right over the Abejos' shares as well as for annulment of sale to Telectronics
Petitioners: Sps Jose and Aurora Abejo, Telectronic Systems Inc.
Respondents: Hon. Judge Rafael de la Cruz of RTC Pasig, Sps Agapito
and Virginia Braga, Virgilio Braga and Norberto Braga
Doctrines:
1) Disputes involving controversies between and among stockholders fall
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC under Section 5 of
PD 902-A.
2) An intra-corporate controversy is one which arises between a stockholder
and the corporation.
Facts: Telectronic Systems Inc purchased 133, 000 minority shareholdings
in the Pocket Bell Ph Inc from the Sps. Abejo and 63, 000 shares from Sps.
Braga (the former majority stockholders).
With the said purchases, Telectronics would become the majority
stockholder, holding 56% of the outstanding stock and voting power of the
Pocket Bell corporation.
Norberto Braga, the corporate secretary and son of the sps
Bragas, refused to register the transfer of shares in the corporate books,
asserting that the Bragas has preemptive rights over the 133,000 Abejo
shares and that Virginia Braga never transferred her 63, 000 shares to
Telectronics but had lost the five stock certificates representing those
shares.
The Abejos and Telectronics filed two SEC cases, (1) praying for
mandamus that SEC orders Norberto Braga to register the transfer and sale
of the Pocket Bell shares and (2) for injunction and a temporary restraining
order that the SEC enjoin the Bragas from disbursing assets of Pocket Bell
and from performing such other acts pertaining to the functions of
corporate officers.
Norberto filed a Motion to Dismiss the mandamus case
contending that SEC has no jurisdiction over it since it does not involve an
intracorporate controversy between stockholders. SEC hearing officer
Joaquin Garaygay issued an order granting Braga’s motion and dismissed
the first SEC case.
The Bragas filed a Motion to Dismiss the injuction case but the
SEC Director created a three-man committee to hear and decide the SEC
cases.
The Bragas filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with the SEC en ban to dismiss the two cases on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction of the SEC. SEC dismissed the petition, ruling that the
issue is not the ownership of the shares but the nonperformance by the
corporate secretary of the ministerial duty of recording transfers of shares
of stock of the corporation.
The Bragas filed an action in CFI (RTC) for (1) annulment and
rescission of the sale on the ground that it violated the pre-emptive right
over the Abejos’ shareholdings and (2) declaration of nullity of transfer, that
the said stock certificates were intended as security for a loan application
and were thus endorsed by her in blank, had been lost. RTC Judge de la
Cruz issued an order restraining Telectronics agents or representatives
from assuming control of the corporation and discharging their functions.
Issue: Who between the RTC and SEC has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the dispute? SEC.
Decision: The court ruled that the dispute is INTRACORPORATE one. It
has arisen between the principal stockholders of the corporation due to the
refusal of the corporate secretary, backed up by his parents as former
majority shareholders, to perform his "ministerial duty" to record the
transfers of the corporation's controlling (56%) shares f stock, covered by
duly endorsed certificates of stock, in favor of Telectronics as the purchaser
thereof. Mandamus in the SEC to compel the corporate secretary to register
the transfers and issue new certificates in favor of Telectronics and its
nominees was properly resorted to.
The claims of the Bragas, that they had an alleged perfected preemptive
of Virginia Braga's shares covered by street certificates duly endorsed by
her in blank, may in no way deprive the SEC of its primary and exclusive
jurisdiction to grant or not the writ of mandamus ordering the registration
of the shares so transferred. The Bragas' contention that the question of
ordering the recording of the transfers ultimately hinges on the question of
ownership or right thereto over the shares notwithstanding, the jurisdiction
over the dispute is clearly vested in the SEC.
As to the sale and transfer of the Abejos' shares, the Bragas cannot oust the
SEC of its original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. As
the SEC maintains, "There is no requirement that a stockholder of a
corporation must be a registered one in order that the Securities and
Exchange Commission may take cognizance of a suit.” This is because the
SEC by express mandate has "absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control
over all corporations" and is called upon to enforce the provisions of the
Corporation Code, among which is the stock purchaser's right to secure the
corresponding certificate in his name under the provisions of Section 63 of
the Code. any problem encountered in securing the certificates of stock
representing the investment made by the buyer must be expeditiously dealt
with through administrative mandamus proceedings with the SEC, rather
than through the usual tedious regular court procedure.
Under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction
. . . the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal,
where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a
uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory
statute administered.”
SEC can take cognizance of a case, the controversy must pertain to any of
the following relationships: [a] between the corporation, partnership or
association and the public; [b} between the corporation, partnership or
association and its stockholders, partners, members, or officers; [c] between
the corporation, partnership or association and the state in so far as its
franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; and [d] among the
stockholders, partners or associates themselves.''

The Court finds that under the facts and circumstances of record, it is but
fair and just that the SEC's order creating a receivership committee be
implemented forthwith, in accordance with its terms.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Granting the petition in G.R. No. 63558, annulling the challenged
Orders of respondent Judge dated February 14, 1983 and March 11, 1983
(Annexes "L" and "P" of the Abejos' petition) and prohibiting respondent
Judge from further proceeding in Civil Case No. 48746 filed in his Court
other than to dismiss the same for lack or jurisdiction over the subject-
matter; 

(c) Directing the SEC through its Hearing Committee to proceed
immediately with hearing and resolving the pending mandamus petition
for recording in the corporate books the transfer to Telectronics and its
nominees of the majority (56%) shares of stock of the corporation Pocket
Bell pertaining to the Abejos and Virginia Braga and all related issues,
taking into consideration, without need of resubmittal to it, the pleadings,
annexes and exhibits filed by the contending parties in the cases at bar; and


(d) Likewise directing the SEC through its Hearing Committee to proceed
immediately with the implementation of its receivership or management
committee Order of April 15, 1983 in SEC Case No. 2379 and for the
purpose, the contending parties are ordered to submit to said Hearing
Committee the name of their designated representatives in the
receivership/management committee within three (3) days from receipt of
this decision, on pain of forfeiture of such right in case of failure to comply
herewith, as provided in the said Order; and ordering the Bragas to perform
only caretaker acts in the corporation pending the organization of such
receivership/management committee and assumption of its functions.
This decision shall be immediately executory upon its promulgation.
PD No. 902-A
Section 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the
Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations, partnerships and
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other forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted under
existing laws and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide cases involving.
b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between
and among stockholders, members, or associates; between any or all of them and the
corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or
associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association
and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as
such entity;
BERNARDO vs. ABALOS
FACTS: Respondent Benjamin Abalos, Sr. was the mayor of Mandaluyong
City and his son, Benjamin Abalos Jr. was a candidate for city mayor of the
same city for the May 1998 elections. Petitioners herein interposed that
respondents conducted an all-expense-free affair at a resort in Quezon
Province for the Mandaluyong City public school teachers, registered
voters of the said city and who are members of the Board of Election
Inspectors therein. The said affair was alleged to be staged as a political
campaign for Abalos Jr., where his political jingle was played all
throughout and his shirts being worn by some participants. Moreover,
Abalos Sr. also made an offer and a promise then to increase the allowances
of the teachers. In this regard, petitioners filed a criminal complaint with
the COMELEC against Abalos Sr. and Abalos Jr. for vote-buying, further
alleging that they conspired with their co-respondents in violating the
Omnibus Election Code. Pursuant to the recommendation of the Director
of the Law Department of the COMELEC, the COMELEC en banc
dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. Hence, this petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the petition before the Supreme Court must be given due
course without the petitioners first submitting a motion for reconsideration
before the COMELEC.
HELD: NO. The Court ruled that a petition for certiorari can only be
resorted to if there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. In the instant case, it was said that filing of
the motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC is the most
expeditious and inexpensive recourse that petitioners can avail of as it was
intended to give the COMELEC an opportunity to correct the error imputed
to it. As the petitioners then did not exhaust all the remedies available to
them at the COMELEC level, it was held that their instant petition is
certainly premature. Significantly, they have not also raised any plausible
reason for their direct recourse to the Supreme Court. As such, the instant
petition was ruled to fail.
Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs CA G.R. No. 88550 (184 SCRA
Concept: Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
Facts:
Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by
the Bureau of Energy Development (BED), for the exploration of two coal
blocks in Eastern Samar. IEI asked the Ministry of Energy for another to
contract for the additional three coal blocks.
IEI was advised that there is another coal operator, Marinduque Mining
and Industrial Corporation (MMIC). IEI and MMIC signed a Memorandum
of Agreement on which IEI will assign all its rights and interests to MMIC.
IEI filed for rescission of the memorandum plus damages against the
MMIC and the Ministry of Energy Geronimo Velasco before the RTC of
Makati, alleging that MMIC started operating in the coal blocks prior to
finalization of the memorandum. IEI prayed for that the rights for the
operation be granted back.
Philippine National Bank (PNB) pleaded as co-defendant because they
have mortgages in favor of MMIC. It was dismissed
Oddly enough, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus is President of both IEI and MMIC.
RTC ordered the rescission of the memorandum and for the reinstatement
of the contract in favor of IEI.
CA reversed the ruling of the RTC, stating that RTC has no jurisdiction
over the matter.
Issue: W/ON RTC has jurisdiction?
Held: No. While the action filed by IEI sought the rescission of what appears
to be an ordinary civil contract cognizable by a civil court, the fact is that
the Memorandum of Agreement sought to be rescinded is derived from a
coal-operating contract and is inextricably tied up with the right to develop
coal-bearing lands and the determination of whether or not the reversion of
the coal operating contract over the subject coal blocks to IEI would be in
line with the integrated national program for coal-development and with
the objective of rationalizing the country's over-all coal-supply-demand
balance, IEI's cause of action was not merely the rescission of a contract but
the reversion or return to it of the operation of the coal blocks. Thus it was
that in its Decision ordering the rescission of the Agreement, the Trial
Court, inter alia, declared the continued efficacy of the coal-operating
contract in IEI's favor and directed the BED to give due course to IEI's
application for three (3) IEI more coal blocks. These are matters properly
falling within the domain of the BED.
In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand the
special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court
has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that
the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such
that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and
knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters
or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained
in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the
courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court.
This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim
is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending
referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view"
Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case
since the question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed
and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas
involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency
in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial
Court does not have the competence to decide matters concerning activities
relative to the exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of
mineral resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial
determination. It behooves the courts to stand aside even when apparently
they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the primary
jurisdiction of an administrative agency
GSIS V. CIVIL SERVICE
The GSIS dismissed six government employees on account of irregularities
in the canvassing of supplies. The employees appealed to the Merit Board.
Said board found for the employees and declared the dismissal as illegal
because no hearing took place. The GSIS took the issue to the Civil
Service which then ruled that the dismissal was indeed illegal. The CSC
thereafter ordered the reinstatement of the employees and demanded the
payment of backwages. The replacements of the dismissed employees
should then be released from service. The GSIS remained unconvinced and
raised the issue to the SC. SC affirmed the Civil Service ruling saying o The
CSC acted within its authority o Reinstatement was proper o However, the
SC modified the requirement of backpay. Said backpay should be made
after the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings. Heirs of the dismissed
employees filed a motion for execution of the Civil Serviceresolution so that
backwages can be paid. GSIS however denied the motion saying that the
SC modified that part of the ruling. CSC nonetheless thumbed its nose to
the GSIS and granted the motion. GSIS was made to pay. Backed against
the wall, GSIS filed certiorari with the SC asking that the CSC order be
2
nullified. The GSIS contends that the CSC has no power to execute
its judgments.
ISSUE
Whether the Civil Service has the power to enforce its judgments
HELD
YES. The Civil Service Commission is a consitutional commission invested
by the Constitution and relevant laws not only with authority to administer
the civil service, but also with quasi-judicial powers. It has the authority to
hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it
or brought to it on appeal. It has the power, too, sitting en banc, to
promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or
before any of its offices, which rules should not however diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights. In light of all the foregoing consitutional and
statutory provisions, it would appear absurd to deny to the Civil Service
Commission the power or authority or order execution of its decisions,
resolutions or orders. It would seem quite obvious that the authority to
decide cases is inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that what
has been decided is carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of
adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, should
normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority
to enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the law
otherwise provides. Therefore, the GSIS must yield to the order of the CSC.
Leonardo Paat vs CA G.R. no. 111107 (266 SCRA 167)
Facts:
May19, 1989. The truck of Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR
because the driver of the truck was not able to produce the required
documents for the forest products.
Jovitio Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Officer (CENRO), issued an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the
owner 15 days to submit an explanation. Owner was not able to sumbit an
explanation and the order of the CENRO was enforced.
The issue was brought to the secretary of the DENR. While pending, the
owner filed a suit for replevin against the Layugan. Layugan filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the owner failed to exhaust administrative
remedies. Trial court ruled in favor of the owner. CA sustained Trial Court’s
decision
Issue: W/ON the trial court has jurisdiction?
Held. No. This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before
a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition
that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes
afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can
still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then
such remedy should be exhausted first before courts judicial power can be
sought. The premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones
cause of action.
VALMONTE vs BELMONTE
FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with
preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that
respondent be directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the
Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban
who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7
election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda
Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the
documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow
petitioners access to the public records for the subject information On June
20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government
Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner
Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive
a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action
necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance
of public interest."
ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to
inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given by the former First Lady
Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO
and PDP-Laban political parties.
HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the
privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition.
His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The
judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the
law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government,
policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the
government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State
power. The concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they
choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they
were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It
cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate and their
newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding responsible
positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared
to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny
The "transactions" used here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover
both steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract,
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not
binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering
further that government-owned and controlled corporations, whether
performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the
people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a
government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within
the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional
policy of transparency in government dealings. Although citizens are
afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to
"access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to
compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries
and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public
concern.
PROSECUTOR LEO C. TABAO vs. JUDGE FRISCO T. LILAGAN and
SHERIFF IV LEONARDO V. AGUILAR [A.M. No. RTJ-01-1651.
September 4, 2001] Case Digest
On February 24, 1998, a water craft M/L Hadja, from Bongao, Tawi-tawi,
was docked at the port area of Tacloban City with a load of 100 tons of
tanbark. Robert Hernandez was the consignee to said cargo. While the
cargo was being unloaded, the NBI decided to verify the shipment's
accompanying documents where it was found to be irregular and
incomplete. Consequently, the NBI ordered the unloading of the cargo
stopped. As a result, the tanbark, the boat, and three cargo trucks were
seized and impounded.
On March 5, 1998, NBI-EVRO 8 Regional Director Carlos S. Caabay filed a
Criminal Complaint for the violation of Section 68 (now Section 78) of P.D.
705, The Forestry Code of the Philippines as amended, against the captain
and crew of the M/L Hadja, Robert Hernandez, Tandico Chion, Alejandro
K. Bautista, a forster, and Marcial A. Dalimot, a Community Environment
and Natural Resources Officer of the DENR. Bautista and Dalimot were also
charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, along with Habi A. Alih and Khonrad V.
Mohammad of the CENRO-Bongao, Tawi-tawi. The complaint was
docketed as I.S. No. 98-296 at the Prosecutor's Office of Tacloban City.
On March 10, 1998, DENR took possession of the cargo, the boat and the
three trucks, through the previous direction of the complainant. Due notice
were issued to the consignee, Robert Hernandez and the NBI Regional
Director.
On March 11, 1998, Hernandez filed in the RTC of Leyte a case for replevin
to recover the items seized by the DENR and was docketed as Civil Case
No. 98-03-42.
3
On March 16, 1998, subpoenas were issued to the respondents in I.S. No.
98-296 and on March 17, 1998, confiscation proceedings were conducted by
the PENRO-Leyte, with both Hernandez and his counsel present.
On March 19, 1998, herein respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan issued a writ
of replevin and directed Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar to take possession
of the items seized by the DENR and to deliver them to Hernandez after the
expiration of five days. Respondent Sheriff served a copy of the writ to the
Philippine Coast Guard station in Tacloban City at around 5:45 p.m. of
March 19, 1998.
Thus, the filing of this Administrative complaint against respondent via a
letter addressed to the Chief Justice and dated April 13, 1998, by Atty.
Tabao.
Complainant avers that replevin is not available when properties sought to
be recovered are involved in criminal proceedings. He also submits that
respondent judge is either grossly ignorant of the law and jurisprudence or
purposely disregarded them.
Complainant states that the respondent sheriff had the duty to safeguard
M/L Hadja and to prevent it from leaving the port of Tacloban City, after
he had served a writ of seizure therefor on the Philippine Coast Guard.
According to the complainant, on March 19, 1998, the vessel left the port of
Tacloban City, either through respondent sheriff's gross negligence or his
direct connivance with interested parties. Moreover, complainant pointed
out that respondent sheriff released the seized tanbark to Hernandez within
the five day period that he was supposed to keep it under the terms of the
writ, thereby effectively altering, suppressing, concealing or destroying the
integrity of said evidence.
Respondent judge claim that the charge of gross ignorance of the law was
premature since there is a pending motion to dismiss filed by the
defendants in the replevin case. Further, he claimed that he was unaware
of the existence of I.S. No. 98-296 and upon learning of the same, he issued
an order dated March 25, 1998, suspending the transfer to Hernandez of
possession of the subject items, pending resolution of an urgent
manifestation by the complainant. Respondent judges stresses that the writ
of replevin was issued in strict compliance with the requirements laid down
in Rule 60 of the Revised Rule of Court. He also pointed out that no
apprehension report was issued by the NBI regarding the shipment and
neither did the DENR issue a seizure report.
Respondent sheriff submits that he served the writ of replevin on the Coast
Guard to prevent the departure of subject vessel since he does not have the
means to physically prevent the vessel from sailing. He further claimed that
he verified the status of the cargo with DENR and that it came from a
legitimate source except that the shipment documents were not in order.
Respondent sheriff contends that it was his ministerial duty to serve the
writ of replevin, absent any instruction to the contrary.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in a report dated April 8, 1999,
recommended that the judge be fined in the amount of P15,000.00 for gross
ignorance of the law and that the charges against respondent sheriff be
dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge was grossly ignorant of the
law and jurisprudence for issuing the writ of replevin.
RULING:
The complaint for replevin states that the shipment of tanbark and the
vessel on which it was loaded were seized by the NBI for verification of
supporting documents. It also stated that the NBI turned over the seized
items to the DENR "for official disposition and appropriate action". These
allegations would have been sufficient to alert the respondent judge that
the DENR had custody of the seized items and that administrative
proceedings may have already been commenced concerning the shipment.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot take
cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of special
competence. Also, the plaintiff in the replevin suit who seeks to recover the
shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies
available to him. Prudent thing for the respondent judge to do was to
dismiss the replevin outright.
Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary or
his representatives may order the confiscation of forest products illegally
cut, gathered, removed, possessed or abandoned, including the
conveyances involved in the offense.
It was declared by the Court in Paat vs. Court of Appeals the that
enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection,
development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and
special responsibilities of the DENR. The DENR should be given free hand
unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well
within its jurisdiction. The court held that the assumption of the trial court
of the replevin suit constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain
of the administrative ageny's prerogative. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to
resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged within
an administrative body of special competence.
The respondent judge's act of taking cognizance of the subject replevin suit
clearly demonstrates ignorance of the law. He has fallen short of the
standard set forth in Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, that
a judge must be an embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence. To measure up to this standard, justices are expected to keep
abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic
legal commands constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one
may be excused, not even a judge.
On the charges against respondent sheriff, the Court agreed with the OCA
that they should be dismissed. Respondent sheriff merely complied with
his material duty to serve the writ with reasonable celerity and to execute it
promptly in accordance with the mandates.
Respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan was found liable for gross ignorance of
the law and is accordingly ordered to pay a fine of 10,000. 00, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt more
severely. The complaint against respondent Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar
is dismissed for lack of merit.
ARROW vs BOT
1. Both petitioner and private respondent Sultan Rent-a-Car are domestic
corporations. Arrow has in his favor a certificate of public convenience
(CPN) to operate a public utility bus air-conditioned-auto-truck service
from Cebu City to Mactan International Airport and vice-versa with the use
of twenty (20) units.
2. Sultan filed a petition with the respondent Board for the issuance of a
CPN to operate a similar service on the same line. Eight days later, without
the required publication, the Board issued an Order granting it provisional
permit to operate.
3. After filing an MR and for the cancellation of such provisional permit
filed but without awaiting final action thereon, Arrow filed the present
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, alleging that the question
involved herein is purely legal and that the issuance of the Order without
the Board having acquired jurisdiction of the case yet, is patently illegal or
was performed without jurisdiction.
4. In their answer, the respondents denied the need for publication before a
provisional permit can be issued, in light of Presidential Decree No. 101,
which authorized respondent Board to grant provisional permits when
warranted by compelling circumstances and to proceed promptly along the
method of legislative inquiry. Issue: W/N publication is necessary before
provisional permits can be granted
4
Held: No. It is the well-settled doctrine that for a provisional permit, an ex
parte hearing suffices. The decisive consideration is the existence of the
public need, as shown in this case by the respondent Board. Petition for
certiorari dismissed.
Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong
Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. v. Dominguez
Petitioners questopn the validity of the order of then Secretary of
Agriculture Hon. Carlos G. Dominguez which ordered: (1) the take-over by
the Department of Agriculture of the management of the petitioner
Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod Ng Mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang
Bayan ng Muntilupa, Inc. (KBMBPM) pursuant to the Department’s
regulatory and supervisory powers under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175, as
amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 13, (2) the creation of a
Management Committee which shall assume the management of KBMBPM
upon receipt of the order, (3) the disbandment of the Board of Directors,
and (4) the turn over of all assets, properties and records of the KBMBPM
the Management Committee.
The exordium of said Order unerringly indicates that its basis is
the alleged petition of the general membership of the KBMBPM requesting
the Department for assistance in the removal of the members of the Board
of Directors who were not elected by the general membership” of the
cooperative and that the ongoing financial and management audit of the
Department of Agriculture auditors shows that the management of the
KBMBPM is not operating that cooperative in accordance with P.D. 175,
LOI 23, the Circulars issued by DA/BACOD and the provisions and by-
laws of KBMBPM. It is also professed therein that the Order was issued by
the Department “in the exercise of its regulatory and supervisory powers
under Section 8 of P.D. 175, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order
No. 113.
Issue: whether or not the Order issued by the Secretary of Agriculture is
illegal
Held: Regulation 34 of Letter of Implementation No. 23 (implementing P.D.
No. 175) provides the procedure for the removal of directors or officers of
cooperatives, thus:
An elected officer, director or committee member may be removed by a vote
of majority of the members entitled to vote at an annual or special general
assembly. The person involved shall have an opportunity to be heard.
A substantially identical provision, found in Section 17, Article
III of the KBMBPM’s by-laws, reads:
Sec. 17. Removal of Directors and Committee Members. — Any elected director
or committee member may be removed from office for cause by a majority
vote of the members in good standing present at the annual or special
general assembly called for the purpose after having been given the
opportunity to be heard at the assembly.
Under the same article are found the requirements for the
holding of both the annual general assembly and a special general
assembly.
Indubitably then, there is an established procedure for the
removal of directors and officers of cooperatives. It is likewise manifest that
the right to due process is respected by the express provision on the
opportunity to be heard. But even without said provision, petitioners
cannot be deprived of that right.
The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent
Secretary of Agriculture arrogated unto himself the power of the members
of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the petitioning
directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175
which grants him authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. This
section does not give him that right.
An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to
him and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. These powers
should not be extended by implication beyond what may to necessary for
their just and reasonable execution.
Supervision and control include only the authority to: (a) act directly
whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; (b) direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of
acts; (c) review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of
subordinate officials or units; (d) determine priorities in the execution of
plans and programs; and (e) prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and
programs. Specifically, administrative supervision is limited to the
authority of the department or its equivalent to: (1) generally oversee the
operations of such agencies and insure that they are managed effectively,
efficiently and economically but without interference with day-to-day
activities; (2) require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of
management audit, performance evaluation and inspection to determine
compliance with policies, standards and guidelines of the department; (3)
take such action as may be necessary for the proper performance of official
functions, including rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of
mal-administration; (4) review and pass upon budget proposals of such
agencies but may not increase or add to them.
The power to summarily disband the board of directors may not
be inferred from any of the foregoing as both P.D. No. 175 and the by-laws
of the KBMBPM explicitly mandate the manner by which directors and
officers are to be removed. The Secretary should have known better than to
disregard these procedures and rely on a mere petition by the general
membership of the KBMBPM and an on-going audit by Department of
Agriculture auditors in exercising a power which he does not have,
expressly or impliedly. We cannot concede to the proposition of the Office
of the Solicitor General that the Secretary’s power under paragraph (d),
Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 above quoted to suspend the operation or cancel
the registration of any cooperative includes the “milder authority of
suspending officers and calling for the election of new officers.” Firstly,
neither suspension nor cancellation includes the take-over and ouster of
incumbent directors and officers, otherwise the law itself would have
expressly so stated. Secondly, even granting that the law intended such as
postulated, there is the requirement of a hearing. None was conducted
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY AND DOLE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioners, vs. WILFREDO HERVILLA, respondent.
An action for Recovery of Possession and Damages filed by Wilfredo
Hervilla against Dole Philippines, involving four (4) hectares of land, now
in the possession of defendant corporation as Administrator of the
properties of National Development Corporation (NDC)
claimant Rolando Gabales, for a consideration of P450.00, sold to Hernane
Hervilla all his rights and interest over a four-hectare land:
It was apparently on the strength of the Tax Declaration that Hernane
Hervilla was induced to acquire it
its adjoining occupant-claimant, Fernando Jabagat, for a consideration of
P270.00, also sold his interest and rights to Hernane Hervilla over another
four (4) hectares of land
Undoubtedly, while adjoining each other, one of these is situated on
Polomolok, South Cotabato, while the other is in Tupi, South Cotabato [the
two lots were later plotted to be in Palkan, Polomolok). For, at the time of
these transfers, the boundary between these places had not definitely been
settled. Hence, the discrepancy.
Wilfredo Hervilla, claiming to be the successor-in-interest of his brother,
Hernane Hervilla who vacated these properties, [in favor of the former],
filed with the District Land Office of the Bureau of Lands in General Santos
City Free Patent Application
5
Wilfredo Hervilla who was then in Palawan, thru his wife, Enuna V.
Hervilla, filed an ejectment suit against Dole before the Municipal Court of
Tupi, South Cotabato (then Cotabato) alleging that "sometime in the early
part of March 1968 defendant by means of threats, of force, intimidation,
strategy and stealth and against the wig of the plaintiffs, entered and
occupied the entire parcels This was dismissed, however, on September 30,
1970 for failure to state a cause of action and without the benefit of trying it
upon the merits
On the basis of the foregoing facts, the court a quo rendered a decision in
favor of the National Development Company (NDC, for short) and Dole
Philippines, Inc.,
the Intermediate Appellate Court REVERSED and set aside Declaring that
plaintiff-appellant, Wilfredo Hervilla, the rightful , Ordering the NDC and
DOLE to vacate the said lots and deliver possession thereof to the said
plaintiff-appellant;
A motion for reconsideration was timely filed by petitioners which the
Court RESOLVED to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration.
PETITIONER CONTENTION: We do not think the Bureau of Lands could
validly make a pronouncement on the issue of possession over the subject
land upon which rested the issuance of the patents in favor of defendants-
appellee, as against the prior finding of this Court that the plaintiff-
appellant had the prior, superior and physical possession thereof, since said
issue is the very sameDecision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, issue
litigated in this case submitted by the parties to the court of justice. In other
words, when the Bureau of Lands issued the patents and OCT's in question,
the case was already pending in court; hence, subjudice. The issuance of the
patents and Original Certificates of Title over the subject land, therefore, is
nun and void, the same having been issued, while the case is still pending
in court.
Court likewise hereby RESOLVES to DENY the Supplement to the Motion
for Reconsideration with Motion for New Trial, for being unmeritorious. 4
Hence, the present petition interposed by the National Development
Company (NDC).
There is no question that the authority given to the Lands Department over
the disposition of public lands 5 does not exclude the courts from their
jurisdiction over possessory actions, the public character of the land
notwithstanding 6and that the exercise by the courts of such jurisdiction is
not an interference with the alienation, disposition and control of public
lands.7 The question that is raised by petitioner NDC before this Court is:
ISSUE:"May the Court in deciding a case involving recovery of possession
declare null and void title issued by an administrative body or office
during the pendency of such case? Specifically, is the Bureau of Lands
precluded, on the ground that the matter is subjudice, from issuing a free
patent during the pendency of a case in court for recovery of possession?
The questions are answered in the negative. It is now well settled that the
administration and disposition of public lands are committed by law to the
Director of Lands primarily, and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources. 8 The jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined
to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimantsx to public
lands 9 or to cases which involve disposition and alienation of public
lands. 10 The jurisdiction of courts in possessory actions involving public
lands is limited to the determination of who has the actual, physical
possession or occupation of the land in question (in forcible entry cases,
before municipal courts) or, the better right of possession (in accion
publiciana, in cases before Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial
Courts). 11
under section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the Director of Lands has
direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any
other form of concession of disposition and management of the lands of
the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact are conclusive
when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture
Moreover, records do not show that private respondent Wilfredo Hervilla
ever filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Director of
Lands issuing free patent over the lands in dispute in favor of petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest. Neither did he appeal said decision to the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, nor did he appeal to the office of the
President of the Philippines. In short, Hervilla failed to exhaust
administrative remedies, a flaw which, to our mind, is fatal to a court
review. The decision of the Director of Lands has now become final. The
Courts may no longer interfere with such decision. 16
ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, vs.Hon. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR Secretary,
and ASTERIO BUQUERON, respondents.
Atlas Consolidated Mining registered the location of its "Master VII Fr."
mining claim with the Mining Recorder of Toledo City. private respondent
Asterio Buqueron registered the declarations of location of his "St. Mary Fr."
and "St. Joseph Fr." mining claims with the same Mining Recorder. , Atlas
registered the declarations of location of its "Carmen I Fr." to "Carmen V.
Fr. " with the same Mining Recorder.
Buqueron's "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." were surveyed and the survey
plans thereof were duly approved by the Director of Mines and Geo
Sciences. Notice of Buqueron's lease application was published
During the said period of publication, petitioner filed an adverse claim
against private respondent's mining claims on the ground that they
allegedly overlapped its own mining claims.
After hearing, the Director of Mines rendered a decision, respondent
(Buqueron) is hereby given the preferential right to possess, lease, explore,
exploit and operate the areas covered by his "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph
Fr." mining claims, except the area covered thereby which is in conflict with
adverse claimant's (Atlas) "Master VII Fr." Adverse claimant (Atlas) on the
other hand, is given the preferential right to possess, lease, explore, exploit
and operate the area covered by its "Master VII Fr." case.
Atlas appealed to the Minister of Natural Resources mining claims of
Asterio Buqueron are null and void, that the "Carmen I Fr. " to "Carmen V.
Fr. " mining claims of Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development
Corporation are valid, and that it be given the preferential right to
possesses, explore, exploit, lease and operate the areas covered thereby.
Deputy Executive Secretary, Office of the President, reversed the decision
of the Minister of Natural Resources and reinstated the decision of the
Director of Mines and Geo Sciences.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not private respondent's appeal to the Office of the
President was time-barred;
Petitioner contends that the appeal was filed out of time and therefore, the
Office of the President did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and should
have dismissed the same outright
It was found that it is evident that private respondent's appeal was filed on
time.
II.
,Although reversed by the Minister of Natural Resources, were affirmed by
the Office of the President.
However, petitioner would have this Court look into the said findings
because of the open divergence of views and findings by the adjudicating
authorities in this mining conflict involving highly contentious issues
which warrant appellate review
This Court has repeatedly ruled that judicial review of the decision of an
administrative official is of course subject to certain guide posts laid
down in many decided cases. Thus, for instance, findings of fact in such
decision should not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence,
but review is justified when there has been a denial of due process, or
mistake of law or fraud, collusion or arbitrary action in the administrative
proceeding , where the procedure which led to factual findings is
irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of
discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest
A careful study of the records shows that none of the above circumstances
is present in the case at bar, which would justify the overturning of the
findings of fact of the Director of Mines which were affirmed by the
Office of the President. On the contrary, in accordance with the prevailing
principle that "in reviewing administrative decisions, the reviewing Court
cannot re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence as if originally instituted
therein, and receive additional evidence, that was not submitted to the
administrative agency concerned," the findings of fact in this case must be
6
respected. As ruled by the Court, they will not be disturbed so long as they
are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or
preponderant (Police Commission vs. Lood, supra).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby DENIED
CARPIO vs EXEC SEC
In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES” was passed. Antonio Carpio, as a member of the
bar and a defender of the Constitution, assailed the constitutionality of the
said law as he averred that it only interferes with the control power of the
president.
He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) by limiting its power “to administrative
control” over the PNP thus, “control” remained with the Department
Secretary under whom both the NPC and the PNP were placed; that the
system of letting local executives choose local police heads also undermine
the power of the president.
ISSUE: Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the
PNP and NPC by virtue of RA 6975.
HELD: No. The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of
government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to
the lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control
powers of the President, is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency”. As
the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the
same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his
Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, “all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of
the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments
are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where
the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person
on the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive
are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of
the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”
Thus, and in short, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised
by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority,
control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in
the executive department.”
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are
placed under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative
realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation
among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement
agencies and public safety agencies created under the assailed Act, the
funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized by the national
government.
HEIRS OF EUGENIA vs ROXAS
Petitioner corporation, Heirs of Eugenia V. Roxas, Inc. (hereinafter referred
to as HEVR), was incorporated on December 4, 1962 by the late Eufrocino
Roxas and his seven children (Pedro, Benigna, Julita, Antonio, Ramon,
Victoria and Eriberto), with the primary purpose of owning and developing
the properties of Eufrocino Roxas and the estate of his late wife, Dona
Eugenia V. Roxas, located in the Province of Laguna. Petitioners Benigna V.
Roxas, Julita N. Roxas, Victoria R. Vallarta, Juanita Roxas and Margarita R.
Tioseco are some of the surviving heirs of Eufrocino and Eugenia Roxas.
In 1971, its articles of incorporation were amended to include the operation
of a resort among its purposes. In early 1972, it opened to the public the
Hidden Valley Springs Resort situated in Calauan. Laguna.
Eufrocino Roxas was Chairman of the Board of Directors and President of
HEVR until the time of his death on August 28, 1979. One of his sons,
Eriberto, a director, was manager of the resort until his death in 1980. He
also succeeded his father as President upon the latter's demise.
After Eriberto Roxas' death on December 4, 1980, private respondents
continued the operations of the restaurant and liquor concession. In 1981,
they incorporated under the name "Hidden Valley Agri-Business and
Restaurant, Inc." (hereinafter referred to as HVABR), and through this
entity they continued to carry on the concession.
Meanwhile, the MOT promulgated on July 28, 1983 its resolution
dismissing HVABR'S petition, finding inter aliathat HVABR was operating
the restaurant and liquor facilities of the resort without the requisite MOT
license.
ISSUE: WON courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and
actions of the administrative departments of the government.
Held: No. the refusal in the issuance of the license to MJBFS. Hence, HEVR
filed the herein second petition docketed as G.R. No. 78618, on June 11,
1987, seeking the nullification of the license issued to MJBFSIn general,
courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the
administrative departments of the government. This is generally true with
respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and
findings of fact. Findings of fact by an administrative board or officials,
following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and will not be disturbed
except where the board or official has gone beyond his statutory authority,
exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without
regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion. And we have
repeatedly held that there is grave abuse of discretion justifying the
issuance of the writ of certiorari only when there is capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction . . . as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of
positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act
at all in contemplation of law
The license to operate the subject restaurant in the Hidden Valley Springs
Resort issued by the DOT in favor of MJB Food and Services (or Guillermo
Roxas) is NULLIFIED.
INDUSTRIAL POWER SALES, INC., petitioner-appellant,
vs.HON. DUMA SINSUAT etc., et al., respondents-appellees.
FACTS: Two invitations to bid were advertised by the Bureau of Supply
Coordination of the Department of General Services. The first called for
eight units of truck for the use of the Bureau of Telecommunications. The
invitation to Bid as well as the requisition itself contained a proviso limiting
the offers to foreign made products on a CIF basis, Port of Manila. The
second invitation to Bid announced that both CIF Port of Manila and FOB
Manila quotations would be accepted and made part of bid requirements.
Among the bidders were Industrial Power Sales, Inc (IPSI) and Delta Motor
Corporation (Delta). The bids were deliberated by the Committee on
Awards and was awarded to IPSI. Delta protested the award to IPSI to the
Bureau of Telecommunications claiming that the trucks offered by IPSI
were not factory built, as stipulated in the requisition and invitation to bid.
The Director ruled that the bidding has been made in strict compliance with
technical specifications and requirements stated by the Bureau of
Telecommunications.
Delta’s next move was to file with the Office of the Secretary of General
Services (Sinsuat). The latter informed the Acting Director of Supply that
the Department had already approved Delta’s price, and categorically
direct him to award to Delta the purchase order of the eight trucks with the
least possible delay. This notice was given notwithstanding all the
Government agencies concerned already agreed on the correctness of the
award to IPSI – Bureau of Telecommunications, the Department of Public
Works & Communications to which said Bureau of Telecommunications
pertains, the Bureau of Supply, which had direct supervision and control of
the bidding, and of course, the Committee on Awards.
IPSI appealed from the Secretary’s decision to award the purchase contract
Delta to the Office of the President as well as the Office of the Auditor
General. The appeal notwithstanding, the Letter-Order in favor of Delta
was released. IPSI then filed with the CFI a petition certiorari and
mandamus, with application for preliminary and mandatory injunction.
The verdict wen against IPSI. From the judgment of the CFI, IPSI appealed
7
to the Court. The plea made in behalf of Secretary Sinsuat claims that IPSI
had gone to Court without first exhausting all administrative remedies.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was an exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies.
HELD: Certain universally accepted axioms govern judicial review
through the extraordinary actions of certiorari or prohibition of
determinations of administrative officers or agencies: first, that before said
actions may be entertained in the courts of justice, it must be shown that all
the administrative remedies prescribed by law or ordinance have been
exhausted; and second, that the administrative decision may properly be
annulled or set aside only upon a clear showing that the administrative
official or tribunal has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion. 1 There are however exceptions to the principle
known as exhaustion of administrative remedies, these being: (1) where the
issue is purely a legal one, (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal
or was done without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; (3) where the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bear the latter's implied or assumed approval, unless actually
disapproved; or (4) where there are circumstances indicating the urgency
of judicial intervention.
In view of these doctrines, there is no need for the exhaustion of
administrative remedies in the case at bar because Secretary Sinsuat indeed
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

National Development Company

Vs Collector of Customs

FACTS
The customs authorities found that the vessel carried on board an
unmanifested cargo consisting of one television set, and respondent
Collector of Customs sent a written notice to the operator of the vessel and
the latter answered stating that the television set was not cargo and so was
not required by law to be manifested. The operator requested an
investigation and hearing but respondent finding the operator’s
explanation not satisfactory imposed on the vessel a fine of P5,000.00,
ordering said fine to be paid within 48 hours from receipt, with a threat that
the vessel would be denied clearance and a warrant of seizure would be
issued if the fine will not be paid.

NDC, as owner, and operator AV Rocha filed for special civil action
for certiorari before the CFI of Manila against the respondent. Respondent
contended that petitioners have not exhausted all available administrative
remedies, one of which is to appeal to the Commissioner of Customs.

ISSUE
Whether or not the contention of respondent is correct.

HELD
The Court held in the negative. Respondent Collector committed
grave abuse of discretion because petitioner NDC was not given an
opportunity to prove that the television set involved is not a cargo that
needs to be manifested. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
required where the appeal to the administrative superior is not a plain,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, as where it is
undisputed that the respondent officer has acted in utter disregard of the
principle of due process.