Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Phenomenological Movement
PHAENOMENOLOGICA
COLLECTION FONDEE PAR H. L. VAN BREDA ET PUBLIEE SOUS LE
PATRONAGE DES CENTRES D'ARCHIVES-HUSSERL
80
HERBERT SPIEGELBERG
111981
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Spiegelberg, Herbert.
The context of the phenomenological movement.
(Phaenomenologica; 80)
Collection ofpreviously published studies which have been revised by the author; intended as a
companion vol. to his The phenomenological movement.
Includes bibliographical references and index of names.
CONTENTS: ComJ)'arative studies: "Intention" and "intentionality" in the Scholastics,
Brentano and Husserl; Husserl's and Peirce's phenomenologies; Husserl's phenomenology and
Sartre's existentialism; Husserl and Pfander on the phenomenological reduction; [etc.].
1. Phenomenology - Collected works. 2. Husser!.
Edmund, 1859-1938 - Collected works. 1. Title. II. Series.
B829.5.S635 142'.7 80-18655
All rights reserved. No part ofthis publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or other-
wise, without the prior written permission of the publisher, Springer-Science+Business Media, B. V.
To The Memory of
JOHNWILD
1902 - 1972
Pioneer of Existential Phenomenology
in America
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements ix
Preface xi
Permissions for reprinting parts ofthe items making up this volume have been given generously by
the following copyright holders:
American Philosophical Quarterly, "The Puzzle of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Phänomenologie
(1929- ?)."
GeraldDuckworth& Co. Ltd., "'Intention' and 'Intentionality' in the Scholastics, Brentano and
Husserl."
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology (JBSP), "Is the Reduction Necessary For
Phenomenolügy? Husserl's and Pfänder's Replies"; "Husserl in England: Facts and Lessons";
"On the Misfortunes of Husserl's Encyclopaedia Britannica Article 'Phenomenology' ";
"Preface to W. R. Boyce Gibson's Freiburg Diary 1928."
Martinus Nijhoff Puhlishers B. V., "Husserl's Approach to Phenomenology für Americans: A
Letter and its Sequel";"The Lost Portrait of Edmund Husserl by Ida and Franz Brentano."
Northwestern University Press, "What William James Knew about Edmund Husserl";
" 'Linguistic Phenomenology': John L. Austin and Alexander Pfänder."
University ofBuffalo, "Husserl's and Peirce's Phenomenologies"; "Review ofWolfgang Köhler,
The Place of Value in a World of Facts."
Walter de Gruyter, "Amiel's 'New Phenomenology'."
Grazer Philosophische Studien, "The Significance of the Correspondence between Franz
Brentano and Edmund Husserl."
PREFACE
The components of this collection fall roughly into two groups: (1) contem-
porary paralleis and (2) historical explorations inside phenomenology. What
they have in common is the intent to remove blinkers from the narrow
provincialist perspective on the Phenomenological Movement in its often far
from splendid isolation and from its preoccupation with its own latest phase.
In this spirit Part I deals largely with relations between central figures in
phenomenology and those in other philosophies, where I found a special need
for historical exploration. Husserl figures in the first four essays against the
background of other earlier philosophies ofintentionality, the native American
phenomenology of Peirce and Sartre's existentialism. The comparison with
Pfänder is concerned with an internal confrontation, but one whose bearing
affects also the relation to the outside world in its puzzlement ab out the
reduction. Pfänder figures even more prominently in the subsequent
comparison with the "linguistic phenomenology" of lohn L. Austin.
As the common denominator for the "Historical Explorations" ofPart II, I
can suggest merely the lure of dark corners in my historical knowledge which
had called for elucidation, mostly in connection with special occasions
explained in each case. Again, Husserl is not the only target of these
explorations. The best possible vindication ofthese studies I can suggest is the
additional light they can provide in helping the figure of phenomenology to
stand out more sharply against the ground of its origins. The case of
Wittgenstein's phenomenology as it now emerges may help to promote more
sympathetic mutual understanding without syncretism. Here I am much
indebted to several Wittgenstein scholars for interest and help.
The Components
Some remarks about the circumstances of each ofthe pieces may be helpful for
their full appraisal.
1. The comparative studies ofthe first part open with a study I had written in
German before leaving the Continent. " 'Intention' and 'Intentionality' in the
Scholastics, Bentano and Husserl" was prepared in an atmosphere where
xiii
"European Philosophy Today," I reversed this order in view ofthe fact that in
Britain only a first acquaintance with Husserl could be assumed and that the
best way to introduce the practically unknown Pfänder was to show first the
impasse in the final stage ofHusserl' s reduction as a background for introducing
Pfänder's alternative. But except for this reversal in the order ofpresentation
the two versions are substantially the same. My main point was to show
Pfänder's radical phenomenology as maintaining Husserl's epoche but
omitting his transcendental reduction with its presuppositions, thus salvaging
the best of Husserl's radicalism.
5. The paper on "Linguistic Phenomenology" tried to take advantage of a
special occasion in the Ibero-American world at the XIIlth International
Congress of Philosophy of 1963 in Mexico City, where Pfänder's work was
comparatively weIl known in Spanish translation. Iwanted to show how
Pfänder's emphasis on the need of initial clarification of meanig prior to
phenomenology proper fits in with the admittedly much more explicit emphasis
on" linguistic" analysis in J ohn L. Austin' s "linguistic phenomenology." This
attempt has now been backed strikingly by Paul Ricoeur's plea for Pfänder's
hints about the need of a study ofthe language ofthe will in a paper he gave at
the Conference on the M unich Phenomenology on' Phenomenology ofWilling
and Ordinary Language Approach,' in 1971. .
6. The second part of these Studies is devoted to more specific historical
topics. My interest in Amiel and his phenomenology was a side-effect of
Walter Biemel's invitation to help hirn with the re-publication of Husserl's
Tagebuchnotizen of 1906 and 1907 in Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, which contained a puzzling isolated reference to Amiel. Winthrop
Bell's surprised response to Husserl's interest in Amiel aroused my curiosity,
with very little immediate success as far as the reference was concerned. It was
only when I began to explore Amiel for his own sake that the really fascinating
information about his "new phenomenology," certainly unknown to Husserl,
emerged. The findings are quite preliminary, but were at least an encourage-
ment for my own research on the experiential phenomenology of the self.
7. F or the article on J ames and Husserl, undertaken in view of Aron
Gurwitsch's interest in the parallel between their study of consciousness, I
would not claim for it more than the interest in a piece of historical detective
work which to my mind establishes James's innocence of antiphenomeno-
logism and the importance of correspondences like Walter Pitkin's as more
trustworthy than his autobiography.
8. The piece on Brentano's Husserl image also makes no phenomenological
claim. Its real interest is to explore such perspectives on Husserl as Brentano's
in a case where pictorial material was available.
9. The paper on the correspondence between Brentano and Husserl was
prepared at the invitation of the Brentano Foundation, read in part at the
xv
thought an American student should go about studying the latest phase of his
phenomenology.
14. The review ofWolfgang Köhler's William James lectures of 1934 goes
back to my first American years at Swarthmore College, where Köhler hadjust
published their book edition under the title The Place 0/ Value in a World 0/
Facts. For me it was a special occasion for studying the place ofphenomeno-
logy in Gestalt psychology, which Köhler and his associates had stressed
especially after their transplantation to the United States.
15. The study of Wittgenstein's Phänomenologie was a result of my casual
reading in his first Cambridge book with its surprising use ofphenomenological
terminology. Since at the same time Paul Ricoeur and others were interested in
pointing out paralleis between the two Austrian thinkers, the exploration of
this puzzling episode in Wittgenstein's development seemed worth starting.
Since the publication of my article in theAmerican Philosophical Quarterly in
1968, a good deal of additional information about Wittgenstein's stake in his
peculiar phenomenology has emerged, which I first hoped to contain within the
framework of a Supplement. But the latest evidence in the shape of a developed
chapter on Phenomenology in the still unpublished Big Typescript (# 213) has
shown me that what is really needed is a complete rewriting of this article.
However, this plan is not yet practicable. I therefore have to leave it at giving
simply a preview ofthe significance ofthis central text in a way which allows a
first hypothesis about the significance of phenomenology for Wittgenstein's
entire development. Even this hypothesis, as far as it can be confirmed or
refuted, will not enable us to solve all the puzzles I raised, for instance the one
about the origins ofhis conception prior to his return to England in 1929. But it
should make it possible to assess more definitely the place of Wittgenstein's
phenomenology in relation to the Phenomenological Movement in general.
NOTES
I See Paul Ricoeur, "Phänomenologie des Wollens und Ordinary Language Approach," Die
Münchener Phänomenologie, The Hague: 1975, pp. 105-124.
2The need far this precaution has just been demonstrated strikingly by the appearance of
Husserl's communications to Winthrop Bell, which made the addition of a last-minute
supplement (see Appendix, p. 229) imperative.
PART I
COMPARATIVE STUDIES
1. "INTENTION" AND "INTENTIONALITY" IN THE
SCHOLASTICS, BRENTANO AND HUSSERO
1. INTRODUCTION
term; some regard Brentano, and some regard Husserl, as the discoverer of
intentionality. In the present context it is impossible to give a complete history
of the problems of intention; not only would this be a very ambitious task, but
the necessary material has not yet been made sufficiently accessible. All I shall
attempt here is to juxtapose the main types ofthe old and new extra-practical
intention and to bring out the most important differences between them.
In this attempt the two terms "intention" and "intentional" (intentionality)
will be dealt with separately, despite the fact that in some places this
differentiation is difficult to maintain. However, the differences between the
referents ofthese terms are much more essential than the grammatical form of
the words would suggest. This has been overlooked previously. I shall begin
with the investigation of the history of "intention."
3. INTENTION IN HUSSERL
What is the situation with regard to the meaning of the term "intention" in
contemporary philosophy? Bearing in mind the distinction between "inten-
tion" and "intentionality," it should be made clear that F ranz Brentano did not
revive the independent term "intention," at least not in those of his writings
published up to 1936. As 1 will point out, he spoke only of intentional objects
and intentional relations. Presumably someone who knew the Scholastics as
weIl as Brentano did had a reason for avoiding the expression intentio, which
was all too reminiscent of the various theories of knowledge connected with
this term, and, in particular, of the Thomistic species doctrine.
Thus the actual term "intention" first re-emerges, as far as 1 can see, in
Edmund Husserl. It is not very easy to determine clearly his conception ofthe
essence of intention. At times we must go beyond Husserl's own statements,
since he hirnself offers no final account of the question. What follows is an
attempt to work out an exegesis of what is essential in the Husserlian
conception by way of a somewhat free and extrapolating approach.
It is best to start from the fact that the Husserlian intention appears in two
different places - in meaningful signs (words) and in very specific kinds of
experiences; the subclasses of these intentions are disregarded here as
inessential for my purpose.
This intention is by no means identical with the word itself. However, it has the
closest relationship with what is designated as the meaning of a word, insofar
as this is not understood as the object meant. The intention, like the meaning, is
10
something that belongs to thc word, it is something that is directed from the
word to an object. Metaphorically, one could speak ofthe verbal intention as a
beam or an arrow shooting out from the word toward the object. Wh at is behind
the image of such an intentional beam is the assumption that a peculiar non-
real ostensive pointer issues from the word to an object, and that one has to
follow it if one wants to understand the word one has heard. The verbal-
intention is, thus, the non-real pointer beam emanating from the the word (as
from a sign post).27 Of course this be am is not an independcnt cntity; it is
attached to the word from which it emanatcs, tied to it as its source of radiation.
Such a phenomenon is attributed to it, bestowed upon it; on the basis of such an
assigned intention pointing toward a thing, the word "has" the meaning ofthis
thing as a property, yet it does not "have" the intention itself, the intentional
beam, for this beam cannot form a property. Meaning is, accordingly, the
property a word has ofpossessing, not as a property per se but as a kind ofideal
external accessory, an intentional be am which emanates from it and points to a
definite object.
Husserl calls experiences that possess this sort of intention, acts or intentional
experiences. Occasionally even such acts themselves are called "inten-
tions."29 Strictly speaking, this is still an improper phrase, apa rs pro toto. Acts
have the "essential character" (Wesenscharakter), the "peculiarity of inten-
tion, the relation to an object through representation or an analogous mode."
Intention, thus, is something pertaining to an act, not the act itself. So
perceiving or wanting are not intentions in themselves, but they include
intentions directed toward the object of perception, toward the target meant.
The essence ofthis experiential intention, however, is ne ver clearly delimited
by a definition in Husser!. Yet from the context it be comes clear that for hirn
intention is the "character" of an act, its peculiarity by virtue ofwhich it relates
to, is directed toward, or aims at an object. Intention is like thc central thread
woven into every act, aiming at the object belonging to each act. Intention is,
therefore, adependent component of an act, adependent part thereof.
One might suppose that there are also independent acts of intending in addi-
tion to those mentioned thus far. Intention in this sense is often identified with
the act ofmeaning( meinen). The German expression meinen itselfhas a variety
of meanings: the most common one being "to beJieve". Yet when it simply
refers to the pointing toward something, to the making something an object ("I
mean this one, no other") then it must be noted that such a meinen makes
possible sense only in connection with other acts. Furthermore, such an
explicit meinen cannot be traced in acts ofperceiving, feeling or wanting; the
11
most common and at the same time most important acts include no explicit
independent meaning intentions (Meinungsinlenlionen). Thus the meaning
of Husserl's original act-intention is that of a peculiar function of pointing at
something. There is reason to place special emphasis on this specific function
because more recently Husserl30 himself describes this function of the
intention as a process of constituting, of constructing, the objects, even as a
productive creation which, by the way, brings extra-practical and practical
intention into immediate proximity again. The question may remain undecided
to what extent a demonstration of such functions is possible. At any rate, they
are not distinctive functions necessary for the essence of general act intentions.
What, then, is the relation between verbal intention and experiential
intention? Certainly it is not a case of an equivocation if both are called
"intentions." A common feature ofboth is, above all, the fact that the carrier of
the intention (word or act) points to an object as weIl as the fact that these
intentions are dependent upon their carriers. To be sure, the difference in
carriers is not the only difference between verbal-intention and act-intention.
Going beyond Husserl's treatment ofthe question, one will also have to note
differences in the structure of the intentions themselves. Thus the verbal-
intention is an artificially assigned attribute ofthe word, its connection with the
word is non-real (ideell), resulting from the act of attribution, while experien-
tial intention, being mental directedness independent of such acts of attribu-
tion, has areal existence in the act itself. Connected with this is the further
difference that verbal intentions are located, as it were, outside ofthe real body
of sound, thus forming a kind of non-real (ideell) appurtenance, whereas act-
intentions are parts embedded in the acts themselves. These differences,
however, do not exclude the possibility that the "pointing beams" ofwords as
weIl as acts constitute a common, basic characteristic ofHusserl' s two types of
intention.
What, then, is the relation between intention in Husserl and intention in the
medieval Scholastics? Let us first briefly point out the main differences in
parallel columns:
The only thing the Scholastics and Husserl might have in common with regard
to intention is, perhaps, the connection with mental acts in general. But this
connection is too general to provide the foundation for an essential relationship
in structure. At any rate, on the basis ofthe findings above, we cannot speak of
a common Scholastic and phenomenological concept of extra-practical
intention.
1fthis is true, then we arejustified in asking why Husserl re-introduced the
Scholastic term at all. The answer can be given only in the light ofthe history of
the expression" intentional." Historically speaking, as I want to re-emphasise,
both terms have been used in a closely parallel fashion, and it is only for
systematic reasons that I considered it appropriate to loosen up their tight
linkage.
13
Among modern philosophers it was indeed Brentano who resumed the use of
14
This becomes even more apparent from Brentano's later objections to this
terminology. In a footnote in the 1911 edition,36 he objects only to the
misunderstanding that the expression "intentional inexistence" denotes an
intention to do something and the pursuit of a goal. "In view ofthis I might have
done better to avoid it altogether. Instead of the term 'intentional' the
Scholastics very frequentIy used the expression 'objective'.37 This has to do
with the fact that something is an object for the mentally active subject, and, as
such, is present in some manner in his consciousness .... " Here too, therefore,
the intentional is nothing but that which is present, immanent, in conscious-
ness, as opposed to that which actually exists. More importantly, Brentano, at
this point, is very close to giving up the expression "intentional" in order to
throw the mental immanence of mental phenomena into even bolder relief. In
an appendix of 1911, the term completely disappears. Here he only speaks of
the "mental reference to something as object.,,38
According to Oskar Kraus,39 however, Brentano later completely gave up
the doctrine ofimmanent objectivity, ofthe mental inexistence ofthe objects.
He maintains that only the reference to something as object remained for
Brentano as characteristic of mental phenomena. Even then, however, it is
significant that in connection with this the expression "intentional," too,
completely disappears. 40 F or Brentano it was and remained closely connected
with the doctrine of the act-immanent objects; mental inexistence, not the
reference to something as object, constituted for hirn the essence ofintention-
ality.
This realisation does not conflict with the claim that at the same time
Brentano was the first to point out the essential relatedness of the mental
phenomena to objects. The only thing that is open to dispute is whether he
characterised specifically this side of the mentallife by the expression" inten-
tional." What he hirnself regarded as being equivalent to" intentional (or even
mental) inexistence of an object," namely, on the one hand, reference to a
content, direction toward a (non-real) object, and, on the other hand,
immanent objectivity, are two very different things. Objects toward which I
direct mys elf do not by any means have to exist immanently. Even if both
things always went together, they would still have to be distinguished
conceptually. It seems that Brentano was not sufficiently aware of this
difference when he combined the two phenomena under the heading "inten-
tional inexistence." That the word "intentional," in particular, is connected
not with the conception of the reference to an object, but with the idea of
immanence is shown clearly by the remark about the adjectives "intentional
(also even mental)" (inexistence) in which their meaning in the sense of
immanence within the mind is once again expressed. 41
Thus "intentional" for Brentano refers to the property of an object which is
immanent in consciousness in a way analogous to that in which the species are
16
The main goal of the present essay has now been reached. All that was
20
intended here was to discuss the relationship between the medieval and the
modern conceptions, to show their differences and their similarities in a
historical context. Systematic problems were investigated and clarified only to
the extent necessary for an understanding of the history. Nevertheless, the
systematic interest served as a kind of guide for the questions posed. It
seems, therefore, appropriate to add a few systematic supplementary remarks
and conclusions.
The present essay has not dealt with a number of questions which would
have to be taken up in a systematic investigation ofintentional structures. To
point out only one: the relationship between intention and consciousness
which, not without reason, has hardly been mentioned so far. We can by no
means assert from the very start that they are identical, as little as that the
mental and the conscious are identical. We should not underestimate how
important it is to clarify these questions. It is also extremely important,
particularly from the epistemological point ofview, to clarify the relationship
between that which is intended and that which is given, whose identity, too,
must not simply be assumed.
On the basis ofthe preceding resuits, a ceitain terminological reform would
seem to be indicated. The term "intention" was certainly meaningful and
historically justified as a me ans of pointing out an extremely important and
thus far alm ost overlooked area of phenomena. But today when the complexity
of the respective structures has been revealed and when, in many cases,
equivocations have intruded, the foreign word has degenerated into a
dangerous catchword because it is often used rather haphazardly; therefore, a
simplifying adaptation ofthe terminology to the new situation would certainly
be desirable.
Yet, as far as possible, the coining of new technical terms should be avoided.
In any case preference should be given to expressions close to the subject-
matter. In many cases the German word meinen is quite suitable; yet, for
reasons indicated above (p. 10), this is not always the case. I would
recommend that the intentional act be designated as "object-directed"
(gegenstandsgerichtei) and the intentionally intended object as "act-meant."
For in view ofthe problematic nature ofthe structure in question, it would be
premature to worry over the substitution of another term for "intentional" in
the sense in which it is opposed to "reell"; possible formulations would be
"act-transcendent" (aktjenseitig) or "experience-transcendent" (erlebnis-
jenseitig). Für the merely intentional object as contras ted with the real object,
the term "act-dependent" or "experience-dependent" would seem appro-
priate. For "intention" itself, meaning a pointing from the word or act to the
object, a term such as "object-directed" or "object-aiming reference" will
usually suffice.
Such terminological revisions, however, do not affect the importance ofthe
21
NOTES
'Translated from the German by Linda L. McAIister and Margarete Schinde. "The present
translation is based on a reprinted version of the German original which appeared in Studia
Philosophica, vol. 29 (1970), pp. 189-216. However, Professor Spiegelberg, who, together
with Professor Donald Sievert, also ofWashington University, checked our drafts, wrote to us
that after more than thirty-five years he found it difficult to stick to the fonnulations of his
original text. His corrections were, therefore, not always based on disagreements with our
translations, but sometimes constituted modifications of the text translated." [L.L.M. and
M.S.].
2 Summa Theologica, 1, 2q, 12a, 1c. Raymundus LuIlus, who offers a comprehensive fonnula
("Intentio est operatio inteIIectus et voluntatis, quae se movet ad dandum complementum
desideratae et inteIIectae rei") in his De Prima et Secunda intentione (Opera VI), considers
only practical intention in the remaining text, especially because this work has a purely ethical
22
character; thus the continuation ofthe definition reads, "et intentio est actus naturalis appetitus,
qui requirit perfectionem quae iIIi naturaliter convenit."
3Ueberweg-Geyer, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 2, 11th ed. (1928), p. 343.
4 Another relevant expression besides M a 'na is M aqsad especially in combinations such as Qsad
Tani (Le. secunda intentio).(Averroes, Compendio de Metafisica, Madrid, 1919, p. 800) and
maqsad alkalam (aim of speech); I am indebted for the reference to the late Max Meyerhof in
Cairo.
5 The distinction between prima and secunda intentio in Arabic philosophy, as I can on!y
hypothesise, has to do with the doctrine ofprimary and secondary substances in Aristot!e. The
secundae intentiones, like secondary substances, have on!y a derivative and, to that extent,
secondary being. This is expressed most c1early by A verroes, who says of the secundae
intentiones (or intelligibilia), "quorum esse est in intellectu tantum" (Metaphysica, I, 1, Venet,
1550f., 169b59).
6 R.D. Simonin, "La notion d' 'intention' dans l'oeuvre de Saint Thomas d' Aquin", Revue des
sciences philosophiques et thiologiques, vol. 19 (1930), pp. 445, sqq.
7 Summa Contra Gentiles IV, 11, "Est autem ... ".
8 This becomes particularly evident by combining the passages I, 58, and VI, 11, in the Summa
Contra Gentiles.
9 Summa Theologica 1, q. 78, a. 4 corp.
10 In the Summa Theologica (1, q. 85 a 1 ad 4) only the intentio intelligibilis or species
intelligibilis appears.
11 Summa Contra Gentiles IV, 11. On the doctrine of the verbum interius see also Summa
Theologica, I, q. 27 a 1 corp.
12 Super !ib. I Posteriorum 1. 46 "Item ... ".
13 Prant!, Geschichte der Logik, vol. 3, sect. XIX, nos 107 and 109.
14" ••• triplex est operatio intellectus. Una est intelligentia simplicium; alia est compositio vel
divisio.... Tertia est operatio discursiva a praemissis ad conc1usiones, at ille discursus est
intentio secunda et est actus rationis per quem ducimur in cognitionem primarum intentionum et
aliarum scientiarum" (Super lib. I, Post, q. 46).
15 "Uno modo dicitur intentio ex parte ipsius intelligentis omne illud quod per modum alicuius
repraesentationis ducit intellectum in cognitionem alicuius rei, sive sit species intelligibilis sive
actus intellectus sive conceptus mentis" (Prant!, vol. 3, sect. 19, no. 396).
16 Quodlibeta, IV, 19.
17 "Frustra fit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora ... ergo praeter actum intelligendi non
oportetponere aliquid aliud" (Prant!, vol. 3, sect. 19, n. 768).
18 "Logica non est de actibus sed est de intentionibus et conceptibus qui formantur per huiusmodi
actus .... Dialectica ergo, quae proprie rationalis est, magis erit de huiusmodi conceptibus
quam de ipsis actibus' ibid., vol. 3, no. 371).
19 "Logica non coniungit actum intellectus actui intellectus sed conceptus secundarios con-
ceptibus primis,... ; ergo manifestum est, quod secunda et prima intentio non sunt actus
intelligendi sed obiectivus conceptus' (Prant!, vol. 3, n. 705).
20". . . intentio secunda quae est quaedam re!atio rationis in praedicabili ad illud de quo est
praedicabile ... " (Prant!, vol. 3, sect. 19, no. 106).
21 " ... qui quidem respectus non tenet se ex parte actus intelligendi vel ex parte scientiae in ordine
ad rem intellectarn sed magis e converso, respectu rationis, tenens se ex parte rei intellectae in
ordine ad intellectum ipsum" (according to Peter Aureol in Prant!, no. 701).
n"Prima intentio ... non est aliud quam esse intellectum". Peter Aureol, in 1, Sent., dist. 23,
art. 1.
23 " Alio modo dicitur intentio, quod se tenet ex parte rei intellectae et hoc modo dicitur intentio
res ipsa quae inteIligitur inquantum in ipsam tenditur sicut in quoddam cognitum per actum
inteIligendi, et intentio sie dicta formaliter et in abstracto dicit ... terminationem quae est
quaedam habitudo rei intellectae ad actum intelligendi ... Prima intentio concretive et
materialiter dicit illud quod intelligitur ... Intentio, prout se tenet ex parte rei intellectus,
dupliciter potest accipi seil. in abstracto ipsa intentionalitas et in concreto pro eo cui ista
intentionalitas convenit" (Prant!, n. 396).
23
24"Intentionalitas (or intentio: note 532) est ipsemet conceptus obiectivus per intellectum
formatus claudens indistinguibiliter conceptionem passivam et rem quae concipitur per ipsam,
et idem est dicta intentio quod conceptus" (Prant!, n. 539).
25 The first example ofthis meaning is, according to Ducange-Henschel, Glossarium mediae et
infimae latinitatis, sub voce intendere, in the Vita of St Catherine ofthe fourteenth century:
Prophetarum cum discretione intendenda.
26 Cp. especially Logical Investigations, vol. 2, no. 1; English edition trans. J.N. Findlay, pp.
269-336.
27 R. Ingarden speaks here of an "intentional direction factor" (Richtungsfaktor) in Das
literarische Kunstwerk (Halle, 1931), pp. 61 ff.
28 Cp. especially Logical Investigations, trans. J.N. Findlay, vol. 2, no. 5, esp. § 18; pp. 533-
659. esp. pp. 580-1.
29 Not taken into consideration here are the equivocations that Husserl hirns elf distinguished, as
weIl as intention in the narrower sense, i.e. the act of the non intuitive or empty aiming at an
object which corresponds to the intuitive experience that fulfils it.
30 As in Formale und transzendentale Logik (Halle, 1929), see esp. p. 183 (Wesen der
Intentionalität als konstituierende Leistung) and p. 216 and E. Fink, Die phänomenolo-
gische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen Kritik (1934); "Studien zur
Phänomenologie 1930-1939," Phaenomenologica, val. 21 (1966). p. 143.
31 Brentano's historical remark in his Psychology concerning Thomas Aquinas, to the effect
that not only what is thought of is intentional in the thinker, but also that the object of love is in
the lover and the thing desired in the desirer, turns out to be correct for the esse intentionale (as
distinguished from the intentio itself).
32 In Sent. I, dist. 23, art. I (ed. Romae, 1595, val. I, p. 530): "Esse intentionale" is comparable
to the "esse.-übiectivum tantum et ficticium seu apparens" and is differentiated from the "esse
reale et fixum extra verorum [probably: rerum] naturam, absque omni apprehensione," "per
quod patet quod esse intentionale non est aliud quam visio aut apparitio obiective. " "Illud quod
non est existens in rerum natura nec habet esse fixum extra secundum quod huiusmodi, illud
inquam est quid intentionale" (Prant!, p. 592, notes 530 and 532).
33" Scholastici ens intentionale appellant ens quod sola conceptione et consideratione inest, seu
ens quod est intra animam per notiones, cui opponitur reale quod reperitur extra animae
notiones" (Goclenius, Lexicon philosophicum).
34 Likewise his folIower Armandus de Bellovisu: "Ipsa ergo res intellecta materialiter et in
concreto dicitur intentive sive res intellecta sive ens reale ut homo, lapis et huiusmodi" (Pranti,
vol. 3, sect. 19, note 631).
35 Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, 2nd ed. Oskar Kraus (1925), Book II, chapter 1,
sect. 5. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, English edition ed. Linda L. McAlister
(London and New York, 1973).
36 2nd ed., vol. 2, p. 8; English ed., p. 180.
37 So Durandus de S. Porciano speaks of an "esse in intellectu obiective" oftruth as opposed to
"esse in intellectu subiective," as it belongs to the species or actus intelligendi (Prant!, note
564).
38 2nd ed. vol. 2, pp. 133ff.; English ed., pp. 271ff.
39 2nd ed. vol. 1, p. 269, no. 11; English ed., p. 89; and Oskar Kraus, Franz Brentano (Munich,
1919), pp. 23f.
40 This becomes particular clear in the Appendix mentioned above: "Mental Reference as
Distinguished from Relation in the Strict Sense."
41 2nd ed., vol. 1, p. 124; English ed., p. 88n. "They [the Scholastics] also use the expression 'to
exist as an object (objectively) in something,' which, if we wanted to use it at the present time,
would be understood, on the contrary, as a designation of areal existence outside the mind. At
least this is what is suggested by the expression 'to exist immanently as an object,' which is
occasionally used in a similar sense, and in which the term 'immanent' should obviously rule out
the misunderstanding which is to be feared."
42 Nicolai Hartmann follows hirn in this, unconsciously to be sure, in his Metaphysics of
Knowledge. For hirn, the intentional object is "wholly and completely immanent" and
represents, as such, the transcendent-real object (see esp. 2nd ed., p. 105ff.).
24
43 English edition ed. Roderick M. Chisholm (London and New York, 1969), pp. 14, 16.
44 Psychologie, 2nd ed., vol. 1, p. 129.
45 Logical Investigations, vol. 2, Inv. 5, sect. 13.
46 Occasionally Husserl himself differentiates between intentional, which can be used both for
meaning and object, and intended, which can only be used for the object (see Logical
Investigations, vol. 2, Inv. I, sect. 30).
47 /deas - General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (1913), trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson,
sect. 88.
48 Ideas, sect. 98.
49 Ideas, sect. 61.
50 This becomes quite clear when we look back to the above-cited passage from Armandus de
Bellovisu (note 35), who used "intentional" primarily to denote whatis immanent, and only in a
secondary sense did he use it to denote the known object of intention.
POSTSCRIPT,1969
(1) The only essential addition in the reprint ofthis essay of 1936 is on p. 16.
I deal here with Brentano's use ofthe expression "intentional relation" in The
Origin o/Our Knowledge 0/ Right and Wrong which I had overlooked when
the original essay was written.
(2) In the light ofnew material, which had not been available to me before,
concerning the role of "intentional" and "intentionality" in the Scholastics,
sections 2 and 5, in particular, need to be supplemented, although they are by
no means outdated. F or additional material on the role of intentio in Ockham
and Albert of Saxony, see I.M. Bochenski, A History o/Formal Logic (Notre
Dame University Press, 1961), pp. 155ff. On the origin ofthe differentiation
between prima and secunda intentio see ibid., p. 154. Compare, further
William and Martha Kneale, The Development ofLogic (Oxford, 1962), pp.
195,229ff.
(3) Husserl's last publications and the posthumous works published in the
Husserliana edition would call for considerable expansion of sections 3 and 7.
Yet I do not believe that this would lead to any essential changes in my
interpretations. For a preliminary enlargement upon my ac count I refer the
reader to the pertinent sections in my book The Phenomenological Move-
ment, A Historical Introduction (The Hague, 1969), pp. 39ff, 117ff.
SUPPLEMENT 1979
* On one minor point I cannot yet concede Marras' criticism; namely, that I am certainly mistaken
in saying that phrases like "intentional inexistence" have no standing among the genuine
Scholastics as I said, incidentally merely in the footnote on p. 40 of The Phenomenological
Movement. Actually in referring me to passages in Thomas' commentaries on Aristotle, Marras
hirnself in his translation of "esse intentionale" openly inserts in brackets the crucial syllable
"in" ("intentional [in] existence"). "Esse intentionale" which I discuss in aseparate section of
my article is primarily opposed to "esse reale" and does not imply the connotation of
"being within."
26
Until the late thirties, phenomenology in today's sense of the term was for
American philosophy a "foreign affair." To this generalization there is only
one possible exception: the phenomenology of Charles Sanders Peirce. 2 True,
the mere absence of the word from the works of other American philosophers
does not prove the absence of the thing so designated. Thus the psychology of
William J ames and the philosophy of George Santayana contain many
phenomenological ingredients without the trademark. On the other hand, the
mere presence ofthe name "phenomenology" in Peirce's writings constitutes
no guarantee that it meant the same thing to hirn as it did to Edmund Husser!.
The principal objective ofthe present paper is therefore to determine whether
and to what extent there is common ground between Peirce's and Husserl's
ideas, and whether this ground is sufficient to speak of their phenomenology in
the singular. 3 In so far as such common ground emerges, I shall also discuss the
possibility of mutual influences.
My point of departure will be the following remarkable coincidence: In 1901
the second volume ofHusserl's Logische Untersuchungen appeared under the
title of Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, a
book in which Husserl used the word "Phänomenologie" prominently for the
first time. The following year, 1902, seems to be the earliest certain date for
Peirce's use of the term "phenomenology" as a label for a branch of his new
c1assification of the sciences and of philosophy in particular. 4 Yet, while
Husserl not only continued using it, but even made it the officiallabel of his
philosophy, Peirce, as will be shown in a later section, abandoned the term
after about two years, to replace it by several neologisms, among which
"phaneroscopy" is the one best known. What was behind this striking though
temporary terminological parallel?
In trying to answer this question I shall begin with Husserl' s phenomenology
and then in this light discuss comparable features ofPeirce's phenomenology.
One minor reason for beginning with Husserl is that his use of the term
"phenomenology" apparently precedes Peirce's by at least one year. A more
important one is that it will facilitate the subsequent comparison.
28
which these phenomena may present themselves, and the various degrees of
clarity with which they were given.
(c) Intentional analysis implied that phenomenology analyzed and de-
scribed the phenomena in terms of their intentional structure, that is, paying
equal attention to the intending act, e.g., the perceiving, and to the intended
content, e.g., the perceived. As is now commonly recognized, it was Husserl's
teacher, Franz Brentano, who had first drawn attention to the phenomenon of
intentional reference. But he had used it only to distinguish between
psychology and the physical sciences. Husserl made it the basis for a
methodical analysis of all phenomena of consciousness in which the parallel
structures ofthe intending acts and the intended contents were studied in their'
reciprocal relationships.
In theLogische Untersuchungen Husserl had applied this reflective analysis
of consciousness in its pure structures only to the foundations of logic and
mathematics. But du ring the first decade ofthe new century, he came to extend
it to an ever widening range of phenomena, until he finally formulated the
program of phenomenology as that of the universal foundation of science and
of every philosophy that aspired to be a rigorous science (strenge
Wissenschaft).
Up to 1905/6, Husserl's phenomenology was epistemologically neutral,
although his doctrine of essences showed a decided tendency toward a
Platonic realism. The subsequent development of his phenomenological
idealism occurs in aperiod when Peirce had already stopped using the name
"phenomenology." Nevertheless the general direction of Husserl's pheno-
menology should at least be indicated, if only for the sake of the record, which
continues to be marred by the seemingly ineradicable legend of Husserl's
epistemological realism. In 1907, in his Göttingen lectures on the Idee der
Phänomenologie, Husserl, under the influence ofDescartes' method of doubt,
introduced for the first time his method of "reduction" or bracketing, wh ich
demanded the suspension of all belief in the existence ofthe world of our naive
experience. In due course this led to the development of a phenomenological
idealism, which became manifest first in the Ideen of 1913 and assumed even
more radical form later on. While Husserl himselfincreasingly insisted on the
fundamental importance ofthis step, not 1et mentioned as such in the Logische
Untersuchungen, I shall refrain from discussing this highly technical and
controversial subject in this context. Yet it is important to realize that Husserl
now conceived of phenomenology as a study inaccessible to the "naive" or
"natural" approach. According to this later interpretation it required a
fundamental change of attitude, which was to give access to an entirely new
dimension in the world of everyday experience. It is hardly necessary to point
out that this later Neo-Cartesian approach would have been utterly unac-
ceptable to Peirce, the avowed anti-Cartesian.
30
I shall not dweIl upon the fundamental importance which the later Peirce
attached to his new discipline of phenomenology or phaneroscopy. 6 N or shall I
attempt to d uplicate accounts of Peirce's phenomenology wh ich can be found
in the comprehensive studies of such Peirce scholars as James Feibleman,
Manley Thompson and Thomas A. Goudge, all based on the texts published in
the Collected Papers, edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Instead I
want to utilize a statement on phenomenology contained in one of Peirce's
letters to William J ames, of which only a small part has been printed in Ralph
Barton Perry's selection from the J ames-Peirce correspondence. 7 The back-
ground for this statement is briefly as follows: In an earlier letter, dated June 8,
1903, Peirce had tried vainly to convince James ofthe necessity ofhis new
phenomenology as outlined in his first two Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism -
those lectures which had elicited J ames' well-known remark about "flashes of
brilliant light relieved against Cymmerian darkness;" in fact, it seems that it
was precisely Peirce's doctrine of the phenomenological categories, i.e.,
firstness, secondness, and thirdness, which James had found so dark. s Now, in
a second letter, dated October 3,1904, in replying to the reprint of James'
essay "Does consciousness exist? ," Peirce tries to prove to J ames that his
phenomenology is really what J ames hirnself was propounding under the new
title of radical empiricism. 9 So he writes:
As 1 understand you, then, the proposition you are arguing is a proposition in what I called
phenomenology, that is just the analysis ofwhat kind of constituents there are in our thoughts and
lives (whether these be valid or invalid being quite aside from the question). It is a branch of
philosophy 1 am most deeply interested in and which 1 have worked upon almost as much as 1 have
upon logic. (Here the letter shows an insert: It has nothing to do with psychology.) ... Perhaps the
most important aspect ofthe series of papers ofwhich the one you sent me is the first, will prove to
be that phenomenology is one science and psychology a very different one .... Phenomenology
has no right to appeal to logic, except to deductive logic. On the contrary, logic must be founded on
phenomenology. Psychology, you may say, observes the same facts as phenomenology does. No.
H does not observe the same facts. It looks upon the same world and the same world that the
astronomer looks at but what it observes in that world is different. Psychology of all sciences
stands most in need of the discoveries of the logician, which he makes by the aid of the
phenomenologist.
There is hardly one sentence in this statement with which Husserl could not
have fully agreed. What would have had Husserl's particular approval is the
disregard for the question ofvalidity or invalidity, the emphasis on the radical
difference between phenomenology and psychology, the affirmation that
phenomenology is a science, a point particularly important to Husserl, and as
such the foundation not only of philosophy, but even of logic. N or would this
exhaust the list of possible agreements.
But behind the agreements of this programmatic facade of Peirce's
31
Firstness precedes all synthesis and all differentiation; it has no unity and no parts. It cannot be
articulately thought; assert it, and it has already lost its innocence; for assertion always implies the
denial of something else .... Remember that every description of it must be false to it. (1.357)
surprising that Peirce never gave any systematic development of his pheno-
menological program, a fact wh ich is actually the major obstacle to a fuIl-scale
comparison between the two phenomenologies. Husserl, much as he realized
that in this area precise mathematical description was essentially impos-
sible,11 was never that pessimistic as to the chances of phenomenolo-
gical description. And while he never arrived at a final formulation of his
phenomenology, he left at least an impressive array of concrete systematic
studies.
N evertheless, it would seem that even Peirce had become more hopeful as to
the chances of a scientific study of Firstness by the time he had adopted the
term "phenomenology" for his science of categories. Thus, when he advanced
the program ofphenomenology as a science in his Lectures on Pragmatism of
1903, he merely stressed the need for the student ofphenomenology - in the
letter to J ames of October 3, 1904, he called hirn actually the "phenomeno-
logist" - to develop the following three qualities:
(1) Seeing what stares one in the face, just as it presents itself, unreplaced by any interpretation,
unsophisticated by any allowance for this or that modifying circumstance;
(2) resolute discrimination, which fastens itselflike a bulldog upon the particular features that we
are studying;
(3) the generalizing power of the mathematician who produces the abstract formula that
comprehends the very essence of the feature under examination purified from all admixture of
extraneous and irrelevant accompaniments. (C.P. 5.42).
I can think of few, if any, passages in Husserl's writings in which the primary
requirements of the phenomenological approach are stated with equal
impressiveness.
But even at this stage there remained certain basic ambiguities in Peirce's
conception of Firstness which make a full-scale comparison with equivalents
in Husserl's phenomenology next to impossible. Thus, as far as I can make out,
Peirce's Firstness occurs as a result oftwo basically incompatible procedures.
According to the one, represented in the quotations above, it makes its first
appearance once we assurne a merely passive, receptive attitude and abstain
from all tampe ring with the phenomena. 12 According to other passages,
however, it would seem that Firstness is given as a result of an operation called
"prescission," a type of abstraction without which it is impossible to even
distinguish between the various categories (4.235). In fact, in such contexts
Firstness is even called "the most abstract of the categories," an "abstract
potentiality," and "a pure abstraction" (1.551); also, in his "New List of
Categories" (1867) Peirce explicitly contested the view that qualities are
"given in the impression." Thus there may weIl have been a shift in Peirce's
views about the proper approach to Firstness. N evertheless, he seems to have
33
held at all times that "separation from all conception of reference to anything
else" was characteristic of all Firstness.
Does Husserl's conception of phenomena have any equivalent of Peirce's
Firstness? True, Husserl has an elaborate theory of abstractions, in which
there is also room for the isolation or" prescission" ofvarious features in them.
But he indicates no preference for qualities as having a privileged status over
other types of properties such as quantity or even of substance. In fact, from
Husserl's original viewpoint there seems to be no reason for assigning priority
to any particular aspect of phenomena. If at all, such priority pertains to the
phenomenon as a structured and interrelated whole, which, for Husserl as weil
as for the gestaltists, is characterized primarily by the character ofunity in the
context of a horizon, or world.
There is, to be sure, in Husser!' s analysis of phenomena an element, later on
designated as the "hyletic datum," which one might feel tempted to relate to
Peirce's Firstness. But this raw material for fully constituted phenomena is so
closely linked up with Husserl's whole conception of knowledge as an
"intentional" process that there is little sense in correlating it with Peirce's
thought without discussing at the same time this very conception, for which,
as will be shown, there is no clear equivalent in Peirce.
Peirce are signs, meanings and generaliaws. Husserl, again, has no compara-
ble status for these phenomena either. It seems legitimate, however, to suggest
that his theory of intentionality, at least insofar as it deals with the structure of
signs, would find its proper place under Peirce's Thirdness.
Finally, there are some aspects in the comparative histories of the term
"phenomenology" in Husserl and in Peirce which throw revealing light on the
different spirit of the two enterprises.
Husserl never seems to have given explicit thought to the question of the
principles, let alone, the ethics, of philosophical terminology. Nor does he
seem to have been guided even unconsciously by any definite policy in
adopting and modifying pre-existing philosophical terms. Thus, when he took
over the term "phenomenology" in 1900, which was then widely and loosely
used in Germany, he seems to have feIt no hesitation in assigning to it a new
and more specific meaning. At that time, and even more so later on, he simply
implied that he had the right to change the tradition al meanings in accordance
with his own evolving and deepening conception of phenomenology - a fact
which has been responsible for a good deal of confusion without and even
within the so-called Phenomenological Movement.
In contrast, Peirce's scrupulous ethics ofterminology not only forbade hirn
to adopt terms which had been in use for different designata, but induced hirn to
abandon them when they were being misused by others. Thus, quoting once
more from the letterto James ofOctober 3, 1904, Peirce, aftertakingJames to
task for his use ofthe term "pure experience," and recommending to hirn again
his choice "phenomenology" stated:
It is downright bad morals so to misuse words, for it prevents philosophy from becoming a science
... it is an indispensable requisite of science that it should have a recognized technical vocabulary
composed of words so unattractive that loose thinkers are not tempted to use them, and a
recognized and legitimated way of making up new words freely when a new conception is
introduced, and that it is vital for science that he who introduces a new conception should be
held to have a duty imposed upon hirn to invent a sufficiently disagreeable series of words to
express it. I wish you would reflect seriously upon the moral aspect of terminologyP
It is well known how this stringent ethics made Peirce, when "finding his
bantling 'pragmatism' wrongly promoted" (to wit, by J ames and Schiller)
... kissed his child good-by and relinquished it to its higher destiny; while, to serve the precise
purpose of expressing the original definition, he begs to announce the birth of the word
pragmaticism which is ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers. (C.P. 5.414)
Apparently it has not yet been realized that the very same principles
responsible for this terminologie al purge were also effective in both Peirce's
38
original choice of the term "phenomenology" and its later abandonment and
replacement.
It was probably in the early years of the new century that Peirce, having
developed his conception of a science of categories in the nineties, also began
looking for an appropriate label for it. 18 About the same time he came to think
that his triadic pattern of categories was so similar to Hegel's scheme that he
called his own philosophy a "variety ofHegelianism" (5.38) and a "resuscita-
tion of Hegel, though in astrange costume" (1.42) - this despite-the fact that
he confessed to his original antipathy and even to his feeling of repulsion
toward Hegel. 19 Thus it may weil have been this new interest in Hegel which
gave hirn the idea that Hegel's term "phenomenology" could be used without
undue violence for the common doctrine of categories, although the equivalent
of what Peirce interprets as Hegel's categories actually occurs in Hegel's
Encyc/opedia oi/he Philosophical Sciences (Part I), rather than in the
Phenomenology oi/he Spirit. 2o In adopting it, he was probably guided more
by the literal meaning of the term "phenomenology", as "a description or
history of phenomena" (see, for instance, the Century Dictionary and
Cyclopedia VI (1891), p. 4441), than by Hegel's much more restricted use in
the third part ofthe Enzyklopädie, translated by Wallace two years later in a
separate volume (Hegel's Philosophy ol Mind).21
There are a number of concrete evidences for Peirce's acute interest in
Hegel just during these years. The invitation which he extended to Josiah
Royce to spend the summer of 1902 with hirn in Milford is one of them. 22 An
even more concrete expression ofhis intensified stake in Hegel can be found in
two reviews of books on Hegel for the Nation. Of these, the one on J. B.
Baillie's The Origin and Signijicance ol Hegel's Logic, published on
November 12, 1902 (vol. 75, p. 390), contains one ofthe peaks ofPeirce's
Hegelianism, even at that clearly not without reservations:
Hegel is a vast intellect. The properly prepared student cannot but feel that the me re
contemplation ofthe problems he presents is good. But the student of Hegelianism tends too much
toward subjectivism, and is apt to break the natural power of penetrating fallacy, which is common
to all men except students of logic, especially of the German stripe.
It is evident enough that all Hegel's categories properly belong to his third grand division, the
Begriff, What, far example, could be more monstrous than to call such a conception as that of
39
being a primitive one, or, indeed, what more absurd than to say that the immediate is abstract? We
might instance a dozen of such self-refutations. That the Hegelians should have allowed the
obviously unsuccessful development ofthe doctrine of Wesen to stand all these years uncorrected,
is a striking instance ofthe mental fossilization that results from their method of study. A powerful
and original study ofwhat the true Hegelian doctrine of Wesen should be according to our present
Iights might breathe some reallife into a modified Hegelianism if anything could have any effcct.
clearly nothing to do with this idioscopy, since the latter "embraces all the
special sciences, which are principally occupied with the accumulation of new
facts" (1.184). What Peirce seems to have liked in his new coinage is the
ending "-scopy," interpreted as "looking at," not as "observation of facts."
This dates the abandonment of the term "phenomenology" as having
occurred between the two letters, although Peirce used it at least once more in
the Monist of 1906 (vol. 16), where he referred in passing to "students of
phenomenology." (5.610)
The final replacement of "phenomenology" by "phaneroscopy" occurs in
two paragraphs written for "Logic viewed as Semiotics, Introduction Number
2, Phaneroscopy" (1.286-287), which the editors date as "c. 1904." I submit
that the first possible date for the second change is after the letter to Lady
Welby of October 12, 1904, the last possible one the Adirondacks lectures of
1905, from which 1.284 is taken. Thus far no explicit statement has come to
light explaining the quick abandonment ofthe transitional term "ideoscopy,"
which occurs only in the letterto Lady Welby. Quite apart from the misleading
similarity of" ideoscopy" and "idioscopy," Peirce' s main reason was probably
that the word "idea" proved unsuited to his purposes, since, in the way it had
been used by the British philosophers, it was too narrow and too loaded, as
he put it, with "a psychological connotation which I am careful to exclude"
(1.285). This conjecture is confirmed by Peirce's entry in the Century
Dictionary under the heading "phaneron.,,24
The new term "phaneron," of which Peirce freely uses the plural form
"phanerons," in contrast to his merely singular use of "phenomenon," is
defined as "the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to
the mind, quite regardless ofwhether it corresponds to any real thing or not"
(1.284); which is of course identical in substance with his earlier descriptions
ofthe "phenomenon." Actually, the literal meaningofthe Greek term suggests
more than a mere "phenomenon" (which merely appears), namely something
that reveals itself in its real nature; what Peirce means is described much better
by the English word "seemings" or appearances.
Was "phaneroscopy" Peirce's last and final terminological choice? This
might be inferred from the fact that the pertinent manuscripts were inscribed
with the name, or with the Greek abbreviation "phan"; see, e.g., the draft for
an unpublished paper in the Monist, written in 1905 (1.306-311; 4.6-10;
4.539 nl; 4.553 nl). Another manuscript, dated c. 1905, bears the title
"Phaneroscopy or the Natural History of Concepts" (1.332-336). Also, on
November 20-22, 1906, Peirce presented to the National Academy of
Sciences a communication on "Phaneroscopy, or Natural History of Signs,
Relations, Categories etc.... " (Report ofthe National Academy ofSeien ces ,
for the year 1906, p. 18). After this entry the chronological bibliography of
41
Peirce's writings by Arthur W. Burks lists no further item related to the whole
field.
There exists, however, one piece of evidence which may suggest some
continued indecision in Peirce's mind on this score. It consists, oddly enough,
of his contributions to the two new volumes of the Century Dictionary and
Cyclopedia of 1909. The significance of this evidence would clearly depend
upon the date, or dates, oftheir submission to the Editor, which theoretically
could have occurred at any time between the first edition of 1891 and the
appearance of the supplementary volumes in 1909, although circumstantial
evidence would make the time after 1904 more likely for most of them.
According to Miss Mary Mackey ofHarvard College Library, the interleaving
next to the entry "phenomenology" in Peirce's own annotated set of the
Century Dictionary, now at the Houghton Library, shows a disappointing
blank.
The most puzzling fact about these contributions is that, while there is an
entry under "phaneron" (p. 990), referring specifically to Peirce as the user of
this term (now defined somewhat differently as "whatever is in any sense
present to the mind, whatever its cognitive value may be, and whether it be
objectified or not"), there is none under "phaneroscopy." On the other hand,
there occurs an entirely new entry entitled "phenoscopy" (p. 991), which is
even signed conspicuously by the name of C. S. Peirce in italies. This last
neologism is defined as "that study which observes, generalizes and analyzes
the elements that are always or very often present in, or along with, whatever is
before the mind in any way as percept, image, experience, thought, habit,
hypothesis, etc." Despite minor variations the identity with the definiens of
"phaneroscopy" is obvious.
Besides, on the very same page, there appear lengthy additions to the brief
entry "phenomenology" of the original volume, presumably at least in part
prepared by Peirce. They consist oftwo more meanings, namely Kant' s, taken
from Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, and Hegel's,
now clearly based on his Phänomenologie des Geistes. These are followed by
five further distinctions in small print. The first of these reads "Cenopythago-
rean phenomenology," described as "universal phenomenology as it is under-
stood by those who recognize the categories offirstness, secondness, and third-
ness. "25 The fifth, (which follows the distinctions of phenomenology of
conscience, clearly referring to Eduard von Hartmann, phenomenology of
mind, probably meaning Sir William Hamilton's conception, and phenomeno-
logy of spirit, obviously in Hegel's sense) is called "Universal Phenomeno-
logy" and characterized as "the observation, analysis, and generalization of
those kinds of elements that are present in the universal phenomenon"; a cross
42
3. COINCIDENCE OR INTERACTION
(3) the insistence upon the radical differences between phenomenology and
psychology;
(4) the claim that such a phenomenology would be a rigorous science, basic
not only for philosophy but even for logic. These agreements seem to
justify the reference to the two phenomenologies by the common noun.
Under these circumstances it seems natural enough to ask whether these
agreements represent mere coincidences, comparable to the conjunction in the
course oftwo planets at their point of nearest approach, or whether there could
have been one-sided or mutual influences.
An answer to this question makes it necessary first to establish how far
Husserl and Peirce were even aware of one another and oftheir philosophical
ideas.
As far as Husserl, Peirce's junior by twenty years, is concerned, there is
certainly no reference to Peirce in his published writings. All one can assurne is
that Husserl had come across Peirce's name when his eye passed over the
famous page of credit to Peirce in William J ames' Pragmatism, a book which,
however, greatly disappointed Husserl, in contrast to his enthusiasm for the
Principles of Psychology. There is also in the Husserl Archives in Louvain a
letter to Husserl by Charles Hartshorne, written in October 1928, in which he
reported his work on the edition of the Collected Papers and mentioned
Peirce's phenomenology, actually suggesting the possibility of an influence
from Husserl's side. However, when Dorion Cairns talked with Husserl three
years later, Husserl apparently did not even recognize Peirce's name. 26
There is, to be sure, a very different story in the case ofMax Scheler. True,
even Scheler knew of Peirce only through James' Pragmatism. But in this
extended discussion of pragmatism, on which he had been working since 1910,
it was Peirce who served as .its main representative. In fact, he took
pragmatism ofthe Peircean variety so much more seriously than Husserl that,
in his book on epistemology and sociology27 he devoted a lengthy chapter to an
examination of its claims. Also, while rejecting pragmatism as philosophically
erroneous, he defended the right of Peircean pragmatism as a correct
interpretation and account of our primary relation to the world and likewise of
the nature of positive science. Scheler's interest in Peirce (whose name he
misspells consistently as Pierce) rather than in J ames would seem to be
another example of Scheler's uncanny flair for what was philosophically
significant, long before others had discovered it.
As to Peirce' s knowledge of Husserl there is at least one piece of concrete
evidence. In the course of a critique of the German logicians, which,
interestingly enough, the editors found in his manuscript on "Phaneroscopy"
of 1906, Peirce named as a representative example "the distinguished
Husser!." However, what Husserl was supposed to exemplify was in Peirce's
44
How many writers of our generation (if I must call names, in order to direct the reader to further
acquaintance with a generally described character-let it be in this case the distinguishedHusserl),
after underscored protestations that their dis course shall be of logic exclusively and not by any
me ans of psychology (almost alliogicians protest that on file), forthwith become intent upon those
elements ofthe process ofthinking which seem to be special to a mind like that ofthe human race,
as wefind it, to too great a neglect ofthose elements which must belong as much to any one as to
any other mode of embodying the same thought. (4.7)
On the one hand, one might well wonder what gave Peirce such a
surprisingly high estimate of Husserl. No English-speaking philosophical
magazine had taken note of Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen. 28 Of other
American philosophers only W. E. Hocking and Walter Pitkin had made his
acquaintance in Germany at that time. Unfortunately there seems to be no way
of determining whether Peirce had owned and had worked through a copy of
the Logische Untersuchungen. But even if he did not, there is at least the
possibility that he used the copy owned by the Johns Hopkins Library since
May 2, 1905.
On the other hand, Peirce's picture ofHusserl's enterprise was clearly based
on a grave misunderstanding. Certainly Husserl never showed the slightest
interest in a study of the "thinking of the human race as we find it." What
probably explains Peirce' s impression was the typical surprise of those who,
after reading Husserl's attack on psychologism in the first volume of the
Logische Untersuchungen, expected from the second volume the develop-
ment of a pure logic purged of all psychological infiltration. Instead they found
themselves confronted with studies which, under the heading of"phenomeno-
logy," culminated in a discussion ofthe acts in which the logical entities and
laws were given, a discussion which Husserl in the first edition had even
mistakenly called descriptive psychology. Despite Husserl's determined
attempt to distinguish this phenomenology from a psychology in the current
sense, the impression of a relapse into psychologism was widespread, even in
Germany. This disappointment may well have prevented Peirce from reading
on and finding, for instance, an important support for his "Scotist realism"
which he might otherwise have discovered in Husserl's second study of the
new volume ("Ueber die ideale Einheit der Spezies"). In any case, Peirce's
re action suggests that he was anything but sympathetic to the new kind of
phenomenology which Husserl was about to develop, and simply considered it
another type of psychology. This can also be gathered indirectly from the fact
that Husserl's phenomenology is not listed in the extended article on
"phenomenology" in the New Volume of the Century Dictionary of 1909.
Summing up, we may therefore say, that Husserl knew practically nothing
45
about Peirce, and that Peirce knew about Husserl only the wrong things, at
least in so far as Husserl's phenomenology was concerned. 29 Thus I see no
alternative to burying all wishful historical hypotheses about early interaction,
let alone cooperation, between the European and the American branches of
phenomenology. All that one might suspect - and that without concrete
evidence - is that the acquaintance with Husserl's misinterpreted phenomeno-
logy confirmed Peirce in his decision to abandon the term "phenomenology"
and to replace it by some new less ambiguous term. But it was chiefly Hegel
who was on his mind, both when he adopted and when he dropped the
phenomenological label.
Does this mean that the rapprochement between Husserl and Peirce was
only a temporary affair, a "conjunction," ended perhaps less by Peirce's
terminological innovation than by Husserl's shift toward phenomenological
idealism? As far as the terminological aspect is concerned, the simultaneous
choice ofthe label" phenomenology" was clearly not more than a coincidence.
There was as little connection between these choices as there was between
Hegel, Peirce's source, and Brentano, a possible inspiration for Husserl's
adoption, with whom Peirce does not seem to ha ve been acquainted at all. And
there can be no question that Brentano was deadly opposed to Hegel and to all
his works. The same holds true for Husserl, though in his later idealistic period
he made some friendlier gestures toward the Post-Kantian Idealists
collectively.
N evertheless, there may be more than such a superficial coincidence when it
comes to the designata behind the labels. Despite the deep-seated differences,
there are enough paralleis between Husserl's and Peirce's phenomenologies to
justify the question about a common root for them both. This root can only be
found in the very nature ofthe problems with which both Peirce and Husserl
struggled. Both were originally mathematicians dedicated to the cause of
establishing philosophy as a rigorous science. And both sought its foundation
in a renewed and enriched approach to the phenomena given in experience.
Thus one might look at Husserl's and Peirce's phenomenologies as two
independent historical paralleis. Their value is that oftwo experiments set up
by the history of philosophy and serving as mutual controls for one another.
Their outcome is all the more sjgnificant, and it does credit to both thinkers.
Thus what Peirce wrote about his own relationship to Hegel could be said even
more appropriately about his agreements with Husserl:
There was no influence upon me from Hegel unless it was of so occult a kind as to entirely escape
my ken; and ifthere was such an occult influence, itstrikes me as about as good an argument for the
essential truth of the doctrine, as in the coincidence that Hegel and I arrived in quite independent
ways substantially to the same ·result. (5.38).
46
NOTES
1 Read in part at the Meeting of the Peirce Society at Goucher College, December 28, 1954,
published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 17 (1957), pp. 164-85.
2 Even in this case it should be remembered at the outset that, prior to the appearance ofvol. I of
the edition of the Collected Papers, Peirce's phenomenology was practically unknown. Even
the term "phenomenology" did not occur in auy ofhis published articles and can be found only
in such places as his four-page Syllabus o/Certain Topics o/Logic (Boston, Alfred Mudge &
Son, 1903), an outline printed specifically for his Lowell Institute lectures of 1903, and in
scattered and unidentified entries in the New Volumes of the Century Dictionary and
Cyc/opedia of 1909. Peirce's manuscripts dealing with this field were apparently inscribed
"phaneroscopy," not "phenomenology." In view of the prominent place given to the term
"phenomenology" in the Collected Papers, it seems worth pointing out that, of the two editors,
Charles Hartshorne, before beginning work on the edition, had studied under Edmund Husserl
at the University ofFreiburg in 1923-1925 and that Paul Weiss had likewise been in Freiburg
between 1929 and 1930.
3 To my knowledge no confrontation between these two 'phenomenologies has as yet been
undertaken, except for one suggestive page in an article by Marvin Farber on "Descriptive
Philosophy and the Nature of Human Existence," in Philosophie Thought in France and the
United States (University of Buffalo Publications, 1950), pp. 420-1.
4 "Minute Logic" (1902) in Collected Papers 2.120. That "the term phenomenology appears in
none ofthe writings ofthe Collected Papers before the Minute Logic of1902" is also the opinion
of Manley Thompson J r. in The Pragmaric Philosophy 0/ c. S. Peirce (The University of
Chicago Press, 1953), p. 157. Thomas A. Goudge, in The Thought o/c, S, Peirce (University
ofToronto Press, 1950), merely mentions the year 1900 as a terminus postquem, butwithout
giving evidence that it appeared prior to 1902 (p. 76). David Savan's statement that Peirce
suggested the existence of a "positive science of Phenomenology" for the first time in the early
90's ("On the Origins of Peirce's Phenomenology" in Philip P. Wiener and Frederic H.
Young, editors, Studies in the Philosophy 0/ Charles Sanders Peirce, Harvard University
Press, 1952, p. 185) does not mean to imply that even the term "phenomenology" occurs in
Peirce at such an early date, as Savan assures me in arecent letter.
S In the second edition of 1913 it was slightly amended: "phenomenology understood as the pure
theory of conscious acts."
6 This is confirmed by the following communication, which I owe to Professor C. I. Lewis, the
first curator ofthe Peirce papers: "As I remember it, Peirce's Phaneroscopy was one ofthe few
larger pie ces ofhis manuscripts which were all together and not represented by several different
and unfinished drafts."
7 The Thought and Character 0/ William James (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1935), vol. 11,
chap. LXXVI. I wish to thank the Library of Harvard U niversity for the permission to include
the quotations from the original letters.
8 Letter of June 3, 1903, in The Thought and Character 0/ William James, 11, 427.
9 To be sure this label appeared for the first time in the article" A World ofPure Experience" in
the issue of the Journal 0/ Philosophy, Psych%gy and Scientljic Method of September 29;
apparently Peirce had not yet seen it when he composed his letter of October 3.
10 Isabel Stearns, "Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness," in Studies in the Philosophy 0/
Char/es Sanders Peirce (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 199. See also Ernest
Nagel, "Guesses at the Riddle" in Journal o/Philosophy XXX (1933), pp. 366 ff.
11 Ideen zu einer reinen PhCmomenologie, § 73.
12See also Collected Papers, 1.357: "What the world was toAdam on the day he opened his eyes
to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had become conscious ofhis own existence .... "
13 L-etterto William James ofJune 8, 1903, published in R. B. Perry, The Thought and Character
0/ William James, vol. II, p. 429.
14 Peirce's phenomenology resembles in this respect the conception advanced in 1905 by Carl
47
Stumpf, who preceded Husserl as student of Franz Brentano. See his "Zur Einteilung der
Wissenschaften" in Abhandlungen der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin,
1906.
15 "To conceive it is to generalize it; and to generalize it is to miss altogether the hereness and
nowness which is its essence." Letter to William James of June 8,1903 in R. B. Perry, The
Thought and Charae/er of William James. Vol. II, p. 429.
16 The Thoughl ofC, S. Peirce, p. 57.
17 See also Collected Papers (5. 413), and Nation 76 (1903), 498.
18 This hypothesis would also fit in with Peirce's simultaneous ambitious attempts to develop a
"natural classification ofthe sciences," including the philosophical sciences and mathematics,
about which he reported to the Secretary ofthe Philosophical Society, S. P. Langley, in a letter
of May 6, 1902 (Philip P. Wiener, "The Peirce-Langley Correspondence" in Proeeedings of
the American Philosophical Societ)', 91 (1947), p. 211).
19 See, for example, Letter to Lady Welby of October 12, 1904 in C, S. Peirce's Letters 10 Lady
Welby, edited by Irwin C. Lieb (New Haven, Whitlocks, Inc., 1953), p. 8; Collected Papers
4.2.
20 See, especially 5.43. Circumstantial evidence makes it seem very unlikely that Peirce ever
studied Hegel's Phänomenologie des Geistes, especially since the first English translation by J.
B. Baillie did not appear until191 O. His knowledge of Hegel's Logik and specifically ofhis list
of the categories seems to have been based on William Wallace's translation of Part I of
the Enzyklopädie, which appeared under the title The Logic of Hegel in 1892, rather than on
the Wissenschaji der Logik. This mayaiso be inferred from the Iistofthe Hegelian "categories"
as given in Peirce's article "Category" in the New Volumes of the Century Dictionary and
Cyclopedia (1909), a list which differs slightly from the one in Hegel's larger work.
21 The close association between phenomenology and the doctrine of categories in Peirce's mind,
which is so surprising to one familiar only with the German original, would seem to be
explainable on the basis ofPeirce's use ofWallace's translation ofPart I. For here Wallace used
the word "category" to render not only the German "Kategorie" but also Hegel's much more
general expression Denkbestimmung (see his Prolegomena 10 Hege/'s Philosophy (Oxford,
1894), p. 227), which results in a rather suggestive juxtaposition of the two terms in a fairly
important passage of the translation (p. 58 f.), where Hegel refers back to the more
comprehensive conception of his earlier phenomenology.
22 "You and I could pitch into the logical problems, and I am sure I could make it weil spent time to
you, while with all you should teach me ofHegel etc., I am equally sure it would tremendously
benefit my own work." (Letter of May 28,1902, published in James Harry Cotton, Royce on
the Human Self (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 301).
23 "The third stage" (ofHegel's thought) "is very close indeed to Thirdness, which is substantially
Hegel's Begriff. Hegel, of course, blunders monstrously, as we shall all be seen to do, but to my
mi nd the one fatal disease of his philosophy is that, seeing that the Begriff in a sense implies
Secondness and Firstness, he failed to see that nevertheless they are elements of the
phenomenon not to be aufgehoben, but as real and able to stand their ground as the Begriff
itself." (This passage is omitted from R. B. Perry's publication of the letter.)
24" A term proposed by C. S. Peirce in order to avoid loading 'phenomenon,"thought,' 'idea,' etc.
with multiple meanings."
25 An entry under "Cenopythagorean" identifies this kind ofNeo-pythagoreanism as "pertaining
to a modem doctrine which resembles Pythagoreanism in accepting universal categories that are
related to and are named after numbers." A manuscript using the same adjective, entitled
"Reflections upon Pluralistic Pragmatism and upon Cenopythagorean Pragmaticism," dated as
c. 1906, is referred to in Collected Papers 5.555-5.563; see also 2.87
26 Private communication.
27 "Der philosophische Pragmatismus" inDie Wissensformen und die Gesellschaji (Leipzig, Der
Neue Geist, 1926), 259-323.
28 See Supplement 1.
29 See Supplement 2.
48
SUPPLEMENT 1
Re footnote 28 on p. 47:
SUPPLEMENT 2
Re footnote 29 on p. 47:
SUPPLEMENT 3
Logic. A Book on the Genesis ofthe Categories ofthe Mind (1890), which
deals mostly with Hegers Phenomenology. This emphasis on the pheno-
menological roots of Heger s "categories" may very weil have revived and
reinforced Peirce's interest in Hegel as his predecessor in his own pheno-
menology of categories.
3. HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY AND
SARTRE'S EXISTENTIALISM J
In the public eye even today phenomenology is mostly identified with the name
of Edmund Husserl and existentialism with that of Jean-Paul Sartre. It
therefore still makes good sense to use their versions as entrance wedges for a
first understanding of the relations between the two movements. I propose to
do so by first bringing out some historical facts about their actual connections
or lack ofthem and then to discuss their essential relations in a more systematic
fashion.
This program presupposes some preliminary agreements ab out the Protean
terms "phenomenology" and "existentialism." To make them sufficiently
precise will require cutting off some marginal types. In this context there will
be no room to justify the eliminations. So I shall have to be rather dogmatic,
keeping my reasons in reserve.
In the case of phenomenology it would be improper to advocate here a wider
conception which would include more than Husserl's version ofphenomeno-
logy, as I have tried to do elsewhere. J Not only out of respect for Husserl, but
for the purpose of sharpening the issue, it seems fitting to consider here
phenomenology in its most rigorous form. To be sure, even then one has to
take account of the development of Husserl's conception from a merely
descriptive to transcendental phenomenology. Yet for the sake ofthe present
confrontation it seems defensible to condense the most important constants of
his phenomenology into the following minimum list of propositions:
1. Phenomenology is a rigorous science in the sense of a coherent system of
propositions; it goes beyond positive science by aiming at absolute
certainty for its foundations and at freedom from presuppositions that have
not passed phenomenological scrutiny.
2. Its subject-matter is the general essences of the phenomena of conscious-
ness; among these phenomena, the phenomenologist distinguishes between
the intending acts and the intended objects in strict correlation; he pays
special attention to the modes of appearance in wh ich the intended referents
present themselves; he does not impose any limitations as to the content of
these phenomena.
3. Phenomenology is based on the intuitive inspection and faithful description
of the phenomena within the context of the world of our lived experience
52
(Lebenswelt), anxious to avoid reductionist oversimplifications and over-
complications by preconceived theoretical patterns.
4. In order to secure the fuHest possible range ofphenomena and at the same
time doubt-proof foundations it uses a special method ofreductions which
suspends the beliefs associated with our naive or natural attitude and shared
even by science; it also traces back the phenomena to the constituting acts
in a pure subject, wh ich itself proves to be irreducible.
5. Its ultimate objective is the examination and justification of all our beliefs,
both ordinary and scientific, by the test of intuitive verification.
To perform the same kind of surgery on the much more amorphous body of
beliefs and attitudes that go by the name of existentialism may appear as an
even more foolhardy enterprise. In attempting it one does weIl to remember
that self-confessed existentialism does not date earlier than 1944 when Sartre,
having already published his major philosophical works, took the word
"existentialism" out of the hands of his ho stile critics and applied it
retroactively to his own writings and to those ofhis predecessors. Any attempt
to define such a sprawling phenomenon has to make incisions which may seem
arbitrary. I submit, however, that there is something like a hard core of present-
day existentialism based on affinities in interest and approach. It includes not
only the self-confessed phenomenological existentialists such as Sartre and
Merleau-Ponty but also Gabriel Marcel, however repentant as to the term
"Christian existentialism," and such unrepentant existentialists as Nicolai
Berdyaev or Nicolo Abbagnano. Besides, according to their major concerns
and themes, Jaspers' deliberately nonphenomenological elucidation of exis-
tence and Heidegger' s phenomenological analytics of existence are inseparable
from fuH-fledged existentialism, their vigorous protests notwithstanding. Even
if their own objectives were different and ulterior, the existentialism of the
forties would never have been possible without their pioneering.
Sartre has attempted to condense the cloudy essence of these existentialisms
into the neat though mystifying formula that in existentialism "existence
precedes essence." But this formula has been repudiated, with good reasons,
by everyone but himself. For the present purposes it may be more helpful to
match the preceding propositions about phenomenology with a similar set
that is meant to apply to hard-core existentialism only:
1. Existentialism, unlike phenomenology, does not aspire to be scientific,
though it is not essentially anti-scientific or even anti-systematic. System-
atic structures and absolute certainty are simply none of its primary
objectives.
2. Its subject-matter is human existence or "human reality," not conscious-
ness, as in phenomenology. It studies existence in its involvement in a
situation within a world. Consciousness, however, reflective as weIl as pre-
reflective, is part of the encompassing structure of existence.
53
3. Existentialism is not restricted to any particular method; Kierkegaard's
existential dialectics and Jaspers' elucidation of existence have historical
priority over phenomenological existentialism.
4. Phenomenological existentialism goes beyond the phenomenological de-
scription of phenomena by a special kind of interpretation, the so-called
hermeneutic method, wh ich aspires to decipher their meaning for existence.
Phenomenological reduction as practiced by Husserl, if it is mentioned at
all, is rejected; so is Husserl's concern for transcendental subjectivity as the
absolute foundation of all being.
5. The ultimate objective of existentialism is not theoreticaljustification, but
the awakening to a special way öflife, usually called "authentic existence."
We are now in a position to approach the question of the historical relations
betweim the two movements. Husserl hirns elf during his lifetime faced only the
predecessors of self-declared existentialism: Karl Jaspers' Existenzphilo-
sophie and Martin Heidegger's existential analysis ofhumanDasein. Jaspers,
although he had used phenomenological description in his psychopathology,
had rejected phenomenology at the very outset of his independent philoso-
phizing because of its claims to scientific rigor. Heidegger, however, publish-
ing his magnum opus Sein und Zeit in Husserl's yearbook for philosophy and
phenomenological research, gave every indication of adhering to the pheno-
menological method, although he claimed at the same time the right to develop
it further and, implicitly at least, to omit some of it. Such a tacit omission was,
for instance, that of Husserl's cherished phenomenological reduction.
Three years later Husserl' s only printed pronouncement about Exis-
tenzphilosophie appeared, notably in a Postscript to his Ideen, at the very end
ofthe last volume ofhis yearbook. It came two years after Heidegger had been
appointed successor to his chair at the University ofFreiburg, an appointment
which, as a matter of fact, had resulted from Husserl' s own recommendation.
Although this pronouncement did not mention either Jaspers or Heidegger by
name, it left no doubt about the identity ofhis targets. It rejected summarily the
actual or suspected charges against Husserl's own philosophizing. It also
declaredExistenzphilosophie a relapse into the deadly sins of anthropologism
and psychologism, hence not acceptable even as a specimen of genuine
philosophy. Other expressions, such as lectures, letters, and especially
marginal comments to his readings in Heidegger, left no doubt ab out the fact
that Husserl saw especially in Heidegger's analytics of existence a corruption
of the phenomenological enterprise. These indictments led soon to a cooling
off and a final ceasing of the once cordial relations between Husserl and his
erstwhile assistant. From then until much later on Heidegger practically
stopped using the term "phenomenology" in his own philosophizing. As a
result, phenomenology and the philosophy of existence remained two comple-
tely separate movements, as far as Germany was concerned.
54
pure apriori metaphysics. But this does not mean that phenomenology rejects
insights based on non-theoretical, notably on emotive experience. On the other
hand, it is a fateful error to identify existentialism with the advocacy of
"irrational man." Existentialism does stress the practical partofhuman nature
as expressed in choice and commitment. But "thought," though not logical
thought in the technical sense, is an essential feature of Heidegger's philo-
sophizing, and Sartre stresses the Cartesian cogito to the extent of seeing in the
emotions primarily magie attempts to evade our situation, instead offacing it
rationally.
b. It is also argued that phenomenology "brackets" aIl questions of
existence, hence that it is essentially a philosophy of detachment in contrast to
existentialism's philosophy of commitment (engagement). But it is a mis-
understanding of the phenomenological reduction to think that bracketing our
beliefs in the existence of the phenomena eliminates the phenomenon of
human existence. This misunderstanding is based on an unfortunate equivoca-
tion in the meaning of the word "existence." F or the existence-character in the
phenomena which we bracket is something quite different from Existenz or
Dasein as the structure of being-in-the-world, which is found only in human
beings. As far as the latter is concerned, bracketing may weIl affect the beliejin
the reality of the world and even of the human being who is in such a world. But
even this does not mean that being-in-the-world and its believed reality is
totally ignored. It may be described qua phenomenon like any other reduced
phenomenon. One may consider Husserl's treatment of this phenomenon as
inadequate. It mayaiso be true that the phenomenologist' s detachment implies
a temporary retreat from the involvement and active participation in concrete
existence. But this does not mean total neglect of the phenomena of existence.
Nor must it be overlooked that the immanent residuum of consciousness which
survives the ordeal of the phenomenological reduction has the character of
absolute existence - an existence that can certainly riyal in poignancy the
existence which the existentialists attribute to the human being incarnated in
the world.
c. FinaIly, it is alleged that phenomenology deals with universal essences,
whereas existentialism is concerned with the concrete single individual.
However, even though it is correct that Husserl's phenomenology is restricted
to universal essences, it is an oversimplification to say that existentialism deals
only with concrete individuals. Even existentialism describes its findings in
universal terms and claims that its universal statements are valid for more than
one single individual. Heidegger's much quoted pronouncement that "the
essence of Dasein is existence" ascribes to human existence an essence. How
else could this statement about an essence be substantiated except by an
essential insight, a Wesenseinsicht in the phenomenological sense?
2. If then phenomenology and existentialism are compatible, are they
56
such has no preference for the phenomena ofhuman existence, it stands to gain
in significance by turning its powers to a field of such vital interest. On the other
hand, the pre-phenomenological insights of existentialism by means of
Kierkegaard's dialectics and Jaspers' non-objectifying elucidation of exis-
tence have been provocative, but highly elusive. Once existentialism comes to
grips with the epistemological problem, which it will not be able to shrug off
indefinitely, it has little hope of support from the more empirical and
positivist philosophies or psychologies. Hs best chance is an approach which
stresses and develops the faithful description ofthe phenomena as they present
themselves, regardless of whether they fit into the framework of our more
traditional methodologies. Besides, if for the existentialist, as Kierkegaard
puts it, "subjectivity is the truth," a phenomenology aimed at finding the
source of all consciousness in subjectivity is at least a congenial approach. Yet,
before existentialism can expect substantial benefit from invoking the aid of
phenomenology, it will have to accept it in its own right and undergo its
discipline, instead of trying to convert it into its handmaiden.
4. How far then can today's existentialism be considered phenomeno-
logically sound? Here, I am afraid, I have to make grave reservations.
Phenomenology has never been foolproof. But some of the fooling that has
invoked its name need not be laid at its doorsteps. I do not want to deny that the
phenomenological existentialists have made suggestive and at times even
striking contributions to the fund of phenomenological insights. But most of
these have to be gone over more cautiously and more critically. Thus, I submit
that such brilliant pieces as Sartre's phenomenology of the social gaze are
vitiated by a selective emphasis on isolated aspects of a roore comprehensive
phenomenon, by inadequate description, and by a hasty interpretation which
ignores alternative meanings that would have deserved consideration.
However, instead of taking such sweeping exceptions I would like to present
a concrete example from the very beginning of Sartre's phenomenological
career which can at the same time demonstrate Husserl's still unsurpassed
descriptive powers. I have in mind his discussion of the ego or the "I."
There is something strange about the relative lack of interest in the "ego" in
a philosophy which professes its prime concern in personal existence. This is
true particularly of Heidegger's analysis of Dasein. Sartre, a vigorous
advocate of Husserl's descriptive phenomenology, went even farther. In his
first major article, "The Transcendence of the Ego,,,7 published in 1936, he
launched a frontal attack on Husserl's doctrine ofthe pure ego. In so doing he
tried to show that this ego was not, as Husserl had maintained, the immanent
source of all consciousness, but its transcendent and constituted object.
This is not the place to discuss the considerable merits and the weaknesses
of Sartre's first "sketch of a phenomenological description" and its ulterior
objectives. I shall focus merely on the reasoning which made Sartre repudiate
58
one ofHusserl's central tenets. For it throws light on Sartre's entire approach
to phenomenology.
Sartre's primary objection to Husserl's pure ego is its superfluousness for
the description of consciousness. Should such an argument carry any weight in
matters of phenomenological description? It smacks more of Occam's razor,
which may have its place in keeping down the number of explanatory
hypotheses, but certainly not in describing the phenomena.
Phenomenologically more significant is Sartre's attempt to show that the
"I" is not part of our ordinary unreflective consciousness: thus, to him, we are
not aware ofthe "I" in reading a book or listening to a paper, but only when we
reflect upon Qur reading or listening. Whence he infers thatit is reflective
consciousness which constitutes the "I" or "me" as transcendent to the
immanent stream of consciousness.
Is this sound phenomenology? In what sense may reflection be said to
constitute the object on which it reflects? This raises, of course, the whole
question ofthe meaning of constitution in Husserl's phenomenology. But there
is certainly no good reason for assuming apriori that reflection brings its object
into being rather than that it merely uncovers or discovers it. In fact, when it
comes to other acts of consciousness, inc1uding Sartre's original pre-reflective
consciousness, Sartre himse1f seems to think that reflection simply illumines,
but does not bring about a consciousness which has been there all the time in
pre-reflective twilight, as it were. What is more, there seems to be very good
evidence for thinking that the "constitution" of the ego in reflection consists
simply in its emergence from the background of consciousness rather than in its
formation on its outskirts. What is constituted is its phenomenal character, not
its being.
I conc1ude that Sartre's critique of Husserl's conception of the ego is
anything but convincing, and particularly that its phenomenological basis is
inadequate. 8
How, then, does Sartre's pseudo-phenomenology ofthe ego compare with
Husserl's research on the subject? Sartre was well aware of the fact that
Husserl's views on the ego had changed between the first edition of his
Logische Untersuchungen of 1901 and the Ideen of 1913. But he took it for
granted that this change was a change for the worse and meant nothing but
Husserl's return to the transcendental ego of Kant or rather the Neokantians.
What Sartre and other critics ofHusserl's shift seem to discount is the fact that
when, in a footnote to the second edition of his Logische Untersuchungen, he
frankly admitted this reversal, he stated: "Since then (i.e., my earlier failure to
discover the ego) I have learned to find it, or more precisely, I have learned not
to be diverted from the pure grasp of the given by the excesses of the
metaphysics of the ego,,9; and in his Ideen he dec1ared that he had found his
earlier scepticism with regard to the ego untenable. IO I suggest that Husserl's
59
explanation ofthe reasons for his shift should be taken seriously. There must
have been phenomenological evidence behind his seeming about-face. In fact,
some ofthis evidence has become available through the publication ofvol. II of
the Ideen, edited by Marly Biemel. ll F or it contains the chapter on the pure
ego which Husserl had promised in the first volume. It deserves the closest
attention ofthose who think they can dispose ofthe pure ego as a remnant from
the pre-phenomenological past. Specifically, Husserl's phenomenology ofthe
ego makes the foIlowing points:
I. It is of the essence of the pure ego that it can be seized firsthand (originäre
Selbsterjassung) by wh at Husserl calls self-perception (Selbstwahrneh-
mung) (§ 23). It is neither capable nor in need of a special constitution
( § 26). It forms an immanent phenomenon which does not present itselfby
different perspectives (Abschattungen ).
2. This original perception ofthe selfis subject to reflective modifications, for
instance by recall. In these reflective modifications the identity of the
persistent ego is given with self-evidence. Only its modes of appearance
differ. Reflective modifications presuppose original perception to which
they refer back in their very structure.
Nevertheless, Husserl denied that this intuitively self-given ego has any
similarity with a Cartesian substance, much as he subscribed to the indubi-
tableness of Descartes' "ego cogito." To hirn, the ego cannot occur in
abstraction from his acts, just as little as the acts can be given in abstraction
from the ego. Both are dependent on each other. But this does not affect their
distinctness.
The chapter on the pure ego makes other important points. Thus it
distinguishes between the pure ego as the focus of all our experiences and the
empirical or "real" human ego with its factual properties, its character, its
aptitudes, etc. Like Sartre, Husserl treats the latter ego as a "transcendent
object" constituted by the transcendental consciousness with its focal ego.
All this does not mean that Husserl' s phenomenology ofthe ego had reached
its final form. Husserl saw weIl enough that, since the pure ego lives in
immanent time, it is affected by the problems of constitution which are posed
by the consciousness of inner time. Moreover, it cannot and must not be
overlooked that, during Husserl's last period, in wh ich he collaborated closely
with Eugen Fink, his doctrine of the ego proliferated into a bewildering
multiplicity of at least three egos. 12 This proliferation may weIl have been the
cause forthe increasing scepticism even among Husserl's close followers, and
finally for Sartre's drastic cure. But this scepticism sacriticed the solid co re
along with the questionable outer shells.
This is not the place to pursue further the problems of Husserl's phenom-
enology of the ego. I introduced it merely as an instance of a case where
Husserl's patient search may be shown to be more penetrating than, and still
60
NOTES
By speaking ofthe reduction in the singular I do not want to imply that the term
"reduction" as used in phenomenological philosophy has only one referent. It
has little, if anything, to do with what we mean ordinarily when we speak of
reduction outside philosophy and of the fallacy of reductionism in general
philosophy. But even phenomenologists, quite apart from the founder of the
Phenomenological Movement, Edmund Husserl, speak of reduction in at least
two senses: (1) the so-called "eidetic reduction," leading from particulars to
universal essences (eide), a sense shared by those phenomenologists who
subscribed to the platform at the head ofthe first volume ofHusserl'slahrbuch
fÜ'r Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung which in 1913 specified
intuition (Anschauung) and the essential insight (Wesenseinsichten ) based on
it as the common ground of all phenomenology, and (2) the more specific-
and controversial- sense of reduction which Husserl called the "phenomen-
ological" or "transcendental reduction," for hirn its fundamental form, in fact,
the entrance gate to pure phenomenology or phenomenology proper. The
question which I am raising here is whether the reduction in this latter sense is
really indispensable for phenomenology or whether a phenomenology is
possible and perhaps even actual without this radical procedure.
For all those even moderately acquainted with Husserl's thought there will
be no question about his own answer concerning the indispensability of the
reduction, at least as far as pure phenomenology was concerned, for instance in
his lectures on Die Idee der Phänomenologie in 1907, although it was not until
1913 that his affirmative answer appeared in print through his Ideen zu einer
reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie.
The case is different with Pfänder, his major associate in Munich after their
first meeting in 1904 and his chief co-editor of the phenomenological yearbook
until about 1925. At first sight it could seem - and this is certainly what
Husserl hirnself believed - that Pfänder took no interest in his phenomeno-
logical reduction. Thus in Pfänder' s writings published during his lifetime,
even in his Logik öf 1921, the only place where he discussed the meaning of
phenomenology explicitly, there is no mention of the reduction. This would
63
ofthe reduction far his phenomenology would require tracing its development
from its very beginnings. Apart from other considerations which would make
such an approach inadvisable in the present context, such a his tory cannot yet
be written. It would require a painstaking search for all the major occurrences
of the term and its equivalents in the contexts of Husserl's published and
unpublished writings. Indications are that the change-over 1'rom the tradition al
philosophical sense ofthe term "reduction" with its pejorative connotation 01'
oversimpli1'ication (the "nothing but" fallacy) to a more honorific and literal
sense, i.e., the "leading back to" from an advanced to a mare basic starting
ground happened almost imperceptibly and without Husserl's pointing it out. 7
However, the important fact for the history of the Phenomenologica!
Movement was that, although Husserl tried, unsuccessfully at that, to launch
the early vers ions ofthe new reduction in his Göttingen lectures since 1906, it
was not until the publication ofhis Ideen in thelahrbuch of 1913 that this
conception reached the wider public and even most of his co-editors, and
caused at once bewilderment, i1' not downright rejection. Here, in the second 01'
the four sections of Book I, Husserl introduced alm ost abruptly a new
"fundamental meditation" leading 1'rom wh at he now called the "natural
attitude" to the "phenomenological attitude," to be achieved by a new
operation, called interchangeably the "phenomenological" or "transcenden-
tal" reduction or the epoche. s,9 He characterized this act in more or less
figurative language as suspension, bracketing, inhibition, putting out of action,
turning off or abstention from the "general thesis," i.e., the belief in the
existence of the natural world as it accompanied the natural attitude. The
result of this new operation was to be the isolation of a region of pure
consciousness whose being could be considered as absolute or beyond possible
doubt, analogously to Descartes' ego cogito, only that Husser!, on the basis of
his theary of intentionality, added to this formula the cogitata qua cogz'tata,
i.e., the intentional objects.
One ofthe odd features ofthis first presentation ofthe reduction was that it
did not offer any clear reason why such a violent change of our natural attitude
was to be required. All that Husserl claimed in the beginning was that it was a
matter of our complete freedom to carry out such an act of intellectual ascesis.
But especially for those used to the happy freedom, if not licentiousness, of the
early phenomenological method, this sudden epistemological rigour appeared
anything but inviting.
Clearly, far Husserl himself the phenomenological reduction meant much
more than a sudden inspiration and a discovery of a new human power. It was
to open up the possibility for a new interpretation of our relation to the world.
Specifically it was to give access to what he called the Ursprünge (origins) of
our world in our consciousness from the Leistungen (achievements) of our
constituting acts. But the mere description of reduction in the Ideen did very
65
little to show the actual procedure in unearthing these constituting acts. More
and more it became clear that the mere suspension ofbeliefwas insufficient to
bring about such discoveries. Thus Husserl began to talk not only of a
"reduction of ... " but also used the phrase "reduction to ... " notably a
reduction to (auf) subjectivity, or even more explicitly to the origins of the
world in subjectivity. This clearly involved a special search, an effort to track
down the way in which the phenomena were supposed to originate in our
consciousness. Such a constitutive phenomenology involved an epistemologi-
cal and even metaphysical position which after 1922 he called openly
"phenomenological idealism."
The burden which this objective put upon the phenomenological reduction
was clearly an enormous one. It is therefore not surprising that Husserl not
only attached increasing importance to this operation, but also struggled to the
end ofhis life to clarify and develop it. The sad fact is that in spite of all these
efforts he never succeeded in doing so and especially in explaining it to others
in a final form. In the following section I shall try to convey a first idea of the
complexities and difficulties as they unfolded in the period after the publication
of the Ideen.
When, after abandoning plans for the publication of the two partially
completed additional volumes ofthe Ideen, Husserl, now in Freiburg, tried to
give a more systematic and radical account of his transcer.dental phenomeno-
10gy - first outlined in his four lectures at the U niversity of London in 1922 -
he devoted a whole semester of lectures to the theory of reduction, published
as Part 11 of his Erste Philosophie (Husserliana VIII). But while this text
contains a major effort to provide new approaches to the reduction, it adds
little, if anything, to its further clarification, especially concerning ways in
which the origin ofthe phenomena from subjectivity can be demonstrated and
convincing proof for an idealistic conclusion be supplied.
subjects which in our natural mundane life are experienced and experience
themselves as standing in intentional real relations to mundanely real objects.
Thus for the absolutely non-involved spectator they become 'phenomena' in
a peculiarly novel sense - and this transformation (Umstellung)12 is called
here the phenomenological-psychological reduction."
Now, while the attempt to distinguish between epoche and reduction is clear
enough, the clarification offered in this paragraph will not do. It differs
considerably from the one implied in III A, where the epoche seemed to be the
necessary ("enabling") condition for the reduction leading to the "mothers,"
whereas here the epoche seems to be the me ans leading directly to the
reduction and thus apparently is its sufficient condition. The fact that the new
distinction refers only to the field of psychology and speaks only of the
phenomenological-psychological reduction, not the transcendental pheno-
menological reduction, makes the distinction incomplete, but could probably
be mended by a suitable extension. However, characterizing the epoche simply
as a means for converting mundane subjects into phenomena describes merely
its function but fails to mention a special act which accounts for this
achievement. This is even more true ofthe characterization ofthe reduction as
Umstellung wh ich, quite apart from the ambiguity of this term, seems to refer
to a becoming, not to an operation by the phenomenologists, as all the preced-
ing and following occurrences of this term suggest.
In the text following this episodic paragraph, the two terms seem to be used
interchangeably, but are also repeatedly given in conjunction and connected by
an "and." Besides, Husserl also attempts to distinguish several "steps"
(Stufen) in both the epoche and the reduction, e.g., the "first" or "behaviour-
istic" one (VI, 251), the phenomenological-psychological one, and the
universal and radical epoche and/or reduction. No wonder that in one ofthe
most revealing paragraphs (VI, 253, 33-254, 17) Husserl refers the reader to
future publications for"transparency" (Durchsichtigkeit) and clarity through
concrete investigations, and to the continuation ofIII B, which does not follow,
one more fact proving the incompleteness ofthis section. No wonder also that
in a note attached to a manuscript from K III 6, now published as "Beilage
XX" (VI, 555) Husserl refers to the need of changing (Umarbeitung) the
account of the "epoche in two steps" which he had already "turned in." This
part of the text was eventually called back from the editor of Philosophia in
Belgrade (see Karl Schuhmann, Husserl-Chronik, The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1977, p. 478).
Thus, while the final stage in Husserl's attempt to clarify his conception of
the phenomenological reduction yielded at least two forms of it and also
several steps ofthe two, he himselfwas not satisfield with this formulation. In
view of this fact, it can hardly be claimed that he succeeded in supplying a
student of transcendental phenomenology with a clear directive for ente ring it
69
through the narrow gate of the phenomenological reduction. Hence it is not
surprising that Husserl refused to release this new distinction for publication,
not even the one in the Pariser Vorlesungen and the Cartesian Meditations,
whose German version remained unpublished during Husserl's lifetime.
Primarily the phenomenological reduction is not a method of mere turning off (Ausschaltung) but
one of leading back (Zurückleitung). By way of the most extreme radicalism of self-reflection it
leads the philosophizing subject through himself back to the transcendental doxic life ( Glaubens-
leben ) which is concealed by his self-apperception as a human being whose correlative of what is
supposedly valid (Geltungskorrelat) "is" the world. To put it differently, it is the method of
uncovering and laying open (Freilegung) of epistemic themes (Thematik) that is in principle non-
worldly: the dimension ofthe origin ofthe world. (Ibid., p. 134.) My translation; see also R. O.
Elveton, The Phenomenology of Husserl. Chicago: Quadrangle Press, 1970.
This formulation makes it plain that Husserl's own accountin theIdeen had
been merely preliminary. The new differentiation can make Husserl's claims
for the reduction at least comprehensible, if not convincing.
However, Fink's article makes much more stringent demands on the
outsider and especiaIly on those brought up in the spirit of a rigorous science
free of unexamined presuppositions. For he begins his exposition of the
reduction with the foIlowing warning:
Any discussion of the phenomenological reduction, however sketchy, faces the practically
inescapable (ausweglos) difficulty of having to talk about it as of a cognitive operation which is
always possible and lies within the horizon of our human possibilities, whereas actually it is by no
means a possibility of our human existence. Hence the unfamiliarity with (Unbekanntheit) the
phenomenological reduction is not merely factual, but is an unfamiliarity with its very possibility
(p. 110). . .. This means in turn: The true theory of reduction cannot be placed right at its
beginning (p. 111). What it calls for is that one surrender himself fully to the cognitive movement
of the basic phenomenological method and, in performing it, transcend the description that started
in the natural attitude. Hence it is wrong to treat the reduction here needed as something that can
be reported in a way intelligible to all and as an intellectual technique specifiable as to its
procedures, running along the natural psychic tracks which any scientifically educated person
could carry out immediately after proper instruction.
One may weIl ask: what has become here of the ideal of a rigorous science of
philosophy with its claim to self-evident rationality shareable on the basis of
rational communication in intersubjectivity, of Platonic justification and
Cartesian clarity? How can one reasonably expect such a blind leap into a
reduction whose real sense cannot be explained beforehand, let alone be
70
The problem has not diminished since Husserl's death. Meaning and
justification of phenomenological reduction provided one of the major topics
for the important Husserl Colloquium at Royaumont in 1957. 14 Here Eugen
Fink hirnself, in briefly listing the "operative" but not explicitly clarified and
examined basic concepts of Husserl's phenomenology, inc1uded among them
the epoche and commented on the lack of clarity and on the indefiniteness
(Unbestimmtheit) ofthe concepts now distinguished, of epoche and reduction
(p. 333). The difference between the natural and the new transcendental
meaning of epoche, according to Fink overlooked by Husserl, is now a
symptom of the "operative obscurity" (Verschattung) at the centre of
Husserl's philosophy. Whatever this late concession ofHusserl's most trusted
interpreter of his last phenomenology may prove, it adds to the difficulty of
understanding Husserl's basic step into transcendental phenomenology - and
makes it even more forbidding.
I can see the ambiguity of the different meanings of the expression epoche. To me it is the
consequence ofthe undoubtedly preliminary inadequacy of our interpretations ofthe Husserlian
doctrine as weIl as of its intrinsic ambiguity.
In his own paper about the phenomenological reduction Van Breda started out
with the thesis that for Husserl it provided access to the genuine philosophical
level. Yetin his answerto Roman Ingarden's remarks on its ambiguity (p. 330,
2) he stated in conclusion:
The ambiguity of the deep sense of the reduction will remain unaffected, I believe, even by the
study of the entirety of the unpublished material. All that remains to be done for us is therefore to
clarify its meaning by interpreting Husserl's extant texts. (p. 332.)
This c1early means that for the time being the access to reductive phenomeno-
logy is a precarious enterprise for any outsider. What are the chances, to say
nothing of the right, of expecting hirn to make such an attempt?
The result ofHusserl's struggle to develop and to explain his conception of
the phenomenological reduction may be summarized as folIows:
71
Under such circumstances the most obvious solution ofthe problem may well
be to completely abandon Husserl's reductive phenomenology as a lost cause.
The safest course would then be areturn to the type of phenomenology that
preceded Husserl's radical enterprise, i.e. to the position which once united the
early phenomenologists at the stage of the foundation of the Jahrbuch.
However, I am not yet ready for such a counsel of despair. I believe that
Husserl's original idea of looking for a method that would put philosophy on
new and more solid foundations through a radical approach was basically
sound. His mistake was that in his passionate eagerness to develop such a
foolproof method he was carried away into making exaggerated claims for it,
72
Unfortunately, as has happened only too often in the his tory of the Pheno-
menological Movement, there has been hardly any public or even private
discussion between its diverging trends about the divisive issues, especially the
phenomenological reduction. In fact, during his lifetime Pfänder published
very littIe about phenomenology as such, and referred to Husserl only in his
Logik in connection with his refutation of psychologism. This does not mean
that he failed to read and examine carefully Husserl's publications, as Husserl
believed. This can be demonstrated from the detailed excerpts and notes found
73
among his papers, especially those related to special Husserl seminars which
Pfänder offered repeatedly.
Perhaps the most explicit comment in these notes is contained at the end of
Pfander's excerpts from Husserl's Cartesian Meditations, which he, like
everyone else at the time, could read only in the French translation that
appeared du ring Husserl's lifetime. 19 Pfiinder's comment on this text reads in
translation:
"I. Nowhere does it really say clearly what is meant by 'transcendental.'
11. The transcendental experience is misdescribed."
The first criticism is perhaps less significant since it applies only to the
Cartesian Meditations. However, it explains why Pfander himselfneverused
transcendental terminology. The second objection is more serious. "Tran-
scendental experience" occurs especially in Husserl's second Meditation
about the opening up (Freilegung) ofthe transcendental field of experience.
Short of further clues, it seems likely that Pfänder's objection concerned
especially Husserl' s constitutional analyses. However, the transcendental
reduction does not figure in Pfander' s critique, which is not surprising in view
ofthe fact that there is not much discussion ofthe reduction in the Meditations.
Pfänder's most explicit critique of Husserl's reduction can be found in his
review of a book on Husserl's phenomenological idealism by Theodor Celms,
one ofHusserl's Latvian students in Freiburg, in a leading German reviewing
journa1. 20
The book had pointed out a dangerous ambiguity in Husserl's terminology
of the phenomenological reduction, inasmuch as it did not distinguish
between "reflection upon" and "reduction to." Besides, as Pfänder restated
Celms in his highly favourable review, Husserl's idealism did not only
abandon his original suspension of belief in the existence of what is
transcendent to consciousness, but is based on the prejudgment that there can
be no being by itself (an sich), but only being for consciousness, nothing
beyond it. As Celms saw it, Husserl's main arguments for his view were
completely inadequate and could not satisfy the standards ofrigorous science.
Among Pfänder's unpublished notes (A IV 4) there is also a more direct
criticism of the phenomenological reduction found on a special sheet among
his preparations for his book Introduction to Philosophy and Phenomeno-
logy. This criticism followed a few remarks about critical realism, which,
according to Pfänder, is based on untenable assumptions. Then he states:
Even the so-called phenomenological reduction starts from the presupposition that, for instance,
the extemal world is ultimately a mere unity of valid beliefs (Geltungseinheit). But it fails to
establish first what precisely is meant by the extemal world and then to investigate what goes on
when the belief in it finds contirmation 'or fulfilment; specitically, whether or not the fulfilling
experiences are also merely intentional, the having of me re contents in consciousness. 21
74
Thus, in Pfänder' s eyes, the phenomenological reduction is burdened with
illegitimate presuppositions and hence not sufficiently radical. Yet this critique
of Husserl' s reduction does not affect the phenomenological reduction itself
but merely the presuppositions which Husserl had implied and never
questioned. W ould it not be possible to free it from this burden? Any answer to
this question would be premature before Pfander's conception ofthe reduction,
or rather of the epoche, is presented in its proper context.
Does this result justify a general answer to the initial question: Is the
phenomenological reduction necessary for phenomenology? Obviously it
does only for two leading members of the Phenomenological Movement,
Husserl and Pfänder. Without taking a similar look at the other protagonists of
the Movement, no definitive conc1usion can be reached. But it cannot be
denied that as a matter of fact Max Scheler and Martin Heidegger developed
phenomenological philosophies without using the reduction in Husserl's or
78
could the phenomena not have their origin equally weIl in "objectivity," or in a
combination ofboth, or even have no" origin" at all? In this sense Husserl was
not radical enough for Pfänder. To hirn to be radical did not mean to take a
transcendental turn, much as he saw in consciousness the essential starting
point for phenomenological investigation.
THus Husserl's conception of radicalism is ultimately ontological in the
sense that it searehes for the ontie "origins" or "roots" from whieh all
phenomena spring. By contrast, Pfänder's coneeption is methodologieal,
inasmuch as his nidiealism refers to the unlimited examination of all
ontologie al eommitments including the one to the origin of all phenomena in
transcendental subjectivity. It has to begin with radical clarification of
meanings, go on to the radical suspension of all beliefs and terminate with the
radical investigation of the given.
But these substantial differenees do not affeet the eommon principle that
phenomenology must not stop short of going to the limits of critical
examination. This entails the epochistie suspension of all naive beliefs until
direct evidence is produced. In this sense both Husserl's and Pfänder's
phenomenologies were eommitted to the phenomenological reduction.
NOTES
1 From J oumal oJthe Britis h Society Jor Phenomenology 4 (1973), 3-15, published first under
the title "Is the Reduction Necessary for Phenomenology? Husserl's and Pfänder's Replies."
The text has been enlarged at the end by an Epilogue and several notes have been added.
2 Schriften aus dem Nachlass. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1975.
3 See his preface to his Gifford Lectures The Discipline oJthe Cave (London: George Unwin
Ltd., 1966, p. 15): "I neither practise nor wholly understand the epoche or suspense of
conviction, of which Husserl wrote so much."
4 See The Phenomenological Movement (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965, p. 613).
5 A seeming exception is the Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, his Marburg lectures of
1927, where, however, the term reduction serves an entirely new, admittedly un-Husserlian
function.
6 Phenomenology oJ Perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945): Introduction.
7 See, e.g., the different uses ofthe term "reduction" in the second oftheLogical Investigations,
compared with the sixth investigation, especially in the second edition, the manuscripts of 1904
and the SeeJelder Reflexionen of 1905, published in the Beilagen of Husserliana X, and the
second lecture ofthe Idee der Phänomenologie of 1907 (Husserliana 11). They make it clear
that Husserl's first objective was "epistemological," involving the restriction to the indubitably
certain by a retreat from all "transcendent" claims to the merely immanent or "reell," a term
which Husserl at the time identified with the "phenomenological," incidentally the first new
sense ofthe term "phenomenology," still retained in the second edition of chapter I ofthe fifth
investigation of 1913.
8 Husserl may have picked up this term from his study ofthe Greek Sceptics in the two-volume
work of 1904 by Raoul Richter (see The Phenomenological Movement, p. 134 note) although he
otherwise rejected scepticism as practically identical with relativism. Even more likely seems to
me that his main source was the Geschichte des griechischen Skeptizismus (1905) by Albert
Goedeckemeyer, his Göttingen colleague at the time.
81
9For the first occurrence ofthis term in the lectures of 1906/07, see E. Marbach, Das Problem
des Ich in der Phänomenologie Husserls. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974, p. 32.
lOBriefe an Roman Ingarden (Phaenomenologica 25), letter of December 10, 1925, p. 35.
11 A similardistinction can be found in Husserliana XV, p. 74, which theeditor, Iso Kern, dates as
"probably 1930." Even before, in a text of January 1924 (A IV 2/11 a), Kar! Schuhmann found
a footnote with the following telling sentences: "To carry out the Epoche is not yet reduction.
Hence I proceed in this manner that after the Epoche I direct my glance to the correlation"
[presumably of noesis and noema]. My translation.
12David Carr in his translation (The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, p. 244) renders Umstellung
by" reorientation." But, while this would be a more idiomatic equivalent, I submit that it cannot
cover the "becoming 'phenomena' " that the reduction is to consist of here.
13 Die Stellung der Phänomenologie in der gegenwärtigen Kritik: see also in Studien zur
Phänomenologie 1930-1939. pp. 119-145. Around the same time Fink prepared the text of a
sixth Cartesian Meditation on "Die transzendentale Methodenlehre" - which he kindly let me
see in Freiburg in 1953 - in which he distinguished two fundamental parts ofthe phenomenolo-
gical reduction, the epoche and the phenomenological reduction proper (das eigentliche
Reduzieren). .
14Cahiers de Royaumont 111 (L'oeuvre et la pensee d'Edmond Husserl), "Editions de Minuit".
lS"Das Schwerste in der Philosophie überhaupt ist die phänomenologische Reduktion, sie mit
Verständnis zu durchdringen und zu üben." Husserl, E., Briefe an Roman Ingarden. The
HaE;ue: Nijhoff, 1968, p. 74.
16See Supplement, p. 82.
17 This story has been told in considerable detail by Karl Schuhmann, Husserl über Pfänder, The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973; see also my "Neues Licht auf die Beziehungen zwischen
Husser! und Pfänder," Tüdschrift voor Filosofie 26 (1974), pp. 565-573.
18 On February 11, 1922, Husserl wrote to Paul Natorp in Marburg about Pfänder as folIows:
Toward you I have to be frank and must therefore say that I consider Pfänder not only a
thoroughly solid (grundsolider) worker, but also a radically philosophical personality. For a
long time his start from Lipps has blocked his access to the transcendental problems, but in his,
in my opinion, original manner ofworking out everything for himselfhe has progressed further
and further, and not in vain his lectures exert a profound influence, in spite of his plain
(nüchtern) style .... Pfänder is rieh in phenomenological insights, which he has picked up
independently, and of which the greater part has not yet been published.
19 Pfänderiana A VIII.
20 Der phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls. Acta Universitatis Latviensis XIX (1925),
249-441; review in Deutsche Literaturzeitung 1929, pp. 2048-2050. There is a strong
possibility that Celms's distinction between reflection (identified with epocM) and reduction
acted as a stimulus on Husserl, who on the whole responded favourably to this study by his
fOrIller student (personal communication).
21 Here one may have to add the following phrase: "or rather experiences in which beingpresents
itself authentically" (selbst leibhaftig).
22 Ethik in kurzer Darstellung, edited by Peter Schwankl, München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag,
1973, p. 54.
23See especially the "Grundgedanken" in Pfander's philosophie auf phänomenologischer
Grundlage, a fragment from the elaboration ofhis introductory lectures for a book which he was
unable to complete. An integration ofthe fragments with the surviving lecture notes is my edition
München: Wilhelm Fink, 1973, p. 26.
24"Linguistic Phenomenology: John L. Austin and Alexander Pfänder," published in the
Proceedings of the 13th International Congress of Philosophy and reprinted below. Apparently
that Pfänder, in stressing the need of apreparatory c1arification of meaning, thought of a
linguistic analysis. Thus in a note written on April 7, 1928 (Pfänderiana A III 2), he pointed
out that in order to find something in phenomenological perception, one has to know first what
one is see king. And this is what one means by words, which are by no me ans arbitrary. "One
has always taken these words in certain meanings and successfully communicated with other
82
people. Whoever believes to mean something other than this ordinary meaning ought to first
make sure ofthis meaning ... with the same conseientiousness whieh he would apply ifhe were
to speak under oath .... " Onee he has established this meaning, he should proeeed to making
phenomenologieal investigations through pereeption about the phenomena as meant.
25 Ethik, p.116.
26 Philosophie, pp. 58-59.
27 Pfänder's restrieted use of the reduetion seems to parallel its use in epistemology by Roman
Ingarden. See..Guido Küng on "Roman Ingarden: Ontological Phenomenology" in the third
revised edition of my The Phenomenological Movement, Section IV, F.
28 "Good Fortune Obligates: Albert Sehweitzer's Seeond Ethical Prineiple." Ethics 85 (1976),
227-234.
29 Perhaps the first philosopher to make extensive use of the label was William J ames with his
"radical empiricism." It seems not altogether impossible that this had a eertain influence on
Husserl, who had received a eopy of James' erucial article of 1904 on "A World of Pure
Experienee" as a present from the author. It is less likely that the so-called "philosophieal
radicals," i.e., the utilitarians in the wake of Jeremy Bentham had anything to do with James's
"radiealism."
SUPPLEMENT 1979
In ending with this sceptical conclusion I should mention that now at least the
following three new interpretations have to be considered:
1. Antonio Aguirre, Genetische Phänomenologie und Reduktion, The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.
2. Karl Schuhmann, Die Fundamentalbetrachtung der Phänomenologie,
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971, pp. 90-103; Husserl über Pfänder,
pp. 177-183;
3. Elisabeth Ströker, "Das Problem der Epoche in der Philosophie Edmund
Husserls," Analecta Husserliana 1(1971), p. 170-185. But at this point
I have to suspend judgment on how far these new solutions can meet the
problem as I have tried to present it. An adequate discussion would
deserve and require a much fuller treatment.
5. "LINGUISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY": JOHN L. AUSTIN
AND ALEXANDER PFÄNDER!
In view ofthe prevalence ofthe slogan" ordinary language" and of such names as "linguistic" or
." analytic" philosophy or "the analysis oflanguage," one thing needs special emphasis in order to
counter misunderstandings. When we examine what we should say when, what words we should
use in what situations, we are looking again not merely at words (or "meanings," whatever they
may be) but also at the realities we use the words to talk about: we are using a sharpened awareness
of words to sharpen our perception of, though not as the final arbiter of, the phenomena. F or this
reason I think it mi~ht be better to use, for this way of doing philosophy, some less misleading
name than those given above - for instance, "linguistic phenomenology," only that is rather a
mouthful (p. 8).
On the strength of this statement one might weIl suspect that at this point
Austin feIt actually closer to phenomenology than to "linguistics." Even the
fact that in the new hybrid phrase "linguistic phenomenology" "phenomeno-
logy" and not "linguistics" is the noun might indicate this. Also, the text makes
it plain that the study of linguistics is to serve as a me ans to "sharpen our
perception ofthe phenomena." That this is his ultimate objective was spelled
out even more fully when Austin answered H. L. Van Breda's questions at the
Colloque de Royaumont as folIows:
We use the multiplicity of expressions which the richness of our language furnishes us in order
to direct our attention to the multiplicity and the richness of our experiences. Language serves us
as interpreter for observing the living facts which constitute our experience, which, without it, we
would tend to overlook .... The diversity of expressions which we can apply attracts our attention
to the extraordinary complexity ofthe situations on which we are called upon to speak. This means
that language iIIumines for us the complexity of life. [My translation]5
However, this does not yet mean that Austin's "phenomenology" deals
directly with the phenomena rather than with the express ions that lead to them.
In fact, even at Royaumont Austin's answer seems to have sidestepped Van
Breda's double question: "To what degree do we make use of criteria which are
not strictly linguistic? In what measure do we study phenomena which are not
85
Certainly ardinary language has na claim ta be the last ward. if there is such a thing.... In
principle it can everywhere be supplemented and improved upan and superseded. Only
remember, it is the first ward. 7
This may suggest that already the second word of philosophy is no longer
Iinguistic analysis. In any case, the last word would belong to a study of the
86
phenomena to which the linguistic express ions refer. In fact, it would seem that
the study ofthe phenomena would have to enter in at least two ways: first, in the
sense of the phenomena as they are viewed by ordinary language; second, in
the sense of the phenomena as they emerge from a fresh examination of the
facts, either by science or by some other direct approach, such as phenomeno-
logy in the continental sense. In the light of this second exploration ordinary
language and its picture of the phenomena may prove to be inadequate and
even wrong.
But while this phenomenological extension oflinguistic analysis was clearly
foreshadowed by Austin's announcements, he hirns elf did not undertake it.
Thus his "plea for excuses," one of the most brilliant demonstrations of his
linguistic perceptiveness, did not yet advance beyond a painstaking review of
the language of excuses.
Now for the corresponding picture of Pfänder's phenomenology and its
stake in linguistic analysis:
It must be realized that, in spite of Pfänder's key role in the growth of the
original Phenomenological Movement and especially of its Munich branch, he
was rather slow in formulating his theoretical conception of phenomenology,
and particularly in stating it in print. His early use of the term, actually even
before Husserl, in his Phänomenologie des Wo lIens of 1900, contains not
much more than a descriptive psychology, and even his much more developed
"Psychologie der Gesinnungen" in the first and third volumes of Husserl:s
Jahrbuch of 1913 and 1916 is mainly another example ofsuch a phenomeno-
logical psychology with special emphasis on the need for determining the
essential structure of the empirical facts. In his Logik of 1921, the develop-
me nt ofHusserl's original program of a pure logic freed from psychologism, he
is surprisingly cautious in answering the question of what phenomenology
really is:
To state briefly and yet intelligibly what phenomenology is and is striving for today is arequest
coming from many quarters, but at the moment it is hardly possible to fulfill it. All that can be done
is to give some hints as to the subject and the task of phenomenology and to characterize the
position of logic in relation to the science so characterized. 8
parallel conceptions. All the more important is it to point out that it was
Pfänder's definite plan to round up his work with the publication not only of an
Ethics but also of an Introduction to Philosophy; the latter was at the same
time to serve as an introduction to his mature phenomenology, for whieh he
also used the phrase, the "Munich phenomenology," clearly in order to
distinguish it from Husserl's Freiburg phenomenology. In fact, the course of
lectures which was to be the foundation for that book and whieh PfäIider
offered sixteen times during his years ofteaching, eventually went by the title
of" Introduction to Philosophy and Phenomenology." But his worseningheart
ailment prevented hirn from carrying out his plan beyond several fragments.
Thus the only authentie source for a reconstruction of this phenomenology is
his carefullecture notes, whieh, however, do not form a continuous text, but
consist only of key sentences. Yet they are sufficient for a clear idea of his
conception and its projected development. In collaboration with Dr. Eberhard
Ave-Lallemant I have prepared a coherent text of this Philosophy on
Phenomenological Foundation which integrates the completed fragments
with the lecture notes. 9 On this basis it is now possible to give a general idea of
this phenomenologieal philosophy and particularly of those of its features
which parallel Austin's linguistic phenomenology.
The basie pattern ofPfänder's final synthesis consists in the successive re-
examination ofthe major substantive issues of systematic philosophy concern-
ing first the real world in its inanimate, animate, psychic, social, and cultural
divisions and in its religious implications, the ideal world ofmathematical and
logieal entities, the phenomena of value and those of ideal requirements. In
each case Pfänder first discusses non-phenomenological approaches to the
issues such as empiricism, rationalism, and Kantian critical philosophy and
their failures before introducing phenomenology as the remaining alternative.
The major reason of the earlier failures was the misrepresentations and
misinterpretations of the original phenomena to which the other approaches
had to resort. Any attempt to do justice to these phenomena has to start with
the removal of these distortions and the return to the original phenomena and
issues.
In introducing phenomenology as the way leading to the authentie phe-
nomena Pfänder became increasingly aware of the need for restoring the sense
of the problems by the following three stages:
(1) clarification ofmeaning (Sinnklärung ), aiming at the elucidation ofwhat
we really mean;
(2) epoche, a term taken over from Husserl, implying for Pfänder simply the
neutralizing suspension of belief in the existence of what is meant, thus
blocking the tendency to infer the existence ofthe referents from the fact
of our referring to them;
(3) phenomenology of perception, i.e., perceptual verification of our clari-
88
correlated can be used for working cooperatively on the same problems from
different directions. This is in fact wh at I would like to suggest in conclusion: in
certain areas of philosophy, particularly those which have already come under
the cultivation of ordinary language, a two-pronged approach is not only
possible, it promises mutual stimulation and verification. Linguistic analysis
can sharpen our eyes for shades in the phenomena for which our individual
phenomenological eyes are not yet sufficiently sensitized. Phenomenology can
clear the ground for the verification ofthe distinctions of ordinary language and
at the same time make room for its orderly development beyond its present
stage. There is no need for an either-or. Analysis as weB as phenomenology
stands to benefit from a both-and.
NOTES
I Reprinted from Alexander Pfander, Phenomenology of Willing and Motivation, pp. 86-92.
Evanston, Ill.: Northwestem University Press, 1967.
2 Among those who have resigned prematurely I suspect the editor ofthe Colloque de Royaumont
on La Philosophie analytique (Paris, 1962), Leslie Beck, whose Avant-Propos expresses
serious doubt about the success of this particular dialogue. His own evidence is hardly that
discouraging. Thus he teils us that "when Merleau-Ponty asked 'Isn't our program the same?'
the firm and clean-cut answer (of Gilbert Ryle) was 'I hope not.' " But if one looks up the main
textthe only place where this answer occurs is in reply to Merleau-Ponty's question ofwhether
Ryle in his studies was always "in strict accord with the program outlined at the beginning ofthe
century by Russell and refined by Wittgenstein and some others" (p. 98). Austin, who took a
leading part in the discussion, was perhaps even more conciliatory than Ryle, at least as shown
in the published text of the Proceedings.
3 Philosophie aufphänomenologischer Grundlage. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1973.
4"A Plea for Excuses," Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Sodety, LVII (1957),1-30; also in
Philosophical Papers (Oxford, 1961), p. 130.
5 La Philosophie analytique, p. 333. Stanley Cavell in "Austin at Criticism" (Philosophical
Review LXXIV, 1965) reprinted in Must We Mean What We Say (New York: Scribner's,
1969, p. 99), believes that in spite of his hesitation Austin did not retract this label.
Unfortunately my inquiries with other students of Austin have not yet yielded clear information
on this point.
6 "In Memoriam J. L. Austin 1911-1960," Proceedings oftheAristotelian Society, LX (1960),
i-xiv.
7 Jbid., LVII (1957),11; Philosophical Papers, p. 132.
8 Logik (Halle, 1921), p. 33. For a translation of the Introduction see A. Pfänder, Phenom-
enology of Willing and Motivation, Northwestem University Press, 1967.
9 Philosophie auf phänomenologischer Grundlage. Zusammengestellt und eingeleitet von
Herbert Spiegelberg. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1973.
10 See his Presidential Address, Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Sodety, LXII (1957),11 n.5:
"And forget for once and for a while, that other curious question, 'Is it true? May we?' "
PART II
HISTORICAL EXPLORATIONS
6. AMIEL'S "NEW PHENOMENOLOGY"\
I. INTRODUCTORY
For me philosophy is a way of seeing things, a mode ofperceiving reality. lt does not create nature,
man, or God, but it finds them and attempts to understand them. Philosophy is the ideal
reconstruction öf consciousness in which consciousness understands itself along with all that it
contains.
November 17,1852 8
But Hering gives no further explanation for this quotation and no information
about Amiel's role in the history of phenomenology and particularly ofFrench
phenomenology, except for abrief comparison with Gabriel M arcel, favoring
the latter. Specifically, he does not mention the fact that the very term
"phenomenology" occurs in an entry oftheJournal only a few pages after the
quoted passage, namelyon February 5, 1853. 9 As to myself, it was not until,
lured on by Amiel's striking introspective observations, I had worked my way
through the published parts of his posthumous journal and some of his scant
publications during his lifetime that I discovered several more explicit
references to "phenomenology." Finally they made me think that he re
something quite basic had escaped Amiel's interpreters and critics, who had
been interested chiefly in his personal case history. I believe that this original
motifin Amiel's thought, unsystematic though it be, deserves to be presented
and discussed, not so much for the sake of priority claims or influences, but for
its intrinsic merits and particularly for the sake of Amiel's insights into the
nature of the self.
It goes without saying that any student of Amiei' s thought, particularly of an
idea which does not seem to have impressed his previous editors Edmond
Scherer, Bernard Bouvier, and Leon Bopp has to be aware ofthe incomplete-
ness ofhis material. As long as not more than perhaps one tenth ofthe 16,900
pages of the original journal are available in print, it may weIl be that a good
many more references to phenomenology are hidden in the unpublished
manuscripts. Subject to the revision which Leon Bopp's new complete edition
will require when finished lO I shaIl merely try to caIl attention to Amiel's
conception of phenomenology as far as it is revealed in the published parts of
his papers. I shall do so by first presenting the main evidence concerning his
use of the term "phenomenology," its meaning, and the method which it
implies far hirn. I shall then try to give an idea of what is easily his most specific
and original contribution to such a phenomenology, his phenomenology ofthe
self (moi).
95
At first sight it may seem preposterous to claim for Amiei, this most
unsystematie and aphoristie thinker, anything as ambitious as the creation of a
new phenomenology. Indeed, as in the case of so many of his ambitions,
Amiel's rambling and repetitious contemplations, however entrancing and
inspiring, faB painfully in achieving anything like a coherent structure. Yet the
ambition cannot be denied, considering one ofhis last entries, writtenjust three
months before his death:
(1) "It seems to me that what remains from all my studies is a new
phenomenology of the spirit, the intuition of universal meta-
morphosis."ll
This passage is not an isolated one, but has antecedents, ofwhieh I succeeded
in tracing the following five, beginning 28 years earlier.
(2) In an entry ofFebruary 5,1853 Amiel speaks ofthe need for a new
"basis for a psychology and an ethics": "in short, a new phenomeno-
logy, more complete and more moral, where the soul as a whole
be comes spirit. Man reproducing the world, surrounding hirnself with
a nature which is the objectivation of his spiritual nature, rewarding
and punishing hirns elf; the things being the divine nature; the nature of
the perfect spirit being understood only in proportion to our own
perfection; intuition as areward for inner purity; science (objective)
coming at the end of goodness (subjective). - This is perhaps the topic
for my summer course.,,12 .
(3) Reflecting about the premature end of these contemplations on that
particular morning Amiel ends with the remark: "The most appro-
priate hours for phenomenology are those which precede dawn.,,13
(4) Thirteenyears later, two morereferences occur. On January 21, 1866,
after describing an experience in which everything seemed unreal to
hirn "including my own individuality," Amiel remarks: "Here I find
myself back in full phenomenology."14
(5) Probably from the same period sterns an undated reflection whieh
Scherer attached to the Journal for 1866. Here Amiel, in referring
. back to his preceding characterization of his own self, concludes:
"This phenomenology ofmyselfis like the magie lantern ofmy destiny
and at the same time like a window opening on the mystery of the
world.,,15
(6) On December 8, 1869 AmieI, in deploring the lack of critical delicacy
among the vulgar intelligences who do not understand the nature and
the laws ofthe human spirit, adds: "Phenomenology is a closed book
for the pachyderms who live on the surface of the soul.,,16
96
Then, in 1881, twelve years later, follows the climactic passage with which I
started this collection of the major explicit references.
Now the mere use of the label "phenomenology" proves of course little, if
anything, about the substance and the originality of Amiel's conception. One
may therefore suspect a loan, however free, from Hegel's conception of
phenomenology. And it is true that Amiei, who was particularly at horne and in
sympathy with German philosophy and letters, knew and mentioned Hegel's
Phenomenology oi {he Spirit. Thus, in an entry of AprilS, 1864, he
characterizes the thought of a much more effective and popularfriend ofhis,
Victor Cherbuliez, as reminding hirn ofHegel by his Olympian detachment. 17
But precisely this reference to Hegel' s Phenomenology makes it clear that and
how much Amiel wanted to keep his own "new" phenomenology apart from
that of his famous predecessor, at least to the extent that his was to be a much
more personal phenomenology, without capital letters.
But then, what is the positive content of this new phenomenology?
Obviously the six quotations above cannot give an adequate idea of what
Amiel had in mind. And, while the contexts which I omitted supply a good deal
of additional light, Amiel' s style of thought and the characteristically
unfinished type of his meditations prevent a precise and systematic restate-
ment ofhis project and its development. N evertheless, apart from the concrete
illustration which will follow in the next seetion, Amiel offers some greatIy
illuminating reflections on the method which he claims to be using. They show
in any case that more was involved than the new use of an old label.
Here is, for instance a direction which precedes the quotation under (5):
To have a faithful portrait, one must convert succession into simultaneity, forsake plurality for
unity, and ascend from the changing phenomena to the essence .... Hence also to show whatever
it may be of my past, of my journal, or of myself does no good to one who has not the poetic
intuition and does not reconstruct me in my totality with and (even) in conflict with the material
which I entrust to him. 18
Thus far, one might think that the "simultaneous, unitary essence" thus to
be intuited is merely a particular, individual item. However, the following later
characterizations of the procedure go far beyond this stage:
Everything becomes transparent to me. I see the types, the meres,19 the ground of(all) beings, the
sense of things.
My natural tendency is to convert everything into thought. All the personal events, all particular
experiences are for me pretexts for meditation, facts to be generalized into laws, realities to be
reduced to ideas. This metamorphosis is cerebral work, philosophical work, operation of
consciousness, which is amental alembic. Our life is nothing but a document for interpretation,
matter to be spiritualized, a sequence offleeting phenomena to be transformed into a microcosmic
scheme. Such at least is the life of the thinker. It depersonalizes itself every day: if he consents to
feel and to act, it is only in order to understand better; if he wills, it is in order to know the will. He
considers hirnself a laboratory of phenomena and does not demand from life anything for hirnself
but vision .... What distinguishes hirn is alienation (desappropriation). Although it is sweet for
97
hirn to be loved, and although he does not know anything equally sweet, this event still seems to
hirn merely the occasion [i.e., instance] of the phenomenon rather than its destination [i.e.,
objective]. He does not even believe that his body is his; he feels the vital commotion (tourbillon )
pass within hirn which he is granted temporarily in order to let hirn perceive the cosmic
disturbances. He is merely thinking subject, he keeps nothing but the form ofthings, he does not
attribute to himselfthe material possession of anything. This is the disposition which makes hirn
immune (incomprehensible) to anything that means enjoyment, domination, acquisition. In fact,
he is fluid like a phantom. which one can see weil, but which one cannot seize, because its solidity
and opaqueness are (merely) apparent. The alienation makes hiin insubstantial (inane) and
empty; he resembles a man in the way in which the Manes of Achilles or the shade of Creusa
resembled living beings without having died. I am a retumer from the grave (revenant). I dream,
standing upright and fully awake. The others appear to me as dreams, and I appear as a dream to
others. This is half-way the condition of a visionary. Without sickness and suffering I could even
doubt whether I am fully alive. The apparitions ofthe resurrected Christ do not overly surprise me,
for that form of existence, excepted from gravity and floating between corporality and spirit, is
alm ost familiar to me. 20
Similar accounts may be found in the entries for July 12, 1876, June 20, 1878,
and F ebruary 18, 1881, where Amiel is also fond of calling the individual
thinker a mere "sampie" (&hantillon) ofthe type. 21
Little as these often highly figurative and telescoped self-interpretations of
Amiel's method may achieve as philosophical ac counts of his own practice,
they contain enough clues for identifying some ofthe more original features in
his conception and method. The following is an attempt to speIl these out in
more contemporary terms:
1. Phenomenology aims at grasping not only individual essences but also
general essences, types, and even ideal laws.
2. Essences are to be grasped by a peculiar type of meditation related to
"poetic intuition" on the basis of concrete phenomena (phenomimes). Even
such terms as "generalization" and "reduction" figure in this connection. But
it is fairly clear that the generalization here mentioned is not based on complete
induction by simple enumeration.
3. It would seem that Amiel's method affects the "reality" of the
phenomena by "reduction." Even the phenomenological contemplator him-
self seems to be losing the weight of his everyday existence when he treats
hirnself as a "laboratory" and assurnes a new, dream-like existence.
4. While this method would seem applicable also to other phenomena,
Amiel hirnself speaks of it only in connection with the study of his own self as
the focus of his interest
5. Phenomenology shows man as "reproducing the world, surrounding
himselfwith a nature which is the objectivation ofhis spiritual nature" (see (2)
above). While this conception has clearly a metaphysical ring, it indicates that
Amiel thought of phenomenology as capable of showing concretely the
"constitution" of the world within the phenomenological contemplator;
I shaIlleave it to the reader already initiated into some ofthe peculiarities of
contemporary phenomenology to evaluate these features in terms especially of
98
Husserlian phenomenology. Vaguenesses and differences notwithstanding,
the points distinguished above seem to be striking anticipations of Husserl's
(1) eidetic phenomenology, (2) idealizing abstraction (ideation, Wesens-
schau ), (3) "phenomenological" or "transcendental" reduction to "pure
phenomena," (4) the "egological" emphasis in Husserl's later phenomeno-
logy, and (5) constitutive phenomenology.
Before leaving Amiei' s phenomenological method I should like to relate it to
his "psychology," to which he refers repeatedly. Now in the statement under
(2) above Amiel implies that his new phenomenology would offer a basis for
both objective psychology and ethics, since it is the subjective base in which
the foundation for all objective science has to be laid. But this isolated
statement is hardly sufficient proof that Amiel distinguishes consistently
between phenomenology and psychology. Very often he calls hirnself a
psychologist and even calls psychology his most constant preference (mon
gout le plus constant).22 According to some passages,23 psychology in the
sense there characterized would seem to coincide with phenomenology,
especially since self-study is again described as a means for obtaining insights
about the whole species, Presumably Amiel had at this time no clear
conception of psychology as a science and conceived of it as a universal
collection of observations about human nature, one's own nature as weIl as
that of other people, Phenomenology, as far as he distinguished it from
psychology, was hardly more than a division within this wider field.
Amiel's prime fascination was clearly with his own self. Some of it was
doubtless the result of a merely personal problem: Amiel suffered tragically
from an inability, reminiscent of aboulia, to live up to his own ambitions and to
the high expectations of others. His all too despondent self-analysis only added
further torture to his plight. Yet even in analysing his merely personal
predicament he often comes up with striking insights of wider scope, And in
any case much of Amiel's preoccupation with his own selfhas a much deeper
foundation: a constant amazement and curiosity (un etonnement et une
curiosite constante) concerning the mystery of the self.24 The fresh insights
which spring from this amazement probably constitute his main and least
exhausted originality and his potential significance for a phenomenology
today. On the following pages I shall make a first attempt to indicate some of
his most characteristic views about the nature of the self.
When in 1854 Amiel published the little volume of poems and thoughts
entitled Grains de mit, he climaxed the poetic section with a somewhat exalted
piece called "The Eternal Proteus." Its theme, introduced by a long litany of
99
rhyming epithets, is the soul (I'time). But this soul, as any reader of Amiel who
knows hirn from the Journal will recognize at once, is identical with the self
(moi). In what is perhaps his most concentrated statement of the "phenomeno-
logy ofmyself', the reflexion of 1866 published by Scherer, we find the same
emphasis on the Protean nature of the self in the following form:
I feel mys elf as a chameleon, a kaleidoscope, a Proteus: changeable and capable of polarization in
every direction; fluid, virtual, and therefore latent even when manifested, and ab se nt even in
presentation. I am an observer, so to speak, ofthe molecular whirlwind which is called individual
Iife; I have the perception and the consciousness of incessant metamorphosis, of that irresistible
movement of existence which is going on within me. I feel the flight, the renewal, the modification
of all the particles ofmy being, all the drops ofmy river, all the radiations ofmy unique force. 25
I am a perpetually new-born being, who does not succeed in becoming solidified in a definitive
form. I am a spirit not married to his body, a fatherland, a prejudice, a vocation, a sex, a genre. Am
I at least sure of.being a man, a European, a tell urian? It seems to me so easy to be something else
that this choice appears to be arbitrary. I could not take seriously a completely fortuitous structure
whose value is purely relative ... 30.
This does not mean that Amiel considers it impossible to describe the self in
more positive terms. He is particularly fond of calling it a monad, and in so
doing refers explicitly to Leibniz:
Amie1 also speaks of the self as the "last sanctuary of intimate conscious-
100
Soon I have nothing left but that, naked thought. Death reduces us to the mathematical point; the
destruction which precedes it pushes us back by concentric circles, narrower and narrower,
toward the last and unconquerable asylum. Isavor with anticipation this zero in which all the
forms and all the modes are extinguished. 33
Much earlier, in Grains de mit, Amiel had said under the heading "The
Captivity of the Spirit":
The thinking of thinking and the consciousness of consciousness, this is where the critical faculty
of the philosopher must terminate (CLXVIII).
Man is nothing except what he becomes, a profound truth; but he also does not become anything
but what he is, an even more profound truth. What are you? A problem of predestination, ofbirth,
of freedom: the abyss. And yet, one must plunge into it, and I have plunged into it. .. 34.
The unique situation of the self with regard to its Protean roles involves for
Amiel the capacity to perform certain peculiar acts which have not been
described before, and which he calls mostly "deplication" and "reimplica-
tion," the one expanding the Protean amoeba ofthe self indefinitely, the other
contracting it to its pointlike minimum. 3)
"Deplication" is described most fully in one of the aphoristic seetions of
Grains de mil under the heading "The Centrifugal Force" (CXLII):
If the spirit is essentially mobile and, so to speak, fluid, and if the spiritual Iife is subject to a
continual movement of rotation like the planet, its prototype, I can explain to myself the almost
irresistible tendency of consciousness to disperse itself. Except at the single central point, except
in its completely point-Iike condensation at the very axis of its Iife, consciousness tends
perpetually to become estranged from itself, to lose itself in the outer world, to evaporate in the
peripheral sphere. Carried away, as it were, by its centrifugal force, its dispersion is proportional
to the radius of its activity.36
Reduced to its status of mathematical point it (consciousness) offers a minimum of grip to the
destructive force. The more it increases its volume, the more it is in danger. The contraction of
ingathering (receuillement), the return to the inner atom, to the monad, is therefore the law of
101
There is a faculty which very few people know and wh ich almost nobody puts into practice: I shall
ca!! it the faculty of"reimplication." To be able to simplify oneself gradually and without limits; to
be able to re live truly the vanished forms of consciousness and existence; for instance, to slip out of
the skin of one's epoch and to resuscitate one's own ancestor; better to detach oneselffrom one's
individuality to the degree offeeling oneselfpositively another being; even better, to get ridofone's
actual organization by forgetting and extinguishing bit by bit one's various senses and entering by a
kind of miraculous re absorption into the psychological condition preceding sight and hearing; even
more, to redescend within that wrapping to the elementary condition of animal and even of plant -
even more profoundly by an increasing simplification to reduce oneselfto the condition of germ, of
point of latent existence; i.e., to free oneself of space, time, body, and life by plunging oneself
again, circle after circle, to the darknesses of one's primitive being, by feeling again by indefinite
metamorphoses the emotion of one's own genesis, and by condensing oneself until one's limbs
become merely virtual: a faculty precious and (only) too rare, supreme privilege ofintelligence,
spiritual youth at our discretion.
the real objectives will soon reveal that Amiel's concern is quite different from
the activist involvement ofthe existentialists, which in Sartre's case often goes
so far as to reject the "inner life" as an inauthentic escape. Amiel's concern
was the preservation and the deepening of the self as the comerstone of any
kind of genuine existence.
In this respect too Amiel's enterprise is much more congenial to Husserl's
undertaking of grounding knowledge on the pure ego as the ultimate foundation
of all reality. But here again Amiel's concern is much more personal, more
immediate: it is man in his concreteness, not the pure theoretical subject,
whom he wants to help, if not to save. Yet this concern too may explain why
Husserl found Amiel such an inspiration, particularly at a stage of his
development when he conceded the ego the status of a genuine intuition, after
having first denied it. 38
The phenomenology ofthe self remains to this day unfinished business. But
Amiel deserves to be remembered as one of its initiators. So does his entire
conception of a new phenomenology. Such remembrance would be the most
fitting fulfillment of Amiel's last hope "that my labors, my experiences, and
my meditations may not be entirely lost and can serve others, even if they do
not make my name survive ... 39
POSTSCRIPT 1966
Since this article was submitted for publication in 1963, I happened to come
across what I believe is the clue to Husserl' s puzzling interest in Amiel. It
consists of a letter by the late William Ernest Hocking to Husserl, written
from Andover Semtnary on October 29, 1904, about a year after Hocking's
return from a study year in Germany, where, during two months in Göttingen,
he had formed a lasting attachment to Husserl, expressed, among other things,
in sixteen letters and postcards now deposited in the Husserl Archives in
Louvain. In the three-page letterjust mentioned Hocking, after telling Husserl
about his problem of getting started on the writing of his first book, quotes the
following sentences from Amiel's journal entry of March 25, 1851,40 clearly
taken from the English translation by Mrs. Humphry Ward (1885):
Show what is in thee! It is no longer a question of promising - thou must perform. Art thou ready?
Give an ac count. Give an account of thy years, thy leisure, thy strength, thy studies, thy talents,
and thy works.
In view of the fact that this is alm ost the only passage in the mostly so
disheartened self-analysis of Amiel which strikes a more activistic note, it
seems to me practically certain that it was Hocking's letter which armed
Husserl with Ihis moral tonic for his "crisis" beginning in 1905. This suspicion
103
is reinforced bya postcript in the margin ofHusserl's reply of August 10, 1905:
Wer ist (I'erzeihen Sie meine Unbildung) der trejjliche Amie!? (Who is -
pardon my ignorance - the worthy AmieI'?). Since Hocking's response of
September 17, 1905 fails to answer this question, the Iikelihood of Husserl's
having followed up the matter by himselfbefore the diary entry of September
25, 1906 looks even more remote.
NOTES
oj Ahout these possibilities see also the article by Georges Poulet, "La Reverie tournoyante d'
Amiei," Les Temps Modernes XVII (1961) pp. I-51. based largely on unpublished material.
36 For another reference to this "expansion" see also the entry to the Journal of May 11, 1853
(B., p. 86).
37 February 3,1862 (B., p. 153).
38 See my The Phenomenological Movement. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, Second edition,
1965, p. 140f.
39 Bouvier, p. 21.
40 Apparently an error of the English translation; in Scherer and Bouvier the date is March
26, 1851.
7.
WHAT WILLIAM JAMES KNEW ABOUT
EDMUND HUSSERL:
ON THE CREDIBILITY OF PITKIN'S TESTIMONYl
Thanks to the pioneer essays of Aron Gurwitsch and Alfred Schutz, to the later
books of Johannes Linschoten, Bruce Wilshire, and John Wild, and to other
articles, recently listed and analyzed most helpfully by James M. Edie,2 the
paralleIs between James's and Husserl's original insights no Ion ger have to be
pointed out. Moreover, James's place in Husserl's field of consciousness, his
admiration for and his debt to J ames, as attested most movingly in his private
diary for September 25,1906, have been sufficiently recorded. 3 Thus it has
been all the more a matter of regret, if not embarrassment, to phenomenolo-
gists, beginning with Husserl hirnself, that J ames did not reciprocate these
sentiments. Instead, the general belief is that J ames had a low opinion of
Husserl's work. The main evidence is, as Edie puts it in his article (p. 488), that
"it was J ames hirnself who advised a great eastern publishing house in
America against publishing a translation of the Logische Untersuchungen."
Husserl's own disappointment about J ames's rejection was so deep that he
talked about it spontaneously to several ofhis Anglo-American visitors. Ralph
Barton Perry, the major authority on J ames, recorded in his diary after a visit to
Husserl in Freiburg on June 21, 1930 (and graciously copied for me):
"[Husserl] says William James advised publishers against the translation
(Pitkin's) of his Logische Untersuchungen - and Husserl evidently feIt badly
because he was so great an admirer of William J ames.,,4 Incidentally, Perry
did not seem to remember any statements by J ames about H usserl, favorable
or unfavorable, when I had occasion to ask hirn about this in 1954.
There is perhaps even more telling evidence of the depth of Husserl's
disappointment when he heard about James's part in the rejection through
WaIter Pitkin's letter to hirn of August 20 from Munich. This letter must have
failed to reach Husserl in Göttingen, which he hadleft, on August 13,1905, for
his momentous vacation in Seefeld, Tirol, stopping on his way in Munich to see
Theodor Lipps. But Pitkin's letter was apparently forwarded to Seefeld; for,
according to a later letter of Pitkin's to Husserl- the letter of October 5 from
N ew York - Husserl again stopped over in Munich on the way back from
106
Seefeld and went to Pitkin' s address in Schwabing, only to discover that Pitkin
had already left for Columbia University, where he had been offered a
lectureship. It seems more than likely that Husserl's impromptu call was an
attempt to find out, not only about the state ofthe translation, but also as much
as possible about the reasons for James's rejection.
I am afraid that in my historical introduction to phenomenology5 I myself
did not sufficiently question the bases for Husserl' s belief in J ames' s hostility.
Now I believe I can undo part ofthe damage by proving that our worries were,
to say the least, premature and exaggerated. 1fJames knew anything about
Husserl, and even if he advised Houghton Mifflin against publishing
Pitkin 's translation, he did so in ignorance ofHusserl's new phenomenology.
My attempt will consist in a reconstruction of William J ames' s phenomenal
field of consciousness with regard to Husserl. I have to admit that this attempt
has a very narrow base. To me this is another illustration ofthe need to salvage
what we still can of the perishing memory of a memorable episode in the
his tory of philosophy.
The only published evidence about James's supposed dirn view ofHusserl's
work occurs in a short paragraph of the autobiography by Walter Boughton
Pitkin (1878-1953), who is now mostly remembered for his best seIler, Life
Begins at Forty (1932), but who was also lecturer in philosophy and
psychology (1905-9) and professor of journalism (1913-43) at Columbia
University. The crucial sentence in On My Own (1944) occurs in a context
which is so revealing that I would like to quoteit here with the surrounding
paragraphs:
I had the idea of a career as a translator of German books. I enjoyed translating atthe time. I had
read scores of novels and serious works then popular. Perhaps I might make as much as $2,000 a
year at the work. No harm feeling out the situation.
The first man I approached was Edmund Husserl. A year before he had been more than friendly
when I went to Göttingen just to talk with hirn about his new "Logische Untersuchungen," a
monumental work in two volumes, which marked an important turn in logical analysis. Husserl
was more than appreciative. He kept me in his horne for a long time and put in part of every day
explaining to me various problems in his new logic. His ability as a teacher was amazing. He put
everything so clearly and repeated the key propositions at such well timed intervals that, even ifl
had not been keenly interested, I could not have failed to understand his philosophy.
Yes, he would be delighted to have me translate his book. So I, big idiot, plunged at the task. I
107
sent hirn chapters for reading and corrections. I finished the task and se nt it to a N ew Y ork
publisher, with a formal letter from Husserl hirnself.
In a few weeks, back came the MS. with a dull note stating that the publishers had referred the
matter to William James, who had said that nobody in America would be interested in a new and
strange German work on logic. Sorry.
Next I tackled Georg Simmel, the Berlin sociologist. I had taken every course he had offered. I
knew his outlook and his special vocabulary. He authorized me to translate his latest book. Again I
rushed in where angels fear to tread. I finished only half ofthe volume this time, before sending it to
New York. That was lucky, for back came the copy. No Americans were interested in German
sociology. Sorry.
While plowing through these heavy tasks oftranslating I had struck out along another line. I was
not seeking a job. I merely wanted to publish various matters I had been working over. . . . 6
Now this somewhat breezy ac count of the whole episode, written nearly
forty years after it happened, leaves James's part in it far from clear. What did
the publisher's "referral" ofthe matter imply? Had he sent Pitkin's manuscript
to J ames? Did J ames in his answer (oral, or in writing?) say anything about
Husserl and about the Logische Untersuchungen? Or did he speak only about
"a new and strange German work on logic" in general terms? And did he
merely give an estimate of the foreseeable interest in such a work on the
American book market? Surely, on the basis of one such sentence alone it is far
from certain that J ames was judging Husserl rather than the American sales
prospects.
The safest way for resolving all these uncertainties would be to consult the
archives of the possible publishers. In 1954 I myself tried the Macmillan
Company, which simply replied that any pertinent correspondence would
have been destroyed long ago, and then Houghton Mifflin, where I learned that
"most of our early correspondence with important figures has been deposited
at the Houghton Library." However, a letter, for which I am indebted to Mr.
Rodney G. Dennis, curator of manuscripts in the Houghton Library of
Harvard University, informs me that "there is no mention of Husserl in
William James's correspondence with Houghton Mifflin." He also established
that the Houghton Library" does not have Husserl' s works or any offprints by
hirn from William James's library."
1 also inquired of the Walter B. Pitkin estate about other documents when I
finally began my search, one year after Pitkin's death in 1953; and from his
widow, Mrs. Katherine B. Pitkin, I received the following kind reply: "I very
much doubt ifthere exist now any J ames or Husserlletters to my husband. And
I think that finally, when he could not find a publisher for his Husserl
translation, he threw it away."
Thus the only hope that remained was the collection ofthe Husserl Archives
in Louvain. And here indeed was the evidence of the Pitkin-Husserl
correspondence, which, thanks to Professor Van Breda, I have now been able
108
to examine more carefully than I could when I was preparing my book The
Phenomenological Movemenl.
To be sure, only one side ofthis correspondence has survived, namely, seven
letters by Pitkin to Husserl, all written in 1905 and dated February 8 and 13
from Berlin, March 23 and April 9 from Florence, April 27 from Rome,
August 20 from Munich, and October 5 from New York.7 All are hand-written
in German, usually on short pages. I shall give, first, abrief description of each
letter, with emphasis on the pertinent information about the translation project:
1. Pitkin in three short pages on February 8 asks Husserl's permission to
translate the Logische Untersuchungen, claiming intensive study ofthe work,
adding arguments for its timeliness, mentioning especially the confusions
(Wirrsale) produced by the so-called "humanistic" trend in philosophy, and
introducing hirnself as an American student of psychology and logic.
2. Pitkin's three-page letter ofFebruary 13 refers to Husserl's reply ofthe
day before, in which Husserl seems to have specified certain conditions, which
Pitkin is ready to accept. Husserl also seems to have pointed out the difficulties
ofthe task, which Pitkin now acknowledges. Husserl must also have offered his
help and invited Pitkin to visit his lectures on the theory of judgment
(Urteilstheorie ) during the coming semester. Pitkin's answer is noncommittal,
but he announces his visit for the first week in March and also that he will come
to stay in the fall "until the completion of the translation." It also appears that
Husserl told Pitkin about his own plan to revise the original text before the
translation. Pitkin then asks for Husserl's consent to his contactingpublishers,
such as Macmillan and Company.
3. On March 23 Pitkin writes on two pages from Florence. He and his wife
must have carried out the plan of visiting Husserl in Göttingen be fore going to
Italy. This becomes clear, not only from later expressions of the hope for a
repeat visit (Wiedersehen), but from the fuller account in On My Own. The
letter reports, first, a response to Pitkin's inquiries (he had apparently
approached several publishers), this one probably from Harper and Brothers-
a name which Husserl entered at the top of the page, presumably after
receiving Pitkin's next letter, where it occurs. Harper's ans wer was almost
completely negative, but it made Pitkin decide that "a complete translation of
at least the first volume was indispensable for negotiations" and that he should
make a "provisional" (prol'isorische) translation as early as possible, it being
understood, of course, that, after contract, "you would subject the entire work
to a revision [Revision]" - a proposal about which he invited Husserl's
opinion. Pitkin also mentions that his planned visit to Franz Brentano had not
yet taken place. (This plan was clearly the result of a suggestion by Husserl,
109
whose contact with his old teacher had been revived by Brentano's letter of
October, 1904; Husserl hirnself eventually visited Brentano in Florence in
1907.)
4. On April 9 Pitkin again sends two pages from Florence. They make it
clear that Husserl had written hirn, telling hirn chiefly about his visit with
Dilthey in Berlin, in whose seminar Pitkin had found out about the Logische
Untersuchungen the preceding semester. But he starts by telling Husserl that
he has by now almost completed (ziemlichjertig) the translation of 110 pages
of Volume I, which would mean the end of the sixth chapter, or half-way
through the rrolegomena. He announces his departure for Rome by April 15
and supplies an address to which Husserl could occasionally send "Cor-
rekturen" - presumably the intended changes about which he may have told
Pitkin at Göttingen. He also indicates that he has some questions about the
meaning of certain sentences but hopes that these "difficulties" will resolve
themselves with continued study. Finally he mentions a letter from Houghton
Mifflin, "the greatest firm with us," containing an explicit request for the
translation manuscript of Volume I.
5. On April 27 Pitkin writes three long pages on the stationery ofthe Fifth
International Congress ofPsychology in Rome, without implying the receipt of
any reply from Husserl to his letter of April 9. Written on the third day ofthe
Congress, the letter consists almost completely of an attempt to brief Husserl
about the interest in, but also the misunderstanding of, the Logische
Untersuchungen which he had encountered at the Congress. Among those
who chiefly talked about Husserl in two afternoon sessions, which he had
attended, he mentions several followers of Alexius Meinong, especially Alois
Höfler. Only in the end does he mention the fact that for the past eight days he
has not been able to do any translating but that he hopes to be able to complete
Volume I after three more weeks.
6. Not until August 20 is there another letter, this time a three-page one
from Munich, where, judging from his address contained in the Proceedings of
the Rome Congress, the Pitkins had settled; perhaps they had gone there for the
summer semester, beginning in May, as is suggested by remarks on the
lectures of Lipps in the autobiography. This letter was apparently not
preceded by one from Husserl. Pitkin apologizes for not having written before,
giving as the major reason for his silence the fact that the publisher had
repeatedly postponed adefinite reply. Also, Pitkin hirnself had been so
burdened with work that he had not had enough time for the negotiations. But
now the one publisher upon whom he had set his hopes had definitely declined,
"for the reason that according to all indications one thousand copies of the
translation could not be sold. In this opinion he is also supported by James"
(underlined). He would bring out a smaller edition only if someone would
advance the costs of production, "which is of course impossible." Pitkin then
110
expresses his own disappointment in view of the fact that he had already
advanced far into the second volume, and he expresses regret about the hours
that Husserl had lost. Pitkin also refers to reports (Berichte) which Husserl had
loaned him and which he was returning, presumably including the one about
German writings on logic from the Archiv fiir systematische Philosophie of
1904, which contained amendments of his formulations in the first edition of
the Logische Untersuchungen, such as his abandonment of the definition of
phenomenology as "descriptive psychology."
7. October 5, 1905, is the date of Pitkin's last letter, this one three pages
long, written on the stationery of the Department of Philosophy and
Psychology of Columbia University. It begins with a reference to Husserl's
unsuccessful attempt to visit him at his Munich address. Whether Pitkin had
heard about this visit through his Munich landlords or through a letter
from Husserl himself is not stated. Pitkin first explains that he had not come to
Gottingen as planned because he had accepted the unexpected offer of a
position at Columbia. He then tries to explain the background for the reprints
of some of his own short articles which Mrs. Pitkin had sent to Husser!. He
reports about his teaching assignment, especially in logic and philosophy of
science, and expresses the hope for a course with advanced students in the
second semester, where he would discuss Volume II of the Logische
Untersuchungen. Finally, he teils Husserl that he will now have better access
to publishers. And he thinks that he can awaken interest in the work, especially
since he has discovered much interest in Bolzano; and he remarks that the new
"absolutistic" logic and the "immanenter Realismus" in the making (Pitkin
was one of the "Six Realists") will sooner or later prepare the way for
Husserl's book.
Compared with the account in the autobiography, On My Own, the letters
show some agreements and some discrepancies.
(a) That Pitkin had gone to Göttingen "a year before" he approached
Husserl about the translation, Le., in 1904, "just to talk with him about his new
Logische Untersuchungen" seems most improbable in the light ofPitkin's first
letter, which does not mention any earlier contacts.
(b) The statement "I sent him chapters for reading and corrections"
certainly does notjibe with the letters, which suggest that, in order to satisfy the
request ofHoughton Mifflin, Pitkin did only a "provisional" translation ofthe
first volume and told Husserl that he would not send it to him for revision until
after acceptance.
( c) "I finished the task" holds true only for Volume I, and there is no way of
telling how far Pitkin had advanced into Volume 11 be fore he abandoned this
job.
(d) That he had sent it to a New York publisher (Macmillan or Harper)
rather than to Houghton Mifflin in Boston is at least an error.
111
(e) That he had added a "formal letter from Husserl himself' is certainly
not borne out by Pitkin's letters.
However, the statement that "after a few weeks back came the MS. with a
dull note stating that the publishers had referred the matter to William J ames,"
who had said "that nobody in America would be interested in a new and
strange German work on logic," is at least compatible with the one brief
sentence in the letter of August 20 stating that the pubIisher was supported in
his estimate that one thousand copies ofthe translation could not be sold on the
book market. But the letters mention no other reasons and contain no specific
reference to Husserl and his book. This, of course, is something which Pitkin
may have feIt he should keep from Husserl.
The letters reveal quite a few additional facts. The translation ofVolume I,
which Pitkin, if his estimate in the Rome letter was correct, might have
completed by May 18, was merely a provisional one, not examined by
Husserl. It might have reached Boston by the end ofMay. Even though Pitkin
states that the publisher postponed the decision repeatedly, the letter of August
20 indicates that the final "No" came a good deal earlier. At least this is
suggested by the autobiography (" a few weeks" after Pitkin had submitted the
manuscript). In fact, this must have been the case if, before leaving Gerrnany at
the beginning of September and abandoning the Logische Untersuchungen,
Pitkin also translated half of George Simmel's "latest book" - which could
only have been his Philosophie des Geldes (1900) of 585 pages - not to
mention the fact that, "while plowing through these heavy tasks of trans-
lating," he had prepared articles for philosophical and psychologicaljournals
in England and the United States. Whateverthe chances of such a superhuman
program for the months between May and the beginning of September might
have been, Pitkin certainly could not have completed the translation ofVolume
II of the Logische Untersuchungen beforestarting on Simmel.
But even if the story as it emerges from the letters is more credible than the
account given in the autobiography, a puzzle remains concerning James's
adviceagainst the publication of Pitkin's translation. For the only sentence
about J ames' s role in the drama occurs in a short paragraph of the letter of
August 20, which I shall insert in the original German:
Endlich aber hat der einzige Verleger, auf dessen Entschluss ich grosse Hoffnung gesetzt habe,
das Unternehmen endgültig abgelehnt und zwar aus dem Grunde dass allem Voraussehen nach
1000 Exemplare der Übersetzung nicht zu verkaufen wären. In dieser Meinung ist er auch von
J ames unterstützt.
("Finally, the only publisher for whose decision I had great hopes has turned down the
undertaking for good, and this for the reason that 1000 copies of the translation could not be sold.
In this opinion he has the support of James.")
This account again leaves J ames' s role in the story far from cIear. All it does
112
say is that J ames supported the publisher's estimate about the prospective
sales. But the basis in James's mind for this support now remains completely
obscure. Wh at kind of question had the publisher asked J ames? Had he sent
hirn the translation or given hirn any specific information about the author of
the original? The only extant direct evidence thus leaves it more than doubtful
that James's "support" was based on any opinion about Husserl hirns elf or
about his work.
From this point onward the attempt to reconstruct the basis for J ames's
response to Houghton Mifflin' s inquiry has to become somewhat hypothetical.
First of all, what are the chances of his having seen Pitkin's provisional
translation of Volume I (Prolegomena), assuming that Pitkin had sent it to
Houghton Mifflin? The answer presupposes a minimum of information about
James's whereabouts du ring the crucial period. We know that James went to
Europe in March, 1905, spending several weeks in Italy and Greece. From
April 25 to April 30 he attended the Fifth International Congress of
Psychology in Rome, subsequently stopping in a variety of places, such as
Orvieto, Siena, Paris, and London, before returning to Boston on J une 11. But
by June 29 he left for Chicago, where he was to give a "round" oflectures in the
summer school ofthe University ofChicago. Then he spent apparently all of
July in the Adirondacks, again lecturing, not to return to Boston until August
29. 8 Thus, unless Houghton Mifflin sent hirn the Pitkin manuscript somewhere
else, which seems highly unlikely, June 11 to June 29 was the only time he
could have examined it at Cambridge with some leisure. Actually this seems
also a time when, according to the Pitkin correspondence, the manuscript
could have been in Boston. But what are the chances of J ames's having given it
a thorough examination? Unless James had special reasons for paying closer
attention to it, he probably restricted hirnself to the rough estimate of the
market outlook for such a translation. Certainly he did not take time for a
written reply.
But now, for the most important circumstance: Even if James laid eyes on
Pitkin's translation, he could have seen only the "Prolegomena to a Pure
Logic," in which, in the first edition, the word Phänomenologie occurs only
once, at the end of a long foonote to Chapter X, where Husserl promises
clarification in the second volume. In other words, from the Prolegomena
James could have learned only about Husserl the antipsychologist and
advocate of a new pure logic, but not about Husserl the phenomenologist in the
making.
about Husserl, possibly from Pitkin hirnself. For both James and Pitkin
attended the Fifth International Congress of Psychology from April 25 to
April 30, 1905, in Rome. In fact, the two were the only American members
present. J ames reported about the congress in two letters of April 25 and
April 30 to his wife. 9 Pitkin did so in his letter of April 27 to Husserl. But
neither mentions the other, which in Pitkin's case may weIl indicate that he did
not meet J ames until after the date of the letter. However, in his autobiography
Pitkin has a lot more to say about his attendance at what he there calls the
"International Congress ofPhilosophy (or something like that)" in 1903 (sie!),
mentioning at least two occasions at which both he and J am es were present: an
official reception at the end ofthe last day in the Villa Borghese, and a private
meeting with some Italian "Futurists," i.e., Italian Pragmatists, who wor-
shiped J ames. Both occasions were also mentioned in J ames' s second letter to
his wife, but in a much more appreciative tone than Pitkin's derisive accounts;
and James says nothing ofPitkin's presence. FinaIly, Pitkin hirnself does not
mention any personal talks with J ames, which would have allowed hirn, the
young beginner, to talk spontaneously about Husserl and his own translation
project. Yet this possibility cannot be ruled out.
As far as J ames is concerned, one also has to be aware of his preoccupa-
tions during the Congress. Immediately after his arrival, the program
committee had persuaded hirn to prepare an address for the general meeting on
the last day, for which occasion J ames chose to give an abridged version of his
article of 1904, "Does Consciousness Exist?", in French under the title "La
Notion de conscience," a feat in which he apparently took a good deal of
pride. According to the second letter to his wife, he worked on this paper for
most ofthe third and fourth days ofthe Congress. This would have left hirn only
the first two days for attending any ofthe meetings. Yet the proceedings ofthe
Congress, published later during the year,1O do not show that he took any
active part in the discussions. However, even on the very first day there were
two events which could have made hirn aware ofHusserl's advent in Europe.
Theodor Lipps (whom J ames in his letter to his wife of April 25 had mentioned
as not coming) delivered the keynote address to the first general session, "Die
Wege der Psychologie," in which he, though once attacked by Husserl as a
prime example of Psychologismus, now proclaimed "Dass, um das Schhlg-
wort des Tages zu gebrauchen, aller 'Psychologismus' völlig überwunden
werde, dies ist wohl die wichtigste Forderung, die an die heutige Psychologie
gestellt werden muss" ("the most important demand to be made on today's
psychology is, to use one of today' s slogans, that it must completely overcome
all psychologism,,).11
Then, in the afternoon ofthe same day, Alois Häfler ofPrague read a paper,
"Sind wir Psychologisten?" Here, in defending hirnself against Husserl's
charge, Höfler mentioned in the very first paragraph the new pejorative sense
114
In 1905 the name of Husserl was not entirely unknown on the American
continent. The earliest and most remarkable case ofreal familiarity with both
volumes of the Logische Untersuchungen is that of Josiah Royce, who
discussed them in his presidential address at the meeting of the American
Psychological Association in Chicago in January, 1902, shrewdly and
critically, but without mentioning phenomenology.13 What would have been
the chance of J ames' s presence and of subsequent communication between the
two on that occasion? The answer is, "Practically none," since James was
already preparing for his departure for his Gifford Lectures in Edinburgh.
There was C. S. Peirce, who, to be sure, referred to "the distinguished
Husserl" in 1906 as one of the German logicians for whom he did not care. 14
Could J ames have conferred with Peirce, at that time mostly confined to his
retreat in Milford, Pennsylvania?
Finally, there is the possibility that James heard ab out Husserl through the
reports of one of the Harvard traveling fellows and first admirers of Husserl,
William Emest Hocking, who had studied in Göttingen in 1903 and knew the
Logische Untersuchungen wel1. 15 But again, how much weight would James
have attached to such areport? Besides, there was Hugo Münsterberg, the
German psychologist-philosopher, who since 1892 had taught at Harvard. It
seems highly doubtful that he was much aware of Husserl's rising fame in
Germany. In fact, there is one piece of telling counterevidence: As Hocking
tells us about the answer to his study report for his committee, consisting of
Royce, J ames, and Münsterberg: "I received from Professor Mlinsterberg,
then chairman, a rather sharp note to the effect that the Department 'did not grant
Fellowships in order that students might seclude themselves in provincial
universities.' ,,16 The fact that, later on, Münsterberg had a friendly cor-
115
respondence with Husserl does not conflict with the evidence that in 1905 he
had no appreciation for hirn. Anyway, as a possible source for James's
knowledge about German philosophers, Münsterberg is unlikely because of
the growing estrangement between the two at this time.
Finally, a much more pervading factor in James's possible re action to
Husserl's logical work has to be considered, namely, James's mounting
rebellion against logic. In contrast to Royce and Peirce, J ames had never been
interested in logic. Peirce, especially in his letters, had often taken hirn to task
for this defect. According to Perry, this resentment against logic, which he calls
one of James's "morbid traits," grew in his last decade, reaching a climax in
1908 in his Hibbert Lectures on "The Pluralistic Universe," where he
"solemnly and publicly renounced logic."17
In this light, what kind of echo could one expect from J ames to a new
German work on "pure logic," especially in the light of what he had just heard
in Rome about the attack oflogicians like Husserl on psychology and Lipps's
charge of psychologism against hirnself? Whatever sources of information
were atJames's disposal at the time ofHoughton Mifflin's inquiry, none could
have made hirn believe that Husserl was a logician comparable with Lotze or
Sigwart, whose texts had already been published in English translation.
CONCLUSIONS
What all the available evidence, direct and indirect, adds up to seems to be the
following:
1. J ames "supported" Houghton Mifflin' s pessimistic prognosis about the
possible sales of Pitkin's translation of the Logische Untersuchungen. But
such support may not have amounted to more than seconding a preconceived
negative judgment by the inquiring publisher.
2. As tothe basis forthis "support," there is no solid proofthat James knew
anything of or about Husserl at all. It could have been based on a general
opinion about German logic.
3. There is a possibility that James saw, but hardly read, Pitkin's
"provisional" draft ofthe translation ofVolume I. 1fthis is the case, Husserl's
suspicion, as expressed to Cairns in 1931, thatJames was putoffby Husserl's
antipsychologism makes good sense. But even the state of the provisional
translation could have contributed to his negative verdict.
4. J ames could have heard in Rome and from some of his Harvard
colleagues about Husserl and his Logische Untersuchungen. Butnone ofthese
sources could have convinced hirn that here was the work of a major
philosopher in the making.
5. In no case could James have known anything about Husserl's pheno-
116
NOTES
1 From Life-World and Consciousness. Essays for Aron Gurwitsch, edited by Lester E.
Embree, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972, pp. 407-22.
2 "William James and Phenomenology," Review of Metaphysics, XXIII (1970), 481-527,
esp. 484, n. 8.
3 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XVI (1956), 294-95; reprinted in The
Phenomenological Movement (The Hague, 1960), p. 114.
4 For similar expressions see the Freiburgdiary ofW. R. Boyce Gibson (publishedin theJournal
ofthe British Societyfor Phenomenology, II [1971], 68) underthe date July 14, 1928: "Pitkin
translated the Prolegomena oftheLogische Untersuchungen, but the publisher before agreeing
fmally consulted WilliamJ ames, and William J ames warned hirn off." See also Dorion Cairns's
records of "Conversations with Husser! and Fink" under the date February 13, 1931: "The
prospective publisher of the Logische Untersuchungen was advised by William James not
to publish. Husserl thinks that J ames saw only the Prolegomena, and that its Antipsychologismus
was very unsympathetic to James." There is also evidence that Husserl was so impressed by
Pitkin's interest that, as Dr. Schuhmann of the Husserl Archives in Louvain informs me, he
drafted and presumably sent a letter to his publisher, Max Niemeyer Verlag, during the Easter
vacation of 1905, i.e., even before Pitkin had left Berlin to visit hirn on the way to Italy. This
draft, contained in MS A VI II/15b, teils Niemeyer of Pitkin's request and adds: "I am very
pleased about this, since thus far the English periodicals have reacted so little."
5 The Phenomenological Movement, pp. 111 ff.
6 Chapter 5, "What Next?," p. 319; quoted with the permission of Charles Scribner's Sons.
7 Kar! Schuhmann identified one draft of Husser!'s lost letters to Pitkin ofFebruary 12, 1905, in
MS F I 9 (see Journal ofthe British Society for Phenomenology 3 (1972), p. 65).
8 These dates are taken from Gay Wilson Allen, William James (New York, 1967), pp. 443 ff.
117
9 The letters 01 William James, ed. Henry James (Boston, 1920), pp. 225-27.
10 Atti dei V Congresso Internazionale de Psichologia (Rome, 1905).
11 Ibid., p. 57.
12Ibid., p. 155.
13 The Phenomenological Movement, pp. 740 f.
14 "Husserl's and Peirce's Phenomenologies: Coincidence or Interaction?" Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, XVII (1956),164-85; esp. 183.
15 "From the Early Days oftheLogische Untersuchungen." Edmund Husser11859-1959 (The
Hague, 1959), pp. 1-11.
/6 Ibid, p. 5.
17 The Thought and Character 01 William James (Boston, 1935), II, 690 f.
SUPPLEMENT 1979
Only aft,er the publication of my earlier artic1e when I revisited the Houghton
Library at Harvard in 1972, did I come across the following letter to Pitkin in
the business correspondence of Houghton Mifflin for 1905 (vol. 53, 1905,
p. 146; quoted with permission of the company):
14 March 1905
Mr. W. Pitkin
Berlin, Germany
Dear Sir:
We thank you for kindly calling our attention to your proposed English version
of Professor Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen. Without in the least
questioning the intrinsic excellence of the work, we are still in doubt of being
able to discover a good field for it in this country. Ifit should be practicable for
you to let us see your translation when it is finished, we would be pleased to
have you do so, but we do not feel prepared to decide our course in advance.
Yours very truly
(Signed) Houghton
No other letter to Pitkin seems to have survived and, in view ofthe extensive,
weIl bound and indexed correspondence volume, it seems unlikely that any
comparable piece was written. Also, no letter of Pitkin to the firm seems to
have been kept.
The document above throws remarkable new light even on the correspond-
ence between Pitkin and Husser!. Contrary to Pitkin's letter to Husserl of
Apri19, in which he reported to Husserl about an explicit request for a
translation of volume I, the actualletter voices grave doubts about the whole
project and certainly contains no such request. It only expresses willingness to
118
In St. Gilgen beteiligte er sich gerne an den Porträtbildern seiner Frau, die eine tüchtige Malerin
war, hineinbessernd, oder ihre Bilder im Werden ganz übernehmend: aber freilich musste sie
dann wieder nachhelfen und manches wieder gut machen. So hat er mich im Jahre. 1886
gemeinsam mit seiner Frau gemalt: "ein liebenswürdiges Bild," wie Robert Vischer,3 der
feinsinnige Kunsthistoriker, urteilte.
Sie haben meiner Braut durch das grosse Geschenk, welches Sie ihr mit meinem Portrait gemacht
haben, eine unbeschreibliche Freude bereitet! Jeder ihrer letzten Briefe brachte mir hiervon
erneute Kunde. Sie findet das Bild prächtig, trefflich, lebensvoll, von der gehörigen Stellung und
Beleuchtung, geradezu zum Sprechen ähnlich. Ja sie gesteht mir, dass sie mit dem Wechsel und
der Auswahl der Stellungen und Beleuchtungen schier die ganze freie Zeit verspiele und
verträume. Kurz sie ist sowohl von dem Werke als auch von dem Künstler, der die Sendung
überdies mit so liebenswürdigen Zeilen begleitet, ganz begeistert. So sind meine Erwartungen
noch übertroffen worden.
After their wedding the Husserls displayed the portrait prominently in their
horne. For some time before her marriage Husserl's daughter Elly kept it on a
wall in herroom in Freiburg. Whenin 1939, after Edmund Husserl's death, his
papers and books were transferred to Louvain, the portrait was put into a van
with Mrs. Husserl's personal belongings, which were to be shipped to the
United States. On September 16, 1940, this van with the portrait was
destroyed by fire in the harbor of Antwerp as a resuIt of an aIIied air raid. 4
When in April, 1966 I had occasion to ask Mrs. Rosenberg about this
portrait, she was kind enough to send me a little snapshot of hers, showing her
room in the Freiburg apartment with the portrait at an angle on one ofthe walls
(Plate I). I took this snapshot to Mr. Herbert Weitmann ofthe Photographie
9. -
_._
~.
Plate H. Photographie Enlargement Plate III. A Contemporary Photo. Plate IV. The Projection Retouched.
and Projection.
122
Services ofWashington University, St. Louis, who turned it over to two ofhis
assistants, Messrs. Bayard Fitzgerald and lohn Oytman. They managed to
enlarge the picture on the wall in the snapshot sufficiently to yield an
expressive face and also to spread out the picture in a way which neutralized
the perspective distortion. Even so, the reproduction was blurred by many
distracting reflections and left many areas ambiguous (Plate II). Miss Marilyn
Roth, an art student at Webster College, toned down these reflections by
retouching. At this stage Mrs. Rosenberg also sent me from her collection
copies of two contemporary photos of young Husserl as a student. (See
Plate III for the later one.) On this basis and in an attempt to take account of
written comments by Mrs. Rosenberg, Miss Roth also tried to resolve some of
the remaining ambiguities (Plate IV).
Obviously the result is at best an approximation. The only qualifiedjudge,
Mrs. Rosenberg, points out that the reproduction does not show the blond,
curly hair and the blue eyes ofthe original. She also feels that the narrow steep
head ofthe final version has something deadly serious about it compared with
the friendliness and naturalness of the original as she remembers it.
Thus the final photo is at best a doubtful copy of a copy of a painting that
represented an original through the eyes oftwo gifted amateurs. The only hope
is that this reconstruction is still better than the nothing oftotal destruction left
by the Antwerp bomb.
However, the real value of this reconstruction seems to me neither
iconographic nor aesthetic. Subsequent tradition and the comments of the
editors ofBrentano's works have often given the impression that Brentano had
a very dubious opinion of his erstwhile student Husser!. Much of this can be
discredited by a study oftheir extant correspondence. The portrait, however,
unique not only as a portrait painted by a philosopher but as that of a pupil by
his teacher, teIls an additional part ofthe story. Brentano had singled out this
particular student as worthy of a special portrait. With all its imperfections, the
reconstruction can show that in 1886 Brentano had seen in Husserl's eyes a
spark, if, not yet, the spark of genius. As Mrs. Rosenberg, to whom I am so
deeply indebted for her help in this iconographic venture, put it to me, the
portrait throws a certain light on the relation between the two philosophers, and
it is a bright and warm light.
It is often believed that in his later years Brentano took a rather dirn view of
Husserl's philosophical achievements and in particular ofhis phenomenology.
And it is certainly true that at least in two letters to Hugo Bergmann of
123
September 6, 1907 and March 27, 1908 5 Brentano expressed hirnselfnot only
in puzzled but rather unfavorable terms about Husserl's philosophizing, even
after Husserl had visited hirn in Florence in an attempt to explain his new
views to his former teacher.
The entire relation between the always revered master and the emancipated
pupil would require a full-scale study, in which their voluminous correspon-
dence between 1891 and 1916 would have to be a center piece. Some of it
certainly deserves publication. 6
But it is perhaps even more important to inquire into the basis for Brentano' s
low opinion of Husserl's work. In the Bergmann letters Brentano hirnself
mentioned specifically Emil Utitz as the source ofhis information. Indications
are that almost all his evidence about Husserl was based on similar oral
reports.
But there is even more conclusive proof for the fact that Brentano never
made a study of any of Husserl's publications. Even when he recommended
Husserl to Carl Stumpffor possible" Habilitation" in Halle (October 18, 1886)
Brentano pointed out that he had not seen any of his written work.
Husserl had sent Brentano copies ofhis Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891)
with its printed dedication and of the first volume of his Logische Unter-
suchungen (1900) and other reprints with handwritten inscriptions. According
to Professor Chisholm, to whom I am indebted for this and other pertinent
information, none of these shows any markings in the text.
The most telling case is actually the one ofthe Philosophie der Arithmetik.
Some time in 1891 (the letter has no specific date) Brentano wrote Husserl a
brief but warm acknowledgment, but added that he would have to postpone
reading the book. Then in 1904, as shown in a letter of October 7, Brentano
rediscovered the volume, and, in the beliefthat he had not yet acknowledged
the dedication, sent hirn his apologies and renewed thanks. But even then he
did not take a look inside. F or the pages of the book, now in the Brentano
Archives at Brown University under Professor Chisholm's direction, are still
uncut. However, this fact must be seen in the light of Brentano's inability to
read such a work after his unsuccessful operation for cataract in 1903.
As forthe Logische Untersuchungen there is Brentano's own testimony in a
letter to Oskar Kraus of September 28, 1904 thai he had "not seen the two fat
volumes ofhis (Husserl's) Logische Untersuchungen ," which had impressed
so many of his own friends, especially in Munich.
Under these circumstances it seems safe to assert that Brentano's later
verdict on Husserl as a philosopher was not based on direct acquaintance with
the texts of his writings. There is also a good deal of evidence that his
secondary sources of information were not always unbiased. 7
124
NOTES
I Published as "The Lost Portrait of Edmund Husserl by Ida and Franz Brentano" in
Philomathes. Studies and Essays ill Ihe Humanities in Memory of Philip Merlan. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971, pp. 341-45.
2 Appendix II to Oskar Kraus, Franz Brentano (München: C. H. Beck, 1919), p. 162 .
.1 Husserl erroneously put in the name of Robert's father Thcodor, as Mrs. Elly Husserl
Rosenberg informcd me.
4 See H. L. Van Breda, "Le Sauvetage de l'h6ritage husserlien ct la fondation des Archives
Husserl," Husserl et la pensee moderne. Phaenomenologica II (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1959), p. 39. The refcrcnce to (WO such portraits in the text secms to be bascd on a
misunderstanding.
j "Briefe Franz Brentanos," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research VII (1946), pp. 86 f.,
93f.
6 Thus far only two ofBrentano's letters to HusserL without the corresponding letters by Husserl
or any information about them, have been published by Oskar Kraus in Wahrheit und Evidenz
(Leipzig. 1930), pp. 153-61; English translation in the edition by Roderick M. Chisholm
(London, 1966), 135 ff. For other sampies see my 7'he Phenomenological Movemenl (The
Hague, 1965), pp. 89f. and Grazer philosophische Studien VI (]978), pp. 1-12.
7 See especially Oskar Kraus in Wahrheit und Evidenz. pp. XXIX-XXXIII ("Psychologism
and Phenomenologism") and the headline ofp. 153 (" ... on the Basic Mistakes in a so-called
'Phenomenology' ").
9. ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CORRESPONDENCE
BETWEEN BRENTANO AND HUSSERO
1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 2
Although I do not think that in this paper there is need to assemble the entire
antecedents of this correspondence, a selection from them may be helpful.
In particular it seems relevant to mention that the correspondence was
preceded by Husserl's four semesters ofstudy from 1884-86 at the University
of Vienna, during which the young Ph.D. in mathematics, just returned from
126
Philosophie der Arithmetik and to Brentano's reply warning hirn not to call the
wrath of his teacher's foes upon his head. 6 Husserl added that Brentano had
not thanked hirn for the actual dedication until fourteen years later. This
suggests that Husserl had never received Brentano's incompletely dated note
of thanks of 1891; I now suspect that it never went into themail and was
forgotten by Brentano bims elf. Other gaps can be inferred in 1892, in 1893,
1898 and 1916 as indicated in the survey. Karl Schuhmann found at least two
drafts of Husserl's four letters in the nineties. Thus the numbers of the
communications actually exchanged exceeded those listed in the survey
slightly to about 40 pieces. In view ofthis fact Husserl's own minimizing ofthis
correspondence sounds exaggerated. However, it is not the size but the content
ofthis correspondence which matters. I shall therefore attempt to appraise first
the biographical importance of these letters and then their philosophical
substance.
4. PERSONAL SIGNIFICANCE
Thus, after first addressing Husserl as "Lieber Herr Dr." Brentano after 1893
uses almost consistently "Lieber Freund," without however changing over to
the intimate "Du." But more important are the expressions of almost paternal
concern, comfort, encouragement and advice that permeate many of these
pieces, especially during Husserl's continuing professional tribulations. Most
touching is Brentano's repeated attempt to reassure Husserl ofhis unchanged
sympathy and friendship even after Husserl had announced his emancipation
from his master's teachings. This did not diminish Brentano's interest in
finding out ab out and understanding his student' s new development and trying
to show hirn the errors ofhis ways. But even when this approach had failed, he
invited hirn to Florence for direct discussion - which proved to be another
failure. Yet the correspondence continued, without Brentano giving up hope
and certainly without personal estrangement.
Brentano's continued benevolence and sympathy with the Husserls has to
be seen also in the context of his reservations about Husserl's philosophical
competence and achievement. In this respect even his recommendation to Carl
Stumpf in 1886 had been non-committal. And, without having read any of
Husserl's major writings thoroughly, especially after his blindness, Brentano
found hirn in this correspondence and in conversation neither cIear nor
persuasive. In fact, he complained to Husserl directly abouthis vagueness. But
he did not question the seriousness of his efforts and the sincerity of his
affirmations ofloyalty, even in the touchy issue of"psychologism," where he
thought Husserl had included Brentano among its advocates. It was certainly
not easy for hirn to put up with one of his earlier students who failed to take
account of his own later teachings, especially of his "linguistic turn" and his
battle against "fictitious entities."
Is it possible to understand Brentano's ambivalent feelings of attraction to
and frustration with a personality as different as Husserl? They were probably
complex and variable. Husserl's initial enthusiasm and openness at the start
were certainly important factors. So may have been Husserl's conversion to
Protestant Christianity at the time. At one point Brentano's neglect to
acknowledge in time the dedication of Husserl's first book may have added a
certain sense of guilt and recognition for Husserl's magnanimity. His
professional struggles and personal misfortunes became additional reasons for
special sympathy. In any case Brentano's friendship for Husserl was more
than a form and went far beyond their diminishing philosophical ties.
Husserl in his letters almost never went so far as to address his former
teacher as "friend" (exception: 1905); in general he continued using the
title "Professor" or, less formally, "Lehrer" (teacher). But he never failed to
precede these nouns by the adjectives "verehrt" (revered) or "hochverehrt"
(highly revered). This may seem to be to some extent a matter ofconvention.
Yet in Husserl's case it also was a genuine expression ofthe almost excessive
129
veneration and gratitude which he kept feeling for the teacher who had once
awakened hirn to the cause of scientific philosophy. However, this pervading
attitude, which even Brentano acknowledged as genuine, conflicted with
Husserl's craving for intellectual independence. Brentano was to hirn not the
authority figure, as he was to his later students. Husserl could not resolve this
inner conflict, alternating between extravagant expressions of devotion and
abrupt declarations of independence and unspecified departures. And while at
times Husserl feIt hurt by Brentano's implication that he was overly concerned
about academic advancement and by his charge of vagueness, he did not let
this interfere with his personal loyalty and admiration.
Thus wh at the correspondence reveals about the personal relations between
Brentano and Husserl is by no me ans simple. It was inevitably a delicate
relationship. But underlying all the tensions was a sentiment ofmutual respect
which prevented a final break. This speaks perhaps most movingly from the
last decade of this correspondence. Husserl's gratitude for his start with
Brentano made hirn look up to hirn as a model, if not as his guide. And Brentano
saw in his erstwhile student a serious seeker, even though one who had gone
astray, and a lovable personality.
Toward the end ofhis letter ofDecember 29, 1892 Husserl, then a lecturer at
Halle, teIls Brentano that lately he had been occupied with problems of
philosophy of geometry, an occupation which makes good sense after Husserl
had published his first book on philosophy of arithmetic and nearly completed
its second volume in 1892, aIthough no other record of this occupation has
survived. "Some things which be fore seemed to me secure have now become
very dubious. F ormerly I believed that a continuum8 in which any two points
can be connected by one straight line is eo ipso characterized as plane
(Euclidean). This is probably not correct.... In short, the parallel axiom is at
fault ifehlt)." Husserl also announces that his view about "the Riemann-
HelmhoItz theories of space has changed," in which, in spite of defects, he
finds a valuable core, although he is not satisfied with their psychological and
130
logical analyses, which lack clarity. His own approach would be deeper and at
the same time smoother and easier, and he holds out the possibility of a sketch
if Brentano should be interested. In any case Husserl would be grateful to
Brentano for the communication of views divergent from his own.
For these Husserl did not have to wait long. Already on January 3, 1893
Brentano came to the defense of Husserl's earlier position, "which has also
been always my own .... It would be refuted only if one could conceive of a
two-dimensional continuum which met the specification and were still plane.
And certainly you have not been able to constnict such a one." Then he
proceeds to give a formal proof ofthe parallel axiom illustrated by a diagram. 9
Brentano also refused to accept HelmhoItz' theory of space, objecting chiefly
to his self-contradictory terminology. "How can one forgive hirn that he calls
space curved, but characterizes the line which follows the curvature straight
because it is the shortest between two points?" Strangely, no answer to this
letter has survived. 1O
The longest exchange between Brentano and Husserl lasted from 1904 to
1906. The occasion was that on October 7, 1904, after an interruption offour
years, Brentano had sent Husserl a short letter when it had come to his
attention (" kam es mir zur Kenntnis") that in 1891 Husserl had dedicated his
Philosophie der Arithmetik vol. I to hirn ("Meinem Lehrer Franz Brentano in
inniger Dankbarkeit"). (So Brentano had forgotten that he had at least drafted
an acknowledgment.) This letter was received enthusiastically by Husserl,
who, in reaffirming his debt to his teacher, also pointed out that he had moved
beyond his philosophy. This remark led Brentano in his reply ofOctober 21 to
make the following request:
I would be very grateful to you if you would point out to me a single important point in which you
believe to have departed from me and gone beyond me. My eyes do not permit me much reading.
And you know how many a duty lies upon me for the completion of my own work.
More than two months later, in his 12 page letter of January 3, 1905, Husserl
tried to fulfil this request by offering a sequence ofthoughts (Gedankenreihe)
from his Logische Untersuchungen. "Of course it cannot be more than a
sketch (Andeutung) which might easily be exposed to misunderstanding."
What Husserl actually did on about seven handwritten pages in his small,
mostly Gothic script was to outline some basic ideas of the first shorter
volume, the Prolegomena to a Pure Logic, with its "struggle against
psychologism, i.e., an overestimate ofpsychology, very damaging in my view,
as the alleged fundamental discipline for all philosophy and consequently also
131
for the new logic and critique of knowledge." (This formulation must have
struck Brentano as a major challenge to his entire philosophical program. )
However, the second volume ofthis work with its Investigations Concerning
Phenomenology and Theory 0/Knowledge is mentioned only at the very end
as unfinished business. Here Husserl speaks of "very comprehensive and
painstaking (mühselige) phenomenological investigations" to complement the
logical studies, a hint which could hardly have meant much to Brentano. The
sketch of the Prolegomena beg ins with the distinction between two types of
logic: (1) logic as a technology (Kunst/ehre) and (2) logic as a theoretical
discipline, i.e., formal or pure logic. According to Husserl the former is partly
based on psychology. But its more essential basis is pure logic. Pure logic itself,
which also includes pure mathematics, is entirely independent ofpsychology.
The neglect of this distinction is blamed for psychologistic empiricism,
relativism and anthropologism (here not characterized and refuted). Husserl
also mentions his rejection of a logic based on the principle of economy of
thought advocated by such positivists as Ernst Mach and Richard Avenarius.
Then he tries to convey an idea ofthe main content ofhis new theoreticallogic,
in which he had been aided especially by Bolzano. Thus the theme of pure
logic, not that of phenomenology, appeared to Husserl as his main departure
from Brentano and the best way to introduce hirn to his innovations.
Brentano's answer, written six days later on January 9, does not directly
reject Husserl's exposition and even expresses some agreements, for instance
with his inclusion of pure mathematics into logic. What he criticizes alm ost
exclusively is Husserl's distinction between two types of logic. To Brentano
even pure logic with its law of contradiction is based on certain psychological
impossibilities of thinking. But he denies that these inabilities are of such a kind
as to endanger the validity and truth oflogic and mathematics. In particular he
sees no need for accepting the theory of truths-in-themselves advocated by
Bolzano. Finally a long postscript dealing with mathematics argues that it
includes psychic operations and takes account of economy of thought.
Husserl's reply ofMarch 27 first expresses happy surprise at the remaining
common ground regarding pure mathematics as logic and the rejection of
"anthropologism." But then the nine-page letter defends and develops the idea
of a logic which eliminates everything "empirical and psychological" and
confines itself to apriori propositions and theories essentially connected, a
logic wh~ch would include modern arithmetized mathematics. It contains
nothing based on "matters of fact" and deals only with non-empirical
essences. Here, Husserl makes a special point of stating that his Prolegomena
were not directed against Brentano and his students. Finally he dissociates
hirns elf from Bolzano's "propositions-in-themselves" as metaphysical enti-
ties. Bolzano had ignored "epistemology and phenomenology ofknowledge,"
132
which Husserl considered essential. This is, incidentally, the only place in this
correspondence where Husserl uses the noun "phenomenology," but again
without further explanation.
Brentano' sanswer to this most developed plea for pure logic is contained in
a dictation, ofwhich only an incomplete text of April 30 has survived; I doubt
that it was ever completed and sent off to Husserl, since he never acknow-
ledged it. Here Brentano does not deny the possibility of collecting all truths
evident from concepts (Wahrheiten, soweit sie aus Begriffen einleuchten). But
he doubts that they can be put together in a special science. He also states that a
merely theoretical science without practical significance would be pointless,
especially if not matched by empirical facts. Even the greatest mathematicians
like Franz Klein did not treat mathematics as an end in itself.
Brentano's next letter to Husserl of August 1, 1906, which was certainly
received, is dated more than a year later. Beginning with congratulations on
Husserl's promotion to a full chair in Göttingen, Brentano continued:
Unfortunately, after the somewhat vague communications of your letters rather than a sharply
formulated proposition in which you would have expressed a substantial (wesentliche) innovation,
I could not form an opinion of how much and what great things can be expected from your lively
efforts.
I regret that you found my written communications about some scientific points vague which I
believed I shoulc1 stress. I had made a great effort to be precise.
Then he announces his plan for a little text "in which I want to outline with the
greatest clarity and precision possible to me the methodological ideas for a
non-psychological, though not antipsychological critique ofknowledge and the
will. To be sure, I believe that the solution of the questions of epistemological
origin is neither in the area of natural science nor of psychological ex-
perience. The 'immediate experiences' and other acts of knowledge which
function in epistemological research are, to be sure, objectively speaking my
acts, mine, i.e., ofthis psychic individual. But my existence, the existence of
this individual and the existence of my acts as acts of areal psychic individual
133
What you touch upon by way ofscientific questions points undoubtedly to substantial differences
.... But I am not completely clear either about your general standpoint or about any ofyour
specific theses. And this was the meaning of the complaint in my letter. My eyes are weakened. A
few years ago I had to undergo an operation which, in the view ofthe physicians, has protected me
permanently against complete blindness; but at first it has damaged my vision even more. F or this
reason the inspection of your extensive work has become more difficult for me. I have to
economize. This is why I asked for the mention of a particularly precise thesis. I had hoped to
obtain from it a more general estimate. As the saying goes, one can know the lion from his claw (ex
ungue teonem).
At this point I would like to pause in my account for a first appraisal ofthis
most sustained philosophical exchange between Brentano and Husserl. At
first sight its outcome may appear as an unmitigated failure for both
correspondents: Brentano, whose desire for an understanding of Husserl's
innovations had started the exchange, broke it off after the first round,
apparently not sending offhis draft for a reply to Husserl' s second letter, which
in retrospect he called too vague; Husserl, who feIt he could not do any better in
writing merely expressing the hope for another direct talk to discuss the issues
face to face.
But does the dissatisfaction of the correspondents prove that nothing was
accomplished? Even without final agreement, the positions of the partners
stand out more sharply than before, and each of them may have developed his
own position not only to his own satisfaction but for the benefit oflater outside
134
readers. To some extent this seems to me the case in this part of the
correspondence. Husserl's letter of January 3, 1905 contains an unusually
succinct restatement of his Prolegomena, his second of March 27 contrasts
sharply pure" apriori" logic with empirical science. Brentano, in conceding
the elose connection between mathematics and logic, stressed their practical
aspects and introduced his "reisrn" with its rejection of apriori "fictions."
But such belated consolations cannot undo the disappointment of the
participants. To understand it one might resort to a rather simple, all too
simple, explanation: Brentano's lack of directknowledge ofHusserl's writings.
In the beginning, i.e., after the appearance of Husserl's first book, the
Philosophy 0/ Arithmetic, dedicated to Brentano, he only took superficial
notice of it, prevented by the various diversions and dislocations ofhis life after
abandoning his teaching in Vienna. And when he rediscovered the book in
1904, it was too late for hirn to read it after his unsuccessful cataract surgery in
1903, as shown also by the fact that the pages ofthe dedication copy, now in
the possession of Roderick Chisholm, have remained uncut. So Brentano's
knowledge of Husserl's writings remained almost completely indirect and
confined at best to tiresome sampling. Hence his request to Husserl to supply
hirn with a shortcut to one ofhis basic new ideas. Could Brentano at least read
Husserl's letters easily? Even this does not seem to me obvious, considering
not only the length ofHusserl' s most important letters butthe fact that his small
script may not have been easy to decipher for Brentano's remaining vision.
But while not irrelevant, as Brentano's own explanation ofhis request in his
letter of August 1906 and the end of the exchange suggests, this was hardly the
whole story. First, one might question Husserl's strategy in his attempt to fulfil
Brentano's request. Why did he not submit one or more brieftheses, perhaps in
the manner of Brentano' s famous habilitation theses, instead of substituting a
brief summary of his Prolegomena, which, without fuller explanation, could
hardly tell Brentano where Husserl had departed and gone beyond hirn?
However, this substitution could have been explained. For it was true that, in
contrast to the Philosophy 0/Arithmetic, in which Husserl had put Brentano' s
psychological analyses to an only partially successful test, the Logical
Investigations meant a new departure .. But the abridged tale of the
Prolegomena with its loose ends leading to the second volume in which
Husserl had made such impressive and transforming use of Brentano's
conception of intentionality, could hardly capture and retain Brentano's
interest and win his understanding. So he was completely absorbed by
Husserl's distinction ofthe two types oflogic. In defending in his second letter
even more in detail his distinction between pure logic and logic as a
psychology-based art, Husserl also seems to have been little aware of the
change in Brentano' s position, which just around this time had led hirn to his
"reism" and the abandonment of all "fictitious entities" in a way that made all
references to apriori essences for Brentano particularly objectionable.
135
(Vorstellen) and piled up everything that could help to recommend it. But
eventually I had to content mys elf with conceding merely negative ideas, as
does Leibniz in his Nouveaux Essais."
I suspect that this issue is related to Brentano's classification of psychic
phenomena, according to which presentations (in contrast to judgments and
phenomena oflove and hate), do not have positive and negative qualities. Such
qualities would certainly be dimensions of all of Husserl' s acts in the sense of
modes of intentional consciousness.
Did Husserl actually raise this question during the Florence conversations?
Again there is no ans wer in the subsequent correspondence. But at least
Brentano gave Husserl belated credit for having stimulated his own thought in
this matter. Also, his letter proves that in his mind Florence did not mean the
end of philosophical communication.
However, I believe that more is at stake than the semantics of the words
"student" and "teacher." What is involved is the relation between their
referents. And in the case of a social relation between a concrete student and
his teacher this presupposes a study ofthe ways in which each appears to the
other, i.e., a phenomenology of the student and teacher perspectives.
Considering the variety of these actual and possible relations and their
common essential structures, this would be an enormous task. The specific
example of Brentano and Husserl may at least show how this relationship
would have to be approached phenomenologically, i.e., from the side of the
different perspectives of the two main partners. How did they see each other?
What did they even know ab out one another? For example, was Brentano
aware that Husserl had put his conception of the intentional relationship
between the psychic acts and their contents into the center of his phenomeno-
logy of consciousness? On the other hand, how far was H usserl aware of the
fact that Brentano had changed his basic philosophy when in 1904 he rejected
"irrealia" as fictitious entities? In other words, neither one saw the other as he
appeared to himself at the time. This discrepancy was probably also one ofthe
deeper roots of their misunderstandings. But there is certainly no chance of
establishing the amount of agreement or discrepancy between their images of
one another.
Nevertheless, allowing for this lasting uncertainty, we can try to determine
the student-teacher relation between them, as seen in their differing
perspectives.
1. How did Brentano see Husserl as his student? In the beginning he was
apparently impressed by this serious full-fledged mathematician converted to
philosophy, and saw in him an eager student of his own oral and written
teachings. As such he recommended him to Carl Stumpf at Husserl's request,
without committing himself as to his achievements. And he never seems to
have doubted Husserl's continued interest in his own philosophy as far as he
knew about it. But apparently he doubted increasingly Husserl's clarity and
competence as an independent philosopher.
But how far did Brentano consider himself as Husserl's teacher? There is of
course the impersonal sense of teaching in which the lecturer to a large class,
especially on the Continent, broadcasts his teachings to an anonymous and
mostly passive audience with which he has no personal contact. But
Brentano's relationship with Husserl soon developed into much more. Thus he
took a personal interest in this student, climaxing first in the invitation to join
him in his summer vacation in 1886. And then began the correspondence, in
which Brentano also responded to Husserl's questions and finally made an
effort to find out about and criticize his self-declared innovations. All this
shows that Brentano, even though he did not supervise Husserl's written work,
especially not another doctoral dissertation, showed more than the usual
139
teacher's concern in one ofhis less faithful students. To this extent I maintain
that not only did Brentano consider Husserl a serious student of his teachings
but also tried to te ach hirn informally by personal advice and discussion. He
may have been unsuccessful as a teacher in the achievement-sense, but he was
certainly much involved in the task-sense of teaching.
11. In what sense did Husserl see hirnself as Brentano's student? In what sense
was and remained Brentano to hirn his teacher? Husserl hirnself in his
Recollections puts it most succinctly in the following sentences:
At the start his enthusiastic student, I never ceased to worship hirn highly as a teacher. But it was
not granted to me to remain a member of his sChOOJ. 14
This formulation implies that at some point Husserl ceased to consider hirnself
Brentano's student, especially in the sense of being a school member,
presumably after the publication ofthe Philosophy 0/Arithmetic. But he still
looked up to Brentano as his teacher, though hardly in the sense that he still
accepted his teachings. Now Brentano was to hirn the stimulator of his own
independent thought and the source of some of the persistent impulses in his
thought, but no longer his final authority. Was he then in his own eyes more of a
student of Brentano than Brentano was his teacher?
Certainly Husserl continued to study Brentano's writings even in his later
years, though now in a much more critical spirit than at his enthusiastic start.
Correspondingly, Brentano was no longer his teacher any more than any other
thinker. Now the only real "teacher" was the direct evidence ofthe Sachen,
the phenomena in his new sense. Thus one might say that to Husserl the
teacher Brentano became less and less important compared with his own
study, and "worship" took the pi ace of acceptance. Philosophically, his bond
with Brentano was now that of a historical debt.
Thus Brentano's and Husserl's perspectives oftheir teacher-student relat-
ionship did not match. F or Brentano Husserl was the eager but wayward
student whom he could not teach. F or Husserl Brentano was the indispensable
teacher who had supplied hirn with the tools for his own emancipation toward a
more radical start. The human problems of this emancipation are reflected in
their correspondence. But it also shows movingly how some of their personal
friendship survived their philosophical separation.
NOTES
APPENDIX
* These two letters by Husserl have been published in Grazer Philosophische Studien 6 (1978),
pp. 1-12.
143
The following essay, which accompanied the publication ofthe syllabus forthe
four lectures on "Phenomenological Method and Phenomenological Philo-
sophy" which Edmund Husserl delivered at the University of London in
June 1922,2 is chiefly an attempt to salvage an episode in the history of
phenomenology which is rapidly becoming inaccessible. Some of its most
important parts are in all probability past recovery. The special reason for this
attempt is the present revival of interest in phenomenology in England. This
remarkable, if not amazing, comeback makes it doubly important to leam
some of the facts about its largely-forgotten past record.
As far as I can tell, the living memory of Husserl's London lectures has
practically disappeared. In my inquiries since about 1954 I have been unable
to find anyone with the exception ofMrs. G. E. Moore who remembered as
much as the fact ofthese lectures. There is no record ofthem in the files ofthe
University of London except for an entry in the "University of Landon
Gazette" for 7th June, 1922, announcing the forthcoming four lectures;3 the
only references to them I have come across in the literature occurs in C. K.
Ogden and I. A. Richards' The Meaning of Meaning of 1923,4 and in a
"Survey of Recent Philosophical and Theological Literature" by George
Dawes Hicks. 5 The only other printed evidence is Husserl' s own mention ofthe
lectures in his Preface of 1930 to the English edition of W. Boyce Gibson's
translation of his "Ideen" (p. 22) where he referred to them as a less mature
form of the Paris lectures of 1929, later expanded into the "Cartesian
Meditations ."
Is there any explanation for this ne ar-total eclipse? Does ithold any lessons?
Before it makes sense to attempt an answer to these questions, the extant facts
of the case have to be assembled.
ad quem I can find is in Husserl's letter to Roman Ingarden ofDecember 24th, [1]
1921:
Denken Sie, die Londoner Universität hat mich officiell eingeladen, dort 4 Vorlesungen zu
halten. Ich habe angenommen, wohl Ende April oder Ende Juni. Ich werde bei Prof Hicks in
Cambridge logieren. [Imagine, the University ofLondon has invited me officially to deliver there
four lectures. I have accepted, probably for end of April or end of lune. I shall stay with Professor
Hicks in Cambridge.]6
about the scarcity ofhistorical references, especially in the Syllabus, and, most
significant, the omission of the names of any British philosophers. The best
explanation may well be that what mattered to Husserl on this occasion was
the first systematic development ofhis own new "system" (Husserl-Chronik,
p.257).
2. THE VISIT
The exact length ofthe Husserls' stay in England can no longer be ascertained. [3]
It lasted probably for two weeks from June 2 to June 15. Husserl's letter to
Dawes Hicks of 1930 makes it likely that the Husserls carried out the plan,
mentioned in the letter to Ingarden of December, 1921, of accepting Hicks'
hospitality at 9, Cranmer Road, Cambridge, about which he reminisced later
as folIows:
Mit niemand habe ich über die Grundgedanken dieser Schr(ft (Le., the Meditations
Cartesiennes which he had sent to Hieks) so anregende Gespräche gepflogen wie mit Ihnen - an
den unvergessenen schönen Abenden amfireplace in Ihrem Studierzimmer. [With no one did I
engage in such stimulating eonversations about the fundamental ideas of this text (i.e., the
Cartesian Meditations) as with you - on those unforgotten niee evenings in front ofthe fireplace
in your study.]
the topics discussed between the two in front of the fireplace at 9, Cranmer
Road. All the same, the personal relations between the two remained
unaffected by Hicks' possible philosophical disappointment as can be
gathered from Hicks' second invitation to Husserl in 1929, which he declined
in his letter of 1930.
But signs of Hicks' reservations toward, if not disenchantment with,
Husserl's later work can be culled from Hicks' later references to Husserl in his
Hibbert Surveys after 1922. Thus in his Survey of 1927, on the occasion of
commenting on Marvin Farber's Phenomenology as a Method and as a
Philosophical Discipline, Hicks voiced doubts about the possibility of
presenting Husserl's ideas in English. 18 In 1929 Hicks also reviewed briefly
Heidegger' s edition of" some extremely valuable lectures of Husserl deliver-
ed in Goettingen many years aga on the 'Phänomenologie des inneren
Zeitbewusstseins' ," published in the HusserlJahrbuch of 1928 (vol. 28, p. 165).
In 1931 he discussed W. R. Boyce Gibson's translation ofHusserl'sIdeen"
"indeed a formidable task": "It is to be hoped that, as a result ofhis labours, the
leading conceptions of a mode ofthought, now so influential in Germany, will
become better known than they are at present to students of philosophy in this
country. Ofthe value and interest ofthe mode ofthought in question there can
be no doubt (vol. 30, p. 167)." There is, however, no reference to either the
Formale und Transzendentale Logik of 1929 or theMeditations Cartr!siennes
(1931), both personal gifts from Husserl to Hicks, in the following surveys. But
in the Survey for 1936 (vol. 35, p. 451), when discussing the new international
Philosophia, Hicks singled out Husserl's first instalment of the Krisis as
"beyond question the most important contribution to the volume." The 1938
Survey (vol. 37, p. 156) begins with a two-page obituary ofHusserl, including
major events ofhis biography, but strangely omitting reference to the London
lectures.
What should also not go unmentioned is that in December, 1940, Hicks
"co-operated" actively in the founding ofthe International Phenomenological
Society and, at the time of his death, was a member of the Advisory
Committee,19 as the only British philosopher to have served in this capacity.
To this extent his interest in a wider phenomenology remained undiminished.
What then was Husserl's own retrospective appraisal of the London
lectures? According to RudolfBoehm2o he apparently thought for a short while
of publication, but then enlarged them into a "system of philosophy in the
sense of phenomenology and in the form of' meditations on first philosophy'."
But this was only the beginning of further transformations which led to the
Paris lectures and the Cartesian Meditations. Even in his letter of 1930 to
Hicks, Husserl stated that he had found it necessary to execute concretely
(konkrete Durchführung) the fundamental ideas ofthe London lectures, that
151
he had deepened them in the Paris lectures, and that he was to enlarge them
further in the German edition of the Cartesian Meditations.
Perhaps even more revealing was what Husserl told Dorion Cairns in a
conversation on August 28th, 1931.21 Here, in response to one of Cairns'
remarks about the problem ofthe right beginning in phenomenology, Husserl
commented on the fact that this point had made hirn dubious about his own
attempts of giving introductions. A first attempt, destined not only to introduce
other people to phenomenology but also to provide hirnself with guide lines,
had been the series of lectures he had given in London. A later attempt had
been the Paris lectures, and a stilliater one the German text ofthe Cartesian
Meditations. So Husserl admitted that in London he was actually pursuing a
double purpose, namely to introduce phenomenology to his (British) audience
and at the same time to provide guidance for hirns elf. How far were the two
purposes compatible?
Also, on September 1st he confessed that "for years he had been under the
illusion that it would be a comparatively simple matter to write a 'popular'
introduction, but that in reality all his attempts throughout the last ten years,
attempts which had resulted in the London and Paris lectures and the French rIO]
Meditations, had been without satisfactory results."
Husserl's dissatisfaction with his own achievement is, of course, nothing
new. And in many ways it does hirn credit. But in this particular case it has
special significance. For it poses the question not only of an introduction to
phenomenology in general, but of the proper introduction for a British
audience.
What kind of a response might one expect from a typical English listener to
Husserl's cycle? In order to answer this question one must try to put oneself
into the place of a listener generally interested in German philosophy, but not
yet briefed ab out any of its recent developments.
From this perspective one might assurne that the title, with its promise of an
introduction to a new method and to a philosophy based on it, had aroused his
interest, together with the fact that the announcement listed such leading
British philosophers as James Ward and G. E. Moore from Cambridge
University, in addition to Wildon Carr and Dawes Hicks from the University
ofLondon as chairmen ofthe four lectures. Even the topics announced for each
one of the four lectures, beginning with "The Aims of Phenomenological
Philosophy" may weIl have sounded attractive. Also, for those not sufficiently
sure of their command of German there was the reassuring promise of an
152
English syllabus as a listening guide. In fact, one may weIl suspect that for a
good part of the audience this syllabus provided the major basis for
understanding what went on during the German reading. It might, therefore,
be weIl to reflect first independently on how this syllabus must have struck the
typicallistener. In trying to reconstruct his reaction I am referring to the text of
the syllabus as published in the Journal 01 the British Society lor
Phenomenology.
The very first sentences must have startled the audience. What are "the
fundamental considerations" to which Husserl he re refers and from which the
phenomenological method is supposed to have arisen? And what is the point of
an unspecified "radical change of the attitude of natural experience and
knowledge" which it promises? This is supposed to "open out" a "peculiar
realm of given entities" of which Descartes' "ego cogito" is mentioned as
the prime example. Is this Cartesianism all over again? Then, this new
realm is identified with "transcendental phenomenological subjectivity as
immediate phenomenological self-experience," an experience which is not
supposed to be psychological experience. Why "transcendental," a term at
once associated in England with Kantian philosophy? Why"subjectivity"?
And what does "phenomenological" mean in this context? N ext, the reader is
told that this makes possible an apriori science extracted purely from concrete
phenomenological intuition. All these claims must have struck the unprepared
audience as extremely puzzling and certainly thus far as mere assertions.
The second paragraph can only have added to this puzzlement by speaking
of the transformation of the originally "egological" phenomenology into a
"transcendental sociological phenomenology" -incidentally a term which
Husserl never seems to have used elsewhere. Equally strange must have
sounded the next claim, namely that a systematically consistent development
of phenomenology would lead necessarily to an all-comprehensive logic
concerned with the correlates "knowing-act," "knowledge-significance," and
"knowledge-objectivity." Wh at weird conception of logic does this imply?
And what does it mean that this transcendental phenomenology realises the
idea of a "first philosophy"? Is this anything like Aristotle's metaphysics or
Descartes'? Supposedly it contains in itself "the systematically-arranged
totality of all possible apriori sciences, the principles of construction for the
apriori forms of all the sciences of realities for all possible worlds." Since when
is it to be taken for granted that all sciences have such apriori principles?
In a second section of the first lecture we are supposed to learn about the
Cartesian way to the ego cogito and the method of phenomenological
reduction. It begins with mere key phrases hinting at the connection of this
approach with the Platonic Tradition in philosophy. They are followed by such
claims as: "The necessary form of the philosophical beginning" is a
"meditation on the '1'," and "The ultimate basis of all philosophy must
153
that such disciplines as mathematics are naively dogmatic. These sciences are
said to be contained in phenomenology. This, we are told, is the realisation of
the original and genuine idea oflogic in the Platonic sense. "Historicallogic,"
too, is called dogmatic. The exploration of its necessary requirements is
claimed to lead to transcendental phenomenology.
Next, transcendental monadism is said to make "essence requirements" of
the individual monads and of the condition of compossible monads, now called
a "metaphysical inquiry." Here we have clearly arrived in the Leibnizian
world. The topics of teleology, the world, its history and the problem of God
are added. But the bases for these abrupt claims remain unexplained. From
he re we are referred back to the world of non-a priori facts. These in turn are
supposed to lead to the knowledge of possibilities as their presupposition. The
ideal goal for the future is an absolute theory of monads. And a single universal
science on a single universal foundation is to take the place of independent
sciences, which is none other than transcendental phenomenology.
How many English readers will have followed Husserl to this climax? There
is, of course, a good chance that those who could keep up with Husserl's
German delivery ofthe lectures were able to make better sense ofthe syllabus
than by simply reading it. And here one would like to know whether and how
far the actuallectures followed the text ofthe syllabus and ofhis typed text, how
far Husserl simplified or complicated it, how far he improvised, etc. The
following section will make at least a preliminary study of the relation between
the syllabus and the typed text of the lectures.
Thus far the text of the lectures has not yet been published. My subsequent
observations are based on a first examination of the transcript of the text, as
typed out by Ludwig Landgrebe, Husserl's assistant at the time. On the basis of
this examination I have come to the definite conclusion that Husserl had
composed the syllabus before writing out the lectures and that he used it as an
outline in preparing them. Specific evidence for this conclusion can be found at
the very start (M II 3 b, p. 2 of the typescript), where Husserl refers his
listeners to the succinct theses of the syllabus in their hands as something
which he does not want to duplicate in the lecture, hence in a sense as the basic
aid for the understanding ofthe lecture itself. Later, in the third lecture (p. 64),
Husserl refers to a thesis to be found in the syllabus as something which he has
now demonstrated in the lecture, namely, that all questions ofphilosophy are
either transcendental-phenomenological or non-sensical.
In contrast to the syllabus in its often peremptory and sketchy style, the
lectures develop a continuous argument. Thus in the first two lectures Husserl
155
familiar with British philosophy from Locke to Mill, but recommended the
British empiricist philosophers as one of the best, if not the best, approach to
transcendental phenomenology,23 calling for instance Hume "almost the first
phenomenologist."24 Besides, his Britannica article uses the "phenomeno-
logical psychology" ofLocke and the British empiricists as stepping stones for
showing the need for transcendental phenomenology.
The truth, as it now emerges, seems to be that Husserl did not think ofthese
lectures as an introduction für a British public. In fact, as it turns out, he soon r11]
forgot about his audience completely and thought ofthe text chiefly as a guide
for hirnself, a .new way out of the mazes of his own thought.
Perhaps the clearest confirrnation of this interpretation can be found in a
postcard which Husserl wrote less than three months after the lectures on
September 1st, 1922 to one of his former Goettingen students, the later
Socialist Prussian Minister of Education, Adolf Grimme:
Dieses Jahr war eine Zeit grosser Besinnungen. Ich durchdachte noch ein letztes Mal die
principiellen Grundgedanken und Grundlinien der Phänomenologie. Demgemäss wählte ich
auch das Themo für meine Londoner Vorträge (Phänomenologische Methode und phänomeno-
logische Philosophie), die schön ausfielen, aber ziemlich schwierig waren. [This year was a time
of great meditations. For a last time I thought through the basic principles and guide lines of
phenomenology. Accordingly I chose the theme for my London conferences (Phenomenological
Method and Phenomenological Philosophy) which turned out beautifully, but were rather
difficult.]
5. SOME LESSONS
sensitivity for the difficulties and needs of one's audience. What I am pleading
for is the attitude of epistemic humility withaut relativism, which never
presupposes that one is right, and even less that one has a right to be right. If
one is right, and thinks one can demonstrate it, one has to earn this right by
patiently and empathically considering and understanding the case for
alternative positions, which through no merit of our own we happen not to
occupy.
NOTES
1From the Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, vol. 1, No. 1, January 1970,
pp. 3-15.
2 Published in the same issue ofthis Journal, pp. 16-23.
3Letter by J. T. Richnell, B.A., F.L. A., Goldsmith Librarian ofthe University ofLondon Library
ofMay 30,1968.
4 C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning (Tenth Edition), p. 269.
5 Hibbert Journal XXII (1922),182; see below note 14.
6 Edmund Husserl, Briefe an Roman Ingarden. The Hague,Martinus Nijhoff, 1968, p.24.
1See my The Phenomenological Movement. The Hague, Nijhoff, 1969, p. 624.
8See Helen Bosanquet, Bernard Bosanquet. Oxford 1924, p. 145.
9 Recent evidence from the Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University in the form ofhis
letters to his brother Frank of June 3,10 and July 1, 1918 show that he had promised G. F.
Stout a review of the Logische Untersuchungen for Mind, which never materialized; this
explains Mind's apparent neglect of this work.
10 Letter of August 26, 1968, from the Librarian, Miss J. L. Randall-Cutler.
II Personal letter of April 5, 1968.
·12 For a late confirmation of this possibility see the Postscript.
13 Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Society for 1921-22, p. 228.
14 Letter ofDecember 14, 1922: "In England fand ich wärmste Aufnahme, nachträglich hat mich
die Arist. Soc. z. Corresp. Mitglied gemacht." (In England I found a very warm reception;
subsequently the Aristotelian Society has made me a corresponding member). Edmund
Husserl, Briefe an Roman Ingarden, p. 25.
15" Last June Professor Edmund Husserl delivered, on the invitation ofthe University ofLondon,
at University College a remarkable series of lectures on 'Phänomenologische Methode und
Phänomenologische Philosophie'; and these lectures will, it is hoped, be published in English at
no distant date." (XXII, 182).
16 1 call it "iII-fated" in view ofthe fact that the fourth and last version of Husserl's German draft,
now published in Husserliana IX (pp. 277-301) was not only telescoped by the translator but
also paraphrased to such an extent that the original is hardly recognizable and at times distorted.
17See. e.g., W. G. DeBurgh, "George Dawes Hicks" in Proceedings ofthe British Academy
XVII (1941), p. 415.
18" It is far from being an easy task, for Husserl and his followers have introduced a whole galaxy of
new technical terms, for many ofwhich it is well-nigh hopeless to lookfor English equivalents."
(vol. 27, p. 166).
19 See the obituary by John Wild in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 11
(1942),266-7.
20 Husserliana VII, p. xxii. See also Briefe an Roman Ingarden, p. 26. .
21 See Dorion Cairns, Conversations with Husserl and Fink, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff,
1976, p. 27.
22 Vom Gesichtspunkt der Phänomenologie (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), p. 26.
23 See my "Perspektivenwandel" in Edmund HusserI1859-1959, p. 58.
160
24 About Husserl's strong sympathy for and interest in English and American philosophy, see also
the diary note by Ralph Barton Perry quoted in Husserl-Chronik, p. 363.
25 Now available in the translation by Richard Palmer in JBSP 2 (1971), 77-90.
26 Collected Papers I (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 119.
Husserl had a fine time at Cambridge at Hicks' house, and had greatly enjoyed the evening chats by
the fire, leather arm-chairs and smoke. He had met Ward there and, by accident, Stout, who was
examining at Cambridge.
Husserl met Broad and Stout at Cambridge. They were external examiners there. Couldn't get on
with Stout, as Stout couldn't speak German. Had to do everything through an interpreter. Took to [14]
Moore. Moore admired the Logische Untersuchungen, but couldn't swallow Ideen.
Even allowing for the indirectness of this information and the time lag
between 1922 and 1928, the names ofthe British philosophers in this account
can hardly be questioned.
As to J ames Ward, the H usserllibrary, now in Louvain, contains a copy of
his Naturalism and Agnosticism with Husserl's entry "Geschenk des
Verfassers, Cambridge, Juni, 1922." His Psychological Principles, likewise
there, show a pencil note "Geschenk von G. Dawes Hicks, Cambridge, 1922,
Juni."
The contact with Stout could have been particularly meaningful in view of
Stout's interest in Brentano, ofwhich Husserl was aware, but also in Meinong
and Husserl hirnself. Husserl owned Stout's Analytical Psychology of 1896,
but only in a second hand copy. His in ability to communicate with Stout could
have been intensified by Stout's being "terribly deaf"; see C. D. Broad inMind
41 (1945),285. This has just been confirmed by a long letterfor which I am
indebted to his son, A. K. Stout. He also supplied ample correspondential
161
evidence for Stout's continued high regard for Husserl such as sending one of
his students to Husserl in 1933 for special tutoring.
In the case of C. D. Broad the Husserllibrary has two interesting items: his
Perception, physics and Reality (1914) with a personal dedication, and,
perhaps even more revealing, Part 11 (only) ofW. E. Johnson'sLogic (1922)
with the inscription "To Prof. Husserl with kind regards from C.D.B." Could it
be that this gift was related to the striking parallel between Johnson's
conception of"intutive induction" in Chapter VIII and Husserl' s Wesensschau
("ideating abstraction")? A letter card by C. D. Broad of April 27th, 1937,
also in the Husserl Archives, acknowledges the receipt of a reprint ofHusserl's
"Die Krisis der europaeischen Wissenschaften" (Philosophia I), "which I
have been reading with much interest."
The information about G. E. Moore's admiration for the Logische
Untersuchungen and rejection of the Ideen, is at best puzzling. Personally I
find it hard to reconcile it with the factthat, when in 1937 I had several contacts
with Moore while attending his Cambridge lectures and had introduced myself
as a student ofphenomenology, Moore never responded to this cue. Nor did
Broad. And, unfortunately, no one referred me to the stillliving crown witness
of the story of this article, G. Dawes Hicks.
11. ON THE MISFORTUNES OF HUSSERL'S
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA ARTICLE
"PHENOMENOLOGy"j
Phenomenology denotes a new, descriptive, philosophical method, which, since the concluding
years ofthe last century, has established (I) an apriori psychological discipline, able to provide
the only secure basis on which a strong empirical psychology can be built, and (2) a universal
philosophy, which can supply an organum for the methodical revision of all the sciences.
I merely want to point out that this "translation" reverses the order of
phenomenological philosophy and phenomenological psychology; that it
implies that the new apriori psychology has been already "established" since
before 1900; that the new method has also established a "universal philo-
sophy," i.e., presumably an aIl-comprehensive system, and not only "the tool
for a rigorously scientific philosophy"; that it supplies also a tool for the
"methodical revision of all the sciences," not only "makes possible a
methodical reform."
One may sympathize with the plight of the space-pressed would-be
translator, especially in the later sections of the text. But one might at least
have hoped for some indication that the author of this text was no longer
"E.Hu." as the signature under the article still implied, but rather that the
reader was confronted with free and at times wild paraphrases of Husserl's
own text. However, this may weIl have been impossible under the editorial
rules of the Britannica.
Nothing seems to be known about the aftermath ofthe publication. Whether
Husserl himself saw the published article, either in a complete set of the
Britannica or in a reprint, is no longer ascertainable. All that can now be found
in the Husserl Archives is the dedicated personal copy of Salmon's typescript
without reading marks.
There are, however, some strange pie ces ofnegative evidence for Husserl's
final response. When at the end of his "Author's Preface to the English
Edition" ofhisldeas Husserl suggested additional readings, he failed to list the
Encyclopaedia article, his only other published text in English, on which he
had spent so much time and labour foul" years before. Only W. R. Boyce
Gibson mentioned this article in his own "Translator' s Preface" in introducing
C. V. Salmon, its translator, as his helper. Nor am I familiar with any other
mention of this article in Husserl's later writings, letters (except the one to
Pfänder) and conversations, including those with Dorion Cairns. Clearly,
Husserl did not consider the final result of his effort a success.
Unfortunately he had ample reasons. But now, thanks to the labours of
Prof. Richard E. Palmer, Husserl can at last speak to the Anglo-American
readers he had in mind without the Procrustean restrictions of space-conscious
word counters and paraphrasers. At least in this piece, in contrast to the
London lectures, Husserl did refer to the British empiricists as pacemakers for
165
NOTES
ON THE TEXT
The diary has come to the fore only recently when his sons, Professors
A. Boyce Gibson (University ofMelbourne) and Quentin Gibson(Australian
National University) turned over extensive excerpts from this private docu-
ment in transcript to the Husserl Archives in Louvain. I am personally
indebted to them for sending me not only another copy but lending me
a photocopy of the original, after Professor H. L. Van Breda of the Husserl
Archives had asked me through Dr. Mays to undertake an edition far
the JBSP. Bur I am even more in their debt for the prompt help they gave
me during the actual work on this text: Professor A. Boyce Gibson chiefly
far background information about his father, which it would have been
difficult, if not impossible, for me to collect without his assistance, Professor
Quentin Gibson for his careful check on my transcription, which was based in
part on his own, and for his comments. Their permission for the publication,
approval of my selections and concrete suggestions make me feel that this
should almost be considered ajoint edition. I can only claim credit for most of
the explanatory notes not identified as theirs and for this introduction.
The original of this diary consists of handwritten notes jotted down on the
167
pages of a desk diary for the year 1926 with one sm all page per day. The
pertinent entries begin on April 30 and end with the double sheet for
Oetober 16 and 17. However, the aetual dates ofthe entries soon emancipate
themselves from those given at the top of each page, ending with one for
November 16. While for many days there are no entries, reports for others
eover several pages.
The distinctive handwriting is on the whole clearly legible, even to outsiders.
Only in very few pi aces doubts remain about the reading of certain words.
Question marks within brackets follow such words in this edition. In most
cases, Mrs. Ruth Jackson, my indefatigable critical typist, found the solution.
Professor Quentin Gibson solved the remaining uncertainties.
One's first impression may weil be that these notes were meant only for the
writer himself as aids to his memory. This is certainly true for many items here
omitted. However, not only have these memos been prepared with unusual
care, but they also increasingly give me the impression that the writer meant
them to be intelligible to others, even where he did not write in eomplete
sentenees. The fact that they are intelligible and, what is more, intensely
interesting, justifies their publication.
According to Professor Quentin Gibson, his extract "comprised the major
part of the entries made in Freiburg. The only omissions are of incidental
personal items, some accounts of diseussions other than philosophical- in
particular those with Professor (Hermann) Kantorowicz (professor of juris-
prudence) and his friends and with Frau Husserl on English and on Russian
literature, and brief aceounts of discussions with Professor Jonas Cohn
(professor ofphilosophy and pedagogics) (information about recent German
philosophical writings)." I omitted also the section about a revisit to Jena at the
end of the summer semester, some general observations about German
universities at the time, including Husserl's comments on them. Not included
are also several second-hand stories by witnesses who are elearly uninformed
or gossiping. The criterion for inclusion in this seleetion was the interest each
entry has for a better understanding ofthe state ofphenomenology in Freiburg
in 1928.
Meanwhile let us hope that someone will have the requisite courage, insight, leisure, and
familiarity with the niceties of philosophical speech to translate this great thinker into readable
English. It would be something really worth doing.
170
Apparently it took Boyce Gibson five more years and two months of his
Freiburg stay before he feit ready to take on his own assignment by asking for
Husserl's permission.
About the actual visit to Freiburg not much more can now be established
than what transpires from the diary itself. However, Professor Quentin
Gibson, who accompanied his parents as a schoolboy, informs me that, in
accordance with the Australian academic calendar, his father had taken the
whole year 1928 as a sabbatical, spending two months in Italy, a few weeks in
England in the summer and one month in Paris in the autumn. The
approximately six months in Freiburg were the central part of the European
year.
As to later contacts between Boyce Gibson and Husserl, eight letters by
Husserl to Boyce Gibson between December 24,1928 and lune 3,1935 are
now in the Husserl-Archives (see Husserl-Chronik, p. 499). The first letter
reveals that Boyce Gibson had sent to Husserl on November 19 a highly
appreciative farewell message. It contains an acknowledgment of Boyce
Gibson's book on logic, and mentions a second letter from Boyce Gibson,
which had alarmed Husserl because of an apparent hitch in the translation
project, perhaps in connection with the problem of finding a publisher. But
apparently Boyce Gibson went ahead with the task anyhow. To be sure, in
December 1930 Husserl had not yet heard about the production ofthe book,
and therefore told Boyce Gibson that he would have to publish the Nachwort,
the German equivalent to his Preface to the translation, in the Jahrbuch for
1930. Anyway, the translation itself was published by Allen and Unwin
(London) and Macmillan (New York) in 1931.
What was Boyce Gibson's final response to phenomenology? The only
indication in print can be found in one of his last essays on "What is
Philosophy?" which he had read in Melboume, 1933,6 where he distinguished
two types of philosophy, "the philosophy which aims at a life-view or world
view, as the expression goes," and the other which "eschews poetry and has
affinities with science and indeed seeks to outdo science in rigour and
precision." Then he states:
The Phenomenology ofHusseri and his followers aims at this thoroughgoing rigour, and it regards
the speculative world-views and Iife-views as amateurish, subjective, unphilosophical. We need
not be so extreme. The logical and the phenomenological foundations of philosophy are certainly
most important, but so are its contacts with life and conduct, and the rigidity required by one may
be deadening to the other. Let us then accept this twofold conception of philosophy as inwardly
related to poetry and religion, on the one hand, and to science and mathematics on the other ...
(p.94).
Why is this personal diary jotted into an old calendarworth not only preserving
but publishing today? After all, it presents the perspective of German events by
a foreign observer unfamiliar with the scene at a time when there were many
better prepared observers around, some of them still alive.
To begin with, the very fact that the diary is written by an outside observer,
rather than by a local German participant, gives it a special value. That this
observer was British and by academic background and seniority an unusually
qualified one, makes it particularly relevant to an English readership. The only
comparable witness, the much younger Christopher Salmon, apparently left
no comparable record. The only similar one, the American Dorion Caims' s
record of his conversations with Husserl and Eugen Fink, st.ems with one
exception of 1926 from the years 1931 and 1932, when Husserl was already in
retirement. 7
But this diary is unique even from a more general standpoint. Thus far no
comparable first-hand account from German or other sources has come to the
surface, particularly not for the year 1928 with its fateful transition from
Husserl's to Heidegger's Freiburg. True, Boyce Gibson did not and could not
know the inside story with its tragic implications, especially for Husserl. This
does not diminish the value of an ac count of how the transition looked in the
perspective of an unbiased outside witness.
The primary interest of the diary attaches, of course, to Boyce Gibson's
perspective ofHusserl, in whom he was principally interested. The picture ofhis
personality as it appeared to Boyce Gibson at this time, both as a teacher and
as a human being is certainly a remarkable tribute. But even more important is
the information he elicited from Husserl, especially on matters of Anglo-
American interest, such as his views on David Hume and on his visit to
England.
But the diary also throws interesting light on the Heidegger of 1928, his first
impact upon retuming to Freiburg and his relations to Husserl at the time.
Clearly, notwithstanding some initial amusement about Heidegger's
appearance, Boyce Gibson was impressed by his teaching, although he knew
hirn then only by reputation, including Husserl's recommendations. While
Boyce Gibson was not yet aware ofthe developing rift soon after Heidegger's
arrival, one may wonder in retrospect whether Heidegger's reticence at the
farewell party ofNovember 15 had not struck hirn as peculiar. In connection
with Boyce Gibson's interest in Heidegger's metaphysicalleanings, it seems
worth pointing out that he could not yet have heard his inaugural lecture on
"What is Metaphysics?" delivered on July 24, 1929, which, incidentally, did
not contain a single word about Husserl's phenomenology.
172
NOTES
I From the Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, vol. 2, No. 1, J anuary, 1971,
pp. 58-62.
2 See Karl Schuhmann, Reine Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie, The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973, pp. 163-192, and Husserliana UI!2, pp. 627-651 ("Aus dem
Gibson-Konvolut").
3 "William Ralph Boyce Gibson." The Austratasian Journal ofPsychology and Philosophy
XIII (1935), 85-92.
4 See "Husserl in England," eh. 10 above.
5 Mind XXXIV (1925),pp. 311-327.
6 The Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy XI (1933),88-98.
7 Conversations with Husserl and Fink, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976.
8 It should not go unmentioned that, as Professor Quentin Gibson writes me, his father was "hit
hard" when in the thirties the Euckenbund sent hirn Nazi propaganda materials, to the extent
that he severed all his earlier connections with it.
13. HUSSERL'S APPROACH TO PHENOMENOLOGY FOR
AMERICANS: A LETTER AND ITS SEQUEU
The two letters here published were discovered around 1963 by Professor
Margaret Van de Pitte of the U niversity of Alberta at Edmonton, at that time a
graduate student at the University of Southern California, "in a cardboard
folder stacked on a shelf with a few others not related to phenomenology" at
the School of Philosophy of the University. I am greatly indebted to her for
having drawn my attention to this exchange between E. ParI Welch and
Edmund HusserI and for additional helpful inquiries. However, her efforts to
find out why the forgotten letters had landed and remained there were
unsuccessful. One can only surmise that Welch, who at the time was a Ph.D.
candidate at the School, had taken them there and never reclaimed them. The
two letters were preceded by a separate page with the title "Letter concerning
phenomenology by Edmund Husserl in Answer to a Communication by
E. ParI Welch."
Welch's letter, which he, through his son, Professor Cyril Welch ofMount
Alison University, has kindly permitted me to publish together with Husseri's
reply, is printed first, since it throws important light on the content and
arrangement of HusserI's reply.
But my main gratitude goes to Professor Gerhart HusserI who gave me
permission to publish his father's letter.
Before presenting Welch's letter of inquiry and Husserl's response one might
do weil to explore the possible reasons for the interest in phenomenology at the
California School of Philosophy reflected in Welch's inquiry. One likely
hypothesis would be the affinity between the personaIistic philosophy of its
Director, Ralph T. Flewelling, and the variety of personalism which he seems
to have suspected in phenomenology, especially in the "ethical personalism"
ofMax Scheler. This is borne out by the topic ofW elch' s dissertation on "Max
Scheler's Philosophy of Religion. A Study in Phenomenology" and parti-
174
cularly by its preface. This affinity is of course much less clear in the case of
Husserl. But Scheler's tributes to Husserl as the fountainhead ofphenomeno-
logy were all the more reason to explore Husserl's philosophy.
Welch, whose doctoral committee included Flewelling, had, according to
his letter, written to Husserl before in 1932, receiving" one or two" letters in
reply. But since none ofthis preceding correspondence seems to have survived,
one can only suspect that it was related to an earlier phase of Welch's thesis
project. Welch's new letter ofMay 9,1933 was clearly an attempt to secure
more specific aid for his Scheler dissertation, though he did not mention his
name, which at this time Husserl would certainly not have appreciated.
Why would Husserl write a nine-page letter to a young American Ph.D.
candidate, which, according to its date line kept him occupied for four days
(June 17-21)? Among the possible explanations the following seem to me
singly or cumulatively plausible:
1. Welch introduced himself as "on the staff of the School of Philosophy."
Actually he seems to have been merely a research fellow for 1933-1934,
whose name does not figure in the university catalogue. To an uninformed
European such an introduction could only mean that the writer was at least a
"Privatdozent" and as such a "colleague" ("Kollege" as Husserl addresses
him) far beyond the level of a Ph.D. candidate. From Welch's statement that he
was writing a book on the "philosophy of religion of the phenomenological
school," Husserl could hardly gather that this was merely the dissertation on
Max Scheler, which Welch was to submit in 1934.
2. Some ofthe questions raised in Welch's letter made Husserl particularly
aware ofthe problem ofthe proper introduction to the latest, most radical form
of his philosophy.
3. Husserl was particularly anxious to warn Americans about wrong
approaches through misleading introductions and his own earlier works, even
those translated, and to point out the only possible right way through his latest,
largely untranslated writings.
4. Husserl thought of this occasion as an opportunity to promote the
academic fortunes of his student-friend Dorion Cairns, in whom he saw the
future of American phenomenology, as the end ofthe letter and its postscript
amply show.
in the year 1932, but you may pardon a student of philosophy profoundly inter-
ested in you and your work ifhe ventures to address you once again. I am now
on the faculty of the School of Philosophy he re at the University of Southern
California. Being a thorough-going convert to your movement, and writing a
book on the philosophy of religion of the phenomenological school, I find
myself in need of your aid on one or two important matters.
I am devoting an entire seetion to you and your thought in the way of
introducing the reader to the general standpoint ofPhenomenology. Because of
the extreme importance of your thought I am very anxious to present a
thorough and adequate description ofthe philosophy ofPhenomenology to the
English-reading public. That is the reason I am taking the liberty of enlisting
your assistance. There has been but one book devoted to your school, that of
Marvin Farber's "Phenomenology as a Method and as a Philosophical
Discipline." Although this little work is good, it is by no means adequate or
comprehensive. I myself am undertaking the task of supplying the need for a
more comprehensive work. Unquestionably Phenomenology has areal and
much-needed message for American and English philosophy. Therefore, any
help you may be willing to render me will conduce greatly to the enlightenment
of our philosophers.
First of all, do you conceive your system as organically connected with any
philosophie predecessors? Do you feel it to be absolutely new and unique, or
do you believe yourselfto have drawn material from some ofthe great men and
their movements, e.g., Plato, Plotinus, and Descartes? Ifnot, how would you
define your attitude towards these, and in particular towards Plato's view of
essences?
Secondly, how do you deal with the problem of error? I have read your
"LU" and the "Ideen," but do not seem to be able to discover just how you
would solve this problem. Can there be such a thing as error in the intuition of
essences, or in the selection ofthe essences to be intuited? If so, how are we to
know when we err? What standard is one to employ? Ifyou have dealt with this
problem somewhere, and I have missed it, could you give me the reference?
Thirdly, can you tell me under whom you studied? When do you feel you
emancipated yourself from the influence of your teachers?
I believe you will realize the importance of this book to English and
American thought. I want to deal with these questions in order to avoid undue
criticism ofyour system. I will print only what you give me permission to print,
and shall, of course, gratefully acknowledge your assistance in the Preface.
Believe me
Very respectfully and sincerely yours
E. Pari Welch
176
sich allzu früh an eine Einleitung in die Phänomenologie wagte. Dazu war er
noch lange nicht reif genug. Es dürfte aus dieser Situation sich ergeben, dass
Sie fehlgehen würden, wenn Sie sich auf irgend eine der literarischen Darstel-
lungen meiner Phänomenologie stützen. (auch nicht auf die neueste von
Levinas "La theorie de l'intuition dans la Phenomenologie de Husserl,"
F. Alkan, 1930, welcher meine Phänomenologie mit der Heideggerischen auf
eine Ebene bringt und damit ihres eigentlichen Sinnes beraubt). Es wird keine
andere Möglichkeit geben als die, meine eigenen, begreiflicher Weise sehr
schwierigen Schriften zu studieren. Hier sind nun für das Verständnis einer
Philosophie, die im fortgehenden Werden und selbstbesinnlichem Klären
entstand, am allerwichtigsten die der spätesten und reifsten Periode: die
gleichzeitig entstandenen Schriften "Formale und transzendentale Logik"
(1929, separat und im "Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische
Forschung" Bd. X), sowie die nur in französischer Übersetzung erschienenen
"Meditations Cartesiennes" (Armand Colin, Paris, 1931). Wichtig ist auch
das "Nachwort" zur englischen Übersetzung meiner "Ideen" (am Besten die
ein wenig erweiterte deutsche Veröffentlichung im" Jahrbuch ... " Bd. XI., die
auch separat zu haben ist.)2
(3) Nun wird Ihnen schon, was ich bisher schrieb, lieber Herr College, fatal
klingen, da Ihr Thema eine Einheit der phänomenologischen Bewegung, also
so etwas wie eine einheitliche Philosophie dieses Namens voraussetzt,
während ich das leugne, nachdem ich lange genug gewartet habe, dass meinen
früheren Schülern aufgrund meiner den "Logischen Untersuchungen" nach-
folgenden Schriften die Augen aufgehen würden über das, was als eine völlig
neuartige und völlig radikale Philosophie im Werden war und ist. So kann man
z.B. von der Religionsphilosophie Schelers (oder Stavenhagens, oder
J. Herings) sprechen, aber mit Phänomenologie in meinem Sinne hat sie nichts
zu tun. Denn diese eröffnet mit der phänomenologischen Reduktion eine
prinzipiell neuartige Erfahrung, die nicht Welterfahrung ist, und stellt uns
damit direkt auf den absoluten Boden, den der "transcendentalen Subjekti-
vität." Dafür blieb leider die "phänomenologische Bewegung" blind. Fast alle
Darstellungen und kritischen Äusserungen von diesen Seiten über die
Reduktion sind so sinnverkehrend, dass ich Sie nur warnen kann. Es liegt im
Radikalismus der phänomenologischen Reform, dass sie vom Urboden der
neuartigen "transcendentalen Erfahrung" aus und in Gestalt einer systemati-
schen Analytik der Seinssinn konstituierenden transcendentalen Intentio-
nalität aufzuzeigen unternimmt, wie und in welchen Stufen in dieser die Welt
ihren Sinn und ihre Seins geltung gewinnt. Die philosophischen Probleme
erschliessen sich mit ihrem echten Sinn als transcendental-phänomenolo-
gisehe in einer wesensmässigen systematischen Stufenfolge. Es zeigt sich
dabei, dass die religiös-ethischen Probleme solche der höchsten Stufe sind.
(Sie sind also als wissenschaftliche nicht so billig zu haben, wie es
178
der im Grunde naive Ontologismus Schelers meinte.) Eben darum schwieg ich
mich in meinen Schriften über religionsphilosophische Probleme aus. Doch
sind in ihnen und den kommenden Publikationen schon die Wege vorgebahnt,
um zu ihnen hinzuarbeiten und die echten religions-philosophischen Probleme
zu formulieren.
(4) Zum Teil liegt die Antwort auf Ihre formulierten Fragen schon im
Vorstehenden. Ad 1. Meine Philosophie, bitte ich Sie, nicht ein" System" zu
nennen. Denn es ist gerade ihr Absehen, alle "Systeme für immer un-
möglich zu machen. Sie will strenge Wissenschaft sein, die in unendli-
chem Progress systematisch ihre Probleme, Methoden und Theorien
erarbeitet. Was meine Vorgänger anbelangt, so habe ich in einem gewissen
Sinne viele, ja alle grossen Philosophen der Geschichte, so fern alle, auch die
ich nie studierte, mindestens mittelbar auf meine Phänomenologie, wie auf
jede Philosophie der Gegenwart eingewirkt haben. Aber seitdem ich im
Zuendedenken des misslungenen, (weil nicht in rücksichtsloser Konsequenz
durchgeführten) Versuchs der Cartesianischen Meditationen, eine absolut
vorurteilslose Wissenschafts begründung zustande zu bringen, die phäno-
menologische Reduktion erreicht hatte, gab es für mich keine Philosophen,
von denen ich irgendwelche Ergebnisse hatte übernehmen können. Es gab
seitdem für mich nichts, und durfte auch nichts geben, das ich mir nicht auf
dem neuen Wege erarbeitet hätte. Und selbst Vorvermutungen müssten sich
auf ihm selbst als Arbeitshorizonte vorzeichnen und konnten nur dann als
Leitung für die wirklich erledigende Arbeit zugelassen werden.
(5)3 Meine ganze Entwicklung ist durch den Ausgang von F. Brentano
(meinem akademischen Lehrer) bestimmt- von dessen Psychologie, die zum
Grundcharakter des Psychischen die "Intentionalität" rechnete. Aber in der
Vertiefung in die Correlation zwischen den log. Idealitäten und ihren
intentionalen Correlaten (Log. Unt. Bd. II) gestaltete sich mir der Sinn einer
intentionalen Psychologie und ihrer analytischen Methode völlig um. Erst
nach den L.U. hob sich jedoch der radicale philosophische Unterschied
zwischen einer intentionalen Psychologie als positiver Wissenschaft und der
transz. Phänomenologie ab.
(6) Welche Rolle mein "Platonismus," mein energisches Eintreten fUr eine
universale Ontologie, also fur die Erarbeitung von Wesenseinsichten (für
das echte Apriori) in allen Erkenntnissphären, in meiner Entwicklung hatte
und welche neue Bedeutung er in der gereiften transcendentalen Phänome-
nologie gewinnt, darüber wird Sie am Besten meine "Formale und trans-
cendentale Logik" (insbesondere ihr H. Teil) aufklären, obschon darin nur die
"formale Ontologie" in Frage ist. Dank schulde ich für diesen "Platonismus"
dem bekannten Kapitel in Lotze's Logik, wie sehr seine Erkenntnistheorie
und Metaphysik mich stets abstiess. Plotin habe ich nie gelesen, auch die
gros sen Idealisten nach Kant habe ich nur in Bruchstücken kennen
179
gelernt, also nie eingehend studiert. Jetzt erst, nachdem die Phänome-
nologie aufgrund meiner Lebensarbeit den sicheren Gang wirklicher Wissen-
schaft gewonnen hat, (allerdings der grässte Teil meiner konkreten Unter-
suchungen harrt noch der Veröffentlichung), habe ich ein grosses Interesse
auch für sie als meine "Vorgänger." Denn nun kann ich sie als solche
verstehen, nämlich von meiner Phänomenologie aus und auf sie hin. Im
Grunde bin ich zu einem guten Teile Autodidakt. Aber es gibt eben, scheint
mir, Wenden der Wissenschaft, in denen es auf Autodidakten ankommt als
solchen, die nicht der Versuchung der Gelehrsamkeit unterliegen, Gedanken
der Tradition fortzubilden anstatt in deren eigene dunkle Tiefen, in ihre naiven
Voraussetzungen usw. selbstdenkend einzudringen. Im Übrigen habe ich vor
meinen philosophischen Studien ungefähr sieben Jahre ausschliesslich und
berufsmässig Mathematik und exakte Naturwissenschaft studiert und sicher-
lich von dem Geiste des Radikalismus der Weierstrass'schen Vorlesungen
Einfluss erfahren.
(7) Ad 2. Das Problem des Irrtums ist auf der ersten Stufe der Phänome-
nologie beschlossen in der Lehre von der "Modalisierbarkeit" aller Akte. D.h.
es tritt aufin der Erforschung des konstitutiven Aufbaus der Welt im Hinblick
auf die sich immer neu in Intention und Erfüllung vorzeichnende und
bewährende Einstimmigkeit des Seinssinnes: eine Einstimmigkeit durch
Einbrüche der "Modalisierungen" und durch immer neue "Korrekturen"
hindurch. In der höheren Stufe der Phänomenologie wird der Irrtum in eins mit
den Fragen des ethischen Lebens, des Lebens in echter oder unechter
Menschlichkeit, in letztlicher Befriedigung oder Unseligkeit, (einer indivi-
duellen und sozialen Harmonie und Disharmonie) von N euem zum Problem.
Es handelt sich um die allumfassende Problematik, die auch unter dem Titel
der universalen Teleologie angesprochen werden kann. Anders ausgedrückt
sind es die Probleme der Totalität, der transcendentalen Möglichkeit einer
seienden offenen, unendlichen transcendentalen Intersubjektivität, darin be-
schlossen der Möglichkeit "wahrer Selbsterhaltung" einer jeden, einzelnen
und sozialen, Subjektivität im unendlichen Zusammenhang. Die Probleme der
"universellen Harmonie," aber auch die der echten "Humanität" gewinnen
also als phänomenologische Probleme ihren absoluten, auf die transcen-
dentale Subjektivität bezogenen Sinn. So ist der oberste Abschluss für die
Problematik der phänomenologischen Philosophie die Frage nach dem
"Prinzip" der in ihren universalen Strukturen konkret erschlossenen Te-
leologie. Demnach ist das oberste "Konstitutionsproblem" die Frage nach
dem Sein des "Überseienden," eben dieses Prinzips, das eine in sich
zusammenstimmende Totalität der transcendentalen Intersubjektivität mit der
durch sie konstituierten Welt existenzmöglich macht, weshalb man es auch
platonisch als Idee des Guten bezeichnen könnte. (Natürlich darf aber hier
"'Idee" nicht Eidos besagen.) Mit all dem aber bewegt man sich innerhalb der
180
Dear Colleague,
(1) In the midst ofthe unrest ofthis time with its revolutionizing of our entire
German nation and its life, I was unable to answer your kind letter at once.
(2) I am of course very glad that my philosophie al endeavors arouse interest
even in America; endeavors which in the course of a constant inner evolution
through more than four decades have led to a fundamentally novel philosophi-
cal method and thereby to a completely novel philosophy. However, precisely
this novelty, compared with all the philosophical tradition, results in the extra-
ordinary difficulties in its accessibility. It is a hard imposition on those having
their pI ace within the history of philosophy and educated in its traditions to
"bracket" it entirely and not to make any use of it; and hence also not to make
181
any use of its presuppositions which have never been radically isolated, of the
most obvious obviousnesses of the experience of the world and of the logical
(scientific) thinking based upon it. On the other hand, it is necessary to make a
(well-)motivated approach, stafting from the tradition and the natural pre-
scientific experience (in wh ich everyone lives before phenomenology), which
leads upward to the revolutionary phenomenological reduction. And it takes
unusual consistency and energy ofthought to remain firm and not to fall back
into the tradition al ways of thinking, to really take hold of the new, without
falsifying it by such all too tempting relapses. The fact that someone was my
academic student or has become a philosopher under the influence of my
writings does not therefore mean by far that he has penetrated to areal
understanding of the inner meaning of my, the original phenomenology and its
method and does research into the new horizons of problems which I have
opened up, to which the future belongs (of which I have become completely
certain). This is true of almost all the students of the Göttingen and the first
Freiburg period, even of such famous men as Max Scheler and Heidegger, in
whose philosophies I see merely ingenious relapses into the old philosophical
naivetes. I have to refer in this context even to my close friend Jean Hering-
Strassburg with regard to the work "Phenomenologie et philosophie religi-
euse" ( Strasbourg 1925), which is certainly of interest to you. Of course this is
also true of Mr. Farber, whose philosophical education during his Freiburg
studies was my special concern. But it was not in my mind that he would risk all
too early an introduction into phenomenology. For this he was by far not yet
mature enough. From this situation it would seem to follow that you would go
astray if you rush at any of the literary accounts of my phenomenology (not
even at the latest by Levinas "La theorie de l'intuition dans la pheno-
menologie de Husserl" F. Alcan, 1930, who puts my phenomenology
on the same plane with that of Heidegger and thus deprives it of its proper
meaning). There will be no alternative to studying my own writings, which are
understandably very difficult. Here, for an understanding of a philosophy
.which arose in continuous development and reflective clarification the most
important writings are those of the latest and most mature period, Le., the
simultaneously developed texts Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929,
separately and in Jahrbuch vol. X) as weIl as the Meditations cartesiennes,
which have appeared only in French translation. Also important is the
Postscript to the English translation ofmy Ideen (its best form is the slightly
enlarged German publication in Jahrbuch, vol. XI, which is also available
separately).4
(3) However, [I realize], my dear colleague, that even what I have written
you thus far, will sound discouraging to you, since your topic presupposes the
unity of the Phenomenological Movement, hence something like a unified
philosophy ofthis name, whereas I deny its existence, after having waited long
182
enough for the possibility that as a result ofmy writings following theLogische
Untersuchungen the eyes of my former students would be opened up for what
was and still is in the making as a completely radical philosophy. Thus, for
instance, one can speak of the philosophy of religion of Scheler (or of
Stavenhagen or Jean Hering), but it has nothing to do with phenomenology in
my sense. For by way ofthe phenomenological reduction this phenomenology
opens up a fundamentally novel experience which is not mundane experience
and thus puts us directly on absolute ground, that of "transcendental
subjectivity." Unfortunately, the "Phenomenological Movement" remained
blind to this. Almost all the accounts and critical expressions from these
corners about the reduction distort its sense so much that I can only warn you.
It is part of the radicalism of the phenomenological reform that it undertakes to
demonstrate how and in what stages in this analytics the world acquires its
sense and its validity of being, as seen from the ultimate ground of
"transcendental experience" and in the form of a systematic analytics of the
transcendental intentionality which constitutes the sense of being. The
philosophical problems disclose themselves in their genuine meaning as
transcendental-phenomenological ones in an essential systematic series of
steps. On these occasions it becomes manifest that the religious-ethical
problems are problems of the highest level. (Consequently they cannot be
obtained as cheaply as Scheler's basically naive ontologism believed.) This is
precisely the reason why in my writings I kept silent about the problems of
philosophy of religion. However, in these and in my forthcoming publications
the roads are cleared in order to work one's way toward them and to formulate
the genuine problems of philosophy of religion.
(4) In part the answer to your formulated questions is contained in the
preceding.
As to question 1: May I ask you not to call my philosophy a "system." F or it
is precisely its objective to make all "systems" impossible once and for all. It
wants to be rigorous science, which in an infinite progression works its way
systematically toward its problems, methods and theories. As far as my
predecessors are concerned, I have in a sense many ofthem, even those whom
I never studied, have had at least an indirect effect on my phenomenology, as
they have had on every philosophy of the present. However, since the time
that, in thinking through the failure (since not carried through in ruthless
consistency) of the attempt of the Cartesian Meditations to achieve a
foundation for science free of all prejudice, I had reached the phenomeno-
logical reduction, there were no philosophers left for me from whom I could
have taken over any results. Since then there was nothing for me, nor by right
could there be anything, that I have not achieved for mys elf by the new
approach. And in this way even presuppositions had to outline themselves
[merely] as horizons for work and could be admitted merely as directives for
really decisive work.
183
The following remarks are to give the readers of the Husserlletter aids for
better understanding than the addressee seems to have achieved. I shall begin
185
manuscripts it appears that Husserl cherished the plan of condensing his final
insights into something he hirnself called a system. 6 Nevertheless, it remains
true that he had no intention ofrivalling any ofthe great systems such as those
of Aristotle or Hegel, and that he denied any substantial loans from them,
claiming that he had reached their conclusions independently by his own
method.
5. The hand-written paragraph-Iength marginal insertion about Franz
Brentano, about whom Welch had not inquired, is interesting proof that
Husserl did not want hirn to be forgotten, although he hirnself had developed
his master's "empirical psychology" into a psychology of intentionality and
finally into transcendental phenomenology.
6. The sixth paragraph takes up Plato's significance for Husserl's philoso-
phy. Here Husserl makes it plain that in his latest phase Platonism has become
subordinated to a transcendentalism for which even PI atonie essences are
constituted in consciousness. He also admits openly that he had not made an
intensive study ofpost-Kantian idealism, although he had lectured about it. I
am not familiar with other texts in which Husserl caIIs hirnself self-taught
("Autodidakt"), as he does in this letter. This is actually correct in the sense
that he had never taken an academic degree in philosophy. It is interesting that
in the letter Husserl connects his own radicalism with the lectures of his
mathematical teacher Karl Weierstrass, see Husserl-Chronik, p. 7.
7. The seventh paragraph tries to answer Welch's question about the
problem of error. Apparently this paragraph attracted the special attention of
the addressee, since translations of single words are pencilled on top of several
German words, not aII of them correct ones. Husserl's attempt to account for
error in terms of "modalizations" of acts clearly does not treat the traditional
problem under its usual name. The expression Modalisierbarkeit (possible
modalization) does not seem to occur in Husserl' s published writings up to that
time. However, it can be related to the discussions of modalities ofbelief in the
Ideen (par. 100ff.), which also mention the possibility ofthe transformations
ofbeliefs. Presumably error, though not itself a mode ofbelief, is to be explained
as the correlate of our changing modes ofbelief, revealing itselfwhen, e.g., our
belief in the Ptolemean system has changed into dis belief. However, it is not
surprising that this account could not make much sense to the uninitiated.
What might have been more helpful is what Husserl suggests by referring to the
consonance between intention and fulfiIIment and the coIIapses (Einbrüche)
and emendations (Korrekturen) in our constitution of the world. In other
words, error occurs in our experience wherever a crisis develops in the normal
fulfillments of our intentions and when the lack of fulfillment is followed
by a correction, thus revealing our having been in error. However,
at this point Husserl turns at once to the situation as it unfolds on
higher levels of our experience, including that of religious knowledge,
187
date line the incubation time for this letter extended over four days. Here was a
carefully considered attempt to give directions to an American scholar writing
from a new center of philosophy. This challenge gave Husserl a chance of
thinking through the wh oIe problem ofhow to introduce others to the maturest
stage of his radieal phenomenology, to survey critically the existing intro-
ductory literature and to develop some of his own ideas, not only about the
problem of error but about his religious teleology.
But what about the objective significance ofthe letter apart from Husserl's
own perspective? What light does it throw on Husserl's philosophy in general
or at least on a specific phase in its development? Here one ought to bear in
mind that this was the time when Husserl had practically abandoned work on
the German version of his Cartesian Meditations after having turned them
over to Eugen Fink; in this context it is not without interest that in
recommending this work to Welch, Husserl mentions merely the French
translation, and no longer holds out the prospect of an improved German
version. On the other hand the plan ofthe last work, the Crisis ofthe European
Sciences, which was to grow out ofthe Vienna and Prague lectures of1935 had
not yet been conceived. So Husserl was looking for new and better ways of
introducing the public to his transcendental phenomenology. That this new
phenomenology represented a radieal revolution, not yet sufficiently expressed
in his own earlier work was a conviction which Husserl has rarely, if ever,
expressed as sharply as in this letter. I am familiar with only one other occasion
during the same year, when he warned a student of G. F. Stout, visiting in
Freiburg, not only against approaching phenomenology via the history of
philosophy but even against his own earlier work. This may well have been the
period when he conceived of the radicalism, first announced in his 1922
Lectures at the University ofLondon, as an entirely new type ofphilosophy,
whose first literary expression was the Formal and Transcendental Logic of
1929.
My first impression after seeing this letter was that it might weU be
considered Husserl's "Epistle to the Americans." But on second thought I
have come to realize that this would be misleading. As a letter for Americans it
certainly does not make any attempt to show the relevance ofphenomenology
for American philosophers, which Husserl might weil have done in view of his
admiration for William J ames as a pioneer of phenomenological seeing and
describing. Husserl is simply speaking to a foreign scholar, realizing his
difficulty in ente ring into radieal phenomenology and offering hirn as the only
alternative to the study ofuntranslated text the help of a proven expert, Dorion
Cairns.
Thus the message of this letter is reaily addressed to all those who want to
enter Husserl's "most mature" philosophy directly. This was a problem with
whieh Husserl struggled increasingly as he came to realize that in his
189
radicalism he had left behind the entire Phenomenological Movement and had
maneuvered hirnself into a position of nearly solipsistic isolation. Husserl's
letter to Welch clearly reflects this realization. It also shows that for Husserl
his last period, beginning apparently with the London Lectures of 1922,
involved a drastic change in his philosophical development, to which a new
approach was indicated. Yet in 1933 all he could suggest was the study ofhis
publications since 1929 with no apparent hope that the German version ofthe
Cartesian Meditations would solve the problem. This makes it even more
understandable that he was looking for a completely new approach, which did
not develop until1935 with the Vienna and Prague lectures. In this regard the
letter to Welch shows Husserl at the half-way mark. He announces the radical
novelty ofhis final phenomenology. But he is still in search of a new road that
cou1d make it more accessib1e to newcomers, if not to oldtimers. Obvious1y
there could be no royal road to this phenomenology. But the letter to Welch
proves that Husserl had not yet given up hope that there was a way, and that
such devoted students as Cairns could show it.
(vol. 21, 1940, pp. 159-168) contains no mention ofthe 1933 invitation to the
Schoo1 of Phi10sophy, which pub1ished Flewelling's journal.
Husserl' s reply to the invitation does not seem to have survived, either at the
School of Philosophy or in the Husser1 Archives. Eut we know a good deal
about his reactions and about the very serious thought he gave to the possibility
of an asy1um in the States. The main source for this knowledge is his
correspondence with Dorion Cairns, whom he informed about the invitation in
a letter ofNovember 15. Here he declared at once that, while he feIt tempted to
go for one year, he would not consider doing so without Cairns as his assistant
and Eugen Fink as his collaborator(who, however, did not particu1arly like the
idea, as Husser1 added). So Husser1 asked Cairns for an immediate response
about his readiness to join hirn. A letter by Mrs. Husserl of November 29
mentioned the fact that Husserl had sent a first reply to Flewelling inquiring
among other things particularly about the possibility of a teaching assistant in
view ofhis difficulty of expressing hirnself in English. On December 9 Husserl
hirnself told Cairns that he had made his simultaneous appointment a pre-
condition (Grundbedingung) for his acceptance. On January 28, 1934
Mrs. Husserl reported to Cairns that there was .still no decision as to the
assistantship question. Flewelling had written on J anuary 13: "The most
difficult question for us would be to take on Dr. Cairns, as we have no notion
how much we would have to pay hirn." But Mrs. Husserl added that any other
solution would be "out of the question" and Cairns' s assistantship a conditio
sine qua non.
Cairns's own response to Husserl's original announcement in a letter of
January 17 made it plain that he would have been ready to go, although at the
time he was even more interested in the possibility of a lectureship at the N ew
School of Social Research, where Husserl had recommended hirn very
strongly to Max Wertheimer (see his letter ofDecembe: 12 and Cairns' reply
of January 12, 1934).
On May 18, Husserl began his letter to Cairns by telling hirn that the
negotiations with Los Angeles had failed. As his chief explanation he named
not his age,9 but the fact that his one basic condition, that of an appointment of
Cairns as his aide, had not been met, largely because of lack of funds.
Nevertheless, Husserl added that once this obstacle should disappear,
negotiations could be resumed in the following year.
All this makes it clear that Dorion Cairns was the key figure in the story of
Husserl's invitation to the United States. His place in Husserl's June letter to
Welch may have precipitated Flewelling's invitation. And when it came, the
failure of a collateral invitation to Cairns was a major reason for Husserl's
final "no."
Husserl in America - this possibility was by no means an idle dream. lO But
in view ofthe short span offour more years he was to live, one may weIl wonder
192
whether the move to America would have been a wise one, allowing him to
work as much or more than he actually did despite the worsening conditions
around him. Certainly it would have given Americans better access to him and
stimulated interest in his work considerably. In any case, it seems worth
recording that Husserl himself seriously considered such a move. The story of
this possibility, beginning with the Welch letter, should also not be forgotten in
view of its message to all students of his later philosophy in the N ew W orld. It
also serves as another reminder ofDorion Cairns' key role in the introduction
of Husserl's thought to America.
NOTES
1 Published as "Husserl's Way Into Phenomenology for Americans: A Letter and its Sequel"
from F. Kersten and R. Zanereds., Phenomenology: Continuation and Criticism. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1973, pp. 168-91.
2 [Husserl's footnote:] Lesenswert sind die [in] den letzten Jahrgängen der Deutschen Literatur-
zeitung erschienenen eingehenden Rezensionen dieser 3 Schriften von A. Gurwitsch und
F. [Alfred] SchUtz.
3 Handwritten insertion in margin of letter.
4[Husserl's footnote:] Also worth reading are the detailed reviews of these writings by
A. Gurwitsch and Alfred Schutz, which appeared in the latest volumes of the Deutsche
Literaturzeitung.
5For possible reasons see Chapter 11, "On the Misfortunes of Husserl's Encyclopaedia
Britannica Article 'Phenomenology'."
6 See Husserliana XV, pp. XXXIV-XLI.
7Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology (The University of California Press, 1939) and The
Philosophy oJ Edmund Husserl (Columbia University Press, 1941).
8 See The Forest Qf Yggdrasil: The Autobiography oJ Ralph T. Flewelling, edited by
W. H. W. Werkmeister and Wilbur Long. University of California Press, 1962, pp. xvii, 113.
9He did so in a letter to AdolfGrimme of April 25, 1934, also mentioning the demands of his
works (Husserl-Chronik, p. 446).
10 Actually Husserl's ashes came to the States, when after the war Mrs. Husserl, who had kept
them with her, joined her daughter Elisabeth Husserl Rosenberg, to whom I am indebted for
this information, in Arlington, Massachusetts. Only five years later could they be deposited
in Mrs. Husserl's grave in Günterstal near Freiburg.
14. A REVIEW OF WOLF GANG KÖHLER'S
THE PLACE OF VALUE IN A WORLD OF FACTS'
important, the very vaguest speculation has sometimes found a shelter under
the roof ofphenomenology. With such aberrations we cannot wish to have any
connection" (68).
Köhler's own phenomenological analyses are mostly given in chapter I1 and
III, which form the basis for the transphenomenological part of the book.
These chapters are chiefly concerned with the phenomenology of value or,
more gene rally, of requiredness, a term introduced by Max Wertheimer.7 It
is meant to include "logic" as weH as values in the narrower sense of the
word (37).
Köhler begins with a discussion of a few outstanding theories ofthis value-
phenomenon. Plato's account is rejected as actually eliminating value from the
real world and confining it to aseparate realm of its own without clarifying the
essence of the phenomenon under consideration. Kant, who did admit
"values" among the facts, nevertheless thought that their locus was in the
structure of the human mind; and he failed to account for the concrete forms
that requiredness assumes. Naturalism, being unable to account for such a
phenomenon, tried to get rid of its last remains with notoriously disastrous
results, not only for our civilization but for science itself. It was, in Köhler's
view, Husserl's lasting merit that he reinstated the "intrinsic requiredness" of
logic as something more than a mere fact. In an admittedly simplifying
statement of Husserl's most relevant insights special stress is laid on their
timeless ideal nature as represented by such truths as "Purpie is a visual
quality which as such has its place between red and blue." Against this
modernized Platonism Köhler raises two objections. The time-indifference of
these truths would not preclude their occurrence in the world offacts unless the
meaning of the term fact is unduly restricted. And, secondly, ideal truth has
immediate bearing upon the world offacts as exemplified by the technician's
caIculations: Truth is in this sense "amphibian" (54).
Incidentally, it might be pointed out that Husserl's position in this matter is
not quite unambiguous. To be sure he is not an outspoken representative of an
"amphibian" Aristotelianism. Certainly, "eidos" and individual, though in
strict correlation, belong in general to two different spheres. However, when
Husserl traces the intuition of these "eide" back to the process of ideating
abstraction, by which we extricate species from individuals ("heraus-
schauen"), one must suspect that they were already somehow inside the
individuals.
There follows a discussion of various psychologistic attempts to explain
away autonomous intrinsic requiredness. Köhler demonstrates their inade-
quacy by confronting them with very telling counter-examples which fulfil the
conditions of the psychologistic accounts while failing to result in
requiredness.
Chapter III, which gives the actual analysis of requiredness, is of more
197
simplified outline, which draws no more distinctions than necessary for the
following studies in natural philosophy. If, as here, these limitations are
explicitly stated, such a procedure is perfectly legitimate. Yet, in some cases, a
more detailed analysis might have affected even the transphenomenal results.
Thus by subsuming value under the term requiredness, simple value-
predicates receive an overcomplicated structure. Aesthetic or ethical value-
qualities in themselves do not imply any requiredness, although they might
entail it. N or would it be plausible that they form the dependent characteristics
of a requirement-system. And such value may inhere in any real object; in fact
it occurs primarily here and is not relegated to any ideal realm of values, the
connection of which with reality appeared to be so problematical.
The situation is certainly different in the case of requiredness as it occurs in
the ideal laws of logic which in their essential structure are definitely
segregated from reality. Here the problem does arise as to how far such ideal
entities can communicate with reality. For instance, once such ideallaws are
established and investigated, the question oftheir significance for real thinking
will arise. And a psychology ofthinking will certainly have to consider how it is
possible that ideal entities can direct real thought. The investigations of
Gestalt psychologists have even supplied definite evidence that in this respect
right thinking shows a different structure from wrong thinking, and that in the
case of insight time-indifferent logical relationships determine largely, if not
exclusively, the course of our thinking. 8 This position no longer involves a
psychologistic conception of logic but could rather be called a logistic
interpretation of psychological data. So long as it is the psychologists
themselves who requisition logic for this service, there is no reason to object to
such "trespassing."
A similar situation arises from the fact that Köhler, to this extent still
conforming to the subjectivistic account, includes the phenomenon of interest
within the scope ofrequiredness, and that sometimes little distinction is drawn
between demands (demanding vectors) and requiredness (which, strict1y
speaking, could be only the result of such demands). Whereas it is com-
paratively plausible that interests, valuations, or demands have an isomorphie
equivalent in selective forces within the cortex, such an equivalence would still
have to be substantiated for value, oughtness, or the ideallaws oflogic to which
they refer.
Furthermore, certain differences among the various types of requiredness
seem to be somewhat underrated. In cases where we try to remember a name
and the one we find is judged as "right" or "wrong" from somewhere behind
the phenomena, or in attempts at successive comparison between something
absent and something present we are faced with a requiredness which is only a
function of our arbitrary interest in certain data. In other words such
199
NOTES
2. When did he adopt it? For what reasons? What were his relations to the
Phenomenological Movement of the time?
3. How far did he abandon this Phänomenologie? When? For what
reasons?
4. What was its role in Wittgenstein's development?
5. What is its philosophical merit?
6. What is its significance for other phenomenologists?
Some ofthese questions can probably never be answered. Some require full
access to Wittgenstein's and others' extant papers and correspondences.
All ofthem presuppose a much fuller knowledge ofWittgenstein's philosophy
than I can muster. This is why I approach the subject with considerable
diffidence. At least I shall try to lean over backwards in an attempt not to over-
estimate the available evidence and not to jump to unwarranted reconstructive
conclusions. But the subject seems to me important enough to justify even an
intruder's questions and to urge those in a better position to take over from
here. For this is not merely achallenge for historical detectives. It is an
opportunity for opening some new windows and for dialogues between
Wittgensteinians and phenomenologists in search of common ground and
meaningful dissents.
As far as I have been able to make out, the words Phänomenologie and
phänomenologische appear at least twelve times in the text of the Philo- [1]
sophische Bemerkungen6 (the noun fourtimes, the adjective eight times). Four
of these references occur in Chap. I (ffi 1 and 4), two in Chap. VI
(both in § 57), one in Chap. VII (§ 75), two in Chap. XX ( ~ 213 and 217),
one in Chap. XXI (§218), and two in Chap. XXII (~224 and 230). This
means that the pertinent passages appear throughout·the text, with a slight
clustering at the very beginning and again toward the end. So Wittgenstein's
phenomenology is clearly a pervading theme of the book, not merely an
incidental side issue.
However, none of these twelve passages contains an explicit definition or
discussion of the meaning of the terms. Thus the only way to determine their
connotation is to approach it by starting from their denotations, i.e., by
watching their use in the contexts of their occurrence.
Here I shall not attempt to carry out such a comparative analysis in detail.
Specifically I shall not quote all the pertinent passages and translate them in
full. Instead I shall simply report my main findings and illustrate them by brief
excerpts. However, the main texts with my translations can be found in the
Appendix below.
204
U nfortunately, my comparisons of the texts do not support the conclusion
that Wittgenstein had arrived at a clear and unified conception of his
Phänomenologie. Rather I seem to perceive two different, though related
conceptions. A relatively simple and clear one emerges from most of the
passages in which the adjective phänomenologisch is used; for instance, in the
ones where Wittgenstein refers to "phenomenological investigation of sense
impressions" ( § 224), to their "phenomenological description" ( § 230), to a
"phenomenological language" used in the description of immediate
experience (ffi 1, 213), to "phenomenological geometry," as opposed to
physical geometry for picturing visual space, and to" phenomenological color
theory" in contrast to physicalistic, physiological, and psychological color theory
( § 218). In all these cases the modifYing adjective seems to characterize distinctive
approaches to the phenomena of direct experience. Phenomenology in this
sense would then be a certain kind of study of the phenomena as given in
experience. This study may be distinguished from other approaches ·in the
following manner:
the primary one pursuing the project, now declared dispensable, of describing
experience in all its complexity without any selection, the other based on the
essentials of our language. It is this second (constructed) language which
allows us to grasp the "essence" ofthe described, apparently one ofthe major
goals of Wittgenstein's descriptive phenomenology.
His other conception ofphenomenology seems to emerge from two passages
in wh ich the noun "phenomenology" is used in a more than incidental fashion
(!§land4):
Phenomenology statfls merely what is possible. . . . It would be the gramm ar for the description of
those facts upon which physics erects its theories .... ( § 1) ... Isn't the theory ofharmony at least
in part phenomenology, hence grammar? (§4)
the book, even after its editorial organization. But, after all, where can such
structure be found in Wittgenstein's other writings since the Tractatus?
It also seems pertinent to mention briefly the antecedents ofthis work with a
view to determining the pi ace of the new phenomenology in relation to
Wittgenstein's earlier writings. It hardly has to be pointed out that the
Tractatus, finished in 1918 and published in 1922, contains no references,
explicit or implicit, to phenomenology. While it seems possible to find some
illuminating paralleis to Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen,1O indications
are that Wittgenstein hirns elf had no interest in them. 11
Wittgenstein's return to philosophy around 1926, after its seeming liquida-
tion in the Tractatus, brought hirn in contact with the Vienna Circle and,
apparently even more momentous, with the protagonist of intuitionist mathe-
matics, L. E. l. Brouwer. But there is no evidence that this meant an exposure
to phenomenology. Immediately after Wittgenstein's arrival in Cambridge, he
launched into prolific writing. It is more than likely that his first completed
piece was the paper, "Some Remarks on Logical Form," which was printed in
the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Societi 2 ahead of its lune Meeting,
where, however, Wittgenstein discarded it in favor of a different piece on
infinity, possibly based on what can now be found in PB, Chap. XV. Again this
paper did not mention phenomenology explicitly. But it did contain some very
telling anticipations of it. On the face of it, the paper shows Wittgenstein in
search of a system of atomic propositions which cannot be derived from
ordinary language. In order to obtain it, he now postulated a new language or
symbolism which has to be based on the
inspecting of the phenomena which we want to describe, thus trying to understand logical
multiplicity. That is to say, we can only arrive at a correct analysis by, what might be called, the
logical analysis of the phenomena themselves, i.e., in a certain sense aposteriori, and not by
conjecturing about apriori possibilities. (P. 163)
This means that it is the phenomena - a term which Wittgenstein uses he re for
the first time prominently - rather than ordinary language which have to teach
us about the structure of atomic propositions. The "logicai" analysis ofthese
phenomena is to suppIy us with the
forms of space and time and with the manifold of spatial and temporal objects, with colors and
sounds and their gradations, continuous transitions and combinations in various proportions, all of
which we cannot seize by our ordinary means of expression. (P. 165)
At the end of the article we are told again that rules for atomic propositions
cannot be Iaid down,
until we have actually reached the ultimate analysis ofthe phenomena in question. This, as we all
know, has not yet been achieved. (P. 171)
208
Wittgenstein had to report results ofhis work in Cambridge .... But before the end ofthe vacations
he had obviously finished the interpretation of the ideas he had already formulated; for then one
finds quite frequently remarks. questions and debates with Schlick and Waismann as weil as
unprepared discussions of Wittgenstein about ideas of Husserl, Heidegger, and Weyl.
Now Waismann's report about the third meeting on December 25, 1929,
clearly still as part of Wittgenstein's report, contains a section of nine lines
under the heading "Physik und Phänomenologie," where Phänomenologie,
in contrast to physics, which merely records regularities, deals with what is
possible, Le., with meaning, not with truth and falsehood. While the editor teIls
us specificaIly to use Waismann's account with the greatest caution, it goes [4]
together very weIl with the passages in PB. Wh at it also shows clearly is that
Wittgenstein made a special point of including Phänomenologie among the
findings of his Cambridge year. Later on, just before the end of the same
conversation, Waismann heads a subsection by the title " Anti-Husserl." It is
introduced by a question from Schlick, in which he inquires about Witt-
genstein's answer to "a philosopher who thinks that the statements of
phenomenology are synthetic judgments apriori" (p. 671). Wittgenstein' s
answer is apparently the only place on record where he refers to Husserl by
name. But it is by no means clear that he rejected Husserl on the basis of direct
knowledge or rather on the strength ofthe picture he received from Schlick's
question, which may weIl have been the result of Schlick' s surprise at suddenly
hearing Wittgenstein talk Phänomenologie and state his own stake in the
issue. For Schlick was engaged in a running battle with Husserl in his
Erkenntnislehre, foilowed by his later article "Gibt es ein materiales A
209
qualities, values, and cultural knowledge. In some pI aces the term phenomeno-
logy is used interchangeably with Gegenstandstheorie (theory of objects),
probably in Meinong's sense, in others with psychology. But since Camap
expressly rejects the psychological interpretation (Psychologisierung) of
values, one gathers that he too was opposed to psychologism.
Now even Camap's conception ofphenomenology does not coincide with
Wittgenstein's in PB. Both stress analysis of phenomena. But at least the
examples mentioned by Camap outnumber Wittgenstein's considerably.
Also, at the time Camap seemed to be much less concemed with problems of
phenomenological description than was Wittgenstein. N evertheless, Witt-
genstein's conception comes much closer to Camap's than to the much more
sophisticated one of Husserl, especially in the late twenties. In suggesting the
possibility of a connection between Camap's and Wittgenstein's conceptions
ofphenomenology one must, however, be aware ofthe fact that, according to
Camap's account in his autobiography,21 their personal relations were rather
tenuous, if not strained.
But even more important is a general proviso which one should attach to any
speculations about possible influences on a thinker ofWittgenstein's cast. Not
only in general is "influence" a very complex affair, presupposing receptive-
ness on the part of the recipient: In the case of a Wittgenstein it could hardly
ever amount to more than a stimulant and a trigger for his own thinking. The
most I would therefore dare hypothesize is that some of the talk and writing
about phenomenology that was in the air when Wittgenstein left Vienna drifted
into his thinking, and that he picked it up when he was faced with the task of
presenting his ideas to a new audience, possibly more receptive for the new
label. What underlies such a possible "influence" is the fact that thinkers as
independent as Husserl, Camap, and Wittgenstein, all looking for deeper
foundations of their logical studies, converged independently on the need of a
fuller study of the phenomena. Actually, such parallelism would mean a much
more valuable confirmation of the validity of their investigations than causal
inter action.
months," implied that he ceased to do so later (p. 218). Until the bulk ofthe
manuscripts between 1929 and 1933 becomes generally accessible, the date of
the Blue Book is the terminus ad quem. [6]
However, what is much more significant than the question ofterminology is
that of the underlying conception. How far did Wittgenstein abandon it at all? I
find this by no me ans easy to decide. Here I shall simply state the case for
maintaining the survival of Wittgenstein's phenomenology even without the
label. However, I shall refrain from giving a detailed exegesis ofthe texts which
could suport this thesis. The following seem to me the main reasons on which it
could be based:
(1) Wittgenstein continued to refer to phenomena and to the need of watching them [7]
(schauen) as an essential part of his later investigations. This is particularly true of his
studies in philosophical psychology (e.g., on thinking, reading, etc.).
(2) He continued to think of his enterprise as merely descriplive (e.g., Blue Book, p. 18;
Brown'Book, p. 125; Philosophical Investigations, pp. 109, 124).
(3) Even in the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein showed continued interest in
determining the essence ( Wesen) of the phenomena. This implies the exploration of what
is essentia\1y possible, impossible, or necessary in the phenomena, not only how we speak
about them. Perhaps the most significant evidence in this context is the enigmatic
aphorism: "The essence is expressed by grammar." (PI §371) For it also implies the
connection with the enterprise which in PB was the equivalent of phenomenology: the
gramm ar of our descriptive language, of sounds, and of colors. In making this point, I
hasten to add that the whole concept of essence in Wittgenstein' s philosophy is in need of a
thorough study. While his essences often seem to be merely "nominal," he seems to me
anything but an easygoing nominalist - nor is H usserl a Platonic realist!
The final decision seems to me to depend on the answer to the question: How
far is Wittgenstein's conception of a philosophicalgrammar not only the heir
ofhis phenomenology but its identical continuation? Now this central concept
in Wittgenstein' s later philosophy is certainly anything but clear and simple. 22
After the failure of so many of his students, beginning with G. E. Moore, I
certainly shall not claim that I understand it any better. The major difficulty, as
I see it, is that it is never quite clear whether Wittgenstein's philosophical
grammar is a grammar oflanguage or a gramm ar of phenomena. Even as far as
the former is concerned, Wittgenstein stresses the question ofthe rules for the
use of words, rather than merely those for their forms (morphology) and
arrangement (syntax) as in traditional grammar, thus widening the meaning of
the term to include semantics or semasiology. But in talking of a grammar of
harmonies, colors, other sense qualities, and of space, he is advocating a
completely new and personal conception. Now, insofar as this second
grammar is a systematic study of the phenomena and not only one ofthe words
referring to them, it would indeed take over the role of the phenomenology of
PB. And ifthis is the case, then it could certainly be argued that Wittgenstein
never abandoned phenomenology, but merely ceased to call it by this name
rather than by a more conventional one, i.e., grammar.
213
This still leaves us with the puzzle about Wittgenstein's reasons for
abandoning the term Phänomenologie. As a general explanation I can only
suggest Wittgenstein's sustained effort to avoid technicaljargon, increased in
his later philosophy by his aversion to reliance upon constructed ideal
languages - including "phenomenological language" - rather than ordinary
language. In this respect his dropping of the term "phenomenology" would
parallel Heidegger's since Sein und Zeit, when he began to turn away from all
such technical expressions. 23
However, there is at least one more specific clue which, subject to further
checking, may lead to apartial explanation. In January 1930, one year after his
arrival in Cambridge, Wittgenstein began his lecturing. Among his listeners
from the very start was G. E. Moore, whose account ofthese lectures in Mind
(1950) gave a very informative, though by no means uncritical, idea of what
went on. Now it appears that at the very beginning of the first lectures
Wittgenstein took up the topic of"rules of grammar," a discussion which, as
Moore teils us, "puzzled rne extremely."24 The account of Wittgenstein's
treatment of this subject (on p. 271) makes it perfectly clear that what
Wittgenstein was talking about was precisely what in PB he had called
Phänomenologie, namely "the arrangement of colors in the color octa-
hedron," which was "really apart of grammar, not of psychology." Moore
added that he was so upset about Wittgenstein' s departure from the ordinary
sense of the phrase "rules of grammar" that he wrote "a short paper about
ihis." He also intimated that Wittgenstein later became doubtful about this
point and referred to his own use as his "jargon."
This makes me wonder whether Wittgenstein, in presenting his ideas, ever
went so far as to inject the additional "jargon" of phenomenology from his
simultaneous preparations for PB. Kar! Britton, to be sure in describing the
situation in Wittgenstein's seminar one year later, teils us:
We feit that Wittgenstein addressed hirnself chiefly to Moore, although Moore seldom intervened
and often seemed to be very disapproving. Sometimes the lecturer appealed to hirn, but my
recollection is thatMoore's replies were usuallyvery discouragingindeed. At all events we had the
impression that a kind of dialogue was going on between Moore and Wittgenstein even when
Moore was least obviously being "brought in.,,25
notebooks. Of course the term still survived in the German text of PB which,
according to Rush Rhees, Wittgenstein lcft with Moore "probably toward the
end of 1930." One wonders wh ether Moore ever read and discussed the
typescript with Wittgenstein before tuming it over to the editors of Witt-
genstein's posthumous writings after his death in 1951. All the same,
Wittgenstein must have come to the conclusion that the use of phenomeno-
logical terminology would be of little help in presenting his philosophy in
Cambridge, as he may have thought at first.
How far did the disappearance of the name Phänomenologie mean that
Wittgenstein lost interest in the ideas of others who continued to use it? Here 1
would like simply to add a remarkable piece of information which 1 owe to
Professor G. H. von Wright, who in answering some of my questions
concluded with the following paragraph:
Perhaps it is of some interest to mention here that Wittgenstein in the last year ofhis life did much
work on a problem-complex which had always greatly interested hirn, viz. colour-concepts. He
was at the time reading Goethe's Farbenlehre, and we had discussions on it and on his own
problems and views. He then often used to say that what he was doing was of a kind some
philosophers call "phenomenology." But he did not hirnselfwant to call it by that name - and I
think I can partly see why. His attitude is connected, I believe, with the stress he wanted to lay on
language in his philosophical inquiries. For this reason, incidentally, Wittgenstein's use ofthe
term "grammar" (or "logical grammar") should be of great interest to phenomenologists.
It is indeed. It also shows that Wittgenstein did not turn his back on
"phenomenology" and not even on the "phenomenologists."
A much deeper and more difficult historical puzzle concems the role of the
phenomenological interlude in Wittgenstein's development. Assuming that
the real break between Wittgenstein (I) and Wittgenstein (11) lies around
1933, just before the Blue Book as for instance von Wright asserts, one might
share his estimate that the PB and a good deal of its content "represent a
transitional stage" from the Tractatus to a "radically new philosophy," during
which he was" fighting his way out of the Tractatus. " But this does not excuse
one from studying this transition in detail and spotting the appearance of the
really new ideas along with the merely temporary innovations.
Personally 1 have not yet come to any conclusions about the role ofthe new
phenomenology in preparing the way to Wittgenstein (11). This has to be done
by the seasoned Wittgenstein specialists. All 1 am prepared to suggest is what 1
aiready implied in my hypothesis about the origins of this conception: (1) that
the new attention to the phenomena at the base of atomic facts not onIy
we.akened the hold ofthe older conception, but it also prepared a way to the less
215
formal investigations ofthe later philosophy, Le., not only to the new attitude
toward "ordinary language" but also to the phenomena which it reflects;
(2) that phenomenology also made Wittgenstein give special attention to the
need for overcoming the complexity of these phenomena by studying the
essentials of language and the "grammar" of the phenomena.
It is true that in the process Wittgenstein changed his view of phenomeno-
logicallanguage and even abandoned all reference to it and to phenomenology
as such. Nevertheless they may have been essential stones on the way to his
final philosophy.
I would therefore not go so far as to suggest that the sheer bulk of new
material, published and unpublished, from this period calls for the insertion of
a new stage in the periodization of Wittgenstein's philosophizing. The
evidence is still too incomplete for proposing such a drastic revision. Also, the
new period seems to have been too short and Wittgenstein' s own later estimate
of it too negative in order to call it more than an interlude. But it seems safe to
maintain that Wittgenstein's phenomenology was an important, if not
essential, station on his road from logical atomism to the philosophical
gramm ar of the Philosophiea/ Investigations. At least for this reason it will
des erve intensive study once the evidence is fully accessible.
It is also still too early to give more than a tentative and conditional evaluation
ofwhat is thus far known about Wittgenstein's phenomenology. Nevertheless,
even at this stage some of the merits and possible demerits of his conception
can be stated, if only in the spirit ofwaiting for evidence which may support or
refute a hypothesis.
I must confess that, as far as intrinsic value is concerned, I find it difficult to
become very enthusiastic about the shape ofWittgenstein' s phenomenology as
it has come down to us in PB. Quite apart from the aphoristic style which this
book shares with all his writings after the Tra eta tus , his conception of
phenomenology as it emerges from PB is anything but clear. And even after
adding to it the whole range ofthe philosophical gramm ar as it developed in his
subsequent writings, there remain so many dark and ambiguous corners that I
hesitate to claim for it more than the merit of a seminal idea which Wittgenstein
himself could not unfold.
Of course even more serious would be downright contradictions in the text.
Ofthese at least one near-contradiction is disturbing and suggests the need for
much fuller development: that in his conception of a phenomenological
language. A similar near-contradiction is that, while the Aristotelian Society
216
(1) There is need for going to the phenomena as the basis for any logico-philosophical treatise.
(2) Essences are indispensable for the description of the phenomena in their complexity.
(3) Pure descriptive phenomenology free of hypotheses from physics, physiology, and
empirical psychology is the necessary prerequisite for explanatory science.
(4) A" grammar" of the phenomena caUs for the systematic study of the structural
relationships among them, as exemplified in the relations among colors.
NOTES
9 Announced in Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Man and His Philosophy, ed. by K. T. Fann (New
York, DelI Publishing Company, 1967), p. 405.
JOSee Max Black, A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Ithaca,
Comell University Press. 1964), p. 131.
11 Professor J. N. Findlay told me in conversation that when in 1939 he mentioned Husserl's
Logische Untersuchungen to Wittgenstein, he expressed some astonishment that he was still
interested in this old text.
12Vol. 9 (1929), pp. 162-171, abbreviated hereafter as SR.
13 Ludwig Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis, p. 10.
14Ibid., p. 19.
15 Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, 1st ed. (1918), pp. 119-124; 2nd ed. (1925), pp. 127-131.
Gesammelte Aufsätze (1938), pp. 20-30; English("Is There aFactuaIAPriori?") inReadings
in Philosophical Analysis, ed. by H. Feigl and W. Sellars (New York, 1949), pp. 277-285.
16 "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33," Mind, vol. 63 (1954), pp. 289-316, and vol. 67
(1955), pp. 1-27; also in Philosophical Papers (1959), pp. 247-318.
17 Zettel, ed. by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (Berkeley, University of Califomia
Press, 1967), p. iv.
18 The Philosophy of Wittgenstein (Englewoods Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1964), Chap. 6, "The
Rejection of Logical Atomism."
19 As far as Wittgenstein is concemed, the only reference to Kaufmann occurs at the end of the
reportofthe Waismann conversation ofJanuary 2, 1930 (Waismann, op. eit., p. 84), in the form
of a rejection (Ablehnung) of one ofKaufmann's views about number, which was published only
later in the year in Kaufmann's Das Unendliche in der Mathematik und seine Ausschaltung.
However, in this book Kaufmann refers repeatedly to the Tractatus, which he calls highly
important (hochbedeutsam) (p. 26 n.).
20See The Phenomenological Movement, op. eit., p. 762.
21 In The Philosophy of Rudolj Carnap, ed. by Paul Schilpp (La Salle, Open Court, 1963),
pp. 25 ff.
22See, e.g., John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy (New York, Basic Books, revised
edition, 1967), p.433.
23Se The Phenomenological Movement, op. eit., pp. 291, 747.
24See now Philosophical Papers (New York, 1962), p. 26L.
25 Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Man and His Philosophy, op. eil., p. 56.
26"Wittgenstein et Husserl," Jalons (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), pp. 188-207.
27"Husserl and Wittgenstein on Language" in Phenomenology and Existentialism, ed. by
E. N. Lee and M. Mandelbaum (Baitimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), pp. 207-
217. Gerd Brand even goes so far as to call hirn the phenomenologist par excellence in Die
grundlegenden Texte von L. Wittgenstein, Suhrkamp, 1975.
28 "Wittgenstein's Phenomenology," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 20
(1959), pp. 37-50.
APPENDIX
A. Phänomenologie
( I ) Die Physik unterscheidet sich von der (1) Physics differs from phenomenology
Phänomenologie dadurch, dass sie Gesetze by its aim of establishing laws. Phenomenology
219
feststellen will. Die Phänomenologie stellt nur establishes merely possibilities. Thu~ pheno-
die Möglichkeiten fest. Dann wäre alsl01 die menology would be the grammar for the de-
Phänomenologie die Grammatik der Beschrei- scription of those facts upon which physics
bung derjenigen Tatsachen, auf denen die erects its theories.
Physik ihre Theorien abfbaut.
Erklären ist mehr als Beschreiben. Aber jede Explaining is more than describing. But every
Erklärung enthalt eine Beschreibung. explanation contains a description.
Der Farbenraum wird z.B. beiltil(fig dar- F or instance, the color space is represented
gestellt durch das Oktaeder, mit den reinen parenlhelically through the octahedron, with
F arben an den Eckpunkten, und diese Darstel- the pure colors in the corner points, and this
lung ist eine grammatische, keine psycho- representation is a grammatical, not a psycho-
logische. Zu sagen, dass unter den und den logical one. By contrast, to say that under such
Umständen - etwa - ein rotes Nachbild and such conditions a red afterimage becomes
sichtbar wird, ist dagegen Psychologie (das visible is psychology (this may or may not
kann sein, oder auch nicht, das andere ist a occur, but the other is apriori; the one can be
priori; das eine kann durch Experimente fest- established by experiments, the other cannot).
gestellt werden, das andere nicht).
( ~ I, p. 51 f)
(2) Ist nicht die Harmonielehre wenig- (2) Isn't the theory of harmony at least in
stens teilweise Phänomenologie, also Gram- part phenomenology, hence grammar?
matik? (§4, p. 53)
(3) Alle unsere Redeformen sind aus der (3) All our forms of speaking have been
normalen physikalischen Sprache hergenom- taken from the usual language of physics and
men und in der Erkenntnistheorie oder cannot be used in theory of knowledge or
Phänomonologie nicht zu gebrauchen, ohne phenomenology without casting distorting
schiefe Lichter auf den Gegenstand zu werfen. lights upon the subject.
(§57,p.88)
(4) Die blosse Redensart, "ich nehme x ( 4) The very form of expression "I perceivex"
wahr," ist schon aus der physikalischen Aus- has been taken over from the phraseology of
drucksweise genommen und x soll hier ein physics, and 'x' is to stand here for an object of
physikalischer Gegenstand - z. B. ein Körper- physics - e.g., a body. Itis already amistake to
sein. Es ist schon falsch, diese Redeweise in apply this way of speaking in phenomenology,
der Phänomenologie zu verwenden, wo dann x where 'x' must then mean a datum. For now
ein Datum bedeuten muss. Denn nun kann even 'I' and "perceive" cannot have the same
auch" ich" und" nehme wahr" nicht den Sinn meaning as above.
haben wie oben. Ibid.
B. "Phenomenological investigation"
Die Gefahr, die darin liegt, Dinge einfacher The danger which lies in wanting to see
sehen zu wollen, als sie in Wirklichkeit sind, things as simpler than they are in reality is
wird heute oft sehr überschätzt. Diese Gefahr nowadays often much overestimated. How-
besteht aber tatsächlich im höchsten Grade in ever, this danger does indeed exist in the
der phänomenologischen Untersuchung der highest degree in the phenomenological
Sinneseindrücke. Diese werden immer fur viel investigation of the sense impressions. These
einfacher gehalten, als sie sind. ( § 224, p. 281) are always considered to be much simpler than
theyare.
C. "Phenomenological description"
Die Beschreibung der Phänomene mittels The description ofthe phenomena by means
der Hypothese der Körperwelt ist unumgäng- of the hypothesis of a corporeal world is
220
lieh durch ihre Einfachheit, verglichen mit der unavoidable because of its simplicity, com-
unfassbar komplizierten phänomenologischen pared with the inconceivably complicated phe-
Beschreibung. Wenn ich verschiedene zer- nomenological description. When I see dif-
streute Stücke einer Kreislinie sehe, so ist ihre ferent scattered pieces of a circular line, a
genaue direkte Beschreibung vielleicht unmög- precise direct description is perhaps impos-
lich, aber die Angabe, dass es Stücke eines sible, but the information that these are the
Kreises sind, den ich aus nicht weiter unter- pieces of a circle which for reasons not further
suchten Gründen nicht ganz sehe - ist einfach. examined I do not see completely - is simple.
(§230, p. 286)
D. "Phenomenological Language"
E. "Phenomenological geometry"
... man könnte auch sagen: Sie [d.h. eine One could also say: the Euclidean plane in
euklidische Zeichenebene] soll genau so stark our drawing must tremble just strongly enough
zittern, dass wir es noch nicht merken, dann ist for us not to notice it; then physical geometry is
ihre physikalische Geometrie ein Bild unserer a picture of our phenomenological geometry.
phänomenologischen. (§ 217, p. 271).
Es scheint einfache Farben zu geben. There seem to be simple colors. They are
Einfach als psychologische Erscheinungen. simple qua psychological phenomena. What I
Was ich brauche, ist eine psychologische oder need is a psychological or rather a phenomeno-
vielmehr phänomenologische Farbenlehre, logical color theory, not a physicalistic one,
keine physikalische und ebensowenig eine and just as little a physiological one.
physiologische.
Und zwar muss es eine rein phänomeno- More specifically, it must be apure pheno-
logische Farbenlehre sein, in der nur von menological color theory, in which only what is
wirklich Wahrnehmbarem die Rede ist und actually perceivable is under discussion, and
keine hypothetischen Gegenstände - Wellen, no hypothetical objects - waves, cells, etc.-
Zellen etc. - vorkommen. (§ 218, p. 273) figure.
***
The following passage is quoted from Ludwig Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis. Gespräche
aufgezeichnet von Friedrich Waismann, aus dem Nachlass herausgegeben von B. F. McGuinness
(Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1967), p. 63.
SUPPLEMENT 1979
Emendations
[1] The new evidence after sampling of the microfilms, especially from the
manuscripts preceding the typescripts and the final printed version ofPB,
may weIl double the number of such passages.
[2] An English translation ofthe book by Raymond Hargreaves and Roger
White appeared in New York, Barnes & Noble, 1975.
[3] The Philosophische Grammatik is now available in an edition by Rush
Rhees (BlackweIl, 1968); an English translation by Anthony Kenny
appeared atthe University ofCalifornia Press in 1974. This textcontains
the terms "Phänomenologisches" and "Nicht-phänomenologisches"
only once (p. 215). Also, there are only incidental discussions of the
meaning of "grammar," chiefly in Part I, pp. 184-192.
[4] It now turns out that the formulation reported by Waismann in his reports
agrees almost verbatim with the one at the beginning of Wittgenstein's
manuscript notebook for PB which was not included in the final version.
[5] There is a possibility that the papers of Felix Kaufmann, housed at
Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, will yield some
pertinent information.
[6] Any hope that such evidence will still emerge has now practically to be
abandoned in the light of G.R. von Wright's information that
"Wittgenstein on his last visit to Vienna, from Christmas 1949 to March
1950, ordered a great many papers, belonging to all his periods of work,
to be burned" (loc. eil., p. 484). Thus the gap in his papers between 1918
and 1929 will probably never be closed.
223
[7] This statement may have to be qualified in the light of such passages as
Philosophical Investigations #383, where Wittgenstein denies the
intention of analyzing phenomena rather than "their concept and hence
the use of the word." Certainly Wittgenstein's conception of pheno-
menon and its role in various phases ofhis philosophy is in need of further
study.
[8] What I called the conclusive test of my hypothesis through an inspection
of G. E. Moore's "scribbled notes" from Wittgenstein's Cambridge
lectures was now possible thanks to Professor Casimir Lewy in Cam-
bridge, who not only showed me kindly the original ofMoore's notebooks
but put a xerox copy of the crucial page at my disposal and gave me
permission to quote from it. It occurs in vol. I, p. 15, and contains the
following information about Wittgenstein's third Cambridge lecture:
So I was wrong in surmising that Wittgenstein would not inject the term
"Phenomenology" into his lectures. He did and did so conspicuously enough
for G. E. Moore to take it down twice.
The following sampies of new evidence are all contained in the manuscripts
from which the typescripts were selected, since they supply a much fuller
picture of the genesis of Wittgenstein's thought.
l. Almost the first topic taken up in the manuscript Band I (von Wright
#105) ofthe Philosophische Bemerkungen, probably written soon after the
last carrying a date (9.2.29), is "Phänomenologie" (pp. 3-4). It contains the
passages published under Al. But these are preceded by a much longer series
of remarks discussing the relation of physics to the wahre Phdnomenologie
which are otherwise alm ost identical with what Wittgenstein told the Schlick
group at the end of the passage quoted above from the Waismann conversa-
tions. There are also completely new remarks such as the one that just as
sentences make up (bilden) physics, thus "grammar makes up Phänomeno-
logie (or however one cares to name it)." (My translation.)
2. Volume 11 of the Philosophische Bemerkungen (Von Wright # 106,
RollI of Cornell microfilms) begins with a discussion of "phenomenological
language" of which the latter half has been printed in PB # 74 and # 75. It
includes the statement that in spite of all possible objections there can be a
phenomenological language, and that ordinary language is to some extent
phenomenological, though it does not allow for aseparation of sensory fields
as does phenomenological language.
3. Perhaps the most intriguing novelty Iran across occurs in volume VII
"Bemerkungen zur Philosophie" (Von Wright # 111 RollI), where Wittgen-
stein raises as "the most important question" that of an essential difference
( Wesensunterschied) between "logical" and" phenomenological grammar,"*
which seems to coincide with the difference between essential and unessential
grammar. What seems remarkable ab out this distinction is (I) that here the
adjective "phenomenological" is used to qualify the noun "grammar," and (2)
that this implies the possibility of a non-phenomenological grammar. Thus at
this point Wittgenstein did not simply identify phenomenology with grammar.
4. In 1977 G. E. M. Anscombe published Wittgenstein'sBemerkungen
uber die Farben (Remarks on Colour) based on three manuscripts written
#209 is now listed as "missing." The two texts certainly differ considerably at the very
beginning, although in both of them phenomenology figures close to the start. #209 was.
probably the "bulky typescript" which Wittgenstein had taken to Bertrand Russell before
May 5, 1930 (who forwarded it to Moore on May 8), and on which Russell reported to the
Council of Trinity College on the same date, entitled, Philosophische Bemerkungen (see
Bertrand RusselI, Autobiography 1914-1944 [Boston: Little Brown, 1968] pp. 297-301).
Photostats of # 209 could have been the basis for the Rush Rhees edition.
* Some light on this distinction is thrown by the paragraph on top ofp. 215 ofthePhilosophische
Grammatik. Such a grammaris to contain a "chapter" on color, where the use of color words is
laid down, in contrast to what is to be said about the "logical constants" like "and," "or," ete.
225
during the last months ofhis life early in 1951. They reflect his work on color
concepts and his study of Goethe's Farbenlehre mentioned in Professor Von
Wright's letter (see p. 214). In two ofthese manuscripts(pp. 9 # 53 and49 #
248) the following identical sentence appears: "Es gibu zwar keine Phano-
menologie, wohl aber phanomenologische Probleme." [True, there is no
phenomenology, but there are indeed phenomenological problems.]
There is no obvious connection between this isolated sentence and the
preceding and following observations about color in either manuscript.
In the second Manuscript, #3 (p. 15) raises the question "What kind of a
sentence is that, that the admixture ofwhite removes the coloredness from the
color." In answering it Wittgenstein not only denies that this can be a
"proposition of physics" but adds: "Hier ist die Versuchung sehr gross, an eine
Phanomenologie, ein Mittelding zwischen Wissenschaft und Logik zu
glauben." [Here the temptation to believe in a phenomenology, something
midway between science and logic, is very great.] But clearly Wittgenstein did
not yield to this temptation.
Enigmatic though the sentence about the non-existence of a phenomenology
and the existence of phenomenological problems may be, it establishes at least
the fact that the subject of phenomenology had not been completely dropped at
the stage of the Philosophical Investigations. But it still has to be clarified
what he meant at the time by the phenomenology whose existence he denied
and the phenomenological problems whose persistence he affirmed. As to the
latter, one may assume that most of the open questions raised in the Remarks
on Color are phenomenological problems. Did he then understand by
phenomenology a doctrine in the style of Goethe' s Farbenlehre consisting of a
"phänomenologische Analyse," which in Wittgenstein's view (Il, # 16 p. 16)
was Goethe's objective, a phenomenology which is conceptual analysis
(BegrijJsanalyse) rather than physics?
In any case it would appear that to the end Wittgenstein acknowledged that
there was place for a study halfway between physics and logic and that there
was a temptation to call it phenomenology, only that he denied that it could be
more than a collection of problems apparently insoluble, but suitable for
"remarks. "
5. The latest and for this study most revolutionizing text came to my
attention as the result of my encounter with Dr. Michael N edo, the editor of the
new critical edition of Wittgenstein's works, at the Second International
Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, Austria in 1977. On that occasion, in
connection with a discussion group on Wittgenstein and Phenomenology, he
told me about the "chapter" entitled "Phänomenologie" in Wittgenstein's
Final Version of the Big Typescript of 1933 (# 213), still unpublished,
consisting of 49 typewritten pages now contained in volume 89 ofthe Cornell
226
enlargement (Microfilm Roll 21). A first idea of the subject matters included
under this title may be obtained from Wittgenstein' s own Table ofContents, in
which this "Phänomenologie" forms the 13th of15 subdivisions. It is preceded
by one entitled simply "Philosophie" and followed by one with the title
"Idealismus etc." The seven sub-sections ofthe "Phänomenologie" section go
by the following titles (in my translation):
94. Phenomenology is Grammar (p. 437)
95. Is it Possible to Penetrate more Deeply into the Properties of Visual
Space? (p. 443)
96. Visual Space in Contrast to Euclidean Space (p. 446)
97. The Seeing Subject and Visual Space (p. 462)
98. Visual Space Compared With an Image (Plane Image) (p. 465)
99. The Smallest Visible Objects (p. 469)
100. Colors and Color Mixtures (p. 473)
I shall not attempt to report about the contents ofthe actual text, before it has
been released. Anyway, the subtitles make it plain that the chapter begins with
a characterization, though without definition, of phenomenology as dealing
with the rules for a language that describes the phenomena of our experience;
even the color-octahedron and musical theory of harmony are in this sense
phenomenology or grammar. Next Wittgenstein deals in considerable detail
with the grammar of our language ofvisual space in contrast to the Euclidean
space of geometry. Finally he discusses most extensively the phenomena of
color and color mixtures. While here too he claims that he is ultimately only
concerned with the gramm ar of the phenomenological language used in the
description ofthe phenomena, the actual investigations increasingly deal only
with the phenomena of shape and color and their laws.
Even this most extensive and explicit treatment of Phänomenologie is
anything but systematic and comprehensive. Nevertheless, it is the peak of
Wittgenstein's occupation with the subject. This means that my original
article, in which I had assumed that that references to Phanomenologie in the
Philosophische Bemerkungen were the high water mark, if not the end of his
temporary conception will have to be re-focussed. But any such rewriting ofthe
entire article had better be postponed until the new text is fully accessible and
all other relevant texts assembled and analyzed, which presupposes a
systematic index of subjects to the published and unpublished writings. In the
meantime the new text from the Big Typescript supplies at least a much fuller
denotation for Wittgenstein's concept of Phanomenologie.
6. One possible explanation for the origin of the concept of Phäno-
menologie in Wittgenstein's writings was suggested to me by Rush Rhees in a
letter of 1979, according to which the most Jikely source for it was Ludwig
227
* In venturing thus far I would Iike to pay tribute to a preceding ingenious hypothesis, based not
only on my collection but on Wittgenstein's Blue Book, offered by Don Ihde in Phenomeno-
logical Perspectives, edited by Philip J. Bossert(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975) pp. 47-
61 under the title "Wittgenstein's 'Phenomenological Reduction.' " Its main point is that
Wittgenstein was influenced by a generalized phenomenological method which provided in part
ij basis for the turn to ordinary language. But at the same time the peculiar use of a
"phenomenological reduction takes a turn inverse to Husserl and towards the isolation and
description of linguistic phenomena over a phenomenology of experience" (p. 48).
228
had occupied hirn since the Notebooks of 1914-1916, he points out again that
there is a set of phenomena covered neither by science nor by 10gic which has to
be studied in its own right. The fact that Wittgenstein was no longer prepared to
call this study Phänomenologie is perhaps less important than that he sees
here a vast area ofphenomena that have to be acknowledged as problems even
if they should prove to be insoluble.
Such a working hypothesis about the stages in the origin and development of
Wittgenstein's interest in a peculiar phenomenology will have to be verified
much more fully in the light of the text of his papers once they are fully
organized and edited. In the meantime the fact that not only the term "pheno-
menology" but also a characteristic set of problems designated by it had a
persistent place in Wittgenstein's thought seems to be worth recording and
exploring for its own sake. Indications are that it represents another variety of
thought thai belongs to the pattern of the Phenomenological Movement in the
wider sense.
APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENT 1980 TO "HUSSERL IN ENGLAND"
This Supplement, written after the reprinting ofthe original article was already
at the galley stage, is the result of an odd repetition ofthe circumstances which
necessitated the Postscript 1969 after the unexpected arrival of the Freiburg
Diary 1928 by W. R Boyce Gibson at the Husserl Archives in Louvain in
1969. 1 Only this time, the information that, thanks to the efforts of Professor
Cyril Welch of Mount Allison University, became available to me is even
more authentie and of greater significance than the Diary for supplementing
and correcting the story of Husserl's visit to England, for it comes from the
letters of Edmund Husserl and his wife Malvine.
Winthrop Bell, the Canadian addressee of these 23 letters and postcards
from 1919 to 1925, was one of Husserl's earliest Anglo-American students
(after William Ernest Hocking who had spent only two months in Göttingen in
1902). Bell had come to Husserl after a year's graduate study at Harvard and
then at Cambridge, England - a fact which mayaIso explain Husserl's hope
to enlist hirn as his" mentor" and assistant during his visit to England in 1922.
Bell had left Cambridge for health reasons to go to Leipzig, where he first
learned about Husserl. So he transferred to Göttingen, where he stayed on
from 1911 to 1914. There he had just completed his German Ph.D. thesis, at
Husserl's urging on "Eine kritische Untersuchung der Erkenntnistheorie
von J osiah Royce"2 when W orld War I broke out, leading to Bell' s internment
in Ruhleben near Berlin. After his return as a civilian to America, he taught
philosophy first at Toronto, then at Harvard. But then he had to take charge of
the family enterprise (fisheries) in Chester, Nova Scotia. Having obtained his
address through the Harvard Alumni Office I took up correspondence with
hirn in 1955 and learned on that occasion, in addition to fascinating other
information about his years with Husserl, that he had some letters from
Husserl. But he did not offer to send them or copies ofthem to me at the time.
After his death his papers were transferred to Mount Allison University, his
undergraduate college. But at that time the letters were not yet included. It
came therefore as a happy surprise to me when Cyril Welch wrote me in
October 1980 that Husserl's letters to Bell were finally accessible, and that he
could even send me xerox co pies of the 23 pieces that had been turned over to
the University Library Archives on September 8, 1980.
230
Even than I had no good reason to expect that these letters would prove of
major importance in view ofwhat Bell had written me in November 3, 1955:
I still have sorne letters frorn Husserl frorn the 1920s, but with little philosophical significance in
thern, I fear. And what there is of that kind would be rather rneaningless without letters I had
written to hirn. Of those I have no copies. I learned to use the typewriter only quite late in life
(unfortunately), so rny letters to hirn were handwritten and no copies were kept. And I could not
today recall what I wrote.
[1] As early as December 7, 1921, when, in a postcard beginning with the sentence
"There are signs and wonders," Husserl announced to Bell the invitation by
the University of London, his "first thought" concemed the possibility of
Bell' s joining hirn in London as his" wise mentor" and helper. He added to this
news the "big request" that Bell translate the four lectures he was to give for the
printer and likewise a brief syllabus for the university news paper. Then he
asked for advice whether he should look into F. H. Bradley' s major works and
for information about philosophers in London, for instance Hicks? Bosanquet?
Finally he announced at once his theme : "Phenomenological Method and
Phenomenological Philosophy." The fact that Husserl had thought imme-
diately for Bell as his assistant for the English undertaking explains why his
messages to hirn are the best source for the still missing information about the
visit. A second postcard, written on December 19, acknowledging a preceding
Christmas note from Bell, states that Husserl, who had accepted Hicks's
invitation for April, had realized this early date would interfere with Bell' s
231
teaching at Toronto and ofTers to postpone his London commitment until June
if this would help.
[2] Husserl's preparations for the English lectures appear now in an entirely new
light from what I thought before seeing his pieces to Bell. The postcard of
January 22, 1922 shows hirn studying English contemporary philosophers
apparently suggested spontaneously by Bell. As Karl Schuhmann has
established, Bell also sent hirn the following books: Lord Haldane, The
Reign oJRelativity, London, 1921 (Husserl Library at the Louvain Archives.
BA 662), William Sorley, Moral Va lu es and the Idea oJGod, Cambridge,
1918 (BA 1608) and probably others. Yet these names and that of Wildon
Carr,4 to which Husserl responds, are hardly representative of London and
Cambridge philosophy at the time. Husserl himselfinquires about Shadworth
Hodgson5 and again about F. H. Bradley, whom he had read and liked during
his years at the University ofHalle (1887-1901). Another item ofinterest is
that, in preparation for the visit, Husserl took English lessons which would
enable hirn to follow at least slow English conversations and discussions.
However, judging from later remarks, the results were limited.
On J anuary 28, 1922 Husserl acknowledged the receipt of a work by
R A. F. Hoernle (1880-1943), an Idealist friend of the ailing Bernard
Bosanquet, of South African descent, whom Husserl was to meet later on the
occasion of the lectures, calling it sehr hübsch (very nice). This was Hoernl6' s
first book, the Studies in Metaphysics (1920) (BA 797). According to Karl
Schuhmann, HusserlinanMS(ofFebruary 19,1922) underBI38 creditsthis
book with having seen that thus far metaphysics had always tried to reduce
"Being" to one kind ofbeing. Incidentally, Hoernle had published "A Plea for
a Phenomenology ofMeaning" in the Proceedings oJ the Aristotelian Society
XXII (1921),71-89, discussing Meinong and Husserl on pp. 80-86.
In a postcard ofMay 10, 1922, Husserl announced the receipt of other books
which he had read "with much enjoyment". They may weIl have included
Bell's own copy ofBradley'sAppearance and Reality (BA 187). I agree with
Karl Schuhmann that Bell's selection may have contributed to Husserl's
impression that Idealism was still dominant in England and even encouraged
him to present phenomenology as a form of idealism. But at the same time he
stated to Bell that he had not ordered any more books ("although I would be
very eager for Whitehead's writings"6), since he would not have the time to
read them before his arrival in London. The same would be the case with the
writings of Samuel Alexander. Although most of these readings dealt with
British Idealist authors, Husserl was most anxious to meet others like James
Ward and G. E. Moore (December 6, 1921) in Cambridge.
[3] The exact length of the Husserls' stay in England can now be determined
from his postcard of J anuary 10, 1922 and Malvine's letter from Cambridge of
June 11. They arrived in Cambridge on the Saturday before Pentecost (June
232
3), and returned to Freiburg on Saturday June 20. Thus the entire visit did not
exceed two weeks.
[4] Husserl's extensive retrospect on the visit to Cambridge and London of
December 13 contains a remarkably complete record of his philosophical
contacts during this briefvisit G. Dawes Hicks was of course the central figure
during the entire period. He sees in hirn the only Englishman who realizes that
phenomenology is not only literature for the day ofthe "usual philosophical
and international style" but a "serious enterprise in which one can and
eventually must invest one's life." But Husserl also remarks that Hicks is a
philosophical personality whose "irrational" life circumstances had used up
his powers rather "irrationally." (Once, in connection with Hicks's insistence
on early publication of the London lectures in English he even states: "The old
gentleman takes hirnself a little tragic.") He met several times with the "fine"
J ames Ward, chairman ofthe second London lecture, who was the only one to
call on the Husserls and invited them twice to tea, in addition to beinga
dinner guest at Hicks's with G. E. Moore, and who took hirn once to dinner at
Trinity College, where at high table he introduced Husserl to McTaggart, "the
stout Hegelian," who withdrew promptly after dinner. For an evening party
G. F. Stout appeared, "a magnificent short little man, who was manifestly
pleased to see me, and C. D. Broad, a lively, apparently gifted young man your
age." Then there was G. E. Moore, the chairman ofthe last London lecture,
"very keen and interesting, but I ne ver saw hirn again" - a fact which suggests
that the occasion took place after the London lecture of June 11. W. E.
Johnson, the logician was unable to come, and Sorley refused to see a German
after having lost a son in the war. In London Husserl was surprised not to be
met by the Vice-Chancellor who had invited hirn, but only by the Provost in
charge of technical arrangements perfunctorily. He talked briefly with
Haldane, Hoernle, who" speaks German well," with [A.] Wolf(University of
London) whom he considered philosophically innocent( ahnungslos) and like-
wise Ernest Belford Bax, a non-university philosopher with German idealist
leanings.7
Bertrand Russell, for whom Husserl had expressed his "veneration" largely
because of his opposition to the war, for instance in a letter to Bosanquet, to
which both he and Russell himselfhad responded (August 20, 1920), was one
ofthose he missed in London (" he is just married and one assurnes that he is on
a trip"). Also Whitehead, then still at the Imperial College in Kensington,
"was invisible to me." No wonder that Husserl summed up the balance ofhis
English encounters in the sentence: "Thus I did not get to know those in whom
I was particularly interested."
Incidentally, Mrs. Husserl, in her letter of June 11 from Cambridge
remarked: "All of them (Ward, Moore, Stout, etc.) and even Hicks speak
German poorly. That is a pity."
233
On the whole, one had the impression that very much depends on the English edition of the
lectures. For hardly anyone knows enough German in order to understand Gerrnan lectures
completely.
F or the fourth time I am lecturing here in Freiburg" Introduction to Philosophy" and for the third
234
time in a completely new form. This is the most difficult lecture for me - and, to tell the truth, I
have been working on the systematic sequence ofthoughts which I am now converting into lecture
form for more than a year - it is the same which was presented in London in compressed form.
[11] Already in preparing the lectures (January 28, 1922) and especially in his
retrospect, Husserl doubts the appropriateness and effectiveness of the
lectures. Thus on May lOhe wrote to Bell: "I have laid out the whole thing
too grandly.... Insanely (unsinniger Weise) 1 have made the new basic
conception of philosophy (from the idea of phenomenology as first philosophy)
the theme of my lectures." And on September 30 in explaining why he could
not go through the manuscript of the London lectures and prepare them for the
printer he wrote: "I found that it (the text) was too compressed and difficult."
[12] This interpretation of his ultimate objective in the London lectures is
confirmed by the way he explains his project to Bell on May 10, 1922: "This
winter 1 have thought through anew the basic (prinzipiell) foundation of
phenomenology and its differentiation (Verzweigung) down to the system of
ontologies and parallel constitutive disciplines."
[13] For David Carr's English translation see now The Crisis 01 European
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1970.
[14] Husserl's characterization of his encounter with G. F. Stout in the letter of
December 13, 1922 sounds much more positive than what he told W. R
Boyce Gibson in 1928 (see above p. 160).
NOTES
No index of subjects has been added, since no special need for it is anticipated
in this book, in which the subjects are of secondary importance and easily
traceable with the help of the headings and subheadings of each essay.
Salmon, ChristopherV. 162-165, 171, 185 Van Breda, H.L. 70, 84, 107, 124, 162, 166,
Santayana, George 27 234
Sartre, Jean-Paul XII, XIII, 51-61, 102 Van de Pitte, Margaret 173
Savan, David 46 Varet, Gilbert 56
Schapire, Rosa 103 Vischer, Robert 119, 124
Schättle, Margarete 21
Scheler, Max 33, 43, 47,60,77,78,83,146, Waismann, Friedrich 204, 206, 208, 210,
173,174,176,177,181,182,185,189 218,222,224
ScheU, Hermann 126 WaIIace, William 38, 47
Scherer, Edmond 94, 95, 99, 103, 104 Ward, Humphrey 102
Schiller, F.C.S. 37, 190 Ward, James 147, 151, 160, 231, 232
Schilpp, Paul218 Weierstrass, Kar! 126, 179, 183, 186
Schlick, Moritz 202, 208, 210, 224 Weiler, Gershon 217
Schmidt, Raymund 139 Weininger, Otto 227
Schopenhauer, Arthur 227 Weiss, Paul 30,46
Schröder, Ernst 48 Weitmann, Herbert 119
Schuhmann, KarlXI, XII, XV,48, 68, 81, 82, Welby, Victoria 39, 40, 47
116, 127, 139-141, 160, 172,231,233,234 Welch, Cyril 173, 189,229
Schuppe, Wilhelm 48 Welch, E. P. XV, 173-192
Schutz, Alfred 105,157, 192 Werkmeister, W.H.W. 192
Schwankl, Peter 81 Wertheimer, Max 191, 196
Schweitzer, Albert 78, 82 Weyl, Herrnann 146, 155
Sellars, Wilfred 218 White, Roger, 222
239
Whitehead, A.N. 36, 136, 155,231, 232, 234 Wright, Georg Hendrik von 214, 218, 222-
Wiener, Philip P. 46, 47 225, 227
Wild, lohn 105, 159 Wundt, Wilhelm 48, 149
Williams, Forrest 61
Wilshire, Bruce 105 Yorck von Wartenburg, Paul136
Wittgenstein, Ludwig XII, XVI, 75, 85, 90, Young, Frederic H. 46
158, 202-228
Wolf, A. 232 Zaner, Richard 192