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A Handbook for
Legislators and Citizens
Third Edition
ConventionofStates Action Handbook
A Solution As BIG As The Problem!
Table of Contents
The Case for a Convention of States
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Washington, D.C., Is Out of Control and Will Not Relinquish Power. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The Founders Gave Us a Solution: A Convention of States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
How Our Proposal Differs from Other Article V Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Our Political Plan to Call a Convention of States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Why a Convention of States Is the Safest Alternative to Preserve Our Liberty. . . . . . 10
We Know How a Convention of States Would Operate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Action Steps for Legislators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Action Steps for Citizens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Model Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
“Can We Trust the Constitution? Answering the
‘Runaway Convention’ Myth” by Michael Farris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Excerpts from “Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the
Constitution’s ‘Convention for Proposing Amendments’ ”
by Professor Robert G. Natelson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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Introduction
What is not widely known is that the Constitution itself provides a real, effective solution. Mark
Levin’s bestselling book, The Liberty Amendments, has opened the eyes of millions of Americans
to the possibility of stopping the federal abuses of power through a Convention of States. Although
we began the COS Project independently, our plan is a near-perfect match with Levin’s ideas.
The plan we propose does not commit us to any particular amendments. That will be up to the
states when they convene. But it does commit us to a particular subject—proposed amendments
must be designed to limit the power of the federal government.
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ConventionofStates Action Handbook
72% poorer.
and Debt Crisis
• The Spending and Debt Crisis The $17 trillion national debt is stagger-
ing, but it only tells a part of the story.
• The Regulatory Crisis If we apply the normal rules of business 3. Congressional Attacks
• Congressional Attacks on State accounting, the federal government on State Sovereignty
Sovereignty owes at least $50 trillion more in vested For years, Congress has been using fed-
Social Security benefits and other pro- eral grants to keep the states under its
• Federal Takeover of Decision grams. This is why the government can- control. By attaching mandates to fed-
Making not tax its way out of debt. Even if it eral grants, Congress has turned state
These abuses are not mere instances of confiscated everything owned by pri- legislatures into their regional agencies
bad policy. They are driving us towards vate citizens and companies, there rather than treating them as truly inde-
an age of “soft tyranny” in which the would still not be enough to cover the pendent republican governments.
government “softens, bends, and debt.
A radical social agenda and an erosion
guides” men’s wills. If we do nothing to
of the rights of the people accompany
halt these abuses, we run the risk of
all of this. While substantial efforts
becoming, as Alexis de Tocqueville
2. The Regulatory Crisis
The federal bureaucracy has placed a have been made to combat social engi-
warned in 1840, nothing more than regulatory burden upon businesses that neering and protect peoples’ rights, we
“a flock of timid and industrious ani- is complex, conflicted, and crushing. have missed one of the most important
mals, of which the government is the Little accountability exists when exec- principles of the American founding.
shepherd.” utive agencies—rather than Congress— State legislatures need to be free to
enact the real substance of the law. implement the will of the voters in their
Research from the American Enterprise own states, not the will of Congress.
Institute, shows that since 1949 federal
4
protection of liberty requires a strict Government, rather than the States,
adherence to the principle that power is would assume such responsibilities.
4. Federal Takeover of the
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ConventionofStates Action Handbook
Article V, U.S. Constitution
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of
shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments Ratification may be proposed by the Congress;
to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Provided that no Amendment which may be made
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and
shall call a Convention for proposing Amend- eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth
ments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article;
Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, and that no State, without its Consent, shall be
when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
of the several States, or by Conventions in three
7
How Our Proposal Differs from
ConventionofStates Action Handbook
8
Our Political Plan to Call
9
Why a Convention of States Is the Safest
ConventionofStates Action Handbook
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ConventionofStates Action Handbook
“The convention for
proposing amendments is
called to propose solutions
to discrete, pre-assigned
problems.” “When two-
thirds of the states apply on
a given subject, Congress
must call the convention.”
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ConventionofStates Action Handbook
12
Action Steps for Citizens
“The grassroots
will be the engine
that drives this
project.”
13
Leadership of the Convention of States Project
ConventionofStates Action Handbook
B.A. in English Literature, San Diego O’Keefe also serves on the board of directors of the Wisconsin
State University Club for Growth, which has been active defending
Gov. Walker’s agenda during legislative campaigns, recall
J.D., with honors, University of the campaigns, and legislative races.
Pacific McGeorge School of Law
When he is not engaged in political activities, O’Keefe is a
Mark Meckler is the founder and President of Citizens for Self- private investor based in rural Wisconsin, where he and his
Governance, an organization created to support grassroots wife raised three children.
activism in taking power from Washington, D.C., and return-
ing it to its rightful owners, the citizens of the states. Meckler
is widely regarded as one of the most effective and well-net-
worked grassroots organizers in the nation and is regularly
Citizens for Self-Governance,
Michael Farris
called on for political commentary in all forms of media.
Senior Fellow for Constitutional
Meckler is the co-founder and former National Coordinator Studies, Head of Convention of
for the Tea Party Patriots, the largest tea party organization in States Project
the nation. He left the organization in February 2012 and
B.A. in Political Science, magna
founded CSG to work more broadly on expanding the self-
cum laude, Western Washington
governance movement beyond the partisan divide.
University
As the President of CSG, Meckler makes sure that all projects,
J.D., with honors, Gonzaga University School of Law
including Convention of States, are fully and appropriately
funded, staffed and managed, with a focus on strict steward- LL.M., with merit, in Public International Law, University
ship of donor dollars for maximum leverage and effect. of London
Meckler is also personally involved in all media and public
relations efforts. Michael Farris is the Chancellor of Patrick Henry College and
Chairman of the Home School Legal Defense Association. He
Meckler and his wife Patty live in Northern California with was the founding president of each organization.
their teenage children, where they share a love of outdoor
recreation and equestrian activities. Farris is a constitutional appellate litigator who has served as
lead counsel in the United States Supreme Court, 8 federal
circuit courts, and the appellate courts of 13 states.
Eric O’Keefe He has been a leader on Capitol Hill for over 30 years
Citizens for Self-Governance, and is widely known for his leadership on homeschooling, reli-
Board of Directors gious freedom, and the preservation of American sovereignty.
Eric O’Keefe has a 25-year history as A prolific author, Farris has been recognized with a number of
an active strategist, board member, awards including the Salvatori Prize for American Citizenship
and donor with organizations working by the Heritage Foundation and as one of the “Top 100
to advance individual liberty, promote Faces in Education for the 20th Century” by Education Week
citizen engagement and restore con- magazine.
stitutional governance. O’Keefe helped found U.S. Term Lim-
its in 1991, and in recent years, co-founded the Campaign for Farris and his wife Vickie have 10 children and 17 grandchildren.
Primary Accountability, the Health Care Compact Alliance,
and Citizens for Self-Governance. O’Keefe is also a founding
board member of the Center for Competitive Politics and Cit-
izens in Charge Foundation.
14
Appendix
Model Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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ConventionofStates Action Handbook
www.COSAction.com Model Application for States
Whereas, the federal government has created a crushing national debt through improper and imprudent spending,
and
Whereas, the federal government has invaded the legitimate roles of the states through the manipulative process
of federal mandates, most of which are unfunded to a great extent, and
Whereas, the federal government has ceased to live under a proper interpretation of the Constitution of the
United States, and
Whereas, it is the solemn duty of the States to protect the liberty of our people—particularly for the generations
to come—to propose Amendments to the Constitution of the United States through a Convention of the States
under Article V to place clear restraints on these and related abuses of power,
Section 1. The legislature of the State of _________ hereby applies to Congress, under the provisions of Article
V of the Constitution of the United States, for the calling of a convention of the states limited to proposing
amendments to the Constitution of the United States that impose fiscal restraints on the federal government,
limit the power and jurisdiction of the federal government, and limit the terms of office for its officials and for
members of Congress.
Section 2. The secretary of state is hereby directed to transmit copies of this application to the President and
Secretary of the United States Senate and to the Speaker and Clerk of the United States House of Representatives,
and copies to the members of the said Senate and House of Representatives from this State; also to transmit
copies hereof to the presiding officers of each of the legislative houses in the several States, requesting their
cooperation.
Section 3. This application constitutes a continuing application in accordance with Article V of the Constitution
of the United States until the legislatures of at least two-thirds of the several states have made applications on
the same subject.
16
Can We Trust the Constitution?
We can’t walk
boldly into our
future, without first
understanding
our history.
Some people contend that our Consti- ticipating at Annapolis concluded that a tion prior to the time that Congress
tution was illegally adopted as the broader convention was needed to acted to endorse it. The states told their
result of a “runaway convention.” address the nation’s concerns. They delegates that the purpose of the Con-
They make two claims: named the time and date (Philadelphia; vention was the one stated in the
second Monday in May). Annapolis Convention resolution: “to
1. The convention delegates were
The Annapolis delegates said they were render the constitution of the Federal
instructed to merely amend the
going to work to “procure the concur- Government adequate for the exigencies
Articles of Confederation, but they
rence of the other States in the appoint- of the Union.”
wrote a whole new document.
ment of Commissioners.” The goal of Congress voted to endorse this Conven-
2. The ratification process was the upcoming convention was “to render tion on February 21, 1787. It did not pur-
improperly changed from 13 state the constitution of the Federal Govern- port to “call” the Convention or give
legislatures to 9 state ratification ment adequate for the exigencies of the instructions to the delegates. It merely
conventions. Union.” proclaimed that “in the opinion of
What role was Congress to play in call- Congress, it is expedient” for the Con-
The Delegates Obeyed ing the Convention? None. The vention to be held in Philadelphia on the
Annapolis delegates sent copies of their date informally set by the Annapolis
Convention and formally approved by 7
Their Instructions from
resolution to Congress solely “from
state legislatures.
the States
The claim that the delegates disobeyed motives of respect.”
their instructions is based on the idea What authority did the Articles of Con- Ultimately, 12 states appointed dele-
that Congress called the Constitutional federation give to Congress to call such gates. Ten of these states followed the
Convention. Proponents of this view a Convention? None. The power of phrasing of the Annapolis Convention
assert that Congress limited the dele- Congress under the Articles was strictly with only minor variations in wording
gates to amending the Articles of Con- limited, and there was no theory of (“render the Federal Constitution
federation. A review of legislative implied powers. The states possessed adequate”). Two states, New York and
history clearly reveals the error of this residual sovereignty which included the Massachusetts, followed the formula
claim. The Annapolis Convention, not power to call this convention. stated by Congress (“solely amend the
Congress, provided the political impetus Articles” as well as “render the Federal
Seven state legislatures agreed to send
for calling the Constitutional Conven- Constitution adequate”).
delegates to the Constitutional Conven-
tion. The delegates from the 5 states par- Continued to page 18
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Can We Trust The Constitution? Answering The “Runaway Convention” Myth
ConventionofStates Action Handbook
Every student of history should know islatures. Moreover, the Annapolis Con- than state legislatures. This was done in
that the instructions for delegates came vention and a clear majority of the states accord with the preamble of the Consti-
from the states. In Federalist 40, James insisted that any amendments coming tution—the Supreme Law of the Land
Madison answered the question of “who from the Constitutional Convention would be ratified in the name of “We the
gave the binding instructions to the del- would have to be approved in this same People” rather than “We the States.”
egates.” He said: “The powers of the manner—by Congress and all 13 state But before this change in ratification
convention ought, in strictness, to be legislatures. could be valid, all 13 state legislatures
determined by an inspection of the com- The reason for this rule can be found in would also have to consent to the new
missions given to the members by their principles of international law. At the method. All 13 state legislatures did just
respective constituents [i.e. the states].” time, the states were sovereigns. The this by calling conventions of the people
He then spends the balance of Federalist Articles of Confederation were, in to vote on the merits of the Constitution.
40 proving that the delegates from all 12 essence, a treaty between 13 sovereign Twelve states held popular elections to
states properly followed the directions nations. Normally, the only way changes vote for delegates. Rhode Island made
they were given by each of their states. in a treaty can be ratified is by the every voter a delegate and held a series
According to Madison, the February approval of all parties to the treaty. of town meetings to vote on the Consti-
21st resolution from Congress was
However, a treaty can provide for some- tution. Thus, every state legislature con-
merely “a recommendatory act.”
thing less than unanimous approval if all sented to the new ratification process
The States, not Congress, called the the parties agree to a new approval thereby validating the Constitution’s
Constitutional Convention. They told process before it goes into effect. This is requirements for ratification.
their delegates to render the Federal exactly what the Founders did. Those who claim to be constitutionalists
Constitution adequate for the exigencies
When the Convention sent its draft of while contending that the Constitution
of the Union. And that is exactly what
the Constitution to Congress, it also rec- was illegally adopted are undermining
they did.
ommended a new ratification process. themselves. It is like saying George
Congress approved both the Constitu- Washington was a great American hero,
The Ratification Process tion itself and the new process. but he was also a British spy. I stand
Along with changing the number of with the integrity of our Founders who
properly drafted and properly ratified
Was Properly Changed
The Articles of Confederation required required states from 13 to 9, the new rat-
any amendments to be approved by ification process required that state con- the Constitution.
Congress and ratified by all 13 state leg- ventions ratify the Constitution rather
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Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s
ConventionofStates Action Handbook
Vermont Constitution of 1786 both and New Jersey. The Dominion proved in 1744 at Lancaster, Pennsylvania; in
authorized amendments conventions unpopular, and in 1689 colonial con- 1745, 1746, 1751, and 1754 at Albany;
limited as to subjects by a “council of ventions swept it away; nevertheless, and in 1768 at Fort Stanwix (Rome),
censors.” The Massachusetts Constitu- northeastern governments continued to New York.
tion of 1780 provided for amendment confer together. Many of these meetings
The assembly at Lancaster became one
by convention. The Georgia Constitu- were conclaves of colonial governors,
of the more noted. Participants included
tion of 1777 required the legislature to usually conferring on issues of defense
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and
call a convention to draft constitutional against French Canada and her
several Indian tribes. The proceedings
amendments whose gist had been pre- allied Indian tribes, rather than conven-
lasted from June 22 to July 4, 1744, and
scribed by a majority of counties. tions of diplomatic delegations. An
produced the Treaty of Lancaster. Even
example from outside the Northeast
Conventions within individual colonies more important, however, was the
was the meeting of five governors
or states represented the people, towns, seven-colony Albany Congress of 1754,
held at Alexandria, Virginia in 1755.
or counties. Another sort of “conven- whose proceedings are discussed in
Many others, however, were full-dress
tion” was a gathering of three or more Part IV.A.
conventions among commissioners
American governments under protocols
appointed from three or more colonies. The most famous inter-colonial conven-
modeled on international diplomatic
These meetings were usually, but tions were the Stamp Act Congress of
practice. These multi-government
not always, held under the sanction of 1765 and the First Continental Con-
conventions were comprised of delega-
royal authorities. gress of 1774, discussed in Parts IV.B
tions from each participating govern-
and IV.C. As for the Second Continental
ment, including, on some occasions, To be specific: Three colonies met at
Congress (1775-81), participants might
Indian tribes. Before Independence, Boston in 1689 to discuss defense
initially have thought of it as a conven-
such gatherings often were called “con- issues. The following year, the acting
tion, but it is not so classified here
gresses,” because “congress” was an New York lieutenant governor called,
because it really served as a continuing
established term for a gathering of sov- without royal sanction, a defense con-
legislature.
ereignties. After Independence, they vention of most of the continental
were more often called “conventions,” colonies to meet in New York City. The After the colonies had declared them-
presumably to avoid confusion with the meeting was held on May 1, 1690, with selves independent states, they contin-
Continental and Confederation Con- New York, Massachusetts Bay, Con- ued to gather in conventions. All of
gresses. But both before and after Inde- necticut, and Plymouth colonies in these meetings were called to address
pendence the terms could be employed attendance. A similar gathering specific issues of common concern.
interchangeably. occurred in 1693 in New York, this time Northeastern states convened twice in
under Crown auspices. Other defense Providence, Rhode Island—in Decem-
Multi-government congresses or con-
conventions were held in New York ber, 1776 and January, 1777, and again
ventions were particularly common in
City in 1704, Boston in 1711, Albany in in 1781. Other conventions of north-
the Northeast, perhaps because govern-
1744 and 1745, and New York City in eastern states met in Springfield, Mas-
ments in that region had a history of
1747. The New England colonies held sachusetts (1777); New Haven,
working together. In 1643 the four
yet another in 1757. Connecticut (1778); Hartford, Con-
colonies of Massachusetts, Plymouth
necticut (1779 and 1780); and Boston,
Colony, Connecticut, and New Haven In addition to defense conventions,
Massachusetts (1780). Conventions that
formed the United Colonies of New there were conventions serving as
included states outside the Northeast
England. Essentially a joint standing diplomatic meetings among colonies
included those at York Town, Pennsyl-
committee of colonial legislatures, this and sovereign Indian tribes, particularly
vania (1777), Philadelphia, Pennsylva-
association was not always active, but the Iroquois. There were at least ten
nia (1780 and, of course, 1787),
endured at least formally until 1684. In such conclaves between 1677 and 1768
and Annapolis, Maryland (1786). There
1695, the Crown created the Dominion involving three or more colonies. Those
also were abortive calls for multi-
of New England, a unified government ten included gatherings in 1677, 1689,
state conventions in Fredericksburg,
imposed on New England, New York, 1694, and 1722 at Albany, New York;
20
Virginia, Charleston, South Carolina, “convention of committees.” It was to presumed to set the voting rules while
and elsewhere. be a forum in which state delegations calling a third Hartford convention, two
makes its own rules, elects its own ing amendments is, like its direct pred- • During the Founding Era a call
officers, establishes and staffs its own ecessors, a multi-government proposing could come from one or more states,
committees, and sets its own time convention. This suggests that an from Congress, or from another con-
of adjournment. amendments convention is deliberative vention. Article V prescribes that
in much the same way its predecessors the call for an amendments conven-
All Founding-Era conventions were
were. This suggests further that when a tion comes only from Congress,
deliberative bodies. This was true to a
legislature attempts in its application to but is mandatory when two thirds of
certain extent even of conventions
compel the convention to merely vote the states have submitted similar
whose formal power was limited to an
up-or-down on prescribed language, it applications.
up-or-down vote. When Rhode Island
is not utilizing the application power in
lawmakers submitted the Constitution • During the Founding Era, one propos-
a valid way.
to a statewide referendum in town ing convention (that of 1787) had
meetings rather than to a ratifying con- Prevailing convention practice during attempted to specify how the states
vention, a principal criticism was that the Founding Era permitted a few pro- were to review its recommendations.
the referendum lacked the deliberative cedural variations, and it is precisely in Article V clarifies that an amend-
qualities of the convention. Critics con- these areas that the text of Article V pre- ments convention does not have this
tended that a ratifying convention, scribes procedure. Specifically: power.
unlike a referendum, provided a central
• During the Founding Era, multi-state Thus do text and history fit together to
forum for a full hearing and debate and
conventions could be authorized guide us in the use of Article V.
exchange of information among people
merely to propose solutions for state
from different locales. They further
approval, or, less commonly, to
contended that the convention offered a
resolve issues; in the latter case each
way to supplement the affirmative or
state “pledged its faith” to comply
negative vote with non-binding recom-
with the outcome. Article V clarifies
mendations for amendments.
that an amendments convention only
Before and during the Founding Era, may propose. At the Constitutional
American multi-government conven- Convention, the Framers rejected
tions enjoyed even more deliberative proffered language to create an
freedom than ratifying conventions— amendments convention that could
as, indeed, befits the dignity of a diplo- resolve.
matic gathering of sovereignties. No
• During the Founding Era, a proposing
multi-government convention was lim-
convention could be plenipotentiary
ited to an up-or-down vote. Each was
or limited. Article V clarifies that nei-
assigned discrete problems to work on,
ther the states nor Congress may call
but within that sphere each enjoyed
plenipotentiary conventions under
freedom to deliberate, advise, consult,
Article V, because that Article author-
confer, recommend, and propose.
izes only amendments to “this Consti-
Multi-government conventions also
tution,” and, further, it proscribes
could refuse to propose. Essentially,
certain amendments.
they served as task forces where dele-
gates from different states could share • During the Founding Era, an “appli-
information, debate, compare notes, and cation” for a multi-government con-
try to hammer out creative solutions to vention could refer either to (1) a
the problems posed to them. request from a state to Congress to
call, or (2) the call itself. Article V
History and the constitutional text
clarifies that an application has only
inform us that a convention for propos-
the former meaning.
22
Notes
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Notes
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Inside Back Cover
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