Hydrocarbon Leak Detection for Oil Storage Tanks (Gasoline, Jet Fuel, Diesel)

Oil storage tanks may leak through the tank walls or through the tank bottom. After some years
of operation, it is common for an oil storage tank to experiment corrosion at its base, due to
either the stored fluid (e.g. salty water contained in crude oil) resulting in internal corrosion, or
soil humidity causing external corrosion.

TTK oil leak detection system with the addressable FG-OD sense cable provides continuous
monitoring and protection to oil storage tanks, assisting in the prevention of soil contamination
and loss of product.

The FG-OD oil leak sense cable, developed by TTK, is fast responding, re-usable and ATEX
approved. It provides fully mapped, simultaneous leak locations across the network of cables,
together with an alarm and logging system.

Lightning protection of oil storage tanks has becomes a controversial subject, due to conflicting
protection criteria. One such is the sense of using self-protection criteria, relying on the strict
fulfillment of the operational conditions, material thickness and reliable bonding; the other
refers to the necessity of standalone lightning protection system (LPS) where air terminals are
installed in order to avoid any interception between the lightning stepped leader and the tank
body that could cause hot spots and excessive temperature rise. Each method has its own
advantages and drawbacks. In this paper these criteria are analyzed with critical view in order
to make appropriate decisions in selecting the most suitable method of protection for a given
situation.

It is the common practice at international level to install external lightning protection systems
(LPS) in buildings and structures to protect them against lightning direct strikes or side flashes.
However many internationally reputed standards allow metal structures themselves to act as
standalone lightning interception points provided that the thickness of the wall exceeds certain
threshold value. For a given wall material, two values of minimum thickness are recommended;
based on the fact that whether material puncturing in the event of a lightning strike is
permissible or not. It has been discussed in the literature that even when puncturing is
prevented, hot-spot effects may pose ignition threats and fire hazard.

Petrochemical storages and gas/oil pipelines are most often considered as self-protected
structures against lightning direct strikes, provided that the required minimum thickness is
assured. In many safety codes the minimum thickness of metal plates is recommended as 4.8
(3/16”) mm for the tank roof to be considered as the air-termination for interception with
lightning stepped leaders. However, once the storage operation is started it is almost
impracticable to monitor the exact thickness of the tank walls so that the metal plates can be
replaced right at the correct time. Furthermore none of the standards on safety of
petrochemical systems specify the details of many other conditions that enhance the risk of
failure of the walls during the process of lightning interception with tank roof and current
passage through tank walls; especially when the containers store inflammable petrochemicals.
Reduction of thickness with time, possibilities of fume leakage, presence of non-conducting
sealing at joints, internal protrusions and irregularities, strike point issues, localized heating,
bound charge problem etc. are several such conditions partly or completely overlooked by the
standards. In this paper we discuss these issues in detail and analyzed the thermal and
mechanical effects that may be considered in recommending the minimum thicknesses of
storage tank walls to act as lightning interception and current path system. We also discuss the
replacement criteria of metallic sheets that will ensure the safe handling of lightning current
when the storage tank itself is treated as the lightning protection system Experiences in México
in this regard have also been discussed in detail with suitable examples.

OIL STORAGE TANK ACCIDENTS

There are more lightning-related fires than one could expect in the oil industry. Unfortunately,
there is not easy way to collect detailed information about tank fires. Even though each full
surface tank fire seems to receive quite a lot of attention on a local basis, the information given
in local media is normally very limited from a technical point of view. Oil companies typically try
to minimize the publicity about fire incidents, including lightning-related ones, as it might give
an impression that these facilities are very hazardous.

Impact of lightning over process areas and tanks or vessels may cause severe damage to static
or dynamic equipment, possibly resulting in loss of containment and multiple and extended
releases of hazardous substances on the ground, as well as to fires and explosions.

Chang and Lin made the review of 242 accidents of storage tanks that occurred in industry
facilities over last 40 years (1960-2003). The results show that 74% of accidents occurred in
petroleum refineries, oil terminals or storage. Fire and explosion account for 85% of the
accidents. There were 80 accidents (33%) caused by lightning and 72 (30%) caused by human
errors including poor operations and maintenance. Other causes were equipment failure,
sabotage, crack and rupture, leak and line rupture, static electricity, open flames, etc. The study
concluded with a terrible thought: Most of those accidents would have been avoided if good
engineering have been practiced.

Public information shows tragic scenes of damage and events. For example, figure 1 [7] shows
the lightning struck effect over a huge storage tank at a South Jersey oil refinery. The lightning
struck a tank containing about 36,000 barrels — about 1.5 million gallons — of xylene, a gasoline
blending component. ARIA database [8] indicates 50 lightning-related events and their effects
recorded in several countries, from 1977 to 2005, like USA, Germany, China, Russia, Australia,
United Kingdom, Indonesia, Albania, Canada Italy, Bahamas, Greece, Thailand, Nigeria, Brazil,
Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, Poland, Spain, Peru, among others.
 Figura 1. Un relámpago golpeó un enorme tanque de almacenamiento en la refinería de petróleo de South Jersey.

Fuente: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259576161

LIGHTNING-RELATED RISK OF OIL STORAGE TANKS

There is some degree of randomness regarding lightning strikes and there are seldom first-hand
witnesses to a hit or the resulting damage sequence. Consequently, the subject of lightning
damage in the oilfield is surrounded by mystery and myth. Unfortunately, lightning protection
in the oilfield is found to be the exception rather than the rule…they are usually installed only
after a catastrophic event [9]. There is a vast difference between the likelihood of a given
structure actually being hit and the likelihood that the structure will sustain damage if it is hit.
Table 1 provides one ranking of selected operational equipment by its apparent susceptibility to
being hit, and by the apparent frequency of actual damages reported. Tanks made the top of
the hit list in regards to damage frequency and extent of damage, even though they are not the
most susceptibility to a lightning hit in a facility. Numerous tank explosions were reported and
included full tanks, empty tanks, partially full tanks, stock tanks, water tanks, metal, and
fiberglass tanks.

The major factors which increase a given structure´s susceptibility to be hit by lightning are:

1. Lightning activity (ground flash density) in the site.

2. Height of the structure

3. Degree of isolation.

The content and material of construction play a major role in the effect and damages of a
lightning strike. The ability of a structure to avoid lightning-related damage is directly related to
the ease with which the current can pass the elements of the structure and be dissipated to
earth. A critical situation is when the lightning current tries to flow in highly resistive materials,
rising to rapid heating and vaporization of the material. That´s why fiberglass tanks are prone to
be vaporized when it is hit by lightning.

LIGHTNING PROTECTION CRITERIA

Lightning protection is a matter of degree, more than an absolute. There are two ways to
accomplish the protection: to guarantee minimum damage as a result of a direct impact, and/or
to avoid direct impact in the protected structure. Two lightning protection schemes are possible
for the former: (a) self-protection and (b) non-isolated air terminals. In the latter, the only
scheme is an isolated system. Isolated and non-isolated lightning protection systems.

A. Self-protection

In this scheme, lightning stepped leader is allowed to intercept with the tank roof, thus total
lightning current will be injected into the metal structure of the tank. The first return stroke of
negative lightning strikes, the commonest among cloud-to-ground flashes, has impulse currents
with a peak value, ip, of 30 kA on average, a peak current derivative, (di/dt)p, of 30 kA / μs on
average and continuing current of several hundred of amperes and times of 0,5 s. Thus,
interception of lightning leader and consequent passage of impulse current may generate highly
localized hotspots, large potential gradients, and mechanical stresses in the material due to the
flow of fast varying currents. In such situation strong tank walls are essential to prevent
puncturing at the point of strike, joule heating close to flammable materials and mechanical
collapse due to magnetic forces. Not only real failures but even the sense of the risk of failure
may strongly influence the smooth operation of the system.

B. Non-Isolated System

In this scheme, lightning stepped leader is allowed to intercept with the air terminal bonded to
the tank roof, thus total lightning current will be injected into the metal structure of the tank,
but hotspot is put away from the metal structure of the tank to the tip of the air terminal. Effects
by the current passage on the metal structure of the tank are similar to those given for self-
protection scheme. Figure 3 depicts this protection scheme.

C. Isolated System

In this scheme, isolated metal masts are installed to protect the storage tanks. These conductors
are installed with a minimum separation, s, from the tanks to avoid arcing between tank and
mast in the event of lightning strike to the mast. The minimum separation is calculated by the
pertinent equation given in [3]. The mast will act as both the air-termination and the down
conductor. A suitable grounding system should be installed at the earth-termination of the mast
in order to disperse the lightning current readily into the soil masses. The tank walls and the
mast should be electrically bonded at the ground level to avoid surface arcing. Such isolated LPS
will prevent the development of hotspots in the tank walls and also ensure that there will be no
significant current flow in the tank walls. However, due to the rapidly varying current along the
mast in the event of a lightning will induce certain voltage in the tank walls which will in turn
drives current to ground. However this current will be much smaller than the current injected
by direct lightning strikes. Lightning bulk current is managed by air terminals and metallic tank
is exposed only to induction voltages and currents.
Contrary to some believes, Isolated and Non-Isolated systems made of air terminals increases
the probability that a strike will occur in the proximity of the installation, but a properly designed
system can offer substantial damage avoidance protection for many structures. Conversely, an
improperly designed system can aggravate lightning-related problems.

CONCLUSIONS

Self-protection for oil storage tanks represents the primary lightning protection scheme.
Operational conditions, material thickness and reliable bonding should be ensured in order to
reduce ignition possibility of such scheme. However, if some of them are not likely to be fulfilled,
it is necessary to implement isolated air terminals to avoid erosion in the surface and also inner
surface hot-spots at the point of strike.

Remember that isolated structures are more prone to be hit by lightning, so the next step in
protection after guaranteeing self-protection is modifying the surroundings installing
engineered higher structures, like air terminals (lightning rods) to avoid direct impact.

To minimize damage to tanks, do not connect an isolated, pointed and protruding object which
could serve as an air terminal (lightning rod) in series with a resistive material such as fiberglass.

Bibliografia

 API Recommended Practice 2003, “Protection Against Ignitions Arising Out of Static,
Lightning and Stray Currents”, American Petroleum Institute.
 NFPA 780 “Standard for the Installation of Lightning Protection Systems, 2011 edition.
 IEC 62305-3 “Protection against lightning – Part 3: Physiscal damage to structures and
life hazards”, 2010 Edition.
 H. Persson, A. Lonnermark, “Tank Fires: Review of fire incidents 1951-2003”, SP
Swedish National Testing and Research Institute, Provning Forskning, SP Report
2004:14.
 E. Renni, E. Krausmann, G. Antonioni, S. Bonvicini, G. Spadoni, V. Cozzani, “Risk
assessment of major accidents triggered by lightning events”, AIDIC Conferences
Series, Vol. 9, 2009.