CIVPRO
(INTRO)
1. City of Manila vs. Judge Grecia-Cuerdo, et. al., GR No. 175723, Feb. 4, 2014
[G.R. No. 175723. February 4, 2014.]
THE CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., and MS. LIBERTY
M. TOLEDO, in her capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila, petitioners, vs. HON.
CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 112, Pasay City; SM MART, INC.; SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.; STAR
APPLIANCES CENTER; SUPERVALUE, INC.; ACE HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC.;
WATSON PERSONAL CARE STORES, PHILS., INC.; JOLLIMART PHILS., CORP.; SURPLUS
MARKETING CORPORATION and SIGNATURE LINES, respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolutions 1 dated April 6, 2006 and
November 29, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87948.
The antecedents of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
The record shows that petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner
Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for the taxable period from January to December
2002 against private. respondents SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star
Appliances Center, Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware Philippines, Inc., Watsons
Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc., Jollimart Philippines Corp., Surplus Marketing Corp.
and Signature Lines. In addition to the taxes purportedly due from private
respondents pursuant to Sections 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of
Manila (RRCM), said assessment covered the local business taxes petitioners were
authorized to collect under Section 21 of the same Code. Because payment of the
taxes assessed was a precondition for the issuance of their business permits, private
respondents were constrained to pay the P19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.
cACEaI
On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed [with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City] the complaint denominated as one for "Refund or Recovery of Illegally
and/or Erroneously-Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue
TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction" which was docketed as Civil Case No. 04-
0019-CFM before public respondent's sala [at Branch 112]. In the amended
complaint they filed on February 16, 2004, private respondents alleged that, in
relation to Section 21 thereof, Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the RRCM
were violative of the limitations and guidelines under Section 143 (h) of Republic
Act No. 7160 [Local Government Code] on double taxation. They further averred
that petitioner city's Ordinance No. 8011 which amended pertinent portions of the
RRCM had already been declared to be illegal and unconstitutional by the
Department of Justice. 2
In its Order 3 dated July 9, 2004, the RTC granted private respondents' application
for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 4 but the RTC denied it in its Order 5
dated October 15, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing the
July 9, 2004 and October 15, 2004 Orders of the RTC. 6
In its Resolution promulgated on April 6, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioners' petition
for certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled
that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax refund,
which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant
to its expanded jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a
petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the
said case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 7 but the CA denied it in its
Resolution dated November 29, 2006.
Hence, the present petition raising the following issues: cDCSTA
I-Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the
case for lack of jurisdiction.
II-Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in enjoining by issuing a Writ of Injunction
the petitioners[,] their agents and/or authorized representatives from implementing
Section 21 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila, as amended, against private
respondents.
III-Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of Injunction despite
failure of private respondents to make a written claim for tax credit or refund with
the City Treasurer of Manila.
CIVPRO (INTRO)

IV-Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that under Section 21 of the
Manila Revenue Code, as amended, they are mere collecting agents of the City To plaintiff Ace Hardware Phils., Inc.
-
Government. 419,689.04
V-Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of Injunction because
petitioner City of Manila and its constituents would result to greater damage and To plaintiff Watsons Personal Care
prejudice thereof. (sic) 8 -
231,453.62
Without first resolving the above issues, this Court finds that the instant petition Health Stores Phils., Inc.
should be denied for being moot and academic.

Upon perusal of the original records of the instant case, this Court discovered that To plaintiff Jollimart Phils., Corp.
-
a Decision 9 in the main case had already been rendered by the RTC on August 13, 140,908.54
2007, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby renders JUDGMENT in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant to grant a tax refund or credit for taxes To plaintiff Surplus Marketing Corp.
paid pursuant to Section 21 of the Revenue Code of the City of Manila as amended -
for the year 2002 in the following amounts: TCSEcI 220,204.70

To plaintiff SM Mart, Inc.

-
To plaintiff Signature Mktg. Corp.
P11,462,525.02 -
94,906.34

To plaintiff SM Prime Holdings, Inc. ——————

- TOTAL:
3,118,104.63 -
P19,316,458.77

===========
To plaintiff Star Appliances Center
- Defendants are further enjoined from collecting taxes under Section 21, Revenue
2,152,316.54 Code of Manila from herein plaintiff:

SO ORDERED. 10

To plaintiff Supervalue, Inc. The parties did not inform the Court but based on the records, the above Decision
- had already become final and executory per the Certificate of Finality 11 issued by
1,362,750.34
CIVPRO (INTRO)
the same trial court on October 20, 2008. In fact, a Writ of Execution 12 was issued
by the RTC on November 25, 2009.
In view of the foregoing, it clearly appears that the issues raised in the present
petition, which merely involve the incident on the preliminary injunction issued by
the RTC, have already become moot and academic considering that the trial court,
in its decision on the merits in the main case, has already ruled in favor of
respondents and that the same decision is now final and executory. Well entrenched
is the rule that where the issues have become moot and academic, there is no
justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical
use or value. 13
In any case, the Court finds it necessary to resolve the issue on jurisdiction raised
by petitioners owing to its significance and for future guidance of both bench and
bar. It is a settled principle that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and
academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. 14
However, before proceeding, to resolve the question on jurisdiction, the Court
deems it proper to likewise address a procedural error which petitioners committed.
STIcaE
Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they filed the instant special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in assailing the Resolutions
of the CA which dismissed their petition filed with the said court and their motion
for reconsideration of such dismissal. There is no dispute that the assailed
Resolutions of the CA are in the nature of a final order as they disposed of the
petition completely. It is settled that in cases where an assailed judgment or order
is considered final, the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, in the instant
case, petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45,
which is a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. 15
Petitioners should be reminded of the equally-settled rule that a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent action based on grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and it will lie only if
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. 16 As such, it cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal. 17 DaCEIc
Nonetheless, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and
in the interest of substantial justice, this Court has, before, treated a petition for
certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari, particularly (1) if the petition for
certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within which to file a petition
for review on certiorari; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there
is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules. 18 Considering that the
present petition was filed within the 15-day reglementary period for filing a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45, that an error of judgment is averred, and
because of the significance of the issue on jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper
and justified to relax the rules and, thus, treat the instant petition for certiorari as
a petition for review on certiorari.
Having disposed of the procedural aspect, we now turn to the central issue in this
case. The basic question posed before this Court is whether or not the CTA has
jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order
issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
On June 16, 1954, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 1125 (RA 1125) creating the
CTA and giving to the said court jurisdiction over the following:
(1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties
imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal
Revenue Code or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue;
(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs
duties, fees or other money charges; seizure, detention or release of property
affected fines, forfeitures or other penalties imposed in relation thereto; or other
matters arising under the Customs Law or other law or part of law administered by
the Bureau of Customs; and
(3) Decisions of provincial or City Boards of Assessment Appeals in cases involving
the assessment and taxation of real property or other matters arising under the
Assessment Law, including rules and regulations relative thereto.
On March 30, 2004, the Legislature passed into law Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282)
amending RA 1125 by expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, enlarging its
membership and elevating its rank to the level of a collegiate court with special
jurisdiction. Pertinent portions of the amendatory act provides thus:
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. — The CTA shall exercise:
a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:
CIVPRO (INTRO)
1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in
relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue or
other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in
relations thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code
or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National
Internal Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which case the
inaction shall be deemed a denial;
3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases
originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate
jurisdiction;
4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs
duties, fees or other money charges, seizure, detention or release of property
affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto, or other matters
arising under the Customs Law or other laws administered by the Bureau of
Customs; CTDAaE
5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real
property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals;
6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him
automatically for review from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which are
adverse to the Government under Section 2315 of the Tariff and Customs Code;
7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of nonagricultural
product, commodity or article, and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of
agricultural product, commodity or article, involving dumping and countervailing
duties under Sections 301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code,
and safeguard measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may
appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said duties.
b. Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein provided:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising from violations of
the National Internal Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs Code and other laws
administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Bureau of Customs:
Provided, however, That offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where
the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed
is less than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) or where there is no specified amount
claimed shall be tried by the regular Courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be
appellate. Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the
recovery of civil liability for taxes and penalties shall at all times be simultaneously
instituted with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by the CTA, the filing
of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil
action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the
criminal action will be recognized.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal offenses:
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial
Courts in tax cases originally decided by them, in their respected territorial
jurisdiction. STHAaD
b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional
Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally
decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdiction.
c. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving final and executory
assessments for taxes, fees, charges and penalties: Provides, however, that
collection cases where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges
and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be tried
by the proper Municipal Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial
Court.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection cases:
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial
Courts in tax collection cases originally decided by them, in their respective
territorial jurisdiction.
b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional
Trial Courts in the Exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases
CIVPRO (INTRO)
originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction. 19
A perusal of the above provisions would show that, while it is clearly stated that the
CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders or resolutions of the
RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their
original or appellate jurisdiction, there is no categorical statement under RA 1125
as well as the amendatory RA 9282, which provides that the CTA has jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in local
tax cases filed before it.
The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the
exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the
Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of appellate
jurisdiction. 20 Thus, in the cases of Pimentel v. COMELEC, 21 Garcia v. De Jesus, 22
Veloria v. COMELEC, 23 Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v.
Lubrica, 24 and Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, 25 this Court has ruled against the
jurisdiction of courts or tribunals over petitions for certiorari on the ground that
there is no law which expressly gives these tribunals such power. 26 It must be
observed, however, that with the exception of Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, 27 these
rulings pertain not to regular courts but to tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers.
With respect to the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 8249 28 now provides that the
special criminal court has exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
TAacIE
In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants power
to the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. With respect to the Court of Appeals, Section
9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) gives the appellate court, also in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, the power to issue, among others, a writ of
certiorari, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As to Regional Trial
Courts, the power to issue a writ of certiorari, in the exercise of their original
jurisdiction, is provided under Section 21 of BP 129.
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with
respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides,
nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted
that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional
mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
Indeed, in order for any appellate court, to effectively exercise its appellate
jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari.
In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can
reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is
deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There
is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered as partial, not
total.
Consistent with the above pronouncement, this Court has held as early as the case
of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. 29 that "if a case may be appealed to a
particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or
body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction." 30 This principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals,
31 where the Court stated that "a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of
error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court." 32 The rulings in J.M. Tuason
and De Jesus were reiterated in the more recent cases of Galang, Jr. v. Geronimo 33
and Bulilis v. Nuez. 34
Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court provides that when
by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs,
processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by
such court or officer. CHDAEc
If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that jurisdiction over their
certiorari petition lies with the CA, this Court would be confirming the exercise by
two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same
subject matter — precisely the split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the
orderly administration of justice. 35 The Court cannot accept that such was the
legislative motive, especially considering that the law expressly confers on the CTA,
CIVPRO (INTRO)
the tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of
judicial review over local tax cases without mention of any other court that may
exercise such power. Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that since
appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax refund is vested
in the CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an
interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the same
court. To rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one court decides
an appeal in the main case while another court rules on an incident in the very
same case.
Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the pronounced judicial
abhorrence to split jurisdiction to conclude that the intention of the law is to divide
the authority over a local tax case filed with the RTC by giving to the CA or this
Court jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against interlocutory orders of the RTC
but giving to the CTA the jurisdiction over the appeal from the decision of the trial
court in the same case. It is more in consonance with logic and legal soundness to
conclude that the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the CTA over tax cases filed in
and decided by the RTC carries with it the power to issue a writ of certiorari when
necessary in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. The supervisory power or jurisdiction
of the CTA to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction should co-
exist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal,
the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision
over the acts of the latter. 36
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power
necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that will preserve the subject
of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the appeal. It carries
with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court
thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to
control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper
exercise of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or
restrain the performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise
of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it. 37
Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a court which is endowed with a
particular jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary to enable it to act
effectively within such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are
inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them in order to enforce its
rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any
attempted thwarting of such process.
In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the same level as
the CA and shall possess all the inherent powers of a court of justice. HTCDcS
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied
from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on
them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and
efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity and
functions of the courts, as well as to the due administration of justice; or are directly
appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and
include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in
behalf of the litigants. 38
Thus, this Court has held that "while a court may be expressly granted the incidental
powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence
of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential
to effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every
regularly constituted court has power to do all things that are reasonably necessary
for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and for the
enforcement of its judgments and mandates." 39 Hence, demands, matters or
questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming
within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and
determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter,
even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which,
as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance. 40
Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably concluded that the
authority of the CTA to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari questioning
interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in a local tax case is included in the powers
granted by the Constitution as well as inherent in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction.
Finally, it would bear to point out that this Court is not abandoning the rule that,
insofar as quasi-judicial tribunals are concerned, the authority to issue writs of
certiorari must still be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot
be implied from the mere existence of their appellate jurisdiction. This doctrine
remains as it applies only to quasi-judicial bodies.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
CIVPRO (INTRO)

||| (City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo, G.R. No. 175723, [February 4, 2014], 726 PHIL 9- such explanation. Hence, the Complaint for Damages 8 filed by respondent against
28) petitioner and MLHI, the pertinent portions of which read: CSIHDA

2. Medical Plaza Makati Condominium Corp. vs. Robert Cullen, GR No. 181416, xxx xxx xxx
Nov. 11, 2013
6. Thereafter, plaintiff occupied the said condominium unit no. 1201 and religiously
[G.R. No. 181416. November 11, 2013.] paid all the corresponding monthly contributions/association dues and other
assessments imposed on the same. For the years 2000 and 2001, plaintiff served as
MEDICAL PLAZA MAKATI CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. ROBERT H. President and Director of the Medical Plaza Makati Condominium Corporation;
CULLEN, respondent.
7. Nonetheless, on September 19, 2002, plaintiff was shocked/surprised to [receive]
DECISION a letter from the incumbent Corporate Secretary of the defendant Medical Plaza
Makati, demanding payment of alleged unpaid association dues and assessments
PERALTA, J p:
arising from plaintiff's condominium unit no. 1201. The said letter further stressed
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing that plaintiff is considered a delinquent member of the defendant Medical Plaza
Makati. . . .;
the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated July 10, 2007 and Resolution 2 dated
January 25, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86614. The assailed decision reversed and set
8. As a consequence, plaintiff was not allowed to file his certificate of candidacy as
aside the September 9, 2005 Order 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati,
director. Being considered a delinquent, plaintiff was also barred from exercising his
Branch 58 in Civil Case No. 03-1018; while the assailed resolution denied the
right to vote in the election of new members of the Board of Directors . . .;
separate motions for reconsideration filed by petitioner Medical Plaza Makati
Condominium Corporation (MPMCC) and Meridien Land Holding, Inc. (MLHI). 9. . . . Again, prior to the said election date, . . . counsel for the defendant [MPMCC]
sent a demand letter to plaintiff, anent the said delinquency, explaining that the
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
said unpaid amount is a carry-over from the obligation of defendant Meridien. . . .;
Respondent Robert H. Cullen purchased from MLHI condominium Unit No. 1201 of
10. Verification with the defendant [MPMCC] resulted to the issuance of a
the Medical Plaza Makati covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 45808 of
certification stating that Condominium Unit 1201 has an outstanding unpaid
the Register of Deeds of Makati. Said title was later cancelled and Condominium
obligation in the total amount of P145,567.42 as of November 30, 2002, which again,
Certificate of Title No. 64218 was issued in the name of respondent.
was attributed by defendant [MPMCC] to defendant Meridien. . . .; DIETcC
On September 19, 2002, petitioner, through its corporate secretary, Dr. Jose
11. Due to the seriousness of the matter, and the feeling that defendant Meridien
Giovanni E. Dimayuga, demanded from respondent payment for alleged unpaid
made false representations considering that it fully warranted to plaintiff that
association dues and assessments amounting to P145,567.42. Respondent disputed
condominium unit 1201 is free and clear from all liens and encumbrances, the
this demand claiming that he had been religiously paying his dues shown by the fact
matter was referred to counsel, who accordingly sent a letter to defendant
that he was previously elected president and director of petitioner. 4 Petitioner, on
Meridien, to demand for the payment of said unpaid association dues and other
the other hand, claimed that respondent's obligation was a carry-over of that of
assessments imposed on the condominium unit and being claimed by defendant
MLHI. 5 Consequently, respondent was prevented from exercising his right to vote
[MPMCC]. . . .;
and be voted for during the 2002 election of petitioner's Board of Directors. 6
Respondent thus clarified from MLHI the veracity of petitioner's claim, but MLHI 12. . . . defendant Meridien claimed however, that the obligation does not exist
allegedly claimed that the same had already been settled. 7 This prompted considering that the matter was already settled and paid by defendant Meridien to
respondent to demand from petitioner an explanation why he was considered a defendant [MPMCC]. . . .;
delinquent payer despite the settlement of the obligation. Petitioner failed to make
CIVPRO (INTRO)
13. Plaintiff thus caused to be sent a letter to defendant [MPMCC] . . . . The said
letter . . . sought an explanation on the fact that, as per the letter of defendant
Meridien, the delinquency of unit 1201 was already fully paid and settled, contrary
to the claim of defendant [MPMCC]. . . .;
14. Despite receipt of said letter on April 24, 2003, and to date however, no
explanation was given by defendant [MPMCC], to the damage and prejudice of
plaintiff who is again obviously being barred from voting/participating in the election
of members of the board of directors for the year 2003;
15. Clearly, defendant [MPMCC] acted maliciously by insisting that plaintiff is a
delinquent member when in fact, defendant Meridien had already paid the said
delinquency, if any. The branding of plaintiff as delinquent member was willfully and
deceitfully employed so as to prevent plaintiff from exercising his right to vote or
be voted as director of the condominium corporation;
16. Defendant [MPMCC]'s ominous silence when confronted with claim of payment
made by defendant Meridien is tantamount to admission that indeed, plaintiff is
not really a delinquent member; CScTED
17. Accordingly, as a direct and proximate result of the said acts of defendant
[MPMCC], plaintiff experienced/suffered from mental anguish, moral shock, and
serious anxiety. Plaintiff, being a doctor of medicine and respected in the community
further suffered from social humiliation and besmirched reputation thereby
warranting the grant of moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00 and for which
defendant [MPMCC] should be held liable;
18. By way of example or correction for the public good, and as a stern warning to
all similarly situated, defendant [MPMCC] should be ordered to pay plaintiff
exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00;
[19]. As a consequence, and so as to protect his rights and interests, plaintiff was
constrained to hire the services of counsel, for an acceptance fee of P100,000.00
plus P2,500.00 per every court hearing attended by counsel;
[20]. In the event that the claim of defendant [MPMCC] turned out to be true,
however, the herein defendant Meridien should be held liable instead, by ordering
the same to pay the said delinquency of condominium unit 1201 in the amount of
P145,567.42 as of November 30, 2002 as well as the above damages, considering
that the non-payment thereof would be the proximate cause of the damages
suffered by plaintiff; 9
Petitioner and MLHI filed their separate motions to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. 10 MLHI claims that it is the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) which is vested with the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case. Petitioner, on the other hand, raises the following specific grounds
for the dismissal of the complaint: (1) estoppel as respondent himself approved the
assessment when he was the president; (2) lack of jurisdiction as the case involves
an intra-corporate controversy; (3) prematurity for failure of respondent to exhaust
all intra-corporate remedies; and (4) the case is already moot and academic, the
obligation having been settled between petitioner and MLHI. 11 AIaSTE
On September 9, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision granting petitioner's and MLHI's
motions to dismiss and, consequently, dismissing respondent's complaint.
The trial court agreed with MLHI that the action for specific performance filed by
respondent clearly falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB. 12 As to
petitioner, the court held that the complaint states no cause of action, considering
that respondent's obligation had already been settled by MLHI. It, likewise, ruled
that the issues raised are intra-corporate between the corporation and member. 13
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the trial court's decision and remanded
the case to the RTC for further proceedings. Contrary to the RTC conclusion, the CA
held that the controversy is an ordinary civil action for damages which falls within
the jurisdiction of regular courts. 14 It explained that the case hinged on petitioner's
refusal to confirm MLHI's claim that the subject obligation had already been settled
as early as 1998 causing damage to respondent. 15 Petitioner's and MLHI's motions
for reconsideration had also been denied. 16
Aggrieved, petitioner comes before the Court based on the following grounds:
I.
THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE, NOT THERETOFORE
DETERMINED BY THE SUPREME COURT, OR HAS DECIDED IT IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT
WHEN IT DECLARED THE INSTANT CASE AN ORDINARY ACTION FOR DAMAGES
INSTEAD OF AN INTRA-CORPORATE CONTROVERSY COGNIZABLE BY A SPECIAL
COMMERCIAL COURT. cEHSIC
II.
CIVPRO (INTRO)
THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED THE INSTANT CASE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT WHEN
IT TOOK COGNIZANCE OF THE APPEAL WHILE RAISING ONLY PURE QUESTIONS OF
LAW. 17
The petition is meritorious.
It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations in the complaint. It is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by
the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would
become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant. 18 Also
illuminating is the Court's pronouncement in Go v. Distinction Properties
Development and Construction, Inc.: 19
Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which
comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause
of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction
over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the
plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all
or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the
allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether
or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein. . . . 20
Based on the allegations made by respondent in his complaint, does the controversy
involve intra-corporate issues as would fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting
as a special commercial court or an ordinary action for damages within the
jurisdiction of regular courts? AIECSD
In determining whether a dispute constitutes an intra-corporate controversy, the
Court uses two tests, namely, the relationship test and the nature of the controversy
test. 21
An intra-corporate controversy is one which pertains to any of the following
relationships: (1) between the corporation, partnership or association and the public;
(2) between the corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as its
franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; (3) between the corporation,
partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, members or officers; and
(4) among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves. 22 Thus, under the
relationship test, the existence of any of the above intra-corporate relations makes
the case intra-corporate. 23
Under the nature of the controversy test, "the controversy must not only be rooted
in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but must as well pertain to the
enforcement of the parties' correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation
Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation." 24
In other words, jurisdiction should be determined by considering both the
relationship of the parties as well as the nature of the question involved. 25
Applying the two tests, we find and so hold that the case involves intra-corporate
controversy. It obviously arose from the intra-corporate relations between the
parties, and the questions involved pertain to their rights and obligations under the
Corporation Code and matters relating to the regulation of the corporation. 26
Admittedly, petitioner is a condominium corporation duly organized and existing
under Philippine laws, charged with the management of the Medical Plaza Makati.
Respondent, on the other hand, is the registered owner of Unit No. 1201 and is thus
a stockholder/member of the condominium corporation. Clearly, there is an intra-
corporate relationship between the corporation and a stockholder/member. HDIaST
The nature of the action is determined by the body rather than the title of the
complaint. Though denominated as an action for damages, an examination of the
allegations made by respondent in his complaint shows that the case principally
dwells on the propriety of the assessment made by petitioner against respondent
as well as the validity of petitioner's act in preventing respondent from participating
in the election of the corporation's Board of Directors. Respondent contested the
alleged unpaid dues and assessments demanded by petitioner.
The issue is not novel. The nature of an action involving any dispute as to the validity
of the assessment of association dues has been settled by the Court in Chateau de
Baie Condominium Corporation v. Moreno. 27 In that case, respondents therein filed
a complaint for intra-corporate dispute against the petitioner therein to question
how it calculated the dues assessed against them, and to ask an accounting of
association dues. Petitioner, however, moved for the dismissal of the case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction alleging that since the complaint was against the
owner/developer of a condominium whose condominium project was registered
with and licensed by the HLURB, the latter has the exclusive jurisdiction. In
sustaining the denial of the motion to dismiss, the Court held that the dispute as to
the validity of the assessments is purely an intra-corporate matter between
petitioner and respondent and is thus within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC
CIVPRO (INTRO)
sitting as a special commercial court. More so in this case as respondent repeatedly
questioned his characterization as a delinquent member and, consequently,
petitioner's decision to bar him from exercising his rights to vote and be voted for.
These issues are clearly corporate and the demand for damages is just incidental.
Being corporate in nature, the issues should be threshed out before the RTC sitting
as a special commercial court. The issues on damages can still be resolved in the
same special commercial court just like a regular RTC which is still competent to
tackle civil law issues incidental to intra-corporate disputes filed before it. 28
Moreover, Presidential Decree No. 902-A enumerates the cases over which the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) exercises exclusive jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and
among stockholders, members or associates; between any or all of them and the
corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members,
or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or
association and the State insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to
exist as such entity; and
c) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers, or
managers of such corporations, partnerships, or associations. 29 cITAaD
To be sure, this action partakes of the nature of an intra-corporate controversy, the
jurisdiction over which pertains to the SEC. Pursuant to Section 5.2 of Republic Act
No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, the jurisdiction of the
SEC over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A has
been transferred to RTCs designated by this Court as Special Commercial Courts. 30
While the CA may be correct that the RTC has jurisdiction, the case should have
been filed not with the regular court but with the branch of the RTC designated as
a special commercial court. Considering that the RTC of Makati City, Branch 58 was
not designated as a special commercial court, it was not vested with jurisdiction
over cases previously cognizable by the SEC. 31 The CA, therefore, gravely erred in
remanding the case to the RTC for further proceedings.
Indeed, Republic Act (RA) No. 9904, or the Magna Carta for Homeowners and
Homeowners' Associations, approved on January 7, 2010 and became effective on
July 10, 2010, empowers the HLURB to hear and decide inter-association and/or
intra-association controversies or conflicts concerning homeowners' associations.
However, we cannot apply the same in the present case as it involves a controversy
between a condominium unit owner and a condominium corporation. While the
term association as defined in the law covers homeowners' associations of other
residential real property which is broad enough to cover a condominium
corporation, it does not seem to be the legislative intent. A thorough review of the
deliberations of the bicameral conference committee would show that the
lawmakers did not intend to extend the coverage of the law to such kind of
association. We quote hereunder the pertinent portion of the Bicameral Conference
Committee's deliberation, to wit:
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ZUBIRI). Let's go back, Mr. Chair, very quickly on homeowners.
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (REP. ZIALCITA). Ang sa akin lang, I think our views are
similar, Your Honor, Senator Zubiri, the entry of the condominium units might just
complicate the whole matters. So we'd like to put it on record that we're very much
concerned about the plight of the Condominium Unit Homeowners' Association. But
this could very well be addressed on a separate bill that I'm willing to co-sponsor
with the distinguished Senator Zubiri, to address in the Condominium Act of the
Philippines, rather than address it here because it might just create a red herring
into the entire thing and it will just complicate matters, hindi ba?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ZUBIRI). I also agree with you although I sympathize with them
— although we sympathize with them and we feel that many times their rights have
been also violated by abusive condominium corporations. However, there are
certain things that we have to reconcile. There are certain issues that we have to
reconcile with this version.
In the Condominium Code, for example, they just raised a very peculiar situation
under the Condominium Code — Condominium Corporation Act. It's five years the
proxy, whereas here, it's three years. So there would already be violation or there
will be already a problem with their version and our version. Sino ang matutupad
doon? Will it be our version or their version?
So I agree that has to be studied further. And because they have a law pertaining
to the condominium housing units, I personally feel that it would complicate matters
if we include them. Although I agree that they should be looked after and their
problems be looked into. cTEICD
Probably we can ask our staff, Your Honor, to come up already with the bill although
we have no more time. Hopefully we can tackle this again on the 15th Congress. But
I agree with the sentiments and the inputs of the Honorable Chair of the House
panel.
CIVPRO (INTRO)
May we ask our resource persons to also probably give comments?
Atty. Dayrit.
MR. DAYRIT. Yes I agree with you. There are many, I think, practices in their
provisions in the Condominium Law that may be conflicting with this version of ours.
For instance, in the case of, let's say, the condominium, the so-called common areas
and/or maybe so called open spaces that they may have, especially common areas,
they are usually owned by the condominium corporation. Unlike a subdivision where
the open spaces and/or the common areas are not necessarily owned by the
association. Because sometimes — generally these are donated to the municipality
or to the city. And it is only when the city or municipality gives the approval or the
conformity that this is donated to the homeowners' association. But generally,
under PD [Presidential Decree] 957, it's donated. In the Condominium Corporation,
hindi. Lahat ng mga open spaces and common areas like corridors, the function
rooms and everything, are owned by the corporation. So that's one main issue that
can be conflicting.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ZUBIRI). I'll just ask for a one-minute suspension so we can
talk.
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (REP. ZIALCITA). Unless you want to put a catchall phrase
like what we did in the Senior Citizen's Act. Something like, to the extent — paano
ba iyon? To the extent that it is practicable and applicable, the rights and benefits
of the homeowners, are hereby extended to the — mayroon kaming ginamit na
phrase eh. . . to the extent that it be practicable and applicable to the unit
homeowners, is hereby extended, something like that. It's a catchall phrase. But
then again, it might create a. . .
MR. JALANDONI. It will become complicated. There will be a lot of conflict of laws
between the two laws.
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (REP. ZIALCITA). Kaya nga eh. At saka, I don't know. I think
the — mayroon naman silang protection sa ano eh, di ba? Buyers decree doon sa
Condominium Act. I'm sure there are provisions there eh. Huwag na lang, huwag na
lang.
MR. JALANDONI. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be best if your previous comments
that you'd be supporting an amendment. I think that would be — Well, that would
be the best course of action with all due respect.
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (REP. ZIALCITA). Yeah. Okay. Thank you. So iyon na lang final
proposal naming 'yung catchall phrase, "With respect to the. . ." 32
xxx xxx xxx
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ZUBIRI). . . . And so, what is their final decision on the definition
of homeowners?
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (REP. ZIALCITA). We stick to the original, Mr. Chairman. We'll
just open up a whole can of worms and a whole new ball game will come into play.
Besides, I am not authorized, neither are you, by our counterparts to include the
condominium owners. IEAHca
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ZUBIRI). Basically that is correct. We are not authorized by the
Senate nor — because we have discussed this lengthily on the floor, actually, several
months on the floor. And we don't have the authority as well for other Bicam
members to add a provision to include a separate entity that has already their legal
or their established Republic Act tackling on that particular issue. But we just like to
put on record, we sympathize with the plight of our friends in the condominium
associations and we will just guarantee them that we will work on an amendment
to the Condominium Corporation Code.So with that — we skipped, that is correct,
we have to go back to homeowners' association definition, Your Honor, because we
had skipped it altogether. So just quickly going back to Page 7 because there are
amendments to the definition of homeowners. If it is alright with the House Panel,
adopt the opening phrase of Subsection 7 of the Senate version as opening phrase
of Subsection 10 of the reconciled version.
xxx xxx xxx 33
To be sure, RA 4726 or the Condominium Act was enacted to specifically govern a
condominium. Said law sanctions the creation of the condominium corporation
which is especially formed for the purpose of holding title to the common area, in
which the holders of separate interests shall automatically be members or
shareholders, to the exclusion of others, in proportion to the appurtenant interest
of their respective units. 34 The rights and obligations of the condominium unit
owners and the condominium corporation are set forth in the above Act.
Clearly, condominium corporations are not covered by the amendment. Thus, the
intra-corporate dispute between petitioner and respondent is still within the
jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a special commercial court and not the HLURB. The
doctrine laid down by the Court in Chateau de Baie Condominium Corporation v.
CIVPRO (INTRO)
Moreno 35 which in turn cited Wack Wack Condominium Corporation, et al. v. CA
36 is still a good law.
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and REVERSE the Court of Appeals
Decision dated July 10, 2007 and Resolution dated January 25, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 86614. The Complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 58,
which is not a special commercial court, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-1018 is
ordered DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. Let the case REMANDED to the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for re-raffle purposes among the
designated special commercial courts.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Medical Plaza Makati Condominium Corp. v. Cullen, G.R. No. 181416, [November
11, 2013], 720 PHIL 732-749)
3. Sandoval vs. Caneba, 190 SCRA 77 (1991)
[G.R. No. 90503. September 27, 1990.]
NESTOR SANDOVAL, petitioner, vs. HON. DOROTEO CAÑEBA, Presiding Judge, RTC,
Manila, Branch 20, DEPUTY SHERIFF OF MANILA (RTC, Manila, Branch 20), and
ESTATE DEVELOPERS & INVESTORS CORPORATION, respondents.
Arnold V . Guerrero & Associates for petitioner.
Lino M. Patajo for private respondent.
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J p:
The issue in this petition is whether or not the ordinary courts have jurisdiction over
the collection of unpaid installments regarding a subdivision lot.
On August 20, 1987 private respondent filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila for the collection of unpaid installments regarding a subdivision lot,
pursuant to a promissory note, plus interest. On January 29, 1988 the trial court
rendered a decision.
It appears that petitioner was declared in default so much so that after receiving
the evidence of private respondent, the trial court rendered its decision on January
19, 1988, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, on the allegations and the prayer of the complaint and the evidence
adduced in support therefor, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendant
to pay plaintiff the following:
1. The sum of P73,867.42 plus interest and other charges commencing from January
1, 1988 until fully paid;
2. Such sum which shall not be less than P2,000.00 or 25% of the amount of
delinquency whichever is greater, as and for attorney's fees.
3. Costs against the defendant.
SO ORDERED." 1
On September 28, 1988 the trial court issued an order directing the issuance of a
writ of execution to enforce its decision that had become final and executory.
On September 30, 1988 petitioner filed a motion to vacate judgment and to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter and that its decision is null and void. A motion for reconsideration
of the writ of execution was also filed by petitioner. An opposition to both motions
was filed by private respondent to which a reply was filed by petitioner.
On February 17, 1989 the trial court denied the motion to vacate the judgment on
the ground that it is now beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to do so. It directed
the issuance of a writ of execution anew.
Hence the herein petition wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave
abuse of discretion as follows:
"5.1. The respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion and acted without
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the complaint before him notwithstanding that
exclusive and original jurisdiction over the subject-matter thereof is vested with the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) pursuant to PD 957.
5.2 The respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion and acted without
jurisdiction in refusing to vacate his judgment rendered without jurisdiction and in
issuing a writ of execution to implement his abovesaid void judgment." 2
CIVPRO (INTRO)
The petition is impressed with merit.
Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 957 the National Housing Authority (NHA)
was given the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide certain cases as follows:
"SECTION 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and
business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957,
the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices:
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed
by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman. (Emphasis supplied.)"
The language of this section, particularly, the second portion thereof, leaves no
room for doubt that exclusive jurisdiction over the case between the petitioner and
private respondent is vested not on the RTC but on the NHA. The NHA was re-
named Human Settlements Regulatory Commission and thereafter it was re-named
as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). 3
Undeniably the sum of money sought to be collected by private respondent from
petitioner represented unpaid installments of a subdivision lot which the petitioner
purchased. Petitioner alleges that he suspended payments thereof because of the
failure of the developer to develop the subdivision pursuant to their agreement.
In Antipolo Realty Corporation vs. National Housing Authority, 4 the suit which was
filed with the NHA, likewise involved non-payment of installments over a subdivision
lot, wherein this Court held that the NHA has exclusive authority to hear and decide
the case.
In Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Teresita Payawal, 5 this Court ruled that upon the issuance
of Presidential Decree No. 957, the trial court may no longer assume jurisdiction
over the cases enumerated in Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 397. We even
stated therein that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board has the authority
to award damages in the exercise of this exclusive power conferred upon it by
Presidential Decree No. 1344.
In Estate Developers and Investors Corporation vs. Antonio Sarte and Erlinda Sarte,
G.R. No. 93646, which is a case substantially similar to the instant case, in a
resolution of August 13, 1990 this Court upheld the exclusive jurisdiction of the
HLURB over the collection suit.
Considering that the trial court has no jurisdiction under the circumstances
obtaining in this case, the decision it rendered is null and void ab initio. It is as if no
decision was rendered by the trial court at all.
When as in this case the attention of the trial court is drawn to its lack of
competence and authority to act on the case, certainly the trial court has a duty to
vacate the judgment by declaring the same to be null and void ab initio.
This is as it should be. Inasmuch as the questioned judgment is null and void, it is,
as above observed, as if no decision had been rendered by the trial court. It cannot
become final and executory, much less can it be enforced by a writ of execution.
The trial court, rather than reiterating the issuance of a writ of execution in this
case, which it did, should have recalled and cancelled the writ of execution of the
judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of the trial court
dated January 29, 1988 is hereby declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Sandoval v. Cañeba, G.R. No. 90503, [September 27, 1990], 268 PHIL 72-77)
4. Magpale vs. CSC, 215 SCRA 398 (1992)
[G.R. No. 97381. November 5, 1992.]
BENIGNO V. MAGPALE, JR., petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and ROGELIO
A. DAYAN, in his capacity as the General Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority,
respondents.
Abad, Bautista & Associates for petitioner.
CIVPRO (INTRO)

SYLLABUS
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES EXERCISING JUDICIAL
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; APPEALS; PHRASE "PARTY FUNCTIONS MUST BE CONFERRED BY LAW. — Settled is the rule that a tribunal,
ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY DECISION" REFERS TO GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE AGAINST board, or officer exercising judicial functions acts without jurisdiction if no authority
WHOM ADMINISTRATIVE CASE IS FILED. — After Mendez vs. Civil Service has been conferred by law to hear and decide the case. (Acena v. Civil Service
Commission, (204 SCRA 965 [1991]), the extent of the authority of respondent CSC Commission, 193 SCRA 623 [1991]).
to review the decisions of the MSPB is now a settled matter. The Court, in said case
held: "The phrase 'party adversely affected by the decision' refers to the DECISION
government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose
of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or MELO, J p:
salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office . . . By inference or implication, the
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing Resolution No. 90-962 dated
remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is found
October 19, 1990 of respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC). Said CSC resolution
guilty of the charges filed against him. But when the respondent is exonerated of
set aside and modified the decision dated February 5, 1990 of the Merit Systems
said charges, as in this case, there is, no occasion for appeal." (pp. 967-968).
Protection Board in MSPB Case No. 449, which ordered the immediate
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. — While it is true, as contended by respondent Civil Service reinstatement in the service of herein petitioner Benigno V. Magpale, Jr., without
Commission that under Section 12 (par. 11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Book V of loss of seniority rights and with payment of back salaries and other emoluments to
Executive Order 292, the CSC does have the power to — "Hear and decide which he is entitled under the law. LLphil
administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal,
The record shows that petitioner started his career in government as an employee
including contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices
in the Presidential Assistance on Community Development in 1960. Fifteen years
and of the agencies attached to it . . ." the exercise of the power is qualified by and
later, or in 1975, he transferred to the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) as Arrastre
should be read together with the other sections of the same sub-title and book of
Superintendent. He was promoted to the position of Port Manager in 1977 of the
Executive Order 292, particularly Section 49 which prescribes the following
Port Management Unit (PMU), General Santos City. Then he was reassigned, in the
requisites for the exercise of the power of appeal, to wit: (a) the decision must be
same year, to PPA-PMU, Tacloban City where he likewise discharges the functions
appealable; (b) the appeal must be made by the party adversely affected by the
of Port Manager. On December 1, 1982, the PPA General Manager designated Atty.
decision; (c) the appeal must be made within fifteen days from receipt of the
William A. Enriquez as officer-in-charge of PPA-PMU, Tacloban City effective
decision, unless a petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed; and (d) the notice
December 6, 1982. On January 6, 1983, petitioner was ordered to immediately report
of appeal must be filed with the disciplining office, which shall forward the records
to the Assistant General Manager (AGM) for Operations, PPA, Manila. Petitioner
of the case, together with the notice of appeal to the appellate authority within
reported at PPA, Manila on the same date and performed the duties and functions
fifteen days from filing of the notice of appeal, with its comments, if any.
assigned to him.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASES THAT MAY BE APPEALED TO CSC; CASE AT BAR. — Under Section
In an Internal Control Department Report dated March 5, 1984, the PMU-Tacloban
47 of the same Code, the CSC shall decide on appeal all administrative disciplinary
Inventory Committee and the Commission on Audit (COA) stated that petitioner
cases involving the imposition of: (a) a penalty of suspension for more than thirty
failed to account for equipment of PPA valued at P65,542.25 and to liquidate cash
days; or (b) fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary; or (c) demotion in rank
advances amounting to P130,069.61. He was found also to have incurred
or salary or transfer; or (d) removal or dismissal from office. The February 5, 1990
unauthorized absence from May 25, 1984 to July 23, 1984.
decision of the MSPB did not involve dismissal or separation from office, rather, the
decision exonerated petitioner and ordered him reinstated to his former position. On July 23, 1984, or nineteen months after he began reporting in Manila, a formal
Consequently, in the light of our pronouncements in the aforecited cases of Mendez charge for Dishonesty, Pursuit of Private Business without permission as required
vs. Civil Service Commission and Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission, the MSPB by Civil Service Rules and Regulations, Frequent and Unauthorized Absences and
decision was not a proper subject of appeal to the CSC.
CIVPRO (INTRO)
Neglect of Duty was filed against petitioner. Based on said charges, he was ordered
preventively suspended and has been out of service since then.
For almost four years, the case remained unacted upon. The formal investigation
and hearing resumed on September 18, 1987.
On January 18, 1989, a Decision was rendered by the Secretary of the Department
of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), through its Administrative Action
Board, finding petitioner guilty of Gross Negligence on two counts: (a) for his failure
to account for the forty-four (44) assorted units of equipment, among them a Sony
Betamax, and a TV Camera, and (b) for failing to render the required liquidation of
his cash advances amounting to P44,877.00 for a period of four years. Petitioner was
also found guilty of frequent and unauthorized absences. Accordingly, he was meted
the penalty of dismissal from the service with the corresponding accessory
penalties. prLL
When petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision was denied
in the DOTC's Order of February 20, 1989, he appealed to the Merit Systems and
Protection Board (MSPB) of respondent Civil Service Commission.
On February 5, 1990, the MSPB rendered a Decision reversing the Decision of the
DOTC. The pertinent portion of the MSPB'S Decision reads:
"After a careful review of the records of the case, this Board found the appeal
meritorious. Respondent cannot be held liable for Gross Negligence for his alleged
failure to account for several properties and for failure to liquidate the cash
advances he received as there was no showing that he has been specifically required
to do so either by law or regulation. The mere detail of respondent to PPA-Manila,
in the absence of an order requiring him to turn over and account for the funds and
property received for his office at PMU-Tacloban will not necessarily obligate him
to make accounting for the same.
Moreover, Section 105, Chapter 5 of Presidential Decree 1445, otherwise known as
`The Government Auditing Code of the Philippines', measured the liability of an
officer accountable for government property only to the money value of said
property. Though respondent is the person primarily liable for these funds and
property, he holds this liability jointly with the person who has the actual possession
thereof and who has the immediate responsibility for their safekeeping.
As to the charge relative to respondent's frequent unauthorized absences had been
sufficiently and convincingly explained, due to which the Board found him not at all
guilty of the offense charged (sic).
IN VIEW THEREOF, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed. Respondent-
Appellant Magpale should immediately be reinstated in the service without loss of
seniority rights and with payment of back salaries and other emoluments to which
he is entitled under the law." (pp. 31-32, Rollo.)
On March 1, 1990, PPA, through its General Manager, herein respondent Rogelio A.
Dayan, filed an appeal with the Civil Service Field Office-PPA, and the latter office
indorsed the appeal to respondent CSC in a letter dated March 5, 1990.
On March 5, 1990, petitioner requested the Secretary of the DOTC to direct the PPA
to implement the MSPB decision as it has become final and executory. Said request
was reiterated in another letter also dated March 5, 1990 by petitioner to OIC
Wilfredo M. Trinidad of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration and
Legal Affairs, DOTC.LLphil
On March 13, 1990, petitioner filed with the MSPB a Motion for Implementation of
the MSPB decision. This was opposed by the PPA through its General Manager.
On April 27, 1990, petitioner filed with respondent CSC his comment to the appeal
of the PPA contending that he is not an accountable officer and is under no
obligation to account for the property and equipment; that said property and
equipment were not received by him as custodian and he should not be held liable
for the loss of the same; that the said property and equipment were placed in PPA-
PMU Tacloban City which the herein petitioner left on October 8, 1982 and since
then had lost control over them. Moreover, petitioner averred that as to the
unliquidated cash advances of P44,877.00, the same had long been liquidated.
Finally, petitioner claimed that his failure to secure the clearance for any possible
property or financial obligation in PMU-Tacloban was due to the urgency of his
transfer to PPA-Manila and the absence of any order or demand to secure the
clearance.
On May 29, 1990, the MSPB issued an Order for the immediate implementation of
its February 5, 1990 Decision, ruling that:
"Records further show that a copy of this Board's decision was received by the
Office of the Honorable Secretary, that Department, thru Mr. Frankie Tampus on
CIVPRO (INTRO)
February 6, 1990. Records finally show that as of March 5, 1990, no motion for
reconsideration of this Board's aforementioned decision has ever been filed as
evidenced by the certification of even date issued and signed by Director Adelaida
C. Montero of the Office for Central Personnel Records, this Commission. Hence,
said decision has long become final and executory". (p. 34, Rollo.)
On June 28, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the appeal of PPA claiming
that:
"1. Appeal of PPA was filed out of time and that the CSC has no jurisdiction over it;
2. The PPA has not exhausted administrative remedies before appealing to the
higher body, the CSC;
3. The MSPB decision has become final and therefore cannot be disturbed anymore.
(p. 22, Rollo.)
On October 19, 1990, respondent CSC rendered its now assailed Resolution No. 90-
962, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:
"The Commission thus holds respondent Magpale guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty
on two (2) counts for his failure to account for the forty-four (44) equipments (sic)
under his charge and to render an accounting for cash advances amounting to
P44,877.90. Accordingly, considering two mitigating circumstances of length of
service and first offense in favor of respondent, the commission hereby imposes a
penalty of suspension for a period of one (1) year against him. As he has been out
of the service since 1984, the penalty is deemed served and he should now be
reinstated to his former position. This is, however, without prejudice to any criminal
or civil proceedings that the agency concerned or the COA may institute as proper
under the premises.
Finally, the decision of the MSPB exonerating the respondent Magpale for Gross
Negligence is hereby reversed. Corollarily, the order of payment of back salaries is
hereby set aside. MSPB is likewise reminded to be more circumspect on matters of
this nature, especially as the instant case involves accountability of public funds and
property. cdphil
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission finds respondent
Benigno V. Magpale, Jr., guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty on two (2) counts for failure
to account for the forty-four (44) equipments (sic) under his charge and to render
an accounting for cash advance amounting to P44,877.90. In view of the attendant
mitigating circumstances of length of service and first offense in favor of respondent
and the Neglect of Duty to account for cash advance in the amount of P44,877.90
(second count) be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, the penalty of
suspension for one (1) year shall be imposed against respondent. This shall be
without prejudice to any criminal or civil proceedings that PPA or COA may institute
against respondent. Accordingly, the Decision and Order of MSPB dated February 5,
1990 and May 23, 1990, respectively, are hereby set aside ". (pp. 27-28, Rollo.)
Hence, the present recourse.
The petition alleges that respondent CSC, in issuing its Resolution No. 90-962,
gravely abused its discretion because:
"1. The law did not authorize an appeal by the government from an adverse decision
of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB);
2. Respondent PPA General Manager did not have the right or legal personality to
appeal from the MSPB decision;
3. Assuming that the appeal was available to respondent DAYAN, the same was filed
out of time after the MSPB decision had long become final and executory." (pp. 6-
7, Petition; pp. 7-8, Rollo.)
In support of his first contention, petitioner invokes Paragraph 2(a), Section 16,
Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known
as the Administrative Code of 1987 which provides:
"SECTION 16. Offices in the Commission. — The Commission shall have the following
offices:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) The Merit Systems Protection Board composed of a Chairman and two (2)
members shall have the following functions:
(a) Hear and decide on appeal administrative cases involving officials and employees
of the Civil Service. Its decision shall be final except those involving dismissal or
separation from the service which may be appealed to the Commission." (Emphasis
supplied.).
claiming that since the MSPB decision was not for dismissal or separation from the
service, but reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and with payment of back
CIVPRO (INTRO)
salaries, the said MSPB decision should be deemed final, immediately executory and
unappealable. llcd
Petitioner next contends that assuming, for the sake of argument. that the decision
of the MSPB was appealable, respondent Dayan, even in his capacity as General
Manager of the PPA, did not have the legal personality nor the right to appeal the
decision of the MSPB, citing paragraph 1, Section 49, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I,
Book V, of Executive Order No. 292 and the case of Paredes vs. CSC, G.R. No. 88177,
December 4, 1990, 192 SCRA 84.
Assuming further that the MSPB decision was appealable and that respondent
Dayan had the legal personality to appeal the MSPB decision, petitioner still
contends that the appeal should not have been given due course by the respondent
CSC because the appeal was not filed with the proper disciplining office in
accordance with same Section 49 of Executive Order No. 292, which, in this case,
should be the DOTC, not with the CSC Field Office at the PPA.
On the merit of the petition, petitioner claims that assuming even further that an
appeal lies from the MSPB decision, that respondent Dayan had the legal personality
or standing to institute the appeal and that it was filed with the proper office, still
CSC Resolution 90-962 was rendered with grave abuse of discretion because
petitioner cannot be suspended for alleged failure to account for pieces of
equipment and cash advances since this is not the neglect of duty contemplated by
Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807 or Section 46 of the chapter on the Civil
Service in Executive Order 292. At most, petitioner can be held liable for the money
value of the equipment and advances as mandated by Section 105 of Presidential
Decree No. 1445, the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.
For its part, respondent CSC maintains —
First, that the finality of the MSPB decision in disciplinary cases as stated in Section
16, Paragraph 2(a), Book V of Executive Order No. 292, relied upon by petitioner, is
modified by Section 12, Paragraph 11, Book V, of the same Executive Order No. 292,
which reads:
"SECTION 12. Powers and Functions. — The Commission shall have the following
powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought directly or on
appeal, including contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its
offices and of the agencies attached to it."
Furthermore, relevant provisions of Executive Order No. 135 dated February 25,
1987 amending Section 19(b) of Presidential Decree No. 807 and Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 1409 state, thus: Cdpr
"WHEREAS, in the interest of justice, there is a need to confer upon the Civil Service
Commission jurisdiction over appeal in contested or provisional appointments and
to make its decision thereon, as well as in administrative disciplinary cases final and
reviewable by the Supreme Court.
xxx xxx xxx
Relationship with the Civil Service Commission. — The Commission shall hear and
decide appeals from other decisions of the Board provided that the decisions of the
Commission shall be subject to review on certiorari only upon receipt of a copy
thereof by the aggrieved party."
Thus, respondent CSC argues that it is deemed not to have lost its appellate
jurisdiction over the decisions of the MSPB in administrative disciplinary cases.
Second, the case of Paredes v. CSC is not applicable. Respondent Dayan appealed
the MSPB decision not in his personal capacity nor in pursuit of his private interest,
but as held of the PPA, being the general manager thereof.
Third, the appeal was filed with the proper disciplining office because the decision
appealed from was that of the MSPB, one of the offices in respondent CSC. Thus,
respondent CSC was justified in giving due course to PPA's notice of appeal filed
with its (CSC) Field Office at the PPA.
Finally, petitioner's claim that he is liable only for the money value of the property
and cash advances and cannot be administratively charged for such infraction is
untenable and a mockery of the civil service law. For his failure to account for the
property under his charge and to liquidate his cash advances, petitioner is guilty of
Gross Neglect of Duty and should have been dismissed from the service if no
mitigating circumstances were considered in his favor.
We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective
memoranda. After considering the same and the pertinent laws and jurisprudence,
We find that the petition must be granted.
CIVPRO (INTRO)
After Mendez vs. Civil Service Commission, (204 SCRA 965 [1991]), the extent of the
authority of respondent CSC to review the decisions of the MSPB is now a settled
matter.
The Court, in said case held:
"It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provision of law. (Victorias
Milling Co., Inc. vs. Office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, 153 SCRA
318).
A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as `The Philippine Civil Service Law'
shows that said law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers
or employees from administrative charges.
Section 37 paragraph (a) thereof, provides:
'The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases
involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine
in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer,
removal or dismissal from office . . .' (emphasis supplied) (p. 7, Rollo).
Said provision must be read together with Section 39 paragraph (a) of P.D. 805 which
contemplates: prcd
'Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the
decision . . .' (emphasis supplied) (p. 104, Rollo)
The phrase 'party adversely affected by the decision' refers to the government
employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of
disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or
salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office. In the instant case, Coloyan who
filed the appeal cannot be considered an aggrieved party because he is not the
respondent in the administrative case below.
Finally, pursuant to Section 37 paragraph (b) of P.D. 807, the city mayor, as head of
the city government, is empowered to enforce judgment with finality on lesser
penalties like suspension from work for one month and forfeiture of salary
equivalent to one month against erring employees.
By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case
where the respondent is found guilty of the charges filed against him. But when the
respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in this case, there is, no occasion for
appeal." (pp. 967-968).
The above ruling is a reiteration of the earlier pronouncement in Paredes vs. Civil
Service Commission, (192 SCRA 84 [1990]) cited by petitioner, wherein We said:
"Based on the above provisions of law, appeal to the Civil Service Commission in an
administrative case is extended to the party adversely affected by the decision, that
is, the person or the respondent employee who has been meted out the penalty of
suspension for more than thirty days; or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days
salary demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. The
decision of the disciplining authority is even final and not appealable to the Civil
Service Commission in cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more
than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. Appeal in
cases allowed by law must be filed within fifteen days from receipt of the decision.
Here the MSPB after hearing and the submission of memoranda exonerated private
respondent Amor of all charges except for habitual tardiness. The penalty was only
a reprimand so that even private respondent Amor, the party adversely affected by
the decision, cannot even interpose an appeal to the Civil Service Commission.
As correctly ruled by private respondent, petitioner Paredes the complainant is not
the party adversely affected by the decision so that she has no legal personality to
interpose an appeal to the Civil Service Commission. In an administrative case, the
complainant is a mere witness (Gonzalo v. D. Roda, 64 SCRA 120). Even if she is the
Head of the Administrative Services Department of the HSRC as a complainant she
is merely a witness for the government in an administrative case. No private interest
is involved in an administrative case as the offense is committed against the
government." (pp. 98-99). prcd
While it is true, as contended by respondent Civil Service Commission that under
Section 12 (par. 11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Book V of Executive Order 292, the CSC
does have the power to —
"Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or
on appeal, including contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of
its offices and of the agencies attached to it . . ."
the exercise of the power is qualified by and should be read together with the other
sections of the same sub-title and book of Executive Order 292, particularly Section
CIVPRO (INTRO)
49 which prescribes the following requisites for the exercise of the power of appeal,
to wit:
(a) the decision must be appealable;
(b) the appeal must be made by the party adversely affected by the decision;
(c) the appeal must be made within fifteen days from receipt of the decision, unless
a petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed; and
(d) the notice of appeal must be filed with the disciplining office, which shall forward
the records of the case, together with the notice of appeal to the appellate authority
within fifteen days from filing of the notice of appeal, with its comments, if any.
Under Section 47 of the same Code, the CSC shall decide on appeal all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of: Cdpr
(a) a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or
(b) fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary; or
(c) demotion in rank or salary or transfer; or
(d) removal or dismissal from office.
The February 5, 1990 decision of the MSPB did not involve dismissal or separation
from office, rather, the decision exonerated petitioner and ordered him reinstated
to his former position. Consequently, in the light of our pronouncements in the
aforecited cases of Mendez vs. Civil Service Commission and Paredes vs. Civil Service
Commission, the MSPB decision was not a proper subject of appeal to the CSC.
Settled is the rule that a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions acts
without jurisdiction if no authority has been conferred by law to hear and decide
the case. (Acena v. Civil Service Commission, 193 SCRA 623 [1991]).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Civil Service Commission is hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE and the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board dated February
5, 1990 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Magpale, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 97381, [November 5, 1992])
5. De Murga vs. Chan, G.R. No. L-24680, October 7, 1968
[G.R. No. L-24680. October 7, 1968.]
JESUSA VDA. DE MURGA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUANITO CHAN, defendant-appellant.
Jose Go and Fernando P. Blanco for plaintiff-appellee.
Abelardo A. Climaco. T. de los Reyes, Enrique A. Fernandez and Ernani Cruz Paño for
defendant-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER; PRELIMINARY NOTICE OR
DEMAND; NOTICE TO VACATE OR PAY INCREASED RENTAL; SUFFICIENCY. — A notice
giving the lessee the alternative either to pay the increased rental or otherwise
vacate the land is not the demand contemplated by the Rules of Court in unlawful
detainer cases. Without any subsequent definite demand to vacate the premises,
subject to no condition, the lessee did not incur in default which would give rise to
a right on the part of the lessor to bring an action of unlawful detainer.
2.ID.; JURISDICTION; INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACT. — Where the controversy
hinges on the correct interpretation of a clause of a contract of lease, that is,
whether or not it contemplated an automatic renewal of the lease, the action was
not for unlawful detainer but one not capable of pecuniary estimation and,
therefore, beyond the competence of a municipal court.
DECISION
ANGELES, J p:
In this appeal, two issues involving questions of law are posed for resolution: First,
whether or not the allegations in the complaint constitute a cause of action for
unlawful detainer, and confer jurisdiction over the case to the municipal court (now
city court) of Zamboanga City, under the provisions of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
and decisions interpreting the same, when particularly considered in the light of the
contexture of the pertinent letter of demand to vacate the leased premises (Annex
J of the Complaint), couched in the following wise:
"Please be advised further that we reiterate our demand made to you in our
registered letter dated February 4, 1959 (to vacate the leased premises) which was
received by you on the 10th instant, unless you pay the amount of Six Hundred
pesos (P600.00) or Seven Hundred pesos (P700.00) as new rental per our letter of
CIVPRO (INTRO)
January 19, 1959, before the expiration of the 15-day period granted you for
vacating the same."
and, Second, whether or not the lessor and the lessee had agreed upon an
automatic renewal of the lease of the premises, under the stipulation in clause "7"
of the corresponding contract of lease, containing the following agreement.
"7. — That upon the termination of the term of Ten (10) years above expressed, the
said Jesusa Vda. de Murga shall have the option to purchase the buildings belonging
to and constructed by the said Juanito Chan, and the price of said building or
buildings shall be determined by three commissioners, two of whom shall be
appointed by each of the parties, and the remainder commissioner shall be
appointed by both. However, in the event that the said Jesusa Vda. de Murga shall
not exercise the right granted her for any reason or cause, this contract of lease
shall be automatically renewed but the period for said renewal shall, however, be
fixed and adjusted again by the parties. It is agreed further that in case of said
renewal, the rental shall also be adjusted by the parties depending on the business
condition which shall then at that tine prevail." (Exhibit A.)
Jesusa Vda. de Murga was the owner of the two parcels of land in the City of
Zamboanga, designated as lots 36 and 38 of the cadastral plan of the place, and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 3287 and 3288, respectively.
On January 31, 1949, a contract of lease over said two lots was entered into by and
between Jesusa Vda. de Murga as lessor, and Juanito Chan as lessee, the basic terms
of which pertinent to the present case are: The period of the lease was ten (10)
years from January 31, 1949; the lessee to pay a monthly rent of P500.00 within the
first ten days of every month; with the consent of the lessor, the lessee may
introduce improvements on the land; and Clause '7' quoted hereinabove. (Exhibit
A.).
Upon taking possession of the leased premises, with the consent of the lessor, the
lessee introduced improvements on the land consisting of buildings of the total
costs of P70,000.00. It is not disputed that the lessee paid in full the monthly rent
during the ten- year period of the lease.
As early as July 23, 1958, before the expiration of the ten-year period of the lease,
there had been intercourse of communications between the lessor and the lessee
for the renewal of the lease, but the parties failed to arrive at an agreement; hence,
this action by the lessor against the lessee.
Thus, on July 23, 1958, the lessor informed the lessee of her willingness to renew
the lease for five years at a monthly rent of P700.00 (Exhibit B.) In his reply the
lessee said:
". . . Much as I am willing to consider the suggested increase of rental, however, I
would like to plead with you that due to very poor business at present, I may not
be able to consider your indicated increase." (Exhibit C.)
On August 1, 1958, the lessor advised the lessee that:
"Beginning February 1, 1959, . . . the rental of my lots . . . will be P700.00." (Exhibit
D.)
On January 18, 1959, the lessee advised the lessor that she (lessor) should purchase
the buildings constructed on the land in accordance with the stipulation in the
contract of lease, and —
". . . In case you do not agree with the purchase of the aforesaid buildings, I am
willing to continue occupying the land and execute a new contract of lease, but I
am appealing to you to take consideration the prevailing business conditions by
reducing the monthly rental to P400.00, . . ." (Exhibit L.)
On January 19, 1959, the lessor replied that —
". . . she rejects the option to purchase the buildings, . . . and her present last offer
is: (a) Six hundred pesos (P600.00) rentals payable within the first fifteen days of
every month, without contract; or (b) Seven hundred pesos (P700.00) rentals payable
within the first fifteen days of every month, one year advanced rental, with a five-
year contract." (Exhibit F.)
On January 20, 1959, the lessor informed the lessee that the conditions stated in
the latter's letter of January 18, 1959, were not acceptable to her. (Exhibit G.)
On January 21, 1959, the lessee advised the lessor that he (lessee) cannot accept
the conditions stated in her (lessor's) letters of January 19 and 20, 1959.
". . . y, insisto que Vd. compre mis casas enclavadas en los lotes objeto de
arrendamiento. Yen caso de su negativa seguire ocupando el solar bajo el pago de
un alquiler mensual de Quinientos pesos (P500.00) debido al negocio reinante en
estos dias, tal como esta dispuesto en el contrato de arrendamiento firmado por
Vd. y yo el dia 31 de Enero de 1949." (Exhibit H.)
CIVPRO (INTRO)
On February 4, 1959, the lessor made demand on the lessee to vacate the premises
— After a trial, decision was rendered ordering the defendant to vacate the premises,
". . . for the reason that the lease contract had expired on January 31, 1959, . . . and
the lessor had waived the right to exercise the option granted her under paragraph
'7' of said contract, . . ." (Exhibit I.)
On February 16, 1959, the lessee sent his check for P500.00 to the lessor in payment
of the monthly rental corresponding to the month of February, 1959. (See Exhibit J.)
On February 19, 1959, the lessor returned to the lessee the check which the latter
had sent to the former, stating further in the letter that she was demanding that
the leased premises be vacated, if he (lessor) would not agree to pay the new rental
of P600.00 or P700 .00 a month beginning February 1, 1959, as embodied in the
letter, Exhibit J, hereinabove quoted.
Disregarding the written demand of the lessor, dated February 19, 1959, Exhibit J,
the lessee chose to remain in the possession of the leased premises and insisted
that the contract of leasestipulated an automatic renewal of the lease, and
conformably thereto, he has a right to continue occupying the premises; and as
token of his decision, he sent to the lessor his check for P500.00 in payment of the
monthly rent corresponding to the month of February 1959. The lessor was
undoubtedly not satisfied with the tendered amount of P500.00, because she had
demanded P600.00 or P700.00, as new monthly rent as a condition for the renewal
of the lease. And without any further definite demand on the lessee to vacate the
premises filed, on March 10, 1959, a complaint of unlawful detainer in the municipal
court of Zamboanga City against the lessee, Juanito Chan, to eject the latter from
the leased premises. The facts alleged in the complaint as cause of action, consisted
in reproducing and reiterating the substance of the correspondence exchanged
between lessor and lessee, as narrated above, and claiming that the possession of
the lessee of the premises had become illegal by his failure and refusal to pay the
increased new rental. For relief, the plaintiff prayed that the defendant be ordered
to vacate the premises, and "TO PAY THE NEW RENTS DEMANDED OF P600.00 or
P700.00 FROM FEBRUARY 1, 1959 MONTHLY AS THE CASE MAY BE." Attached to the
complaint, as annexes thereto, were copies of the letters exchanged between the
lessor and the lessee, Exhibits B to J.
In his answer (as amended), the defendant admitting the genuineness and
authenticity of the letters annexed to the complaint, but traversing some of the
allegations therein, raised the defenses of lack of jurisdiction of the court over the
case, and lack of cause of action for unlawful detainer.
to pay the plaintiff the sum of P600.00 as monthly rent from February 1, 1959, and
P500.00 as attorney's fees.
The defendant appealed from the decision to the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga City. Before this Court, the defendant again raised the special defenses
of lack of jurisdiction of the municipal court and lack of cause of action for unlawful
detainer. Ruling on the issue of lack of jurisdiction, the court said:
"With reference to the contention of defendant that the municipal court had no
jurisdiction to try this case because the interpretation, application and enforcement
of the terms of the Lease Agreement is within the competence of a court higher
than that of the municipal court, deserves hardly any discussion. Suffice it to say
that the jurisdiction of the municipal court is grounded on Section 88 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948."
After a trial, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment ordering the defendant
to vacate the premises, to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,200.00 from February 1,
1959, as monthly rental of the land, and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees.
From the foregoing decision, the defendant interposed a direct appeal to this Court.
Therefore, only questions of law may be considered in this appeal.
Among the four errors assigned by the appellant in his brief, the first two pose the
issue of lack of jurisdiction of the municipal court and of the lack of cause of action
for unlawful detainer; the remaining errors delving on questions of fact which, by
reason of the nature of the appeal are, therefore, deemed admitted and may not
be reviewed in this appeal.
In relation to the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the municipal court over the case, it
is to be noted that, after the lessor and the lessee had failed to agree on the renewal
of the lease which terminated on January 31, 1959, the lessor, on February 19, 1959,
sent the demand letter hereinabove quoted, Exhibit J. It was, then, as it is now, the
contention of the lessee that such demand is not that kind of demand contemplated
in the Rules of Court as complying with the jurisdictional requirement — that demand
to vacate is indispensable in order to determine whether the tenant's possession
has become illegal. On this matter, the rulings in the following cases are pertinent
and applicable:
CIVPRO (INTRO)
"The notice giving lessee the alternative either to pay the increased rental or
otherwise to vacate the land is not the demand contemplated by the Rules of Court
in unlawful detainer cases. When after such notice, the lessee elects to stay, he
thereby merely assumes the new rental and cannot be ejected until he defaults in
said obligation and necessary demand is first made." (Manotok vs. Guinto, L-9540,
April 30, 1957.)
"The lessor may, under Article 1569 of the Civil Code, judicially dispossess the lessee
for default in the payment of the price agreed upon. But where such default is based
on the fact that the rent sought to be collected is not that agreed upon, an action
for ejectment cannot lie." (Belmonte vs. Martin, 42 Of. Gaz. No. 10, 2146.)
In the case at bar, it clearly appears from the demand letter of February 19, 1959,
that the obligation to vacate the leased premises would be dependent on the failure
of the lessee to agree to the new rent demanded by the lessor. As the lessee,
however, was in the physical possession of the land by virtue of a prior contract of
lease, and the demand was in the alternative imposing a new rental, even without
taking into account the efficacy of the stipulation for an automatic renewal of the
lease, which shall be discussed hereafter, in the light of the ruling in Belmonte vs.
Martin, supra, without any subsequent definite demand to vacate the premises,
subject to no condition, the lessee did not incur in default which would give rise to
a right on the part of the lessor to bring an action of unlawful detainer.
Delving on the second special defense to wit, that the allegations in the complaint
do not constitute a cause of action of unlawful detainer, it is the contention of the
lessee-appellant that clause `7' of the contract of lease, quoted hereinabove, meant
an express grant to the lessee to renew the lease at his option, contrary to the claim
of the lessor-appellee that there must be a prior mutual agreement of the parties.
As we read clause `7', We find that it envisioned the happening of two eventualities
at the expiration of the lease on January 31, 1959 — either the lessor may purchase
the improvements constructed by the lessee on the land, or in case the lessor fails,
for any cause or reason, to exercise the option to buy, the lease shall be deemed
automatically renewed. The evidence has established that the lessor had refused to
buy the buildings on the land. The statement in said clause `7' that in case of renewal
the duration of the lease and the new rental to be paid shall be adjusted by the
parties, is of no moment in the solution of the issue, whether or not the facts alleged
in the complaint constitute a cause of action of unlawful detainer. The pleadings of
the parties, and the annexes thereto, clearly show that the jugular vein of the
controversy hinges on the correct interpretation of clause `7' of the contract of
lease, a matter outside the jurisdiction of the municipal court. The lessor- appellee
maintains that the lease had terminated on January 31, 1959, renewable only upon
a new agreement of the parties; on the other hand, the lessee-appellant contends
that, inasmuch as the controversy hinges on the interpretation of clause `7' of the
contract, that is, whether or not said clause contemplated an automatic renewal of
the lease, the action was not for unlawful detainer but one not capable of pecuniary
estimation and, therefore, beyond the competence of the municipal court.
The contention of the lessee-appellant must be sustained.
In Cruz vs. Alberto, 39 Phil. 991, the contract of lease had the following provision:
"That the term of this contract of lease shall be six years from the date of the
execution and extendible for another six years agreed upon by both parties."
It was contended by the lessor that the lease cannot be extended except upon
mutual agreement. Ruling on the contention, the Supreme Court said:
"We are of the opinion that the trial judge was entirely correct in his interpretation
of the contracts in question; and though it must be admitted that this interpretation
renders the words `agreed upon by both parties' superfluous, yet this does not
involve any strain upon the meaning of the entire passage. If the interpretation
which the appellant would have us adopt be true, the entire clause relative to the
extension of the term would be superfluous, for if the extension is only to be
effective upon a new agreement of the parties to be made at the expiration of the
original term, why should anything at all be said about an extension? Parties who
are free to make one contract of lease are certainly free to make a new one when
the old has expired without being reminded of their faculty to do so by the insertion
of a clause of this kind in the first lease. This would not only be superfluous but
nonsensical. The clause relative to the extension of the lease should, if possible, be
so interpreted as to give it some force.
As we interpreted the contracts before us, the parties meant to express the fact
that they had already agreed that there might be an extension of the lease and had
agreed upon its duration, thus giving the defendant the right of election to take for
a second term or to quit upon the expiration of the original term. The clause in
question has the same meaning as if the words "agreed upon by both parties" had
been omitted and the passage had closed with a period after the word `years' in
the first contract and after "extension" in the third contract.
"It has been held by this court that the word `extendible' standing without
qualification in a contract of lease, means that the term of the lease may be
extended and is equivalent to a promise to extend, made by the lessor to the lessee,
CIVPRO (INTRO)

and, as unilateral stipulation, obliges the promisor to fulfill his promise. (Legarda having fulfilled his promise to grant the extension of time stipulated therein, unless
Koh vs. Ongsiako, 36 Phil. 185). Such a stipulation is supported by the consideration the lessee has failed to comply with or has violated the conditions of the contract.
which is at the basis of the contract of lease (16 R.C.L. pp. 883, 884) and obviously It is not necessary that the extension be expressly conceded by the lessor because
involves a mutuality of benefit, or reciprocity, between the parties, notwithstanding he consented thereto in the original contract."
the right of election is conceded solely to the lessee. As a general rule, in construing
provisions of this character, the tenant is favored, where there is any uncertainty,
and not the landlord, upon the principle that a grant should be taken most strongly
UPON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, We declare that the municipal court (now
against the grantor. (15 R.C.L. p. 884 24 Cyc. 915.)"
city court) of Zamboanga City had no jurisdiction over the case; therefore, the
appealed decision is set aside and reversed, with costs against the plaintiff-appellee.
In the case of Legarda Koh vs. Ongsiaco, 36 Phil. 189-190, the contract of lease had
this provision:
||| (Vda. de Murga v. Chan, G.R. No. L-24680, [October 7, 1968], 134 PHIL 433-442)
"The term of the said contract shall be for one year, counting from the 1st of
6. Editha Padlan vs. Elenita and Felicisimo Dinglasan GR No. 180321, March 20,
December of the present year (1963) which term shall be extendible at the will of 2013
both parties."
[G.R. No. 180321. March 20, 2013.]
Said the Supreme Court:
EDITHA PADLAN, petitioner, vs. ELENITA DINGLASAN and FELICISIMO DINGLASAN,
"According to Article 1091 of the Civil Code, obligations arising from contracts have respondents.
legal force between the contracting parties and must be fulfilled in accordance with
their stipulations. Therefore if the defendant bound himself to lease his properties DECISION
for the period of one year, which term should be extendible, it is evident and strictly
in accord with justice that the plaintiff-lessee has a right, at the termination of the PERALTA, J p:
first period of one year, to have the said contract of lease renewed in fulfillment of
the stipulated extension of the term of the lease; otherwise, the clause contained This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision 1 dated June 29, 2007
in the document Exhibit 1, that the lease at its termination would be extendible, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86983, and the Resolution 2 dated
would be worthless." October 23, 2007 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. 3

"The defendant-appellant is wrong in his contention that the renewal or extension The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
of the contract depended solely upon himself, notwithstanding the stipulations
Elenita Dinglasan (Elenita) was the registered owner of a parcel of land designated
contained in said contract, inasmuch as the renewal and continuation of the lease
as Lot No. 625 of the Limay Cadastre which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
could not be left wholly to the plaintiff's free will, without counting on the
(TCT) No. T-105602, with an aggregate area of 82,972 square meters. While on board
defendant's consent — a consent expressly granted in the promise that the term
a jeepney, Elenita's mother, Lilia Baluyot (Lilia), had a conversation with one Maura
would be extended, which term, although its duration was not fixed, should be
Passion (Maura) regarding the sale of the said property. Believing that Maura was a
understood to be for another year, a period equal to and not greater than the term
real estate agent, Lilia borrowed the owner's copy of the TCT from Elenita and gave
of the lease.
it to Maura. Maura then subdivided the property into several lots from Lot No. 625-
"When a contract of lease provides that the term thereof is extendible, the A to Lot No. 625-O, under the name of Elenita and her husband Felicisimo Dinglasan
agreement is understood as being in favor of the lessee, and the latter is authorized (Felicisimo).
to renew the contract and to continue to occupy the leased property, after notifying
Through a falsified deed of sale bearing the forged signature of Elenita and her
the lessor to that effect. The lessor can withdraw from the said contract only after
husband Felicisimo, Maura was able to sell the lots to different buyers. On April 26,
CIVPRO (INTRO)
1990, Maura sold Lot No. 625-K to one Lorna Ong (Lorna), who later caused the
issuance of TCT No. 134932 for the subject property under her name. A few months
later, or sometime in August 1990, Lorna sold the lot to petitioner Editha Padlan for
P4,000.00. Thus, TCT No. 134932 was cancelled and TCT No. 137466 was issued in
the name of petitioner. HESIcT
After learning what had happened, respondents demanded petitioner to surrender
possession of Lot No. 625-K, but the latter refused. Respondents were then forced
to file a case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga, Bataan for the
Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 137466, docketed as Civil Case No.
438-ML. Summons was, thereafter, served to petitioner through her mother, Anita
Padlan.
On December 13, 1999, respondents moved to declare petitioner in default and
prayed that they be allowed to present evidence ex parte. 4
On January 17, 2000, petitioner, through counsel, filed an Opposition to Declare
Defendant in Default with Motion to Dismiss Case for Lack of Jurisdiction Over the
Person of Defendant. 5 Petitioner claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction
over her, because the summons was not validly served upon her person, but only
by means of substituted service through her mother. Petitioner maintained that she
has long been residing in Japan after she married a Japanese national and only
comes to the Philippines for a brief vacation once every two years.
On April 5, 2001, Charlie Padlan, the brother of petitioner, testified that his sister is
still in Japan and submitted a copy of petitioner's passport and an envelope of a
letter that was allegedly sent by his sister. Nevertheless, on April 5, 2001, the RTC
issued an Order 6 denying petitioner's motion to dismiss and declared her in default.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
On July 1, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision 7 finding petitioner to be a buyer in
good faith and, consequently, dismissed the complaint.
Not satisfied, respondents sought recourse before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. No.
CV No. 86983.
On June 29, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision 8 in favor of the respondent.
Consequently, the CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC and ordered
the cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of Lorna and the petitioner, and the
revival of respondents' own title, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated July 1, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 4, Mariveles, Bataan (Stationed in
Balanga, Bataan) in Civil Case No. 438-ML is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Transfer Certificate of Title No. 134932 issued in the name of Lorna Ong and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 137466 issued in the name of defendant-appellee
Editha Padlan are CANCELLED and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 134785 in the
name of the plaintiffs-appellants is REVIVED. aCTHDA
SO ORDERED. 9
The CA found that petitioner purchased the property in bad faith from Lorna. The
CA opined that although a purchaser is not expected to go beyond the title, based
on the circumstances surrounding the sale, petitioner should have conducted
further inquiry before buying the disputed property. The fact that Lorna bought a
5,000-square-meter property for only P4,000.00 and selling it after four months for
the same amount should have put petitioner on guard. With the submission of the
Judgment in Criminal Case No. 4326 rendered by the RTC, Branch 2, Balanga, Bataan,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Maura Passion 10 and the testimonies of
respondents, the CA concluded that respondents sufficiently established that TCT
No. 134932 issued in the name of Lorna and TCT No. 137466 issued in the name of
petitioner were fraudulently issued and, therefore, null and void.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner argued that not
only did the complaint lacks merit, the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case and the person of the petitioner.
On October 23, 2007, the CA issued a Resolution 11 denying the motion. The CA
concluded that the rationale for the exception made in the landmark case of Tijam
v. Sibonghanoy 12 was present in the case. It reasoned that when the RTC denied
petitioner's motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, petitioner neither
moved for a reconsideration of the order nor did she avail of any remedy provided
by the Rules. Instead, she kept silent and only became interested in the case again
when the CA rendered a decision adverse to her claim.
Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
OF THE PETITIONER.
CIVPRO (INTRO)
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF THE CASE. HCacTI
III
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE. 13
Petitioner maintains that the case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy finds no application in
the case at bar, since the said case is not on all fours with the present case. Unlike
in Tijam, wherein the petitioner therein actively participated in the proceedings,
petitioner herein asserts that she did not participate in any proceedings before the
RTC because she was declared in default.
Petitioner insists that summons was not validly served upon her, considering that
at the time summons was served, she was residing in Japan. Petitioner contends
that pursuant to Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, when the
defendant does not reside in the Philippines and the subject of the action is property
within the Philippines of the defendant, service may be effected out of the
Philippines by personal service or by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. In this case, summons was served only by substituted service to her
mother. Hence, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person.
Also, petitioner posits that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter,
considering that from the complaint, it can be inferred that the value of the property
was only P4,000.00, which was the amount alleged by respondents that the property
was sold to petitioner by Lorna.
Finally, petitioner stresses that she was a buyer in good faith. It was Maura who
defrauded the respondents by selling the property to Lorna without their authority.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that the CA was correct in ruling in their
favor.
The petition is meritorious.
Respondents filed the complaint in 1999, at the time Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129,
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, was already amended by Republic Act (RA)
No. 7691, An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, amending for the purpose
BP Blg. 129. 14 Section 1 of RA 7691, amending BP Blg. 129, provides that the RTC
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction on the following actions: IcHTAa
Section 1.Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980," is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), except actions for forcible entry
into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts; . . .
Section 3 of RA 7691 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level
courts, thus:
Section 3.Section 33 of the same law [BP Blg. 129] is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the
property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00)
or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not
declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by
the assessed value of the adjacent lots. AIHECa
CIVPRO (INTRO)
Respondents filed their Complaint with the RTC; hence, before proceeding any
further with any other issues raised by the petitioner, it is essential to ascertain
whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case based on the
above-quoted provisions.
However, in order to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, an
examination of the complaint is essential. Basic as a hornbook principle is that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined
by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as
well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the
allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are
the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint,
jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. 15
What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. 16
Respondents' Complaint 17 narrates that they are the duly registered owners of Lot
No. 625 of the Limay Cadastre which was covered by TCT No. T-105602. Without
their knowledge and consent, the land was divided into several lots under their
names through the fraudulent manipulations of Maura. One of the lots was Lot 625-
K, which was covered by TCT No. 134785. On April 26, 1990, Maura sold the subject
lot to Lorna. By virtue of the fictitious sale, TCT No. 134785 was cancelled and TCT
No. 134932 was issued in the name of Lorna. Sometime in August 1990, Lorna sold
the lot to petitioner for a consideration in the amount of P4,000.00. TCT No. 134932
was later cancelled and TCT No. 137466 was issued in the name of petitioner.
Despite demands from the respondents, petitioner refused to surrender possession
of the subject property. Respondents were thus constrained to engage the services
of a lawyer and incur expenses for litigation. Respondents prayed for the RTC (a) to
declare TCT No. 137466 null and to revive TCT No. T-105602 which was originally
issued and registered in the name of the respondents; and (b) to order petitioner to
pay attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00 and litigation expenses of P20,000.00,
plus cost of suit. 18
An action "involving title to real property" means that the plaintiff's cause of action
is based on a claim that he owns such property or that he has the legal rights to
have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same. Title is
the "legal link between (1) a person who owns property and (2) the property itself."
"Title" is different from a "certificate of title" which is the document of ownership
under the Torrens system of registration issued by the government through the
Register of Deeds. While title is the claim, right or interest in real property, a
certificate of title is the evidence of such claim. 19
In the present controversy, before the relief prayed for by the respondents in their
complaint can be granted, the issue of who between the two contending parties
has the valid title to the subject lot must first be determined before a determination
of who between them is legally entitled to the certificate of title covering the
property in question.
From the Complaint, the case filed by respondent is not simply a case for the
cancellation of a particular certificate of title and the revival of another. The
determination of such issue merely follows after a court of competent jurisdiction
shall have first resolved the matter of who between the conflicting parties is the
lawful owner of the subject property and ultimately entitled to its possession and
enjoyment. The action is, therefore, about ascertaining which of these parties is the
lawful owner of the subject lot, jurisdiction over which is determined by the
assessed value of such lot. 20
In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege the
assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon
to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. 21 In the case at bar, the
only basis of valuation of the subject property is the value alleged in the complaint
that the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner in the amount of P4,000.00. No tax
declaration was even presented that would show the valuation of the subject
property. In fact, in one of the hearings, respondents' counsel informed the court
that they will present the tax declaration of the property in the next hearing since
they have not yet obtained a copy from the Provincial Assessor's Office. 22 However,
they did not present such copy. IESTcD
To reiterate, where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real
property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed
value of the property subject thereof. 23 Since the amount alleged in the Complaint
by respondents for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has
jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void.
24
Consequently, the remaining issues raised by petitioner need not be discussed
further.
CIVPRO (INTRO)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 86983, dated June 29, 2007, and its Resolution dated October 23, 2007,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, dated July 1,
2005, is declared NULL and VOID. The complaint in Civil Case No. 438-ML is dismissed
without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Padlan v. Spouses Dinglasan, G.R. No. 180321, [March 20, 2013], 707 PHIL 83-94)
7. Quesada vs. DOJ, 500 SCRA 454
[G.R. No. 150325. August 31, 2006.]
EDGARDO V. QUESADA, petitioner, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and CLEMENTE
TERUEL, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:
For our resolution is the Petition for Certiorari 1 (with prayer for preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order) assailing the Resolutions dated
January 17, 2001 and September 17, 2001 issued by the Secretary of Justice in I.S.
No. 00-29780-C, entitled "Clemente M. Teruel, complainant, versus Ramon P.
Camacho, Jr., Edgardo V. Quesada and Rodolfo Corgado, respondents."
On March 1, 2000, Clemente M. Teruel, herein respondent, filed with the Office of
the City Prosecutor, Mandaluyong City, an affidavit-complaint 2 charging Edgardo V.
Quesada (herein petitioner), Ramon P. Camacho, Jr., and Rodolfo Corgado with the
crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Revised Penal Code,
docketed as I.S. No. 00-29780-C. The affidavit-complaint alleges that on June 13,
1998 at Shangrila Plaza Hotel, EDSA, Mandaluyong City, Quesada, Camacho, and
Corgado represented themselves to Teruel as the president, vice-
president/treasurer, and managing director, respectively, of VSH Group Corporation;
that they offered to him a telecommunication device called Star Consultant
Equipment Package which provides the user easy access to the internet via
television; that they assured him that after he pays the purchase price of P65,000.00,
they will immediately deliver to him two units of the internet access device; that
relying on their representations, he paid them P65,000.00 for the two units; and that
despite demands, they, did not deliver to him the units.
It was only petitioner Quesada who filed a counter-affidavit. 3 He alleged that he,
Camacho, and Corgado are Star Consultant Trainers of F.O.M. Philippines, Inc., a
corporation engaged in the business of selling and marketing telecommunication
products and technologies; that they formed the VSH Group as a corporation "for
the principal purpose of pooling the commissions they will receive as Star
Consultant Trainers and then dividing said commissions among themselves
according to their agreement"; that while he admitted that the two units of internet
access devices purchased by herein respondent Teruel were not delivered to him,
however, this was not due to their alleged fraudulent representations since they
merely acted as sales agents of F.O.M. Phils., Inc.; and that they found out too late
that the said company could not cope with its commitment to them as it ran short
of supplies of telecommunication products.
On April 25, 2000, Assistant City Prosecutor Esteban A. Tacla, Jr. issued a Resolution
4 finding probable cause against petitioner Quesada, Camacho, and Corgado, and
recommending the filing of the corresponding Information.
Consequently, an Information for estafa against petitioner Quesada, Camacho, and
Corgado was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Mandaluyong City, docketed
as Criminal Case No. MC-00-2510. This case was later raffled off to Branch 208.
In the meantime, petitioner filed with the Department of Justice a Petition for
Review challenging the April 25, 2000 Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor. On
January 17, 2001, the Secretary of Justice issued a Resolution 5 dismissing the
petition. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution 6 dated
September 17, 2001.
While the RTC was hearing Criminal Case No. MC-00-2510, petitioner filed with this
Court the instant Petition for Certiorari alleging that the Secretary of Justice, in
dismissing his Petition for Review in I.S. No. 00-29780-C, acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that the
element of fraud or deceit in the crime of estafa is not present 7 and that there is
no evidence which will prove that the accused's promise to deliver the purchased
items was false or made in bad faith. 8
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, maintains that the Secretary of Justice, in
finding a probable cause against the three accused, did not act with grave abuse of
discretion and prayed for the dismissal of the instant petition for being
unmeritorious.
CIVPRO (INTRO)
Initially, we observe that the present petition was directly filed with this Court, in
utter violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, must be filed with the Court of Appeals whose decision may then be
appealed to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the same Rules. 9 A direct recourse to this Court is warranted only where there
are special and compelling reasons specifically alleged in the petition to justify such
action. Such ladder of appeals is in accordance with the rule on hierarchy of courts.
In Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto, 10 we stressed that this should be the constant policy that
must be observed strictly by the courts and lawyers, thus:
. . . . The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and
immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing
with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called
extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where
serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should
generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of
Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts
for some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the
issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of
Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific
action for the writ's procurement must be presented. This is and should continue
to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.
(Underscoring supplied)
We later reaffirmed such policy in People v. Cuaresma 11 after noting that there is
"a growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications
for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed
upon and adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land."
We again emphasized that:
. . . . This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. . . . . It is
also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals
. . . . This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to
parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the
court to which application therefor will be directed. There is, after all, a hierarchy
of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also
serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter,
with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is
established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands
upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's
docket. . . . . (Underscoring supplied)
Here, we cannot discern any special and compelling reason to justify the direct filing
with this Court of the present petition. Clearly, it should be dismissed outright.
EacHCD
Even assuming that the petition can be filed directly with this Court, the same must
fail. Petitioner contends that the element of fraud or deceit as an element of the
crime of estafa is absent. Consequently, the affirmance by the Secretary of Justice
of the Investigating Prosecutor's finding that there exists a probable cause is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
The issue of whether the element of fraud or deceit is present is both a question of
fact and a matter of defense, the determination of which is better left to the trial
court after the parties shall have adduced their respective evidence. It bears
stressing that a preliminary investigation is merely an inquiry or proceeding to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that
a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial. 12 It does not call for the application of rules and standards
of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. 13 As
implied by the words "probably guilty," the inquiry is concerned merely with
probability, not absolute or moral certainty. 14 At this stage, the complainant need
not present proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary investigation does not
require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties' evidence. 15 A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a
crime has been committed and was committed by petitioner and his co-accused. As
ruled by the Investigating Prosecutor and affirmed by the Secretary of Justice,
petitioner's representation and assurance to respondent Teruel that the
telecommunication equipment would be delivered to him upon payment of its
purchase price was the compelling reason why he parted with his money. Such
assurance, the Investigating Prosecutor added, is actually a misrepresentation or
deceit.
CIVPRO (INTRO)
Thus, we hold that the Secretary of Justice did not gravely abuse his discretion. An
act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of
discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must
be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law,
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility. 16
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the instant petition. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Quesada v. DOJ, G.R. No. 150325, [August 31, 2006], 532 PHIL 159-167)
8. Lumbuan vs. Ronquillo, G.R. No. 155713, May 5, 2006
[G.R. No. 155713. May 5, 2006.]
MILAGROS G. LUMBUAN, * petitioner, vs. ALFREDO A. RONQUILLO, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J p:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision 1
dated April 12, 2002, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52436 and its
Resolution 2 dated October 14, 2002, denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The salient facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, 3 are as follows:
Petitioner Milagros G. Lumbuan is the registered owner of Lot 19-A, Block 2844 with
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 193264, located in Gagalangin, Tondo, Manila. On
February 20, 1995, she leased it to respondent Alfredo A. Ronquillo for a period of
three years with a monthly rental of P5,000. The parties also agreed that there will
be a 10% annual increase in rent for the succeeding two years, i.e., 1996 and 1997,
4 and the leased premises will be used exclusively for the respondent's fastfood
business, unless any other use is given, with the petitioner's prior written consent.
5
While the respondent at the start operated a fastfood business, he later used the
premises as residence without the petitioner's prior written consent. He also failed
to pay the 10% annual increase in rent of P500/month starting 1996 and
P1,000/month in 1997 to the present. Despite repeated verbal and written demands,
the respondent refused to pay the arrears and vacate the leased premises.
On November 15, 1997, the petitioner referred the matter to the Barangay
Chairman's office but the parties failed to arrive at a settlement. The Barangay
Chairman then issued a Certificate to File Action. 6
On December 8, 1997, the petitioner filed against the respondent an action for
Unlawful Detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 157922-CV. It was raffled to the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 6. On December 15, 1997, the
respondent received the summons and copy of the complaint. On December 24,
1997, he filed his Answer by mail. Before the MeTC could receive the respondent's
Answer, the petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment dated January 7, 1998.
7 Acting upon this motion, the MeTC rendered a decision 8 on January 15, 1998,
ordering the respondent to vacate and surrender possession of the leased premises;
to pay the petitioner the amount of P46,000 as unpaid rentals with legal interest
until fully paid; and to pay the petitioner P5,000 as attorney's fees plus cost of the
suit. CcEHaI
The respondent then filed a Manifestation calling the attention of the MeTC to the
fact that his Answer was filed on time and praying that the decision be set aside.
The MeTC denied the prayer, ruling that the Manifestation was in the nature of a
motion for reconsideration which is a prohibited pleading under the Rules on
Summary Procedure.
Upon appeal, the case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
38, and docketed as Civil Case No. 98-87311. On July 8, 1998, the RTC rendered its
decision 9 setting aside the MeTC decision. The RTC directed the parties to go back
to the Lupon Chairman or Punong Barangay for further proceedings and to comply
strictly with the condition that should the parties fail to reach an amicable
settlement, the entire records of the case will be remanded to MeTC of Manila,
Branch 6, for it to decide the case anew.
The respondent sought reconsideration but the RTC denied the motion in an Order
dated March 15, 1999. Thus, he sought relief from the Court of Appeals through a
petition for review. 10 On April 12, 2002, the appellate court promulgated a decision,
reversing the decision of the RTC and ordering the dismissal of the ejectment case.
CIVPRO (INTRO)
The appellate court ruled that when a complaint is prematurely instituted, as when
the mandatory mediation and conciliation in the barangay level had not been
complied with, the court should dismiss the case and not just remand the records
to the court of origin so that the parties may go through the prerequisite
proceedings.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the appellate
court. Hence, this present petition.
In the meantime, while this petition was pending before this Court, the parties went
through barangay conciliation proceedings as directed by the RTC of Manila, Branch
38. Again, they failed to arrive at an amicable settlement prompting the RTC to issue
an Order 11 remanding the case to the MeTC of Manila, Branch 6, where the
proceedings took place anew. On April 25, 2000, the MeTC rendered a second
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment on the merits is hereby rendered for
the plaintiff as follows:
1. Ordering defendant and all persons claiming right of possession under him to
voluntarily vacate the property located at Lot 19-A Block 2844, Gagalangin, Tondo,
Manila and surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff;
2. Ordering defendant to pay to plaintiff the amount of P387,512.00 as actual
damages in the form of unpaid rentals and its agreed increase up to January 2000
and to pay the amount of P6,500.00 a month thereafter until the same is actually
vacated;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees plus cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED. 12
The respondent appealed the foregoing decision. The case was raffled to RTC of
Manila, Branch 22, and docketed as Civil Case No. 00-98173. The RTC ruled in favor
of the petitioner and dismissed the appeal. The respondent elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals, where it is now pending.
The sole issue for our resolution is:
[WHETHER] THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT FOR THE ALLEGED FAILURE OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE
MANDATORY MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION PROCEEDINGS IN THE BARANGAY
LEVEL. 13
With the parties' subsequent meeting with the Lupon Chairman or Punong Barangay
for further conciliation proceedings, the procedural defect was cured. Nevertheless,
if only to clear any lingering doubt why the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
complaint, we shall delve on the issue. cDAEIH
The petitioner alleges that the parties have gone through barangay conciliation
proceedings to settle their dispute as shown by the Certificate to File Action issued
by the Lupon/Pangkat Secretary and attested by the Lupon/Pangkat Chairman. The
respondent, on the other hand, contends that whether there was defective
compliance or no compliance at all with the required conciliation, the case should
have been dismissed.
The primordial objective of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules, 14 is to reduce the
number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice
which has been brought about by the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts. To
attain this objective, Section 412(a) of Republic Act No. 7160 15 requires the parties
to undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat as a
precondition to filing a complaint in court, 16 thus:
SECTION 412. Conciliation. — (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court. — No
complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority
of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government
office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties
before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement
has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as
attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman. . . .
Here, the Lupon/Pangkat Chairman and Lupon/Pangkat Secretary signed the
Certificate to File Action stating that no settlement was reached by the parties.
While admittedly no pangkat was constituted, it was not denied that the parties
met at the office of the Barangay Chairman for possible settlement. The efforts of
the Barangay Chairman, however, proved futile as no agreement was reached.
Although no pangkat was formed, in our mind, there was substantial compliance
with the law. It is noteworthy that under the aforequoted provision, the
confrontation before the Lupon Chairman or the pangkat is sufficient compliance
with the precondition for filing the case in court. 17 This is true notwithstanding the
mandate of Section 410(b) of the same law that the Barangay Chairman shall
constitute a pangkat if he fails in his mediation efforts. Section 410(b) should be
CIVPRO (INTRO)
construed together with Section 412, as well as the circumstances obtaining in and
peculiar to the case. On this score, it is significant that the Barangay Chairman or
Punong Barangay is herself the Chairman of the Lupon under the Local Government
Code. 18
Finally, this Court is aware that the resolution of the substantial issues in this case
is pending with the Court of Appeals. While ordinarily, we would have determined
the validity of the parties' substantial claims since to await the appellate court's
decision will only frustrate speedy justice and, in any event, would be a futile
exercise, as in all probability the case would end up with this Court, we find that we
cannot do so in the instant case. DCcSHE
It must be underscored that supervening events have taken place before the lower
courts where the parties have been adequately heard, and all the issues have been
ventilated. Since the records of those proceedings are with the Court of Appeals, it
is in a better position to fully adjudicate the rights of the parties. To rely on the
records before this Court would prevent us from rendering a sound judgment in this
case. Thus, we are left with no alternative but to leave the matter of ruling on the
merits to the appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52436 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38, in Civil Case No. 98-87311 is
AFFIRMED.
The Court of Appeals is ordered to proceed with the appeal in CA-G.R. No. 73453
and decide the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Lumbuan v. Ronquillo, G.R. No. 155713, [May 5, 2006], 523 PHIL 317-325)
9. People vs. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267 (1998)
[G.R. No. 117970. July 28, 1998.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ULYSSES M. CAWALING ERNESTO
TUMBAGAHAN, RICARDO DE LOS SANTOS, and HILARIO CAJILO, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Soo, Gutierrez, Leogardo & Lee for accused-appellants.
SYNOPSIS
Accused-appellants Mayor Ulysses M. Cawaling and Policemen Ernesto
Tumbagahan, Ricardo De los Santos and Hilario Cajilo were convicted of murder by
the Regional Trial Court of Romblon. Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo argue that
the trial court erred when it assumed jurisdiction over the criminal case. They insist
that the Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, had jurisdiction to try and hear the
case against the appellants, as they were public officers at the time of the killing
which was allegedly committed by reason of or in relation to their office. The Court
ruled that the information filed against the appellants contains no allegation that
appellants were public officers who committed the crime in relation to their office.
In the absence of such essential allegation, and since the present case does not
involve charges of violation of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act), the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the present case.
To escape criminal liability, appellants also invoke the justifying circumstances of
self-defense and lawful performance of duty. Allegedly, the victim was firing his gun
and shouting. Then the mayor and the policemen arrived at the scene to pacify him.
The victim, however, fired at them, which forced them to chase him and return fire.
The Court found this scenario bereft of plausibility. As found by the trial court,
unlawful aggression did not start with the victim but rather with the appellants.
Appellants failed to establish with clear and convincing evidence that the killing was
justified. The justifying circumstance of having acted in the lawful performance of
their duties cannot be invoked by appellants. Appellants, except the mayor, were
men in uniform who happened to be on duty when they killed the victim. The victim
was not committing any offense at the time. The Court denied the appeal and
affirmed the conviction of the appellants with the modification that the award of
P6,000.00 as actual damages is deleted for lack of basis and the award for loss of
earning capacity was increased to P928,000.00
Judgment of conviction affirmed. caITAC
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; SANDIGANBAYAN DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION
OVER THE PRESENT CASE; NO ALLEGATION IN THE INFORMATION THAT THE
OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED IN RELATION TO THE OFFICE OF APPELLANTS OR
NECESSARILY CONNECTED WITH THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR FUNCTIONS. — The
Information filed against the appellants contains no allegation that appellants were
CIVPRO (INTRO)
public officers who committed the crime in relation to their office. The charge was
for murder, a felony punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. As
clarified in Aguinaldo, et al. vs. Domagas, et al., "[I]n the absence of such essential
allegation, and since the present case does not involve charges of violation of R.A.
No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft etc. Act), the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over
the present case. (Bartolome vs. People, 142 SCRA 459 [1986] Even before
considering the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged, it is thus essential
to determine whether that offense was committed or alleged to have been
committed by the public officers and employees in relation to their offices."
Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. In the
absence of any allegation that the offense was committed in relation to the office
of appellants or was necessarily connected with the discharge of their functions, the
regional trial court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction to hear and decide the
case.
2. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. —
In the present case, the appellants have presented no sufficient and conclusive
evidence to show that they were charged, arraigned and acquitted in a military
commission, or that the case was dismissed therein without their consent. The
defense merely offered as evidence certain disposition forms and a letter, dated
March 8, 1983, recommending that the case against Appellants Tumbagahan, Cajilo
and De los Santos be dropped and considered closed. No charge sheet and record
of arraignment and trial were presented to establish the first jeopardy. As pointed
out by the solicitor general, "appellants were never arraigned, they never pleaded
before the Judge Advocate General's Office, there was no trial, and no judgment on
the merits had been rendered.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; TRIAL COURT'S ASSESSMENT
THEREON AND THEIR TESTIMONIES DESERVE GREAT RESPECT. — As a general rule,
the factual findings of trial courts deserve respect and are not disturbed on appeal,
unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted, and would otherwise materially affect the
disposition of the case. This rule, however, does not apply when the judge who
penned the decision was not the same one who had heard the prosecution
witnesses testify, as in the present case. Nonetheless, we have carefully perused
and considered the voluminous records of this case, and we find no reason to alter
the findings of the court a quo in regard to the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses and their testimonies.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; SELF-DEFENSE; NOT ESTABLISHED
IN CASE AT BAR. — Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is a condition sine
qua non for the successful invocation of self-defense. As factually found by the trial
court, unlawful aggression did not start with the victim, but rather with the
appellants. Cawaling and his men proceeded to the C & J-4 Kitchenette and waited
for Ronie to come out. When the victim did. they chased and shot him without
giving him any opportunity to defend himself. Granting arguendo the veracity of the
defense's factual version, it is important to note that appellants admitted that Ronie
was running away from them when they chased and shot him. Thus, unlawful
aggression--assuming it was initially present--had ceased, and the appellants no
longer had any right to pursue the offender. Basic is the rule that when unlawful
aggression ceases, the defender no longer has the right to kill or even wound the
former aggressor. Upon the cessation of the unlawful aggression and the danger or
risk to life and limb, there should be a corresponding cessation of hostilities on the
part of the person defending himself. Furthermore, the means employed to ward
off the attack was unreasonably excessive. Being armed, the appellants could have
easily ordered the victim to surrender. Even the first shot at his shoulder would
have been sufficient to immobilize him, yet they fired a succession of shots at him
while he was in no position to put up a defense. Jurisprudence teaches that when
an accused admits having committed the crime but invokes self-defense to escape
criminal liability, the burden of proof is reversed and shifted to him. He must then
prove the elements of self-defense. It necessarily follows that he must now rely on
the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the
prosecution; for even if the latter evidence were weak, it could not be disbelieved
after the accused had admitted the killing. Thus, appellants must establish with clear
and convincing evidence that the killing was justified, and that they incurred no
criminal liability therefor. They failed to do so, and their conviction thus becomes
inevitable.
5. ID.; ID.; ACT DONE IN THE LAWFUL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES DOES NOT INCLUDE
MURDER; CASE AT BAR. — Appellants contend that the killing of Ronie resulted from
the lawful performance of their duties as police officers. However, such justifying
circumstance may be invoked only after the defense successfully proves that (1) the
accused acted in the performance of a duty, and (2) the injury or offense committed
is the necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of such
duty. These two requisites are wanting in this case. The appellants, except Mayor
Cawaling, were men in uniform who happened to be on duty when they killed Ronie.
The victim was not committing any offense at the time. Killing the victim under the
circumstances of this case cannot in any wise be considered a valid performance of
a lawful duty by men who had sworn to maintain peace and order and to protect
the lives of the people. As aptly held in People vs. De la Cruz, "Performance of duties
does not include murder." That Ronie was a troublemaker in their town is not an
CIVPRO (INTRO)
excuse; as the Court declared in the same case of People vs. De la Cruz, "Murder is
never justified, regardless of the victim."
6. ID.; CONSPIRACY; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — The trial court correctly appreciated
the presence of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct
proof of conspiracy is rarely found, for criminals do not write down their lawless
plans and plots. The agreement to commit a crime, however, may be deduced from
the mode and manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from acts that
point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of intent. It
does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as the act of one is the act of all,
and each incurs the same criminal liability. We concur with the trial court's
elucidation: "All of the accused chased the victim and his brother; four (4) of whom
blocked their ways, first, to their elder brother Nelson Elisan's house and, second,
to their elder sister Imelda Elisan Tumbagahon's house. Having changed course by
proceeding to the ricefield in their desperate attempt to evade the accused, all the
six (6) armed accused continued their pursuit. Their victim, having fallen on the rice
paddy, and rising and kneeling on it with raised hands, all the said accused with
their flashlights beamed on their victim, in a united and concerted manner, shot
him. After Ronie Elisan had fallen down, co-accused Mayor Cawaling was even heard
as saying '(Y)ou left [sic] him, he is already dead.' . . . ."
7. ID.; EQUIPOISE RULE; CANNOT BE INVOKED WHERE THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION ESTABLISHING GUILT IS OVERWHELMING; CASE AT BAR — We reject
appellants' position that the equipoise rule should apply to this case. In People vs.
Lagnas, the Court, through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, described this rule as
follows: "Once again, albeit in effect a supportive and cumulative consideration in
view of the preceding disquisition, the equipoise rule finds application in this case,
that is, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty, and is not sufficient to support a conviction." In this case, the inculpatory
facts point to only one conclusion: appellants are guilty. As amplified in the
discussion above, the Court agrees with the trial court that the guilt of the
appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt. cCEAHT
8. ID.; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; FACT THAT THE VICTIM WAS
FOREWARNED IS IMMATERIAL; WHAT IS DECISIVE IS THAT THE EXECUTION OF THE
ATTACK MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE VICTIM TO DEFEND HIMSELF OR TO
RETALIATE; ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH DEEMED ABSORBED BY TREACHERY;
CASE AT BAR. — We have ruled that treachery might still be appreciated even when
the victim was warned of danger to his person, for "what is decisive is that the
execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to
retaliate." The appellants waited for Ronie to come out of the restaurant. All of
them chased the victim and prevented him from seeking refuge either in the house
of his sister Imelda or that of his brother Nelson. All of them carried firearms and
flashlights. They fired their guns at the victim while he was on his knees with arms
raised, manifesting his intention not to fight back.
9. ID.; ID.; EVIDENT PREMEDITATION; NOT ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR; NOTHING
IN THE RECORDS SHOWS HOW AND WHEN THE PLAN TO KILL WAS HATCHED, OR
HOW MUCH TIME HAD ELAPSED BEFORE IT WAS CARRIED OUT. — We also affirm
the finding of the trial court that the prosecution failed to prove the attending
circumstance of evident premeditation. To prove this aggravating circumstance, the
prosecution must show the following: (1) the time when the offender determined
to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his
determination; and (3) a lapse of time, between the determination to commit the
crime and the execution thereof, sufficient to allow the offender to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. Nothing in the records shows how and when the plan to
kill was hatched, or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out.
10. ID.; MURDER; PENALTY; TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY IMPOSED RECLUSION
PERPETUA IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY AGGRAVATING OR MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES. — Prior to the amendment of Section 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, the imposable penalty for murder was reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death. In their Brief, Appellants Cajilo and Tumbagahan argue for the
imposition of the lower penalty of reclusion temporal, contending that their filing
of bail bonds/property bonds, before the order for their arrest was issued, should
be treated as voluntary surrender. We cannot accept this contention. In the first
place, it has no factual basis. The warrant for the arrest of herein appellants was
issued on August 18, 1987, but appellants' counsel filed the Urgent Motion for Bail
only thereafter, on September 2, 1987. In the second place, appellants failed to
prove the requisites for voluntary surrender, which are: (1) the offender has not
been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority
or to the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. The records reveal that a
warrant of arrest was actually served on Tumbagahan and Cajilo on September 2,
1987 and that they were in fact detained. In view of the absence of any other
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the trial court correctly imposed reclusion
perpetua.
CIVPRO (INTRO)
11. ID.; ID.; CIVIL INDEMNITY; AWARD OF ACTUAL DAMAGES DELETED FOR LACK OF
BASIS. — We cannot affirm the award of actual damages and lost earnings, however.
The award of actual damages has no basis, as no receipts were presented to
substantiate the expenses allegedly incurred. An alleged pecuniary loss must be
established by credible evidence before actual damages may be awarded. Similarly
erroneous is the award for loss of earning capacity, which should be computed as
follows: "2/3 x [80 - age of victim at the time of death] x [reasonable portion of the
annual net income which would have been received as support by heirs]" As
testified to by Nelson Ilisan, the deceased had been earning an average of P100
daily or P3,000 monthly. From this monthly income must be deducted the
reasonable amount of P1,000 representing the living and other necessary expenses
of the deceased.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
It is axiomatic that once an accused-appellant admits killing the victim, he bears the
burden of establishing the presence of any circumstance like self-defense,
performance of a lawful duty or, for that matter, double jeopardy, which may relieve
him of responsibility, or which may mitigate his criminal liability. 1 If he fails to
discharge this burden, his conviction becomes inevitable. In this Decision, we also
reiterate the following doctrines: (1) the regional trial court, not the Sandiganbayan,
has jurisdiction over informations for murder committed by public officers, including
a town mayor; (2) the assessment of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies deserve great respect; (3) the equipoise rule cannot be invoked
where the evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming; (4) alibi cannot be believed
in the face of credible testimony identifying the appellants; and (5) conspiracy may
be proven by circumstantial evidence. Cdpr
The Case
Before us is an appeal from the 34-page Decision 2 dated October 21, 1994,
promulgated by the Regional Trial Court of Romblon in Criminal Case No. OD-269.
Convicted of murder were former Mayor Ulysses M. Cawaling and Policemen
Ernesto Tumbagahan, 3 Ricardo De los Santos and Hilario Cajilo.
Prior to the institution of the criminal case against all the appellants, an
administrative case 4 had been filed before the National Police Commission, in
which Policemen Ernesto Tumbagahan Ricardo De los Santos, Hilario Cajilo (three of
herein appellants) and Andres Fontamillas were charged by Nelson Ilisan 5 with the
killing of his brother Ronie 6 Ilisan. On April 6, 1986, Adjudication Board No. 14 7
rendered its Decision which found Tumbagahan, De los Santos, Cajilo and
Fontamillas guilty of grave misconduct and ordered their dismissal from the service
with prejudice. 8 On June 26, 1986, the Board issued a resolution, 9 dismissing the
respondents' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal Alexander Mortel
filed, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Odiongan, Romblon, 10 an Information
for murder 11 against the appellants and Andres Fontamillas. The accusatory portion
reads:
"That on or about the 4th day of December 1982, at around 9:00 o'clock in the
evening, in the Poblacion, [M]unicipality of San Jose, [P]rovince of Romblon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did
then and there, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation and taking
advantage of their superior strenght [sic] willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot RONIE ILISAN, with the use of firearms, inflicting upon the latter
multiple mortal injuries in different parts of his body which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death."
Accused Tumbagahan, De los Santos, Cajilo and Fontamillas, with the assistance of
their lawyers Atty. Abelardo V. Calsado and Juanito Dimaano, pleaded not guilty
when arraigned on February 15, 1988; 12 while Accused Cawaling, assisted by
Counsel Jovencio Q. Mayor, entered a plea of not guilty on March 16, 1988. 13
After due trial, 14 the court a quo 15 rendered its Decision dated October 21, 1994,
16 the decretal portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused (1) ULYSSES M. CAWALING, (2) ERNESTO
TUMBAGAHAN, (3) RICARDO DELOS SANTOS, (4) HILARIO CAJILO, AND (5) ANDRES
FONTAMILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER under the
Information, dated June 4, 1987, and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law.
The accused, jointly and severally, are ORDERED to pay Nelson Elisan the sum of.
P6,000.00 as actual damages and the heirs of the deceased Ronie Elisan the sums of
P116,666.66 by way of lost earnings and P50,000.00 as indemnity for death, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The bail bonds of all the accused are ORDERED CANCELLED and all said accused are
ORDERED immediately confined in jail.
CIVPRO (INTRO)
The slug (Exh. A); the .38 caliber revolver (with 3 empty shells and 3 live bullets) (Exh.
G); and the slug of bullet (Exh. H) are confiscated in favor of the government.
After the judgment has become final, the Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Clerk of
Court, this Court, is ordered to deliver and deposit the foregoing Exhibits A, F, G and
H, inclusive, to the Provincial Director, PNP, of the Province of Romblon properly
receipted. Thereafter, the receipt must be attached to the record of the case and
shall form part of the record.
The period of preventive imprisonment the accused had undergone shall be
credited in their favor to its full extent Pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.
The case against co-accused ALEX BATUIGAS who is at large is ORDERED ARCHIVED
pending his arrest." 17
Hence, this appeal. 18
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The trial court gives this summary of the facts as viewed by the prosecution
witnesses:
"The killing occurred on December 4, 1982 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening at
the ricefield of Poblacion, San Jose, Romblon when the bright moon was already
above the sea at an angle of about 45 degrees, or if it was daytime, it was about
9:00 o'clock in the morning (Imelda Elisan Tumbagahon, on direct examination, tsn,
Jan. 17, 1989, p. 5, and on cross examination, tsn, April 18, 1989, p. 22).
On December 4, 1982, about 8:00 o'clock or 8:30 o'clock in the evening, Vicente
Elisan and his elder brother Ronie Elisan, the victim, were drinking tuba at C & J-4
Kitchenette of co-accused Andres Fontamillas in Poblacion, San Jose, Romblon.
When they stood up to go home, Luz Venus, the wife of Diosdado Venus, told them
not to go out because the accused were watching them outside about three (3)
meters from the restaurant. Diosdado Venus accompanied them upon their request
and they went out and walked towards home. About a hundred meters from the
restaurant, the six (6) accused, that is, Mayor Cawaling, the four (4) policemen,
namely, Hilario Cajilo, Andres Fontamillas, Ernesto Tumbagahan and Ricardo delos
Santos, and civilian Alex Batuigas, the mayor's brother-in-law, flashlighted them and
Diosdado Venus ran going back. The two (2) brothers also ran towards home to the
house of their elder sister Imelda Elisan Tumbagahon. Co-accused Andres
Fontamillas and Hilario Cajilo blocked them on the gate of the fence of their sister's
house. Ronie Elisan ran towards the ricefield. The accused were chasing them.
Vicente Elisan saw his brother Ronie f[a]ll down on the ricefield while he ran towards
the bushes and la[y] on the ground. Ronie Elisan rose up by kneeling and raising his
two (2) hands. All the six (6) accused approached him with their flashlights and shot
him. Ronie fell down about twenty (20) meters from the bushes where Vicente Elisan
hid behind the coconut tree. Co-accused Cawaling said ["]you left him, he is already
dead.["] Mayor Cawaling was armed with .45 caliber, policemen Andres Fontamillas
and Hilario Cajilo were both with armalites, Ernesto Tumbagahan and Ricardo delos
Santos were both with .38 caliber and so with civilian Alex Batuigas. They left
towards the house of Mayor Cawaling. After they were gone, Vicente Elisan ran
towards the house of his older brother Nelson Elisan. Upon seeing him, Vicente told
Nelson that Ronie was already dead. Nelson said nothing. While they were there,
elder sister Imelda Elisan Tumbagahon, who was crying came. She said: "Manong,
patay ron si Ronie." (Brother, Ronie is already dead). Nelson said ["]do not be noisy;
they might come back and kill all of us. ["] Imelda stopped crying.
After a while, brothers Nelson and Vicente Elisan went to the house of barangay
captain Aldolfo Tumbagahon. The three (3) went to the townhall and called the
police but there was none there. Going to the house of the Chief of Police Oscar
Montero, they were told by his wife that Commander Montero was in the house of
Mayor Cawaling. They proceeded to the place where Ronie Elisan was shot. The
cadaver was brought to the house of Nelson Elisan. Vicente Elisan found an empty
shell of a .45 caliber about three (3) arm's length from the body of the victim. They
surrendered it to the Napolcom." 19
Dr. Blandino C. Flores described the gunshot wounds of the victim as follows:
"Gunshot Wounds:
1. Shoulder:
Gun shot wound ½ x ½ inch in diameter shoulder right 2 inches from the neck with
contussion [sic] collar s[u]rrounding the wound.
2. Right Axilla:
Gun shot wound ¼ x ¼ inch in diameter, 2 inches below the right nipple with
contussion [sic] collar s[u]rrounding the wound.
CIVPRO (INTRO)
3. Left Axilla:
Exit of the gun shot wound from the right axilla, measuring ½ x ½ inch with edges
everted, one inch below the axilla and one inch below the level of the nipple.
4. Back:
Gun shot wound measuring ¼ x ¼ inch, along the vertebral column, right at the level
of the 10th ribs with contussion [sic] collar.
5. Leg, Left:
Gun shot wound measuring ¼ x ¼ anterior aspect upper third leg with contussion
[sic] collar, with the exit ½ x ½ posterior aspect upper third leg, left." 20
Based on the death certificate (Exhibit E) issued by Dr. Flores, Ronie Ilisan died of
severe hemorrhage and gun shot wo[unds]." 21
Version of the Defense
Appellant Cawaling, in his 47-page Brief, 22 presented his own narration of the
incident as follows:
"At around 7:00 in the evening of December 4, 1982, Ulysses Cawaling, then the
mayor of the [M]unicipality of San Jose in the [P]rovince of Romblon, arrived aboard
a hired motorized boat from Manila in the seashore of San Jose. From the seashore,
he immediately proceeded to his home. At around 7:30 in the evening, Cawaling
went to the municipal hall to check on administrative matters that piled up in the
course of his trip to Manila. He also went inside the police station (located inside
the municipal building) to be apprised of any developments, after which he went
out and joined Pfc. Tumbagahan and Pfc. Cajilo who were standing near the flagpole
in front of the municipal building. The three engaged in a conversation. Cawaling
learned that the two police officers were the ones assigned for patrol/alert for that
night. The three of them went inside the INP office and there Cawaling informed
the two policemen that he received information from reliable persons that certain
persons were plotting to kill him and a member of the town's police force. It is to
be noted that this occurred at the height of the communist insurgency and political
violence in the countryside in the early 80's. Hence, such information was taken very
seriously, having been relayed by sources independent of each other.
Cawaling, as town chief then empowered with supervisory authority over the local
police, accompanied Pfc. Tumbagahan and Pfc. Cajilo in conducting patrol and
surveillance operations around the small municipality. He usually did this as routine
since Romblon was then plagued with political assassinations and armed conflict.
On their way to the seashore, they passed by C & J-4 Kitchenette, and chanced upon
Ronnie Ilisan and his brother Vicente Ilisan drinking liquor and discussing in very
loud voices. They stopped right in the front of the restaurant and there they heard
Ronnie Ilisan state in a every loud voice that he will kill a person that night. Inside
the restaurant, without the knowledge then of Cawaling and the two police officers,
witness Gil Palacio, who was buying cigarettes and Luz Venus, the cook/server of
the restaurant, saw Ronnie Ilisan, very drunk, brandishing in the air a .38 caliber
Smith and Wesson revolver with a protruding screw.
Initially dismissing Ronnie Ilisan's statement as just another hollow swagger of an
intoxicated person ("salitang lasing"), Cawaling and the two policemen proceeded
on their way. After the patrol, they returned to the municipal building and stationed
themselves in front. At around 8:30 in the evening, Ronnie Elisan passed by the
municipal hall walking towards the direction of the house of Nelson Ilisan, another
brother, and shouted the challenge, "gawas ang maisog", meaning THOSE WHO ARE
BRAVE, COME OUT. Cawaling and the two police officers again brushed aside [the]
challenge as just another foolish drunken revelry [o]n the part of Ronnie Ilisan, a
well-known troublemaker in the small municipality.
A few moments later, after Ronie Ilisan had passed by, they distinctly heard a
gunshot and hysterical female voices shouting, " pulis, tabang" meaning POLICE!
HELP! four times. Impelled by the call of duty, Cawaling and the two policemen
immediately ran in the direction of the gunshot and the desperate female voices
until they reached the house of Nelson Ilisan in San Jose Street. At this point, they
saw Ronnie Ilisan holding a .38 caliber revolver. They also saw Vicente Ilisan,
Francisco Tesnado, Fe Ilisan, the wife of Nelson and Delma Ilisan, the wife of Vicente,
the latter two being the same persons who cried " pulis, tabang" four times.
Cawaling then told Ronnie to surrender his gun but the latter responded by pointing
the gun at Cawaling and pulling the trigger.
At the precise moment that the gun fired, Cawaling warned the two policemen to
drop to the ground by shouting "dapa". Fortunately, Cawaling was not hit. Ronnie
Ilisan then turned around and ran towards the church. The two policemen gave
chase. Cawaling, still shaken and trembling after the mischance was initially left
behind but followed shortly. When Ronnie Ilisan reached the church, he turned
around and again fired at the pursuing Pfc. Cajilo. Fortunately, the gun misfired.
When they finally reached the ricefield, Pfc. Cajilo fired two (2) warning shots in the
air for Ronnie to surrender. Ronnie responded by firing once again at Pfc.
Tumbagahan but failed to hit the latter. At that instance, Pfc. Cajilo counter-fired at
CIVPRO (INTRO)
Ronnie Ilisan hitting him. Pfc. Tumbagahan also fired his weapon in the heat of
exchange and also hit Ronnie Ilisan. As a result of the gunshot wounds, Ronnie Ilisan
later on succumbed.
Pfc. Tumbagahan picked up the gun still in the hand of the dead Ronnie Ilisan and
gave it to Pfc. Cajilo. The three, Cawaling, who subsequently caught up with them
after the incident, and the two police officers, then proceeded to the police station
located in the municipal building to formally report the incident in their station
blotter." 23
The "Brief for All of the Accused-Appellants" filed by Atty. Napoleon U. Galit and
the "Brief for Appellants Ernesto Tumbagahan and Hilario Cajilo" submitted by Atty.
Joselito R. Enriquez merely repeated the facts as narrated by the trial court.
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies credible, the court a quo
convicted the appellants. The killing was qualified to murder because of the
aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and treachery. The trial
court ruled that there was a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and
his assailants, as the latter were greater in number and armed with guns. It further
ruled that abuse of superior strength absorbed treachery, as it ratiocinated:
"'Certain cases,' an authority wrote, 'involving the killing of helpless victim by
assailants superior to them in arms or numbers, or victims who were overpowered
before being killed, were decided on the theory that the killing was treacherous,
when perhaps the correct qualifying circumstance would be abuse of superiority. In
these cases the attack was not sudden nor unexpected and the element of surprise
was lacking.' (Id., I Aquino, pp. 423-424). In the instant case, we earlier ruled that the
qualifying treachery should be considered as an exception to the general rule on
treachery because it was not present at the inception of the attack. The killing was
not sudden nor unexpected and the element of surprise was lacking. It is for this
reason that we hold that alevosia should be deemed absorbed or included in abuse
of superiority. Even assuming ex-gratia argumenti that it should be the other way
around, the situation will not be of help, penaltywise, to the accused." 24
The defenses raised by the appellants were dismissed and their witnesses declared
unworthy of belief for the following reasons:
1. It was highly improbable that Defense Witness Tesnado would not tell his wife
(Dory) and Bebelinia Ilisan Sacapaño about the incident he had allegedly witnessed,
more so when Sacapaño was the victim's first cousin.
2. The spot report prepared by Station Commander Oscar M. Montero, the
testimonies of Cajilo and Tumbagahan and the medical findings of Dr. Flores
Contradicted one another on the following details: the caliber of the gun used in
shooting the victim, the wounds inflicted and the whereabouts of Cawaling during
the shoot-out.
3. Cawaling and his men, armed with guns, could have immediately disarmed the
victim at the initial encounter. The court could not understand why the victim was
able to fire his gun, run then stop and again fire his gun, without being caught.
4. The positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses prevails over the
alibi posed by De los Santos and Fontamillas, a defense that was not corroborated
by any other witness.
5. The .38 caliber revolver, allegedly owned by the victim, was in fact owned and
used by Alex Batuigas.
6. The defense presented a photo and a sketch to prove that Imelda Ilisan
Tumabagahan had an obstructed view of the killing. The trial court ruled that such
evidence was misleading, because the window, from where said witness allegedly
saw the incident, was at the eastern side of her house, and thus afforded a clear
view of the incident, while the window referred to by the defense was at the
southern portion.
7. The questioned testimonies of Dr. Flores, Nelson Ilisan and Provincial Prosecutor
Pedro Victoriano, Jr., though not formally offered as evidence, may be admitted
because of the failure of the defense to object thereto at the time they were called
to testify.
8. The defense failed to prove that the prosecution witnesses had any ill motive to
testify falsely against the appellant.
9. Appellants had a motive to kill the victim. Nelson Ilisan testified that his brother
Ronie (the victim) had witnessed Bonifacio Buenaventura (a former chief
commander of the San Jose Police Force) kill a certain Ruben Ventura. Cawaling,
who was Buenaventura's first cousin, wanted Ronie dead, because the latter had
CIVPRO (INTRO)
not followed his instruction to leave town to prevent him from testifying in said
case.
Assignment of Errors
The appellants, through their common counsel, Atty. Napoleon Galit, assign the
following errors to the lower court.
"1. The trial court gravely erred in sustaining prosecutor's theory of conspiracy and
thus renders nugatory or has totally forgotten that policemen when in actual call of
duty normally operate in group but not necessarily in conspiracy.
2. The trial court gravely erred in believing the theory of the prosecution that
accused-appellant Ulysses Cawaling was one of the alleged co-conspirators in the
killing of the deceased Ronnie Elisan.
3. The trial court gravely erred in not believing the defense of accused-appellant
Ulysses Cawaling that he has nothing to do with the shooting incident except to
shout to arrest the accused[,] which prompted his co-accused policemen to chase
the accused and sho[o]t him when he resisted, after he fired at Mayor Cawaling.
4. The trial court gravely erred in not giving weight to accused-appellant
policemen['s] testimonies which carry the presumption of regularity.
5. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting all the accused-appellants by
applying 'the equipoise rule' thereby resulting [i]n reasonable doubts on the guilt."
25
In their joint brief, 26 Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo cite these other errors:
"1. The trial court gravely erred in relying on the theory of the prosecution that
accused-appellants Ernesto Tumbagahan and Hilario Cajilo were alleged co-
conspirators in the killing of the victim, Ronie Ilisan.
2. The trial court gravely erred in not believing the defense that herein accused-
appellants merely did a lawful duty when the shooting incident happened which led
to the death of Ronnie Ilisan.
3. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting herein accused-appellants by
applying the equipoise rule, thereby resulting in reasonable doubt on their guilt.
4. Prescinding from the foregoing, herein accused-appellants do press and hold, that
the lower court committed grave, serious and reversible error in appreciating the
qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia).
5. The lower court committed grave, serious and reversible error in convicting both
accused-appellants of murder, instead merely of homicide, defined and penalized
under the Revised Penal Code.
6. The lower court committed grave, serious and reversible error in appreciating the
qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength.
7. The consummated crime being merely homicide, the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender should be considered to lower the penalty of homicide.
8. The lower court committed error in not considering double jeopardy.
9. The lower court committed error in not dismissing the case for want of
jurisdiction." 27
Appellant Cawaling imputes these additional errors to the court a quo:
"1. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting herein accused-appellant, Ulysses
M. Cawaling, considering that he had no part in the killing and the prosecution failed
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt;
2. The trial court gravely erred in not finding the shooting incident a result of hot
pursuit and shoot-out between the deceased Ronnie Ilisan and the police officers
in the performance of their duty and self-defense, and in sustaining the
prosecution's conspiracy theory;
3. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting Accused-Appellant Ulysses M.
Cawaling considering that there was blatant absence of due process in the
proceedings tantamount to mistrial." 28
This Court's Ruling
We affirm the conviction of the appellants. In so ruling, we will resolve the following
issues: (1) jurisdiction of the trial court, (2) double jeopardy, (3) credibility of
prosecution witnesses and their testimonies, (4) self-defense, (5) performance of
lawful duty, (6) alibi, (7) conspiracy, (8) rule on equipoise, (9) qualifying circumstances,
(10) damages and (11) attending circumstances as they affect the penalty.
CIVPRO (INTRO)
We shall address the first two issues as important preliminary questions and discuss
the merits of the remaining ones, which we have culled from the errors cited by the
appellants in their aforementioned briefs.
First Issue:
Jurisdiction of the Trial Court
Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo argue that the trial court erred when it assumed
Jurisdiction over the criminal case. They insist that the Sandiganbayan, not the
regular courts, had jurisdiction to try and hear the case against the appellants, as
they were public officers at the time of the killing which was allegedly committed
by reason of or in relation to their office.
We do not agree.
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at
the time of the institution of the action. Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it may
not be ousted from the case by any subsequent events, such as a new legislation
placing such proceedings under the jurisdiction of another tribunal. The only
recognized exceptions to the rule, which find no application in the case at bar, arise
when: (1) there is an express provision in the statute, or (2) the statute is clearly
intended to apply to actions pending before its enactment. 29
The statutes pertinent to the issue are PD 1606, as amended; 30 and PD 1850, as
amended by PD 1952 and BP 129.
Section 4 of PD 1606 31 reads:
"Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation
to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies
mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed
prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be
tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
xxx xxx xxx
However, former President, Ferdinand Marcos issued two presidential decrees
placing the members of the Integrated National Police under the jurisdiction of
courts-martial. Section 1 of PD 1952, 32 amending Section 1 of PD 1850, reads:
"SEC. 1. Court Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of
the Armed Forces. — Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding — (a)
uniformed members of the Integrated National Police who commit any crime or
offense cognizable by the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-
martial pursuant to and in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 408, as
amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War; (b) all persons subjects to military
law under Article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War who commit any crime or
offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under
the said Articles of War; Provided, that, in either of the aforementioned situations,
the case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial authorities when
court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Article 38 of
Commonwealth Act Numbered 408, as amended, or court-martial jurisdiction over
the person of the accused military or Integrated National Police personnel can no
longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from the active service without
jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless otherwise provided by law:
PROVIDED FURTHER, THAT THE PRESIDENT MAY, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE,
ORDER OR DIRECT, AT ANY TIME BEFORE ARRAIGNMENT, THAT A PARTICULAR CASE
BE TRIED BY THE APPROPRIATE CIVIL COURT.
As used herein, the term uniformed members of the Integrated National Police shall
refer to police officers, policemen, firemen, and jail guards."
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of regular courts over civil and criminal cases
was laid down in BP 129, the relevant portion of which is quoted hereunder:
"Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. — Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken
cognizance of by the latter." 33
CIVPRO (INTRO)
In relation to the above, Section 4-a-2 of PD 1606, as amended by PD 1861, quoted
earlier, lists two requisites that must concur before the Sandiganbayan may exercise
exclusive and original jurisdiction over a case: (a) the offense was committed by the
accused public officer in relation to his office; and (b) the penalty prescribed by law
is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or higher than
a fine of six thousand pesos (P6,000). 34 Sanchez vs. Demetriou 35 clarified that
murder or homicide may be committed both by public officers and by private
citizens, and that public office is not a constitutive element of said crime, viz.:
"The relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution
is, in our opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall into the intent of the Constitution,
the relation has to be such that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without
the office. In other words, the office must be a constituent element of the crime as
defined in the statute, such as, for instance, the crimes defined and punished in
Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the Revised Penal Code.
Public office is not the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either murder
or homicide whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is
the same except when the perpetrator, being a public functionary, took advantage
of his office, as alleged in this case, in which event the penalty is increased.
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and
even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises, not from the allegations
but on the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from
the manner of the commission of the crime."
Furthermore, the Information filed against the appellants contains no allegation that
appellants were public officers who committed the crime in relation to their office.
The charge was for murder, a felony punishable under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. As clarified in Aguinaldo, et al. vs. Domagas, et al., 36 "[I]n the absence
of such essential allegation, and since the present case does not involve charges of
violation of R.A. No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft etc. Act), the Sandiganbayan does not have
jurisdiction over the present case. (Bartolome vs. People, 142 SCRA 459 [1986]) Even
before considering the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged, it is thus
essential to determine whether that offense was committed or alleged to have been
committed by the public officers and employees in relation to their offices."
Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. 37 In
the absence of any allegation that the offense was committed in relation to the
office of appellants or was necessarily connected with the discharge of their
functions, the regional trial court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case. 38
Second Issue:
Double Jeopardy
In seeking their acquittal, Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo also invoke their right
against double jeopardy. They argue that the first jeopardy attached when a criminal
case for murder was filed before the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO), which
was allegedly dismissed after several hearings had been conducted. 39 We are not
persuaded.
There is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first
jeopardy has attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly
terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as that in the first.
And the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and
(e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent. 40
For a better appreciation of appellants' argument, we must consider PD 39 41 and
its implementing rules, 42 which prescribe the procedure before a military
commission. A summary preliminary investigation shall be conducted before trial
for the purpose of determining whether there is prima facie evidence to pursue trial
before a military Commission. The investigation report shall contain a summary of
the evidence, the acts constituting the offense or offenses committed, and the
findings and recommendations of the investigating officer. Thereafter, the report
shall be forwarded to the judge advocate general, who shall determine for either
the defense secretary or for the AFP chief of staff whether the case shall be referred
for trial to a military commission. 43 Where a prima facie case is found against the
accused, formal charges shall be signed by a commissioned officer designated by
the judge advocate general. 44 The accused shall then be arraigned, during which
the charge and specification shall be read and the accused shall enter his plea. 45
After hearings, a record of the trial shall be forwarded to the AFP chief of staff for
proper action. 46
In the present case, the appellants have presented no sufficient and conclusive
evidence to show that they were charged, arraigned and acquitted in a military
commission or that the case was dismissed therein without their consent. The
defense merely offered as evidence certain disposition forms 47 and a letter, 48
dated March 8, 1983, recommending that the case against Appellants Tumbagahan,
CIVPRO (INTRO)

Cajilo and De los Santos be dropped and considered closed. 49 No charge sheet and A. Luz Venus told us not to go out when [I] stood up to go home.
record of arraignment and trial were presented to establish the first jeopardy.
Q. Do you know why you were advise[d] not to go out?
As pointed out by the solicitor general, "appellants were never arraigned, they never
pleaded before the Judge Advocate General's Office, there was no trial, and no A. Yes, sir.
judgment on the merits had been rendered." 50
Q. Why?
Third Issue:
A. Because we were being watched by Mayor Cawaling, Andres Fontamillas, Hilario
Credibility of Witnesses Cajilo and Alex Bat[ui]gas.
As a general rule, the factual findings of trial courts deserve respect and are not
disturbed on appeal, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance xxx xxx xxx
have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted, and would otherwise
Q. When you were informed by Luz Venus that you should not go out because
materially affect the disposition of the case. 51 This rule, however, does not apply
Mayor Cawaling and the persons you mentioned were outside watching for you,
when the judge who penned the decision was not the same one who had heard the
what did you do?
prosecution witnesses testify, 52 as in the present case. Nonetheless, we have
carefully perused and considered the voluminous records of this case, and we find A. We did not go out.
no reason to alter the findings of the court a quo in regard to the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses and their testimonies. Q. Since you remained inside, what did you do?

Vicente Ilisan, the victim's brother, narrated before the trial court the circumstances A. I also viewed thru the window.
relevant to the crime:
Q. Did you see them?
"Q. In the evening of December 4, 1982, at about 8:00 or 8:30, where were you?
A. Yes, sir.
A. I was inside the restaurant of Andres Fontamillas.
Q. How far were they from the restaurant?
xxx xxx xxx
A. About three meters.
Q. What were you doing there?
Q. What were they doing outside the restaurant?
A. I was drinking tuba.
A. They were also viewing us.
Q. When you were about to finish drinking tuba, what did you do?
Q. For how long did they remain there viewing you?
A. I stood up preparing to go home.
A. Just a short time.
Q. Were you able to leave that restaurant actually?
Q. And later on, do you know where did they go? [sic]
A. No, sir.
A. No, sir. I went out from the restaurant and when I went out, I did not see them
Q. Why? Cdpr anymore.
CIVPRO (INTRO)

A. We also ran towards home.
Q. Before you went out of the restaurant, what did you do?
Q. To whose house?
A. Diosdado Venus accompanied us.
A. That of my older sister Imelda [E]lisan.
Q. Why did you ask Diosdado Venus to accompany you?
Q. Were you able to reach that house?
A. Yes, sir. Because we were aware that we were being watched from outside so we
asked to be accompanied by Diosdado Venus. A. No, sir.

Q. From the restaurant accompanied by Diosdado Venus, what did you do? Q. Why, what happened when you ran away?

A. Towards home. A. Andres Fontamillas and Hilario Cajilo were blocking us on the gate of the fence
of my sister's house.
Q. Were you able to reach home?
Q. Since your way was blocked, where did Ronie Elisan go?
A. No, sir.
A. We ran towards the ricefield.
Q. Why, what happened on the way?
Q. When you ran, what did Mayor Cawaling do?
A. Diosdado Venus ran going back because we were lighted by a flashlight.
A. They were chasing us.
Q. How many flashlight[s] were trimed [sic] to you?
Q. What about Alex Batuigas, what did he do?
A. Six.
A. He also followed helping chasing us. [sic]
Q. Did you come to know who trimed [sic] the flashlight towards you?
Q. What about the four policemen, what did they do?
A. Yes, sir.
A. The same. They were also chasing us.
Q. Who were they?
Q. About how far is that restaurant [from] the spot where you were first lighted by
A. Mayor Cawaling, Andres Fontamillas, Hilario Cajilo, Ernesto Tumbagahan, Ricardo the flashlight of the accused?
delos Santos and Alex Batuigas.
A. About one hundred meters.
Q. How were you able to recognize them when that was night time?
Q. Now, according to you, you ran towards the ricefield, what happened while you
A. Because the flashlight[s] were bright. were running towards the ricefield?

Q. When Diosdado Venus ran back to his restaurant, what did your brother Ronie A. I saw my brother fell [sic] down.
Elisan and you do?
Q. Fell down where?
CIVPRO (INTRO)

A. On the ricefield. A. He fell down.

Q. What about you, where were you when your brother fell down in the ricefield?
A. I ran towards the bushes.
Q. What did you do upon reaching the bushes?
A. I la[y] on the ground with my belly touch[ing] on the ground behind the coconut
tree.
Q. And how far is that spot where your elder brother had fallen down to the spot
where Diosdado Venus left you when he returned to the restaurant?
A. To my estimate it is about 300 meters.
Q. After your brother had fallen down, what did the accused do?
A. Mayor Cawaling said, ["]you left him, he is already dead.["]

Q. When your brother according to you had fallen on the ricefield, what did he do
thereafter?
A. He rose up, [raised] his hands and surrender[ed] to them.
Q. In rising, what was his position?
A. He was rising like this. (Witness demonstrating by kneeling [and] raising his two
hands).
Q. While Ronie Elisan was kneeling and raising both of his hands, what happened?
Q. Where did they go?
A. They went towards the house of Mayor Cawaling." 53
Imelda Tumbagahan was at home feeding her child when she heard her brother
Ronie shouting for help. After getting a flashlight and looking through the window
of her house, she saw Cawaling and Alex Batuigas chasing Ronie who was running
towards her house. Tumbagahan and De los Santos prevented Ronie from entering
the fence of her house, as a result of which, her brother ran towards a rice field
nearby. There, on bended knees and with hands raised, Ronie was shot by Cawaling
and his men. 54

A. Mayor Cawaling approached him together with the four policemen and his Nelson Ilisan also heard his younger brother Ronie shouting for help while being
brother-in-law and they shot him. chased by the group of Cawaling. As Cajilo and Fontamillas blocked Ronie from
entering the gate of Imelda's house, the victim ran towards a rice field. Nelson
Q. Do you know what weapon[s] were used in shooting your brother?
stopped Cawaling and asked, "Nong, basi guinalagas ninyo and acon hali? (Nong,
why do you chase my brother)" But the mayor merely continued chasing Ronie.
A. Yes, sir.
Thereafter, Nelson saw his brother, on his knees with both hands raised, shot by
Q. What weapon were used? appellants. 55

A. The weapon of Mayor Cawaling is .45 caliber and that of Andres Fontamillas and
Hilario Cajilo were both armalite and that of Ernesto Tumbagahan, Alex Batuigas
and Ricardo delos Santos were .38 caliber.
Q. How were you able to identify their weapons?
A. Because the flashlight[s] were bright.
Q. Now, what happened to your brother when he was fired upon by the accused in
this case?
The three aforementioned witnesses narrated in detail the assault against their
brother Ronie and positively identified the appellants as the perpetrators. The trial
court cannot be faulted for relying on their testimonies and accepting them as true,
56 especially when the defense failed, to prove any ill motive on their part. 57 In
addition, family members who have witnessed the killing of their loved one usually
strive to remember the faces of the assailants. 58 Thus, the relationship per se of
witnesses with the victim does not necessarily mean that the former are biased. On
the contrary, it is precisely such relationship that would impel them to seek justice
and put the real culprit behind bars, rather than impute the offense to the innocent.
59
CIVPRO (INTRO)
Appellant Cawaling submits that the prosecution witnesses tampered with the
evidence by cleaning the cadaver before an autopsy could be done. "Such irregular
washing of the cadaver by a close relative of the deceased, who is educated and
who presumably knew perfectly well the need to preserve it in its original state for
the medico-legal examination[,] is highly suspicious. It points to the fact that the
relatives of the deceased wanted to hide, or erase something that would bolster
and assist the defense (that is, state of drunkenness, powder burns or lack thereof,
indicating the firing of a weapon or the proximity of the weapon used on the
deceased, etc.)." 60
Such contention is unavailing. First, Bebelinia Sacapaño merely cleaned the cadaver
and made no further examination. Second, appellants had an opportunity to have
the body examined again to determine or prove important matters, such as whether
Ronie was drunk, if he fired a gun, how many and what caliber of guns were used
in shooting him; they did not, however, avail themselves of this opportunity. As
public officers, appellants knew that it was within their power to request or secure
from the court, or any other competent authority, an order for another autopsy 61
or any such evidence as may affirm their innocence. Third, their conviction lies in
the strong and convincing testimonial evidence of the prosecution, not in the
corroborative testimony of Bebelinia Sacapaño.
Relying on the testimonies of Luz Venus and Gil Palacio, Appellant Cawaling also
pointed out that "[t]he power of observation of alleged eyewitness Vicente was
severely affected by his intoxication. It may be inferred that an intoxicated person's
sense[s] of sight and hearing and of touch are less acute than those of a sober
person and that his observation are inexact as to what actually occurred." 62
This argument is not persuasive. The evidence presented fails to show that Vicente
was so intoxicated that night as to affect his powers of observation and
retrospection. Defense Witness Palacio merely saw the witness drinking tuba on the
night of the killing. 63 Meanwhile the whole testimony of Luz on the matter mainly
reveals that Ronie was the person she was referring to as drunk, as shown by this
portion: 64
"Q When Ronie and Vicente both surnamed Ilisan entered the C & J-4 kitchenette
what if any did you observe?
A I saw them so dr[u]nk (Nakita ko sila lasing na lasing).
Q Who was lasing na lasing or so dr[u]nk?
A Ronie Ilisan sir."
Granting that Vicente was drunk, the conviction of the appellants is still inevitable
in view of the positive declarations of Witnesses Nelson and Imelda, who
unequivocally identified appellants as perpetrators of the senseless killing of their
brother Ronie.
Appellant Cawaling also questions the trial court's reliance on the testimonies of Dr.
Blandino Flores, 65 Nelson Ilisan 66 and Prosecutor Pedro Victoriano, Jr., 67 for
failure of the prosecution to offer them as evidence. In People vs. Java, 68 this Court
ruled that the testimony of a witness, although not formally offered in evidence,
may still be admitted by the courts, if the other party does not object to its
presentation. The Court explained: "Section 36 of [Rule 132] requires that an
objection in the course of the oral examination of a witness should be made as soon
as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent. Since no objection to
the admissibility of evidence was made in the court below, an objection raised for
the first time on appeal will not be considered." In the present case, a cursory
reading of the stenographic notes reveals that the counsel for the appellants did
not raise any objection when said witnesses testified on the matters now being
impugned. Moreover, they repeatedly cross-examined the witnesses, which shows
that they had waived their objections to the said testimonies of such witnesses.
Lastly, Appellant Mayor Cawaling questions the motive of Prosecutor Pedro
Victoriano Jr. This contention is likewise bereft of merit. Unlike judges who are
mandated to display cold neutrality in hearing cases, 69 prosecutors are not
required to divest themselves of their personal convictions and refrain from
exhibiting partiality. In this case, there is reasonable ground for Prosecutor
Victoriano to believe that an offense has been committed and that the accused was
probably guilty thereof. 70 Under the circumstance, it is his sworn duty to see that
justice is served. 71 Thus, "[h]e may prosecute with earnestness and vigor — indeed,
he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike
foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about
a just one." 72 Further,
"Under the prevailing criminal procedure, the fiscal's sphere of action is quite
extensive, for he has very direct and active intervention in the trial, assuming as the
Government's representative the defense of society, which has been disturbed by
the crime, and taking public action as though he were the injured party, for the
purpose of securing the offender's punishment, whenever the crime has been
CIVPRO (INTRO)
proved and the guilt of the accused as the undoubted perpetrator thereof
established." 73
Fourth Issue:
Self-Defense
To escape criminal liability, the appellants also invoke the justifying circumstances
of self-defense and lawful performance of duty. 74 Allegedly, Ronie was firing his
gun and shouting "Guwa ang maisog! (Come out who is brave!)." Then the mayor
and the policemen arrived at the scene to pacify him. Ronie fired at them, which
forced them to chase him and return fire.
We find this scenario bereft of plausibility.
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is a condition sine qua non for the
successful invocation of self-defense. 75 As factually found by the trial court,
unlawful aggression did not start with the victim, but rather with the appellants.
Cawaling and his men proceeded to the C & J-4 Kitchenette and waited for Ronie
to come out. When the victim did, they chased and shot him without giving him any
opportunity to defend himself.
Granting arguendo the veracity of the defense's factual version, it is important to
note that appellants admitted that Ronie was running away from them when they
chased and shot him. Thus, unlawful aggression — assuming it was initially present
— had ceased, and the appellants no longer had any right to pursue the offender.
Basic is the rule that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has
the right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. Upon the cessation of the
unlawful aggression and the danger or risk to life and limb, there should be a
corresponding cessation of hostilities on the part of the person defending himself.
76
Furthermore, the means employed to ward off the attack was unreasonably
excessive. Being armed, the appellants could have easily ordered the victim to
surrender. Even the first shot at his shoulder would have been sufficient to
immobilize him, yet they fired a succession of shots at him while he was in no
position to put up a defense.
Jurisprudence teaches that when an accused admits having committed the crime
but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, the burden of proof is reversed
and shifted to him. He must then prove the elements of self-defense. 77 It
necessarily follows that he must now rely on the strength of his own evidence and
not on the weakness of that of the prosecution; for even if the latter evidence were
weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing. 78 Thus,
appellants must establish with clear and convincing evidence that the killing was
justified, and that they incurred no criminal liability therefor. 79 They failed to do
so, and their conviction thus becomes inevitable. 80
Fifth Issue:
Lawful Performance of Duties
Appellants contend that the killing of Ronie resulted from the lawful performance
of their duties as police officers. However, such justifying circumstance may be
invoked only after the defense successfully proves that (1) the accused acted in the
performance of a duty, and (2) the injury or offense committed is the necessary
consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty. 81 These two
requisites are wanting in this case.
The appellants, except Mayor Cawaling, were men in uniform who happened to be
on duty when they killed Ronie. The victim was not committing any offense at the
time. Killing the victim under the circumstances of this case cannot in any wise be
considered a valid performance of a lawful duty by men who had sworn to maintain
peace and order and to protect the lives of the people. As aptly held in People vs.
De la Cruz, 82 "Performance of duties does not include murder." That Ronie was a
troublemaker in their town is not an excuse; as the Court declared in the same case
of People vs. De la Cruz, "Murder is never justified, regardless of the victim."
Sixth Issue:
Alibi
We likewise brush aside the defenses of alibi and denial raised by Appellant De los
Santos. Prosecution witnesses positively identified him and Fontamillas as part of
the group which chased and shot Ronie Ilisan. It is elementary that alibi and denial
are outweighed by positive identification that is categorical, consistent and
untainted by any ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter.
Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative
and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. 83
In fact, De los Santos failed to establish with clear and convincing evidence that it
was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime during its
commission. 84 The evidence he had presented demonstrated only that, at the time,
he was sleeping in his house, which was near the locus criminis.
CIVPRO (INTRO)
Alibi is always considered with suspicion and received with caution, not only
because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it is easily fabricated
and concocted. 85 It is therefore incumbent upon the appellant to prove that he
was at another place when the felony was committed, and that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed. 86 This he failed to prove.
Seventh Issue:
Conspiracy
The trial court correctly appreciated the presence of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found, for
criminals do not write down their lawless plans and plots. The agreement to commit
a crime, however, may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission
of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action, and community of intent. 87 It does not matter who inflicted the
mortal wound, as the act of one is the act of all, and each incurs the same criminal
liability. 88 We concur with the trial court's elucidation:
"All of the accused chased the victim and his brother; four (4) of whom blocked their
ways, first, to their elder brother Nelson Elisan's house and, second, to their elder
sister Imelda Elisan Tumbagahon's house. Having changed course by proceeding to
the ricefield in their desperate attempt to evade the accused, all the six (6) armed
accused continued their pursuit. Their victim, having fallen on the rice paddy, and
rising and kneeling on it with raised hands, all the said accused with their flashlights
beamed on their victim, in a united and concerted manner, shot him. After Ronie
Elisan had fallen down, co-accused Mayor Cawaling was even heard as saying (Y)ou
left [sic] him, he is already dead.' . . ." 89
Eight Issue:
Equipoise Rule
We reject appellants position that the equipoise rule should apply to this case. 90
In People vs. Lagnas, 91 the Court, through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado,
described this rule as follows:
"Once again, albeit in effect a supportive and cumulative consideration in view of
the preceding disquisition, the equipoise rule finds application in this case, that is,
if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations,
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty, and is not sufficient to support a conviction."
In this case, the inculpatory facts point to only one conclusion: appellants are guilty.
As amplified in the discussion above, the Court agrees with the trial court that the
guilt of the appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Ninth Issue:
Murder or Homicide?
The Information alleges three qualifying circumstances: treachery, evident
premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength. If appreciated, any one of
these will qualify the killing to murder. However, Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo
posit that there was no treachery, reasoning that Ronie was not an unsuspecting
victim, as he had been forewarned by Diosdado Venus of the presence of the
appellants inside the restaurant and there had been a chase prior to the killing.
Further, they contend that abuse of superior strength is deemed absorbed in
treachery, and that "the addition of abuse of superior strength to qualify the case
to murder is nothing more than mere repetition — a legal chicanery, so to say.
Similarly, where treachery is not proved, there can be no abuse of superior strength,
vice-versa." 92
We partly agree.
Treachery exists when the malefactors employ means and methods that tend
directly and especially to insure their execution without risk to themselves arising
from the defense which the victims might make. The essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the
person attacked. 93 While we do not disregard the fact that the victim, together
with his brother Vicente, was able to run towards a rice field, we still believe that
treachery attended the killing.
In People vs. Landicho, 94 we ruled that treachery might still be appreciated even
when the victim was warned of danger to his person, for "what is decisive is that
the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or
to retaliate."
The appellants waited for Ronie to come out of the restaurant. All of them chased
the victim and prevented him from seeking refuge either in the house of his sister
Imelda or that of his brother Nelson. All of them carried firearms and flashlights.
CIVPRO (INTRO)
They fired their guns at the Victim while he was on his knees with arms raised,
manifesting his intention not to fight back.
We cannot appreciate the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength,
however, as we have consistently ruled that it is deemed absorbed in treachery. 95
We also affirm the finding of the trial court that the prosecution failed to prove the
attending circumstance of evident premeditation. To prove this aggravating
circumstance, the prosecution must show the following: (1) the time when the
offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the
offender clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time, between the
determination to commit the crime and the execution thereof, sufficient to allow
the offender to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 96 Nothing in the records
shows how and when the plan to kill was hatched, or how much time had elapsed
before it was carried out.
Tenth Issue:
Damages
The trial court awarded the following: (a) P50,000.00, as civil indemnity; (b) P6,000.00,
as actual damages; and (c) P116,666.66, for lost earnings. In computing the latter,
the trial court used the following formula:
"Total annual net income = 10% x total annual gross income
= 10 x P25,000.00
= P2,500.00
xxx xxx xxx
Loss of earning capacity of Ronie Elisan = 2/3 (90-20) x P2,500.00 = P116,666.66." 97
Consistent with jurisprudence, we affirm the ruling of the trial court awarding the
amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim. 98
We cannot do the same to the award of actual damages and lost earnings, however.
The award of actual damages has no basis, as no receipts were presented to
substantiate the expenses allegedly incurred. An alleged pecuniary loss must be
established by credible evidence before actual damages may be awarded. 99
Similarly erroneous is the award for loss of earning capacity, which should be
computed as follows: 100
"2/3 x [80 — age of victim at the time of death] x [reasonable portion of the annual
net income which would have been received as support by heirs]"
As testified to by Nelson Ilisan, the deceased had been earning an average of P100
daily or P3,000 monthly. 101 From this monthly income must be deducted the
reasonable amount of P1,000 representing the living and other necessary expenses
of the deceased. Hence, the lost earnings of the deceased should be computed as
follows:
= 2/3 x [80-22] x [P24,000]
= 2/3 x [58] x [P24,000]
= 2[P1,392,000]
——————
3
= P2,784,000
—————
3
= P928,000.
Eleventh Issue:
Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
Prior to the amendment of Section 248 of the Revised Penal Code, 102 the
imposable penalty for murder was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death. In their Brief, Appellants Cajilo and Tumbagahan argue for the imposition of
the lower penalty of reclusion temporal, contending that their filing of bail
bonds/property bonds, before the order for their arrest was issued, should be
treated as voluntary surrender. 103
We cannot accept this contention. In the first place, it has no factual basis. The
warrant for the arrest of herein appellants was issued on August 18, 1987, 104 but
appellants' counsel filed the Urgent Motion for Bail only thereafter, on September
2, 1987. 105 In the second place, appellants failed to prove the requisites for
voluntary surrender, which are: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2)
the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; and
CIVPRO (INTRO)
(3) the surrender is voluntary. 106 The records reveal that a warrant of arrest was
actually served on Tumbagahan and Cajilo 107 on September 2, 1987 and that they
were in fact detained. 108
In view of the absence of any other aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the trial
court correctly imposed reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED
with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the award of P6,000 as actual damages is
DELETED, and (2) the award for loss of earning capacity is INCREASED to P928,000.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED. LLphil
||| (People v. Cawaling, G.R. No. 117970, [July 28, 1998], 355 PHIL 1-45)
10. Zamora vs. Heirs of Carmen, G.R. No. 146195, November 18, 2004
[G.R. No. 146195. November 18, 2004.]
AVELINA ZAMORA, EMERITA ZAMORA-NICOL, SONNY NICOL,
TERESA ZAMORA-UMALI, CLARENCE UMALI, ROBERTO
ZAMORA, ROLANDO ZAMORA, MARY ANN ZAMORA,
MICHELLE ZAMORA and RODRIGO ZAMORA, petitioners, vs.
HEIRS OF CARMEN IZQUIERDO, represented by their attorney-
in-fact, ANITA F. PUNZALAN, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the Decision 2 of the Court
of Appeals dated September 12, 2000 and its Resolution dated December 1, 2000 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 54541, entitled "Avelina Zamora, et al., petitioners, versus Heirs of
Carmen Izquierdo, represented by the executrix, Anita F. Punzalan, respondents."
The records show that sometime in 1973, Carmen Izquierdo and Pablo Zamora
entered into a verbal stipulation whereby the former leased to the latter one of her
apartment units located at 117-B General Luna Street, Caloocan City. They agreed
on the following: the rental is P3,000.00 per month; the leased premises is only for
residence; and only a single family is allowed to occupy it.
After the death of Carmen (lessor) in 1996 her attorney-in-fact, Anita Punzalan,
representing the heirs, herein respondents, prepared a new contract of lease
wherein the rental was increased from P3,000.00 to P3,600.00 per
month. 3 However, petitioners refused to sign it.
In January 1997, Pablo (lessee) died. His wife, Avelina Zamora, and their children
(two of whom have their own families), herein petitioners, continued to reside in
the apartment unit. However, they refused to pay the increased rental and persisted
in operating a photocopying business in the same apartment.
Meanwhile, petitioner Avelina Zamora applied with the Metropolitan Waterworks
& Sewerage System (MWSS) for a water line installation in the premises. Since a
written consent from the owner is required for such installation, she requested
respondents' attorney-in-fact to issue it. However, the latter declined because
petitioners refused to pay the new rental rate and violated the restrictions on the
use of the premises by using a portion thereof for photocopying business and
allowing three families to reside therein.
This prompted petitioner Avelina Zamora to file with the Office of the Punong
Barangay of Barangay 16, Sona 2, District I, Lungsod ng Caloocan, a complaint
against Anita Punzalan (respondents' attorney-in-fact), docketed as "Usaping Bgy.
Blg. 1-27-97, Ukol sa: Hindi Pagbibigay ng Pahintulot sa Pagpapakabit ng Tubig."
On August 24, 1997, during the barangay conciliation proceedings, petitioner Avelina
Zamora declared that she refused to sign the new lease contract because she is not
agreeable with the conditions specified therein. TDcHCa
The following day, Anita Punzalan sent Avelina a letter 4 informing her that the
lease is being terminated and demanding that petitioners vacate the premises
within 30 days from notice.
Despite several barangay conciliation sessions, the parties failed to settle their
dispute amicably. Hence, the Barangay Chairman issued a Certification to File Action
dated September 14, 1997. 5
Consequently, on October 2, 1997, respondents, represented by Anita Punzalan, filed
with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 49, Caloocan City, a complaint for
unlawful detainer and damages against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No.
23702. 6 Forthwith, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss 7 the complaint on the
ground that the controversy was not referred to the barangay for conciliation. First,
CIVPRO (INTRO)
they alleged that the barangay Certification to File Action "is fatally defective"
because it pertains to another dispute, i.e., the refusal by respondents' attorney-in-
fact to give her written consent to petitioners' request for installation of water
facilities in the premises. And, second, when the parties failed to reach an amicable
settlement before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, the Punong
Barangay (as Lupon Chairman), did not constitute the Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundobefore whom mediation or arbitration proceedings should have
been conducted, in violation of Section 410(b), Chapter 7 (Katarungang
Pambarangay), Title One, Book III of Republic Act No. 7160 8 (otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1991), which reads:
"SECTION 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement. —
(a) . . .
(b) Mediation by lupon chairman — Upon receipt of the
complaint, the lupon chairman 9 shall, within the next working
day, summon the respondent(s), with notice to the
complainant(s) for them and their witnesses to appear before
him for a mediation of their conflicting interests. If he fails in his
mediation effort within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting
of the parties before him, he shall forthwith set a date for the
constitution of the pangkat in accordance with the provisions of
this Chapter." (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents opposed the motion to dismiss, 10 the same being prohibited
under Section 19 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. They prayed that
judgment be rendered as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint,
pursuant to Section 6 11 of the same Rule.
On July 9, 1998, the MTC issued an Order 12 denying petitioners' motion to dismiss
and considering the case submitted for decision in view of their failure to file their
answer to the complaint.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, 13 contending that a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of failure to refer the complaint to
the Lupon for conciliation is allowed under Section 19 of the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure, which partly provides:
"SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. — The following
pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases
covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the
complaint or information except on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to
comply with the preceding section[referring to Section
18 on referral of the complaint to the Lupon for
conciliation];
xxx xxx xxx."
On August 26, 1998, the MTC rendered a Judgment 14 in favor of respondents and
against petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants, ordering defendants and all
persons claiming right under them:
1 To vacate the leased premises located at No. 117-B
General Luna Street, Caloocan City and to
surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff;
2) To pay the amount of three thousand six hundred
(P3,600.00) pesos per month starting January,
1997 until the premises being occupied by
them is finally vacated and possession thereof
is restored to the plaintiff;
3) To pay plaintiff the sum of five thousand (P5,000.00)
pesos as and for attorney's fees; and
4) To pay the costs of this suit. ASICDH
SO ORDERED."
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 125, Caloocan City, rendered its
Decision 15 dated February 15, 1999 affirming the MTC Judgment. Subsequently, it
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 16
Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 54541. On September 12, 2000, it rendered a Decisions 17 affirming
the RTC Decision.
Thereafter, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the
Appellate Court in its Resolution dated December 1, 2000. 18
Hence, the instant petition.
CIVPRO (INTRO)

I appellee was given by the Sangguniang Barangay the authority
to bring her grievance to the Court for resolution. While it is
The primordial objective of Presidential Decree No. 1508 (the Katarungang
true that the Sertifikasyon dated September 14, 1997 is entitled
Pambarangay Law), now included under R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government
`Ukol Sa Hindi Pagbibigay Ng Pahintulot Sa Pagpapakabit Ng
Code of 1991), is to reduce the number of court litigations and prevent the
Tubig', this title must not prevail over the actual issues discussed
deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought about by the
in the proceedings.
indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts. 19 To attain this objective, Section 412(a)
of R.A. No. 7160 requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before
the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat as a precondition to filing a complaint in court,
Hence, to require another confrontation at the barangay level
thus:
as a sine qua non for the filing of the instant case would not
"SECTION 412. Conciliation. — (a) Pre-condition to Filing of serve any useful purpose anymore since no new issues would
Complaint in Court. — No complaint, petition, action, or be raised therein and the parties have proven so many times in
proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the past that they cannot get to settle their differences
the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other amicably." 20
government office for adjudication, unless there has been a
We cannot sustain petitioners' contention that the Lupon conciliation alone, without
confrontation between the parties before
the proceeding before the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo, contravenes the law
the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or
on Katarungang Pambarangay. Section 412(a) of R.A. No. 7160, quoted earlier,
settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon or
clearly provides that, as a precondition to filing a complaint in court, the parties
pangkat secretary and attested to by the lupon or
shall go through the conciliation process either before the Lupon Chairman (as what
pangkat chairman . . .." (Emphasis supplied)
happened in the present case), or the Pangkat.
In the case at bar, the Punong Barangay, as Chairman of the Lupong Tagapamayapa,
Moreover, in Diu vs. Court of Appeals, 21 we held that "notwithstanding the
conducted conciliation proceedings to resolve the dispute between the parties
mandate in Section 410(b) of R.A. No. 7160 that the Barangay Chairman shall
herein. Contrary to petitioners' contention, the complaint does not only allege, as a
constitute a Pangkat if he fails in his mediation efforts," the same "Section 410(b)
cause of action, the refusal of respondents' attorney-in-fact to give her consent to
should be construed together with Section 412(a) of the same law (quoted earlier),
the installation of water facilities in the premises, but also petitioners' violation of
as well as the circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the case." Here, while
the terms of the lease, specifically their use of a portion therein for their
the Pangkat was not constituted, however, the parties met nine (9) times at the
photocopying business and their failure to pay the increased rental. As correctly
Office of the Barangay Chairman for conciliation wherein not only the issue of water
found by the RTC:
installation was discussed but also petitioners' violation of the lease contract. It is
"The records show that confrontations before the barangay thus manifest that there was substantial compliance with the law which does not
chairman were held on January 26, 1997, February 9, 1997, require strict adherence thereto. 22
February 23, 1997, February 28, 1997, July 27, 1997, August 3,
II
1997, August 10, 1997, August 17, 1997 and August 24, 1997
wherein not only the issue of water installation was discussed We hold that petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint for unlawful detainer is
but also the terms of the lease and the proposed execution of proscribed by Section 19(a) of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, quoted
a written contract relative thereto. It appears, however, that no earlier. Section 19(a) permits the filing of such pleading only when the ground for
settlement was reached despite a total of nine meetings at the dismissal of the complaint is anchored on lack of jurisdiction over the subject
barangay level. matter, or failure by the complainant to refer the subject matter of his/her
complaint "to the Lupon for conciliation" prior to its filing with the court. This is
It is of no moment that the complaint was initially made by
clear from the provisions of Section 18 of the same Rule, which reads:
defendant-appellant Avelina Zamora because herein plaintiff-
CIVPRO (INTRO)

"SEC. 18. Referral to Lupon. — Cases requiring referral to the
Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1508where there is no showing of compliance with
such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may
be revived only after such requirement shall have been
complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases
where the accused was arrested without a warrant." (Emphasis
supplied)

As discussed earlier, the case was referred to the Lupon Chairman for conciliation.
Obviously, petitioners' motion to dismiss, even if allowed, is bereft of merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54541 sustaining the Decision of the RTC which upheld
the MTC Judgment is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners. ACETSa

SO ORDERED.

||| (Zamora v. Heirs of Izquierdo, G.R. No. 146195, [November 18, 2004], 485 PHIL
416-425)