with his vast
experience, having worked therein for sixteen years, is,
far from being dishonesty, to his credit. In the
circumstances, it was certainly not improper that he
rendered some kind of service to the government, since
he was receiving salaries, while being unable to perform
his regular duties as judge without any fault on, his part.
As to whether or not in doing so he, placed in jeopardy
the independence of the judiciary and failed to act
according to the correct norm of conduct which a judge
should observe vis-a-vis service to the other
departments of the government will be discussed a non.
Of course, none of these is to be taken as meaning that
this Court looks with favor at the practice of long
standing to be sure, of judges being detailed in the
Department of Justice to assist the Secretary even if it
were only in connection with his work of exercising
administrative authority over the courts. The line
between what a judge may do and what he may not do
in collaborating or working with other offices or officers
under the other great departments of the government
must always be kept clear and jealously observed, least
the principle of separation of powers on which our
government rests by mandate of the people thru the
Constitution be gradually eroded by practices
purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest
of the public service. The fundamental advantages and
the necessity of the independence of said three
departments from each other, limited only by the specific
constitutional precepts a check and balance between
and among them, have long been acknowledged as
more paramount than the serving of any temporary or
passing governmental conveniences or exigencies.
Therefore, herein administrative complaint is hereby
dismissed.
5. IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U.
MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS NORTE
PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.
A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC October 5, 1988
FACTS: Pursuant to the E.O RF6-04 issued on June
21, 1988 by the Honorable Provincial Governor of Ilocos
Norte, Hon. Rodolfo C. Farinas, Judge Manzano was
designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial
Committee on Justice under the Executive Department.
As such, Judge Manzano requested the Supreme Court
to issue a Resolution authorizing him to accept the
appointment and declare that his membership to the
said committee as neither violative of the Independence
of the Judiciary nor a violation of Section 12, Article VIII,
or of the second paragraph of Section .7, Article IX (B),
both of the Constitution. Hence, this case.
ISSUE: Whether the appointment of Judge Manzano as
member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice is in conformity with the Constitution.
RULING: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that Under the
Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and
other courts established by law shall not be designated
to any agency performing quasi- judicial or
administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII,
Constitution).
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the
Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which
discharges administrative functions, will be in violation of
the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his
request. In Garcia vs. Macaraig, “While the doctrine of
separation of powers is a relative theory not to be
enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of
government precluding its doctrinaire application, it
cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required
to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in
character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise
there is a plain departure from its command. The
essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a
higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo,
can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an
executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is
indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of
such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the
task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility
no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary
can be satisfied with nothing less.”
6. Puyat v. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-51122 March 25,
1982
FACTS: The Puyat and Acero groups were competitors
for the election foreleven Directors of the International
Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) a private corporation.
Most of the elected directors came from thePuyat group,
thus, they have control of the Board and the
management of IPI. Acero group instituted a quo
warranto against the Puyat group before the SEC.
Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the
Interim BatasangPambansa, orally entered his
appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which
the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds.
Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in
force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as
counsel before ... any administrative body", and SEC
was an administrative body. Later, Atty. Fernandez
moved to intervene in the case as he was an owner of
the ten shares of IPI which the SEC granted. This
precipitated the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.
Later, Reyes then instituted a case before the CFI of
Rizal (now Pasig) against Respondent Acero and others
to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in the IPI to
respondent Acero where Atty. Fernandez appeared as
counsel for defendant Excelsior. The court ruled that
Assemblyman Fernandez could not appear as counsel
in a case originally filed with a Court of First Instance as
in such situation the Court would be one "without
appellate jurisdiction."
ISSUE: Whether in intervening in the SEC Case,
Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as
counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body
in contravention of the Constitutional provision.
RULING: YES. The Supreme Court hold that the
intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC. No.
1747 falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in
Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution. Certain
salient circumstances militate against the intervention of
Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had
acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI,
representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding
shares. He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May
30, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on
May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had been filed
on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the
scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May
31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to
intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as
counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, but
which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing,
perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided,
instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in
the matter under litigation. And it maybe noted that in
the case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-
51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant
Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are
constrained to find that there has been an indirect
"appearance as counsel before ... an administrative
body" and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the
Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an
afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the
proceedings in some other capacity.
Case No.7. CONCERNED OFFICIALS OF THE MWSS
V. HON. VASQUEZ, ET AL., G.R. No. 109113, JAN.25,
1999
Facts:
In order to provide about 1.3 million liters of water daily
to about 3.8 million people in the metropolitan arca, the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
(MWSS) launched the Angat Water Supply Optimization
Project (AWSOP) consisting of several phases. With the
completion of the construction of the main aqueduct
from Angat Dam all the way down to La Mesa Dam in
Quezon City, MWSS focused its attention to the
Distribution System Phase of the project that would
particularly call for the supply of labor, materials and
equipment, and of the installation of new watermains.
MWSS caused the publication of an Invitation for
Prequalification and Bids and 14 contractors submitted
corresponding applications. MWSS' Pre-qualification,
Bids and Awards Committee for Construction Services
and Technical Equipment (PBAC-CSTE), after
evaluating the applications, issued a report concluding
that only 11 out of the 14 contractors were prequalified
to bid. The major factors considered in the evaluation
were the applicants' financial condition, technical
qualifications and experience to undertake the project
under bid.
Philippine Large Diameter Pressure Pipes
Manufacturers' Association (PLDPPMA) sent seven
letters to the MWSS requesting clarification, as well as
offering some suggestions, on the technical
specifications for the projects. Former MWSS
Administrator Luis Sison issued six addenda to the
bidding documents that embodied the meritorious
suggestions of PLDPPMA on various technical
specifications. The bidding was conducted by PBAC on
the previously scheduled date and the prequalified
bidders using steel and fiberglass pipes submitted their
respective bid proposals. The 3 lowest bidders proposed
to use fiberglass pipes. PBAC-CSTE formally submitted
its report on its bid evaluation and held that while the
winning bidder was the lowest, it was invalid for failure
to acknowledge an addendum which is a major
consideration that could not be waived. PBAC-CSTE
recommended that the contract be instead awarded to
the second lowest but complying bidder, F.F. Cruz &
Co., Inc., subject to the latter's manifestation that it
would only hire key personnel with experience in the
installation of fiberglass pressure pipes.
PLDPPMA filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a
letter-complaint protesting the public bidding conducted
by the MWSS detailing charges of an "apparent plan" on
the part of the MWSS to favor suppliers of fiberglass
pipes, and urging the Ombudsman to conduct an
investigation thereon and to hold in abeyance the award
of the contracts. The Ombudsman referred PLDPPMA's
letter-complaint to the MWSS Board of Trustees for
comment along with a directive to it to hold in abeyance
the awarding of the subject contract. MWSS asked for
an extension of time within which to submit its comment
but called, at the same time, the attention of the
Ombudsman to PD 1818 prohibiting the issuance of
restraining orders/injunctions in cases involving
government infrastructure projects.
The Ombudsman ruled directing the Board of Trustees
of MWSS to set aside the recommendation of its PBAC-
CSTE that a contract be given to a contractor offering
fiberglass pipes and to instead award the contract to a
complying and responsive bidder pursuant to the
provisions of PD 1594.
MWSS' Motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence,
the petition.
Issue:
Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of PLDPPMA's complaint and to
correspondingly issue its challenged orders directing the
Board of Trustees of the MWSS to set aside the
recommendation of PBAC-CSTE.
Held:
Petition GRANTED.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
While the broad authority of the Ombudsman to
investigate any act or omission which appears "illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient" may be yielded, it is
difficult to equally concede, however, that the
Constitution and the Ombudsman Act have intended to
likewise confer upon it veto or revisory power over an
exercise of judgment or discretion by an agency or
officer upon whom that judgment or discretion is lawfully
vested. The Office of the Ombudsman, in issuing the
challenged orders, has not only directly assumed
jurisdiction over, but likewise pre-empted the exercise of
discretion by, the BOT of MWSS. Indeed, the
recommendation of the PBAC-CSTE to award the
contract appears to be yet pending consideration and
action by the MWSS Board of Trustees.
The Court viewed the assailed Order to be more of an
undue interference in the adjudicative responsibility of
the MWSS BOT rather than a mere directive requiring
the proper observance of and compliance with the law.
The report submitted by the Office of the Ombudsman
reveals its predisposition against the use of fiberglass
pipes, a technical, rather than a legal, matter. It should
not be amiss to mention that the PBAC, was tasked with
the responsibility for the conduct of prequalification,
bidding, evaluation of bids and recommending award of
contracts. Part of PBAC's review was to verify whether
the proposed pipe materials were in conformity with the
permitted alternative materials specified in the bid
document. PBAC was evidently guided by the rule that
bids should be evaluated based on the required
documents submitted before, and not after, the opening
of bids, that should further dispel any indiscriminate or
whimsical exercise of discretion on its part.
The MWSS, a GOCC created by law through RA 6234,
is charged with the construction, maintenance and
operation of waterwork system to insure an
uninterrupted and adequate supply and distribution of
potable water. It is the agency that should be in the best
position to evaluate the feasibility of the projections of
the bidders and to decide which bid is compatible with
its development plans. The exercise of this discretion is
a policy decision that necessitates among other things,
prior inquiry, investigation, comparison, evaluation, and
deliberation - matters that can best be discharged by it.
MWSS has passed resolutions to likewise show its
approval of the technical specifications for fiberglass.
Case No.8, LASTIMOSA VS. VASQUEZ, GR. 116801,
April 06, 1995
Facts:
Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of Santa
Fe, Cebu, filed a criminal complaint for frustrated rape
and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse
of authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal
Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo. The cases were
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas. The
Ombudsman, Hon. Conrado Vasquez, directed that
Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape in the
Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner here is the Assistant Provincial prosecutor of
Cebu. She and the Provincial Prosecutor refused to file
a criminal charge of attempted rape against Mayor
Ilustrisimo. Thus, the Ombudsman filed an
administrative complaint against them for grave
misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of duty
refraining from prosecuting. The two were placed under
preventive suspension. It was the contention of the
petitioner that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over
the case of the mayor thus, they cannot be forced to file
the case against Ilustrisimo.
Issue:
W/N the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call
on the provincial prosecutor to assist it in the
prosecution of the case for attempted rape against
Mayor Ilustrisimo.
Held:
Petition was dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The Office of the Ombudsman has the power to
“investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.”
This power has been held to include the investigation
and prosecution of any crime committed by a public
official regardless of whether the acts or omissions
complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise
from, the performance of his official duty. It is enough
that the act or omission was committed by a public
official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a
public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power
of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.
In the exercise of his power, the Ombudsman is
authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance. Section
31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770)
provides: Designation of Investigators and
Prosecutors.—The Ombudsman may utilize the
personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize any
fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government
service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to
assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain
cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him as
herein provided shall be under his supervision and
control. (Emphasis added)
It does not matter that the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor had already conducted the preliminary
investigation and all that remained to be done was for
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file the
corresponding case in court. Even if the preliminary
investigation had been given over to the Provincial
Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the nature of
the offense to be charged would still be subject to the
approval of the Office of the Ombudsman.
This is because under S31 of the Ombudsman’s Act,
when a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the
“supervision and control” of the Ombudsman which
means that he is subject to the power of the
Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or
modify his (prosecutor’s) decision. Petitioner cannot
legally act on her own and refuse to prepare and file the
information as directed by the Ombudsman.
9. Dolalas v. Ombudsman
G.R. No. 118808, December 24, 1996
Facts:
The petitioners were charged administratively by
private respondent Villarante for miscarriage of justice,
dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, unnecessary delay in
the administration of justice and for failure to prosecute
a criminal case for an unreasonable length of time
before public respondent Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao.
The letter-complaint addressed to the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao arose out of said criminal case
of alarms and scandals filed against private respondent
by a police officer. Private respondent alleged that:
1. there has been no pre-conference, arraignment
or pre-trial held or conducted by petitioner
judge;
2. the said criminal case was maliciously filed by
one P/Sgt. Salutillo in connivance with
petitioner judge in order to discourage the
former from instituting a criminal complaint
against said police officers men for abuse of
authority and police brutality with physical
injury; and
3. said criminal case filed against him has been
unnecessarily delayed in that P/Sgt. Salutillo
 and petitioner-judge totally failed to prosecute
their own malicious action within a reasonable
length of time thus prejudicing the constitutional
right of the former to an impartial investigation
and a fair and speedy trial
On the basis of the letter-complaint filed by herein
private respondent, Graft Investigation Officer of the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao directed petitioners
to submit their respective counter-affidavits. Petitioners
motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration were
denied by public respondent, hence the petition before
this Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman may take
cognizance of the complaint against petitioner
Ruling:
No.
This Court agrees with petitioner-judge. The
complaint against petitioner-judge before the Office of
the Ombudsman is basically administrative in nature. In
essence, petitioner-judge is being charged with having
violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1[6] and Rule 3.05, Canon
3[7] of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
It must be borne in mind that the resolution of the
administrative charge of unduly delaying the disposition
of the said criminal case involves the determination of
whether, in resolving the alarms and scandals case,
petitioner-judge acted in accordance with the guidelines
provided in the Rules of Court and in the Administrative
Circulars in pursuance of the ideals embodied in the
Code of Judicial Conduct. Such is clearly an
administrative matter. Unquestionably, this Court is
mandated under Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution to assume administrative supervision over
all courts and the personnel thereof.
This Court, in the case of Sanz Maceda v.
Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464, held that:
Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution
exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and
court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of
the Court of Appeals down to the lowest
municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this
power, it is only the Supreme Court that can
oversee the judges and court personnels
compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they
commit any violation thereof. No other branch
of government may intrude into this power,
without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
The issue in this case is whether the
OMBUDSMAN may take cognizance of a case filed
against a judge.
The law provides that Supreme Court is
mandated under Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution to assume administrative supervision
over all courts and the personnel thereof.
In this case, the Supreme Court states that the
complaint against a judge which is administrative in
nature is cognizable by the Supreme Court as
provided by the Constitution.
Therefore, the OMBUDSMAN cannot determine
whether a judge acted in accordance with the rules
provided by law.
Role of the OMBUDSMAN
10. BIR v. Ombudsman
G.R. No. 115103, April 11, 2002
Facts:
Graft Investigation Officer Soquilon of the
OMBUDSMAN received information from an informer
regarding allegedly anomalous grant of tax refunds to
Limtuaco and La Tondea.
Ombudsman issued a subpoena duces
tecum addressed to Atty. Mansequiao of the Legal
Department of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
ordering him to appear before the Ombudsman and to
bring the complete original case dockets of the refunds
granted to Limtuaco and La Tondea.
The BIR, through Assistant Commissioner for Legal
Service Jaime M. Maza, asked that it be excused from
complying with the subpoena duces tecum because the
Limtuaco case was pending investigation by Graft
Investigation Officer Baldrias and the investigation
thereof and that of La Tondea was mooted.
Ombudsman issued another subpoena duces
tecum, addressed to BIR Commissioner Chato ordering
her to appear before the Ombudsman and to bring the
complete original case dockets of the refunds granted to
Limtuaco and La Tondea.
The BIR moved to vacate the subpoena duces
tecum however the Ombudsman denied the Motion to
Vacate the Subpoena Duces Tecum.
The BIR moved to reconsider but the Ombudsman
denied the motion for reconsideration and reiterated its
directive to the BIR to produce the documents.
 BIR filed before this Court the instant Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to take
cognizance of the complaints filed against the BIR
officials/employees with regard to its findings
Ruling:
Yes. No less than the 1987 Constitution enjoins that the
“Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the
people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any
form or manner against public officials or employees of
the government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate case,
notify the complainants of the action taken and the result
thereof.” Clearly, there is no requirement of a pending
action before the Ombudsman could wield its
investigative power. The Ombudsman could resort to its
investigative prerogative on its own or upon a complaint
filed in any form or manner. Even when the complaint is
verbal or written, unsigned or unverified, the
Ombudsman could, on its own, initiate the investigation.
The power to investigate and to prosecute which
was granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and
unqualified. The Ombudsman Act makes it perfectly
clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
encompasses “all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance
and nonfeasance that have been committed by any
officer or employee x x x during his tenure of office.
However, such power or authority must done with
due process. The law clearly provides that if there is a
reasonable ground to investigate further, the investigator
of the Office of the Ombudsman shall first furnish the
respondent public officer or employee with a summary
of the complaint and require him to submit a written
answer within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt
thereof. In the instant case, the BIR officials concerned
were never furnished by the respondent with a summary
of the complaint and were not given the opportunity to
submit their counter-affidavits and controverting
evidence. Instead, they were summarily ordered to
appear before the Ombudsman and to produce the case
dockets of the tax refunds granted to Limtuaco and La
Tondea. They are aggrieved in that, from the point of
view of the respondent, they were already deemed
probably guilty of granting anomalous tax
refunds. Plainly, respondent Office of the Ombudsman
failed to afford petitioner with the basics of due process
in conducting its investigation.
The issue in this case is whether the
Ombudsman has the authority to take
cognizance/investigate the findings of the BIR
officials/employees.
The Ombudsman Act provides that the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses “all
kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and
nonfeasance that have been committed by any
officer or employee during his tenure of office.
In this case, the court ruled that the
Ombudsman has the authority to take
cognizance/investigate the allegedly anomalous
grant of tax refunds of the BIR.
Thus, the Ombudsman may take
cognizance/investigate the findings of the BIR
officials/employees.
CASE #11
Office of the Ombudsman vs. Enoc,
374 SCRA 691, G.R. Nos. 145957-68 January 25,
2002
Facts:
Enoc and others were employed at the Office of the
Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC), Davao del Sur,
Provincial Office, Digos, Davao del Sur with salaries
below grade 27. They were charged with 11 counts of
malversation through falsification, based on alleged
purchases of medicine and food assistance for cultural
community members, and in connection with the
purchases of supplies for the OSCC without
bidding/canvass. The information was filed in the Office
of the Ombudsman. Respondents moved to quash the
informations invoking that the Ombudsman has no
authority to prosecute graft cases falling within the
jurisdiction of regular courts. This motion was granted by
the RTC and the cases were dismissed without
prejudice, however, to their refiling by the appropriate
officer. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has
jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
Yes. Indeed, this Court has reconsidered the said ruling
and held that the Ombudsman has powers to prosecute
not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the regular
courts. It held: The power to investigate and to
prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary
and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any
public officer or employee when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The
law does not make a distinction between cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable
by regular courts. It has been held that the clause “any
illegal act or omission of any public official” is broad
enough to embrace any crime committed by a public
officer or employee.
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary
jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take
over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the
government, the investigation of such cases." The grant
of this authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion
from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and
employees cognizable by other courts. The exercise by
the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible
with the discharge of his duty to investigate and
prosecute other offenses committed by public officers
and employees.
The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all
complaints against officers and employees of the
government and to enforce their administrative, civil and
criminal liability in every case where the evidence
warrants.
CASE #12
Fuentes vs. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao,
368 SCRA 36, GR. No. 124295 October 23, 2001
Facts:
Government, through DPWH filed an expropriation case
against the owners of the properties, Amadeoet. al, the
property owners affected by the project to construct its
first fly-over in Davao City. The government won the
expropriation case. For the unpaid price of lots, Amadeo
and others filed a motion for the issuance of writ of
execution to satisfy the claim which was granted by the
lower court. Writ of execution was issued. Sheriff
Paralisan then issued Notice of Levy to all scrap in
DPWH premise. Bacquial was the highest bidder but
unable to withdraw the scrap due to prevention of its
custodian, Engr. Alejo.
A motion for a break through was filed and granted in
favor of Bacquial. In the course of execution, an order
temporarily suspending the execution was issued. An
order subsequently issued upholding the validity of the
writ of execution.
On the basis of letters from Congressman Garcia of the
Second District of Davao City and Engineer Alejo, the
Court Administrator, Supreme Court directed Judge
Fuentes, the one who issue the writ of execution and
Sheriff Paralisan to comment on the report
recommending the filing of an administrative case
against the sheriff and other persons responsible for the
anomalous implementation of the writ of execution.
After considering facts, the Supreme Court declared
Sheriff Paralisan Guilty and dismissed from service. It
then directed Office of Court Administrator to conduct an
investigation on the charges against Judge Fuentes.
Later a case was filed for violation of Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, through Office of the
Ombudsman against Judge Fuentes. Motion to dismiss
was denied, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman may conduct an
investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise of his
official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an
administrative charge for the same acts before the
Supreme Court.
Ruling:
The Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a
criminal or administrative complaint before his office
against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to
investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must
indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate
action.
Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively
vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision
over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal
trial court clerk. Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is
tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and
take the proper administrative action against them if
they commit any violation of the laws of the land. No
other branch of government may intrude into this power,
without running afoul of the independence of the
judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers.
13. Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals, 465 SCRA 437,
G.R. No. 161629 July 29, 2005
Petitioner Atty. Ronaldo P. Ledesma is the Chairman of
the First Division of the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) of
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID).
Complaints were filed against him on the grounds of
conduct prejudicial to the service on the anomalies
surrounding the extension of the Temporary Resident
Visas (TRVs) to foreign nationals tainted with
irregularities.The issue in this case is whether or not
actions of the office of the Ombudsman are only
advisory in nature rather than one having any binding
effect.
The law provides, the provisions of RA 6770 support
public respondents theory. Section 15 is substantially
the same as Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution
which provides for the powers, functions and duties of
the Ombudsman. We draw attention to subparagraph 3,
to wit:
SEC. 15.Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of
the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate
action against a public officer or employee at fault or
who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty
required by law, and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution,
and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its
disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this
Act: Provided, That the refusal by any officer without
just cause to comply with an order of the
Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine,
censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is
at fault or who neglects to perform an act or
discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground
for disciplinary action against said officer.
In this case, the proper interpretation of the Courts
statement in Tapiador should be that the Ombudsman
has the authority to determine the administrative liability
of a public official or employee at fault, and direct and
compel the head of the office or agency concerned to
implement the penalty imposed. In other words, it
merely concerns the procedural aspect of the
Ombudsman’s functions and not its jurisdiction.We note
that the proviso above qualifies the order to remove,
suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer
or employee akin to the questioned issuances in the
case at bar. That the refusal, without just cause, of any
officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman
to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for
disciplinary action, is a strong indication that the
Ombudsman’s recommendation is not merely advisory
in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of
law. This should not be interpreted as usurpation by the
Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or any
officer concerned. It has long been settled that the
power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute
any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an
exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority
in respect of the offense charged. By stating therefore
that the Ombudsman recommends the action to be
taken against an erring officer or employee, the
provisions in the Constitution and in RA 6770 intended
that the implementation of the order be coursed through
the proper officer, which in this case would be the head
of the BID.
Therefore, it is thus clear that the framers of our
Constitution intended to create a stronger and more
effective Ombudsman, independent and beyond the
reach of political influences and vested with powers that
are not merely persuasive in character. The
Constitutional Commission left to Congress to empower
the Ombudsman with prosecutorial functions which it did
when RA 6770 was enacted. The court held that the
Court of Appeals did not commit any error in finding the
petitioner guilty of conduct prejudicial to the interest of
the service and reducing petitioners period of
suspension to six (6) months and one (1) day without
pay, taking into account the education and length of
service of petitioner.
14. Estarija vs. Ranada, 492 SCRA 652, G.R. No.
159314 June 26, 2006
Estarija, who as Harbor Master issues the necessary
berthing permit for all ships that dock in the Davao Port,
had been demanding monies ranging from P200 to
P2000 for the approval and issuance of berthing
permits, and P5000 as monthly contribution from the
DPAI. A complaint was filed in order to stop the mulcting
and extortion activities of Estarija to the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI). Ombudsman ordered petitioners
preventive suspension and rendered a decision in the
administrative case, finding Estarija guilty of dishonesty
and grave misconduct.
The issue in this case is whether or not the dismissal
was unconstitutional since the Ombudsman did not have
direct and immediate power to remove government
officials, whether elective or appointive, who are not
removable by impeachment. Petitioner contends that the
Ombudsman’s administrative authority is merely
recommendatory, and that Republic Act No. 6770,
otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, is
unconstitutional because it gives the Office of the
Ombudsman additional powers that are not provided for
in the Constitution.
The law provides, Among the powers of the
Ombudsman enumerated in Section 13, Article XI of the
Constitution are:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
the following powers, functions, and duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any
public official or employee of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as
of any government owned or controlled corporation with
original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty
required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any
abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.
3. Direct the Officer concerned to take appropriate
action against a public official or employee at fault, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith.
4. Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate
case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to
contracts or transactions entered into by his office
involving the disbursement or use of public funds or
properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission
on Audit for appropriate action.
5. Request any government agency for assistance
and information necessary in the discharge of its
responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent
records and documents.
6. Publicize matters covered by its investigation
when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.
7. Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape,
mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the
Government and make recommendations for their
elimination and the observance of high standards of
ethics and efficiency.
8. Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such
other powers or perform such functions or duties as may
be provided by law.
In this case, Rep. Act No. 6770 provides for the
functional and structural organization of the Office of the
Ombudsman. In passing Rep. Act No. 6770, Congress
deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with the power to
prosecute offenses committed by public officers and
employees to make him a more active and effective
agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public
office. Moreover, the legislature has vested the
Ombudsman with broad powers to enable him to
implement his own actions.In Ledesma v. Court of
Appeals, we held that Rep. Act No. 6770 is consistent
with the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution.
They gave Congress the discretion to give the
Ombudsman powers that are not merely persuasive in
character. Thus, in addition to the power of the
Ombudsman to prosecute and conduct investigations,
the lawmakers intended to provide the Ombudsman with
the power to punish for contempt and preventively
suspend any officer under his authority pending an
investigation when the case so warrants. He was
likewise given disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies except
members of Congress and the Judiciary.
Thus, the Constitution does not restrict the powers of
the Ombudsman in Section 13, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, but allows the Legislature to enact a law
that would spell out the powers of the Ombudsman.
Through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6770,
specifically Section 15, par. 3, the lawmakers gave the
Ombudsman such powers to sanction erring officials
and employees, except members of Congress, and the
Judiciary. To conclude, we hold that Sections 15, 21, 22
and 25 of Republic Act No. 6770 are constitutionally
sound. The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely
recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render
this constitutional body not merely functional but also
effective. Thus, we hold that under Republic Act No.
6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has
the constitutional power to directly remove from
government service an erring public official other than a
member of Congress and the Judiciary.
Therefore, the petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals are hereby
AFFIRMED.
15. Ombudsman v. Masing, G.R. No. 165416,
January 22, 2008
FACTS: In G.R. Nos. 165416 and 165731, respondent
Masing, former Principal of the Davao City Integrated
Special School (DCISS) in Bangkal, Davao City and
Respondent Tayactac an office clerk were found guilty
of the administrative charges collecting unauthorized
fees, failing to remit authorized fees, and to account for
public funds by the Ombudsman. On appeal, the CA
ruled in their favor and granted their petition under Rule
43. Ombudsman which was not impleaded filed an
Omnibus Motion to Intervene and for Reconsideration
but it was denied.
In G.R. No. 165584, respondent Masing was found
guilty for oppression, serious misconduct, discourtesy in
the conduct of official duties, and physical or mental
incapacity or disability due to immoral or vicious habits
by the Ombudsman. But on appeal, the CA granted her
petition. Office of the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus
Motion to Intervene and for Reconsideration which the
Court of Appeals denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Ombudsman may directly discipline
public school teachers and employees.
RULING: YES. The Supreme Court ruled that
theTheOmbudsmans order to remove, suspend,
demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or
employee is not merely advisory or recommendatory but
is actually mandatory. The authority of the Ombudsman
to act on complaints filed against public officers and
employees is explicit in Article XI, Section 12 of the
1987 Constitution, viz: The Ombudsman and his
Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly
on complaints filed in any form or manner against public
officials or employees of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall,
in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the
action taken and the result thereof.
 The manifest intent of the lawmakers was to
bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full
administrative disciplinary authority in accord with the
constitutional mandate. the Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 is intended to play a
more active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft
and corrupt practices and other offenses committed by
public officers and employeesThe Ombudsman is to be
an activist watchman, not merely a passive one. He is
vested with broad powers to enable him to implement
his own actions.
16. Macalintal v. Comelec, G.R. No. 157013. July 10,
2003
FACTS: Petitioner Macalintal, member of the Philippine
Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003suffer from constitutional infirmity. Petitioner
avers that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violate
Article IX-A (Common Provisions) of the Constitution, to
wit:Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which
shall be independent, are the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit. (Emphasis supplied)
He submits that the creation of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee with the power to review, revise,
amend and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC, R.A. No.
9189 intrudes into the independence of the COMELEC
which, as a constitutional body, is not under the control
of either the executive or legislative departments of
government; that only the COMELEC itself can
promulgate rules and regulations which may be
changed or revised only by the majority of its members;
and that should the rules promulgated by the COMELEC
violate any law, it is the Court that has the power to
review the same via the petition of any interested party,
including the legislators.respondent COMELEC cited the
same reason. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189
are in violation of Section 1, Article IX-A of the
Constitution.
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that composed
of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee (JCOC) is a purely legislative body. There is
no question that the authority of Congress to monitor
and evaluate the implementation of R.A. No. 9189 is
geared towards possible amendments or revision of the
law itself and thus, may be performed in aid of its
legislation.
However, aside from its monitoring and evaluation
functions, R.A. No. 9189 gives to the JCOC the
following functions: (a) to review, revise, amend and
approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
promulgated by the COMELEC [Sections 25 and 19];
and (b) subject to the approval of the JCOC [Section
17.1], the voting by mail in not more than three countries
for the May 2004 elections and in any country
determined by COMELEC.
Interpreting Section 1, Article X of the 1935
Constitution providing that there shall be
an independent COMELEC, the Court has held that
[w]hatever may be the nature of the functions of the
Commission on Elections, the fact is that the framers of
the Constitution wanted it to be independent from the
other departments of the Government.
The Court has no general powers of supervision
over COMELEC which is an independent body except
those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to
review its decisions, orders and rulings.[46] In the same
vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its
recognized extensive legislative power to enact election
laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of
the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over
its rule-making authority.
By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress
has empowered the COMELEC to issue the necessary
rules and regulations to effectively implement the
provisions of this Act within sixty days from the
effectivity of this Act. This provision of law follows the
usual procedure in drafting rules and regulations to
implement a law the legislature grants an administrative
agency the authority to craft the rules and regulations
implementing the law it has enacted, in recognition of
the administrative expertise of that agency in its
particular field of operation.[47] Once a law is enacted
and approved, the legislative function is deemed
accomplished and complete. The legislative function
may spring back to Congress relative to the same law
only if that body deems it proper to review, amend and
revise the law, but certainly not to approve, review,
revise and amend the IRR of the COMELEC.
By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review,
amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of
its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the
constitutional mandate of independence of the
COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with
no option but to withdraw from its usual reticence in
declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.
The second sentence of the first paragraph of
Section 19 stating that [t]he Implementing Rules and
Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of
this Act for prior approval, and the second sentence of
the second paragraph of Section 25 stating that [i]t shall
review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission,
whereby Congress, in both provisions, arrogates unto
itself a function not specifically vested by the
Constitution, should be stricken out of the subject
statute for constitutional infirmity. Both provisions
brazenly violate the mandate on the independence of
the COMELEC.
Similarly, the phrase, subject to the approval of the
Congressional Oversight Committee in the first sentence
of Section 17.1 which empowers the Commission to
authorize voting by mail in not more than three countries
for the May, 2004 elections; and the phrase, only upon
review and approval of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee found in the second paragraph of
the same section are unconstitutional as they require
review and approval of voting by mail in any country
after the 2004 elections. Congress may not confer upon
itself the authority to approve or disapprove the
countries wherein voting by mail shall be allowed, as
determined by the COMELEC pursuant to the conditions
provided for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No.
9189.[48] Otherwise, Congress would overstep the
bounds of its constitutional mandate and intrude into the
independence of the COMELEC.
Puno’s opinion
The COMELEC is, however, subject to
congressional scrutiny especially during budget
hearings. But Congress cannot abolish the COMELEC
as it can in case of other agencies under the executive
branch. The reason is obvious. The COMELEC is not a
mere creature of the legislature; it owes its origin from
the Constitution. Furthermore, the salary of the
Chairman and the Commissioners cannot be decreased
during their tenure.[232] Enjoying fiscal autonomy, the
COMELEC has a wider discretion in the disbursement
and allocation of approved appropriations. To safeguard
the COMELEC from undue legislative interference, the
1987 Constitution provides that its approved annual
appropriations are to be automatically and regularly
released.[233] Also, Congress has no power to call the
commissioners of the COMELEC to a question hour.
The Constitution provides that the question hour is
limited to heads of departments under the Executive
branch, and the deliberations during the drafting of the
1987 Constitution clearly reflect this sentiment. Be that
as it may, the COMELEC is mandated to submit to the
President and the Congress a comprehensive report on
the conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall.[234] This provision allows
Congress to review and assess the effectivity of election
laws and if necessary, enact new laws or amend
existing statutes.
Be that as it may, I respectfully submit that the
legislative veto power or congressional oversight
power over the authority of COMELEC to issue rules
and regulations in order to enforce election laws is
unconstitutional.
As aforediscussed, the Constitution divided the
powers of our government into three categories,
legislative, executive, and judicial. Although not
hermetically sealed from one another, the powers of the
three branches are functionally identifiable. In this
respect, legislative power is generally exercised in the
enactment of the law; executive power, in its execution;
and judicial power, in its interpretation. In the absence of
specific provision in the Constitution, it is fundamental
under the principle of separation of powers that one
branch cannot exercise or share the power of the other.
In addition, our Constitution created other
offices aside from the executive, the legislative and the
judiciary and defined their powers and prerogatives.
Among these bodies especially created by the
Constitution itself is the COMELEC.
The COMELEC occupies a distinct place in our
scheme of government. As the constitutional body
charged with the administration of our election laws, it is
endowed with independence in the exercise of some of
its powers and the discharge of its responsibilities. The
power to promulgate rules and regulations in order
to administer our election laws belongs to this
category of powers as this has been vested
exclusively by the 1987 Constitution to the
COMELEC. It cannot be trenched upon by Congress
in the exercise of its oversight powers.
In Gallardo v. Tabamo, Jr.,[235] this Court traced
the origin of COMELECs power to promulgate rules
and regulations. It was initially a statutory grant. Both
the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions did not explicitly
grant the COMELEC the power to promulgate rules and
regulations. The power was vested by Congress to the
COMELEC in the Omnibus Election Code,[236] viz:
Sec. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on
Elections.- In addition to the powers and functions
conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission
shall have the exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and
honest elections, and shall:
(c) Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the
provisions of this Code or other laws which the
Commission is required to enforce and administer.
This statutory power was elevated to a
constitutional status with the insertion of the word
regulations in section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution, viz:
While under the 1935 Constitution it had "exclusive
charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections," exercised "all other
functions . . . conferred upon it by law" and had the
power to deputize all law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government for the purpose of
insuring free, orderly and honest elections, and under
the 1973 Constitution it had, inter alia, the power to (a)
"[E]nforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct
of elections" (b) "[D]eputize, with the consent or at the
instance of the Prime Minister, law enforcement
agencies and instrumentalities of the Government,
including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the
purpose of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections,"
and (c) "[P]erform such other functions as may be
provided by law," it was not expressly vested with the
power to promulgate regulations relative to the conduct
of an election. That power could only originate from a
special law enacted by Congress; this is the necessary
implication of the above constitutional provision
authorizing the Commission to "[P]erform such other
functions as may be provided by law."
The present Constitution, however, implicitly grants the
Commission the power to promulgate such rules and
regulations. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article
IX-C thereof reads as follows:
"SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise
the following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall." (emphasis
supplied)
x xx xxx xxx
The word regulations is not found in either the 1935 or
1973 Constitutions. It is thus clear that its incorporation
into the present Constitution took into account the
Commission's power under the Omnibus Election Code
(Batas PambansaBlg. 881), which was already in force
when the said Constitution was drafted and ratified, to:
x xx xxx xxx
"Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the
provisions of this Code or other laws which the
Commission is required to enforce and administer . . . ."
Hence, the present Constitution upgraded to a
constitutional status the aforesaid statutory authority to
grant the Commission broader and more flexible powers
to effectively perform its duties and to insulate it further
from legislative intrusions. Doubtless, if its rule-making
power is made to depend on statutes, Congress may
withdraw the same at any time. Indeed, the present
Constitution envisions a truly independent Commission
on Elections committed to ensure free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections, and to serve as the
guardian of the people's sacred right of suffrage the
citizenry's vital weapon in effecting a peaceful change of
government and in achieving and promoting political
stability.[237]
The elevation of the COMELECs power to
promulgate rules and regulations in the 1987
Constitution is suffused with
significance. Heretofore, it was Congress that granted
COMELEC the power to promulgate rules and
regulations, and hence, Congress can withdraw or
restrict it by the exercise of its veto or oversight power.
Under the 1987 Constitution, the power to promulgate
rules and regulations has been directly granted by the
Constitution and no longer by Congress. Undoubtedly,
the power was granted to COMELEC to strengthen its
independence, hence, its exercise is beyond invasion by
Congress. Under any lens, sections 19 and 25 of Rep.
Act No. 9189 constitute undue restrictions on the
constitutional power of the COMELEC to promulgate
rules and regulations for such rules are made subject to
the prior review and approval of Congress. The
impugned provisions can result in the denial of this
constitutionally conferred power because Congress can
veto the rules and regulations the COMELEC has
promulgated. Thus, I respectfully submit that sections 19
and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 granting Congress the
power to review, revise, amend and approve the
implementing rules and regulations of the COMELEC,
otherwise known as subordinate legislations in other
countries, are unconstitutional.
I now come to section 17.1 of Rep. Act No. 9189
which provides:
Sec. 17. Voting by mail.-
17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall
authorize voting by mail in not more than three (3)
countries, subject to the approval of the
Congressional Oversight Committee. Voting by mail
may be allowed in countries that satisfy the following
conditions:
(d) Where the mailing system is fairly well-
developed and secure to prevent
occasion of fraud;
(e) Where there exists a technically
established identification system that
would preclude multiple or proxy voting;
and
(f) Where the system of reception and custody
of mailed ballots in the embassies,
consulates and other foreign service
establishments concerned are adequate
and well-secured.
Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be
allowed only upon review and approval of the Joint
Oversight Committee. (emphases supplied)
 From the law itself, it is clear that Congress has
already set the necessary standards to guide the
COMELEC in identifying the countries where voting by
mail may be allowed, viz: (1) the countries must have a
mailing system which is fairly developed and secure to
prevent occasion of fraud; (2) there exists a technically
established identification that would preclude multiple or
proxy voting; and (3) where the system of reception and
custody of mailed ballots in the embassies, consulates
and other foreign service establishments concerned are
adequate and well-secured.
Since the legislative standards have been defined,
all that remains is their enforcement. Our Constitution
has specifically given the COMELEC the power to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election. The power is exclusive
and it ought to be self-evident that it cannot be
subject to review and revision or veto by Congress
in the exercise of its oversight power. Again, the
reason for the exclusivity is to insulate COMELEC from
the virus of partisan politics. In the exercise of this
exclusive power, the Commission must be accorded
considerable latitude. Unless the means and methods
adopted by COMELEC are clearly illegal or constitute
grave abuse of discretion, they should not be interfered
with.[238] Thus:
There are no ready-made formulas for solving public
problems. Time and experience are necessary to evolve
patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In
the matter of the administration of the laws relative to
the conduct of elections, as well as in the appointment
of election inspectors, we must not by any excessive
zeal take away from the Commission on Elections the
initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates
properly belongs to it. Due regard to the independent
character of the Commission, as ordained in the
Constitution, requires that the power of this court to
review the acts of that body should, as a general
proposition, be used sparingly, but firmly in appropriate
cases. We are not satisfied that the present suit is one
of such cases.[239]
I join the majority in holding that section 17.1 of
Rep. Act No. 9189 is unconstitutional for it allows
Congress to negate the exclusive power of the
COMELEC to administer and enforce election laws and
regulations granted by the Constitution itself.
Case No. 17. COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS
DE FILIPINAS vs. THE BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITY
COMMISSIONERS, (1916) G.R. L-11216
Facts:
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS is
a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Spain
and engaged in business in the Philippine Islands as a
common carrier of passengers and merchandise by
water: On June 7, 1915, the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners issued and caused to be served an
order to show cause why they should not be required to
present detailed annual reports respecting its finances
and operations respecting the vessels owned and
operated by it, in the form and containing the matters
indicated by the model attached to the petition.
They are ordered to present annually on or before
March first of each year a detailed report of finances and
operations of such vessels as are operated by it as a
common carrier within the Philippine Islands, in the form
and containing the matters indicated in the model of
annual report which accompanied the order to show
cause herein.
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS
denied the authority of the board to require the report
asked for on the ground that the provision of Act No.
2307 relied on by said board as authority for such
requirement was, if construed as conferring such power,
invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt on the part of
the Legislature to delegate legislative power to the
board. It is cumbersome and unnecessarily prolix and
that the preparation of the same would entail an
immense amount of clerical work.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is constitutional to require COMPANIA
GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS to pass a
detailed report to the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners of the Philippine Islands?
Whether the power to require the detailed report is
strictly legislative, or administrative, or merely relates to
the execution of the law?
Held:
The order appealed from is set aside and the cause is
returned to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners
with instructions to dismiss the proceeding.
The section of Act No. 2307 under which the Board of
Public Utility Commissioners relies for its authority, so
far as pertinent to the case at hand, reads as follows:
Sec. 16. The Board shall have power, after hearing,
upon notice, by order in writing, to require every public
utility as herein defined: (e) To furnish annually a
detailed report of finances and operations, in such form
and containing such matters as the Board may from
time to time by order prescribe.
The statute which authorizes a Board of Public Utility
Commissioners to require detailed reports from public
utilities, leaving the nature of the report, the contents
thereof, the general lines which it shall follow, the
principle upon which it shall proceed, indeed, all other
matters whatsoever, to the exclusive discretion of the
board, is not expressing its own will or the will of the
State with respect to the public utilities to which it refers.
Such a provision does not declare, or set out, or indicate
what information the State requires, what is valuable to
it, what it needs in order to impose correct and just
taxation, supervision or control, or the facts which the
State must have in order to deal justly and equitably with
such public utilities and to require them to deal justly
and equitably with the State. The Legislature seems
simply to have authorized the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners to require what information the board
wants. It would seem that the Legislature, by the
provision in question, delegated to the Board of Public
Utility Commissioners all of its powers over a given
subject-matter in a manner almost absolute, and without
laying down a rule or even making a suggestion by
which that power is to be directed, guided or applied.
The true distinction is between the delegation of power
to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion
as to what shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and
in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the
latter no valid objection can be made.
The Supreme Court held that there was no delegation of
legislative power, it said:
The Congress may not delegate its purely legislative
powers to a commission, but, having laid down the
general rules of action under which a commission shall
proceed, it may require of that commission the
application of such rules to particular situations and the
investigation of facts, with a view to making orders in a
particular matter within the rules laid down by the
Congress.
In section 20 (of the Commerce Act), Congress has
authorized the commission to require annual reports.
The act itself prescribes in detail what those reports
shall contain. In other words, Congress has laid down
general rules for the guidance of the Commission,
leaving to it merely the carrying out of details in the
exercise of the power so conferred. This, we think, is not
a delegation of legislative authority.
In the case at bar the provision complained of does not
lay “down the general rules of action under which the
commission shall proceed.” nor does it itself prescribe in
detail what those reports shall contain. Practically
everything is left to the judgment and discretion of the
Board of Public Utility Commissioners, which is
unrestrained as to when it shall act, why it shall act, how
it shall act, to what extent it shall act, or what it shall act
upon.
The Legislature, by the provision in question, has
abdicated its powers and functions in favor of the Board
of Public Utility Commissioners with respect to the
matters therein referred to, and that such Act is in
violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. The
Legislature, by the provision referred to, has not asked
for the information which the State wants but has
authorized and board to obtain the information which the
board wants.
Case No. 18
US vs. ANG TANG HO
G.R. No. 17122, 43 Phil 1, February 27, 1922
Facts:
During a special session, the Philippine Legislature
passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act
Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay
and Corn. The said act under extraordinary
circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue
the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the
distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, the
Governor General issued Executive Order 53 fixing the
price at which rice should be sold.
Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and
illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the
price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way
higher than that prescribed by the Executive Order. He
was charged in violation of the said Executive Order and
was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5
months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed
the sentence countering that there was an undue
delegation of power to the Governor General.
Issue:
Whether or not there was an undue delegation of power
to the Governor General.
Discussions:
By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to
constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and
enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which
is elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine
Islands. As to the question here involved, the authority
of the Governor-General to fix the maximum price at
which palay, rice and corn may be sold in the manner
power in violation of the organic law.
Act No. 2868, as analysed by the Court, wholly fails to
provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy
should contain, so that it could be put in use as a
uniform policy required to take the place of all others
without the determination of the insurance commissioner
in respect to matters involving the exercise of a
legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and
without which the act could not possibly be put in use.
The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions
when it leaves the legislative branch of the government
and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors
or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that,
in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in
present but which may be left to take effect in future, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed
fact or event.
Held:
Yes. When Act No. 2868 was analyzed, it is the violation
of the proclamation of the Governor-General which
constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was
no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the
Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-
General to say what was and what was not “any cause”
for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not
“an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,”
and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at
which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or
quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be
issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should
be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when
the law should be suspended.
The Legislature did not specify or define what was “any
cause,” or what was “an extraordinary rise in the price of
rice, palay or corn,” Neither did it specify or define the
conditions upon which the proclamation should be
issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was
committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all,
because the Governor-General issued the proclamation.
The act or proclamation does not say anything about the
different grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is
charged with the sale “of one ganta of rice at the price of
eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than
that fixed by Executive order No. 53.”
Non-Delegation Doctrine
19. People v. Vera
G.R. No. L-45685, November 16, 1937
Facts:
Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial
court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration and four
motions for new trial but all were denied. He then
elevated to the the case to the Supreme Court however
the Supreme Court remanded the appeal to the lower
court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he
appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of
the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila
CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office.
The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera
upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition
to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered
alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng
under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act
No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature
granting provincial boards the power to provide a
system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the
law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like
Manila because it is only indicated therein that only
provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by
the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the
Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said
law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards
and this also constitutes undue delegation of power.
Further, the said probation law may be an
encroachment of the power of the executive to provide
pardon because providing probation, in effect, is
granting freedom, as in pardon.
Issue:
Whether there was undue delegation of legislative
power.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court concludes that Section 11 of Act
No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful
delegation of legislative authority to the provincial
boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.
There is no set standard provided by Congress on how
provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of
probation. The provincial boards are given absolute
discretion which is violative of the constitution and the
doctrine of the non delegation of power.
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power or not,it is usual to inquire
whether the statute was complete in all its terms
and provisions when it left the hands of the
legislature so -that nothing was left to the judgment
of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.
In United States vs. Ang Tang Ho {[1922], 43 Phil., 1),
the Supreme Court adhered to the foregoing rule. The
general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a
certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in
by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated
by executive officers and administrative boards. As a
rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence
invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite
standard by which the administrative board may be
guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers
delegated to it.
The power to make laws—the legislative power—is
vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law and
in a unicameral National Assembly by the Constitution.
The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly
may not escape its duties and responsibilities by
delegating that power to any other body or authority.
Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional
and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non
delegare potest. This principle is said to have originated
with the glossators, was introduced into English law
through a misreading of Bracton, there developed as a
principle of agency, was established by Lord Coke in the
English public law in decisions forbidding the delegation
of judicial power, and found its way into America as an
enlightened principle of free government. It has since
become an accepted corollary of the principle of
separation of powers.
The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of
legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits
of exceptions. An exception sanctioned by
immemorial practice permits the central legislative
body to delegate legislative powers to local
authorities. On quite the same principle, Congress is
empowered to delegate legislative power to such
agencies in the territories of the United States as it
may select, Courts have also sustained the
delegation of legislative power to the people at
large, though some authorities maintain that this
may not be done. Doubtless, also, legislative power
may be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14,
paragraph 2, of Article VI of the Constitution of
the Philippines provides that "The National As limitations
and restrictions as it may impose, -to fix within specified
limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage
and wharfage dues." And section 16 of the same article
of the Constitution provides that "In times of war or other
national emergency, the National Assembly may by law
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject
to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate
rules and regulations to carry out a declared national
policy."
The issue in this case is whether there valid
delegation of power when the legislative delegated
the power to give pardon to the provincial boards.
The law provides that delegation is valid when the
statute is complete in all its terms and provisions
when it left the hands of the legislature so -that
nothing was left to the judgment of any other
appointee or delegate of the legislature.
In this case, the Congress did not set standard on
how provincial boards must act in carrying out a
system of probation.
Hence, the delegation is void.
Non-Delegation Doctrine
20. Pelaez v. The Auditor General
G.R. No. L-23825, December 24, 1965
Facts:
In 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting
to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93
to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33)
municipalities. Then petitioner Pelaez, as Vice President
of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present
special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to
restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents,
from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said executive orders and/or any
disbursement by said municipalities. Petitioner alleges
that said executive orders are null and void, upon the
ground said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by
Section 3, Republic Act No. 2370 which provides that
barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered
nor their names changed” except by Act of Congress.
Pelaez argues: “If the President, under this new law,
cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a
municipality which is composed of several barrios, since
barrios are units of municipalities?”
The Auditor General countered that there was no
repeal and that only barrios were barred from being
created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from
the bar and that a municipality can be created without
creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec.
68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power to
create municipalities to the President.
Issue:
Whether Congress has delegated the power to create
barrios to the President by virtue of Section 68 of
Revised Administrative Code.
Ruling:
No. Although Congress may delegate to another branch
of the government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in
itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate
 — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such
standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of
policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate
such policy, which is the essence of every law; and,
without the aforementioned standard, there would be no
means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether
the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause
“as the public welfare may require” – which would mean
that the President may exercise such power as the
public welfare may require – is present, still, such will
not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation
of power. In the first place, what the phrase “as the
public welfare may require” qualifies is the text which
immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is
“the President may change the seat of government
within any subdivision to such place therein as the
public welfare may require.” Only the seat of
government may be changed by the President when
public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of
municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create
municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in
character not administrative.

The issue in this case is whether the

Congress validly delegated the power to create
barrios.
The law states that although Congress may
delegate to another branch of the government the
power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete
in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate or determinable
— to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.

In this case Section 68 of Revised

Administrative Code lacked any standard mentioned
above.
Thus there is no valid delegation of power.