ABANTE v.

LAMADRID BEARING PARTS

[G.R. No. 159890. May 28, 2004]

FACTS:

Empermaco B. Abante, Jr., herein petitioner, was employed by respondent

company Lamadrid Bearing and Parts Corporation as a salesman covering the
whole area of Mindanao. His average monthly income was more or less P16, 000.00,
but later was increased to approximately P20, 269.50. Aside from selling the
merchandise of Respondent Corporation, he was also tasked to collect
payments from his various customers. Petitioner encountered five customers/clients
with bad accounts. Petitioner was confronted by respondent Lamadrid over the bad
accounts and warned that if he does not issue his own checks to cover the said bad
accounts, his commissions will not be released and he will lose his job. Not contented
with the issuance of the foregoing checks as security for the bad accounts,
respondents "tricked" petitioner into signing two documents, which he later
discovered to be a Promissory Note and a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage. Due to
financial difficulties, petitioner inquired about his membership with the SSS in order
to apply for a salary loan. To his dismay, he learned that he was not covered by the
SSS and therefore was not entitled to any benefit. While doing his usual rounds as
commission salesman, petitioner was handed by his customers a letter from
the respondent company warning them not to deal with petitioner since it no
longer recognized him as a commission salesman. Petitioner thus filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against respondent company
and its president, Jose Lamadrid, before the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision in favor of the petitioner. But on appeal, the NLRC reversed its earlier
decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists between

plaintiff and respondent company

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that there was no employer-employee relationship.

Because to ascertain the existence of an employer-employee relationship,
jurisprudence has invariably applied the four-fold test, namely: (1) the manner of
selection and engagement; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the presence or absence of
the power of dismissal; and (4) the presence or absence of the power of control. Of
these four, the last one is the most important. Under the control test, an employer-
employee relationship exists where the person for whom the services are performed
reserves the right to control not only the end achieved, but also the manner and
means to be used in reaching that end. Where a person who works for another does so
more or less at his own pleasure and is not subject to definite hours or conditions of
work, and in turn is compensated according to the result of his efforts and not the
amount thereof, no relationship of employer-employee exists. Petitioner Abante was
a commission salesman who received 3% commission of his gross sales. No quota was
imposed on him by the respondent. He was not required to report to the office at
any time or submit any periodic written report on his sales
performance and activities. He was not designated by respondent to conduct his
sales activities at any particular or specific place. He pursued his selling
activities without interference or supervision from respondent company and
relied on his own resources to perform his functions. Respondent company did not
prescribe the manner of selling the merchandise; he was left alone to adopt any style
or strategy to entice his customers. Moreover, petitioner was free to offer his services
to other companies engaged in similar or related marketing activities as
evidenced by the certifications issued by various customers.

Thus, the appeal filed by the petitioner regarding the undue labor practices
illegal dismissal with money claims against respondent company and its president is
DISMISSED.
JO v. NLRC
[G.R. No. 121605. February 2, 2000]

FACTS:

The private respondent, Peter Mejila, was working as a barber on piece-rate

basis was designated by Paz Martin Jo and Cesar Jo, herein petitioners, as caretaker
of their barbershop. In addition to his being a barber, his duties as caretaker were to
report to the owners of the barbershop whenever the aircondition units malfunction
and/or whenever water or electric power supply was interrupted; to call the laundry
woman to wash dirty linen; to recommend applicants for interview and hiring; and to
attend to other needs of the shop. For this additional job, he was given an honorarium
equivalent to1/3 of the net income of the shop.

Private respondent had a misunderstanding with his co-worker. Meanwhile,

private respondent continued reporting for work at the barbershop. But, on January
2, 1993, he turned over the duplicate keys of the shop to the cashier and took away
all his belongings therefrom. On January 8, 1993, he began working as a regular
barber at the newly opened Goldilocks Barbershop also in Iligan City. Subsequently,
the respondent demanded separation pay and other monetary benefits.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint, but ordered petitioners to pay
private respondent his 13th month pay and attorneys fees. On appeal before the
NLRC, the existence of employer-employee relationship was affirmed the petitioners
were ordered to reinstate private respondent and pay the latters backwages, 13th
month pay, separation pay and attorneys fees .

ISSUES:

Whether or not there exist an employer-employee relationship.

Whether or not private respondent was dismissed from or had abandoned his
employment.

RULING:

In the first issue, the Supreme Court found that there is no cogent reason to
disturb the findings of the NLRC that employer-employee exists in this case.
determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the following
elements are considered: 1) selection and engagement of worker; 2) power of
dismissal; 3) the payment of wages; and 4) the power to control the worker’s
conduct, with the latter assuming primacy in the overall consideration. The power of
control refers to the existence of the power and not necessarily to the actual exercise
thereof.
 While on the second issue, the Supreme Court held that to constitute
abandonment, there must be concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt
acts from which it may be inferred that the employee concerned has no more interest
in working. In other words, there must be a clear, deliberate and unjustified refusal
to resume employment and a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship on the part of the employee.

In the case at bar, the labor arbiter was convinced that private respondent was
not dismissed but left his work on his own volition because he could no longer bear
the incessant squabbles with his co-worker. Nevertheless, public respondent did not
give credence to petitioners claim that private respondent abandoned his job.
Moreover, there were circumstances which clearly manifest private respondent’s
intention to sever his ties with petitioners.

Thus, the decision of the NLRC shall be revered and set aside.
FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE v. IAC
G.R. No. 75112 August 17, 1992

FACTS:
Daniel Funtecha was a working student at petitioner Filamer Christian Institute.
He was assigned as the school janitor to clean the school 2 hours every morning. Allan
Masa was the son of the school president and at the same time he was the school’s
jeepney service driver. On October 20, 1977 at about 6:30pm, after driving the
students to their homes, Masa returned to the school to report and thereafter have to
go home with the jeep so that he could fetch the students early in the morning. Masa
and Funtecha live in the same place so they usually go home together. Funtecha had a
student driver’s license so Masa let him take the driver’s seat. While Funtecha was
driving, he accidentally hit an elderly Kapunan, herein plaintiff, which led to his
hospitalization for 20 days. The plaintiff filed a criminal case and an independent civil
action based on Article 2180 against Funtecha.
In the independent civil action, the lower court ruled that Filamer is
subsidiarily liable for the tortious act of Funcheta and was compelled to pay for
damages based on Article 2180 which provides that employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks. Filamer assailed the decision and it argued that under Section
14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR, working scholars are excluded from the
employment coverage hence there is no employer-employee relations between
Filamer and Funcheta; that the negligent act of Funcheta was due to negligence only
attributable to him alone as it is outside his assigned task of being the school janitor.
The CA denied Filamer’s appeal but the Supreme Court agreed with Filamer.
Subsequently, plaintiff filed for a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Filamer should be held subsidiarily liable.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held in favor of the heirs of the plaintiff. The provisions of
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR was only meant to provide
guidelines as compliance with labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods,
and wages is concerned. This does not in any way affect the provisions of any other
laws like the civil code. Moreover, the IRR cannot defeat the provisions of the Civil
Code.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of
employment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a
claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a
person, against both doer-employee and his employer.
Funtecha is an employee of Filamer. He need not have an official appointment
for a driver’s position in order that Filamer may be held responsible for his grossly
negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident
was for the benefit of Filamer. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school
driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve
Filamer of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was
negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the
supervision over him. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to prove that it had
imposed sanctions or warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by persons
other than the driver. Filamer has failed to show proof of its having exercised the
required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.
Wherefore, the decision of the respondent appellate court affirming the trial
court decision is reinstated.
JARDIN v. NLRC
GR NO. 119268 FEBRUARY 23, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioners Angel Jardin, Demetrio Calagos, Urbano Marcos, Rosendo Marcos,
Luis De Los Aangeles, Joel Ordeniza and Amado Centeno were the drivers of a taxi
owned by respondent Philjama International Inc, now Goodman Taxi, under the
boundary system. Petitioners decided to form a labor union to protect their rights and
interests against illegal deduction of private respondent for the washing of taxi units.
Upon the knowledge of the private respondent about the plan of the petitioners, He
refused to let them drive the taxi when they reported to work. The petitioners
brought the complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal and illegal deduction
of washing fees before the court against private respondent. However, the labor
arbiter dismissed said complaint for lack of merit.
On appeal, the NLRC, in a decision dated April 28, 1994, reversed and set aside
the judgment of the labor arbiter and ruled in favor of the petitioners.
Accordingly, the Resolution of August 10, 1994, and the Decision of April 28,
1994 are hereby set aside. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter subject of the appeal is
likewise set aside and a new one entered dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.

ISSUES:
Whether or not employer-employee relationship exists.
Whether or not the employers are liable for unfair labor practice, illegal
dismissal and illegal deduction of washing fees.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ordered the private respondent to reinstate petitioners to
their positions held at the time of the complained dismissal. Private respondent is
likewise ordered to pay petitioners their full backwages, to be computed from the
date of dismissal until their actual reinstatement. However, the order of public
respondent that petitioners be reimbursed the amount paid as washing charges is
deleted.
In the first issue, the four-fold test must apply in determining the employer-
employee relationship, these are: 1) the selection and engagement of the employee;
2) the payment of wages; 3) the power of dismissal; and 4) the employer's power to
control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to
be accomplished. Hence, petitioners are undoubtedly employees of private
respondent because as taxi drivers they perform activities which are usually necessary
or desirable in the usual business or trade of their employer. The fact that the drivers
do not receive fixed wages but get only that in excess of the so-called "boundary" they
pay to the owner/operator is not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between
them from that of employer and employee. We have applied by analogy the
abovestated doctrine to the relationships between bus owner/operator and bus
conductor, and auto-calesa owner/operator and driver,
Moreover, under the law, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work
shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from
him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Lastly, with regard to the amount
deducted daily by private respondent from petitioners for washing of the taxi units,
we view the same as not illegal in the context of the law. We note that after a tour of
duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has driven to the same
clean condition when he took it out. Car washing after a tour of duty is indeed a
practice in the taxi industry and is in fact dictated by fair play. Hence, the drivers are
not entitled to reimbursement of washing charges.
Wherefore, the assailed decision of public respondent dated October 28, 1994,
is hereby set aside. The decision of public respondent dated April 28, 1994, and its
resolution dated December 13, 1994, are hereby reinstated but was modified.
Villavilla v. CA
G.R. No. 79664, August 11, 1992

FACTS:
Arturo Villavilla, son of petitioners, was employed as "tripulante" of the fishing
boat "F/B Saint Theresa" from 1974 until September 11, 1977, when the boat sank off
Isla Binatikan, Taytay, Palawan. Arturo was not among the known survivors of that
sinking and had been missing since then.
On November 20, 1979, petitioners Andres Villavilla and Ester Gadiente
Villavilla, parents of Arturo, filed a petition with the Social Security Commission
against Reynaldo Mercado and Marcelino Cosuco, owners of the ill-fated fishing boat,
for death compensation benefits of Arturo whom respondents Marcelino Cosuco and
Reynaldo Mercado, the former being the owner F/B Saint Theresa and the latter being
the operator of said vessel, failed to register as their employee.
The Social Security System (SSS) filed a petition to intervene and contended
that respondents should be held liable in damages equivalent to the benefits due the
petitioners for failure to report Arturo for coverage pursuant to Sec. 24 (a) of the
Social Security Act, as amended.
The Social Security Commission issued an Order dismissing the petition for lack
of cause of action. On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals in its decision of April 10,
1987, affirmed the questioned Order of respondent Commission there being no
reversible error.

ISSUES:
Whether or not there was an employer-employee relationship between
petitioners' deceased son, Arturo Villavilla, and herein private respondents.
Whether or not private respondents are liable for the death compensation
benefits of Arturo Villavilla.
Whether there was a violation of the Social Security Act, as amended, by
private respondents for not registering Arturo Villavilla with the System as their
employee as mandated by law.

RULING:
The Supreme Court held that there is no reversible error in the questioned
judgment of the appellate court, thus the same is affirmed.
In this case, the Court held that records disclose that the relationship between
Mercado and the crew members of the ship headed by its skipper, Capt. Pedro
Matibag, is one positively showing the existence of a joint venture. The crew
members did not receive fixed compensation as they only shared in their catch, they
ventured to the sea irrespective of the instructions of the boat owners. Moreover,
there was neither right of control nor actual exercise of such right on the part of the
boat owner over his crew members. Hence, no employer-employee relationship
existed between petioners’ son and respondents.
As such, Arturo could not be made subject of compulsory coverage under the
Social Security Act. Hence, private respondents cannot be said to have violated said
law when they did not register him with the Social Security System. A fortiori,
respondent as well as intervenor are not answerable to petitioners for any death
benefits under the law.
CHARLIE JAO, Petitioner, v. BCC PRODUCTS SALES INC.
G.R. No. 163700: April 18, 2012

FACTS:
Charlie Jao, herein petitioner, maintained that respondent BCC Product Sales
Inc. (BCC) and its President, respondent Terrance Ty (Ty), employed him as
comptroller starting from September 1995, to handle the financial aspect of BCCs
business. On October 19, 1995, the security guards of BCC, acting upon the instruction
of Ty, barred him from entering the premises of BCC where he then worked.
Petitioner attempted to report to work on different occasions but the same
were frustrated because he continued to be barred from entering the premises of
BCC. Hence, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, reinstatement with full
backwages, non-payment of wages, damages and attorneys fees.
Respondents countered that petitioner was not their employee but the
employee of Sobien Food Corporation (SFC), the major creditor and supplier of BCC,
and that SFC had posted him as its comptroller in BCC to oversee BCCs finances and
business operations and to look after SFCs interests or investments in BCC.
The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of employer employee
relationship. NLRC reversed the labor arbiter’s decision. On appeal, the CA held that
there was no employer- employee relationship existed between petitioner BCC and
the private respondent. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is an employer- employee relationship.

RULING:

The Supreme Court deemed it proper to affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals. In determining the presence or absence of an employer-employee
relationship, the Court has consistently looked for the following incidents, to wit: (a)
the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the
power of dismissal; and (d) the employers power to control the employee on the
means and methods by which the work is accomplished. The last element, the so-
called control test, is the most important element.
Hereunder are some of the circumstances and incidents occurring while
petitioner was supposedly employed by BCC that debunked his claim against
respondents:
It can be deduced from the March 1996 affidavit of petitioner that respondents
challenged his authority to deliver some 158 checks to SFC. Considering that he
contested respondents challenge by pointing to the existing arrangements between
BCC and SFC, it should be clear that respondents did not exercise the power of
control over him, because he thereby acted for the benefit and in the interest of SFC
more than of BCC.
In addition, petitioner presented no document setting forth the terms of his
employment by BCC. The failure to present such agreement on terms of employment
may be understandable and expected if he was a common or ordinary laborer who
would not jeopardize his employment by demanding such document from the
employer, but may not square well with his actual status as a highly educated
professional.
Petitioners admission that he did not receive his salary for the three months of
his employment by BCC, as his complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of
wages and the criminal case for estafa he later filed against the respondents for non-
payment of wages indicated, further raised grave doubts about his assertion of
employment by BCC. Moreover, his name did not appear in the payroll of BCC despite
him having approved the payroll as comptroller.
Lastly, the confusion about the date of his alleged illegal dismissal provides
another indicium of the insincerity of petitioner’s assertion of employment by BCC. In
the petition for review on certiorari, he averred that he had been barred from
entering the premises of BCC on October 19, 1995, and thus was illegally dismissed.
Yet, his complaint for illegal dismissal stated that he had been illegally dismissed on
December 12, 1995 when respondents security guards barred him from entering the
premises of BCC, causing him to bring his complaint only on December 29, 1995, and
after BCC had already filed the criminal complaint against him. The wide gap
between October 19, 1995 and December 12, 1995 cannot be dismissed as a trivial
inconsistency considering that the several incidents affecting the veracity of his
assertion of employment by BCC earlier noted herein transpired in that interval.
Wherefore, the Supreme Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.