Pretty v UK

Facts: the applicant was dying of a neuron disease. She was paralyzed but could make decisions. She wanted to
die to be spared of suffering and indignity but could not do it by herself. She thus wanted her husband to help
her commit suicide. However, it was a crime to assist another to commit suicide under the British laws and her
request to guarantee her husband freedom from prosecution if he helped her was refused.
Complaint: The applicant claimed that the U.K. violated Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment), Article 2 (right to life), Article 8 (right to respect for private life), Article 9 (freedom
of conscience) and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination)
ISSUE: Whether the terminally ill should be free to ask assistance in taking their own lives.
Holding: the ECHR found no violation of article 2, 3, 8, 9 and 14
Reasoning: Article 2 � 1 enjoined States to refrain from the unlawful taking of life and to take appropriate
steps to safeguard lives. Article 2 could not be interpreted as conferring a right to die so there was no violation
of article 2. Moreover, as article 3 was construed in conjunction with Article 2 there was no violation of article 3
either.
PEOPLE v. CAYAT
FACTS: Cayat is a native of a nonchristian tribe in Baguio. He was found guilty of act 1639 which prohibits
natives of non Christian tribes from acquiring wines and liquors other than those native wines which the
members of such tribes have been accustomed to. Cayat said it violates equal protection, due process,
improper exercise of police power.
Issue: Whether or Not the law denies equal protection to one prosecuted and sentenced for violation of said
law.
Held: No. It satisfies the requirements of a valid classification, one of which is that the classification under the
law must rest on real or substantial distinctions.
The distinction is reasonable. The classification between the members of the non- Christian and the members
of the Christian tribes is not based upon accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree of civilization and
culture. The term ‘non-Christian tribes’ refers to a geographical area and more directly to natives of the
Philippines of a low grade civilization usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities. The
distinction is reasonable for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non- Christian
tribes”
Beltran vs. Sec. of Health
FACTS: This case involves a law seeking to promote voluntary donation of blood and to phase out commercial
blood banks within 2 years from its effectivity. The purpose of the law is to prevent blood transfusion
transmissible diseases which were proven in studies to be more prone in blood transfusions w/c come from the
commercial blood banks as compared to those coming from the Phil. National Red Cross. Petitioners assailed
the latter’s constitutionality on the ground of deprivation of property and liberty.
ISSUE: WON RA 7719 (National Blood Services Act) constitutes as unlawful deprivation of personal liberty and
property.
HELD: No. It was a VALID legislation. The interest of commercial blood banks must yield to a greater interest of
the public.
Marcos v. Manglapus
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand Marcos petitions the SC for mandamus and prohibition asking to order
respondents to issue travel documents to him and his immediate family and to enjoin the implementation of
the President "s decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Issue:
WON the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, in the exercise of the powers
granted in her by the Constitution.

Ruling:
Affirmative. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the
President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power ". The
powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive. Even the members of the Legislature has recognized that indeed Mrs. Aquino has the power under
the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning, as per House Resolution No. 1342
AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY vs. CITY OF MANILA

FACTS:
American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation
duly registered and doing business in the Philippines. In the course of its ministry, plaintiff’s
Philippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof. The
acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business
of general merchandise without providing itself with the necessary Mayor’s permit and municipal
license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000 (mayor’s permit) and Ordinances Nos. 2529 (license
fees) and required plaintiff to secure the corresponding permit and license fees. The Plaintiff
paid such under protest and filed suit questioning the legality of the ordinances under which
the fees are being collected.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila are constitutional and valid
2. Whether the provisions of said ordinances are applicable or not to the case at bar

HELD:
1. Yes, they are constitutional. The ordinances do not deprive defendant of his constitutional right
of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, even though it prohibits
him from introducing and carrying out a scheme or purpose which he sees fit to claim as part of
his religious system. It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance Nos. 3000 and 2529 cannot be considered
unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff society.

2. It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets
was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot
mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said “merchandise” for
profit. For this reason The Court believe that the provisions of the ordinances cannot be applied
to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession
and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.

Tolentino v Secretary of Finance GR No. 115455, August 25, 1994

FACTS:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the
sale or
exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
Herein, various petitioners seek to declare RA 7166 as unconstitutional. One of the reasons is that it violates
Article VI, Section 28 (1) which provides that “the rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress
shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.”

ISSUE:
Whether RA 7166 violates the principle of progressive system of taxation

RULING:
No. Lacking empirical data on which to base any conclusion regarding these arguments, any discussion whether
the VAT is regressive in the sense that it will hit the poor and middle income group in society harder than it will
the rich is largely an academic exercise.

Regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce. “Evolve a progressive system of taxation” is a
directive to Congress. These provisions are placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as
judicially enforceable rights.

SAHIN vs. TURKEY

FACTS:
Leyla Sahin was a medical student at Istanbul University. She came from a muslim-practicing
family and she always wore headscarf as her religious duty. However, the university issued
a circular prohibiting the use of headscarf. Students who have been found violating the said circular
should not be allowed to enter the lectures, seminars and exams. Due to Sahin’s belief, she
refused to remove her headscarf which resulted to denial to attend class, lectures, exams and later
on her enrolment in the said school. She transferred to another university to continue her medical
studies and filed a case before the European Court of Human Rights contesting that the university
violated her right to education but refusing her with her right to manifest her own religious
belief. The State argued that such prohibition is justified by the exercise of its police power on
the grounds of the principle of Secularism, respect of others and pluralism and it is within the
bounds of the domestic law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sahin’s right to manifest religious belief was violated by the prohibition
to wear the headscarf
HELD:
The court ruled in favour of the State. It ruled that there was a valid interference by the
State in order to protect the principle of Secularism. The Court further explained that there was a
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the legitimate objectives
pursued by the interference. It is not only the wearing of headscarf that was prohibited but
also with other various forms of religious attire are also forbidden on the university premises. It
also acknowledges the fact that the University is in principle better placed than an international
court to evaluate the local needs and conditions or the requirements of a particular course.
Hence, the Courts view cannot validly substitute its view for that of the university authorities.
CHAPLINSKY vs NEW HAMPSHIRE
Facts. A New Hampshire statute prohibited any person from addressing any offensive, derisive or annoying
word to any other person who is on any street or public place or calling him by any derisive name. Chaplinsky, a
Jehovah’s Witness, called a City Marshal a “God damned racketeer” and a “damned fascist” in a public place
and was therefore arrested and convicted under the statute.

Issue. Did the statute or the application of the statute to Chaplinsky’s comments violate his free speech rights
under the First Amendment of the Constitution?

Held
The Court, in a unanimous decision, upheld the arrest. Writing the decision for the Court, Justice Frank Murphy
advanced a "two-tier theory" of the First Amendment. Certain "well-defined and narrowly limited" categories
of speech fall outside the bounds of constitutional protection. Thus, "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
slanderous," and (in this case) insulting or "fighting" words neither contributed to the expression of ideas nor
possessed any "social value" in the search for truth.

PEOPLE vs DORIQUEZ

FACTS:
The appellant Romeo Doriquez was charged with the offence of grave oral defamation
before the CFI of Iloilo. Also, six days later. He was indicted of another offence in the same
court, the offence being the discharge of firearm. Upon his arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to
the two indictments and moved to dismiss both information’s against him on the ground that the
institution of a criminal action for discharge of firearm would place him in double jeopardy for
he was previously charged with the offence of alarm and scandal based on the same facts in the
municipal court of Batad, Iloilo which was dismissed without his consent.
The court denied his motion to dismiss and subsequently his motion for reconsideration
was also denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the appellant was placed in double jeopardy by charging him with discharge of
firearm
HELD:
For double jeopardy to attach in his favor, the accused must prove, among other things,
that there is "identity of offences," so that, in the language of section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Court, his "conviction or acquittal ... or the dismissal of the case (without his express
consent) shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same offence charged or for any attempt to,
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offence which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offence charged in the former complaint or information." It is altogether
evident, however, that the offence of discharge of firearm is not the crime of alarm and scandal,
nor is it an attempt or a frustration of the latter felony. Neither may it be asserted that every crime
of discharge of firearm produces the offence of alarm and scandal.

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, supra

FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte. She stated in the COC that she is a resident of the place for seven months. Private respondent
Montejo subsequently filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification on the ground that Imelda failed to
meet the constitutional requirement of one-year residency. COMELEC granted the Petition for Disqualification,
holding that Imelda is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City as her place of domicile when she lived and
even voted in Ilocos and Manila.

ISSUE: Whether or not Imelda is deemed to have abandoned her domicile of origin
HELD:
An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residence in different places.
Residence implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence
or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature
does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion that “she could not have been a resident of Tacloban
City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of
many places” flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between
(actual) residence and domicile for election purposes.

Aquino vs COMELEC GR No 120265 18 September 1995

Facts: Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the new 2nd district of Makati stating that he has
been residing there for ten months. When his candidacy was opposed he filed another certificate of candidacy
stating that he has been residing in Makati for more than a year by virtue of a contract of lease. COMELEC
dismissed petition for Aquino’s disqualification and garnered majority vote on 1995 election. Mateo Bedon
filed for suspension of his proclamation. COMELEC decided in favour of Bedon hence the petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not Aquino failed the constitutional residency requirement?

Decision: Petition dismissed, COMELEC decision affirmed. In order for Aquino to qualify he must prove that he
has established not just residence but domicile of choice. Clearly, the place “where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home” where he eventually intends to return and remain – his domicile – is
what the Constitution speaks of residence for purposes of election law. Property ownership is not an indicia of
the right to vote or to be voted upon.

Agote vs. Lorenzo

FACTS:
Petitioner Vicente Agote was charged to have violated Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearms) and COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 (Gun Ban) for having in possession one (1) .38 cal. Rev. with four
(4) live bullets in a public place during the election period without having secured the necessary license and
authority from the COMELEC. During the pendency of the case, Republic Act No. 8294 was approved into law.
Eventually, the trial court rendered judgment of conviction in both cases wherein separate penalties were
imposed respectively. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, claiming that the penalty for illegal possession of
firearms under P.D. No. 1866 had already been reduced by the subsequent enactment of Republic Act No.
8294, which the trial court subsequently denied. He then filed a petition before the Court of Appeals which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 2991-UDK, but was likewise dismissed.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Republic Act No. 8294 should be applied retroactively.

HELD:
1) Yes. The rule is that penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of
a felony. Republic Act No. 8294 lowers the penalty for illegal possession of firearms depending on the
class of firearm possessed. The lighter penalty may be imposed to a person who shall unlawfully
possess any firearm or ammunition, “unless no other crime was committed”. Moreover, the Court has
already ruled in Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals that said law must be given retroactive effect in favor of
those accused under P.D. No. 1866. But as violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 or the Gun Ban
was also committed by the petitioner at the same time, the Court cannot but set aside petitioner’s
conviction for illegal possession of firearm.

PEOPLE vs LADJAALAM

FACTS:
The trial court found the appellant guilty of maintaining a drug den, an offense for which
was sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua. Appellant’s guilt was established by the testimony of Prosecution
Witness, who himself had used the extension house of appellant as a drug den on several
occasions, including the time of the raid.
The former’s testimony was corroborated by all the raiding police officers who testified
before the court. That appellant did not deny ownership of the house and its extension lent credence
to the prosecution’s story.
The trial court also convicted appellant of direct assault with multiple counts of attempted
homicide. It found that the act of the accused in firing his gun at the policemen who were about
to arrest him constituted such complex crime. Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct assault
with multiple attempted homicide, the trial court convicted him also of the separate offense
of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, and sentenced him to
6 years of Prision Correcional to 8 years of Prision Mayor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant can be convicted separately of illegal possession of firearms
after using said firearm in the commission of another crime.

HELD:
NO. The appealed Decision was affirmed with modifications. Appellant is found guilty
only of two offenses:
(1) Direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a weapon; and
(2) Maintaining a drug den. The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession
of firearms, provided that “no other crime was committed by the person arrested.” If the
intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should
have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish,
neither should we.” The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of illegal
possession of an M-14 rifle, an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct
assault. This arises from the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the
Court’s review.

Llamanzares v Comelec

FACTS:
The petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe- Llamanzares also known as Grace Poe- Llamanzares wishes to run
as the President of the Republic of the Philippines. However, petitions were made by Estrella Elamparo to deny
due course or cancel the COC of Poe-Llamanzares for the reason that the latter is not a natural-born citizen on
the account of the fact that she is a foundling. In addition, Elamparo stated that Poe-Llamanzares even
assuming that the latter is a natural-born citizen she has deemed to lost the same when the she became a
naturalized American citizen, according to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be continuous from birth.

ISSUE: For the purpose of Civil Law-

Whether or not Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe- Llamanzares is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines?

HELD:
The presumption of a natural-born citizenship of the foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents
are nationals of the Philippines. Adopting the legal principles of international laws from 1930 Hague Convention
and the 1961 Convention on stateliness is rational and reasonable and consistent in the Philippine
Constitution’s regime of Jus saguinis. Moreover, the SC clearly stated that the COMELEC cannot reverse the
judicial precedent as it was reserved to the court. In line with this, the Supreme Court ruled that Poe is qualified
to be a candidate for President on May 2016. The court likewise stated that Poe-Llamanzares, being a foundling
is a natural-born citizen based on 1. Circumstantial evidence, 2. Legislation and 3. Generally Accepted principle
of other laws.