Syman v. Jacinto, G.R. No.

L-5612, October 31, 1953

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

FACTS: On January 2, 1951, the Collector of Customs, Port of Manila ordered the seizure
of two shipments of textile and a number of sewing machines, consigned to petitioner
Syman and after due hearing rendered a decision ordering that the same be delivered to
the importer after payment of the necessary dues thereon. Petitioner asked for the
execution of the decision, in view of the fact that it had become final and could no longer
be reviewed by the Commissioner of Customs after the lapse of fifteen days from the date
of notification to petitioner who did not appeal to the Commissioner of Customs.

Petitioner Sy Man sought to (1) to declare null and void that portion of the Memorandum
Order of the Insular of Customs which provides that decisions of the Collector of Customs
in seizure cases, whether appealed or not, are subject to review by the Insular Collector
(now commissioner). The petitioner claims that when a decision of the Collector in a
seizure case is not appealed by the importer to the Commissioner within 15 days as
provided for in Section 1380, Revised Administrative Code, then said decision becomes
final not only as to said importer but as to the Government as well,

On the other hand, it is the contention of the applicants that the Commissioner as head
of the Bureau of Customs and the chief executive and administrative officer thereof under
section 550, Revised Administrative Code, and also by virtue of section 1152 of the same
Code has supervision and control over the Collector, and that by reason of said
supervision and control, he may motu propio review and revise decisions of the Collector
in seizure cases even when not appealed by the importer. Under that theory, the
Commissioner of Customs promulgated his Memorandum Order of August 18, 1947.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the Memorandum Order of the Insular of Customs in so far as it declared
that in protest cases, decisions of Collectors of Customs in seizure cases, whether
appealed or not, are subject to review by the Insular Collector.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court ruled that under the present law governing the Bureau
of Customs, the decision of the Collector of Customs in a seizure case if not protested
and appealed by the importer to the Commissioner of Customs on time, becomes final
not only as to him but against the Government as well, and neither the Commissioner nor
the Department Head has the power to review, revise or modify such unappealed
decision. We also find and hold that the memorandum order of the Insular Collector of
Customs of August 18, 1947, is void and of no effect, not only because it has not been
duly approved by the Department Head and duly published as required by section 551 of
the Revised Administrative Code but also because it is inconsistent with law. For the
foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. No pronouncement as
to costs.
Let us now see if there is any law giving authority to the Commissioner of Customs to review and
revise unappealed decisions in seizure cases.

SEC. 1393. Supervisory authority of Commissioner and of Department Head in certain cases.
— If in any case involving the assessment of duties the importer shall fail to protest the decision
of the collector of customs and the Commissioner shall be of the opinion that the decision was
erroneous and unfavorable to the Government, the latter may order a reliquidation; and if the
decision of the Commissioner in any unprotested case should, in the opinion of the Department
Head, be erroneous and unfavorable to the Government, the Department Head may require
the Commissioner to order a reliquidation or he may, if in his opinion the public interest
requires, direct the Commissioner to certify the cause to the Court of First Instance of Manila,
in the manner provided in section one thousand three hundred and eighty-six hereof, there to
be reviewed by the court as other customs cases removed thereto.

Except as in the preceding paragraph provided, the supervisory authority of the Department
Head over the Bureau of Customs shall not extend to the administrative revisal of the decisions
of the Commissioner in matters removable into court.

It will be noticed that the section is entitled "supervisory authority of the Commissioner and of the
Department Head in certain cases." We find no similar legal provision in seizure cases. The logical
inference is that the lawmakers did not deem it necessary or advisable to provide for this supervisory
authority or power of revision by the Commissioner and the Department Head on unappealed seizure
cases; and it is highly possible that up to and until 1947, when the memorandum order of August 18th
of that year was issued, it was not the practice of the Bureau of Customs to have unappealed seizure
cases sent up by Collectors to the Commissioner's office for review and revision.

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his

capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent., G.R. No. L-12426,
February 16, 1959

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

FACTS:

This a petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and
injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent
Office.

On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had
scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are
qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office.

Petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association contends that one who has passed the
bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines
and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent
Office, and that consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of
the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent
Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before said office, such
as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent,
is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.

In Its answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that
the prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but
includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, thus
examination is proper. Further, the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any
other quasi-judicial body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who
would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office which, and that the action taken by
the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the
Patent Law of the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in
accordance with which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar
examination as that prescribed by respondent.

Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of
America authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine
as to who practice before the United States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly
authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether the Respondent Director is authorized by the Patent Law to issue a
Circular to conduct scheduled examination for the purpose of determining who are
qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office.

RULING: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that it has the exclusive and constitutional power
with respect to admission to the practice of law in the Philippines 1 and to any member of
the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity,
whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the
question arises as to whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the
preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in
the practice of law. In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before
the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and
the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the
enforcement of their rights in patent cases.

The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is

reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and
training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further
examination or other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it
advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar practising before him
enlist the assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers and
documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine
sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for the
registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and
technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require
persons desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit an examination,
even if they are already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic
Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and of the United States
Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he
(respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following
provisions of said Rules of Practice:

Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register of an attorneys and a register

agents are kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the names of all
persons recognized as entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office in
the preparation and prosecution of applicants for patent. Registration in the
Patent Office under the provisions of these rules shall only entitle the person
registered to practice before the Patent Office.

(a) Attorney at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice
before any United States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of
the United States who fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions
of these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his
name entered on the register of attorneys.

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to practice and

register unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a
prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested
information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the
Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute and
possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to
enable him to render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise
competent to advise and assist him in the presentation and prosecution of their
application before the Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may
determine whether a person seeking to have his name placed upon either of the
registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral
character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical
matters must be submitted and an examination which is held from time to time
must be taken and passed. The taking of an examination may be waived in the
case of any person who has served for three years in the examining corps of the
Patent Office.

Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States
Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself,
which reads as follows:

The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of

Commerce may prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of
 agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other
parties before his office, and may require of such persons, agents, or attorneys,
before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, that
they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute,
are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to
applicants or other persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent to
advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or
prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office. The
Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing,
suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case from further
practice before his office any person, agent or attorney shown to be incompetent
or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the
said rules and regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud in any matter,
deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective applicant, or other
person having immediate or prospective applicant, or other person having
immediate or prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or
by advertising. The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly
recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of
the person so refused recognition or so suspended by the district court of the
United States for the District of Columbia under such conditions and upon such
proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to
the provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and
regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and
pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for
purposes of comparison:

SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not
inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.

The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions
of the United States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine
the qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S.
Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that
they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to render valuable service to
and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may take the form of
a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is
silent on this important point. Our attention has not been called to any express provision
of our Patent Law, giving such authority to determine the qualifications of persons
allowed to practice before the Patent Office.

Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of
law giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on
examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office,
then there would be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are more or less
complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc.,
assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc.,
as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any lawyer practising before
them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an
examination to qualify.

In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar
authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their
profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office
involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent
Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts
involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so
much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the
Supreme Court.

PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE

(PCSO), Petitioner, v. CHAIRPERSON MA. GRACIA M. PULIDO-TAN,
COMMISSIONER HEIDI L. MENDOZA, COMMISSIONER ROWENA V. GUANZON,
THE COMMISSIONERS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), Respondents., G.R. No.
216776, April 19, 2016

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS: On March 4, 2008, THE PCSO thru its Board issued Resolution No. 135
approving the payment of monthly cost of living allowance (COLA) to its officials and
employees for a period of three (3) years in accordance with the Collective Negotiation
Agreemennt, hence it released the amount of P381,545.43 to all qualified officials and
employees of its Nueva Ecija Provincial District Office which on March 18, 2011,
Executive Ochoa confirmed.

On post Audit, the COO issued Notice of Disallowance invalidating such payment
on the ground that it is contrary to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
Circular No. 2001-03 dated November 12, 2001 and it amounts to double compensation
that is prohibited under the 1987 Constitution. PCSO appealed but is was denied, hence
this petition contending that:

1. The PCSO Board of Directors is authorized under Sections 6 and 9 of R.A. No.
1169, as amended, to fix salaries and to determine allowances, bonuses, and other
incentives of its officers and employees;

ISSUE: Whether the PCSO is authorized to grant COLA to its employees under Sections
6 and 9 of R.A. No. 1169.
RULING: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the PCSO stresses that it is a self-sustaining
government instrumentality which generates its own fund to support its operations and
does not depend on the national government for its budgetary support. Thus, it enjoys
certain latitude to establish and grant allowances and incentives to its officers and
employees.

We do not agree. Sections 6 and 9 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended, cannot be relied upon
by the PCSO to grant the COLA. Section 6 merely states, among others, that fifteen
percent (15%) of the net receipts from the sale of sweepstakes tickets (whether for
sweepstakes races, lotteries, or other similar activities) shall be set aside as contributions
to the operating expenses and capital expenditures of the PCSO. Also, Section 9 loosely
provides that among the powers and functions of the PCSO Board of Directors is "to fix
the salaries and determine the reasonable allowances, bonuses and other incentives of
its officers and employees as may be recommended by the General Manager x x x subject
to pertinent civil service and compensation laws." The PCSO charter evidently does not
grant its Board the unbridled authority to set salaries and allowances of officials and
employees. On the contrary, as a government owned and/or controlled corporation
(GOCC), it was expressly covered by P.D. No. 985 or "The Budgetary Reform Decree on
Compensation and Position Classification of 1976," and its 1978 amendment, P.D. No.
1597 {Further Rationalizing the System of Compensation and Position Classification in
the National Government), and mandated to comply with the rules of then Office of
Compensation and Position Classification (OCPC) under the DBM.14

Even if it is assumed that there is an explicit provision exempting the PCSO from the
OCPC rules, the power of the Board to fix the salaries and determine the reasonable
allowances, bonuses and other incentives was still subject to the DBM review. In Intia, Jr.
v. COA the Court stressed that the discretion of the Board of Philippine Postal Corporation
on the matter of personnel compensation is not absolute as the same must be exercised
in accordance with the standard laid down by law, i.e., its compensation system, including
the allowances granted by the Board, must strictly conform with that provided for other
government agencies under R.A. No. 675816 in relation to the General Appropriations
Act. To ensure such compliance, the resolutions of the Board affecting such matters
should first be reviewed and approved by the DBM pursuant to Section 6 of P.D. No.
1597. Following Intia, Jr., We subsequently ruled in Phil. Retirement Authority (PRA) v.
Bu

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. QUE PO LAY, defendant-

appellant. G.R. No. L-6791, March 29, 1954

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

FACTS: Appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars,
U.S. checks and U.S. money orders failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through
its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by
Central Bank Circular No. 20. Appellant appeals on the claim that the said circular had no
force or effect because the same was not published in the official Gazette prior to the act
or omission imputed to said appellant. It is contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638
and Act 2930 both require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an
order or notice of general applicability. The Solicitor General answering this contention
says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the
Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have
force and effect. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not circulars and regulations should be published in order to have
force and effect.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court rules that is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank
is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its
issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. (See U.S.
vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil., 119 and authorities cited therein.) Moreover, as a rule,
circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question
which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective,
this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the
people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.

In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year
1949, it was not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's
conviction of its violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did
not have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or
after November 1951. In other words, appellant could not be held liable for its violation,
for it was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange
in his possession thereof.

Eto nasama ko dati pa nadigest ko ngkamali.

Blas F. Ople vs Ruben D. Torres, GR No. 127685, 23 July 1998

FACTS: On December 6, 1996, President Ramos issued an Administrative Order No.

308, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System.”

Petitioner Senator Blas F. Ople filed a petition seeking to invalidate A.O. No. 308 on
several grounds. He argued that the establishment of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System requires a legislative act. Thus, the issuance of A.O.
No.308 by the President is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of
congress. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law
and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No.308
establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life
and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates
their right to privacy.
On this point, respondents counter-argue that A.O. No. 308 was issued within the
executive and administrative powers of the president in implementing the legislative policy
of the Administrative Code without encroaching on the legislative powers of congress.
Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is an unconstitutional usurpation of the
power of Congress to legislate.

RULING:Legislative power is the authority to make laws, and to alter and repeal them.
The Constitution has vested this power in the Congress. The grant of legislative power to
Congress is broad, general, and comprehensive. Any power deemed to be legislative by
usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has
lodged it elsewhere. The executive power, on the other hand, is vested in the President.
It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of
carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. As head of
the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the
government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and
employees of his department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus
and offices. Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of
supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public
order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control
to enable him to discharge his duties effectively. Administrative power is concerned with
the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental
organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and
check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders,
rules and regulations. From these precepts, the Court holds that A.O. No. 308 involves a
subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative
order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should
be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.

We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the
Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and “incorporates in a unified
document the major structural, functional and procedural principles of governance” and
“embodies changes in administrative structures and procedures designed to serve the
people.” Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it
cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially it
violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the “right to be let alone.” We
reiterate that any law or order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this
Court to strict scrutiny.