particular fact.
"37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce
MINORU FUJIK v. MARINAY
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who
married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s
parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where
he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara).
Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and
Maekara were married in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara
brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly
suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and
started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to
reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay
obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the
ground of bigamy. Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled:
"Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the
Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared
void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of
the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family
Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between
Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the
Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the
National Statistics Office (NSO). RTC dismissed the petition on
the ground that only "the husband or the wife," in this case
either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their
marriage void, and not Fujiki. Fujiki argued that Rule 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of
the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural
implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753) 15 in
relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register
Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or
annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the
court to the local registrar of the municipality where the
dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of
Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to
"marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and
"judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are
subject to cancellation or correction. The petition in the RTC
sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the
Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara. RTC further justified its motu proprio
dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil
Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The
Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for
correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction
of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that
the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can
be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a]
petition [for correction of entry] x x x." The RTC considered the
petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is
a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition. The Solicitor
General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese
Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that
"[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in
a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court
judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially
Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil
registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other
words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a
person’s legal capacity and status x x x." 38 The Japanese Family
Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino
citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108
proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no
jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule
108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v.
Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked." 41
DECISION
a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil
registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a
marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention
of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.
Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the
limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and
children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion. 86 A direct action for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also
necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the
Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic
Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial
Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located." 87 In
other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by
the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the
civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or
cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of
a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family
Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign
judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action
for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case which was already
tried and decided under foreign law.
REPUBLIC V. OLAYBAR
Respondent requested from the (NSO) a Certificate of No
Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her
marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof,
she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son
Sune, a Korean National. he denied having contracted said
marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged
husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer;
and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is
not hers.4 She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries
in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife
portion thereof.5 Respondent impleaded the Local Civil
Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as
parties to the case. Finding that the signature appearing in the
subject marriage contract was not that of respondent, the court
found basis in granting the latter’s prayer to straighten her
record and rectify the terrible mistake. 10Petitioner, however,
moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the
grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical
and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to
fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and
(2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife
portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring
the marriage void ab initio. RTC held that it had jurisdiction to
take cognizance of cases for correction of entries even on
substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being
the appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering
that respondent’s identity was used by an unknown person to
contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be
feasible for respondent to institute an action for declaration of
nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages
under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner argued
that petition instituted by respondent is actually a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of a Rule 108
proceeding.
Issue
whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage
contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may be
undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding.
DECISION
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The
proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the
correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is
summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship
or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the
procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation
of Republic v. Valencia19 in 1986, the Court has repeatedly
ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true
facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing
themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding." 20 An
appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial
court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have
been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel
have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s
case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered. Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It
requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion
as parties of all persons who may claim interest which would be
affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the
civil registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition,
if any; and it states that although the court may make orders
expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court
shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108
are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to
effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil
register In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the
certificate of marriage are admittedly the personal
circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that
her signature was forged and she was not the one who
contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other
words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if
there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract.
It must be recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a
CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she was married to
a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of
entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108,
respondent made the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well
as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It
is likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set
forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of the
Solicitor General was likewise notified of the petition which in
turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate
in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted
where respondent herself, the stenographer of the court where
the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a document
examiner, testified. Several documents were also considered as
evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence presented,
the trial court found that the signature appearing in the subject
marriage certificate was different from respondent’s signature
appearing in some of her government issued identification
cards.23 The court thus made a categorical conclusion that
respondent’s signature in the marriage certificate was not hers
and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as
she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.
While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to
determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the
proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had
been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of
respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence
of the parties had already been admitted and examined.
Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as
there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the
record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the
evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the
subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion
thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage
void as there was no marriage to speak of.
ONDE V. OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRATION OF LAS PIÑAS CITY
Petitioner filed a petition2 for correction of entries in his
certificate of live birth before the R TC and named respondent
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pifias City as sole
respondent. Petitioner alleged that he is the illegitimate child
of his parents Guillermo A. Onde and Matilde DC Pakingan,
but his birth certificate stated that his parents were married.
His birth certificate also stated that his mother's first name is
Tely and that his first name is Franc Ler. He prayed that the
following entries on his birth certificate be corrected as follows:
Entry From To
1) Date and place of marriage of his December 23, 1983 - Not
parents Bicol Married
2) First name of his mother Tely Matilde
3) His first name Franc Ler Francler
RTC dismissed the petition for correction of entries on the
ground thatit is insufficient in form and substance. It ruled that
the proceedings must be adversarial since the first correction is
substantial in nature and would affect petitioner’s status as a
legitimate child. It was further held that the correction in the
first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city
civil registrar under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048,
issues: (1) whether the RTC erred in ruling that the correction
on the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by
the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048; (2) whether the
RTC erred in ruling that correcting the entry on petitioner’s
birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23,
1983 in Bicol to "not married" is substantial in nature requiring
adversarial proceedings; (3) whether the RTC erred in
dismissing the petition for correction of entries; and (4)
whether the RTC erred in ruling that there is no proof that
petitioner’s parents were not married on December 23, 1983.
Petitioner argues that Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court allows a
substantial correction of entries in the civil registry, stating
that in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, 3 the
case cited by the RTC, we have actually ruled that substantial
changes in the civil registry are now allowed under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court. He likewise adds that proof that his parents
were not married will be presented during the trial, not during
the filing of the petition for correction of entries.
In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
contends that the RTC correctly dismissed the petition for
correction of entries. It points out that the first names of
petitioner and his mother can be corrected thru administrative
proceedings under R.A. No. 9048. Such correction of the entry
on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married
on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is a substantial
correction affecting his legitimacy. Hence, it must be dealt with
in adversarial proceedings where all interested parties are
impleaded.
DECISION
1 irst name of petitioner and his mother as appearing in his
birth certificate can be corrected by the city civil registrar
under R.A. No. 9048 under Section 15 of R.A. No. 9048, clerical
or typographical errors on entries in a civil register can be
corrected and changes of first name can be done by the
concerned city civil registrar without need of a judicial order.
2 correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his
parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not
married" is a substantial correction requiring adversarial
proceedings. Said correction is substantial as it will affect his
legitimacy and convert him from a legitimate child to an
illegitimate one we held that corrections of entries in the civil
register including those on citizenship, legitimacyof paternity
or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage,involve substantial
alterations. Substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversaryproceedings
3 we likewise affirm the RTC in dismissing the petition for
correction of entries. As mentioned, petitioner no longer
contested the RTC ruling that the correction he sought on his
and his mother’s first name can be done by the city civil
registrar. Under the circumstances, we are constrained to deny
his prayer that the petition for correction of entries before the
RTC bereinstated since the same petition includes the
correction he sought on his and his mother’s first name.
We clarify, however, that the RTC’s dismissal is without
prejudice. As we said, petitioner can avail ofthe administrative
remedy for the correction of his and his mother’s first
name.1âwphi1 He can also file a new petition before the RTC to
correct the alleged erroneous entry on his birth certificate that
his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol. This
substantial correction is allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
We also stress that a petition seeking a substantial correction of
an entry in a civil register must implead as parties to the
proceedings not only the local civil registrar, as petitioner did
in the dismissed petition for correction of entries, but also all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected by the correction.
we cited Section 3, and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court, as the procedural requirements laid down by
the Court to make the proceedings under Rule 108 adversary.
In Republic v. Uy,12 we have similarly ruled that when a
petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register involves substantial and controversial alterations,
including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the
requirements of the Rules of Court is mandated. Thus, in his
new petition, petitioner should at least implead his father and
mother as parties since the substantial correction he is seeking
will also affect them.
HABEAS CORPUS
RULE 102
Habeas Corpus
Section 1. To what habeas corpus extends. — Except as
otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas
corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by
which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto.
Section 2. Who may grant the writ. — The writ of habeas
corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member
thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it
shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be
made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or
before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for the
hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a
Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at
any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only
within his judicial district.
Section 3. Requisites of application therefor. — Application
for the writ shall be by petition signed and verified either by the
party for whose relief it is intended, or by some person on his
behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the person in whose behalf the application is
made is imprisoned or restrained on his liberty;
(b) The officer or name of the person by whom he is so
imprisoned or restrained; or, if both are unknown or
uncertain, such officer or person may be described by
an assumed appellation, and the person who is served
with the writ shall be deemed the person intended;
 (c) The place where he is so imprisoned or restrained,
if known;
(d) A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of
such person, if it can be procured without impairing
the efficiency of the remedy; or, if the imprisonment
or restraint is without any legal authority, such fact
shall appear.
Section 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. —
If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of
record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall
not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is
allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Not
shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of
a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the
Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment.
Section 5. When the writ must be granted and issued. — A
court or judge authorized to grant the writ must, when a
petition therefor is presented and it appears that the writ ought
to issue, grant the same forthwith, and immediately thereupon
the clerk of the court shall issue the writ under the seal of the
court; or in case of emergency, the judge may issue the writ
under his own hand, and may depute any officer or person to
serve it.
Section 6. To whom writ directed, and what to require. — In
case of imprisonment or restraint by an officer, the writ shall
be directed to him, and shall command him to have the body of
the person restrained of his liberty before the court or judge
designated in the writ at the time and place therein specified.
In case of imprisonment or restraint by a person not an officer,
the writ shall be directed to an officer, and shall command him
to take and have the body of the person restrained of his liberty
before the court or judge designated in the writ at the time and
place therein specified, and to summon the person by whom he
is restrained then and there to appear before said court or
judge to show the cause of the imprisonment or restraint.
Section 7. How prisoner designated and writ served. — The
person to be produced should be designated in the writ by his
name, if known, but if his name is not known he may be
otherwise described or identified. The writ may be served in
any province by the sheriff or other proper officer, or by a
person deputed by the court or judge. Service of the writ shall
be made by leaving the original with the person to whom it is
directed and preserving a copy on which to make return or
service. If that person cannot be found, or has not the prisoner
in his custody, then the service shall be made on any other
person having or exercising such custody.
Section 8. How writ executed and returned. — The officer to
whom the writ is directed shall convey the person so
imprisoned or restrained, and named in the writ, before the
judge allowing the writ, or in case of his absence or disability,
before some other judge of the same court, on the day specified
in the writ, unless, from sickness or infirmity of the person
directed to be produced, such person cannot, without danger,
be bought before the court or judge; and the officer shall make
due return of the writ, together with the day and the cause of
the caption and restraint of such person according to the
command thereof.
Section 9. Defect of form. — No writ of habeas corpus can be
disobeyed for defect of form, if it sufficiently appears therefrom
in whose custody or under whose restraint the party
imprisoned or restrained is held and the court or judge before
whom he is to be bought.
Section 10. Contents of return. — When the person to be
produced is imprisoned or restrained by an officer, the person
who makes the return shall state therein, and in other cases the
person in whose custody the prisoner is found shall state, in
writing to the court or judge before whom the writ is
returnable, plainly and unequivocably:
(a) Whether he has or has not the party in his custody
or power, or under restraint;
(b) If he has the party in his custody or power, or
under restraint, the authority and the true and whole
cause thereof, set forth at large, with a copy of the
writ, order execution, or other process, if any, upon
which the party is held;
(c) If the party is in his custody or power or is
restrained by him, and is not produced, particularly
the nature and gravity of the sickness or infirmity of
such party by reason of which he cannot, without
danger, be bought before the court or judge;
(d) If he has had the party in his custody or power, or
under restraint, and has transferred such custody or
restraint to another, particularly to whom, at what
time, for what cause, and by what authority such
transfer was made.
Section 11. Return to be signed and sworn to. — The return
or statement shall be signed by the person who makes it; and
shall also be sworn by him if the prisoner is not produced, and
in all other cases unless the return is made and signed by a
sworn public officer in his official capacity.
Section 12. Hearing on return. Adjournments. — When the
writ is returned before one judge, at a time when the court is in
session, he may forthwith adjourn the case into the court, there
to be heard and determined. The court or judge before whom
the writ is returned or adjourned must immediately proceed to
hear and examine the return, and such other matters as are
properly submitted for consideration, unless for good cause
shown the hearing is adjourned, in which event the court or
judge shall make such order for the safekeeping of the person
imprisoned or restrained as the nature of the case requires. If
the person imprisoned or restrained is not produced because of
his alleged sickness or infirmity, the court or judge must be
satisfied that it is so grave that such person cannot be produced
without danger, before proceeding to hear and dispose of the
matter. On the hearing the court or judge shall disregard
matters of form and technicalities in respect to any warrant or
order of commitment of a court or officer authorized to commit
by law.
Section 13. When the return evidence, and when only a plea.
— If it appears that the prisoner is in custody under a warrant
of commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be
considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint, but if
he is restrained of his liberty by any alleged private authority,
the return shall be considered only as a plea of the facts therein
set forth, and the party claiming the custody must prove such
facts.
Section 14. When person lawfully imprisoned recommitted,
and when let to bail. — If it appears that the prisoner was
lawfully committed, and is plainly and specifically charged in
the warrant of commitment with an offense punishable by
death, he shall not be released, discharged, or bailed. If he is
lawfully imprisoned or restrained on a charge of having
committed an offense not so punishable, he may be
recommitted to imprisonment or admitted to bail in the
discretion of the court or judge. If he be admitted to bail, he
shall forthwith file a bond in such sum as the court or judge
deems reasonable, considering the circumstances of the
prisoner and the nature of the offense charged, conditioned for
his appearance before the court where the offense is properly
cognizable to abide its order of judgment; and the court or
judge shall certify the proceedings, together with the bond,
forthwith to the proper court. If such bond is not so filed, the
prisoner shall be recommitted to confinement.
Section 15. When prisoner discharged if no appeal. — When
the court or judge has examined into the cause of caption and
restraint of the prisoner, and is satisfied that he is unlawfully
imprisoned or restrained, he shall forthwith order his
discharge from confinement, but such discharge shall not be
effective until a copy of the order has been served on the officer
or person detaining the prisoner. If the officer or person
detaining the prisoner does not desire to appeal, the prisoner
shall be forthwith released.
Section 16. Penalty for refusing to issue writ, or for
disobeying the same. — A clerk of a court who refuses to issue
the writ after allowance thereof and demand therefor, or a
person to whom a writ is directed, who neglects or refuses to
obey or make return of the same according to the command
thereof, or makes false return thereof, or who, upon demand
made by or on behalf of the prisoner, refuses to deliver to the
person demanding, within six (6) hours after the demand
therefor, a true copy of the warrant or order of commitment,
shall forfeit to the party aggrieved the sum of one thousand
pesos, to be recorded in a proper action, and may also be
punished by the court or judge as for contempt.
Section 17. Person discharged not to be again imprisoned. —
A person who is set at liberty upon a writ of habeas
corpus shall not be again imprisoned for the same offense
unless by the lawful order or process of a court having
jurisdiction of the cause or offense; and a person who
knowingly, contrary to the provisions of this rule, recommits or
imprisons, or causes to be committed or imprisoned, for the
same offense, or pretended offense, any person so set at liberty,
or knowingly aids or assists therein, shall forfeit to the party
aggrieved the sum of one thousand pesos, to be recovered in a
proper action, notwithstanding any colorable pretense or
variation in the warrant of commitment, and may also be
punished by the court or judge granting the writ as for
contempt.
Section 18. When prisoner may be removed from one
custody to another. — A person committed to prison, or in
custody of an officer, for any criminal matter, shall not be
removed therefrom into the custody of another unless by legal
process, or the prisoner be delivered to an inferior officer to
carry to jail, or, by order of the proper court or judge, be
removed from one place to another within the Philippines for
trial, or in case of fire epidemic, insurrection, or other necessity
or public calamity; and a person who, after such commitment,
makes signs, or counter-signs any order for such removal
contrary to this section, shall forfeit to the party aggrieved the
sum of one thousand pesos, to be recovered in a proper action.
Section 19. Record of writ, fees and costs. — The proceedings
upon a writ of habeas corpus shall be recorded by the clerk of
the court, and upon the final disposition of such proceedings
the court or judge shall make such order as to costs as the case
requires. The fees of officers and witnesses shall be included in
the costs taxed, but no officer or person shall have the right to
demand payment in advance of any fees to which he is entitled
by virtue of the proceedings. When a person confined under
color of proceedings in a criminal case is discharged, the costs
shall be taxed against the Republic of the Philippines, and paid
out of its Treasury; when a person in custody by virtue or under
color of proceedings in a civil case is discharged, the costs shall
be taxed against him, or against the person who signed the
application for the writ, or both, as the court shall direct.
ILUSORIO V BILDNER
Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio.
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of
extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many years,
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board and
President of Baguio Country Club.
they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons.
Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave.,
Makati City when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse,
Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other
hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. upon Potencianos arrival
from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about five
(5) months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda
(Lin), alleged that during this time, their mother gave
Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an
antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor in New York,
U.S.A. As a consequence, Potencianos health deteriorated.
Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a
petition[10] for guardianship over the person and property of
Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latters advanced age, frail
health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. fter attending a
corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not
return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland
Condominium, Makati Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that respondents [11] refused
petitioners demands to see and visit her husband and
prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City.
ISSUE
May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her
husband to live with her in conjugal bliss?
DECISION
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention,[1] or by which the rightful custody of
a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.[2] Slx
"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining
another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner
at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his
capture and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever
the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that
behalf."[3]
It is a high prerogative, common-law writ, of ancient origin, the
great object of which is the liberation of those who may be
imprisoned without sufficient cause.[4] It is issued when one is
deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented from exercising
legal custody over another person.[5]
writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement
or detention,[13] or by which the rightful custody of a person is
withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a
person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process,
where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are
unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally
valid has later become arbitrary. [14] It is devised as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as
the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.
[15]
Jksm
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is
to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. [16]
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must
be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.
[17]
The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective,
not merely nominal or moral.[18]
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective
detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios liberty
that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under
medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or
medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to
discern his actions.
After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there
was no unlawful restraint on his liberty.
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio did not request the administrator of
the Cleveland Condominium not to allow his wife and other
children from seeing or visiting him. He made it clear that he
did not object to seeing them. As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios
mental state, the Court of Appeals observed that he was of
sound and alert mind, having answered all the relevant
questions to the satisfaction of the court.
Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to
make choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his
residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The
choices he made may not appeal to some of his family members
but these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano.
He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not
prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that
declaration, and absent any true restraint on his liberty, we
have no reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice,
Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights
against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his
right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his
fundamental constitutional right. Es
When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also
emphasized that the same shall be enforced under penalty of
contempt in case of violation or refusal to comply. Such
assertion of raw, naked power is unnecessary.
The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not
involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right
of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see
his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without
threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a
husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by
compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or
by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial
authority and is best left to the man and womans free choice.
SERAPIO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal
Counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock,
non-profit foundation established in February 2000 ostensibly
for the purpose of providing educational opportunities for the
poor and underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and
students, and support to research and advance studies of young
Muslim educators and scientists. . petitioner, as trustee of the
Foundation, received on its behalf a donation in the amount of
Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200 Million) from Ilocos Sur
Governor Luis Chavit Singson through the latters assistant
Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte. Gov. Singson publicly accused then
President Joseph E. Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in
several illegal activities, including its operation on the illegal
numbers game known as jueteng. This triggered the filing with
the Office of the Ombudsman of several criminal complaints
against Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner,
together with other persons. Ombudsman filed an amended
Information in said case charging Estrada and several co-
accused, including petitioner, with plunder. Sandiganbayan
issued a Resolution inding probable cause to justify the
issuance of warrants of arrest for the accused, including
petitioner. When apprised of said order, petitioner voluntarily
surrendered at 9:45 p.m. on the same day to Philippine
National Police Chief Gen. Leandro Mendoza. Petitioner has
since been detained at Camp Crame for said charge. petitioner
filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for Bail which
was set for hearing. etitioner filed with this Court on June 29,
2001 a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 148468, praying that the Court declare void the
questioned orders, resolutions and actions of the
Sandiganbayan on his claim that he was thereby effectively
denied of his right to due process. Petitioner likewise prayed
for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus; that the People be
declared to have waived their right to present evidence in
opposition to his petition for bail; and, premised on the failure
of the People to adduce strong evidence of petitioners guilt of
plunder, that he be granted provisional liberty on bail after due
proceedings
ISSUE
(5) Whether petitioner was deprived of his right to due process
in Criminal Case No. 26558 and should thus be released from
detention via a writ of habeas corpus.
DECISION
Article III, Sec 13 of the Constitution, which states that
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall
before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.[88]
Anent the issue of the propriety of the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus for petitioner, he contends that he is entitled
to the issuance of said writ because the State, through the
prosecutions refusal to present evidence and by the
Sandiganbayans refusal to grant a bail hearing, has failed to
discharge its burden of proving that as against him, evidence of
guilt for the capital offense of plunder is strong. Petitioner
contends that the prosecution launched a seemingly endless
barrage of obstructive and dilatory moves to prevent the
conduct of bail hearings. Specifically, the prosecution moved
for petitioners arraignment before the commencement of bail
hearings and insisted on joint bail hearings for petitioner,
Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada despite the fact that it was
only petitioner who asked for a bail hearing; manifested that it
would present its evidence as if it is the presentation of the
evidence in chief, meaning that the bail hearings would be
concluded only after the prosecution presented its entire case
upon the accused; and argued that petitioners motion to quash
and his petition for bail are inconsistent, and therefore,
petitioner should choose to pursue only one of these two
remedies.[104] He further claims that the Sandiganbayan,
through its questioned orders and resolutions postponing the
bail hearings effectively denied him of his right to bail and to
due process of law.[105]
Petitioner also maintains that the issuance by the
Sandiganbayan of new orders canceling the bail hearings which
it had earlier set did not render moot and academic the petition
for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, since said orders have
resulted in a continuing deprivation of petitioners right to bail.
[106]
He argues further that the fact that he was arrested and is
detained pursuant to valid process does not by itself negate the
efficacy of the remedy of habeas corpus. In support of his
contention, petitioner cites Moncupa vs. Enrile,[107] where the
Court held that habeas corpus extends to instances where the
detention, while valid from its inception, has later become
arbitrary.[108]
However, the People insist that habeas corpus is not
proper because petitioner was arrested pursuant to the
amended information which was earlier filed in court, [109] the
warrant of arrest issuant pursuant thereto was valid, and
petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the authorities.[110]
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue
where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in
custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which
jurisdiction to do so.[111] In exceptional circumstances, habeas
corpus may be granted by the courts even when the person
concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his
voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as the
fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom
against arbitrary and lawless state action due to its ability to
cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes. [112] Thus, in
previous cases, we issued the writ where the deprivation of
liberty, while initially valid under the law, had later become
invalid,[113] and even though the persons praying for its issuance
were not completely deprived of their liberty. [114]
The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus in favor of petitioner. The general rule
that habeas corpus does not lie where the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to issue the
same[115] applies, because petitioner is under detention
pursuant to the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan on
April 25, 2001 after the filing by the Ombudsman of the
amended information for plunder against petitioner and his co-
accused. Petitioner had in fact voluntarily surrendered himself
to the authorities on April 25, 2001 upon learning that a
warrant for his arrest had been issued.
The ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile[116] that habeas
corpus will lie where the deprivation of liberty which was
initially valid has become arbitrary in view of subsequent
developments finds no application in the present case because
the hearing on petitioners application for bail has yet to
commence. As stated earlier, the delay in the hearing of
petitioners petition for bail cannot be pinned solely on the
Sandiganbayan or on the prosecution for that
matter. Petitioner himself is partly to be blamed. Moreover, a
petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for
asserting ones right to bail. [117] It cannot be availed of where
accused is entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on the
discretion of the court and the latter has not abused such
discretion in refusing to grant bail, [118] or has not even exercised
said discretion. The proper recourse is to file an application for
bail with the court where the criminal case is pending and to
allow hearings thereon to proceed.
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be
unjustified but would also preempt the Sandiganbayans
resolution of the pending application for bail of petitioner. The
recourse of petitioner is to forthwith proceed with the hearing
on his application for bail.
LACSON V. PEREZ
Facts: President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of
Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well as
General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress
the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged
leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were thereafter
effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus
and habeas corpus with an application for the issuance of
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38
and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof.
Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court,
wherein the information against them were filed, would desist
arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved.
They also contend that they are allegedly faced with impending
warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold
departure orders were issued against them.
G.R. No. 147780 for prohibition, injunction, mandamus,
and habeas corpus (with an urgent application for the issuance
of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction) filed by Panfilo M. Lacson, Michael Ray B. Aquino,
and Cezar O. Mancao; (2) G.R. No. 147781
for mandamus and/or review of the factual basis for the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, with
prayer for a temporary restraining order filed by Miriam
Defensor-Santiago;
DECISION
Petitioner Laban ng Demoktratikong Pilipino is not a
real party-in-interest. The rule requires that a party must show
a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to
himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to
warrant an invocation of the courts jurisdiction and to justify
the exercise of the courts remedial powers in his behalf (KMU
Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 [1994]). Here,
petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which
would justify resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person
not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by
a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members,
and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest
and detention for the crime of rebellion. Every action must be
brought in the name of the party whose legal right has been
invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent
threat of invasion or infringement.
At best, the instant petition may be considered as an
action for declaratory relief, petitioner claiming that its right to
freedom of expression and freedom of assembly is affected by
the declaration of a state of rebellion and that said
proclamation is invalid for being contrary to the Constitution.
However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory
relief affords little comfort to petitioner, this Court not having
jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition. Section
5[1], Article VIII of the Constitution limits the original
jurisdiction of the Court to cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
SANGCA VS CITY PROSECUTOR OF CEBU
petitioner Anisah Impal Sangca filed the instant petition
praying for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and the
release of Lovely Impal Adam who was detained in the Cebu
City Jail for alleged violation of Section 5, Article 2 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002. PDEA received information that Adam was
engaged in illegal drug trafficking activities in Cebu City and
neighboring cities and municipalities. After evaluating the
information, Police Chief Inspector Josefino Ligan, PDEA VII
Asst. Regional Director for Administration/Operation, together
with FO1 Rayford A. Yap and PO2 Dindo M. Tuliao, planned an
entrapment operation.
I nformation charging Adam with
violation of Section 5, Article 2 of R.A. No.
9165 was filed and docketed as Criminal
Case BEFORE RTC. On petition for review
before the Department of Justice, Secretary
Raul M. Gonzalez found no probable cause to
hold Adam liable for the offense charged,
reveals that no payment was ever made by
the police officers for the supposed object of
the buy-bust operations. The police officers
have not even alleged in their affidavits that
payment was made to respondent in
exchange for the shabu. No buy-bust money
was ever presented. The certificate of
inventory does not show any buy-bust
money.These stick out like a sore thumb in
the case at bar.
Suffice it to say that one of the essential
elements to be established in the prosecution
of the drug buy-bust cases, that is, the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefore is wanting
Justice Secretary directed the City Prosecutor of Cebu City to
withdraw the information.[3] PDEA filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied by the Justice Secretary
Finding that Adam could not be held liable for the crime
charged, Judge Ingles issued an Order on January 26, 2007
granting the Motion to Withdraw Information and ordering the
release of the accused, unless otherwise held for another valid
ground.
DECISION
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention in which any person is deprived of
his liberty, or in which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled to it. Its essential object and
purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint
and to relieve a person from it if such restraint is illegal. The
singular function of a petition for habeas corpus is to protect
and secure the basic freedom of physical liberty. [7]
In the instant case, records show that Adam has been
released upon order of the trial judge on January 26,
2007. Therefore, the petition has become moot.[8]
MANGILA V. PANGILINAN
seven criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita Mangila
and four others with syndicated estafa in violation of Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Presidential
Decree No. 1689, and with violations of Section 7(b) of
Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipino Act of 1995) were filed. The complaints arose from the
recruiting and promising of employment by Mangila and the
others to the private complainants as overseas contract
workers in Toronto, Canada, and from the collection of visa
processing fees, membership fees and on-line application the
private complainants without lawful authority from the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA).1Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan, Presiding Judge of
the MTCC, conducted a preliminary investigation on the
complaints. After examining Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the
complainants, Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest
of Mangila and her cohorts without bail. entire records of the
cases, including the warrant of arrest, were transmitted to the
City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City for further proceedings
and appropriate action in accordance with the prevailing rules.3
As a consequence, Mangila was arrested on June 18, 2003 and
detained at the headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Claiming that Judge
Pangilinan did not have the authority to conduct the
preliminary investigation; that the preliminary investigation he
conducted was not yet completed when he issued the warrant
of arrest; and that the issuance of the warrant of arrest was
without sufficient justification or without a prior finding of
probable cause, Mangila filed in the Court of Appeals (CA)a
petition for habeas corpus to obtain her release from detention.
Her petition averred that the remedy of habeas corpus was
available to her because she could no longer file a motion to
quash or a motion to recall the warrant of arrest considering
that Judge Pangilinan had already forwarded the entire records
of the case to the City Prosecutor who had no authority to lift or
recall the warrant.5
CA denied the petition for habeas corpus for its lack of merit
As a general rule, a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted
where relief may be had or could have been procured by resort
to another general remedy. As pointed out in Luna vs. Plaza, if
petitioner is detained by virtue of a warrant of arrest, which is
allegedly invalid, the remedy available to her is not a petition
for habeas corpus but a petition to quash the warrant of arrest
or a petition for a reinvestigation of the case by the Municipal
Judge or by the Provincial Fiscal.
Section 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that the Municipal Judge who conducted the
preliminary investigation shall transmit his resolution,
together with the record of the case, including the warrant of
arrest, to the Provincial Prosecutor, who shall review the same
and order the release of an accused who is detained if no
probable cause is found against him. Thus, the proper remedy
available to petitioner is for her to file with the Provincial
Prosecutor a motion to be released from detention on the
grounds alleged in the instant petition.
ISSUE
Did the CA err in ruling that habeas corpus was not the proper
remedy to obtain the release of Mangila from detention?
DECISION
Restraint that is lawful and pursuant to a court process cannot
be inquired into through habeas corpus.
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been devised as
a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint. In Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 10 the Court
discoursed on the nature of the special proceeding of habeas
corpus in the following manner:
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a
special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Rules of Court,
as amended. In Ex Parte Billings, it was held that habeas
corpus is that of a civil proceeding in character. It seeks the
enforcement of civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to
inquire into the criminal act of which the complaint is made,
but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act and the
immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint.
The rule applies even when instituted to arrest a criminal
prosecution and secure freedom. When a prisoner petitions for
a writ of habeas corpus, he thereby commences a suit and
prosecutes a case in that court.
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor
intended as substitute for the trial court’s function. It cannot
take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ
cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of error
that might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits. The
inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the
question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order are,
for any reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily granted
where the law provides for other remedies in the regular
course, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances.
Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of
trial. The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual
remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where
exceptional circumstances are extant. In another case, it was
held that habeas corpus cannot be issued as a writ of error or as
a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not
involving the questions of jurisdiction occurring during the
course of the trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional
safeguards of human life and liberty must be preserved, and
not destroyed. It has also been held that where restraint is
under legal process, mere errors and irregularities, which do
not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by
habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not illegal.
Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a
proceeding in rem when instituted for the sole purpose of
having the person of restraint presented before the judge in
order that the cause of his detention may be inquired into and
his statements final. The writ of habeas corpus does not act
upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who
holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful authority.
Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner
(prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody,
and the only question to be resolved is whether the custodian
has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ
may be denied if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is
entitled thereto ex merito justicias.
A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a "palladium of
liberty," is a prerogative writ which does not issue as a matter
of right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge. It is,
however, a writ of right on proper formalities being made by
proof. Resort to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act
of which a complaint is made but unto the right of liberty,
notwithstanding the act, and the immediate purpose to be
served is relief from illegal restraint. The primary, if not the
only object of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjuciendum, is to
determine the legality of the restraint under which a person is
held.11 (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the
legality of the detention, and, if the detention is found to be
illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Equally well-
settled however, is that the writ will not issue where the person
in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge
with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court
of record.12
Judge Pangilinan issued the warrant of arrest against Mangila
and her cohorts. Consequently, the CA properly denied
Mangila’s petition for habeas corpus because she had been
arrested and detained by virtue of the warrant issued for her
arrest by Judge Pangilinan, a judicial officer undeniably
possessing the legal authority to do so. With Mangila’s arrest
and ensuing detention being by virtue of the order lawfully
issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not
an appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint on her
liberty. This is because the restraint, being lawful and pursuant
to a court process, could not be inquired into through habeas
corpus
TUJAN-MILITANTE V. CADA
petition lacks merit. The RTC-Caloocan correctly took
cognizance of the habeas corpus petition. Subsequently, it
acquired jurisdiction over petitioner when the latter was served
with a copy of the writ in Quezon City.
The RTC-Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus
proceeding
Arguing that the RTC-Caloocan lacked jurisdiction over the
case, petitioner relies on Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC
and maintains that the habeas corpus petition should have
been filed before the family court that has jurisdiction over her
place of residence or that of the minor or wherever the minor
may be found.18 As to respondent, she asserts, among others,
that the applicable rule is not Section 3 but Section 20 of A.M.
No. 03-04-04-SC.19
We find for respondent.
In the case at bar, what respondent filed was a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Section 20 of A.M.
No. 03-04-04-SC and Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.20 As
provided:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified
petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors
shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall
beenforceable within its judicial region to which the Family
Court belongs.
However, the petition may be filed with the regular court in the
absence of the presiding judge of the Family Court, provided,
however, that the regular court shall refer the case tothe Family
Court as soon as its presiding judge returns to duty.
The petition may also be filed with the appropriate regular
courts in places where there are no Family Courts.
The writ issued by the Family Court or the regular court shall
be enforceable in the judicial region where they belong.
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so
granted,the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family
Court or to any regular court within the region where the
petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing
and decision on the merits.
Upon return of the writ, the court shall decide the issue on
custody of minors. The appellate court, or the member thereof,
issuing the writ shall be furnished a copy of the decision.
(emphasis added)
Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial
region, petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus,
whether they be filed under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court
orpursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may
therefore be filed withany of the proper RTCs within the
judicial region where enforcement thereof is sought.21
In view of the afore-quoted provision,it is indubitable that the
filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
before a family court in any of the cities enumerated is proper
as long as the writ is sought to be enforced within the National
Capital Judicial Region, as here.
In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the
family court of Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City and Quezon
City both belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by
the RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented in Quezon City.
Whether petitioner resides in the former or the latter is
immaterial in view of the above rule.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, DATUKAN
MALANG SALIBO,
Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo) and other Filipinos were
allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage. 4 "While in
Saudi Arabia, . . . Salibo visited and prayed in the cities of
Medina, Mecca, Arpa, Mina and Jeddah. Salibo learned that
police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao
suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang.7 Butukan S. Malang
was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for allegedly
participating in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao
Massacre. He had a pending warrant of arrest issued by the
trial court in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal
Ampatuan, Jr., et al.8 Salibo presented himself before the
police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name.
There, he explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and
that he could not have participated in the November 23, 2009
Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that
time.9
To support his allegations, Salibo presented to the police
"pertinent portions of his passport, boarding passes and other
documents"10 tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang
Salibo was in Saudi Arabia from November 7 to December 19,
2009.11
The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not
arrest him because he was not Butukan S. Malang. 12
Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo
and tore off page two of his passport that evidenced his
departure for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009. They then
detained Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police Station for about three
(3) days he was detained for another 10 days. While in
Cotabato City, the Criminal Investigation and Detention Group
allegedly made him sign and affix his thumbprint on
documents.14
On August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the
Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City, where he
is currently detained.15
On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed before the Court of
Appeals the Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus 16questioning
the legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty.17 He
maintained that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. 18 he
Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making the
Writ returnable to the Second Vice Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice). 20 The
Court of Appeals ordered the Warden of the Quezon City Jail
Annex to file a Return of the Writ
The trial court found that Salibo was not "judicially
charged"29 under any resolution, information, or amended
information. The Resolution, Information, and Amended
Information presented in court did not charge Datukan Malang
Salibo as an accused. He was also not validly arrested as there
was no Warrant of Arrest or Alias Warrant of Arrest against
Datukan Malang Salibo. Salibo, the trial court ruled, was not
restrained of his liberty under process issued by a court. 30
ial court granted Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus and
ordered his immediate release from detention.
On appeal37 by the Warden, however, the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the trial court's Decision. Contrary to the
trial court's finding, the Court of Appeals found that Salibo's
arrest and subsequent detention were made under a valid
Information and Warrant of Arrest.39 Even assuming that
Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias
Warrant of Arrest, the Court of Appeals said that "[t]he orderly
course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies
exhausted before the writ [of habeas corpus] may be
invoked[.]"40 According to the Court of Appeals, Salibo's proper
remedy was a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of
Arrest.
ISSUES

First, whether the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
153, Pasig City on petitioner Salibo's Petition for Habeas
Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals; and Second,
whether petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is to file a Petition
for Habeas Corpus.
DECISION
respondent Warden correctly appealed before the Court of
Appeals.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made
through a petition filed before this court or any of its
members,50 the Court of Appeals or any of its members in
instances authorized by law,51 or the Regional Trial Court or
any of its presiding judges.52 The court or judge grants the writ
and requires the officer or person having custody of the person
allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ. 53A
hearing on the return of the writ is then conducted.54
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that
which issued the writ.55 Should the court issuing the writ
designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable,
the lower court shall proceed to decide the petition of habeas
corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower court "acquire[s]
the power and authority to determine the merits of the
[petition for habeas corpus.]"56 Therefore, the decision on the
petition is a decision appealable to the court that has appellate
jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court.57
In Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, etc,58 "a petition for habeas corpus
was filed before this Court . . . [o]n behalf of. . . Alfredo B. Saulo
[(Saulo)]."59 This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and
ordered respondent Commanding General of the Philippine
Constabulary to file a Return of the Writ. This court made the
Writ returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila. 60
After hearing the Commanding General on the Return, the
Court of First Instance denied Saulo's Petition for Habeas
Corpus.61
Saulo appealed before this court, arguing that the Court of First
Instance heard the Petition for Habeas Corpus "not by virtue of
its original jurisdiction but merely
delegation[.]"62 Consequently, "this Court should have the final
say regarding the issues raised in the petition, and only [this
court's decision] . . . should be regarded as operative." 63
This court rejected Sciulo's argument and stated that his "logic
is more apparent than real."64 It ruled that when a superior
court issues a writ of habeas corpus, the superior court only
resolves whether the respondent should be ordered to show
cause why the petitioner or the person in whose behalf the
petition was filed was being detained or deprived of his or her
liberty.65 However, once the superior court makes the writ
returnable to a lower court as allowed by the Rules of Court,
the lower court designated "does not thereby become merely a
recommendatory body, whose findings and conclusion[s] are
devoid of effect[.]"66 The decision on the petition for habeas
corpus is a decision of the lower court, not of the superior
court.
Called the "great writ of liberty[,]"76 the writ of habeas corpus
"was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and
only sufficient defense of personal freedom." 77 The remedy of
habeas corpus is extraordinary78 and summary79 in nature,
consistent with the law's "zealous regard for personal liberty." 80
Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of
habeas corpus "shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement
or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or
by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
the person entitled thereto."81 The primary purpose of the writ
"is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal." 82 "Any restraint which
will preclude freedom of action is sufficient." 83
The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any
offense so as to entitle a person to the efficient remedy of
habeas corpus. It may be availed of as a post-conviction
remedy84 or when there is an alleged violation of the liberty of
abode.85 In other words, habeas corpus effectively substantiates
the implied autonomy of citizens constitutionally protected in
the right to liberty in Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution.86 Habeas corpus being a remedy for a
constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious and
deliberate level of scrutiny so that the substantive right to
liberty will not be further curtailed in the labyrinth of other
processes.87
Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. None of the grounds for
filing a Motion to Quash Information apply to him. Even if
petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he alleged
could not have been cured by mere amendment of the
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of
the accused appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of
Arrest from "Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan Malang Salibo"
will not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in this case.
A motion for reinvestigation will' not cure the defect of lack of
preliminary investigation. The Information and Alias Warrant
of Arrest were issued on the premise that Butukan S. Malang
and Datukan Malang Salibo are the same person. There is
evidence, however, that the person detained by virtue of these
processes is not Butukan S. Malang but another person named
Datukan Malang Salibo.
Petitioner Salibo presented in evidence his Philippine
passport,148 his identification card from the Office on Muslim
Affairs,149 his Tax Identification Number card,150 and clearance
from the National Bureau of Investigation 151 all bearing his
picture and indicating the name "Datukan Malang Salibo."
None of these government-issued documents showed that
petitioner Salibo used the alias "Butukan S. Malang."
Moreover, there is evidence that petitioner Salibo was not in
the country on November 23, 2009 when the Maguindanao
Massacre occurred.
A Certification152 from the Bureau of Immigration states that
petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia on November 7,
2009 and arrived in the Philippines only on December 20,
2009. A Certification153 from Saudi Arabian Airlines attests that
petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia on board Saudi
Arabian Airlines Flight SV869 on November 7, 2009 and that
he arrived in the Philippines on board Saudi Arabian Airlines
SV870 on December 20, 2009.cralawlawlibrary
o require petitioner Salibo to undergo trial would be to further
illegally deprive him of his liberty. Urgency dictates that we
resolve his Petition in his favor given the strong evidence that
he is not Butukan S. Malang.
In ordering petitioner Salibo's release, we are prejudging
neither his guilt nor his innocence. However, between a citizen
who has shown that he was illegally deprived of his liberty
without due process of law and the government that has all the
"manpower and the resources at [its] command"157 to properly
indict a citizen but failed to do so, we will rule in favor of the
citizen.

Should the government choose to prosecute petitioner Salibo, it

must pursue the proper remedies against him as provided in
our Rules. Until then, we rule that petitioner Salibo is illegally
deprived of his liberty. His Petition for Habeas Corpus must be
granted.cralawred