CUSTODIAL RIGHTS

G.R. No. L-51858 January 31, 1985

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RICARDO CABRERA and LORETO SIPE, accused. RICARDO CABRERA, accused whose death sentence is under review.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Before us for automatic review is the Decision of the then Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch II, at Koronadal (in Criminal Case
No. 537), finding Ricardo Cabrera (the APPELLANT, for brevity) guilty of Murder with Assault upon an Agent of a Person in Authority and
imposing upon him the penalty of capital punishment. His co-accused, Loreto SIPE, was found guilty of Direct Assault upon an Agent of a
Person in Authority and was sentenced to "the penalty of PRISION CORRECCIONAL in its medium or 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years
and 2 months period (sic);" but after crediting him with the period of his preventive imprisonment, he was ordered released by the Trial
Court.

The facts upon which conviction rested disclose that in the evening of September 16, 1972, Patrolmen Victor Poral and Felix Fellores (the
latter hereinafter referred to as the VICTIM, for short) were assigned to keep peace and order at a dance party in Barrio Guinsangan, Norala,
South Cotabato.

At around 11:00 o'clock that evening, an unidentified man approached them reporting that he was being chased by somebody armed with a
gun. Hiding to the place, they saw accused SIPE holding a .20 gauge "paltik." They each fired a warning shot in the air and ordered SIPE to
drop his firearm. SIPE refused. Instead, he sought cover in a nearby canal and fired at the VICTIM, who was hit in his right thigh. The VICTIM
fired back hitting SIPE on his left thigh near the buttocks. While the VICTIM was loading his riffle for the next shot, APPELLANT, armed with
a bladed weapon called pinuti" (Exhibit "B") rushed from behind and knifed him on the right side of his body killing him on the spot.
APPELLANT then scampered away. The foregoing, in substance, was the testimony of Patrolman Poral who added that he was unable to fire
at the fleeing APPELLANT as his pistol jammend.

The autopsy findings disclosed a stab wound "over the lateral aspect of the right chest" of the VICTIM, and a bullet wound on the right thigh.
Death was attributed to severe hemorrhage secondary to the stab wound.

At about 2:00 o'clock in the morning of September 17, 1972, APPELLANT was arrested by the Chief of Police in the house of Gerardo Maroma
where APPELLANT was staying, located about a kilometer away from the site of the incident. The bladed weapon used, still stained with
blood, was allegedly found inside said house.
In separate sworn statements given by APPELLANT at the police headquarters on September 19, 1972 1 and before Municipal Judge
Amandito Araneta on September 21, 1972, 2 he confessed to having stabbed the VICTIM.

During the trial, however, APPELLANT repudiated his statements alleging that they were obtained by force and that he admitted his guilt
because of the maltreatment to which he was subjected.

As his alibi, APPELLANT maintained that in the evening in question, he attended the dance in the barrio with Hector Azucena, Eugenio Valle
and two ladies. Hector Azucena also stayed in the house of Gerardo Maroma for the harvest season. After the dance, at about 11:00 P.M., he
and Hector went home together and when they were already nearing the house, they heard gunshots. They paid no heed and just went to
sleep. At dawn, policemen arrived, manhandled the owner, Gerardo Maroma, and thereafter brought APPELLANT down the house and took
him to the municipal building, together with Maroma and Valle. APPELLANT denied that he was found hiding in the ceiling and that a
bloodied knife was found on his person as the Chief of Police had testified. When queried why he killed a policeman, APPELLANT replied that
he knew nothing of what they were asking him. At the police headquarters, however, they forced him to sign a confession threatening to kill
him if he refused.

The Trial Court discredited the defense version and as aforestated, meted out conviction for both accused.

In this appeal, APPELLANT faults the Trial Court with the following errors: in holding that he had executed his extrajudicial confession
voluntarily; in concluding that he had been positively Identified by Patrolman Poral; in failing to appreciate the testimony of Benjamin Maca
who pointed to Andresito Sipe as the real culprit; in not giving weight and credence to his defense of alibi; and in not acquitting him.

A review of the evidence discloses overriding considerations, which engender reasonable doubt regarding APPELLANT's culpability.

To prove maltreatment, Dr. Arturo P. Pingoy, before whom APPELLANT was brought on September 30, 1972 for examination and treatment
of the injuries that he had suffered, testified that he found APPELLANT "weak and frustrated" with "a generalized kind of wounds appearing
from the head to the lower extremities," 3 some of which had healed, others were healing 4 while others were infected. The medical
certificate that he had issued (Exhibit "4") particularized the injuries as follows:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that Mr. Ricardo Cabrera, a 28 years old male, single, had consulted and been given treatment in this hospital
this day 30th of September — 1972, because of generalized body weakness and pain, and multiple infected injuries an over the
body. The following are the approximate injuries noted:

Head — infected incised wound (R) parieto occipital region 2 cm. long, ¼ cm. deep. Healed incised wound posterior aspect of
(1) pinna 3 cm. no. 2. Near healing incised wound posterior to (L) mastoid 3 cm.

Face — punctured wound (L) side of the bridge of the nose, ¼ cm. in diameter,
 Left Upper Extremities — Abrasions: elbow joint posterior aspect 1/3 x ½ cm. no. 5; forearm lateral aspect 2 cm. no. 2; volar
middle finder 3 cm.

Punctured wounds — elbow joint posterior aspect with pus, 1 cm. diameter. Incised wounds-wrist, medial aspect 4 cm. long,
1/3 cm. deep.

Right Upper Extremities — Abrasions; linear, wrist joint posterior aspect 1 ½ cm.

Incised wound — arm anterior aspect 3 cm. long, ¼ cm. deep.

Left Lower Extremities — Incised wound — thigh lateral aspect, horizontal 11 cm. long, ¼ cm. deep, crossed by vertical wound
14 cm. long, and ¼ cm. deep.

Anterior aspect, upper 1/3 of leg, 1 ½ cm. Anterior aspect, lower ½ of leg, 1 cm.

Right Lower Extremities — Linear abrasion with hematoma — anterior aspect of the leg, 1/3 to 1 cm. no. 7.

(SGD.) DR. ARTURO P. PINGOY (Exhibit "4")

The question then arises as to whether the injuries described were inflicted before or after APPELLANT's confessions were taken. The
prosecution would have us believe that it was after and that the injuries had no bearing to those confessions. 5 However, no proof has been
submitted to substantiate the same. We are also faced with the following considerations. The crime was committed on September 16, 1972.
APPELLANT was arrested on September 17, 1972. He executed his confessions on September 19 and 21, 1972, respectively, and he
continued to be under police custody from the time of his arrest until September 30, 1972, the date that he was examined by Dr. Pingoy.
Obviously, the maltreatment occurred within that period and the only purpose would have been to force APPELLANT to admit guilt against
his will. The objective having been achieved, there would have been no reason for further maltreatment thereafter. Moreover, as
APPELLANT had declared, when his statement was taken by the Municipal Judge, he (APPELLANT) complained about the maltreatment he
received at the hands of the police; that the Judge noted his injuries as he was merely in shorts and shirt, and that the Judge even inquired
why he had many wounds but that when he gave the reason, the Judge merely stated that the police were "bad." 6

True, the Chief of Police and the Municipal Judge, each in his turn, testified that APPELLANT was in good physical shape when the latter gave
his statements before them. However, their testimonies cannot prevail over the physical evidence as shown by the medical findings. During
the trial, APPELLANT also exhibited to the Trial Court the scars from the injuries that he had received.

APPELLANT's confessions having been extracted by force and violence, they stand discredited in the eyes of the law and cannot be
the basis for sustaining a judgment of conviction. Such a verdict would now rest largely on Patrolman Poral's Identification of
APPELLANT, which, however, we do not find as indubitable. Said police officer maintained that he witnessed the stabbing of the VICTIM by
APPELLANT. Notwithstanding, in addition to APPELLANT, the police arrested seven (7) other people, three of whom were subjected to
investigation, and according to them, they were also subjected to maltreatment. It is likewise strange that Patrolman Poral was not even
listed as one of the witnesses for the prosecution in the criminal complaint filed before the Municipal Court on September 19, 1972. 7 Surely,
in three days' time, he could have informed the Chief of Police that he was an eyewitness. It was only on October 16, 1972, at the preliminary
investigation before the Fiscal, or one month after the crime had been committed that he gave his version of the incident. 8

Furthermore, one Benjamin Maca, who had also attended the dance that evening and who was apparently also in the scene of the crime,
graphically described how the VICTIM was attacked. He testified that when the VICTIM was firing his gun at accused Loreto SIPE, Andresito
Sipe approached from behind, went under the VICTIM's right arm and stabbed him as a result of which the latter went limp. 9 He was certain
that it was Andresito Sipe and not APPELLANT who had stabbed the VICTIM, but explained that since they both had the same height and
build, Patrolman Poral must have mistaken one for the other, since the latter was not personally acquainted with APPELLANT. The fact that
Benjamin admitted not having informed the police of what he saw that same evening of the incident would not detract from his testimony
for, as he had explained, the next day the police had made arrests and he was confident that the "truth will come out."

Indeed, no motive has been attributed to APPELLANT for stabbing the VICTIM, whereas, it was but natural that Andresito Sipe would go to
the aid of accused SIPE, who was his brother, and at whom the VICTIM was aiming his firearm at the time the latter was stabbed.

With the foregoing considerations taken into account, we have failed to arrive at that moral certainty sufficient to convict.

At this juncture, we reiterate the reminder to Judges and Fiscals before whom declarants are brought for swearing to the truth of their
statements to adopt the practice of having the confessants physically and thoroughly examined by independent and qualified doctors before
administering the oath, even if it is not requested by the accused. If physicians are not available then they should themselves examine the
bodies of the declarants for signs of possible violence. This would not only deter attempts to secure confessions through violence but would
also preclude future controversies on whether the statements were obtained through torture or not, which only delay criminal trials. 10Then
Municipal Judge Amandito Araneta was not only wanting in the observance of the prescribed practice but was also indifferent to
APPELLANT's plight and should be, as he is hereby, censured.

WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the appealed judgment is hereby REVERSED, and appellant Ricardo Cabrera is hereby acquitted. Costs de
oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-51770 March 20, 1985

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO GALIT, defendant-appellant.
CONCEPCION, JR., J:

1. The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery. He had been detained and interrogated almost continuously for five days, to
no avail. He consistently maintained his innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously, something drastic had to be done. A
confession was absolutely necessary. So the investigating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on his
innocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must be obtained. So they continued to maltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face with a rag and
pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner could not take any more. His body could no longer endure the pain inflicted on him and
the indignities he had to suffer. His will had been broken. He admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the confession
they prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a reenactment.

2. This incident could have happened in a Russian gulag or in Hitler's Germany. But no it did not. It happened in the Philippines. In this case before Us.

3. The Revised Penal Code punishes the maltreatment of prisoners as follows:

ART. 235. Maltreatment of prisoners. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, in
addition to his liability for the physical injuries or damage caused, shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall over do
himself in the correction or handling of a prisoner or detention prisoner under his charge, by the imposition of punishments in a cruel and
humiliating manner.

If the purpose of the maltreatment is to extort a confession, or to obtain some information from the prisoner, the offender shall be punished
by prision correccional in its minimum period, temporary special disqualification and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, in addition to his
liability for the physical injuries or damage caused.

4. This Court in a long line of decisions over the years, the latest being the case of People vs. Cabrera, 1 has consistently and strongly condemned the
practice of maltreating prisoners to extort confessions from them as a grave and unforgivable violation of human rights. But the practice persists.
Fortunately, such instances constitute the exception rather than the general rule.

5. Before Us for mandatory review is the death sentence imposed upon the accused Francisco Galit by the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, in Crim.
Case No. CCC-VII-2589 of said court.

6. The record shows that in the morning of August 23, 1977, Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a widow, was found dead in the bedroom of her house located at
Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, as a result of seven (7) wounds inflicted upon different parts of her body by a blunt instrument. 2 More than two weeks
thereafter, police authorities of Montalban picked up the herein accused, Francisco Galit, an ordinary construction worker (pion) living in Marikina, Rizal, on
suspicion of the murder. On the following day, however, September 8, 1977, the case was referred to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further
investigation in view of the alleged limited facilities of the Montalban police station. Accordingly, the herein accused was brought to the NBI where he was
investigated by a team headed by NBI Agent Carlos Flores. 3 NBI Agent Flores conducted a preliminary interview of the suspect who allegedly gave
evasive answers to his questions. 4 But the following day, September 9, 1977, Francisco Galit voluntarily executed a Salaysay admitting participation in the
commission of the crime. He implicated Juling Dulay and Pabling Dulay as his companions in the crime. 5 As a result, he was charged with the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, in an information filed before the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, committed as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of August 1977 in the municipality of Montalban, province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with Juling Doe and Pabling Doe, whose true
Identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and three of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent of gain and by
 means of force, intimidation and violence upon the person of one Natividad Fernando while in her dwelling, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously take, steal and carry away from the person of said Natividad Fernando, cash money of an undetermined
amount, belonging to said Natividad Fernando, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the latter in an undetermined amount; that by
reason or on the occasion of said robbery, and for purpose of enabling them (accused) to take, steal and carry away the said cash money
in pursuance of their conspiracy and for the purpose of insuring the success of their criminal act, with intent to kill, did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a dagger said Natividad Fernando on the different parts of her body,
thereby inflicting multiple injuries on the head and extremities, which directly caused her death, and the total amount of the loss is
P10,000.00 including valuables and cash.

Trial was held, and on August 11, 1978, immediately after the accused had terminated the presentation of his evidence, the trial judge dictated his decision
on the case in open court, finding the accused guilty as charged and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
sum of P110,000.00, and to pay the costs. Hence, the present recourse.

7. The incriminatory facts of the case, as found by the trial court, are as follows:

From the evidence adduced in this case, it was gathered that in the early morning of August 23, 1977, a 70-year old woman named
Natividad Fernando, widow, in the twilight of her life, was robbed and then hacked to death by the accused and two others in her (victim's)
own residence at Montalban, Rizal.

Prosecution witness Florentino Valentino testified that he heard accused Francisco Galit and his wife having an argument in connection
with the robbery and killing of the victim, Natividad Fernando. It appears that on August 18, 1977, accused Galit and two others, namely,
Juling Dulay and a certain "Pabling" accidentally met each other at Marikina, Rizal, and in their conversation, the three agreed to rob
Natividad Fernando; that it was further agreed among them to enter the premises of the victim's house at the back yard by climbing over
the fence; that once inside the premises, they will search every room, especially the aparador and filing cabinets, with the sole aim of
looking for cash money and other valuables.

Witness Valentino further testified that on August 22, 1977, at around 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon, accused Francisco Galit and his two
companions, Juling Dulay and Pabling, as per their previous agreement, met at the place where they formerly saw each other in Mariquina,
Rizal; that the three conspirators took a jeepney for Montalban and upon passing the Montalban Municipal Building, they stopped and they
waited at the side of the road until the hour of midnight; that at about 12:00 o'clock that night, the three repaired to the premises of the
victim, Natividad Fernando; that they entered the said premises through the back wall of the house; that while entering the premises of said
house, Juling Dulay saw a bolo, lying near the piggery compound, which he picked up and used it to destroy the back portion of the wall of
the house; that it was Juling Dulay who first entered the house through the hole that they made, followed by the accused Galit and next to
him was "Pabling", that it was already early dawn of August 23, 1977 when the three were able to gain entrance into the house of the
victim; as the three could not find anything valuable inside the first room that they entered, Juling Dulay destroyed the screen of the door of
the victim, Natividad Fernando; that upon entering the room of the victim, the three accused decided to kill first the victim, Natividad
Fernando, before searching the room for valuables; that Juling Dulay, who was then holding the bolo, began hacking the victim, who was
then sleeping, and accused Galit heard a moaning sound from the victim; that after the victim was killed, the three accused began
searching the room for valuables; that they helped each other in opening the iron cabinet inside the room of the victim, where they found
some money; that when the three accused left the room of the victim, they brought with them some papers and pictures which they threw
outside; that after killing and robbing the victim, the three accused went out of the premises of the house, using the same way by which
they gained entrance, which was through the back portion of the wall; that the three accused walked towards the river bank where they
 divided the loot that they got from the room of the victim; that their respective shares amount to P70.00 for each of them; and that after
receiving their shares of the loot, the three accused left and went home.

When witness Florentino Valentino was in his room, which was adjoining that of accused Francisco Galit, he overheard accused Galit and
his wife quarreling about the intention of accused Galit to leave their residence immediately; that he further stated that he overheard
accused Galit saying that he and his other two companions robbed and killed Natividad Fernando.

As a result of the killing, the victim, Natividad Fernando, suffered no less than seven stab wounds. There was massive cerebral
hemorrhage and the cause of death was due to shock and hemorrhage, as evidenced by the Medico-Legal Necropsy Report (Exhs. 'C' and
'C-2'), and the pictures taken of the deceased victim (Exhs. 'E', 'E-1' and 'E-2').

8. The accused, upon the other hand, denied participation in the commission of the crime. He claimed that he was in his house in Marikina, Rizal, when the
crime was committed in Montalban, Rizal. He also assailed the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession extracted from him through torture, force and
intimidation as described earlier, and without the benefit of counsel.

9. After a review of the records, We find that the evidence presented by the prosecution does not support a conviction. In fact, the findings of the trial court
relative to the acts attributed to the accused are not supported by competent evidence. The principal prosecution witness, Florentino Valentino merely
testified that he and the accused were living together in one house in Marikina, Rizal, on August 23, 1977, because the mother of his wife is the wife of the
accused; that when he returned home at about 4:00 o'clock in the morning from the police station of Marikina, Rizal, the accused and his wife were
quarreling (nagtatalo); that he heard that the accused was leaving the house because he and his companions had robbed "Aling Nene", the owner of a
poultry farm and piggery in Montalban, Rizal; that the wife of the accused was imploring him not to leave, but the latter was insistent; that he saw the
accused carrying a bag containing about two handfuls (dakot) of coins which he had taken from Aling Nene; that upon learning of what the accused had
done, he went to the Montalban police the next day and reported to the police chief about what he had heard; and that a week later, Montalban policemen
went to their house and arrested the accused. 6

10. This Court, in the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 7 laid down the correct procedure for peace officers to follow when making an arrest and in
conducting a custodial investigation, and which We reiterate:

7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be
shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement
he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone
he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the
arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of
counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself
or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of
counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall
be inadmissible in evidence.

11. There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no state witnesses, and not even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the
crime. The only evidence against the accused is his alleged confession. It behooves Us therefore to give it a close scrutiny. The statement begins as
follows:
 I. TANONG: Ipinagbibigay-alam ko sa inyo ang inyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang-
Batas ng Pilipinas na kung inyong nanaisin ay maaaring hindi kayo magbigay ng isang
salaysay, na hindi rin kayo maaaring pilitin o saktan at pangakuan upang magbigay ng
naturang salaysay, na anuman ang inyong sasabihin sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring
laban sa inyo sa anumang usapin na maaaring ilahad sa anumang hukuman o tribunal dito
sa Pilipinas, na sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring katulungin mo ang isang manananggol at
kung sakaling hindi mo kayang bayaran ang isang manananggol ay maaaring bigyan ka ng
isa ng NBI. Ngayon at alam mo na ang mga ito nakahanda ka bang magbigay ng isang
kusang-loob na salaysay sa pagtatanong na ito?

SAGOT: Opo.

12. Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under
the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or
language known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the
time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that
he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit
him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed
reenactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights.

13. The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in a manner contrary
to law.

14. Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances surrounding the taking of any confession, especially where the prisoner claims having
been maltreated into giving one. Where there is any doubt as to its voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.

15. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Minister of Justice for whatever action he may deem proper to take against the investigating officers.

16. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, SET ASIDE, and another one entered ACQUITTING the accused Francisco
Galit of the crime charged. Let him be released from custody immediately unless held on other charges. With costs de oficio.

17. SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 71208-09 August 30, 1985

SATURNINA GALMAN AND REYNALDO GALMAN, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE MANUEL PAMARAN AND ASSOCIATE JUSTICES AUGUSTO AMORES AND BIENVENIDO VERA
CRUZ OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE HONORABLE BERNARDO FERNANDEZ, TANODBAYAN, GENERAL FABIAN C. VER, MAJOR
GENERAL PROSPERO OLIVAS, SGT. PABLO MARTINEZ, SGT. TOMAS FERNANDEZ, SGT. LEONARDO MOJICA SGT. PEPITO TORIO, SGT.
PROSPERO BONA AND AlC ANICETO ACUPIDO, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 71212-13 August 30, 1985

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the TANODBAYAN (OMBUDSMAN), petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, GENERAL FABIAN C. VER, MAJOR GEN. PROSPERO OLIVAS, SGT. PABLO MARTINEZ, SGT. TOMAS
FERNANDEZ, SGT. LEONARDO MOJICA, SGT. PEPITO TORIO, SGT. PROSPERO BONA AND AIC ANICETO ACUPIDO, respondents.

CUEVAS, JR., J.:

On August 21, 1983, a crime unparalleled in repercussions and ramifications was committed inside the premises of the Manila International
Airport (MIA) in Pasay City. Former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., an opposition stalwart who was returning to the country after a long-
sojourn abroad, was gunned down to death. The assassination rippled shock-waves throughout the entire country which reverberated
beyond the territorial confines of this Republic. The after-shocks stunned the nation even more as this ramified to all aspects of Philippine
political, economic and social life.

To determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all aspects of
the tragedy, 1 P.D. 1886 was promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board which later became more popularly known as the Agrava
Board. 2 Pursuant to the powers vested in it by P.D. 1886, the Board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses appeared and
testified and/or produced documentary and other evidence either in obedience to a subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the
Board Among the witnesses who appeared, testified and produced evidence before the Board were the herein private respondents General
Fabian C. Ver, Major General Prospero Olivas, 3 Sgt. Pablo Martinez, Sgt. Tomas Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo Mojica, Sgt. Pepito Torio, Sgt.
Prospero Bona and AIC Aniceto Acupido. 4

UPON termination of the investigation, two (2) reports were submitted to His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos. One, by its
Chairman, the Hon. Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava; and another one, jointly authored by the other members of the Board — namely: Hon.
Luciano Salazar, Hon. Amado Dizon, Hon. Dante Santos and Hon. Ernesto Herrera. 'the reports were thereafter referred and turned over to
the TANODBAYAN for appropriate action. After conducting the necessary preliminary investigation, the TANODBAYAN 5 filed with the
SANDIGANBAYAN two (2) Informations for MURDER-one for the killing of Sen. Benigno S. Aquino which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
10010 and another, criminal Case No. 10011, for the killing of Rolando Galman, who was found dead on the airport tarmac not far from the
prostrate body of Sen. Aquino on that same fateful day. In both criminal cases, private respondents were charged as accessories, along with
several principals, and one accomplice.

Upon arraignment, all the accused, including the herein private ate Respondents pleaded NOT GUILTY.

In the course of the joint trial of the two (2) aforementioned cases, the Prosecution represented by the Office of the petition TANODBAYAN,
marked and thereafter offered as part of its evidence, the individual testimonies of private respondents before the Agrava Board. 6 Private
respondents, through their respective counsel objected to the admission of said exhibits. Private respondent Gen. Ver filed a formal "Motion
to Exclude Testimonies of Gen. Fabian C. Ver before the Fact Finding Board as Evidence against him in the above-entitled
cases" 7 contending that its admission will be in derogation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination and violative of the
immunity granted by P.D. 1886. He prayed that his aforesaid testimony be rejected as evidence for the prosecution. Major Gen. Olivas and
the rest of the other private respondents likewise filed separate motions to exclude their respective individual testimonies invoking the
same ground. 8 Petitioner TANODBAYAN opposed said motions contending that the immunity relied upon by the private respondents in
support of their motions to exclude their respective testimonies, was not available to them because of their failure to invoke their right
against self-incrimination before the ad hoc Fact Finding Board. 9 Respondent SANDIGANBAYAN ordered the TANODBAYAN and the private
respondents to submit their respective memorandum on the issue after which said motions will be considered submitted for resolution. 10

On May 30, 1985, petitioner having no further witnesses to present and having been required to make its offer of evidence in writing,
respondent SANDIGANBAYAN, without the pending motions for exclusion being resolved, issued a Resolution directing that by agreement of
the parties, the pending motions for exclusion and the opposition thereto, together with the memorandum in support thereof, as well as the
legal issues and arguments, raised therein are to be considered jointly in the Court's Resolution on the prosecution's formal offer of exhibits
and other documentary evidences.11 On June 3, 1985, the prosecution made a written "Formal Offer of Evidence" which includes, among
others, the testimonies of private respondents and other evidences produced by them before the Board, all of which have been previously
marked in the course of the trial.12

All the private respondents objected to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence on the same ground relied upon by them in their
respective motion for exclusion.

On June 13, 1985, respondent SANDIGANBAYAN issued a Resolution, now assailed in these two (2) petitions, admitting all the evidences
offered by the prosecution except the testimonies and/or other evidence produced by the private respondents in view of the immunity
granted by P.D. 1886. 13

Petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the said Resolution having been DENIED, they now come before Us by way of
certiorari 14 praying for the amendment and/or setting aside of the challenged Resolution on the ground that it was issued without
jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Private prosecutor below, as counsel for the mother of
deceased Rolando Galman, also filed a separate petition for certiorari 15 on the same ground. Having arisen from the same factual beginnings
and raising practically Identical issues, the two (2) petitioners were consolidated and will therefore be jointly dealt with and resolved in this
Decision.

The crux of the instant controversy is the admissibility in evidence of the testimonies given by the eight (8) private respondents who did not
invoke their rights against self-incrimination before the Agrava Board.

It is the submission of the prosecution, now represented by the petitioner TANODBAYAN, that said testimonies are admissible against the
private respondents, respectively, because of the latter's failure to invoke before the Agrava Board the immunity granted by P.D. 1886. Since
private respondents did not invoke said privilege, the immunity did not attach. Petitioners went further by contending that such failure to
claim said constitutional privilege amounts to a waiver thereof. 16 The private respondents, on the other hand, claim that notwithstanding
failure to set up the privilege against self- incrimination before the Agrava Board, said evidences cannot be used against them as mandated
by Section 5 of the said P.D. 1886. They contend that without the immunity provided for by the second clause of Section 5, P.D. 1886, the
legal compulsion imposed by the first clause of the same Section would suffer from constitutional infirmity for being violative of the witness'
right against self- incrimination. 17 Thus, the protagonists are locked in horns on the effect and legal significance of failure to set up the
privilege against self-incrimination.

The question presented before Us is a novel one. Heretofore, this Court has not been previously called upon to rule on issues involving
immunity statutes. The relative novelty of the question coupled with the extraordinary circumstance that had precipitated the same did
nothing to ease the burden of laying down the criteria upon which this Court will henceforth build future jurisprudence on a heretofore
unexplored area of judicial inquiry. In carrying out this monumental task, however, We shall be guided, as always, by the constitution and
existing laws.

The Agrava Board, 18 came into existence in response to a popular public clamor that an impartial and independent body, instead of any
ordinary police agency, be charged with the task of conducting the investigation. The then early distortions and exaggerations, both in
foreign and local media, relative to the probable motive behind the assassination and the person or persons responsible for or involved in
the assassination hastened its creation and heavily contributed to its early formation. 19

Although referred to and designated as a mere Fact Finding Board, the Board is in truth and in fact, and to all legal intents and purposes, an
entity charged, not only with the function of determining the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing, but more importantly, the
determination of the person or persons criminally responsible therefor so that they may be brought before the bar of justice. For indeed,
what good will it be to the entire nation and the more than 50 million Filipinos to know the facts and circumstances of the killing if the
culprit or culprits will nevertheless not be dealt with criminally? This purpose is implicit from Section 12 of the said Presidential Decree, the
pertinent portion of which provides —

SECTION 12. The findings of the Board shall be made public. Should the findings warrant the prosecution of any person, the
Board may initiate the filing of proper complaint with the appropriate got government agency. ... (Emphasis supplied)

The investigation therefor is also geared, as any other similar investigation of its sort, to the ascertainment and/or determination of the
culprit or culprits, their consequent prosecution and ultimately, their conviction. And as safeguard, the P.D. guarantees "any person called to
testify before the Board the right to counsel at any stage of the proceedings." 20 Considering the foregoing environmental settings, it cannot
be denied that in the course of receiving evidence, persons summoned to testify will include not merely plain witnesses but also those
suspected as authors and co-participants in the tragic killing. And when suspects are summoned and called to testify and/or produce
evidence, the situation is one where the person testifying or producing evidence is undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense
and not merely in order to shed light on the facts and surrounding circumstances of the assassination, but more importantly, to determine
the character and extent of his participation therein.

Among this class of witnesses were the herein private respondents, suspects in the said assassination, all of whom except Generals Ver and
Olivas, were detained (under technical arrest) at the time they were summoned and gave their testimonies before the Agrava Board. This
notwithstanding, Presidential Decree No. 1886 denied them the right to remain silent. They were compelled to testify or be witnesses
against themselves. Section 5 of P.D. 1886 leave them no choice. They have to take the witness stand, testify or produce evidence, under pain
of contempt if they failed or refused to do so. 21 The jeopardy of being placed behind prison bars even before conviction dangled before their
very eyes. Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to be a witness against themselves, both of which are sacrosantly enshrined and
protected by our fundamental law. 21-a Both these constitutional rights (to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against
himself) were right away totally foreclosed by P.D. 1886. And yet when they so testified and produced evidence as ordered, they were not
immune from prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them.

Of course, it may be argued is not the right to remain silent available only to a person undergoing custodial interrogation? We find no
categorical statement in the constitutional provision on the matter which reads:

... Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. ... 22 (Emphasis supplied)

Since the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, we now have a mass of jurisprudence 23 on this specific portion of the subject provision. In all
these cases, it has been categorically declared that a person detained for the commission of an offense undergoing investigation has a right to
be informed of his right to remain silent, to counsel, and to an admonition that any and all statements to be given by him may be used against
him. Significantly however, there has been no pronouncement in any of these cases nor in any other that a person similarly undergoing
investigation for the commission of an offense, if not detained, is not entitled to the constitutional admonition mandated by said Section 20,
Art. IV of the Bill of Rights.

The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the term "custodial" by having it inserted between the words "under" and
investigation", as in fact the sentence opens with the phrase "any person " goes to prove that they did not adopt in toto the entire fabric of
the Miranda doctrine. 24 Neither are we impressed by petitioners' contention that the use of the word "confession" in the last sentence of
said Section 20, Article 4 connotes the Idea that it applies only to police investigation, for although the word "confession" is used, the
protection covers not only "confessions" but also "admissions" made in violation of this section. They are inadmissible against the source of
the confession or admission and against third person. 25

It is true a person in custody undergoing investigation labors under a more formidable ordeal and graver trying conditions than one who is
at liberty while being investigated. But the common denominator in both which is sought to be avoided is the evil of extorting from the very
mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter
convict him. This is the lamentable situation we have at hand.

All the private respondents, except Generals Ver and Olivas, are members of the military contingent that escorted Sen. Aquino while
disembarking from the plane that brought him home to Manila on that fateful day. Being at the scene of the crime as such, they were among
the first line of suspects in the subject assassination. General Ver on the other hand, being the highest military authority of his co-petitioners
labored under the same suspicion and so with General Olivas, the first designated investigator of the tragedy, but whom others suspected,
felt and believed to have bungled the case. The papers, especially the foreign media, and rumors from uglywagging tongues, all point to them
as having, in one way or another participated or have something to do, in the alleged conspiracy that brought about the assassination. Could
there still be any doubt then that their being asked to testify, was to determine whether they were really conspirators and if so, the extent of
their participation in the said conspiracy? It is too taxing upon one's credulity to believe that private respondents' being called to the witness
stand was merely to elicit from them facts and circumstances surrounding the tragedy, which was already so abundantly supplied by other
ordinary witnesses who had testified earlier. In fact, the records show that Generals Ver and Olivas were among the last witnesses called by
the Agrava Board. The subject matter dealt with and the line of questioning as shown by the transcript of their testimonies before the Agrava
Board, indubitably evinced purposes other than merely eliciting and determining the so-called surrounding facts and circumstances of the
assassination. In the light of the examination reflected by the record, it is not far-fetched to conclude that they were called to the stand to
determine their probable involvement in the crime being investigated. Yet they have not been informed or at the very least even warned
while so testifying, even at that particular stage of their testimonies, of their right to remain silent and that any statement given by them may
be used against them. If the investigation was conducted, say by the PC, NBI or by other police agency, all the herein private respondents
could not have been compelled to give any statement whether incriminatory or exculpatory. Not only that. They are also entitled to be
admonished of their constitutional right to remain silent, to counsel, and be informed that any and all statements given by them may be used
against them. Did they lose their aforesaid constitutional rights simply because the investigation was by the Agrava Board and not by any
police investigator, officer or agency? True, they continued testifying. May that be construed as a waiver of their rights to remain silent and
not to be compelled to be a witness against themselves? The answer is yes, if they have the option to do so. But in the light of the first portion
of Section 5 of P.D. 1886 and the awesome contempt power of the Board to punish any refusal to testify or produce evidence, We are not
persuaded that when they testified, they voluntarily waived their constitutional rights not to be compelled to be a witness against
themselves much less their right to remain silent.

Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional
statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his
capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion 'tending to force testimony from the
unwilling lips of the defendant. 26

Similarly, in the case of Louis J. Lefkowitz v. Russel 27 Turley" citing Garrity vs. New Jersey" where certain police officers summoned to an
inquiry being conducted by the Attorney General involving the fixing of traffic tickets were asked questions following a warning that if they
did not answer they would be removed from office and that anything they said might be used against them in any criminal proceeding, and
the questions were answered, the answers given cannot over their objection be later used in their prosecutions for conspiracy. The United
States Supreme Court went further in holding that:

the protection of the individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment against coerced statements prohibits use in subsequent
proceedings of statements obtained under threat or removal from office, and that it extends to all, whether they are policemen
or other members of the body politic. 385 US at 500, 17 L Ed. 562. The Court also held that in the context of threats of removal
from office the act of responding to interrogation was not voluntary and was not an effective waiver of the privilege against
self- incrimination.

To buttress their precarious stand and breathe life into a seemingly hopeless cause, petitioners and amicus curiae (Ex-Senator Ambrosio
Padilla) assert that the "right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself" applies only in favor of an accused in a criminal case.
Hence, it may not be invoked by any of the herein private respondents before the Agrava Board. The Cabal vs. Kapunan 28 doctrine militates
very heavily against this theory. Said case is not a criminal case as its title very clearly indicates. It is not People vs. Cabal nor a prosecution
for a criminal offense. And yet, when Cabal refused to take the stand, to be sworn and to testify upon being called as a witness for
complainant Col. Maristela in a forfeiture of illegally acquired assets, this Court sustained Cabal's plea that for him to be compelled to testify
will be in violation of his right against self- incrimination. We did not therein state that since he is not an accused and the case is not a
criminal case, Cabal cannot refuse to take the witness stand and testify, and that he can invoke his right against self-incrimination only when
a question which tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is profounded to him. Clearly then, it is not the character of the suit
involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by
law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not. 29 If in a mere forfeiture case where
only property rights were involved, "the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself" is secured in favor of the defendant, then
with more reason it cannot be denied to a person facing investigation before a Fact Finding Board where his life and liberty, by reason of the
statements to be given by him, hang on the balance. Further enlightenment on the subject can be found in the historical background of this
constitutional provision against self- incrimination. The privilege against self- incrimination is guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution. In the Philippines, the same principle obtains as a direct result of American influence. At first, the provision in our
organic laws were similar to the Constitution of the United States and was as follows:

That no person shall be ... compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself. 30

As now worded, Section 20 of Article IV reads:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no other import except to make said provision also applicable to cases other than
criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to testify against himself" applies to the herein private respondents notwithstanding
that the proceedings before the Agrava Board is not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case

No doubt, the private respondents were not merely denied the afore-discussed sacred constitutional rights, but also the right to "due
process" which is fundamental fairness. 31 Quoting the highly-respected eminent constitutionalist that once graced this Court, the former
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, due process —

... is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out
and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the
bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of
reasonableness. Correctly, it has been Identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair
play (Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, 1983, pp. 32-33). It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice and
judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect
(democratic) traditions of legal and political thought."(Frankfurter, Hannah v. Larche 1960, 363 US 20, at 487). It is not a
narrow or '"echnical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances."(Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy
1961, 367 US 1230) Decisions based on such a clause requiring a 'close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our
 society. (Bartkus vs. Illinois, 1959, 359 US 121). Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery
to form or phrases. (Pearson v. McGraw, 1939, 308 US 313).

Our review of the pleadings and their annexes, together with the oral arguments, manifestations and admissions of both counsel, failed to
reveal adherence to and compliance with due process. The manner in which the testimonies were taken from private respondents fall short
of the constitutional standards both under the DUE PROCESS CLAUSE and under the EXCLUSIONARY RULE in Section 20, Article IV. In the
face of such grave constitutional infirmities, the individual testimonies of private respondents cannot be admitted against them in ally
criminal proceeding. This is true regardless of absence of claim of constitutional privilege or of the presence of a grant of immunity by law.
Nevertheless, We shall rule on the effect of such absence of claim to the availability to private respondents of the immunity provided for in
Section 5, P.D. 1886 which issue was squarely raised and extensively discussed in the pleadings and oral arguments of the parties.

Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which grants "use immunity"; and the other, which grants what is known as
"transactional immunity." The distinction between the two is as follows: "Use immunity" prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and
its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. On the other hand, "transactional immunity" grants
immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates." 32 Examining Presidential Decree 1886,
more specifically Section 5 thereof, which reads:

SEC. 5. No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, records, correspondence,
documents, or other evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued by the Board on the ground that his testimony or the
evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture; but his testimony or any
evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in connection with any transaction, matter or thing concerning which
he is compelled, after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except that such
individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying, nor shall
he be exempt from demotion or removal from office. (Emphasis supplied)

it is beyond dispute that said law belongs to the first type of immunity statutes. It grants merely immunity from use of any statement given
before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or producing evidence do not
render the witness immuned from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the right against self- incrimination. He is merely saved
from the use against him of such statement and nothing more. Stated otherwise ... he still runs the risk of being prosecuted even if he sets up
his right against self- incrimination. The dictates of fair play, which is the hallmark of due process, demands that private respondents should
have been informed of their rights to remain silent and warned that any and all statements to be given by them may be used against them.
This, they were denied, under the pretense that they are not entitled to it and that the Board has no obligation to so inform them.

It is for this reason that we cannot subscribe to the view adopted and urged upon Us by the petitioners that the right against self-
incrimination must be invoked before the Board in order to prevent use of any given statement against the testifying witness in a subsequent
criminal prosecution. A literal interpretation fashioned upon Us is repugnant to Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution, which is the first
test of admissibility. It reads:
 No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or
any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall
be inadmissible in evidence. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision renders inadmissible any confession obtained in violation thereof. As herein earlier discussed, this exclusionary
rule applies not only to confessions but also to admissions, 33 whether made by a witness in any proceeding or by an accused in a criminal
proceeding or any person under investigation for the commission of an offense. Any interpretation of a statute which will give it a meaning
in conflict with the Constitution must be avoided. So much so that if two or more constructions or interpretations could possibly be resorted
to, then that one which will avoid unconstitutionality must be adopted even though it may be necessary for this purpose to disregard the
more usual and apparent import of the language used. 34 To save the statute from a declaration of unconstitutionality it must be given a
reasonable construction that will bring it within the fundamental law. 35Apparent conflict between two clauses should be harmonized. 36

But a literal application of a requirement of a claim of the privilege against self- incrimination as a condition sine qua non to the grant of
immunity presupposes that from a layman's point of view, he has the option to refuse to answer questions and therefore, to make such
claim. P.D. 1886, however, forecloses such option of refusal by imposing sanctions upon its exercise, thus:

SEC. 4. The Board may hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and impose appropriate penalties therefor. A person
guilty of .... including ... refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness or to subscribe to an affidavit or deposition when lawfully
required to do so may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt by the Board. ...

Such threat of punishment for making a claim of the privilege leaves the witness no choice but to answer and thereby forfeit the immunity
purportedly granted by Sec. 5. The absurdity of such application is apparent Sec. 5 requires a claim which it, however, forecloses under
threat of contempt proceedings against anyone who makes such claim. But the strong testimonial compulsion imposed by Section 5 of P.D.
1886 viewed in the light of the sanctions provided in Section 4,infringes upon the witness' right against self-incrimination. As a rule, such
infringement of the constitutional right renders inoperative the testimonial compulsion, meaning, the witness cannot be compelled to
answer UNLESS a co-extensive protection in the form of IMMUNITY is offered. 37 Hence, under the oppressive compulsion of P.D. 1886,
immunity must in fact be offered to the witness before he can be required to answer, so as to safeguard his sacred constitutional right. But in
this case, the compulsion has already produced its desired results the private respondents had all testified without offer of immunity. Their
constitutional rights are therefore, in jeopardy. The only way to cure the law of its unconstitutional effects is to construe it in the manner as
if IMMUNITY had in fact been offered. We hold, therefore, that in view of the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to testify or to answer
questions under Sec. 4 of P.D. 1886, the testimonies compelled thereby are deemed immunized under Section 5 of the same law. The
applicability of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886 cannot be made to depend on a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination which the
same law practically strips away from the witness.

With the stand we take on the issue before Us, and considering the temper of the times, we run the risk of being consigned to unpopularity.
Conscious as we are of, but undaunted by, the frightening consequences that hover before Us, we have strictly adhered to the Constitution in
upholding the rule of law finding solace in the view very aptly articulated by that well-known civil libertarian and admired defender of
human rights of this Court, Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, in the case of People vs. Manalang 38 and we quote:

I am completely conscious of the need for a balancing of the interests of society with the rights and freedoms of the
individuals. I have advocated the balancing-of-interests rule in an situations which call for an appraisal of the interplay of
conflicting interests of consequential dimensions. But I reject any proposition that would blindly uphold the interests of
society at the sacrifice of the dignity of any human being. (Emphasis supplied)

Lest we be misunderstood, let it be known that we are not by this disposition passing upon the guilt or innocence of the herein private
respondents an issue which is before the Sandiganbayan. We are merely resolving a question of law and the pronouncement herein made
applies to all similarly situated, irrespective of one's rank and status in society.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS and finding the instant petitions without merit, same are DISMISSED. No pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Aquino, J., concurs (as certified by Makasiar, C.J.).

Abad Santos, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

MAKASIAR, C.J., concurring:

To admit private respondents' testimonies and evidence before the Fact-Finding Board (FFB) against them in the criminal prosecution
pending before the Sandiganbayan, would violate their constitutional or human rights the right to procedural due process, the right to
remain silent, and the right against self- incrimination.

That their testimonies and other evidence they submitted before the FFB in these criminal cases are incriminatory, is confirmed by the very
fact that such testimonies and evidence were the very bases of the majority report of the FFB recommending the prosecution of private
respondents as accessories.
It should be stressed that the basic purposes of the right against self- incrimination are (1) humanity or humanitarian reasons to prevent a
witness or accused from being coerced, whether physically, morally, and/or psychologically, into incriminating himself, and (2) to protect
the witness or accused from committing perjury, because the first law of nature is self- preservation.

The utilization in the prosecution against them before the Sandiganbayan of the testimonies and other evidence of private respondents
before the FFB collides with Section 1, Section 17 and Section 20 of the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal of the laws.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 17, No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of
this Section shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The Bill of Rights constitutes the reservation of the sovereign people against, as well as the limitation on, the delegated powers of
government. These rights thus enshrined need no express assertion. On the contrary, the police and prosecution officers of the country
should respect these constitutional liberties as directed in the recent decision in the Hildawa and Valmonte cases (G.R. Nos. 67766 and
70881, August 14, 1985). The established jurisprudence is that waiver by the citizen of his constitutional rights should be clear, categorical,
knowing, and intelligent (Johnson vs. Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464, cited in Abriol vs. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 [1949] and in Chavez vs. CA, 24 SCRA
663, 682-683).

The use of testimonies and other evidence of private respondents before the FFB against them in the criminal cases subsequently filed
before the Sandiganbayan would trench upon the constitutional guarantees that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law ... that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law" and that (Section 17,
Article IV, 1973 Constitution), that "no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. ..." and that " a person has the right to
remain silent ..." (Section 20, Article IV, 1973 Constitution).

There can be no implied waiver of a citizen's right against self-incrimination or of his right to remain silent.
Any such renunciation cannot be predicated on such a slender or tenuous reed as a dubious implication. Otherwise, it would be easier to lose
the human rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights than to protect or preserve them; it would be easier to enslave the citizen than for him to
remain free. Such a result was never intended by the Founding Fathers.

The first sentence of Section 20 of the Bill of Rights stating that "no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself," applies to
both the ordinary witness and the suspect under custodial investigation.

In support of the rule that there can be no implied waiver of the right against self-incrimination and all other constitutional rights by the
witness or by the accused, is the fact that the right against double jeopardy can only be renounced by the accused if the criminal case against
him is dismissed or otherwise terminated with his express consent. Without such express consent to the dismissal or termination of the case,
the accused can always invoke his constitutional right against double jeopardy.

If Section 5 of P.D. 1886 were interpreted otherwise, said section would become a booby trap for the unsuspecting or unwary witness, A
witness summoned either by subpoena or by Invitation to testify before the FFB under Section 5, cannot refuse, under pain of contempt, to
testify or produce evidence required of him on the ground that his testimony or evidence may tend to incriminate or subject him to a penalty
or forfeiture; because the same Section 5 prohibits the use of such testimony or evidence which may tend to incriminate him in any criminal
prosecution that may be filed against him. The law or decree cannot diminish the scope and extent of the guarantee against self-
incrimination or the right to remain silent or the right against being held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law, or
against deprivation of his life, liberty or property without due process of law.

As a matter of fact, numerous decisions culled by American jurisprudence are partial to the rule that immunity statutes which compel a
citizen to testify, should provide an immunity from prosecution that is as co-extensive, as total and as absolute as the guarantees themselves
(Jones Law on Evidence, Chapter XVIII, Section 863, pp. 1621-1623; Kastigar vs. US 1972, 406 US 441).

Even if the witness testified pursuant to an invitation, the invitation does not remove the veiled threat of compulsion, because as stated in
the Chavez case, supra.

Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional
statements. Pressures which operate to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his
capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion attending to force testimony from the
unwilling lips of the defendant (Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, 679).

The summons issued to private respondents has been euphemistically called as an invitation, instead of a subpoena or subpoena duces
tecum, as a sign of respect for the important and high positions occupied by private respondents. But the effect of such an invitation thus
worded is the same as a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum. Precisely, the phraseology of Section 5 of P.D. 1886 entices the unsuspecting
private respondents to testify before the FFB, by dangling in the same Section 5 the assurance that their testimony or the evidence given by
them will not be used against them in a criminal prosecution that may be instituted against them.
At the very least, their consent to testify was under such misapprehension. Hence, there can be no clear, categorical, knowing and intelligent
waiver of the right to remain silent, against self-incrimination, against being held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law, and against being deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law under such misapprehension.

In any event, Section 5 of P.D. 1886 creates a doubt, which doubt is accentuated by the difference of opinion thereon among the counsels in
these cases and among members of this Court. And it is basic in criminal law that doubts should be resolved liberally in favor of the accused
and strictly against the government.

The procedural due process both under Sections 1 and 17 of the Bill of Rights, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, simply means, in the
language of Justice Frankfurter, the sporting Idea of fair play. The FFB and its counsel did not inform the private respondents herein of their
right to remain silent and their right against self-incrimination, and that their testimonies may be utilized against them in a court of law,
before they testified. This is not fair to them, and hence, they were denied procedural due process.

It should be stressed that the FFB was merely a fact-finding agency for the purpose of gathering all the possible facts that may lead to the
Identity of the culprit. Such testimonies may provide leads for the FFB, its counsels and agents to follow up. The FFB and its counsels cannot
rely solely on such testimonies to be used against the private respondents in these criminal cases. It should be recalled that the FFB had
ample funds for the purpose of accomplishing its object. As a matter of fact. it refunded several million pesos to the government after it
concluded its investigation. The Board and its counsel could have utilized the said amount to appoint additional agents to look for witnesses
to the assassination. In this respect, the FFB counsel could be faulted in not utilizing the funds appropriated for them to ferret out all
evidence that will Identify the culprit or culprits. The failure of the FFB's counsel to use said funds reflects on the initiative and
resourcefulness of its counsel. He could prosecute private respondents on evidence other than their testimony and the evidence they gave
before the FFB.

As heretofore stated, the private respondents were compelled to testify before the FFB whether by subpoena or by invitation which has the
effect of a subpoena as provided for in Section 5 of P.D. 1886; because private respondents then believed, by reading the entire Section 5,
that the testimony they gave before the FFB could not be used against them in the criminal cases subsequently filed before the
Sandiganbayan. Because the Board was merely a fact-finding board and that it was riot conducting a criminal prosecution the private
respondents were under the impression that there was no need for them to invoke their rights to remain silent, against self-incrimination
and against being held for a criminal offense without due process of law.

It should be recalled that the counsel of the FFB after submitting the majority report, refused to cooperate with the Tanodbayan in these
cases with the pompous declaration that, after submitting their majority report, he automatically became functus oficio. Was his refusal to
cooperate with, and assist, the Tanodbayan in the prosecution of these cases, born of the realization that the FFB majority report is as weak
as it was precipitate? And when the Tanodbayan has now his back to the wall, as it were, by the ruling of the respondent Sandiganbayan
excluding the testimonies and other evidence of private respondents herein on the ground that the use of their testimonies and other
evidence will incriminate them, the FFB counsel, without being requested by the Tanodbayan, now files a memorandum in support of the
position of the Tanodbayan. what is the reason for this turn-about to save his report from the fire which they started with such enthusiasm?
As above emphasized, it is the duty of the police and the prosecuting authorities to respect their rights under the Constitution as we stated in
the recent Hildawa and Valmonte cases, supra.

The grant of immunity under Section 5 of P.D. 1886 would be meaningless if we follow the posture of petitioners herein. Such a posture
would be correct if the phrase "after having invoked his privilege against self- incrimination" were transposed as the opening clause of
Section 5 to read a follows "After having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, no person shall be excused from attending and
testifying ... etc."

Said Section 5 has two clauses and contemplates two proceedings. The first clause from "No person shall be excused ... etc." up to "penalty or
forfeiture refers to the proceeding before the FFB. The second clause after the semi-colon following the word "forfeiture which begins with
but his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in connection with any transaction, matter, or thing
concerning which he is compelled, after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination to testify . refers to a subsequent criminal
proceeding against him which second clause guarantees him against the use of his testimony in such criminal prosecution, but does not
immunize him from such prosecution based on other evidence.

The private respondents herein, if the contention of the prosecution were sustained, would be fried in their own fat. Consequently, the
petition should be dismissed.

CONCEPCION, JR., J., concurring:

1. Let me preface my opinion by quoting from my dissent in Pimentel. 1

1. We are committed to the mandate of the Rule of Law. We resolve controversies before Us without considering what is or
what might be the popular decision. No. We never do. We only consider the facts and the law. Always the facts and the law.

2. The issue before Us is not I repeat not the guilt or innocence of Gen. Fabian C. Ver, Major Gen. Prospero Olivas, and others for
their alleged participation in the assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr.

3. The issue is: Are the testimonies given by them before the Agrava Board admissible in evidence against them in their trial
before the Sandiganbayan?

4. The issue therefore is purely a question of law. It involves the interpretation of Sec. 5, P.D. No. 1886 and calls for the
application of the Rule of Law.

5. Sec. 5, P.D. No. 1886 reads:

 No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, records, correspondence, documents, or
other evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued by the Board on the ground that his testimony or the evidence required of
him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture; but his testimony or any evidence produced by him
shall not be used against him in connection with any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled. after
having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except that such individual so testifying
shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying, nor shall he be exempt from
demotion or removal from office.

6. This section means that any person who is invited or summoned to appear must obey and testify as to what he knows. Even if the
testimony tends to incriminate him he must testify. Even if he claims his constitutional right against self-incrimination, he still must testify.
However, his testimony cannot be used against him in any subsequent proceeding, provided that at the time it is being presented, he invokes
his privilege against self-incrimination. His testimony, no matter what it may be, cannot in any way cause him harm.

The only exception is if the testimony he gave is false, in which case he can be prosecuted and punished for perjury. He may also be demoted
or removed from office.

7. The testimonies given by private respondents before the Agrava Board are therefore not admissible against them in their trial before the
Sandiganbayan, having invoked their privilege against self-incrimination.

PLANA, J., concurring:

I would like to underscore some considerations underlying my concurrence:

1. According to the Constitution, no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. But the law (PD 1886) which created the
Agrava Board decrees that no person shall be excused from testifying on the ground of self- incrimination. If the law had stopped after this
command, it would have been plainly at variance with the Constitution and void. lt was to ward off such a Constitutional infirmity that the
law provided for immunity against the use of coerced testimony or other evidence, an immunity which, to be constitutionally adequate, must
give at least the same measure of protection as the fundamental guarantee against self-incrimination.

2. Presidential Decree 1886 was not intended either to restrict or expand the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. On the one
hand, a law cannot restrict a constitutional provision. On the other hand, PD 1886 was adopted precisely to coerce the production of
evidence that hopefully would unmask the killers of Senator Aquino, although the compulsory process is accompanied by "use" immunity.

3. It is argued that the right against self- incrimination must have been invoked before the Agrava Board if the use of evidence given therein
against the witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution is to be barred. I did not agree.
I fail to see why to preserve pursuant to law (PD 1886) one's constitutional right against self-incrimination, one has to offer resistance to
giving testimony a resistance which the said law itself says is futile and cannot prevail, as no witness by its specific injunction can refuse to
testify.

4. The constitutional right against self-incrimination may be waived expressly. It may also be waived impliedly by speaking when one has the
option to hold his tongue. Waiver by implication presupposes the existence of the right to keep silent. Thus, when one speaks because the
law orders him to do so, his action is not really voluntary and therefore his testimony should not be deemed an implied waiver of his
constitutional right against self- incrimination.

5. Presidential Decree 1886 does not give private respondents absolute immunity from prosecution, It only bars the use against them of the
evidence that was elicited from them by the Agrava Board. If there are other evidence available, private respondents are subject to
indictment and conviction.

6. Moreover, the evidence given to the Agrava Board is not, in my view, completedly immunized. What PD 1886 bars from use is only the
testimony of the witness who testified before the Agrava Board and whatever was presented as part of his testimony, as such. PD 1886 could
not have intended to convert non-confidential official documents into shielded public records that cannot be used as evidence against
private respondents, by the mere fact that they were admitted in evidence as part of private respondents' testimony before the Agrava
Board. In other words, evidence otherwise available to the prosecution, such as official documents, do not become barred just because they
have been referred to in the course of the testimony of private respondents and admitted in evidence as part of their testimony They may
still be subpoenaed and offered in evidence. Conceivably, some objections might be raised; but the evidence will be unfettered by the
exclusionary rule in PD 1886.

ESCOLIN, J., concurring:

I concur in the dismissal of the petitions. The admission in evidence of the testimonies of private respondents given before the Agrava Board
would constitute a violation of their right against self- incrimination guaranteed under Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution. I subscribe
to the majority view that Section 5 of P.D. 1886 cannot be constitutionally tenable, unless a grant of immunity is read into it vis-a-vis the
compulsion it imposes upon a witness to testify. Otherwise stated, Section 5 of P.D. 1886 should be interpreted as an immunity statute,
which, while depriving one of the right to remain silent, provides an immunity from prosecution that is as co-extensive, as total and as
absolute as the guarantees themselves. (Jones Law on Evidence, Chapter XVIII, Section 863, pp. 1621-1623, Kastigar v. U.S., 1972, 406 US
441).

Clearly, this is how the private respondents understood the legal provision under consideration. For ably assisted as they were by counsel,
they would not have allowed themselves to be deliberately dragged into what the Chief Justice would call a "booby trap". Viewed from
another angle, therefore, it could not be truly said that private respondents had waived their right against self- incrimination in a manner
that is clear, categorical, knowing and intelligent. (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464, cited in Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 and Chavez v.
CA, 24 SCRA 663).

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the majority opinion penned by Justice Serafin R. Cuevas and in the pithy separate opinion of Justice Nestor B. Alampay but would
like to add some personal observations.

This case furnishes an opportunity to appreciate the workings of our criminal justice system.

The prosecutions which led to this petition serve as a timely reminder that all of us-civilian or military, layman or judge, powerful or
helpless- need the Bill of Rights. And should the time ever come when like the respondents we may have to invoke the Constitution's
protection, the guarantees of basic rights must be readily available, in their full strength and pristine glory, unaffected by what is currently
popular or decreed and heedless of whoever may be involved

In many petitions filed with this Court and lower courts, the military has often been charged with riding roughshod over the basic rights of
citizens. Officers and enlisted men in the frontlines of the fight against subversion or rebellion may, in the heat of combat, see no need to be
concerned over such ,niceties" as due process, unreasonable searches and seizures, freedom of expression, and right to counsel. They are
best reminded that these rights are not luxuries to be discarded in times of crisis. These rights are the bedrock of a free and civilized society.
They are the reason why we fight so hard to preserve our system of government. And as earlier stated, there may come times when we may
have to personally invoke these basic freedoms for ourselves. When we deny a right to an accused, we deny it to ourselves.

The decision of the Court underscores the importance of keeping inviolate the protections given by the Bill of Rights. Acts which erode or
sacrifice constitutional rights under seductive claims of preserving or enhancing political and economic stability must be resisted. Any
lessening of freedom will not at all increase stability. The liberties of individuals cannot be preserved by denying them.

The dividing line between legitimate dissent or opposition on one hand and subversion or rebellion on the other may be difficult to pinpoint
during troubled times. The lesson of this petition is that those charged with suppressing the rebellion and those who sit in courts of justice
should ever be vigilant in not lumping legitimate dissenters and rebels together in one indiscriminate classification.

An abiding concern for principles of liberty and justice is especially imperative in periods of crisis and in times of transition. And all persons
from the mighty to the lowy must be given the fullest measure of protection under the Bill of Rights if our constitutional guarantees are to
have any meaning.

In addition to the right against self- incrimination, of not being compelled to be a witness against one's self, so ably discussed by Justice
Cuevas in the Court's opinion, I am constrained by considerations of basic fairness to vote against granting the petition.
The private respondents were called to testify before the Agrava Commission. The decree creating the commission stated that no person
may refuse to attend and testify or to produce evidence before it on the ground that what he says or produces may incriminate him. But
since the witness is compelled to give all he knows or possesses in effect shorn by law of his right not to incriminate himself the decree
states that the evidence wrung from that witness may not be used against him later. This is, simply speaking, what the petition is all about.

The respondents may be prosecuted as indeed they have been prosecuted. They may eventually be convicted if the evidence warrants
conviction. however, they may not be convicted solely on the evidence which came from their own mouths or was produced by their own
hands. The evidence must come from other sources. It would be the height of unfairness and contrary to due process if a man is required to
state what he knows even if it would incriminate him, is promised immunity if he talks freely, and is later convicted solely on the testimony
he gave under such a promise of immunity.

I believe that P.D. 1886 is the first Immunity Act to be enacted in the Philippines. It may be relevant, therefore, to refer to American decisions
expounding on immunity statutes, more so when a comparison of P.D. 1886 with such statutes as the U.S. Immunity Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 745,
18 U.S.C.A. Section 3486, shows a similarity in the protection given by the statutes.

The U.S. Immunity Act of 1954 was enacted to assist federal grand juries in their investigations of attempts to endanger the national security
or defense of the United States by treason, sabotage, espionage, sedition, seditious conspiracy, and violations of various laws on internal
security, atomic or nuclear energy, and immigration and nationality. The law stated that a witness shall not be excused from testifying or
from producing books, papers, or other evidence on the ground that it may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture.
The statute then provides:

But no such witness shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter,
or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self- incrimination, to testify or produce
evidence nor shall testimony so compelled be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding ... against him in any court.

The American statute provides immunity against prosecution, penalties, and use of the testimony. P.D. 1886 is of more limited scope. Only
the use of the compelled testimony is proscribed. The witness may still be prosecuted but the prosecution will have to look for evidence
other than the words of the accused given before the Agrava Commission.

In Brown v. Walker (161 U.S. 591) the U.S. Supreme Court was confronted with the validity of the 1893 Immunity Act. Brown was
subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury investigating railroad anomalies. lie refused to testify on grounds of self- incrimination, arguing
that the Immunity Act compelling him to testify was unconstitutional. The Court ruled that "(W)hile the constitutional provision in question
is justly regarded as one of the most valuable prerogatives of the citizen, its object is fully accomplished by the statutory immunity and we
are therefore of opinion that the witness was compellable to answer." In other words, the statutory immunity takes the place of the
invocation of the constitutional guarantee. There is no need at the time of taking testimony to invoke the Fifth Amendment because it would
be denied any way and the witness would be compelled to testify. It would be absurd to invoke a protection which cannot be availed of when
compelled to testify. The time to invoke the immunity is when the testimony is being used contrary to the granted immunity. Protected by
the statutory immunity, a witness cannot even insist on his right to remain silent when testifying.
In Ullmann v. United States (350 U.S. 422), the court interpreted the Immunity Act of 1954 and stated.

xxx xxx xxx

... Since that time the Court's holding in Brown v. Walker has never been challenged; the case and the doctrine it announced
have consistently and without question been treated as definitive by this Court, in opinions written, among others, by Holmes
and Brandeis, Justices. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Arndstein 226 U.S. 34, 42; Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 142. The 1893
statute has become part of our constitutional fabric and has been included in substantially the same terms, in virtually all of
the major regulatory enactments of the Federal Government.' Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 6. For a partial list of these
statutes, see, Id., 335 U.S. at pages 6-7, note 4. Moreover, the States, with one exception a case decided prior to Brown v.
Walker have, under their own constitutions, enunciated the same doctrine, 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), 2281, and have
passed numerous statutes compelling testimony in exchange for immunity in the form either of complete amnesty or of
prohibition of the use of the compelled testimony. For a list of such statutes, see 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), 2281, n. 11 (pp.
478-501) and Pocket Supplement thereto, 2281, n. 11 (pp. 147-157). (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

It is interesting to note how the American Supreme Court in Ullmann treated the immunity not only against the use of the testimony (as
under P.D. 1886) but even against prosecution.

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner, however, attempts to distinguish Brown v. Walker. He argues that this case is different from Brown v.
Walker because the impact of the disabilities imposed by federal and state authorities and the public in general such as loss of
job, expulsion from labor unions, state registration and investigation statutes, passport eligibility and general public
opprobrium-is so oppressive that the statute does not give him true immunity. This, he alleges, is significantly different from
the impact of testifying on the auditor in Brown v. Walker, who could the next day resume his job with reputation unaffected.
But, as this Court has often held, the immunity granted need only remove those sanctions which generate the fear justifying
the invocation of the privilege 'The interdiction of the other Amendment operates only here a witness may possibly expose
him to a criminal charge. But if the criminality has already been taken away, the amendment ceased to apply.' Hale v.
Henkel 201 U.S. 43, 67. Here, since the Immunity Act protects a witness who is compelled to answer to the extent of his
constitutional immunity, he has of course, when a particular sanction is sought to be imposed against him, the right to claim
that it is criminal in nature. (Emphasis supplied).

In United States v. Murdock (284 U.S. 141), the court ruled that "the principle established is that full and complete immunity against
prosecution by the government compelling the witness to answer is equivalent to the protection furnished by the rule against compulsory
self-incrimination.
P.D. 1886, being an immunity statute should not be given a strained or absurd interpretation in order to achieve a certain result. If the
immunity given by the decree is equivalent to the protection furnished by the right against self- incrimination, then, paraphrasing Justice
Frankfurter in Ullmann, the same protection given by one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized must not be
interpreted in a hostile or niggardly spirit,

xxx xxx xxx

... Too many, even those who should be better advised, view this privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers. They too readily assume
that those who invoke it are either guilty of crime or commit perjury in claiming the privilege. Such a view does scant honor to
the patriots who sponsored the Bill of Rights as a condition to acceptance of the Constitution by the ratifying States. The
Founders of the Nation were not naive or disregard ful of the interest of justice ...

I, therefore, join the majority in dismissing the petition.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." 1 This basic right against self- incrimination, which supplanted
the inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused as practiced during the Spanish regime, has become an indispensable
part of our laws since 1900. Pursuant thereto, an accused in a criminal case has the right not only to refuse to answer
incriminating questions but also to refuse to take the witness stand. He cannot be compelled even to utter a word in his
defense. 2 As stressed in Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 3 the rule may otherwise be stated as the constitutional right of the
accused to remain silent. " The accused can forego testimony 4 without any adverse implication drawn from his decision
to do so, The burden is on the State to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt; the prosecution
must look elsewhere for other "evidence independently and freely secured," The rule forbids what has been considered
as "the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person 'to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction'."
According to Justice Harlan, it was intended "to shield the guilty and imprudent as well as the innocent and
foresighted." 5 Transplanted in this country with the advent of American sovereignty 6and firmly imbedded in our fundamental
law, 7 the said privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, which is predicated on grounds of public policy and
humanity, 8 "is fundamental to our scheme of justice" 9 and is one of the procedural guarantees of our accusatorial system.

1. As I see it, what the prosecution proposed to do in these cases was to present, as evidence of the alleged accessorial acts of private
respondents, the transcripts of their respective testimonies before the Agrava Board. Confronted by the apparent unwillingness of said
respondents to be called to the witness stand in subsequent criminal proceedings, the prosecution sought to put into the record of these
criminal cases (in lieu of private respondents' testimonies) the said transcripts and other evidence given by them in the course of their
testimony before the Agrava Board. If allowed over and despite private respondents' objection, this would be a clear infringement of the
constitutional guarantee that they can invoke in said criminal proceedings, as all of them did. Since the prosecution cannot require said
respondents to testify in the criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan, it stands to reason that it is equally disabled from indirectly
compelling respondents to give evidence against themselves by using their Agrava Board testimonies. The prosecution must present
evidence "derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony." 10

2. It is contended, however, that these self- incriminatory testimonies were given voluntarily because they did not claim the constitutional
guarantee before or while giving testimony to the Agrava Board. Voluntariness, I think. cannot be inferred simply from such failure to invoke
the privilege. There was no fair warning or notice to the declarant that his testimony would be used against him if incriminatory, unless the
privilege is invoked beforehand or during his testimony. If they were properly warned and still gave testimony without t invoking the
privilege, then it would be clear that they knowingly waived the privilege. Otherwise, it meant at the most a willingness on their part to help
the Agrava Board in its fact-finding investigation without waiving (a) the immunity granted by law, and (b) the constitutional guarantee
against self- incrimination in case of subsequent prosecution based on their self-incriminatory testimony. For waiver, it is wellsettled, to be
effective. "must be certain, unequivocal and intelligently, understandably and willingly made. " 11 Mere submission to an illegal search or
seizure "is not consent or waiver of objection. 12 The prosecution has the burden to prove otherwise. The same standard should be observed
in self-incrimination cases.

PD No. 1886 (as amended), which created that "independent ad hoc fact-finding Board," vested it with "plenary powers to determine the
facts and circumstances surrounding the killing [of former Senator Aquino] and to allow for a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation
into all aspects of said tragedy." In consonance with these objectives, the law declared that the privilege was unavailable to an Agrava Board
"witness", as follows: "No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing other evidence on the ground that his
testimony or any evidence requested of him may tend to incriminate him, " 13 etc. At the same time, the Board was empowered to summarily
hold and punish any person in direct contempt for "refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness," its judgment being "final and
unappealable."

Quite plainly, the constitutional right against compulsory self-incrimination could not be invoked by Agrava Board witnesses, The privilege
was suspended or temporarily taken away for purposes of the investigation, in order that the Board would have access to all relevant
evidence and all sources of information, not excluding compelled incriminatory statements of probable and possible or potential defendants.
An Agrava Board witness was, under the terms of the quoted provision, placed in a dilemma: (1) to answer truthfully all questions including
those tending to be self-incriminatory, since he cannot invoke the privilege; (2) to lie and become liable criminally for perjury; and (3) to
insist on his right to remain silent and be summarily punished by the Board for direct contempt. It is plain that such a witness was under
compulsion to give self-incriminatory testimony. It was not voluntary. Precisely because of its coerced nature (an infringement of his
constitutional right against self- incrimination), PD No. 1886 promised. in exchange or as a substitute for the privilege, limited immunity (as
provided in the next succeeding clause, same section), to wit:

... but his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in connection with any transaction, matter
or thing concerning which he was compelled, after having invoked his privilege against self- incrimination, to testify or
produce evidence. 14
Such immunity 15 would bar the prosecution's use against the witness of his said testimony in subsequent criminal proceedings (wherein he
is charged with offenses related to his testimony). Nevertheless, this would not operate to change the involuntary nature of his self-
incriminatory testimony. As far as the witness is concerned, it was "coerced", not freely given, because he was not fully accorded the "liberty
of choice." The law withheld his basic freedom to choose between testifying and remaining silent without the risk of being punished for
direct contempt to forego testimony which could possibly be to his detriment.

3. I cannot agree with the proposition that the privilege should be invoked by the witness before or while giving testimony to the Agrava
Board. Section 5 should be reasonably construed and fairly applied to the cases at bar, in the light of the accused's constitutional right
against compulsory self- incrimination. The formula of limited-immunity in-lieu-of-the-privilege contained in said section rendered
unnecessary or superfluous, the invocation of the privilege before the Board. Under said formula, the witness was deprived of the privilege
to protect himself against inquisitorial interrogation into matters that a targeted defendant or virtual respondent can keep to himself in
ordinary investigations or proceedings.

Even if the provision is susceptible of an interpretation in support of the petitioner's stand, it appears that the time for invoking the privilege
is not clear enough or certain from the language of the law. Equally plausible and logical is the contrary view that it may be invoked later on
when it became apparent that the prosecution intended to use the testimony given before the Board to secure conviction of the declarant in
the subsequent criminal proceedings. The privilege cannot be deemed waived by implication merely as a consequence of failure to claim it
before the Board. It bears emphasis that the right of an accused "witnesses" against compulsory self-incrimination is predicated on the
constitutional guarantee, not on the special law in question.

3. In the United States, the generally accepted approach in Fifth Amendment Cases (involving the constitutional guarantee under
consideration) was stated as follows in Johnson vs Zerbst:" 16 It has been pointed out that 'courts indulge in every reasonable presumption
against a waiver of the fundamental rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of such fundamental rights.'" Because, as
Dean Griswold of Harvard Law School (later, Solicitor General of the United States) eloquently puts it:

[T]he privilege against self-incrimination is one of the great landmark,s in man's struggles to make himself civilized ... [W]e do
not make even the most hardened criminal sign his own death warrant, or dig his own grave ... We have through the course of
history developed a considerable feeling of the dignity and intrinsic importance of the individual man. Even the evil man is a
human being. 17

In this jurisdiction, more than four decades ago, the late Justice Jose P. Laurela nationalist, constitutionalist and eminent jurist, whose
incisive and authoritative opinions on constitutional questions are often cited by the bench and the bar- voted to sustain a claim of the
constitutional guarantee in Bermudez vs. Castillo. 18 In his concurrence, he said inter alia:

(1) As between two possible and equally rational constructions, that should prevail which is more in consonance with the
purpose intended to be carried out by the Constitution. The provision ... should be construed with the utmost liberality in favor
of the right of the individual intended to be secured. ...
 (2) I am averse to the enlargement of the rule allegedly calculated to gauge more fully the credibility of a witness if the witness
would thereby be forced to furnish the means for his own destruction. Unless the evidence is voluntarily given, the policy of
the constitution is one of protection on humanitarian considerations and grounds of public policy...

(3) The privilege should not be disregarded merely because it often affords a shelter to the guilty and may prevent the
disclosure of wrongdoing. Courts can not, under the guise of protecting the public interest and furthering the ends of
justice, treat a sacred privilege as if it were mere excrescence in the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied; at page 493.)

In sum, considering the pertinent legal provisions and judicial pronouncements as well as the climate prevailing when the private
respondents testified before the Agrava Board, I find it unavoidable to reach the conclusion that they did so under legal, moral and
psychological compulsion. Their compelled testimonies before the Agrava Board cannot thereafter be used against them in the cases at bar
in view of the immunity granted by P.D. No. 1886. They were not obliged to invoke then and there the constitutional guarantee. If they did,
that would have sufficed to afford them adequate protection. If they did not, they could do so later on when the Government prosecutors (in
spite of the statutory grant of immunity) decided in the subsequent criminal proceedings, to use against them their Agrava Board
testimonies. For, as earlier stated, there was no intelligent and knowing waiver on their part of their constitutional right against self-
incrimination.

Accordingly, and for other reasons well stated in the main separate concurring opinions, I vote to dismiss the petitions.

ALAMPAY, J., concurring:

I vote for the dismissal of the petition in these consolidated cases.

What appears to be the basic and principal issue to which the consideration of the Court is addressed to is the singular question of whether
testimonies adduced by the private respondents before the Ad Hoc Agrava Fact Finding Board and sought to be introduced against them in
the Sandiganbayan wherein they have been accused were rightfully excluded as evidence against them.

I find untenable the insistence of the petitioner Tanodbayan that the private respondents should have claimed the right against self-
incrimination before the said Fact Finding Board and that having omitted doing so, the said privilege afforded to them by law can no longer
be invoked by them before the Sandiganbayan.

The right claimed by private respondents rests on the fundamental principle that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself as so stated in our Constitution and from the fact that Section 5 of P.D. 1886 disallows the use against him of such testimony or any
evidence produced by him before the said Fact Finding Board, except for perjury. Petitioner argues however, that there was a waiver of this
right to self-incrimination when respondents proceeded to give their testimonies on various dates before the Agrava Fact Finding Board
without formally invoking on said occasions their right against self-incrimination.
As private respondents could not have excused themselves from testifying before said Board as clearly emphasized in the very first clause of
Section 5 of P.D. 1886, and as at that point of time, there was no reason for the declarant to anticipate or speculate that there would be any
criminal charge or any proceeding instituted against them, it would therefore, be unnatural and illogical to expect that private respondents
would even contemplate the need of prefacing their declarations with an invocation before the Fact Finding Board of their privilege against
self-incrimination.

In fact for a declarant to announce his claim of the aforestated privilege prior to or while testifying before said Fact Finding Board, would
irresistibly create an inference and convey an impression that said witness is burdened with his own awareness that he stands already
incriminated in some wrong. To insist therefore, even in the absence yet of any proceeding against him, that the witness invoke the said
privilege before the Agrava Fact Finding Board, would be obviously self-demeaning. Such an effect could not have been intended by Section 5
of P.D. 1886, which was even meant to grant to the witness a benefit rather than a burden. It is more reasonable therefore, to conclude that
the privilege against self-incrimination would be accorded to said witness after he has invoked the same in a subsequent proceeding
wherein he has been charged of a wrong doing, except in a case for perjury. It is only at such time when the necessity of invoking the mantle
of the privilege or the immunity afforded to him by law would arise.

It cannot also be rightfully concluded that private respondents had intentionally relinquished or abandoned the said right which they
claimed before the Sandiganbayan. The fact that the issue of when and before what forum should such claim to the right against self-
incrimination be necessarily presented has provoked much discussion and debate because of divergent views. This has even prompted the
submissions to the Court of opinions of amicus curiae or friends of the court as to how Section 5 of Presidential Decree 1886 should be
construed and applied which are however different from and contrary to the views expressed by the Justices of the Sandiganbayan and other
legal luminaries. These conflicting views negate the proposition that there was an effective waiver made by the private respondents of their
rights.

It has earlier been stated by this Court that to be effective, such waiver must be certain and unequivocal and intelligently, understandably
and willingly made. (Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 24 SCRA 663). In the same cited case, it has been stated that courts indulge in every
reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights (Citing Johnson vs. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. ed. 1461, 1466). Furthermore, whether the alleged waiver is express or
implied, it must be intentional. (Davison vs. Klaess 20 N.E. 2d. 744, 748, 280 N.Y. 252; 92 CJS, 1058).

I find it difficult to accept that private respondents had at any time, ever intended to relinquish or abandon their right against self-
incrimination.

PATAJO, J., concurring:

I vote for the dismissal of the petition in these consolidated cases. Said petitions do not merit being given due course and should be
dismissed outright.
I hold the view that the testimonies and evidence given before the Agrava Board are inadmissible as evidence against those who testified or
gave said evidence irrespective of whether said persons were subpoenaed or invited. I believe it is not a condition sine quo non to the non-
admissibility of said evidence that at the time they testified or gave evidence before the Agrava Board that they had invoked their privilege
against self-incrimination.

The Agrava Board was created as an independent ad hoc fact finding board to determine all the facts and circumstances surrounding the
assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983. It was given plenary powers to allow for a free, unlimited and
exhaustive investigation into all the aspects of said tragedy. It was given the power to issue subpoena or subpoena duces tecum and "other
compulsory processes" requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of any evidence relative to any matter under
investigation by said Board.

Those who have been subpoenaed to appear and testify or produce any documentary evidence before the Board shall not be excused from
testifying or presenting evidence before said Board on the ground that their testimony or evidence may tend to incriminate them or subject
them to penalty or forfeiture. I believe an invitation from the Board is as much a compulsory process 1 to appear and testify before the Board
as a subpoena and one receiving said invitation cannot also excuse himself from appearing and testifying before the Board. Petitioners
appear to share this view when they said in subparagraph (c), paragraph 7 of their petition in G.R. No. L-71208-09.

(c) People were either invited or issued subpoenas, depending upon their rank and office, to give testimony before the Board
and among those invited were respondents General Fabian C. Ver and Major General Olivas while the rest of the military
respondents were issued subpoenas.

Unquestionably, it was the intention of the decree creating the Board to investigate the Aquino assassination to encourage all who have
some information on any "aspect of said tragedy" to furnish the Board said information whether they are subpoenaed or issued other forms
of compulsory process such as an invitation and to do so without fear that what they will say may be used against them. It is in this context
that Section 5 of PD No. 1886 should be viewed. When they testified before the Board, they were given full assurance that whatever they say
before the Board will not be used against them. Only if they testify falsely that they may be prosecuted for perjury. This is to prevent people
from preventing the Board from finding out the truth about the Aquino assassination by giving false leads or information for ulterior
reasons.

Actually Section 5 of PD No. 1886 falls under that category of statutes which do not pronounce an entire immunity by forbidding punishment
or prosecution for any testimony or evidence given in connection with the investigation of certain offenses more widely known as immunity
statutes, but merely prohibit in any criminal prosecution the use of the testimony of the witness. Immunity statutes as well as statutes
prohibiting the use of testimony in any subsequent criminal prosecution have been the expedients resorted for the investigation of many
offenses, chiefly those whose proof or punishment were otherwise impracticable because of the implication in the offense itself of all who
could bear useful testimony.
 The expediency and practical utility of this mode of obtaining evidence may as a measure of legislation, be open to argument.
But the tradition of it as a lawful method of annulling the privilege against self-incrimination is unquestioned in English
history." ignore on Evidence, Vol. III, p. 469.

Speaking of this kind of privilege of non-admission of testimony given by the witness in subsequent prosecutions as allowed by the common
law and modified by subsequent statutes, State vs. Quarles 13 Ark 307, 311, said:

The privilege in question, in its greatest scope, as allowed by the common law and no one, be he witness or accused, can
pretend to claim it beyond its scope at the common law never did contemplate that the witness might not be proved guilty of
the very crime about which he may be called to testify; but only that the witness should not be compelled to produce the
evidence to prove himself guilty of that crime. His privilege, therefore, was not an exemption from the consequences of a
crime that he might have committed; but only an exemption from the necessity of himself producing the evidence to
establish his own crime ... So long as it might be lawful to produce in evidence against an accused party whatever he might
before have voluntarily said as a witness on a prosecution against another, there were no means by which the privilege could
be made available short of a claim by the witness to be silent; and as that was the rule of the common law, this was the
common-law mode of making the privilege available. And that silence was but a mode of making the privilege available, and
was not of the essence of the privilege itself, is conclusively proven by all that current of enlightened authority, to which we
yield our fullest assent, which holds that the privilege has ceased when the crime has been pardoned, when the witness has
been tried and acquitted, or is adjudged guilty, or when the prosecution, to which he was exposed, has been barred by lapse of
time ... But the Legislature has so changed the common-law rule, by the enactment in question in the substitution of a rule that
the testimony required to be given by the act, shall never be used against the witness for the purpose of procuring his
conviction for the crime or misdemeanor to which it relates, that it is no longer necessary for him to claim his privilege as to
such testimony, in order to prevent its being afterwards used against him. And the only question that can possibly arise under
the present state of the law, as applicable to the case now before us, is as to whether our statutory regulations afford sufficient
protection to the witness, responsive to this new rule and to his constitutional guarantee against compulsory self-accusation ...

Considering the objectives sought to be achieved by PD No. 1886 the provision thereof making testimony and evidence given before the
Board inadmissible in evidence against the ones giving the same, provides protection beyond that granted by the Constitutional provision
against self- incrimination, otherwise it will be constitutionally suspect. Counselman vs. Hitchcock, 142 US 547, 35 L Ed 1110.

Of relevance are the observations of the District Court, N.D. Illinois, in United States vs. Armour & Co., 112 Fed 808, 821, 822:

All of these immunity acts are relied upon by the individual defendants, and, while expressed in, slightly varying language, they
all mean the same thing, and each of them is a substitute for the privilege contained in that clause of the fifth amendment to
the Constitution, reading:

'Nor shall any person be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.'
This fifth amendment deals with one of the most cherished rights of the American citizen, and has been construed by the
courts to mean that the witness shall have the right to remain silent when questioned upon any subject where the answer
would tend to incriminate him. Congress by the immunity laws in question, and by each of them, has taken away the privilege
contained in the amended it is conceded in argument that this cannot be done without giving to the citizen by way of immunity
something as broad and valuable as the privilege thus destroyed We are not without authority on this question. By a previous
act, Congress undertook to take away the constitutional privilege by giving the citizen an equivalent, and the Supreme Court
held in the case of Counselman v. Hitchcock 142 U.S. 547, 12 Sup. Ct. 195, 35 I Ed., 1110, that the substitution so given was not
an equivalent. Then, at various times, the immunity acts in question were passed by Congress with full knowledge that in
furnishing a substitute for this great right of the citizen, it must give something as broad as the privilege taken away. It might
be broader, but it could not be narrower.

Now, in my judgment, the immunity law is broader than the privilege given by the fifth amendment, which the act was
intended to substitute. The privilege of the amendment permits a refusal to answer. The act wipes out the offense about which
the witness might have refused to answer. The privilege permits a refusal only as to incriminating evidence. The act gives
immunity for evidence of or concerning the matter covered by the incident and the evidence need not be self-incriminating.
The privilege must be personally claimed by the witness at the time. The immunity flows to the witness by action of law and
without any claim on his part. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 16 Sup. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed. 819; Hale vs. Henkel (recently decided)
26 Sup. Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. -; State v. Quarles 13 Ark. 307, quoted in 142 U.S. 567, 12 Sup. Ct. 199 (35 L. Ed. 1110); People Sharp,
107 N.Y. 427, 14 N.E. 319, 1 Am. St. Rep. 851; Brown v. Walker approved in Lamson v. Boyden, 160 I11. 613, 620, 621, 43 N.E.
781: People v. Butler, St. Foundry, 201 I11. 236, 248, 66 N.E. 349.

I am further of opinion that the immunity given by the act must be as broad as the liabilities imposed by the act. The act calls
upon the citizen to answer any 'lawful requirement' of the Commissioner. 'Require' means to ask of right and by authority.
Webster's Dictionary. Tenn. Coal Co. v. Saller (C.C.) 37 Fed. 545, 547. Anything is a requirement by a public officer which brings
home to the person called upon that the officer is there officially and desires compliance. 'Demand' and' require' are
synonymous. Miller v. Davis, 88 Me. 454, 34 Atl. 265. The citizen may be punished for refusal to answer such lawful
requirement. I am of opinion that when the Commissioner of Corporations, who has power to compel, makes his demand, it is
the duty of the witness to obey.

The contention has been made that in order to get immunity the citizen shall wait until the compulsion becomes irresistible.
That is the effect of the government contention. I am not able to bring my mind to accept that doctrine. If I am right in saying
that immunity flows from the law l, without any claim on the part of the defendant and at different times that has been
conceded here in argument then no act of any kind on his part which amounts to a claim of immunity, which amounts to
setting up a claim of immunity is demanded by the law. The law never puts a premium on contumacy. A person does not
become a favored citizen by resistance to a lawful requirement. On the contrary, the policy of the law favors the willing giving
of evidence whenever an officer entitled to make a demand makes it upon a citizen who has no right to refuse. And it would be
absurd and un-American to favor the citizen who resists and places obstacles in the way of the government as against the
citizen who, with a full knowledge of the law, obeys without resistance the demand of an officer who has the legal right to
 make the demand for something which the citizen has no legal right to refuse. This, then, is the proposition to which we are
led. When an officer, who has a legal right to make a demand, makes such demand upon a citizen who has no legal light to
refuse, and that citizen answers under such conditions, he answers under compulsion of the law.

There is no merit then to the contention that private respondents should be invoked the privilege against self-incrimination before the
Agrava Board for precisely PD No. 1886 had explicitly provided that the testimony of those who testified before the Board can not be used
against them. It will be a meaningless act of supererogation to require that said witnesses before answering any question addressed to them
must invoke their privilege against self-incrimination. The phrase "after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination" in Section 5
of PD No. 1886 to be consistent with the intention of said decree, should refer to the time that the testimony of the witness will be used
against him in another proceeding, such as the cases now pending before the Sandiganbayan. It could not refer to the proceedings before the
Agrava Board because no one is being accused before said Board and no matter how self-incriminating the testimony of said witness is, he
runs no risk of being prejudiced, much less convicted by the Agrava Board. It is in the prosecution of cases based on the report of said Board
that the witness should invoke his right against self-incrimination. These private respondents did just that when they moved for the
exclusion in evidence of their statement before the Agrava Board. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of PD No. 1886.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

The majority decision is based on erroneous premises, viz. what the case at bar presents a "novel question;" that "this Court has not been
previously called upon to rule on issues involving immunity statute" and is burdened with the monumental task" of "laying the criteria ... (to)
build future jurisprudence on a heretofore unexplored area of judicial inquiry." 1 The fact is that we have a wealth of settled jurisprudence
and precedents, Philippine and foreign, that control the determination of the simple issue at bar and call for the setting aside of the exclusion
order issued by respondent court (Sandiganbayan) which wrongly rules as totally and absolutely inadmissible the testimonies given by
private respondents General Ver and Olivas and their six co- respondents (all charged as accessories) as well as all the documents, records
and other evidence produced by them before the Fact-Finding Board, notwithstanding that all were represented by counsel 2 and none of
them invoked the privilege or right against self- incrimination or made any claim or objection at the time of his testimony before the Board
that any question propounded to him and which he willingly answered called for an incriminating answer against himself.

The following vital considerations based on settled jurisprudence and precedents show that respondent court acted with gross error and
misconception of the applicable principles of the right against self-incrimination:

1. Respondent court grossly disregarded the settled guidelines laid down for trial courts by this Court of Appeal vs. Paylo 3 thru Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, speaking for a unanimous Court, Chat

By so doing [ordering the exclusion of the proferred confessions of the two accused upon a ground not raised by counsel but
motu proprio by the trial court, i.e. lack of independent proof of conspiracy] the [trial] court overlooked that the right to
objection is a mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not seasonably made,
 the objection is deemed waived and the [trial] court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence (Marella vs.
Reyes, 12 Phil. 1) ... Suffice it to say that the lower court should have allowed such confessions to be given in evidence at least
as against the parties who made them, and admit the same conditionally to establish conspiracy, in order to give the
prosecution a chance to get into the record all the relevant evidence at its disposal to probe the charges. At any rate, in the final
determination and consideration of the case, the trial court should be able to distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible,
and reject what, under the rules of evidence, should be excluded.

Trial courts should be liberal in the matter of admission of proof and avoid the premature and precipitate exclusion of evidence on doubtful
objections to its admissibility, citing the Court's long-standing basic ruling and policy in Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix Ins. Co. 4 that reception and
admission of evidence objected to on doubtful or technical grounds is ultimately the less harmful course to either litigant, since the Supreme
Court upon appeal would then have all the materials before it necessary to make a correct judgment (instead of returning the case for a new
trial which only prolongs the determination of the case); and

There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to admissibility of evidence for the
prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
charges, from which the People can no longer appeal 5

2. The right against self-incrimination is found in the first sentence of section 20 of the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution stating that "No
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." This single sentence constituted the whole text of section 18 of the Bill of Rights
of the 19,7,5 Constitution. This right against self-incrimination has a settled meaning in jurisprudence which is fully applicable here since the
right against self-incrimination was first enforced here as an inviolable rule" in U.S. President McKinley's instructions under date of April 7,
1900 to the Taft Commission. 6 As recounted by the late Mr. Justice Conrado Sanchez as ponente for a unanimous Court in the leading 1968
case of Chavez vs. Court of Appeals 7, "Mr. Justice Malcolm, in expressive language, tells us that this maxim was recognized in England in the
early days 'in a revolt against the thumbscrew and the rack.' An old Philippine case [1904] speaks of this constitutional injunction as 'older
than the Government of the United States;' as having 'its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused
person;' and as having been adopted in the Philippines 'to wipe out such practices as formerly prevailed in these Islands of requiring accused
persons to submit to judicial examinations, and to give testimony regarding the offenses will which they were charged.' " But Mr. Justice
Sanchez equally stressed that "(an) accused occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness
may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, 8 an
accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions." 9

As restated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes for a unanimous Court in Suarez vs. Tengco, 10 "No legal impediment exists against a litigant calling any
of the adverse parties to be his witness. ... True, an accused in a criminal case may not be compelled to testify, or to so much as utter a word,
even for his own defense (U.S. vs, Junio, 1 Phil. 50; U.S. vs. Luzon, 4 Phil. 344: U.S. vs. Binayoh 35 Phil. 23; Sec. l(c), Rule 111, Rules of Court).
But while the constitutional guaranty against self-incrimination protects a person in all types of cases, be they criminal, civil, or
administrative (Art. 111, Sec. 1, No. 18, Phil. constitution: Bermudez vs. Castillo, 64 Phil, 483), said privilege in, proceedings other than a
criminal case against him who invokes it, is considered an option of refusal to answer incriminating question, and not a prohibition of
inquiry.
 Except in criminal cases, there is no rule prohibiting a party litigant from utilizing his adversary as witness. As a matter of fact,
section 83 of Rule 123, Rules of Court expressly authorizes a party to call an adverse party to the witness stand and
interrogate him. This rule is, of course, subject to the constitutional injunction not to compel any person to testify against
himself. But it is established that the privilege against self-incrimination must be invoked at the proper time, and the
proper time to invoke it is when a question calling for a incriminating answer is propounded. This has to be so, because
before a question is asked there would be no way of telling whether the information to be elicited from the witness is self-
incriminating or not. As stated in Jones on Evidence (Vol. 6, pp. 4926-4927), a person who has been summoned to testify
'cannot decline to appear, nor can he decline to be sworn as a witness' and 'no claim of privilege can be made until a question
calling for a incriminating answer is asked, at that time, and, generally speaking, at that time only, the claim of privilege may
properly be interposed.' (Gonzales vs. Sec. of Labor, L-6409, February 5, 1954, 11 cit. in Navarro, Criminal Procedure, p. 302.)'

Suarez was cited with favor and reaffirmed in Bagadiong vs. Gonzales, 12 wherein once again the Court, with the concurrence in the result of
the now Chief Justice, under similar facts held that the petitioner (provincial treasurer) could not refuse to take the stand as an adverse party
in a civil case since the privilege against self-incrimination "in proceedings other than a criminal case against him who invokes it, is
considered an option to refuse to answer incriminating questions, and not a prohibition of inquiry" and "must be invoked when a question
calling for an incriminating answer is propounded, because before a question is asked, there would be no way of telling whether the
information to be elicited from the witness is self-incriminating or not." The Court therein denied "the petition to prohibit respondent judge
from directing petitioner to take the witness stand and testify ... without prejudice to petitioner's properly invoking the guaranty against
self-incrimination when questions are propounded to him on the stand. Costs against the petitioner."

3. All the respondents at bar were in this category of ordinary witnesses in the hearings of the Fact-Finding Board. They were not accused in
any criminal case nor were they persons under custodial interrogation who under the second part of section 20 of the Bill of Rights
(consisting of three additional sentences 13) were given additional rights to silence and counsel and to be informed of such rights and to the
out-lawing of any confession obtained in violation of the rights guaranteed in the cited section, by virtue of the incorporation into the Bill of
Rights of the rights granted in the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Miranda-Escobedo cases. As noted by former Chief Justice Enrique
M. Fernando, "(I)t amounts to an acceptance of the applicability in this jurisdiction of the epochal American Supreme Court decision
in Miranda vs. Arizona, the opinion being rendered by Chief Justice Warren. It is thus now a part of our fundamental law. Such doctrine was
promulgated in response to the question of the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual interrogated under police custody,
considering that such a time and under the stress of such conditions, his right against self-incrimination could be rendered futile." 14 The
Miranda pronouncements thus became necessarily a part and parcel of the additional rights granted in the cited section 20, as made by the
late U.S. Chief Justice Warren in the Miranda case thus: "The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. " 15 These additional Miranda rights could not
be invoked by respondents, as the members of the Fact-Finding Board were not law enforcement officers nor were respondents under
custodial interrogation.
As ordinary witnesses before the Fact-Finding Board and under the settled jurisprudence above-cited, they could not invoke the right to
silence and refuse to take the witness stand. Their right and privilege (which is not self-executory or automatic ipso jure) was, while
testifying, whether voluntarily or by subpoena, to invoke the privilege and refuse to answer as and when a question calling for an
incriminating answer is propounded. Failure to invoke the privilege which is personal does automatically result in its loss ipso facto. The
law, usage and settled jurisprudence uniformly require that the privilege must be asserted or else is lost. The court or board upon its
invocation still has to pass upon and rule upon the proper application of the privilege. As restated by Francisco, the rule and exceptions are:
"Certainly, where the witness, on oath declares his belief that the answer to the question would criminate or tend to criminate him, the court
cannot compel him to answer, unless it is clear perfectly, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances of the case, that the witness is
mistaken, or is acting in bad faith, and that the answer cannot possibly have any such tendency. " 16

4. The view that withal, it is best, although not required, that a warning to the witness of his option to refuse an answer to incriminating
questions as advanced even by the Tanodbayan at the hearing dates back to a century ago and has been long discarded as "witnesses are
usually well enough advised beforehand by counsel as to their rights when such issues impend" and "as general knowledge spread among
the masses and the preparation for testimony became more thorough." Thus, "ignore, the bible on the law of evidence so remarks and adds
that "there is no reason for letting a wholesome custom degenerate into a technical rule." —

It is plausible to argue that the witness should be warned and notified, when a incriminating fact is inquired about, that he has
an option to refuse an answer; and this view was often insisted upon, a century ago, by leaders at the Bar,

xxx xxx xxx

But there are opposing considerations. In the first place, such a warning would be an anomaly; it is not given for any other
privilege; witnesses are in other respects supposed to know their rights; and why not here? In the next place, it is not called for
by principle, since, until the witness refuses, it can hardly be said that he is compelled to answer; nor is it material that he
believes himself compelled; for the Court's action, and not the witness' state of mind, must be the test of compulsion. Again, the
question can at any rate only be one of judicial propriety of conduct, for no one supposes that an answer given under such an
erroneous belief should be struck out for lack of the warning. Finally, in practical convenience, there is no demand for such
rule; witnesses are usually well enough advised beforehand by counsel as to their rights when such issues impend, and judges
are too much concerned with other responsibilities to be burdened with the provision of individual witnesses' knowledge; the
risk of their being in ignorance should fall rather upon the party summoning than the party opposing.

Nevertheless, it is plain that the old practice was to give such a warning, when it appeared to be needed. But, as general
knowledge spread among the masses, and the preparation for testimony became more thorough, this practice seems to have
disappeared in England, so far at least as any general rule was concerned.

In the United States, both the rule and the trial custom vary in the different jurisdictions. No doubt a capable and painstaking
judge will give the warning, where need appears, but there is no reason for letting a wholesome custom degenerate into a
technical rule. 17
But from the environmental facts and circumstances of the Fact-Finding Board hearings, to require such a warning to the witness of his
option of refusal to answer incriminatory questions would have been an exercise in absurdity and futility, As is a matter of public knowledge,
respondents had concluded in their investigation that Galman was the assassin of the late Senator Aquino. As observed by former Senator
Ambrosio Padilla as amicus curiae at the hearing on the merits of August 15, 1985, they were all too eager to testify and make a strong effort
to gain support from the Fact-Finding Board and the public for the military version and report that the assassin was Galman who was
forthwith gunned down by the military escorts and guards at the tarmac. It would have been ridiculous, if not bordering on officiousness and
impropriety, to warn them as the highest ranking military officers of their option of refusal to answer incriminatory questions and also as
the majority holds, 18 of their right to remain silent. When respondents generals appeared before the Board, respondent Ver precisely made
the opening statement that

GENERAL VER:

I welcome this opportunity, Madame Justice, members of this Honorable Board, Dean, Gentlemen this
opportunity to assist ... this Honorable Board in the quest for truth and justice, We all deplore this tragic incident
which is now the subject of inquiry, This Board, this Honorable Board is mandated to conduct a free, full and
exhaustive investigation into the matter under investigation We all hope that my testimony, madame, will
somehow dispel any misconception, or any misinformation surrounding this tragic incident. I am now ready to
answer your questions.

JUSTICE AGRAVA:

Now, General, at the outset, we give the right and the privilege for every witness to be assisted by counsel Do
you have your counsel with you this morning?

GENERAL VER:

I did not bring any counsel, madame, but ... if I need a counsel, madame, I could probably look for... probably ...

JUSTICE AGRAVA:

Yes?

GENERAL VER:

I may call Fiscal Parena or the Public Coordinator. I was talking to Atty. Tan to assist me, in the protection of my
constitutional rights ...

JUSTICE AGRAVA:
 Yes.

GENERAL VER:

... if it is necessary:

ATTY. TAN:

Your Honor, please, it is part of the function of this office to help the witness if he doesn't have counsel, and so, if
the General is willing to have me, I will happily serve as counsel, Your Honor.

JUSTICE AGRAVA:

All right.

GENERAL VER:

Thank you. 19

Respondent Olivas likewise testified before the Board in response to its invitation to assist it in determining the true facts and circumstances
surrounding the double killing.

6. The majority decision would go around this by asserting without basis in the record that "(A)ll the private respondents, except Generals
Ver and Olivas, are members of the military contingent that escorted Sen. Aquino while embarking from the plane that brought him home to
Manila on that fateful day. Being at the scene of the crime as such, they were among the first line of suspects in the subject assassination.
General Ver on the other hand, being the highest military authority of his co-petitioners labored under the same suspicion and so with
General Olivas, the first designated investigator of the tragedy, but whom others suspected, felt and believed to have bungled the case. The
papers, especially the foreign media, and rumors from ugly wagging tongues, all point to them as having, in one way or another participated
or have something to do, in the alleged conspiracy that brought about the assassination. Could there still be any doubt then that their being
asked to testify, was to determine whether they were really conspirators and if so, the extent of their participation in the said conspiracy?" In
fact, the respondent court's decision and separate opinions as well as the majority decision at bar and the separate concurring opinions all
fail to specify the particular portions of the testimonies of respondents or any specific question and answer that can be in any way deemed to
be self-incriminating. Indeed, even if we assumed arguendo that they were warned of their right against self-incrimination and tried
absurdly to invoke the same, there is no specific question and answer by way of testimony that could be pointed to them as having been
made under compulsion for the simple reason that their testimony was in full support of their own military report that Galman was Aquino's
killer and for which they were trying to gain the Board's acceptance. In the all too brief and inadequate deliberations held on August 20 and
21, 1985 after the hearing on the merits of August 15, 1985, without reaching a definite conclusion, the ponente reported and I share this
view from a cursory examination, for want of material time, of the excluded testimonies only since the excluded documents, records and
other evidence produced by them were not before the Court that there is nothing in the excluded testimonies that could in any way be
deemed self-incriminatory perse. So there would be no legal basis whatever for their exclusion. But the ponente circulated only last August
26th at noon his draft for dismissal of the petitions which were filed only last month. And its release has been set for August 30th.

7. There has not been enough time to weigh and ponder on the far-reaching consequences of the decision at bar. The decision orders the
total and unqualified exclusion of the testimonies and evidence produced before the Fact-Finding Board by the eight respondents charged as
accessories "even though (they) failed to claim (their) privilege before giving the incriminating testimony" (citing 21 Am. Jur. 2d. 218). But
the cited compilation of American State and Federal Law expressly cautions that "The question whether a witness must claim exemption . on
from self-incrimination to be entitled to immunity from subsequent prosecution must in each case be determined in the light of
constitutional and statutory provisions in the jurisdiction where the question arises" (21 Am. Jur. 2d. 151). It recites on the same cited page
that "Under a statute granting immunity to persons who have been compelled to testify, one who has appeared voluntarily and testified
without claiming his privilege against self-incrimination or one who has appeared and testified pursuant to a void subpoena or one
addressed to another person, without claiming the privilege, cannot say he has been compelled to testify, and therefore, he is not entitled to
immunity." And the necessity of claiming the privilege against self-incrimination before an administrative officer or board such as the Fact
Finding Board is recognized to be essential, thus:

This is not only equally true as for the case of testimony in a judicial trial, but the explicitness is here even more essential, and
particularly where the administrative officer makes a general demand for documents or testimony upon a broad class of
topics. The reason is clear. The officer has testimonial powers to extract a general mass of facts, or which some, many, or most
will certainly be innocent and unprivileged, some may be privileged communications (e.g., between attorney and client) whose
privilege remains unaffected by the statute defining his powers, and some may be privileged as self-incriminating but liable to
become demandable by overriding this privilege with a grant of immunity. Among these mass of facts, then, the officer will
seek those which are relevant to his administrative inquiry; he cannot know which of them fall within one or another privilege
in particular, which of them tend to criminate at all, or to criminate a particular person; if such facts are there, he may not
desire or be authorized to exercised the option of granting immunity so as to obtain them; his primary function and power is
to obtain the relevant facts at large, and his power to obtain a special and limited class of facts by grant of immunity is only a
secondary one, and one which he will not exercise till a cause arises, if even then.

For these reasons of practical sense, then, as well as for the inherent requirements of principle already noticed for judicial
officers, it is particularly true for an inquiry by an administrative officer that the witness must explicitly claim his privilege,
and specifically the privilege against self- incrimination, and must then be overridden in that claim, before immunity can take
effect. (VII Wigmore on Evidence, 2282, pp. 517-518)

The concurrence of Justice Vera Cruz sounds even more ominous thus:

I believe that where evidence is produced by a witness in accordance with the conditions of the statute granting immunity
such as P.D. No. 1886, as amended, its immunity provisions attach instantly and it is entirely immaterial what use the
investigation authority makes of it (People ex rel. Massarsky v. Adams, 47 N.Y.S. 2d 375, 62 N.E. 2d 244).
 Consequently, the evidence, given before the Agrava Board by the accused in the instant cases namely, Generals Fabian Ver
and Prospero Olivas, and Sergeants Pablo Martinez, Tomas Fernandez, Leonardo Mojica, Pepito Torio, Prospero Bona and
Aniceto Acupido cannot be used against them and this proscription did attach instantly when they testified before the same
Board. Verily, the prohibition stands, irrespective of the purpose for which the prosecution would like to use this evidence.

The total and unqualified exclusion of the testimony and evidence granted by respondent court and sustained by the majority decision
herein refers expressly to the eight respondents charged as accessories. Would not this unprecedented grant of immunity and exclusion of
testimony be now claimed by the rest of the twenty-two accused charged as principals except for the lone civilian? As reported by the press,
respondent court has suspended its trial and placed the pressure on the Court to rush its decision, as "(T)he so-called 'trial of the century'
has been delayed since last week on motion of the defense panel which had argued that the high court's decision on the admissibility of Ver's
testimonies was a vital prerequisite to the presentation of witnesses for the defense. " 20 Would this not result in the People holding an
empty bag of excluded testimonies and evidence, since to all intents and purposes all respondents-accused testified before the Fact-Finding
Board? Would their testimonies be inadmissible for purposes even of impeaching such testimony as they may now give before respondent
court? These ponderous questions need not confront us had we but required respondent court to hew to the settled procedure and doctrine
of Yatco (supra, par. I hereof) of giving the prosecution a chance to get into the record its relevant evidence until the final determination and
consideration of the case, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence of the prosecution may lead to the erroneous acquittal of the accused or
dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no longer appeal.

8. The alleged "ambiguous phraseology" of section 5 of P.D. 1886 cited in respondent court's questioned order and bolstered by the majority
decision's "novel" conclusion and ruling that the cited section quoted therein 21 requires a claim from the witness of the privilege against
self-incrimination but "forecloses under threat of contempt proceedings [under section 4] against anyone who makes such a claim. But the
strong testimonial compulsion imposed by section 5 of P.D. 1886 viewed in the light, of the actions provided in section 4, infringes upon the
witness' right against self- incrimination. As a rule, such infringement of the constitutional right renders inoperative the testimonial
compulsion, meaning, the witness cannot be compelled to answer UNLESS a co-extensive protection in the form of IMMUNITY is offered.
Hence, under the oppressive compulsion of P.D. 1886, immunity must in fact be offered to the witness before he can be required to answer,
so as to safeguard his sacred constitutional right. But in this case, the compulsion has already produced its desired results the private
respondents had all testified without offer of immunity. Their constitutional rights are, therefore, in jeopardy. The only way to cure the law
of its unconstitutional effects is to construe it in the manner as if IMMUNITY had in fact been offered. We hold, therefore, that in view of the
potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to testify or to answer questions under Sec. 4 of P.D. 1886, the testimonies compelled thereby are
deemed immunized under Section 5 of the same law. The applicability of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886 cannot be made to depend on a
claim of the privilege against self-incrimination which the same law practically strips away from the witness. " Emphasis supplied).

It bears emphasis that none of respondents made any such claim against self-incrimination. The "oppressive compulsion" if it may be so-
called, consists of a maximum penalty of P200. fine and/or 30 days imprisonment for direct contempt. As indicated, it would be ridiculous
for any respondent to 1 make such claim when his testimony was but in full support of their own military theory and report that Galman
killed Aquino.
The language of the cited section 22 is plain and simple. It excuses no one from testifying and producing books and records but grants him
immunity from prosecution (except for perjury) after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination " There is nothing oppressive
about such compulsion in exchange for immunity provided the witness invokes his and aims his privilege a against self-incrimination.

In the Court's Resolution of July 9, 1985, Mr. Justice Aquino, voting to dismiss outright the petitions. opined that The clause 'concerning
which lie is compelled to testify after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination' is surplusage. It is in conflict with the first
clause which, as already stated, gives immunity to the witness except in case of perjury. So, section 5 should be read as if that clause were not
there.This is contrary to the rules of statutory construction that there is no room for construction when tile text is plain and simple, i.e.
requires invocation and that the provisions must be taken in context and all the words taken into account and given their full meaning. The
Anti-Gambling Law, Act No. 1757, enacted on October 9, 1907 by the Philippine Commission (probably the first Philippine immunity statute)
granted such absolute immunity and does not contain the conditional clause requiring that the witness invoke his privilege against self-
incrimination. Section 10 of the cited Act reads:

Sec. 10. Upon any investigation or proceeding for violation of this Act no person shall be excused from giving testimony upon
the ground that such testimony would tend to convict him of a crime, but such testimony cannot be received against him upon
any criminal investigation or proceeding; Provided, however, That no person so testifying shall be exempt from prosecution or
punishment for perjury committed in the course of any proceeding or investigation had by virtue of [his Act. (1 CPS [Rev. Ed.],
190)

But when the statute grants conditional immunity (and not absolute as in the above-quoted section 10 of the Anti-Gambling Act.), then it
explicitly contains the cited conditional clause in section 5 of P.D. 1886 granting immunity only when "he is compelled to testify after having
invoked his privilege against self-incrimination. "

This is but in accord with long-settled Philippine jurisprudence cited above (supra. paragraph 2 hereof), that the witness has an option of
refusal to answer incriminatory questions, which he loses ipso facto if he does not invoke the privilege and nevertheless answers the
questions. Here, in review of the national and international importance of the case with the country's very prestige at stake, the P.D. added
the incentive of offering immunity: "The purpose of immunity provisions is to aid prosecuting officers by inducing criminals or their
confederates to turn state's evidence and tell on each other, to enable prosecuting officers to procure evidence which would otherwise be
denied to them because of the constitutional right against self-incrimination, and at the same time to protect every person from gluing
testimony which directly or indirectly would be helpful to the prosecution in securing an indictment or a conviction. The provisions for
immunity are or should be as broad as or co-extensive with the constitutional provisions granting the privilege against self-incrimination."
(21 Am. Jur. 2d. Criminal Law, sec. 148). It is bad enough that no state's evidence turned up to tell on his confederates in exchange of
immunity. But to call the cited section " a booby trap for the unsuspecting or unwary witness" unless it was construed as granting absolute
and unconditional immunity from the very fact of merely testifying as a witness before the Board without claiming immunity nor giving any
incriminatory information that would aid the state to determine the true facts about Aquino's assassination would be a sell-out. It would
make a shambles of the letter and spirit as well as the salutary intent and objective of the Decree to ferret out the truth and obtain state
witnesses.
9. The truncated and distorted reading of the cited section 5 which consists of a single integrated paragraph and splitting it into two isolated
parts so as to allow the privilege against self-incrimination (which was already lost for failure to claim it in the Board hearings) to be
resurrected and raised in a much later time frame and "subsequent criminal proceeding" is against all usage and rules of statutory
construction, not to mention the long line of above-cited jurisprudence to the contrary. And if there still be doubt, we need only reproduce
hereunder the similar wording of Senate Joint Resolution 137 (Public Law 88-202) after which section 5 of P.D. 1886 was patterned. Said
law was enacted by the U.S. Congress in December 1963 to empower the Warren Commission to issue subpoenas requiring the testimony of
witness and the production of evidence relating to any matter under its investigation. The Report of the President's Commission on the
Assassination of President John F. Kennedy in its foreword on page X stated that "In addition, the resolution authorized the Commission to
compel testimony from witnesses claiming the privilege against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution by
providing for the grant of immunity to persons testifying under such compulsion." (Emphasis supplied). The cited Public Law reads:

(e) No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, records, correspondence, documents,
or other evidence in obedience to a subpoena, on the ground that the testimony or evidence required of him may tend to
incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture but no individual shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or
forfeiture (except demotion or removal from office) for or on account of any transaction matter, or thing concerning which he
is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination to testify or produce evidence, except that such
individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying.
(Emphasis supplied).

10. As already indicated above, none of the respondents, public and private, has indicated the specific portions of their testimony that they
have been "oppressively compelled" to glue, in alleged violation of their privilege against self-incrimination. The reason for this is that they
all testified voluntarily and eagerly to support the military report and version that Galman killed Senator Aquino. The Board unanimously
rejected the military report and found that the killings were the product of criminal conspiracy. A brief flashback is herein appropriate:
Within 60 seconds from his being led away by soldiers from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport on Sunday,
August 21, 1983 at past one p.m., former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. who was coming home after three years of self-exile in the U.S. laid
dead face down on the tarmac, with his brain smashed by a bullet fired point blank into the back of his head by a murderous assassin. 23 Also
lying dead on the tarmac, face up, near the senator was another man, to be Identified much later as Rolando Galman, whom the soldiers
admittedly gunned down. The military pointed to him as Aquino's assassin, who had somehow allegedly penetrated the air-tight security of
close to 2000 men ringing the airport. The military version met with great public disbelief and skepticism. The first fact-finding commission
created under Administrative Order No. 469 dated August 24, 1983 and P.D. 1879 dated August 27, 1983 was the object of several suits
charging bias and that the President "had already prejudged the case, by rejecting the version of foreign media that it is one of the soldiers,
supposed to guard Aquino, who fatally shot him." 24 The said commission was dissolved per P.D. 1886, dated October 14, 1983 (later
amended by P.D. 1903 dated February 8, 1984) which created the ad hoc Fact-Finding Board with plenary powers to investigate "the
treacherous and vicious assassination (which) has to all Filipinos become a national tragedy and national shame ... (and) to determine the
facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow for a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation into all the aspects of said
tragedy." The Board after extensive hearings, submitted to the President their majority report on October 24, 1984, while the chairman
former Court of Appeals Justice Corazon Agrava submitted her minority report one day earlier on October 23, 1984. All five members of the
Board unanimously rejected the official military version that Galman was the assassin and instead found that there was criminal conspiracy.
Their main difference of opinion is that the four-member majority found twenty-five military men (headed by respondents Generals Ver,
Olivas and Luther Custodia) and one civilian "indictable for the premeditated killing of Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman at
the MIA on August 21, 1983." The chairman's report confined the conspiracy to seven men headed by General Custodia. The Tanodbayan,
after conducting the preliminary investigation, adopted the Board's majority report recommending the indictment of the accused as
"involved in this conspiracy, either as principals, upon the theory that the act of one is the act of all, or as accessories, for attempting to hide
the corpus of the offense." The eight accessories so indicted are the private respondents herein named headed by respondents Ver and
Olivas. (The chairman in her minority report had found that "(T)he indications are that the plotters had agreed that only one would be the
assassin; that the others can either point to Galman as the killer; or they can state that they did not see the shooting; and that they will give
false testimony to mislead and confuse.

11. Only the former lawyers of the Fact-Finding Board created under P.D. No. 1886, consisting of Messrs. Andres R. Narvasa, Bienvenido A.
Tan, Jr., Mario E. Ongkiko and Francisco A. Villa have given us the answer that there is nothing incriminatory per se in the testimonies of the
respondents, in the Memorandum submitted by them, to wit:

I. The so-called 'Galman Theory that it was Rolando Galman who killed Senator Aquino is either true or untrue, a matter the
SANDIGANBAYAN will have to resolve.

II. If the 'Galman Theory' be true as advocated by the military officers concerned then the testimony of Ver, et al. is true. It is
not self-incriminatory. There would then be no reason to exclude it.

If, on the other hand, the theory be untrue as the prosecution in turn advocates then the testimony of Ver, et al. is untrue. It is
incriminatory of them, because by giving it and thereby seeking to hide the crime, they incriminated themselves. Withal there
would also be no reason to exclude it. Surely, after their plot to deceive the Board had been exposed, they should not now be
allowed to use the law to bring about exclusion of the very proof of their deception.

In short, the testimonies of respondents could only be deemed incriminating if it be found that they sought thereby to hide or cover up the
crime and thus incriminate themselves, as accessories to the murder of Senator Aquino. The former Fact-Finding Board lawyers amplify
their theory, as follows:

5. The plain language of Section 5, PD 1886 precludes its interpretation as extending immunity to all testimony or evidence produced before
the Board in obedience to subpoena regardless of whether the witness giving such evidence invokes the privilege against self-incrimination
or not. —

6. The fact is, the invocation by Ver, et al. of such right would have been self-defeating first, it would have prevented them from presenting
evidence in substantiation of the 'Galman Theory,' which they wished the Board to accept; and second, it might have exposed to some extent
their real objective, which was to deceive the Board.
7. It would have been incongruous for Ver, et al. to have claimed that their testimony would incriminate them as accessories to the murder of
Aquino when they were, by testifying, actually in process of committing that precise crime, becoming accessories.

8. Neither PD 1886 nor the Constitution should be used as a shield for crime, fraud or trickery.

9. The foregoing propositions were ignored by the SANDIGANBAYAN. Instead, with all due respect, it has —

a. given Section 5, PD 1886 a strained construction not justified by and contrary to its plain language;

b. given Section 20, Article IV, Constitution, a meaning at odds with its plain terms and contrary to relevant decisions of this
Honorable Supreme Court; and

c. sanctioned the use of legal provisions to shield persons from criminal liability arising from their perfidious testimony before
the Fact-Finding Board.

There is no legal ground nor justification for the exclusion order. It is for respondent court, upon consideration of the evidence for the
People, without any exclusion, and of the evidence for the defense in due course, to render its verdict of guilty or not guilty.

With a word of commendation for the former Fact-Finding Board lawyers and former Senator Ambrosio Padilla and Atty. Ramon Gonzales,
whose memoranda as amid curiae, have been of great assistance, I vote, accordingly, to grant the petitions at bar and to set aside the
questioned exclusion order.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

I vote to grant the Petitions and to reverse the ruling of the Sandiganbayan.

The resolution of the issue revolves around the interpretation to be given to Sec. 5 of PD No. 1886, reading as follows:

SEC. 5. No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, records, correspondence,
documents, or other evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued by the Board on the grounds that his testimony or the
evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture; but his testimony or any
evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in connection with any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which
he is compelled, after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except that such
an individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying, nor
shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office. (Emphasis supplied)
As I read the law, Section 5 does not require that the person testifying before the Agrava Fact Finding Board (the Board, for short) shall first
invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. Under said statute it is obvious that he has no such privilege.

But what is the effect of the second part providing that his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in
connection with any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having invoked his privilege against self-
incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except in case of perjury?

To my mind, the above portion does not grant to a person who has testified before the Board absolute or total immunity. It should not
operate as a shield against criminal liability specially since, under Section 12 of the same Decree, the Board may initiate the filing of the
proper complaint if its finding so warrant. Thus,

SEC. 12. The findings of the Board shall be made public. Should the findings warrant the prosecution of any person the Board
may initiate the filing of the proper complaint with the appropriate government agency. ... (Emphasis supplied)

The inquiry before the Board was a general one. It was not directed against any particular individual or individuals. Private respondents did
not testify therein as suspects or as accused persons. There should therefore be no hindrance to a criminal prosecution.

It has been held that where an inquiry by a grand jury is a general one and is not directed against a particular individual the
fact that on the basis of the information elicited, grounds for a criminal prosecution may evolve against a witness, may not
serve as a bar to such prosecution (U.S. v. Okin D.C.N.J., 154 F. Supp. 553; Benson v. Goldstein, 124 N.Y.S. 2d 452) even though
he testified before the grand jury without being warned of his constitutional privileges against self- incrimination. (U.S. v.
Okin supra) (Emphasis supplied)

The right against self incrimination is not a prohibition of inquiry but an option of refusal to answer incriminating questions Cabal vs.
Kapunan, 6 SCRA 1059 [1962]). The kernel of the privilege is testimonial compulsion. Whether or not any specific portion of the testimonies
of private respondents is incriminating should be determined by the Sandiganbayan itself. The claim against self-incrimination should be
invoked when a specific question, which is incriminating in character, is put to a witness in the subsequent proceeding. There should be no
automatic "immunity bath" of the entire testimony before the Board for immunity does not extend to such of the evidence as is not
privileged.

... But it is established that the privilege against self-incrimination must be invoked at the proper time, and the proper time to
invoke it is when a question calling for an incriminating answer is propounded. This has to be so, because before a question is
asked there would be no way of telling whether the information to be elicited from the witness is self-incriminating or not. As
stated in Jones on Evidence (Vol. 6, pp. 4926-4927), a person who has been summoned to testify 'cannot decline to appear, nor
can be decline to be sworn as a witness' and 'no claim or privilege can be made until a question calling for a incriminating
answer is asked; at that time, and generally speaking, at that time only, the claim of privilege may be interposed. (Gonzales vs.
Sec. of Labor, et al., 94 Phil. 325, 326 [19541).
Moreover, the issue actually addresses itself to a question of admissibility or competency of evidence and not to its credibility. Whether the
evidence so admitted is to be given any probative weight or credence is best addressed to the Sandiganbayan. It should be recalled that the
Board was not unanimous in its assessment of the testimonies given.

There are additional considerations. While the right against self-incrimination is indubitably one of the most fundamental of human rights,
Section 5 of PD No. 1886 should be construed so as to effect a practical and beneficent purpose and not in such a manner as to hinder or
obstruct the administration of criminal justice.

... Any statute which, while it compels him to testify, protects the witness if he does disclose the circumstances of his offense
and the sources from which or the means by which evidence of its commission or of his connection with it may be obtained or
made effectual for his subsequent prosecution and conviction is sufficient to comply with the constitutional requirements.
Such a statute, however should be construed to effect a practical and beneficent purpose, namely, at the same time to secure
the witness in his constitutional rights and to permit the prosecuting officer to secure evidence of a crime. It should not be
construed so as to unduly impede, hinder, or obstruct the administration of criminal justice." Brown v. Walker 161 US 591, 16
Sup. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed. 819. (People ex rel. Hunt vs. Lane, 116 N.Y.S. 990, 132 App. Div. 406)

The objective in all this exercise is to arrive at the truth. "Though the constitutional provisions for the protection of one who appears ... must
be liberally and fairly applied, the interests of the people are also entitled to consideration" (Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 11th Ed., Vol. 1, p.
609; People vs. Coyle 15 N.Y.S. 2d 441, 172 Mis 593). Specially so since, in the language of PD No. 1886 itself, the "treacherous and vicious
assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983, has to all Filipinos become a national tragedy and national shame.
"

In the interest of eliciting the truth, the excluded testimonies should be admitted, leaving it to the Sandiganbayan to determine which
specific questions and answers are to be excluded because they are incriminatory, and which should be given credibility, in found to be
competent and admissible.

RELOVA, J., dissenting:

The issue raised in these two petitions is whether the testimonies and other evidence produced by the private respondents before the
Agrava Board may be used as evidence against them before the Sandiganbayan

Respondent Sandiganbayan rejected their testimonies on the ground that "under statutes providing in substance that no person shall be
excused from testifying or furnishing evidence on the ground that the testimony or evidence may tend to incriminate him, but that no person
shall be subject to indictment or prosecution for anything concerning which he may testify or furnish evidence, it has been held that one who
testifies concerning criminal offenses when required to do so is entitled to immunity from prosecution even though he fails to claim his
privilege before giving the incriminating testimony (21 Am Jur 2d 218). He could not be required, in order to gain the immunity which the
law afforded, to go though the formality of an objection or protest which, however made, would be useless (VIII Wigmore 516)." (p. 4,
Resolution of Sandiganbayan)

Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1886 provides that:

SEC. 5. No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, records, correspondence,
documents, or other evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued by the Board on the ground that his testimony or the
evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture; but his testimony or any
evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in connection with any transaction, matter or thing concerning which
he is compelled, after having invoked his privilege against self- incrimination to testify or produce evidence ... (Emphasis
supplied.)

Pursuant to the above Presidential Decree no one can refuse to testify or furnish evidence before the Fact Finding Board. However, his
testimony or any evidence produced shall not be used against him after he invoked the privilege against self-incrimination. Stated
differently, the privilege against self-incrimination must be invoked when the question at the hearing before the Board, calling for an
incriminating answer is propounded; otherwise, before any question is asked of the witness, he would not know whether the information to
be elicited from him is incriminating or not.

In the case of Gonzales vs. Secretary of Labor, et al., 94 Phil. 325, this Court held that "the privilege against self-incrimination must be
invoked at the proper time, and the proper time to invoke it is when question calling for a incriminating answer is propounded.
This has to be so, because before a question is asked there would be no way of telling whether the information to be elicited from
the witness is self-incriminating or not. As stated in Jones on Evidence (Vol. 6, pp. 4926-4927), a person who has been summoned to
testify 'cannot decline to appear, nor can he decline to be sworn as a witness' and 'no claim of privilege can be made until a question calling
for a incriminating answer is asked; at that time, and generally speaking, at that time only, the claim of privilege may properly be
interposed.'" And, since it is a personal right to be exercised only by the witness, this privilege against self-incrimination may be waived by
him and, when so waived, cannot thereafter be asserted. The privilege is waived by his voluntary offer to testify by, answering questions
without objecting and/or claiming the privilege.

When private respondents gave testimonies before the Board they were not defendants but witnesses invited and/or subpoenaed "to
ventilate the truth thorougly free, independent and dispassionate investigation." They could not refuse or withhold answers to questions
propounded to them unless the inquiry calls for an incriminating answer and a timely objection is raised.

In the case at bar, since the private respondents answered questions from the Fact Finding Board without claiming the privilege against self-
incrimination they cannot now be allowed to invoke the immunity clause provided in Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1886.

I vote to grant the petitions.

G.R. No. 90640 March 29, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BONIFACIO BARROS, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Bartolome F. Macliing for accused-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:

Bonifacio Barros was charged with violating Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended (known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), in an
information which read as follows:

That on or about September 6, 1987, from Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, to Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain
Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while being a passenger in a Dangwa
Bus with Plate No. ABZ 242, destined for Baguio City, without lawful authority did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously carry with him as part of his baggage and transport about four (4) kilos of dried marijuana which the accused
intended for distribution and sale at Baguio City, knowing fully well that said marijuana is a prohibited drug or [a] source of [a]
prohibited drug.

Contrary to law. 1

After trial, the trial court convicted Bonifacio Barros of violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 as amended and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua 2 and to pay a fine of P20,000.00.

Barros now appeals from the judgment of conviction and essentially asks this Court to determine —

Whether the [trial] court deprived [the] accused of his right to due process by:

(1) ignoring manifest absence of the mandatory warrant in the arrest and search of the accused;

(2) admitting confessions extracted from the accused after two hours of interrogation conducted by four (4) soldiers one after
the other under intimidating circumstances; and
 (3) misappreciation of facts. 3

The relevant facts as found by the trial court and as set forth in the court's decision are as follows:

That on September 6, 1987, M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan, both members of the P.C. Mountain Province
Command, rode the Dangwa Bus bearing Plate No. ABZ-242 bound for Sabangan, Mountain Province. Upon reaching
Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, the bus stopped and both M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan, who were seated at the
back, saw accused carrying a carton, board the bus and seated himself on seat No. 18 after putting the carton under his seat.
Thereafter, the bus continued and upon reaching Sabangan, M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan before they alighted, it being their
station, called C2C [Fernando] Bongyao to inspect the carton under seat No. 18. After C2C Bongyao inspected the carton, he
found out that it contained marijuana and he asked the passengers [who] the owner of the carton [was] but nobody answered.
Thereafter, C2C Bongyao alighted with the carton and S/Sgt. Ayan and C2C Bongyao invited the herein accused to the
detachment for questioning as accused was the suspected owner of the carton containing marijuana. As both P.C. officers Yag-
as and Ayan saw accused, Bonifacio Barros carrying that same carton when he boarded the bus at Chackchakan. That upon
entering the detachment the carton was opened in the presence of accused and accused Bonifacio Barros was asked if he
owned the carton of marijuana and accused denied [this]. That when accused denied ownership of the carton of marijuana, the
P.C. officers called for the bus conductor who pinpointed to Bonifacio Barros as the owner of the carton of marijuana. That
during the oral investigation of accused, he finally admitted ownership of the carton (Exhibit "B") containing [four] 4 paper-
wrapped packages of dried marijuana. (Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4").

. . . [A]fter he was orally investigated, [the accused] was brought to the Abatan General Hospital, Bauko, Mountain Province, for
physical examination and a Medico Legal Certificate was issued (Exhibits "F" and "F-1"), indicating that accused suffered no
physical injuries and that accused was probably under the influence of marijuana. That Dra. Danna Aleta inquired from
accused Bonifacio Barros if he smoked marijuana and accused admitted having smoked marijuana. That after accused was
medically examined, he was escorted by three members of the P.C. to the P.C. detachment at Tadian, Mountain Province, where
the carton of marijuana (Exhibit "B") was also brought. That at Tadian, a seizure receipt was made together with a certification
(Exhibit "C") pointing out to the fact that approximately 4 kilos of dried marijuana leaves were from accused Bonifacio Barros
and which certification was signed by the accused (Exhibit "C-1") and subscribed before Judge Romualdo P. Awisan (Exhibit
"C-2"). That in connection with the confiscation of the marijuana subject of the instant case and the apprehension of accused
Bonifacio Barros, the P.C. officers who figured in this case namely M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan and C2C Bongyao have
correspondingly executed their sworn statements (Exhibits "A", "A-1", "A-2", "D", "D-1", "D-2").

. . . [S]amples of the marijuana were taken from each of the four packages marked Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3", and "B-4" and
placed in four separate envelopes, following an order of the court to that effect and were hand-carried by Police Officer Jack
Masilian to Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for laboratory test. That Capt. Carlos Figueroa, the Forensic Expert conducted
two kinds of test on the four samples sent by the court and found them to be positive of marijuana as per his report No. D-011-
88. (Exhibits "I" and "I-1"). 4
The defense of the accused on the facts consisted of a simple denial of the ownership or possession of the carton box containing the four (4)
kilos of marijuana. The trial court summarized the story of the accused in the following manner:

That accused Bonifacio Barros since 1984 was employed at the Honeymoon Disco Pad, Baguio City. That on September 5,
1987, accused was sent by his Manager, Engineer Arsenio Cuanguey to Bontoc, Mountain Province, to get their records from
one Billy Cuanguey at Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province. That upon arriving at Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain
Province, accused looked for the residence of Billy Cuanguey and he was pointed to a house where someone was tending a
store. That accused asked the man if Billy Cuanguey was there and the man answered that he did not know where Billy went.
So accused asked the man if Billy left [in] his room the tapes and records and the man said he did not know. Thereafter,
accused asked the man to stay over night in that house where Billy was staying as it was the instruction of his manager. That
the following day, September 6, 1987, after taking breakfast, accused, was going back to Baguio. On that morning of September
6, 1987, accused Bonifacio Barros boarded the Dangwa Bus at Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province bound for Baguio City.
That when the Dangwa Bus reached the P.C. Checkpoint, soldiers went inside the bus and checked the baggages. That a soldier
fished out a carton under the seat of [the] accused and shouted who owns the carton but nobody answered. Thereafter, the
soldier went down with the carton and moments later returned to the bus and called accused Bonifacio Barros to alight from
the bus. That Mr. Barros was surprised why he was ordered to alight and accused took his baggage which consisted of
apasiking and went down the bus. That accused was led by the soldiers to a house where his pasikingwas taken and his clothes
removed and his wallet taken. Accused was made to accept ownership of the carton of marijuana but he refused.

. . . [A]t 11:00 o'clock that same day, September 6, 1987, three soldiers escorted accused to the hospital and from the hospital,
they proceeded to the Municipality of Tadian, Mountain Province. That upon reaching Tadian, accused was brought to the P.C.
Camp and there he saw someone typing. Later, the soldiers allegedly presented to accused some papers which he was asked to
sign but accused refused. That accused was threatened and if he refused to sign the papers that something will happen to him.
That moments later, accused was threatened [by] a soldier [who] pointed a gun to him and told him to sign the paper and
because of fear, he had to sign the document marked Exhibit "C." Thereafter, the soldiers allegedly threatened again accused
and asked him to sign his name on the inside part of the cover of the carton of marijuana. Exhibit "X" for the court and Exhibit
"B-5" for the prosecution. That after staying at Tadian for one night, accused was brought back to Sabangan and later
transferred to the Bontoc Provincial Jail. 5

Turning to the legal defenses of the accused, we consider first his allegation that the police authorities had impermissibly extracted
confessions from him after two (2) hours of interrogation, "under intimidating circumstances," by four (4) soldiers one after the other. The
accused complains that he was not informed of his rights to remain silent and to counsel, that he had not waived his rights as an accused
person, and that he had signed a confession involuntarily and without the assistance of counsel. He essentially contends that the confession
is inadmissible as evidence against him.

We find, however, that it is not necessary to pass upon the above contention of appellant Barros. For the trial court in reaching its judgment
of conviction had not taken into consideration the statements which had been obtained from the appellant during the interrogation
conducted by the police officers. The trial court, so far as can be determined from its decision, totally disregarded Exhibits "C", "E" and "B-5,"
the alleged uncounselled confessions. The trial court made very clear the bases of its conclusion that the accused was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged; those bases did not include the alleged confessions:

First — M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan testified that they saw the accused carrying the carton (Exhibit "B") when
he boarded the bus at Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province. That the bus conductor pointed to accused at the checkpoint
of Sabangan, Mountain Province. That accused is the owner of the carton (Exhibit "B"). That the carton (Exhibit "B") which
contained four packages of dried marijuana leaves (Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4") was fished out from under the seat
of the accused which fact was admitted by the accused himself.

Second — That per testimony of Dra. Danna Aleta, she examined accused Bonifacio Barros and that he suffered no physical
injuries that would show that the accused was in anyway maltreated by the police authorities, and this fact was also admitted
by accused to the effect that he was never harmed by the police nor the soldiers. Dra. Aleta also found that the accused was
under the influence of drug[s] and that the accused admitted [to] her that he, accused, smoked marijuana. This is clear
evidence that accused is not only a pusher of marijuana but also a user of said prohibited drugs. (See Exhibits "F" and "F-1"
and TSN — Page 24 — Orpecio).

Third — The samples taken from Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4" sent by the court for laboratory test at Camp Dangwa,
La Trinidad, Benguet were all positive of marijuana per Report No. D-011-88 (Exhibits "I" and "I-1") of Captain Carlos
Figueroa, forensical expert.

Lastly, accused's testimony in his own behalf does not impress the court at it lacks the ring of truth. Besides, it is devoid of any
corroboration. Our Supreme Court in this respect said:

The weak and uncorroborated denial of the accused cannot prevail over the clear, positive and straightforward testimony of
prosecution witnesses [sic]." (People vs. Acelajao, 148 SCRA 142)." 6

We turn, therefore, to the second legal defense asserted by appellant Barros — i.e., that his constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures had been violated by the police authorities. The relevant constitutional provisions are found in Sections 2 and 3 [2],
Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witness as he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

Sec. 3. . . .
 (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise such search and seizure
becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the above quoted constitutional
provision. 7 The evidence secured thereby — i.e., the "fruits" of the search and seizure — will be inadmissible in evidence "for any purpose in
any
proceeding. 8

The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute. There
are certain exceptions recognized in our law, one of which relates to the search of moving vehicles. 9 Peace officers may lawfully conduct
searches of moving vehicles — automobiles, trucks, etc. — without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant
before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be
sought. 10 In carrying out warrantless searches of moving vehicles, however, peace officers are limited to routine checks, that is, the vehicles
are neither really searched nor their occupants subjected to physical or body searches, the examination of the vehicles being limited to visual
inspection. In Valmonte vs. De Villa, 11 the Court stated:

[N]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds,
or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search. (Citations omitted)

When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible
only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-
offender or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal
offense. 12

This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an extensive search of moving vehicles in situations
where (1) there had emanated from a package the distinctive smell of marijuana; 13 (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the
Philippine National Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be
transported along the route where the search was conducted; 14 (3) Narcom agents were informed or "tipped off" by an undercover "deep
penetration" agent that prohibited drugs be brought into the country on a particular airline flight on a given date; 15 (4) Narcom agents had
received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the
Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other
identification papers when requested to do
so; 16 and (5) Narcom agents had received confidential information that a woman having the same physical appearance as that of the accused
would be transporting marijuana. 17
In the case at bar, however, we have been unable to find in the record of this case any circumstance which constituted or could have
reasonably constituted probable cause for the peace officers to search the carton box allegedly owned by appellant Barros. The carrying of
such a box by appellant onto a passenger bus could not, by itself, have convinced M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan either that the
appellant was a law violator or the contents of the box were instruments or the subject matter or proceeds of some criminal offense. The
carrying of carton boxes is a common practice among our people, especially those coming from the rural areas since such boxes constitute
the most economical kind of luggage possible. The peace officers here involved had not received any information or "tip-off" from an
informer; no such a "tip-off" was alleged by the police officers before or during the trial. The police officers also did not contend that they
had detected the odor of dried marijuana, or appellant Barros had acted suspiciously in the course of boarding the bus and taking a seat
during the trip to Sabangan, nor in the course of being asked whether he owned the carton box later ascertained to contain four (4) kilos of
marijuana. The testimony of the law enforcement officers who had apprehended the accused (M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan),
and who had searched the box in his possession, (C2C Fernando Bongyao), simply did not suggest or indicate the presence of any such
probable cause.

M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as testified as follows:

Direct Examination by Fiscal Moises Ayochok:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: On September 6, 1987, do you recall if you reported for duty?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And where did you go on the morning of September 6, 1987?

A: I went to Sabangan, sir.

Q: What transportation did you use?

A: Dangwa Bus with Plate No. ABZ-242.

Q: Where did you board the Dangwa Bus?

A: At the Dangwa Terminal at Bontoc.

Q: When you said you boarded the bus with Plate No. ABZ-242 which started for Baguio City from Bontoc,
Mountain Province, and while it stopped at Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, was there anything that
happened?
 xxx xxx xxx

A: When the bus stopped at Sitio Chackchakan, we saw a person carrying a baggage or carton and boarded the
bus then took his seat, seat No. 18.

Q: What was he carrying that time Mr. witness?

A: A carton.

Q: And where did he place that carton which he was carrying?

A: In front of seat No. 18 where he sat.

Q: You mean inside the bus?

A: Yes.

Q: And after this person boarded the bus at sitio Chackchakan and holding a carton and placed it in front of seat
No. 18, what happened to the bus afterwards?

A: It proceeded to Sabangan.

Q: And at Sabangan, Mountain Province, what happened, if any?

A: The bus stopped for the routinary checkpoint and inspection.

Q: When they [were at] the routinary checkpoint, what happened?

Atty. Sokoken:

He did not say routinary checkpoint. He said routinary inspection.

Fiscal Ayochok:

We substitute the words inspection with checkpoint to satisfy the objection of counsel.

Q: What happened when you stopped for the routinary inspection?

A: We called C2C Bongyao a member of the detachment to inspect the baggage of the suspect and when C2C .

Atty. Sokoken:

We request that [the] witness answers the question that he testifies [to] not in the narrative way.

Fiscal Ayochok:

He is answering the question.

Court:

Let the witness finish.

A: When Bongyao inspected the baggage of the suspect and he found out that it contained MJ.

Q: What do you mean MJ?

A: Marijuana.

xxx xxx xxx 18

For his part, S/Sgt. James Ayan testified as follows:

Direct Examination:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And in the morning of September 6, 1987, do you recall where you were particularly in the afternoon?

A: In the morning of September 6, 1987, we rode on a Dangwa bus [with Plate] No. ABZ-242 going to Sabangan.

Q: You said we. Who was your companion that time?

A: Master Sgt. Yag-as, sir.

Q: And when this bus reached Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, what did you see?
A: We saw a civilian board the bus we were riding carrying a carton.

Q: And where did this civilian who boarded the bus which you were riding on place that carton?

A: He placed the carton under the seat of No. 18.

Q: Inside the bus, Mr. witness?

A: Inside the bus, sir.

Q: And what about the passenger who boarded the bus carrying the carton baggage, where did he go?

A: He sat facing the seat No. 18.

Q: Between seat No. 18 and the seat seated by the civilian who brought the carton, where was the carton exactly
located?

A: As far as I know, sir, it was located just beneath seat No. 18.

Q: When this bus which you rode on which the passenger carrying the carton luggage you saw reached Sabangan
what happened there?

A: When the bus reached Sabangan that we were riding, it was stopped for routinary inspection.

Q: What happened next?

A: We called C2C Bongyao to inspect the baggage that we have just seen at Chackchakan.

Q: Did he inspect the baggage?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And what was the contents of that baggage if there was any?

A: It turned out that the contents of the baggage was MJ sir.

Q: You mean marijuana?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Cross Examination:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: You stated that on September 6, 1987, a Dangwa bus stopped at Sabangan, Mt. Province for purposes of
military check-up, is that correct?

A: Routinary inspection, sir.

Q: But it was not you who entered the Dangwa bus for routinary check-up?

A: We were there riding in the bus, sir, and we called C2C Bongyao to come.

Q: So your purpose in riding inside the Dangwa bus was actually to see that person carrying this carton which is
marked Exhibit "B"?

A: No, sir, because I am a detachment commander at Sabangan and that is why I called one of my men, sir.

Q: So that you have full knowledge that from Chackchakan, Bontoc, going to Sabangan, there is already
marijuana being carried inside that bus?

A: That is only our suspect [should be suspicion], sir.

Q: Would you please tell this Honorable Court why you have not inspected it when you arrived at Alab? Why
have you waited to reach Sabangan to inspect it?

A: Because it is the checkpoint, sir, at Nacagang, Sabangan.

Q: Are you now admitting that you do not have authority to inspect the baggage here in Bontoc?

A: We just wanted it checked in Sabangan, sir.

Q: Could you give us a very special reason why you have to wait in Sabangan?
 A: Because we are stationed in Sabangan and that is the checkpoint.

Fiscal Ayochok:

Why argue with the witness? It is up for them to check it at the proper checkpoint.

Court:

Sustained.

xxx xxx xxx 19

The testimony of C2C Fernando Bongyao is much briefer, but equally uninformative:

Direct Examination:

Q: On September 6, 1987, at around 9:30 a.m., do you recall having reported for duty at Nacagang, Sabangan,
Mountain Province?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And while you were on duty at Nacagang, Sabangan, was there anything unusual that happened that time?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was that Mr. witness?

A: When we were on the checkpoint, the bus stopped bearing Plate No. ABZ-242.

Q: When the bus stopped, what did you do?

A: While on my way to check the bus, Master Sergeant Yag-as and Ayan called for me, sir, and they told me that a
carton was placed under seat No. 18, sir.

Q: And when you were told to inspect that carton under seat No. 18, did you inspect that carton?

A: I inspected it, sir.

 Q: You said you inspected that carton, what did you do in inspecting that carton?

A: I inserted my hand inside and when I removed my hand, it was a stuff of marijuana, sir.

xxx xxx xxx 20

So far as the record itself is concerned, therefore, it would appear that there existed no circumstance which might reasonably have excited
the suspicion of the two (2) police officers riding in the same bus as appellant Barros. They asked the police officers at the checkpoint at
Sabangan to inspect the box allegedly carried by appellant Barros apparently on a mere guess that appellant Barros might be carrying
something in the nature of contraband goods. There was, in other words, nothing to show that appellant Barros was then in the process of
"actually committing" or "attempting to commit" a crime. 21 There was, moreover, nothing on the record that could have reasonably led the
two (2) police officers to believe that "an offense [had] in fact just been committed" when appellant Barros boarded the bus at Chackchakan
or when he was asked whether he owned the box here involved at the checkpoint in Sabangan. The two (2) police officers, according to the
record, had no "personable knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested (appellant Barros) had committed it." There was, in
brief, no basis for a valid warrantless arrest. Accordingly, the search and seizure of the carton box was equally non-permissible and
invalid. 22The "fruits" of the invalid search and seizure — i.e., the four (4) kilos of marijuana — should therefore not have been admitted in
evidence against appellant Barros.

The Solicitor General, however, contends that appellant Barros had waived any irregularities which may have attended his arrest.
Presumably, the Solicitor General also argues that appellant Barros has waived the non-admissibility of the carton (Exhibit "B") which
contained four (4) packages of dried marijuana leaves (Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4"). The Solicitor General said:

. . . [E]ven assuming in gratia argumenti that irregularities attended the arrest of appellant, still the same cannot be questioned
at this late stage. Well-settled is the doctrine laid down in the case of Callanta vs. Villanueva (77 SCRA 377), and later
reiterated in the more recent case of Bagcal vs. Villaraza (120 SCRA 525), that "posting of [a] bail bond constitutes waiver of
any irregularity attending the arrest of a person and estops him from questioning its validity." Here, appellant had in fact
posted the required bail to obtain his provisional liberty, albeit his application was subsequently denied (see TSN, Feb. 10,
1988, p. 65). Consistent with jurisprudence, therefore, he should be deemed to have waived any irregularity attending his
arrest, if any there be, and cannot now be heard to assail the same. 23

It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured through an invalid warrantless arrest or a warrantless search and
seizure may be waived by an accused person. The a priori argument is that the invalidity of an unjustified warrantless arrest, or an arrest
effected with a defective warrant of arrest may be waived by applying for and posting of bail for provisional liberty, so as to estop as accused
from questioning the legality or constitutionality of his detention or the failure to accord him a preliminary investigation. We do not believe,
however, that waiver of the latter (by, e.g., applying for and posting of bail) necessarily constitutes, or carries with it, waiver of the former —
an argument that the Solicitor General appears to be making impliedly. Waiver of the non-admissibility of the "fruits" of an invalid
warrantless arrest and of a warrantless search and seizure is not casually to be presumed, if the constitutional right against unlawful
searches and seizures is to retain its vitality for the protection of our people. In the case at bar, defense counsel had expressly objected on
constitutional grounds to the admission of the carton box and the four (4) kilos of marijuana when these were formally offered in evidence
by the prosecution. 24 We consider that appellant's objection to the admission of such evidence was made clearly and seasonably and that,
under the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights under the premises can be reasonably inferred from his conduct before or during
during the trial.

In the dissenting opinion, my learned brother Melo, J. takes the view that appellant Barros had waived his rights by his "stoic deportment"
consisting of failure to object to the search by the police authorities immediately after the opening of the carton box:

. . . In point of fact, when the police authorities inspected the carton of marijuana and asked accused-appellant who owned the
box, accused-appellant denied ownership of the box or carton and failed to even mutter the least bit of protest (p. 3, Decision).
His demeanor should therefore be construed as implicit acquiescence to the search inasmuch as the objection thereto is
vulnerable to express or implied waiver (People vs. Kagui Malasugui (63 Phil. 221 [1936]); 1 Bernas, Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, First ed., 1987, p. 108). . . . . 25

It is submitted, with respect, that Kagui Malasugui is not applicable to the case at bar; rather it is People vs. Burgos,26 promulgated fifty (50)
years after Kaqui Malasuqui, that is applicable. In Burgos, this Court ruled that the accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful
search conducted on the occasion of his warrantless arrest "simply because he failed to object" —

. . . To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion
Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to
a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia vs. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case
of Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin (supra):

xxx xxx xxx

. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the
position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a
peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the
supremacy of the law. (Citation omitted).

We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and
that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." (Johnson vs. Zerbts, 304 U.S. 458).27 (Emphasis
supplied) .

Kagui Malasugui is not applicable to the instant case, because there the Court explicitly found that there was probable cause for the
warrantless arrest of the accused and therefore, the warrantless search effected immediately thereafter was equally lawful. In Kagui Malasugui,
a Chinese merchant was found lying on the ground with several nasty wounds in the head; one resulted in skull fracture and proved fatal. He
died in the hospital to which he had been immediately brought by a policeman. Mr. Malasuqui became a suspect because when the victim
was found, still alive, and upon being asked who had attacked him, laconically answered, "Kagui." On the same day, the accused Kagui
Malasugui was arrested and a search of his person was conducted without objection from the accused. Before the body search of the accused
was carried out, the accused voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities a couple of bracelets belonging to the deceased victim and
when asked if he had anything else to surrender, he, in a trembling voice, answered in the negative. The police thereupon conducted a body
search of the accused, without any objection from him; the search resulted in the production of additional personal effects belonging to the
deceased victim. Under these circumstances, the Court ruled that:

When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or premises, he is precluded from
complaining later thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol. I, p. 631.) The right to be secure from
unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.

A propos my distinguished brother Melo, J.'s suggestion that the right against an unlawful warrantless search or arrest is personal and may
not be invoked by the accused's counsel during trial, it is relevant to note that the law (the Rules of Court) specifies the proper time when
objections to admission of evidence must be raised and that in the case at bar, a timely objection was made by appellant Barros. Finally, the
accused's silence during the warrantless search should not be lightly taken as consent to that search, but rather construed as explained by
the Court in Burgos, 28 and as pointed out by Mr. Justice Laurel, a "demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law."

It is, of course, possible that appellant Barros may in fact have been guilty of transporting the four (4) kilos of marijuana. His guilt must,
however, be established by constitutional means. The non-admissibility of evidence secured through a disregard of the constitutional right
of the accused against unreasonable searches and seizures is the sanction imposed by the Constitution for disregard of such right; the
sanction is a powerful one, for it renders inutile the work done by the police officers, by the prosecutor and by the trial court. It is a sanction
which this Court has no choice but to apply in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Bontoc, Mountain Province, in Criminal Case No. 687
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, the evidence lawfully before the trial court
not being sufficient to establish his guilt thereof beyond reasonable doubt. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin, Romero and Vitug, JJ., concur.

Melo, J., dissents.

G.R. No. 95028 May 15, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE. PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARLO COMPIL Y LITABAN, accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

On the belief that the case for the prosecution depends in the main on his own extrajudicial confession which he claims is inadmissible,
accused Marlo Compil y Litaban filed a demurrer to evidence instead of presenting evidence in his behalf. The trial court however denied his
demurrer, admitted his extrajudicial confession, and found him guilty of robbery with homicide. Now before us, he maintains that his
extrajudicial confession was extracted without the assistance of counsel, thus constitutionally flawed.

As submitted by the prosecution, on 23 October 1987, just before midnight, robbers struck on MJ Furnitures located along Tomas Mapua
Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, which doubled as the dwelling of its proprietors, the spouses Manuel and Mary Jay. The intruders made their way
into the furniture shop through the window grills they detached on the second floor where the bedroom of the Jays was located. Two (2) of
the robbers forthwith herded the two (2) maids of the owners into the bathroom.

Manuel Jay was not yet home. He was to come from their other furniture store, the Best Wood Furniture, along Tomas Pinpin Street, also in
Sta. Cruz. His wife Mary had earlier retired to their bedroom. Sensing however that something unusual was going on outside, Mary opened
the door to peek. Suddenly, a man placed his arms around her neck while another poked a balisong at her nape. She was pushed back into
the bedroom and ordered to open the drawers where she kept money. A third man ransacked the bedroom. They then tied her hands behind
her back, stuffed her mouth with a towel, and took off with some P35,000.00 in cash and pieces of jewelry worth P30,000.00.

Afterwards, Mary who was gagged in the bedroom, and one of the housemaids herded into the bathroom, heard Manuel agonizing amid a
commotion in the ground floor. After noticing that the two (2) men guarding them had already left, the helpers, Jenelyn Valle and Virginia
Ngoho, dashed out of the bathroom and proceeded to the bedroom of their employers. Upon seeing Mary, the two (2) maids untied her
hands and took out the towel from her mouth. They then rushed to the ground floor where they saw Manuel sprawled on the floor among
the pieces of furniture which were in disarray. He succumbed to thirteen (13) stab wounds.

In the investigation that followed, Jessie Bartolome, a furniture worker in MJ Furnitures, told operatives of the Western Police District (WPD)
that just before the incident that evening, while with his girlfriend Linda Hermoso inside an owner-type jeep parked near MJ Furnitures, he
saw his co-workers Marlo Compil, Baltazar Mabini and Jose Jacale go to the back of the furniture shop. Linda then confirmed the information
of Bartolome to the police investigators who also learned that the trio who were all from Samar failed to report for work the day after the
incident, and that Baltazar Mabini was planning to go to Tayabas, Quezon, to be the baptismal godfather of his sister's child.

Thus on 27 October 1987, WPD agents together with Tomas Jay, brother of the deceased, and Jenelyn Valle went to the parish church of
Tayabas, Quezon, to look for Baltazar Mabini and his companions. From the records of the parish they were able to confirm that suspect
Baltazar Mabini stood as godfather in the baptism of the child of his sister Mamerta and Rey Lopez. Immediately they proceeded to the house
of Lopez who informed them that Baltazar Mabini and his companions already left the day before, except Compil who stayed behind and still
planning to leave.

After being positively identified by Jenelyn Valle as one of the workers of the Jay spouses, accused Marlo Compil who was lying on a couch
was immediately frisked and placed under arrest. According to Jenelyn, Compil turned pale, became speechless and was trembling. However
after regaining his composure and upon being interrogated, Compil readily admitted his guilt and pointed to the arresting officers the
perpetrators of the heist from a picture of the baptism of the child of Mabini's sister. Compil was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station
where he was further investigated. On their way back to Manila, he was again questioned. He confessed that shortly before midnight on 23
October 1987 he was with the group that robbed MJ Furnitures. He divulged to the police officers who his companions were and his
participation as a lookout for which he received P1,000.00. He did not go inside the furniture shop since he would be recognized. Only those
who were not known to their employers went inside. Compil said that his cohorts stabbed Manuel Jay to death. He also narrated that after
the robbery, they all met in Bangkal, Makati, in the house of one Pablo Pakit, a brother of his co-conspirator Rogelio Pakit, where they shared
the loot and drank beer until four-thirty in the morning. Then they all left for Quezon and agreed that from there they would all go home to
their respective provinces.

From Tayabas, Quezon, the arresting team together with accused Compil proceeded to the house of Pablo Pakit who confirmed that his
younger brother Rogelio, with some six (6) others including Compil, went to his house past midnight on 23 October 1987 and divided among
themselves the money and jewelry which, as he picked up from their conversation, was taken from Sta. Cruz, Manila. They drank beer until
past four o'clock the next morning.

On 28 October 1987, the day following his arrest, accused Compil after conferring with CLAO lawyer Melencio Claroz and in the presence of
his sister Leticia Compil, brother Orville Compil and brother-in-law Virgilio Jacala, executed a sworn statement before Cpl. Patricio Balanay
of the WPD admitting his participation in the heist as a lookout. He named the six (6) other perpetrators of the crime as Jose Jacale, Baltazar
Mabini, Amancio Alvos, Rogelio Pakit, a certain "Erning" and one "Lando," and asserted that he was merely forced to join the group by Jose
Jacale and Baltazar Mabini who were the masterminds: According to Compil, he was earlier hired by Mabini to work for MJ Furnitures where
he was the foreman.

Meanwhile WPD agents had gathered other leads and conducted follow-up operations in Manila, Parañaque and Bulacan but failed to
apprehend the cohorts of Compil.

On 12 November 1987 an Information for robbery with homicide was filed against Marlo Compil. Assisted by a counsel de oficio he entered a
plea of "Not Guilty" when arraigned. After the prosecution had rested, the accused represented by counsel de parte instead of adducing
evidence filed a demurrer to evidence.

On 2 June 1988 the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 49,1 denied the demurrer, found the accused guilty of robbery with homicide, and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
In his 75-page appellant's brief, accused Compil claims that "(he) was not apprised of his constitutional rights (to remain silent and seek the
assistance of counsel) before the police officers started interrogating him from the time of his arrest at the house of Rey Lopez, then at the
Tayabas Police Station, and while on their way to Manila . . . . (he) was made to confess and declare statements that can be used against him
in any proceeding."2 And, the belated arrival of counsel from the CLAO prior to the actual execution of the written extrajudicial confession
did not cure the constitutional infirmity since the police investigators had already extracted incriminatory statements from him the day
before, which extracted statements formed part of his alleged confession. He then concludes that "[w]ithout the admission of (his) oral . . .
and . . . written extrajudicial (confessions) . . . (he) cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide
based on the testimonies of other witnesses"3 which are replete with "serious and glaring inconsistencies and contradictions."4

In People v. Rous,5 the Third Division of this Court held that an extrajudicial confession may be admitted in evidence even if obtained without
the assistance of counsel provided that it was read and fully explained to confessant by counsel before it was signed. However we adopt our
view in Gamboa v. Cruz 6 where the Court En Banc ruled that "[t]he right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from respondent/accused. At such point
or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting forced or coerced
admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offense." We maintained this rule
in the fairly recent cases of People v. Macam 7 and People v. Bandula 8 where we further reiterated the procedure —

. . . At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he
must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel,
and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate
with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation
shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf . . . Any statement obtained in
violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be in admissible in
evidence.

In the case at bench, it is evident that accused-appellant was immediately subjected to an interrogation upon his arrest in the house of Rey
Lopez in Tayabas, Quezon. He was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was further questioned. And while on their way to
Manila, the arresting agents again elicited incriminating information. In all three instances, he confessed to the commission of the crime and
admitted his participation therein. In all those instances, he was not assisted by counsel.

The belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day even if prior to the actual signing of the uncounseled confession does not cure the
defect for the investigators were already able to extract incriminatory statements from accused-appellant. The operative act, it has been
stressed, is when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect
who has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statements,
and not the signing by the suspect of his supposed extrajudicial confession. Thus in People v. de Jesus 9 we said that admissions obtained
during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are
still flawed under the Constitution.

What is more, it is highly improbable for CLAO lawyer Melencio Claroz to have fully explained to the accused who did not even finish Grade
One, in less than ten (10) minutes as borne by the records, the latter's constitutional rights and the consequences of subscribing to an
extrajudicial confession.

While the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is so convincing that it mentions details which could not have been merely
concocted, and jibes with the other pieces of evidence uncovered by the investigators, still we cannot admit it in evidence because of its
implicit constitutional infirmity. Nevertheless, we find other sufficient factual circumstances to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

We give credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Linda Hermoso, Pablo Pakit and Jenelyn Valle. We believe that Linda Hermoso
saw the accused and Mabini in the vicinity of MJ Furnitures just before the commission of the crime. While Hermoso may have contradicted
herself on some minor incidents, she was straightforward on this specific instance —

FISCAL FORMOSO (re-direct):

Q. You said that you saw Marlo and Puti (Baltazar Mabini) together with Jessie when you were inside the jeep, is
it not?

WITNESS HERMOSO:

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was this before you went to sleep?

A. Yes, sir. 10

Time and again it has been said that minor inconsistencies do not impair the credibility of witnesses, more so with witness Hermoso who
only reached Grade Two and who as the trial court noted had difficulty understanding the questions being propounded to her. In fine, in the
absence of evidence to show any reason why prosecution witnesses should falsely testify, it is fair to conclude that no improper motive
exists and that their testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.

We have repeatedly ruled that the guilt of the accused may be established through circumstantial evidence provided that: (1) there is more
than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and, (3) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 11 And there can be a conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the
circumstances proven form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused as the perpetrator of
the crime. 12
In the instant case, the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused through the following circumstances: First, accused Marlo
Compil and Baltazar Mabini who are both from Samar worked in MJ Furnitures in Sta. Cruz, Manila, and were familiar with the floor plan of
the shop. Second, on the night of the incident, they were seen in front of MJ Furnitures. Third, they were seen going to the rear of the
furniture store. Fourth, robbers forcibly entered MJ Furnitures through the back window on the second floor. Fifth, some two (2) hours after
the commission of the crime, at around two o'clock the following morning, they were in a house in Bangkal, Makati, dividing between
themselves and their five (5) other companions the money and jewelry taken from Sta. Cruz, Manila. Sixth, they all failed to show up for work
the following day. Seventh, accuses Compil turned ashen, was trembling and speechless when apprehended in Tayabas, Quezon, for a crime
committed in Manila. Certainly these circumstances as gleaned from the factual findings of the trial court form an unbroken chain which
leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime.13 Hence even disregarding accused-
appellant's oral and written confessions, as we do, still the prosecution was able to show that he was a co-conspirator in the robbery with
homicide.

While it may be true that the arrest, search and seizure were made without the benefit of a warrant, accused-appellant is now estopped from
questioning this defect after failing to move for the quashing of the information before the trial court. Thus any irregularity attendant to his
arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of "not guilty" and by
participating in the trial. 14

The argument of accused-appellant that the trial court should have convicted the arresting police officers of arbitrary detention, if not delay
in the delivery of detained persons, is misplaced. Suffice it to say that the law enforcers who arrested him are not being charged and
prosecuted in the case at bench.

Likewise devoid of merit is the contention of accused-appellant that granting that he had participated in the commission of the crime, he
should be considered only as an accomplice. Disregarding his extrajudicial confession and by reason of his failure to adduce evidence in his
behalf, the Court is left with no other recourse but to consider only the evidence of the prosecution which shows that the perpetrators of the
crime acted in concert. For, direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy 15 which may be inferred from the acts of the accused during and
after the commission of the crime which point to a joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest. 16 Thus circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to prove conspiracy. 17 And where conspiracy exists, the act of one is the act of all, and each is to be held in the same
degree of liability as the others. 18

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court appealed from is AFFIRMED insofar as it finds accused-appellant MARLO COMPIL y
LITABAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide. Consequently, he is sentenced to reclusion perpetua with all the
accessory penalties provided by law.

Accused-appellant is also directed to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Manuel Jay in the amount of P50,000.00, plus P35,000.00 as actual
damages. He is further directed to return to Mary Jay the jewelry worth P30,000.00, and if he can no longer return the jewelry, to pay its
value.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 97936 May 29, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ALEJANDRO LUCERO y CORTEL, accused-appellant.

PUNO, J.:

If the Constitution has any value, it is because it stands up for those who cannot stand up for themselves. Thus, it protected those under
custodial investigation with the all-important right to counsel. We hold that the right to counsel cannot be diluted without tampering the
scales of justice. For denial of his right to counsel, we acquit accused-appellant.

Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino Echavez, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and John Doe were charged with the crime of robbery with
homicide. The Information against them reads:

That on or about the 7th day of May, 1988, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another , did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously rob one DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID, in the manner as follows: on the date and in the place
aforementioned, the said accused, one armed with handgun, pursuant to their conspiracy blocked the way of the said
complainant who was on board a Mercedez Benz crusing along Road 14 near (the) corner (of) Mindanao Avenue, Pag-asa, this
City, and did then and there, by means of violence and intimidation against persons, take, rob and carry away his cash money
amounting to P6,600.00; one gold necklace with cross pendant, 7 karat, worth P45,000.00; one (1) gold Rolex watch worth
P155,000.00; one (1) 3 karat gold ring worth P80,000.00; one 2 karat gold ring, domino style, worth P27,000.00; one (1) solid
gold bracelet worth 363,600.00, Philippine Currency, belonging to said DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party in the total amount aforementioned; that on the occasion of the robbery and pursuant to
their conspiracy, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, and taking advantage the(ir) superior strength, with the use of
handgun, shot LORENZO BERNALES y ALERIA, a driver of the said offended party, thus inflicting upon him serious and mortal
wounds which resulted to the insta(n)taneous death of the said LORENZO BERNALES y ALERIA, to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of said LORENZO BERNALEZ y ALERIA in such amount as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the
Civil Code.

Contrary to law.1
Only the accused Echavez brothers and Alejandro Lucero were apprehended. The others remained at large.

Trial proceeded only as against the three.

The evidence on record shows that on May 6, 1988, private complainant DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID spent the night at his boarding house,
located at #35 Ilocos Norte Street, Bago-Bantay, Quezon City. He wanted to return that night to his residence at Project 6, Quezon City.
However, his driver, Lorenzo Bernales, advised him not to leave that night for Bernales overheard that the group of Balbino and Bienvenido
Echavez would rob him on his way home. He heeded the advice.

It was around 7:00 a.m., the next day, that Dr. Madrid again asked his driver to bring him to his main residence in Project 6, Quezon City.
While traversing Road 14, a gray-reddish car overtook the Mercedes Benz he was riding and blocked their way. Three (3) men swiftly
alighted from the car blocking them and barged into his Benz. The first grabbed the driver's seat and pushed his driver to the other side of
the seat. The second occupied the right side of his driver. The third sat beside Dr. Madrid at the back sent and punched him. Simultaneously,
the man at the right side of his driver pulled out his gun and announced a hold-up.2

The man beside Dr. Madrid divested him of the following: a gold Rolex watch, studded with diamonds, worth P155,000.00, a three (3) carat
diamond ring worth P80,000.00, another two (2) carat domino-style ring, surrounded with diamonds worth P27,000.00, a necklace worth
P27,000.00, a bracelet worth P50,000.00, and his wallet containing P6,600.00.3

After driving them around the area for a couple of hours, the malefactors stopped his car and alighted. The worst came. The man at the right
side of his driver shot the latter at the chest before fleeing. Dr. Madrid and his driver were rushed by concerned citizens to the Veterans
Memorial Hospital. Two hours later, his driver died of hemorrhage as a result of the gunshot wound he sustained.4 Dr. Madrid survived.5 He
reported the incident to the Quezon City police. When no action was taken on his case, he filed his complaint with the Special Operations
Group of the Central Intelligence Service (CIS).6

Two months later, the CIS efforts paid-off. On July 23, 1988, the Special Operations Group headed by Capt. Raul Boac, after a surveillance of
the suspects, interrogated Bienvenido Echavez in Camp Crame. Two days later, they apprehended Balbino Echavez and Alejandro Lucero.
They turned them over to the Investigation Department of the CIS.7

Pfc. Alberto Pursal was assigned to conduct the investigation of the suspects. He declared that even before the investigation started, Lucero
verbally admitted his participation in the crime and that he was the one who shot Bernales, the driver of Dr. Madrid. 8

In any event, Pfc. Pursal went thru the motions of investigation. He informed Lucero of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel. When Lucero told him that he had no lawyer, Pursal informed that CIS Legal Department about Lucero's need for a lawyer.9 In due
time, Atty. Diosdado Peralta appeared at the investigator's office at around 9:00 p.m. He identified himself as the lawyer who was requested
to assist Lucero and inquired about the latter's whereabouts. He was then directed to where Lucero was.
Atty. Peralta conferred with Lucero. He also apprised Lucero of his constitutional rights. He explained to Lucero that he has the right to
remain silent, that he is not obliged to give any statement to the investigators, and that even if he has already given a statement, he may
refuse to sign it. He observed no reaction from Lucero. Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta gathered the impression that Lucero understood his advice.

Thereafter, the CIS investigator began taking down Lucero's statement. When the investigator started asking the preliminary questions, Atty.
Peralta left to attend the wake of his friend, Capt. Emilio Dacanay, at Fort Bonifacio. He gave word that in case of need, he could be reached at
his residence.

The next morning, Lucero was accompanied by two (2) CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. The extrajudicial statement of Lucero (Exhibit
"C"), was presented to Atty. Peralta. It was already signed by Lucero. In the presence of the two (2) CIS agents, Atty. Peralta examined Exhibit
"C" and explained to Lucero its Legal implications. He asked Lucero whether he gave the statements voluntarily. Lucero replied in the
affirmative. Atty. Peralta then signed Exhibit "C". 10

The three (3) accused denied complicity in the in the crime charged.

Appellant Lucero's defense is alibi. He testified that on May 7, 1988, he was at his house in Caloocan City. He woke up at 6:30 a.m., stayed at
his house the whole day repairing the upholstery of a customer's chair. He was then with his cousin Marcelino Seneta and his wife Mylen
Lucero. He worked until 5 p.m. that day.

Lucero was apprehended on July 25, 1988, more than two (2) months after the commission of the crime. He said he was surprised when
several unidentified men accosted him while he was walking towards his house. They chased him, handcuffed and blindfolded him and
pushed him into a jeep. He was He was blindfolded the whole night and did not know where he was taken. The men turned out to be police
officers. Later, he identified one of the men to be Capt. Boak, head of the CIS Special Operations Group.

The next day, he learned he was in Camp Crame. He claimed that he was tortured. He was not informed of the offense for which he was being
investigated. Neither did they reveal the identity of the complainant. A couple of days lapsed and a CIS agent brought him to a clinic inside
Camp Crame. The doctor saw the contusions on his body. He advised that he be treated. The CIS agent refused and they left the clinic.

Lucero denied knowing Dr. Madrid, the Echavez brothers and the other accused in this case. He said he only met Dr. Madrid at the CIS Office
during the police line-up. He was made to line-up four (4) times before Dr. Madrid finally identified him on the fourth time.

Lucero also claimed he signed the extrajudicial confession (Exhibit "C") 11 under duress. He denied engaging the services of Atty. Peralta. He
likewise confirmed that Atty. Peralta was not present during his actual custodial interrogation. 12

After trial, the court a quo acquitted the Echavez brothers for insufficient evidence. The trial court, however, convicted accused Lucero. The
dispositive portion of the Decision 13 reads:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

 1. The accused brothers BIENVENIDO ECHAVEZ y VALIDA and BALBINO ECHAVEZ y VALIDA are hereby ACQUITTED for
insufficiency of evidence; and

2. Accused ALEJANDRO LUCERO y CORTEL is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct
participation of Robbery with Homicide. Alejandro Lucero is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment term of RECLUSION
PERPETUA.

On the civil aspect, Alejandro Lucero is hereby ordered a) to pay the heirs of the deceased victim Lorenzo Bernales y Aleria the
sum of P30,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages for the mental anguish suffered by his family; and b)
to pay Dr. Demetrio Z. Madrid the sum of P363,600.00 representing the cash money, and money value of the jewelries and
wristwatch he lost due to the robbery at bar.

SO ORDERED.14

Hence this appeal by Lucero, raising the following assignments of error:

1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCES (SIC) OF THE PROSECUTION WHICH WERE
INCONSISTENT, NOT CREDIBLE, UNRELIABLE, DOUBTFUL AND INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S
CONVICTION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE ALLEGED CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH
HOMICIDE INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT CONSPIRACY WAS NOT PROVEN IN THIS CASE.

3. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED ON THE BASIS OF HIS
ALLEGED EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION (MADE IN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION) WHICH WAS OBTAINED THRU FORCE,
VIOLENCE AND WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL OF HIS OWN CHOICE OR ENGAGED BY ANY PERSON ON HIS BEHALF
OR APPOINTED BY THE LOWER COURT AND THEREFORE SUFFERED CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES.

4 THAT THE LOWER ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED WITH CERTITUDE BY THE PROSECUTION.

5. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED PRIMARILY ON THE
BASIS OF THE WEAKNESS OF HIS DEFENSE OF ALIBI AND NOT ON THE STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE; AND
INSPITE OF THE LACK OF POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

6. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND NOT ACQUITTING HIM LIKE HIS CO-
ACCUSED AND ALLEGED CO-CONSPIRATORS [THE ECHAVEZ BROTHERS] OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
We find the appeal meritorious.

The conviction of appellant rests on two (2) facts: (a) his positive identification by the complainant, and (b) his extra-judicial confession
admitting his participation in the crime. We find that the evidence proving these facts cannot stand scrutiny.

Firstly, the credibility of the main prosecution eyewitness, Dr. Demetrio Madrid who identified appellant, is seriously open to doubt. It
stands unrebutted on the record that appellant had to participate at the police line-up four (4) times before he was finally identified by Dr.
Madrid. There is no reason for the ambivalence. The robbery took place in broad daylight and the three malefactors wore no mask. They
drove them around for three (3) hours. Considering these circumstances, there is no reason for Dr. Madrid's failure to immediately identify
appellant.

We are also disconcerted by the vacillating testimony of Dr. Madrid during the trial. Initially, Dr. Madrid claimed that he could identify only
one of the robbers who staged the hold-up. 15 At another point, Dr. Madrid said he could identify two of the malefactors. 16 In his affidavit, Dr.
Madrid presented he could identify all three. 17 Appellant's conviction cannot be made to rest on this nebulous identification by Dr. Madrid.

Secondly, appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extra-judicial confession.

The 1987 Constitution 18 requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime should be provided with counsel. We have
constitutionalized the right to counsel because of our hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions
from a suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions and render them inadmissible. 19 We take pride in constitutionalizing this right to
counsel even while other countries have desisted from elevating this right to a higher pedestal. We have sustained the inviolability of this
precious right with vigor and without any apology.

The trial court did not display the required sensitivity to appellant's right to counsel. Indeed, it did not impose a rigorous respect for the
right. It was satisfied that there was "substantial" compliance with the requirements of right to counsel. This is far from the intent of the
Constitution. The records show that Atty. Peralta's, who was not the counsel of choice of appellant, arrived at the CIS Office an the second
night of appellant's detention. More exactly, he arrived at the CIS Office at around 9:00 p.m. and talked with appellant about his rights. Atty.
Peralta himself admitted he received no reaction from appellant although his impression was that appellant understood him. 20Worse, Atty.
Peralta left appellant in the custody of the CIS agents when his real interrogation started. He said he had to attend the wake of a friend. His
attitude did not speak well of the importance he gave to his role as counsel to a person under custodial interrogation for the commission of a
very serious offense. It was during his absence that appellant gave an uncounselled confession. They tried to cure his uncounselled
confession for the next day, appellant was brought by two (2) CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. In the presence of these agents, Atty. Peralta
asked appellant if he understood the statements he gave and if he signed it voluntarily. Appellant, of course, affirmed the voluntariness of the
execution of the confession. Atty. Peralta was satisfied and the trial court ruled that appellant's right to counsel was not infringed. We
disagree.

We hold that when the Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. The
circumstances in the case at bench clearly demonstrate that appellant received no effective counseling from Atty. Peralta. In People v. De
Guzman, 21 we held that in custodial investigation, the right to counsel attaches from the moment the investigation starts, i.e., when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from the accused. In this case, at the crucial
point when the interrogation was just starting, Atty. Peralta left appellant to attend the wake of a friend . At that critical stage, appellant gave
his uncounselled extra-judicial a confession. Surely, such a confession where appellant was unprotected from mischief cannot convict.

Neither can the trial court convict appellant on the ground that alibi is inherently a weak defense. Chiseled in our jurisprudence is the rule
that the onus is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Given the uncertainty of appellant's
identification and the inadmissibility of his uncounselled confession, there is no thread of evidence to criminally inculpate appellant.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal Case No. Q-88-201 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City , Branch CIII, convicting appellant
Alejandro Lucero y Cortel of robbery with homicide is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 102786. August 14, 1998]

ALEJANDRO B. DE LA TORRE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This case is here on appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June 18, 1991, which affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City finding petitioner Alejandro B. de la Torre guilty of qualified theft and sentencing him to an indeterminate prison
term of 6 years, 1 month, and 11 days, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day, as maximum, and ordering him to indemnify the Manila Electric
Company (MERALCO), the offended party, in the amount of P41,786.00.
The facts are as follows:
In the afternoon of April 18, 1989, Alexander Manalo, an electrical engineer of MERALCO assigned to inspect six electric meters installed
in the premises of the Cathay Pacific Steel and Smelting Corporation (CAPASSCO) on De la Cruz Street in San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon
City, discovered that the said electric meters were missing. He reported the loss to the MERALCO office in Ortigas Avenue, Pasig City. On
April 20, 1989, Manalo and Felino Olegario, also of MERALCO, gave statements to the Northern Police District at Camp Karingal, Sikatuna
Village, Quezon City regarding the loss of the electric meters. They suspected that CAPASSCO employees must have damaged the electric
meters while tampering with them and that to conceal the attempt, the employees must have removed the electric meters. They expressed
suspicion that MERALCO personnel were involved.
Patrolman Edgar Enopia, who was assigned to the case, proceeded to the scene of the crime and inquired from people he saw there if
they had seen the electric meters being taken down from the post near the gate of CAPASSCO. According to Enopia, one of those he asked,
Danilo Garcia, said he had seen at about 10:00 p.m. on April 11, 1989 four crewmembers in a MERALCO service truck, with the number 522
painted on its side, removing the electric meters. Acting on this lead, Enopia asked MERALCO for the identities of the men, one of whom
turned out to be petitioner de la Torre. It appears that MERALCO service truck number 522 had specific crewmembers assigned to it.
On July 4, 1989, the crewmembers were taken to the NPD headquarters for investigation. They were included in a line-up of eight (8)
persons. Garcia pointed to petitioner de la Torre as the leader of the group which took down the electric meters from the CAPASSCO
premises, but he did not recognize the three (3) other crewmembers.
Based on the statements of Alexander Manalo, Felino Olegario, Edgar Enopia, and Danilo Garcia, Assistant City Prosecutor Demetrio
Macapagal filed on July 13, 1989 an information charging petitioner de la Torre with Qualified Theft as defined in Arts. 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code:

That on or about the 11th day of April, 1989, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, ALEJANDRO
DELA TORRE Y BERNAL, being then employed as leadman of a 5-men service crew of linemen of MERALCO, with grave abuse of confidence,
in conspiracy with his co-accused JOHN DOE, PETER DOE and CHARLES DOE, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping
each other, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away the following properties owned by the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) which were installed at
the premises of the CATHAY PACIFIC STEEL AND SMELTING CORPORATION (CAPASSCO), located at No. 292 P. dela Cruz Street, San
Bartolome, Novaliches, this City, customers of the aforesaid MERALCO, to wit:
One (1) GE Type C-9,
120 volts, Co. No. 42GRM-219 ---P13,025.00
One (1) GE Type VW-63-A,
120 volts, Co. No. 41G208 --- 4,997.06
One (1) GE Type V-63-A,
120 volts, Co. No. 41GD-558 --- 2,870.94
One (1) GE Type G-9,
139 volts, 3 phase, No.42GRIM 1091 --- 13,025.00
One (1) WH Type
D4A-2, 3 phase, Co. No.41D4AW-92 --- 4,997.06
One (1) Reactive Meter,
No. 41CA-34 --- 2,870.94

with an aggregate value of P41,786.00, Philippine Currency, belonging to MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, represented by FELINO R.
OLEGARIO, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforementioned amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
 The case was raffled to Branch 92 of the RTC of Quezon City, presided over by Judge Pacita Caizares-Nye. Trial was held from December
28, 1989 to February 1, 1990. In a decision rendered on March 16, 1990, Judge Caizares-Nye, relying heavily on the testimony of Garcia,
found petitioner de la Torre guilty of Qualified Theft and thus sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term of 6 years, 1 month, and 11
days of prision mayor, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum; and ordered him to pay MERALCO the amount
of P41,786.00.
Petitioner de la Torre appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending first, that his constitutional rights were violated during the custodial
investigation conducted in the case; second, that the RTC erred when it admitted in evidence the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
when the same were not formally offered; third, that the RTC took into account hearsay evidence in arriving at its judgment; and fourth, that
the uncorroborated testimony of Garcia was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, the Court of
Appeals[2] affirmed the lower courts decision.[3] The Court of Appeals subsequently denied reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.
First. Petitioner de la Torre alleges violation of his constitutional rights under Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution which provides that any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Petitioner de la Torre claims he was not informed
of his right to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel during the investigation conducted on July 4, 1989 at the NPD
headquarters, where the crewmembers of MERALCO service truck number 522 were presented in a police line-up. He further invokes the
exclusionary rule in par. 3 of the same 12 that any confession or admission obtained in violation of [this rule] shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
In Gamboa v. Cruz,[4] this Court ruled that no custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel, engaged
by the person arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself, or by anyone in
his behalf, and that, while the right may be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless made in writing and in the presence of
counsel.[5] However, this applies only from the moment the investigating officer begins to ask questions for the purpose of eliciting
admissions, confessions, or any information from the accused. A police line-up is not considered part of any custodial inquest because it is
conducted before that stage is reached.[6]
In the instant case, petitioner de la Torre, together with the other crewmembers of MERALCO truck number 522, was merely included in
a line-up of eight (8) persons from which he was picked out by Garcia as the leader of the group which had removed the electric meters from
the CAPASSCO premises. Until then, the police investigation did not focus on petitioner. Indeed, no questions were put to him. Rather, the
questions were directed to witnesses of the complainant. There is, therefore, no basis for petitioners allegations that his rights as a suspect
in a custodial interrogation were violated.
Second. Petitioner contends that the trial court admitted in evidence the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses when the fact is that
before they testified, their testimonies were not formally offered as required by Rule 132, 35 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, as held in People
v. Java:[7]

. . . Rule 132, Section 34 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that for evidence to be considered, it should be formally offered and the
purpose specified. . . .
Under the new procedure as spelled out in Section 35 of the said rule which became effective on July 1, 1989, the offer of the testimony of a
witness must be made at the time the witness is called to testify. The previous practice was to offer the testimonial evidence at the end of the
trial after all the witnesses had testified. With the innovation, the court is put on notice whether the witness to be presented is a material
witness and should be heard, or a witness who would be testifying on irrelevant matters or on facts already testified to by other witnesses
and should, therefore, be stopped from testifying further.

. . . Section 36 of the aforementioned rule requires that an objection in the course of the oral examination of a witness should be made as
soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent. Since no objection to the admissibility of evidence was made in the court
below, an objection raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered.[8]
Petitioner raised this point, however, only in the Court of Appeals. He thus waived his objection by his failure to raise it at the close of
the presentation of the prosecution evidence in the trial court. As already noted, the trial in this case took place from December 28, 1989 to
February 1, 1990. That was after the adoption of the new rule which required that the offer be made at the beginning of the testimony of a
witness. Petitioner should have invoked this rule and objected to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, if not before each of their
testimonies, then at least at the time their testimonies were formally offered at the close of the presentation of the prosecution evidence. Not
having done so, he must be deemed to have waived his objection based on this ground. Consequently, the trial court committed no error in
considering the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in its decision despite the fact that such testimonies had not been offered before
they were given.
Third. Petitioner claims that, in violation of the hearsay rule, written statements pertaining to disputed facts were considered by the trial
court in its decision without presenting the declarants at the trial for examination.
Rule 132, 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court,
and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers
of the witness shall be given orally. The reason for this rule is two-fold: to afford the judge the opportunity of observing the demeanor of the
witness and to allow the adverse party a chance of cross-examining him.
Although hearsay evidence may be admitted because of lack of objection by the adverse partys counsel, it is nonetheless without
probative value. The explanation for this is given in People v. Valero, thus:[9]

The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the
rule of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the same does not give such evidence any probative value. The lack of
objection may make any incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of
evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value.
In this case, documents material to the guilt of the accused were admitted without the prosecution presenting in court those who
executed them, to wit: Exhibit M, certification signed by a certain G.B. Pilapil, Jr., which states that MERALCO did not send out any personnel
to inspect the electrical installations at CAPASSCO during the period April 11, 1989 to April 12, 1989; Exhibit N, certification issued by one
Vitaliano A. Dizon, which states that MERALCO did not receive any complaint from CAPASSCO concerning the electric meters in question
during the same period; and Exhibit P, certification given by a certain E.M. Lopez, Jr., stating that MERALCO did not authorize any of its
employees to remove the subject electric meters.
These documents contain statements of facts and, therefore, those who made them should have been presented in court so that they
could be cross-examined by the defense.Otherwise, whatever matter they contain is hearsay and, consequently, without probative value.
Fourth. We likewise agree with the final point raised by petitioner, namely, that the evidence for the prosecution at the trial is not
sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.The trial court convicted petitioner solely on the uncorroborated testimony of Danilo
Garcia.
Garcia claimed that at about 10:00 p.m. on April 11, 1989, while he was waiting for his wife in front of the CAPASSCO compound on P. de
la Cruz Street, San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City, he saw petitioner supervising the other crewmembers of a MERALCO service truck
number 522 in bringing down the six electric meters from the MERALCO post at the CAPASSCO compound. According to Garcia, he noticed
the Meralco truck parked below the Meralco post outside the CAPASSCO gate. The truck was equipped with a crane-like structure to which
was attached a basket in which two men rode. The basket was raised toward the Meralco post while two or three men remained on the
ground next to the Meralco truck. One man was giving instructions to the men removing the meters. Garcia recognized the truck to be that of
Meralco because of its familiar orange color. Thus, he testified:
Q: While conversing with your friends at a sidewalk beside CAPASSCO, did you observe any unusual incident?
A: There is, sir.
Q: Could you please tell us what is this unusual incident that you observed?
A: Yes, sir, a MERALCO truck was parked and the basket was being raised to the post.
Q: And could you please tell us what happened after the basket was raised to the post, Mr. Witness?
A: While the basket was being raised to the post with two (2) men on board, another one was giving instructions from below.
....
Q: After the adjustment of the basket, what happened, Mr. Witness?
A: Then, they opened the box that was attached to the wall of CAPASSCO while the other one was tampering the meters and handing it to his
companion who was with him in the basket.
....
Q: Mr. Witness, could you recognize the two (2) men aboard the basket if you have the opportunity of seeing them again?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How about the other man who was giving instructions on the ground? Can you recognize that person if you have the opportunity of seeing
him again?
 A: Yes, sir.
....
Q: Will you look around inside the courtroom if he is here?
A: No, sir.
Q: I will show you photographs of several persons. Can you identify the person whom you saw giving instructions on April 11, 1989?
A: Yes, sir.
....
(Witness pointed to a photograph of Alejandro de la Torre which appears on the bailbond filed by the accused.)
....
Q: Can you remember the body number of the truck, Mr. Witness?
A: Body number 522, sir.
Q: You stated that it was Body No. 522. Why do you say that it is 522, Mr. Witness?
A: It so happened that I won in the jueteng, sir.[10]
To be sure, the uncorroborated testimony of a lone witness is sufficient basis for the conviction of the accused if it is credible, positive,
and constitutes proof beyond reasonable doubt that the latter is guilty. However, in the case at bar, the answers given by Garcia to questions
asked during his direct examination fall short of this standard. First, Garcia must have an extremely acute sense of perception to recall a
feature of the MERALCO service truck, such as its number, which at the time had absolutely no significance for him. His claim that he
remembered the number because it was the number of a winning bet in jueteng is too facile to be convincing. Second, Garcia must have a
phenomenal memory to be able to recall almost three months after the incident the appearance of a complete stranger whom he had seen
only once. The removal of electric meters by crewmembers of MERALCO was hardly a remarkable event that would have deserved the
attention to detail that Garcia, a mere chance passerby, apparently lavished upon it. As this Court said in People v. Ibal:[11]

. . . the presence of minor inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness could be an indication of truth. A witness whose testimony is perfect
in all aspects, without a flaw and remembering even the minutest details which jibe beautifully with one another, lays himself open to
suspicion of having been coached or having memorized statements earlier rehearsed.
On the other hand, if, as Garcia said, he noticed that the MERALCO men were tampering with the meters, it is a source of wonder why he
did not report the matter to the barangay authorities.
Not only is the testimony of Danilo Garcia improbable. His credibility as a witness is likewise doubtful in view of the testimony of Pio
Bautista, a council member of Barangay San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City. He testified that Danilo Garcia was not known to residents
of P. de la Cruz Street in San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City. According to Bautista, he made inquiries upon the request of petitioner de
la Torre concerning the residence address of Garcia. Bautista testified:
Q: . . . Were you able to make some exhaustive inquiries of Mr. Danilo Garcia which he said in his sworn statement nakatira sa looban of P. de
la Cruz Street, San Bartolome, Quezon City?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And then what happened when you went in looban, P. de la Cruz Street, San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City?
A: Nobody was able to tell me that a certain Danilo Garcia resides in that place. [12]
Evidence to be believed must come from a credible witness and must itself be credible.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and petitioner Alejandro B. de la Torre is ACQUITTED on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R No. 134056. July 6, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERT FIGUEROA and BEATRICE VALERIO, accused.
ROBERT FIGUEROA, accused-appellant.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Accused-appellant ROBERT FIGUEROA (hereafter OBET) appeals from the 18 May 1998 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court
of Paraaque City, Branch 259, in Criminal Case No. 97-306, convicting him of violation of Section 14-A[2], Article III of R.A. No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA. No. 7659. His co-accused Beatrice Valerio (hereafter
Betty) was acquitted.
OBET and Betty were indicted under an information, dated 2 April 1997, whose accusatory portion reads as follows:

That on 16 February 1997 and for sometime prior thereto in Paraaque City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused without authority of law, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously manufacture, produce, prepare or process methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug amounting to a 2.4 liters,
directly by means of chemical synthesis.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
 When arraigned OBET and Betty each entered a plea of not guilty.[4] Trial on the merits then ensued.
The witnesses presented by the prosecution were NBI Forensic Chemist Mary Ann T. Aranas, NBI Special Investigator III Pio M.
Palencia (hereafter PALENCIA), and NBI Intelligence Agent II Martin Soriano (hereafter SORIANO).
PALENCIA testified that on 15 February 1997, he was in the office of SORIANO at Project 6, Quezon City, when they received a
call from their informant, a woman, who reported that a certain OBET was allegedly engaged in large-scale drug trafficking in
Makati City. PALENCIA and SORIANO forthwith instructed their informant to establish contact with OBET for a buy-bust operation.
After several hours, the informant reported that OBET was already waiting for her at No. 1485 Soliman Street, Makati City, with
instructions for her to come alone as soon as she was ready with P150,000. PALENCIA then caused the dusting of fluorescent
powder over ten pieces of authentic P100 bills as buy-bust money and gave them to the informant.[5]
On board a taxi, PALENCIA, SORIANO and their informant proceeded to the rendezvous area. They arrived at half past twelve
o'clock in the early morning of 16 February 1997. As the gate was already open, the informant entered the premises, while
PALENCIA and SORIANO discreetly crawled and positioned themselves near the gate of the house. Strategically positioned,
PALENCIA overheard OBET ask the informant whether she had the money. PALENCIA then saw the informant hand over the money
to OBET. While counting the money, OBET sensed the presence of other people in the area. OBET, who was in possession of a .45
caliber pistol, fired it twice toward the direction of PALENCIA, while hurrying towards the house. OBET then held hostage his
mistress, Estrella Brilliantes, and her two children for the next three hours until the arrival of one Major Roberto Reyes to whom
OBET surrendered. PALENCIA and SORIANO brought OBET, his firearm and the recovered buy-bust money to the WPD
Headquarters for recording purposes and, thereafter, to the NBI Headquarters.[6]
At the NBI Headquarters, PALENCIA and SORIANO methodically interrogated OBET about the source of his shabu. OBET
eventually volunteered that his source was a certain Betty of 263 El Grande Street, B.F. Homes, Paraaque City. PALENCIA and
SORIANO took OBET to Betty's house as a follow-up operation. They arrived at around 6:00 a.m. of the same day, 16 February 1997.
As OBET called Betty earlier to tell her that he was arriving, Betty already had the gate opened for them. After parking, PALENCIA
saw Betty waiting for them. Upon seeing OBET in handcuffs, Betty asked what happened. OBET replied that he was just caught in a
buy-bust operation. PALENCIA and SORIANO then tried to convince Betty to surrender the shabu that OBET insisted was hidden
inside the house. As Betty persistently denied the existence of the shabu, PALENCIA told OBET to confer with Betty. After a while,
OBET proceeded to the kitchen of the guesthouse located outside the main house, followed by Betty. OBET then promptly pointed to
what he termed as liquid shabu inside a white pail along with other drug paraphernalia, such as a beaker spray. PALENCIA and
SORIANO seized the items.[7]
Thereafter, PALENCIA requested a laboratory examination of all the seized items and an ultraviolet light examination over the
persons of OBET, Betty and a certain Eva Baluyot.[8] PALENCIA claimed that based on the certification issued by the Forensic
Chemistry Division of the NBI, all the items seized from Betty's residence were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride except
specimen no.7; while from among the persons subjected to ultraviolet light examination, only OBET was found positive for
fluorescent powder.[9]
On cross-examination, PALENCIA admitted that he and SORIANO conducted the search without a search warrant, but with the
consent of Betty.[10] He also admitted that he did not actually see OBET or Betty in the act of manufacturing shabu.[11]
 NBI Intelligence Agent II SORIANO corroborated PALENCIA's testimony. He likewise admitted that the custodial investigation of
OBET, during which he divulged Betty as the source of shabu, was conducted in the absence of any counsel. SORIANO also confirmed
PALENCIA's testimony that they were not armed with a search warrant, but that they conducted the follow-up operation at Betty's
house under the hot pursuit theory.[12] He further maintained that OBET, after conferring with Betty, uttered, Ako na nga, ako na
nga"(I will do it, I will do it). OBET then proceeded to the dirty kitchen, pointed to the refrigerator and had it moved.
Thereafter, SORIANO saw a plastic pail containing liquid with floating brown substances.
SORIANO admitted that he and PALENCIA neither witnessed OBET and Betty manufacture shabu in the manner described in
Section 2(j) of the Dangerous Drugs Act[13]; nor did they possess evidence, independent of the items they had seized, that OBET and
Betty were engaged in the labeling or manufacturing of shabu.[14]
Forensic Chemist Mary Ann T. Aranas testified that on 16 February 1997, she conducted a laboratory examination for the
presence of any prohibited or regulated drug on eleven different specimens (Exhibits "B"-"L").[15] The result of the examination
disclosed that all the specimens except specimen no. 7 (Exhibit "H") were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. [16] She
further observed that specimen no. 8 (Exhibit I- I-2), the brown liquid with floating solid flakes contained in a plastic pail, was
positive for epedrine,[17] a substance used in the manufacture of methamphetamine hydrochloride. She opined that this crude form
of shabu would have to undergo chemical processes, like extraction, crystallization, distillation, before it could be finally converted
into shabu's crystalline form. She also conducted a fluorescent powder examination over the persons of OBET and Betty. Only OBET
gave a positive result.[18]
On the other hand, OBET testified that while he was watching television on the night of 15 February 1997, he heard the doorbell
rang. Upon seeing Eva Baluyot, his childhood friend, he opened the door for her. Inside the house, Eva handed him a bundle of
money and stated that she was buying shabu from him. OBET emphatically told Eva that he was not engaged in such illegal trade
and returned the money. OBET then accompanied Eva out of the house. At the garage, OBET noticed someone peeping from the
dark; so he told Eva to go back inside the house with him. Eva ignored the request. OBET thus left Eva at the garage and got his .45
caliber gun from his house. While he was locking the door, his handgun accidentally fired off, as he forgot that it had already been
cocked. This blast was followed by shouts of people outside claiming that they were NBI men. Uncertain, OBET did not go out of the
house but instead told the alleged NBI men to call the Makati Police, specifically Major Reyes. The NBI agents, however, persisted in
convincing OBET to go out of the house. He did get out of his house after three hours when he heard the voice of Major Reyes. OBET
gave to Major Reyes his gun. The Makati Police and the NBI men thereafter conducted a joint search inside OBET's house which,
however, yielded nothing. OBET was then brought to the Makati Police Headquarters where the incident was recorded. Thereafter,
PALENCIA, SORIANO and another NBI man brought OBET to the house of Betty, his former live-in partner, at El Grande Street, B.F.
Homes, Paraaque City, upon the insistence and information of Eva Baluyot.[19]
Upon entering B.F. Homes, SORIANO instructed OBET to call and tell Betty that he was already near. The gate was already
opened when they arrived, and the NBI men freely parked their car at the garage. Then, PALENCIA and SORIANO alighted from the
car and entered Betty's house. OBET was left in the car under the charge of the third NBI man; hence, he knew nothing of what
happened inside Betty's house.[20]
 For her part, Betty admitted that she was romantically involved with OBET and had a child by him. She recalled that on 16
February 1997, OBET called at around 6:00 a.m. and requested her to open the gate for him, as he was already near. She ran down to
the garage and opened the gate. Since her car was parked halfway through the garage, she went to the main house to get her car
keys to make way for OBET's car. But as she came out of the main house, OBET's car was already parked inside the garage. She
noticed that OBET had two companions with long firearms. The two, whom Betty later found out as NBI men PALENCIA and
SORIANO, informed her that they had just come from a buy-bust operation and that OBET had led them to her house, as there were
illegal chemicals kept in the premises. Shocked andamazed, she then asked for a search warrant, but the NBI men could not produce
any.[21]
Betty further recalled that the NBI men claimed that they found contraband items near the dirty kitchen at a small space behind
the refrigerator where cases of softdrinks were stored. Betty denied any knowledge that there were illegal chemicals inside her
house and that these were manufactured into shabu. She also denied knowing Eva Baluyot.[22]
On cross-examination, Betty disclaimed her alleged consent to the search of her house, for she specifically asked the NBI men
for a search warrant. She asserted that she did not see the NBI men find the shabu paraphernalia because she went up to the second
floor of her house. She only saw that the NBI men were bringing several items out of her house.[23]
The trial court agreed with the prosecution's theory that the warrantless arrests of OBET and Betty were conducted within the
purview of valid warrantless arrests enumerated in Section 5,[24] Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. It then ruled as valid the
consented warrantless search conducted at the house of Betty. Consequently, it found that the very items seized by the NBI
agents at the kitchen of Betty's guesthouse were admissible as the corpus delicti of the violation of Section 14-A of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. Thus, the trial court "believed" that the paraphernalia seized were indispensable to the processing or manufacturing of
shabu into crystallized form. Although it conceded that the prosecution witnesses did not actually see the crystallization
processes, the trial court observed that the Dangerous Drug Act does not require that there be actual manufacturing activities at
the time of the seizure.
The trial court, however, acquitted Betty for failure of the prosecution to adduce evidence that she, in conspiracy with OBET,
manufactured shabu without the requisite authority. It did not arrive at a similar conclusion as far as OBET was concerned, but
declared that based on the evidence on record, OBET's guilt of the crime charged was proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, in the
decision of 18 May 1998 the trial court decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the evidence insufficient to warrant the conviction of accused Beatrice Valerio y del Rosario for Violation of Sec. 14-a
of Article III of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659, this court pronounces her NOT GUILTY and considering that she is detained at the NBI
the NBI is directed to immediately release her from custody unless there be some reasons for her detention. Finding, however, accused
Robert Figueroa GUILTY as charged [of] the same offense in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, this Court hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and to suffer the accessory penalties provided by
law, specifically Art. VI [sic] of the Revised Penal Code.

The Clerk of Court is directed to prepare the Mittimus for the immediate transfer of Robert Figueroa to the Bureau of Corrections in
Muntinlupa City.
SO ORDERED.
Unsatisfied with the verdict, OBET appealed the decision to us. He principally premises his prayer for acquittal on the failure of
the State to show by convincing evidence that shortly prior to or during custodial investigation, he was apprised of his constitutional
rights to remain silent, to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and to be informed of such
rights. He asserts that he did not waive those rights. Thus, whatever admissions were allegedly extracted from him are inadmissible
in evidence. Even assuming that his extrajudicial statements were admissible, Betty's acquittal would work in his favor because the
indictment is based on conspiracy. In a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Therefore, the acts imputed to him were also the
acts of Betty, and vice versa. Since the trial court considered insufficient for conviction the acts of Betty, then he, too, should be
acquitted.
In the Appellee's Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that not all warrantless searches and seizures are
illegal. For one, a warrantless search and seizure is not unreasonable and offensive to the Constitution if consent is shown. In this
case, the prosecution convincingly proved that Betty consented to the search of her house. With her consent, Betty validly waived
her constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure. Consequently, the items seized in her house by virtue of the
consented search are admissible in evidence against her and OBET.
The OSG also contends that the acquittal of Betty does not per se work to absolve OBET of the crime charged. Betty's believable
disavowal of the location of the paraphernalia and other circumstances on record reasonably indicative of her innocence cannot
redound in favor of OBET. The latter apparently knew the exact location of the hidden paraphernalia. By such disclosure, it is not
far-fetched to conclude that OBET had been actually engaged in the manufacture of shabu.
We first resolve the question of whether Betty's acquittal would benefit OBET.
We disagree with the theory of OBET that in an indictment based on conspiracy, the acquittal of a conspirator likewise absolves
a co-conspirator from criminal liability. Indeed, the rule is well-settled that once a conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act
of all, and each of the conspirators is liable for the crimes committed by the other conspirators. [25] It follows then that if the
prosecution fails to prove conspiracy, the alleged conspirators should be held individually responsible for their own respective acts.
Accordingly, OBET's criminal liability in this case must be judged on the basis of his own acts as established by the quantum of proof
required in criminal cases.
We should then determine whether the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt OBET's guilt for
unauthorized manufacture of shabu, a regulated drug.
After a meticulous review of the records and of the evidence adduced by the parties in this case, we find that what PALENCIA
and SORIANO did left much to be desired, thereby resulting in a bungled prosecution of the case. The evidence for the prosecution
miserably failed to prove OBET's guilt of the offense charged.
The buy-bust operation was a failure because no shabu or other regulated or prohibited drug was found in OBET's person and
residence. No evidence was adduced to show that OBET handed shabu over to the informant. Yet, he was placed in custody. For
what offense he was held in custody does not, initially, appear very clear on the record.
 It was established that OBET fired two shots toward the direction of PALENCIA and SORIANO and held hostage his mistress and
her two children. Yet he was not placed under custodial investigation for such crimes as grave threats, coercion, illegal possession of
firearms, or crimes other than that with which he was charged.
On the contrary, OBET was held in custody and investigated or interrogated about the source of the shabu, none of which was
found during the buy-bust operation. In short he was held in custody as a consequence of the failed buy-bust operation and as a
follow-up to link him to the source and establish a conspiracy in the illegal trade of shabu. Allegedly, he admitted that the source was
Betty. On the basis of that admission, PALENCIA and SORIANO, together with OBET, proceeded to the residence of Betty. Needless to
state, OBET cannot be investigated for anything in relation to shabu while under custody without informing him of his rights to
remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Any waiver of such rights should be in
writing and made in the presence of a counsel pursuant to Section 12 (1)[26], Article III of theConstitution. It has been held that these
rights attach from the moment the investigation starts, i.e. when the investigating officers begin to ask questions to elicit
information and confessions or admissions from the suspect.[27]
It is always incumbent upon the prosecution to prove at the trial that prior to in-custody questioning, the confessant was
informed of his constitutional rights. The presumption of regularity of official acts does not prevail over the constitutional
presumption of innocence.[28] Hence, in the absence of proof that the arresting officers complied with these constitutional
safeguards, extrajudicial statements, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, made during custodial investigation are inadmissible and
cannot be considered in the adjudication of a case.[29] In other words, confessions and admissions in violation of Section 12 (1),
Article III of the Constitution are inadmissible in evidence against the declarant and more so against third persons. [30] This is so even
if such statements are gospel truth and voluntarily given.[31] Such statements are useless except as evidence against the very police
authorities who violated the suspect's rights.[32]
SORIANO admitted that the custodial investigation of OBET was conducted without the presence of a lawyer, and there is no
proof that OBET waived said right and the right to remain silent. No waiver in writing and in the presence of a counsel was
presented. Thus, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution any admission obtained from OBET in the
course of his custodial investigation was inadmissible against him and cannot be used as a justification for the search without a
warrant.
The search conducted on Betty's house was allegedly consented to by Betty. Indeed, a consented search is one of the exceptions
to the requirement of a search warrant. In People v. Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San,[33] we pointed out that:

This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long
been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4)
waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a
valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if
effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest flagrante delicto, (2)
arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.
 In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee, against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to
constitute, a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. [34] The third
condition does not exist in the instant case. The fact is, Betty asked for a search warrant, thus:
Q And of course, these NBI Special Investigators informed you of their purpose is that correct?
A Yes sir.
Q And of course believing that there was nothing in your house you acceded?
A No sir, I was asking for a search warrant.
Q And what was their reply?
A They did not have any but that Figueroa had led them to the property.[35]
Neither can the search be appreciated as a search incidental to a valid warrantless arrest of either Betty or OBET as intimated
by the trial court. First, Betty's arrest did not precede the search. Second, per the prosecution's evidence OBET was not arrested for
possession or sale of regulated or prohibited drugs as a consequence of the buy-bust operation. He surrendered after taking hostage
Estrella and her two children, although he was thereafter held in custody for further questioning on illegal drugs.
There is no showing that the house occupied by Betty and the articles confiscated therefrom belong to OBET. That OBET
pointed to PALENCIA and SORIANO the places where the articles were found provides no sufficient basis for a conclusion that they
belonged to him. Even if the articles thus seized actually belonged to him, they cannot be constitutionally and legally used against
him to establish his criminal liability therefor, since the seizure was the fruit of an invalid custodial investigation.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the 18 May 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 259, Paraaque City,
convicting herein accused-appellant Robert Figueroa of violation of Section 14-A, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended,
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. He is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, and ORDERED immediately released from
confinement or detention unless his continued detention is warranted by virtue of a valid legal cause. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is directed to submit within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of this decision a report on the release of accused-
appellant.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 133188
Appellee,
Members:

PUNO, Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
 - versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Promulgated:
ELIZAR TOMAQUIN,
Appellant. July 23, 2004

x-----------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Once again, the Court is confronted with the issue of the admissibility of an extrajudicial confession. This appeal particularly involves
the question of whether a barangaycaptain who is a lawyer can be considered an independent counsel within the purview of Section 12,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

On December 17, 1996, the Cebu City Prosecutor filed an Information charging appellant with Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of December, 1996, about 2:30 a.m., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a bladed instrument (tres cantos), with deliberate intent,
with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there suddenly and unexpectedly attack, assault and
use personal violence upon one Jaquelyn Luchavez Tatoy, by stabbing her with said bladed instrument, hitting her on the vital
parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her physical injuries causing:

CARDIO RESPIRATORY ARREST DUE TO SHOCK & HEMORRHAGE SEC. TO STAB WOUNDS TO THE TRUNK
(POSTERIOR ASPECT)

as a consequence of which, Jaquelyn Luchavez Tatoy died almost instantaneously.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]

On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge,[2] and trial thereafter ensued.
 There were no eyewitnesses to the incident, and the prosecutions evidence, aside from appellants extrajudicial confession, was
mainly circumstantial.

As presented by the prosecution, the facts are as follows:

At around 11:00 in the evening of December 14, 1996, appellant Elizar Tomaquin @ Hapon, together with Rico and Romy Magdasal,
Noel Labay, and a certain Cardo, were drinking Red Horse beer in Itom Yuta, Lorega, Cebu City. Appellant left the group at around 1:00 in the
morning,

saying he has a headache. At the behest of Rico Magdasal, the group transferred to Lorega proper. A few minutes later, they heard Rustica
Isogan shouting for help as the latter heard Jaquelyn[3] Tatoy, her goddaughter, asking for help. Isogan got two flashlights and they
proceeded upstairs to Jaquelyns house. The first to go up was a certain Moises, followed by the brothers Rico and Romy Magdasal, while Noel
and Cardo remained downstairs. Rico noticed that the hinge and the walling of the main door were damaged, as if it were kicked open, and
only the light in the kitchen was turned on. Rico also saw a black shoe on the stairs and another in the sala, which he claims belong to
appellant. When they went into the kitchen, they saw Jaquelyn bloodied and sprawled face-up on the floor, with her head inside a plastic
container. Jaquelyn was brought to the hospital, where she expired. A neighbor later found a tres cantos with blood on it by the stairs, which
Rico also identified to be appellants.[4] A certain Rey got the black pair of shoes and tres cantosfor safekeeping which were later turned over
to Policeman Tariao of the Homicide Section, Ramos Police Station. The person who turned over the objects to Policeman Tariao was not
identified.[5]

At around 12:00 in the afternoon of December 15, 1996, barangay tanods Julius Yosores and Armando Zabate of Lorega, Cebu City,
searched for appellant because of the information given by Rico Magdasal that the shoes and tres cantos found in the scene of the crime
belonged to appellant. Together with Rico, they went to the house of Wilson Magdasal where appellant was temporarily staying, and found
him sleeping. Appellant was wearing a bloodstained maong shorts. The tanods told appellant that he is a suspect in the killing of Jaquelyn,
and brought him to the house of barangay captain Atty. Fortunato Parawan. There, appellant was asked about the shirt he was wearing and
he told them that it was in Wilson Magdasals house. It was Edgar Magdasal who found his shirt, wet and bloodstained, among the soiled
clothes. Atty. Parawan then told his tanods to take appellant to the police station.[6]
In the morning of the next day, December 16, 1996, appellant was investigated by SPO2 Mario Monilar of the Homicide Section,
Ramos Police Station in Cebu City. After being apprised of his constitutional rights, appellant told SPO2 Monilar that he was willing to
confess and asked for Atty. Parawan, the barangay captain, to assist him. SPO2 Monilar called Atty. Parawan but the latter told him that he
will be available in the afternoon. When Atty. Parawan arrived at 2:00 in the afternoon, he conferred with appellant for around fifteen
minutes. Atty. Parawan then called SPO2 Monilar and told him that appellant was ready to give his statement. [7] Appellants extrajudicial
confession, which was taken down completely in the Cebuano dialect,[8] reads:

Pasiuna: Mr. ELIZAR TOMAQUIN, pahibaloon ko ikaw nga ubos sa atong batakang balaod (Constitution) aduna kay katungod
nga pahibaloon sa imong mga katungod, sama sa imong katungod sa pagpakahilum, ingon man duna kay
katungod sa pagdamgop/pagpilig sa abogado o manlalaban aron motabang kanimo niining maong
 imbestighasyon nga may kalabutan sa kamatayon ni Jaqueline Tatoy niadtong mga alas 2:30 sa kaadlawon kapin
kongkulang niadtong petsa 15 sa bulan sa Disyembra 1996, didto sa Brgy Lorega proper, Siyudad sa Sugbo. Kong
ugaling dili ka maka-abot pagbayad o pagpangitago abogado aron motabang kanimo karon, ako isip
negrepresenttar sa Estado mohatag akong abogado kanimo. Nasabtan ba kini nimo?
Tubag: OO, nasabtan ka ang akong katungod?

Pangutana: Pahabloon ko usab ikaw nga sumala usab sa atong Batakang Balaod, anfg tanan nga imong isulti karon dinhi,
mahimong magamit ebedensya pabor o batok kanimo sa bisan asaing husgado sa atong nasud. Nasabtan be usab
kini nimo?
Tubag: OO, nasabtan ko usab kanang taan.

Pangutana: Tinuod ba gayod nga nasabtan pag-ayo nimo anf mao nimong mga katungod ug anadam ka ba nga moperma karon
dinhi timailhan sa imong tina-aw nga nga pagsabut? ingon man andam ka ba sa pagsulti sa matuod walay lain
kon kili ang matuod lamang gayud?
Tubag: O
Tubag: Oo, andam ako nga mpemar Sir ug ania karon dinhi ai Atty Parawan ang among Brgy Captain nga maoy akong giisip nga
abogado nga akong pinili nga maoy motabang kanako karon.Aron sa pagmatuod, ako kining pirmahan ning ika
petsa 16 sa bulan sa Disyembre 1996.

...

Pangutana: Sunlion ko, andama bas a pagsulti sa matuod Elizar Tomaquin kon dili ang matuod lamang gayud? Ingon man
andam ka ba nga modawat sa resulta o linugdangan niini?
Tubag: Oo, andam gyud ako.

Pangutana: Palihog isulti ang imong ngalan inong man ang tanan nga circumstacia o rmay kalambigitan sa imong pagkatawo,
sa imong grado, imong trabaho, imong pinuy-anan ug uban pa?
Tubag: Ako si Elizar Tomaquin kinsa nagdala sa bansagon o apelyedo sa akong mama sanglit dili man kasado and akong mama
ug papa. Ang apelyedo sa akong papa, Cabagui ug and akon angga Hapon. Ako 19 anyos ang panuigon, ulitawo ug
kasamtangan nga nagpuyo sa Brgy Lorega proper duol sa kapilaya San Roque apan ako lumad nga taga Bo.
Tunga, Moalboal, Cebu diin didto ano nakatungha sa grade six.

Pangutana: Niadtong kaadlawon sa petsa 15 sa bulan sa Disyembre 1996, diin ka man?

Tubag: Sa sinugdanan nianang mga ala una kapin kon kulang kauba ko sa pag-inom si Rico Magdasal didito sa Brgy Lorega
Proper ug taodtaod niadto nilakaw ako libot sa sitio Itom Tuta ug dayon nakong saka sa balay nila ni Jaqueline
Tatoy sa Brgy Lorega nianang pagka mga alas 2:20 sa maong petsa/kadlawon agii sa aberto nga bentana sa
akong tuyo sa pagkawat sa ilang colored nga TV.
Pangutana: Nganong nakahiabwo ka man na duna silay TV nga colored?
Tubag: Suweto man ko kay permi ko magtan-awan sa ilang colored TV.

Pangutana: Niadtong niagi ka sa ilang bentana aron pagkawat sa ilang TV, diin ka man punta deretso.
Tubag: Deretso ako sa may lamesa sa ilang sala diin didto gibutang ilang TV.

Pangutana: Nakuha ba gayod nimo anf maong TV?

Tubag: Wala, kay sa akong pag-alsa sa among TV nisyagit man si Jaqueline Tatoy nga naghidga sa ilang may terrace ug nidagan
siya padulong sa kusina nila ug diha-diha akong siyang ginsunod, gilayog ug gidunggab makadaghan pinaagi sa
akong tres kantps nga hinagiban (Gidtudo ni Eliza rang Tres Kantos nga nakit-an didto sa patyang lawas nga
Jaqueline Tatoy).

Pangutana: Kapila nimo dunggaba ug diin maigo si Jaqueline Totay?

Tubag: Dili na ko nakahinumdom, ingon man dili sba ko makahinumdom kon diin to siya maigo. Basta manadaghan to nako
siya dunggaba ginamit ko ang akong Tres kantos.

Pangutana: Gawas nga imo to siyang gidunggab, wala ba nimo pahimudsi and iyang pagkapbabye o wala ka bay plano sa pag
rape kaniya niadtong higayona?
Tubag: Wala gyud to nako siya pahimudsi og wala gyud koy tuyo sa pag rape niya. Ang ako ra gyud nga tuyo mao ra gyud and
pagkawat sa ilang TV apan kay nisiyagit man siyang nakaila man kayo siya nako, nahadlok kong mahibaw-an sa
ako untang pagkawat sa ilang TV, hinungdan nga ako siyang gilayog ug gidunggab makadaghan.

Pangutana: Nganog nakahibawo or nakaila ka man nga si Jaqueline Tatoy tong naisiyagit ug imong gidunggab?
Tubag: Duna ma hayag nga suga sa elektresidad sa ilang may kusina.

Pangutana: Kaila ba nimong daan si Jaqueline Tatoy?

Tubag: Oo, Sir ka saw ala pa ang among hitabo permi man kong nagtan-awan sa ilang TV.

Pangutana: Human nim dunggaba si Jaqueline Tatoy unsa may sunod nimonh gibuhat?
Tubag: Dihang sa akong pagtoo nga patay na siya, ako naidagan agi sa pultahan nga akong gisikaran dayon kanaog subay sa
hagdan didto nabiyaan nako ang akong sapatos.

Pangutana: Diin ka man paduiong dagan?

Tubag: Didto ako padulong sa akong gipuya-an sa ilang Wilson Magdasal sa maong Brgy.
 Pangutana: Unya unsa may sunod nimonh gibuhat og nahibaw-an?
Tubag: Niadtong hapon sa petsa 15 sa bulan sa Disyembre 1996, didtoy mga Brgy Tanods sa balay ni Wilson Magdasal diin ila
akong gipangutaan tali sa maong hitabo og igo lan ako nitudlo sa akong white Slave shirt nga akong gihumulan
ug tubig sa planggana sa tumong nga makuha ang mansa sa dugo nga pinisik sa akong paggdunggab patay ni
Jaqueline Tatoy.

Pangutana: Ngano ug unsa may diay kalabutan niadtong maong slaveless white shirt nimo?
Tubag: Mao na ang akong gisul-ob dihang akog kawaton unta ang TV nila ni Jaqueline ug sa iyang pagsiyagit ako siyang
gidunggab-dunggab patay. (Elizar Yomaquin postivo nga nitudlo ug niangkon sa maong whitel sleve less shirt)

Pangutana: Kinign nia karon dinhi nga sapatos itom nga nakuha didto so hagdan sa balay nila ni Jaqueline Tatoy human siya
nakit-i nga patay, unsa may imong ikasulti niini?
Tubag: Mao kana ang akong sapatos nga nabiyaan didto sa ilang hagdan human sa hitabo ug gain sa akong pagdagan akong
napatiran kadtong ilang container.

Pangutana: Sa pagkakaron, wala na akoy ipangutana kanimo. Ikay aduna ka pa bay ikasul ti o bakwion ba hinoon sa mao
nimong gipamahayag nga naglangkob sa duha ka pahina lakip niining maong pahina?
Tubag: Wala na akoy ikadugang pagsulti ni bakwion ba hinnon. Nao kana ang tanan.

Pangutana: Andam ka ba pagperme niini sa pagmatuod nga wlay tawo nga nagpugos, naghulga, nagsaad ug gnate o nag hadlok
ba hinoon kon dili sa imong kaugalingon nga kabubut-on lamang.
Tubag: Oo, andam ako pageram. Aron matuoron kining tanan kini akong permaahn ning petsa 16 sa Diusyembre 1996,
Siyudad Sugbo, Pilipinas.[9]

On the witness stand, appellant did not deny that he had a drinking spree with Rico Magdasal and three other persons. His version of
the incident is that it was Rico who committed the crime and not him. Appellant testified that Rico asked his help in stealing the television
set from the Tatoys residence. When Jacquelyn saw them, she ran towards the kitchen but she did not reach it as Rico had stabbed her on the
back with the tres cantos. Appellant claims that it was Rico who owns the tres cantos, as well as the pair of shoes, left inside Tatoys
house. Afraid of what happened, appellant went home to Wilson Magdasals house and slept there. He was awakened the next morning
by barangaytanod Julius Yosores who kicked him. Yosores also boxed and poked a gun at him. Appellant claims that Rico and Edgar
Magdasal maltreated him in the presence of barangaycaptain Atty. Fortunato Parawan when he was brought to the latters house. He was
made to admit committing the crime because Rico has a family while he is single.[10]

Appellant also repudiated his extrajudicial confession, saying that Atty. Parawan merely asked him to sign a blank sheet of paper and
in exchange, Atty. Parawan promised to assist and help him with his expenses.[11]
 After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (Branch 18) (RTC for brevity) rendered its decision on October 24, 1997, convicting
appellant of the crime of Murder, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, accused Elizar Tomaquin is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby imposed the penalty of RECLUSION PERPERTUA, with the accessory penalties of
the law; to indemnify the heirs of Jaquelyn Tatoy in the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs. The accused is, however,
credited in full during the whole period of his detention provided he will signify in writing that he will abide by all the rules
and regulations of the penitentiary.

SO ORDERED.[12]

Hence, this appeal.

In his Brief, appellant raises the following Assignment of Errors:

1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN SHE (SIC) CONVICTED ACCUSED-APPELLANT BASED ON HIS UNCOUNSELLED
CONFESSION;

2. THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED WHEN SHE (SIC) GAVE FULL CREDENCE AND FULL FAITH ON THE TESTIMONY OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES;[13]

Appellants extrajudicial confession was taken and transcribed entirely in the Cebuano dialect. Rule 132, Section 33 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence provides:

Sec. 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language.-- Documents written in an unofficial language shall not be
admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption of proceedings,
parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared before trial.

The rule is that when there is presented in evidence an exhibit written in any language other than the official language (Filipino or
English), if there is an appeal, that exhibit should be translated by the official interpreter of the court, or a translation should be agreed upon
by the parties, and both original and translation sent to this court. [14] In this case, there is no official translation of appellants extrajudicial
confession in the Filipino or English language. If the Court were to strictly follow the rule, then appellants extrajudicial confession should not
have been admitted by the trial court as evidence for the prosecution.
 Nevertheless, considering that appellant did not interpose any objection thereto, and the parties and the judicial authorities or
personnel concerned appeared to be familiar with or knowledgeable of Cebuano in which the document was written, [15] such extrajudicial
confession was appropriately considered by the trial court as evidence for the prosecution.

As stated at the outset, the crucial issue in this case is whether or not the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant, with the
assistance of Atty. Fortunato Parawan, is admissible in evidence against him. There is no need at this point to secure an official translation of
the confession to English.

Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

The words competent and independent counsel in the constitutional provision is not an empty rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord
the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a
diligent and capable lawyer.[16]

As heretofore stated, Atty. Fortunato Parawan, at that time, was the barangay captain of Barangay Lorega, Cebu City. Under the 1991
Local Government Code, a barangaycaptain performs the following duties and functions:

(a) The punong barangay, as the chief executive of the barangay government, shall exercise such powers and perform
such duties and functions, as provided by this Code and other laws.

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance, the purpose of which is the general welfare of the barangay and
its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the punong barangay shall:

(1) Enforce all laws and ordinances which are applicable within the barangay;

...

(3) Maintain public order in the barangay and, in pursuance thereof, assist the city or municipal mayor
and the sanggunian members in the performance of their duties and functions; . . .[17]
Simply put, Atty. Parawan, as barangay captain, is called upon to enforce the law and ordinances in his barangay and ensure peace and order
at all times.

In fact, as barangay captain, Atty. Parawan is deemed a person in authority under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

ART. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. Who shall be deemed as such. In applying the
provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an
individual or as a member of some court or government corporation, board, or commission, shall be deemed a person in
authority. A barrio captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.

On these bases, it is not legally possible to consider Atty. Parawan as an independent counsel of appellant.

In People vs. Culala,[18] the Court reiterated the rule that a municipal attorney cannot be an independent counsel because as a legal
officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic
services to the people, including the maintenance of peace and order, and it was seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the
defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests. Thus, the Court held that he is no better than a fiscal or a prosecutor who
cannot represent the accused during custodial investigations.[19]

This is reiterated in People vs. Taliman,[20] and People vs. Velarde,[21] where we further ruled that a municipal mayor cannot likewise
be an independent counsel as required by the Constitution.

Similarly in this case, considering that Atty. Parawans role as a barangay captain, was a peacekeeping officer of his barangay and
therefore in direct conflict with the role of providing competent legal assistance to appellant who was accused of committing a crime in his
jurisdiction, Atty. Parawan could not be considered as an independent counsel of appellant, when the latter executed his extrajudicial
confession. What the Constitution requires is the presence of an independent and competent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his
clients defense without any intervening conflict of interest.[22]

Neither does Atty. Parawan qualify as a competent counsel, i.e., an effective and vigilant counsel. An effective and vigilant counsel
necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the
first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. As held in People vs. Velarde:[23]

. . . The competent and independent lawyer so engaged should be present at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising
caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the
accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.[24]
 Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully
understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would
undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent. [25]

The assistance rendered by Atty. Parawan to appellant cannot be fittingly described as effective and vigilant. As testified by Atty.
Parawan, hereinbelow quoted verbatim, this was what transpired when he went to the Ramos police station to assist appellant during the
investigation:

Q What happened when you arrived at the Ramos Police Station at around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of December 16, 1996?
A I go (sic) to the room where Policeman Monilar and the accused and had a conversation with the accused.

Q What transpired during that conversation with the accused.

A I asked him. Are you going to get me as your lawyer?

Q And may we know what did he answer?

A Yes, Cap. Okay Cap.

Q When you said Cap what did he mean by that word Cap.
A Being a Barangay Captain.

Q After the accused told you that you were his counsel of choice. What did you do next if any?
A I informed Elizar Tomaquin that do you know what will be the implication of your admission, you will be imprisoned.
Q After you asked him whether he knew of the implication of his confession that could be because of that confession. What was
his reaction?
A Yes Cap. I know. And then I told him as follows: Because of this confession you will be imprisoned.

Q And what did he say after you told him again that if he would execute that affidavit of confession he would surely be
imprisoned?
A No I even continue that why did he do that?

Q And what did he answer?

A He answered to me that he was drunk at that time.

Q And so what transpired next?

A So I told him are you willing now to give your confession, then policeman Monilar went inside the room and we had that
investigation.

Q Now how was the investigation of the accused done?

 A It was made in a question and answer form.

Q And in what language were the questions framed?

A In the vernacular, vesaya.

Q What did you do during the question and answer form of investigation?
A I just observed them.

Q But did you stay there until the whole taking of the confession was over?
A Yes I was there in the presence of two persons coming from my Barangay.

...

Q When you arrived and saw Mr. Monilar with the accused as an Attorney did you immediately inquire what had happened
before you arrived like; Did you start the investigation? did you inquire from that from Mr. Monilar?
A He was already preparing this top portion here.

INTERPRETER:

Q Witness pointing to the upper portion of the certification up to the signature to that portion above the names typewritten
thereon.

...

Q And that means to say that when he prepared this from the top most portion to that portion immediately right before the
typewritten name Elizar Tomaquin and Atty. Fortunato Parawan you were not around. Correct?
A I was not around but we have already a conversation earlier with Monilar.[26]

Records also show that appellant was presented to SPO2 Monilar in the morning of December 16, 1996. When appellant intimated
that he was willing to confess and requested the presence of Atty. Parawan, SPO2 Monilar called up Atty. Parawan and informed him of
appellants decision. Atty. Parawan arrived at the Ramos Police Station only at 2:00 in the afternoon. [27] By the time Atty. Parawan arrived,
the investigation had already started and SPO2 Monilar had already asked and elicited information from appellant. Worse, Atty. Parawan
merely observed during the entire investigation and failed to advise or explain to appellant the questions being propounded by SPO2
Monilar. He did not even bother to ask appellant if the extrajudicial confession he was about to execute was being voluntarily given.

Moreover, that Atty. Parawan is not an effective and vigilant counsel is bolstered by his own testimony that he already suspected
appellant as having committed the crime when the latter was brought to his house by the barangay tanods, viz.:
 Q Being an attorney naturally your first question to your arresting tanods was where was he arrested and how was he
arrested and what is the reason why he was arrested. Correct?
A Yes.

...

Q You are telling this Court now Atty. Parawan that before the Barangay Tanods could explain to you the circumstances of his
arrest you already started to ask questions like; Why did you have blood in your pants. Where is your t-shirt you
wore. Where did you get that information since you were not in the house of Jaqueline Tatoy when she was killed?
A It was like this. I heard that the victim suffered multiple stab wounds. So when I saw blood stains with all probability it might
come from the victim. It was conclusion something like when I saw that t-shirt stained with blood.

Q So you mean to this Court that you already reached the conclusion of mine (sic) that Elizar Tomaquin one of your
constituents in the Barangay was already on your conclusion in mine (sic) the killer of Jacquilyn Tatoy before your
tanods turned it over to the police for investigation. Is that what you are telling Atty. Parawan?
A It is somewhat like that. That is why I ordered my tanod to bring him to the Homicide.[28]

The Court cannot imagine how Atty. Parawan could have effectively safeguarded appellants rights as an accused during the
investigation when he himself entertained the suspicion that appellant is guilty of the crime charged, and naturally, he would want appellant
to admit having committed it.

It was posited that appellant cannot challenge Atty. Parawans qualification as a competent and independent counsel because he was
his choice.

As provided in Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, (A)ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Ideally, the lawyer called to be present during such
investigations should be as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning, but the word "preferably" does
not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and
independent attorneys from handling his defense.[29] What is imperative is that the counsel should be competent and independent. That
appellant chose Atty. Parawan does not estop appellant from complaining about the latters failure to safeguard his rights.

It appears that appellant chose Atty. Parawan because he was the barangay captain of Brgy. Lorega where appellant resides, and
apparently, appellant trusts Atty. Parawan to protect his rights. The latter, however, fell short in tending to the trust reposed on
him. Appellant did not finish Grade 1 and does not know how to read and write.[30] Asbetween him and Atty.
Parawan who presumably knows the intricacies of the law and appellants predicament, Atty. Parawan should have known better and
exercised his sound judgment before conceding to appellants choice. But it did not occur to him to inhibit himself from acting as appellants
counsel and instead, he even let appellant go through the investigation and execute the extrajudicial confession knowing fully well that he
was biased as regards appellants innocence. Quoted verbatim, Atty. Parawan testified thus:

Q Atty. Parawan comparing yourself to the accused who is a graduate of Batchelor (sic) of Law compared to your constituent
who is jobless, illiterate [and] of low intelligence. The question is this: It did not occur to your mine (sic) to inhibit
yourself despite the request by telling the accused as barangay Captain there could be a conflict of interest and bias that
I would not be in (sic) effective counsel or assistance to you. Did it not occur toy our mine (sic) or not?
A It did not occur to my nime (sic).

...

Q But as experienced attorney you know very well that when you assist a suspect in the police station and the circumstances
he was arrested the best assistance a lawyer could give is would be to tell the accused to remain silent. Would you
agree?

...

A It did not occur to my mine (sic) that time.[31]

Clearly, Atty. Parawan failed to meet the exacting standards of an independent and competent counsel as required by the
Constitution. Thus, the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant, even if gospel truth, is deemed an uncounselled confession and
therefore, inadmissible in evidence.

In this regard, it may not be amiss to repeat the declaration of the Court in People vs. Deniega,[32] stressing the role of the courts in
ascertaining that extrajudicial confessions meet the exacting standards of the Constitution:

Every so often, courts are confronted with the difficult task of taking a hard look into the sufficiency of extra-judicial
confessions extracted by law enforcement authorities as the sole basis for convicting accused individuals. In cases of crimes
notable for their brutality and ruthlessness, the impulse to find the culprits at any cost occasionally tempts these agencies to
take shortcuts and disregard constitutional and legal safeguards intended to bring about a reasonable assurance that only the
guilty are punished. Our courts, in the process of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, play a central role in
bringing about this assurance by determining whether or not the evidence gathered by law enforcement agencies
scrupulously meets exacting standards fixed by the Constitution. If the standards are not met, the Constitution
provides the corresponding remedy by providing a strict exclusionary rule, i.e., that "[a]ny confession or admission
obtained in violation of (Article III, Section 12(1) . . . hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence."
 Without appellants extrajudicial confession, the prosecutions case now teeters precariously on circumstantial evidence, namely:

(1) Rico Magdasals testimony that:

(a) appellant left their drinking session at 1:00 in the morning of December 16, 1996;
(b) the tres cantos and pair of shoes found inside Jaquelyns residence belongs to appellant; and
(c) appellant was wearing a pair of maong shorts and white sando shirt on the night of the crime, which blood-stained shirt
was found among the soiled clothes in Wilson Magdasals house;

(2) Medical Technologist Jude Daniel Mendozas testimony that the blood stains on appellants sando shirt and the tres cantos was of
human origin.[33]

These circumstances, however, are not sufficient to demonstrate positively and convincingly that it was appellant who killed
Jaquelyn.

Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to convict if (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[34] As jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial
evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proven must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.[35]

The circumstantial evidence in this case does not constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that
appellant is the guilty person.

For one, appellants act of leaving the drinking session at 1:00 in the morning does not establish appellants whereabouts at the time
the crime was committed. There is nothing in the testimony of Rico Magdasal and the other prosecution witnesses that will show if appellant
indeed went to Jaquelyns house after he left the group. No one saw him enter or leave her residence. If at all, what was proved is that
appellant was found by the barangay tanods sleeping at home in the afternoon of the same day.

Added to that is the prosecutions failure to establish the chain of custody of these valuable pieces of evidence.

Prosecution witness Armando Zabate testified that the pair of black shoes and tres cantos were given to a certain Rey for
safekeeping. These were later turned over to a Policeman Tariao of the Ramos Police Station. Zabate, however, did not identify the person
who turned over the objects to the police.[36] There was no showing who turned over those articles to the police and Rey was not presented
to identify if these were the same pair of shoes and tres cantos found in Jaquelyns house and turned over to the police.Policeman Tariao was
not called to the witness stand so as to confirm if those articles were the same evidence turned over to him and later presented in
court. Ordinarily, it would not be indispensable for the prosecution to allege and prove every single fact of the case. But in this case, the
pieces of evidence are crucial to the prosecutions case. Also, the fact that a civilian obtained and received the evidence, the possibility that
the integrity of these articles could have been compromised cannot be ignored. The Court even noted that during his direct examination,
SPO2 Monilar was confused as to whether the pair of shoes presented in court was the same ones that were turned over to the police. It
turned out that the marking he made on the shoes were washed off because at one time, the shoes fell in the canal located in front of the
police station and they had to clean and wash the shoes![37] Such sloppy handling renders the chain of custody of those pieces of evidence
dubious, and damaging to the prosecutions case.

And even if appellant did own the pair of shoes and tres cantos, the fact that it was found in the scene of the crime merely proved that
he was in the residence of Jaquelyn at some point in time. But it does not prove when particularly he was there, his authorship of the crime
or his motive for being
there. While the motive of an accused in a criminal case is generally held to be immaterial, not being an element of the crime, motive
becomes important when, as in this case, the evidence of the commission of the crime is purely circumstantial.[38]

The prosecutions evidence that is perceived to be conclusive of appellants guilt is mainly the testimony of Rico Magdasal. Such
testimony, however, is uncorroborated. The rule is that the testimony of one witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction, if such testimony
positively establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.[39]Moreover, the doctrine of long standing that the testimony of
a lone witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict an accused applies only to eyewitnesses. Thus, an uncorroborated
circumstantial evidence is certainly not sufficient for conviction when the evidence itself is in serious doubt. [40] Ricos lone testimony is not
sufficient to establish appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In addition, appellant vehemently denied Ricos allegations. According to appellant, it was Rico who actually owns the pair of shoes
and tres cantos; that it was he who bid appellant to go to the Tatoys residence and lift their TV set; and that it was Rico who stabbed
Jaquelyn. Considering appellants denial and his different version of the incident, it became incumbent upon the prosecution to rebut
appellant's allegations with further evidence to corroborate the statement of Rico. It must be noted that there were other persons present
during their drinking spree, namely, Romy Magdasal, Noel Labay, and a certain Cardo. These persons could have been presented as
witnesses to back up Ricos claim but the prosecution did not do so. Rico testified that appellant owned the tres cantos found by the
stairs; but Rico also stated he only heard that the tres cantos was found by the stairs.[41] Who found the tres cantos that was supposed to have
been used to stab Jaquelyn? The neighbor who allegedly found it by the stairs was not presented in court to identify if the tres
cantos presented by the prosecution was the alleged weapon in the stabbing of Jaquelyn. Such failure of the prosecution to corroborate the
material points of Ricos testimony weakened their case.

The Court also has serious misgivings on the probative value of the white sando shirt that appellant was allegedly wearing at the time
of stabbing Jaquelyn, which Edgar Magdasal later found bloodstained among the soiled clothes.

First, when appellant was asked by the barangay tanods about the shirt he was wearing, he told them that it was in Wilson Magdasals
house. According to barangay tanodArmando Zabate, it was Edgar Magdasal who found the shirt, somewhat wet and bloody, among the
soiled clothes.[42] Edgar Magdasal, however, was not presented to testify as to where he found the shirt, the state the shirt was in when he
found it, and how he knew that it was the shirt worn by appellant.
 Second, Medical Technologist Jude Daniel Mendoza testified that the bloodstains on appellants sando shirt, as well as the tres cantos,
were human blood.[43] Mendoza, however, did not conduct further tests to ascertain the type of blood found on these pieces of evidence nor
did he match it with the victims blood type,[44] hence, it does not connect the bloodstains to the herein victim. In People vs. Rodriguez, the
Court ruled that the maong pants allegedly belonging to appellant and found positive of type O blood has no probative value since the blood
type of appellant and the victim were not taken for purposes of comparison.[45]

The same ruling applies with regard to the bloodstains found on the tres cantos.

Appellant enjoys in his favor the presumption of innocence until the contrary is proven. Proof of the guilt of the accused should not be
tainted with ambiguity. Although appellants defense is weak, conviction must come from the strength of the prosecution's evidence and not
from the weakness of the defense. In this case, the prosecutions evidence is not strong enough to justify a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.[46] Acquittal, therefore, is inevitable.

WHEREFORE, appellant Elizar Tomaquin is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED immediately, unless he is being detained for
some other legal cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of appellant unless he is being lawfully held for
another cause, and to inform this Court of the date of his release, or the ground for his continued confinement, within ten (10) days from
notice of herein decision.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.