MAKING MUSIC TOGETHER: A Study in Social Relationship

Author(s): ALFRED SCHÜTZ

Source: Social Research, Vol. 18, No. 1 (MARCH 1951), pp. 76-97
Published by: The New School
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 MAKING MUSIC TOGETHER
A Studyin Social Relationship

BY ALFRED SCHÜTZ

lVlusic is a meaningful contextwhichis not bound to a con-

ceptualscheme. Yet thismeaningful contextcan be communi-
cated. The processof communication betweencomposerand
listenernormallyrequiresan intermediary: an individualper-
former or a groupofcoperformers. Amongall theseparticipants
thereprevailsocialrelations ofa highly complicated structure.
To analyzecertainelements of thisstructure is thepurposeof
thispaper. The discussion is notaimedat problemscommonly
relegatedto therealm of theso-calledsociology ofmusic,although
itisbelievedthatan investigation ofthesocialrelationships among
theparticipants in themusicalprocessis a prerequisite forany
researchin thisfield;noris it concerned witha phenomenology
of musicalexperience,althoughsome elementary observations
regarding thestructure of music willhave to be made. The chief
interestof our analysisconsists in theparticular characterof all
socialinteractions connectedwiththemusicalprocess:theyare
doubtlessmeaningful to theactoras wellas to theaddressee, but
thismeaningstructure is notcapableof beingexpressed in con-
ceptualterms;theyare foundedupon communication, but not
primarily upon a semantic used
system by the communicator as a
schemeofexpression andbyhispartner as a schemeofinterpreta-
tion.1 For thisveryreasonit can be hopedthata studyof the
socialrelationships connectedwiththemusicalprocessmaylead
to someinsights validformanyotherformsof socialintercourse,
i The systemof musicalnotation,as will be shown,has quite anotherfunction
and a merelysecondaryone.

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 MAKING MUSIC TOGETHER 77
perhapseven to illuminationof a certainaspect of the structure
of social interactionas such that has not so far attractedfrom
social scientiststhe attentionit deserves. This introductory state-
mentrequiressomeclarification.
When sociologistsspeak of social interactiontheyusually have
in mind a set of interdependent actionsof severalhuman beings,
mutuallyrelated by the meaningwhich the actor bestowsupon
his actionand whichhe supposesto be understoodby his partner.
To use Max Weber'sterminology, theseactionshave to be oriented
in theircourse with referenceto one another. In studyingthe
processof communicationas such,mostsociologistshave takenas
a model eitherthe interplayof significative gesturesor language
in thebroadestsenseof thisterm. G. H. Mead, forexample,finds
thattwowrestlers communicatewitheach otherbya ' 'conversation
of gestures"whichenables eitherof the participantsto anticipate
the other'sbehaviorand to orienthis own behaviorby means of
such anticipation.2 We may also say that two chess playerswho
bothknowthefunctionalsignificance of each chessmanin general,
as well as withinthe unique concreteconstellationat any given
momentofa particulargame,communicatetheirthoughtsto each
otherin termsof the "vocabulary"and "syntax"of the schemeof
expressionand interpretation common to both of them,which
is determinedby the body of the "rules of the game." In the
case of ordinaryspeech or the use of writtensymbols,it is
assumedthateach partnerinterpretshis own behavioras well as
thatof theotherin conceptualtermswhichcan be translatedand
conveyedto the other partnerby way of a common semantic
system.
In any of thesecases the existenceof a semanticsystem - be it
the "conversationof significant gestures,"the "rules of the game,"
or "languageproper"- is simplypresupposedas somethinggiven
fromtheoutsetand theproblemof "significance" remainsunques-
tioned. The reason for this is quite clear: In the social world
into which we are born, language (in the broadest sense) is
2 G. H. Mead, Mind, Self, and
Society (Chicago 1937) pp. 14, 63, 253 ff.

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78 SOCIAL RESEARCH
admittedlythe paramount vehicle of communication;its con-
ceptual structureand its power of typification make it the out-
standing tool for the of
conveying meaning. There is even a
strongtendencyin contemporarythoughtto identifymeaning
with its semanticexpressionand to consider language, speech,
symbols,significantgestures,as the fundamentalcondition of
social intercourseas such. Even Mead's highlyoriginalendeavor
to explain the origin of language by an interplayof significant
gestures - his famous example of the dogfight - startsfrom the
suppositionthat a prelinguistic"conversation"of "attitudes"is
possible. It is not necessaryto accept Mead's basic position of
"social behaviorism"in order to admit that,as has so oftenhap-
pened, he has seen a crucial problem more clearlythan others.
Nevertheless,the solution he offersonly seeminglyremovesthe
difficultiesconnectedwith the basic issue, namely,whetherthe
communicativeprocess is really the foundationof all possible
social relationships,or whether,on the contrary,all communica-
tion presupposesthe existenceof some kind of social interaction
which, though it is an indispensablecondition of all possible
communication, does not enterthe communicativeprocessand is
not capable of beinggraspedby it. It is currently ratherfashion-
able to dismissproblemsof this kind with a haughtyreference
to the question of the priorityof the chickenor the egg. Such
an attitudenotonlyreflects an unfamiliarity
withthephilosophical
issue discussedby the Schoolmenunder the heading of priority,
but also constitutesa self-madeobstacle to a serious analysisof
the various problems of foundation importantespecially for
the social sciences.
As faras the questionunderscrutinyis concerned,the concrete
researchesof many sociologistsand philosophershave aimed at
certainformsof social intercoursewhich necessarilyprecede all
communication.Wiese's "contact-situations," Scheler'sperceptual
theory of the alterego, to a certainextentCooley'sconceptof the
face-to-face relationship, Malinowski's interpretationof speech as
originating within the situationdetermined by social interaction,

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 MAKING MUSIC TOGETHER 79
Sartre'sbasic conceptof "lookingat the otherand being looked at
by the other" (le regard),all these are just a few examples of
the endeavor to investigatewhat might be called the "mutual
tuning-inrelationship"upon which alone all communicationis
founded. It is preciselythis mutual tuning-inrelationshipby
whichthe "I" and the "Thou" are experiencedby both partici-
pantsas a "We" in vivid presence.
Instead of enteringhere into the complicated philosophical
analysisof thisproblem,3it maybe permissibleto referto a series
of well-knownphenomena in the social world in which this
precommunicative social relationshipcomes to the foreground.
Mead's example of wrestlershas already been mentioned. It is
typical for a set of similar interrelatedactivitiessuch as the
relationshipbetweenpitcherand catcher,tennisplayers,fencers,
and so on; we findthe same featuresin marchingtogether,danc-
ing together,making love together,or making music together,
and thislast-namedactivitywill serveas an example foranalysis
in thefollowingpages. It is hoped thatthisanalysiswill in some
measurecontributeto clarification of the structureof the mutual
tuning-in which
relationship, originatesin the possibilityof living
togethersimultaneouslyin specificdimensionsof time. It is
also hoped thatthestudyoftheparticularcommunicativesituation
withinthe musical processwill shed some light on the noncon-
ceptualaspectinvolvedin any kind of communication.

Certain elementsof the social structureof the musical process

were analyzedin one of the later writingsof the famousFrench
sociologist,Maurice Halbwachs.4 The paper in questiondeserves
special attentionbecause it was writtenas a kind of introduction
to a major studyon the natureof time,whichwas unfortunately
3 Mead's Philosophyof the Present (Chicago 1932) is just one exampleof how
of thiskind have to be carriedout and wheretheylead.
investigations
4 Maurice Halbwachs,"La mémoirecollectivechez les musiciens,"in Revue
philosophique(March-April1939) pp. 136-65.

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8o SOCIAL RESEARCH
never completedowing to the author's tragicdeath in the con-
centrationcamp of Buchenwaldin July 1944.5
Halbwachs' basic position is well known. He assumed that
all kinds of memoryare determinedby a social frameworkand
that individual memorycannot be conceived of without the
assumptionof a collective memoryfrom which all individual
recollectionderives. This basic principle- which it is not our
concernto criticizehere- was applied to the problemof musical
communicationbecause the authorfeltthatthe verystructureof
music- its developmentwithin the flux of time, its detachment
fromanythingthat lasts,its realizationby re-creation - offersan
excellentopportunityfor demonstratingthat there is no other
possibilityof preserving a set of recollectionswithall theirshades
and details except by recourse to the collective memory. In
otherwords,Halbwachs was primarilyconcernedwith analyzing
the social structureof music. Curiouslyenough,he divided the
realm of music into two distinctparts: music as experiencedby
the educated musicianand music as experiencedby the layman.
With regard to the former,Halbwachs came to the conclusion
thatit is firstof all the possibilityof translatingmusic into visual
symbols - that is, the systemof musical notation- which makes
transmission of music possible. To be sure,the signsof musical
notationare not imagesof the sounds. They are, however,means
of expressingin a conventionallanguageall the commandswhich
the musicianmustobey if he wantsto reproducea piece of music
properly. The conventionalcharacterof the signs of musical
notation and their combinationconsistsin the fact that they
have meaningmerelyby continuousreferenceto the group which
inventedand adopted them. This group, the ' 'society'' of edu-
cated musicians,lives in a world exclusivelyfilled with sounds
and is interestedin nothingelse but creatingor listeningto a
combinationof sounds. Even the inventionof new combinations
5 Four chapters from the manuscript were published posthumously under the
title, "Mémoire et société," in L'Année sociologique, 3rd Series, Vol. I (Paris 1949)
pp. 11-197.

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 MAKING MUSIC TOGETHER 81
of soundsis possibleonlywithinthe framework of the socially
conditionedmusicallanguage(which, forHalbwachs, wasidentical
withthe systemof musicalnotation).The creativeact of the
composeris merelya discovery in the same world of sounds
thatis accessibleexclusivelyto the societyof musicians. It is
preciselybecause the composeracceptsthe conventions of this
societyand becausehe penetrates moredeeplyinto themthan
othersthathe can makehis discoveries.The musicallanguage
is not an instrument inventedafterward in orderto put down
and to transmitto othermusicianswhatone of themhas spon-
taneouslyinvented.On thecontrary, itis thisverylanguagewhich
createsmusic.
This is roughlyHalbwachs'main argumentfor the social
characterofthemusician's music. Yet thechildor themusically
uneducated person learnsnursery rhymes, anthems, popularsongs,
dance or marchmelodiesby rote withoutany knowledgeof
musicalnotation.How is thispossibleand howcan thiskindof
memoryfor sound combinations be referredto the collective
memory?Halbwachs'answeris thatthe layman'smemoryof
musicaleventsis also foundedupon the collectivememorybut
alwaysattachedto metamusical experiences.6The melodyof a
song is remembered because the words - a social product - are
remembered.As fordancesor marchesor otherpiecesof music
dissociatedfromwords,it is the rhythm of marching, dancing,
speaking, thatserves as the carrier of the musical recollection.
Yet rhythm does not existin nature;it, too, is a resultof our
livingin society.The insulatedindividualcould not discover
rhythm.No evidenceisoffered forthisstatement (whichI believe
tobe wrong)exceptreference to therhythmical character ofwork
songsand of our speech. Bothwordsand rhythms are of social
originand so,consequently,are thelayman'smusicalexperiences.
Buttheyrefertoa worldin whichotherthanexclusively sonorous
eventsexistand to a societynotexclusively interestedin musical
texture.So muchforHalbwachs.
«This termis not used by Halbwachs,but probablyrenderswhat he meant.

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82 SOCIAL RESEARCH
Interestingas Halbwachs' analysis is, it suffersfromvarious
shortcomings.In thefirstplace,it seemsto me thatthedistinction
betweena musician'smusicand musicaccessibleto the laymanis
withoutany foundationin fact. But postponingthe discussion
of this question and restrictingourselvesfor the time being to
the provinceof music allegedlyaccessible only to the educated
musician,the followingobjectionsto Halbwachs' theorymust be
raised: (1) He identifies
themusicalthoughtwithitscommunica-
tion. (2) He identifiesmusical communicationwith musical
languagewhichto him is the systemof musicalnotation. (3) He
identifiesmusical notation with the social background of the
musical process.
In regardto the firstobjection,it is clear thatfromthe point of
view of thecomposera musicalthoughtmaybe conceivedwithout
any intentionof communication. This thoughtmay be a perfect
piece of music,having its specificmeaning structure;it may be
rememberedat will withoutbeing translatedinto actual sounds
or into the visible formof notation. This is, of course, not a
particularityof themusicalprocess. It has been said thatRaphael
would have been one of the greatestpainterseven if he had
been bornwithoutarms. In general,all kindsof mentalactivities
performedin fantasymaybe perfectly meaningfuland capable of
being mentallyreproducedwithinthe solitude of the individual
consciousness. All our unexpressedthoughts,our day dreamsas
well as projectsfor futureaction never carried out, show these
features. But any kind of communicationbetweenman and his
fellowman and therefore the communicationof musical thoughts
presupposesan event or a series of events in the outer world
which functions,on the one hand, as a schemeof expressionof
the communicator'sthoughtand, on the otherhand, as a scheme
of interpretationof such thoughtby the addressee. Musical
thoughtscan be transmitted to otherseitherby the mechanicsof
audible sound or by the symbolsof musical notation.
It is hard to understandwhy Halbwachs regarded only the
latteras the appropriateformof musical communication. Obvi-

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 MAKING MUSIC TOGETHER 83
ously he took as a model of his analysisthe situationin which
the composerhas to communicatehis musical idea to the per-
formerbywayofa systemofvisiblesignsbeforethe performer can
translatethese ideas into sounds to be grasped by the listener.
But this procedurehas nothingto do with the particularitiesof
musical communicationas such; it is a more or less technical
question. We may perfectlywell understandan improvisation
executed by one or several instrumentalists.Or we may, with
Tovey,foreseea revolutionin the processof musical communica-
tion by means of the microscopicstudyof phonographicrecords.
"There is nothingto preventthe individual productionof music
directlyin termsof the phonographicneedle. That is to say,the
composer,untrammeledby the techniqueof instruments, will pre-
scribeall producibletimbrein whateverpitchesand rhythmshe
pleases, and will have no more direct cooperation with the
craftsmanwho models the phonographicwave-lines,than the
violinistmaywithStradivarius."7
Musical notationis, therefore,
just one among severalvehicles
of communicatingmusical thought. But musical notationis by
no means identical with musical language. Its semanticsystem
is of quite anotherkind than thatof ideograms,letters,or mathe-
maticalor chemicalsymbols. The ideogramrefersimmediatelyto
therepresentedconceptand so does the mathematicalor chemical
symbol. The writtenword in our alphabeticlanguagesrefersto
the sound of the spokenword and throughit as an intermediary
to the concept it conveys. As stated above, the meaning of a
musicalprocesscannotbe relatedto a conceptualscheme,and the
particularfunctionof musical notation today as well as in its
historicaldevelopmentreflectsthis situation. The musical sign
is nothingbut instructionto the performerto produce by means
of his voice or his instrumenta sound of a particular pitch
and duration,givingin addition,at certainhistoricalperiods,sug-
gestionsas to tempo,dynamics,and expression,or directionsas to
the connectionwithothersounds (by such devices as ties,slurs,
7 Donald Francis Tovey, "Music," in British Encyclopaedia, 14th ed.

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84 SOCIAL RESEARCH
and the like). All theseelementsof the tonal materialcan only
be approximatelyprescribedand the way to obtain the indicated
effectis leftto the performer. "The composer'sspecificindica-
tionsare themselvesnot alwaysa partof his originalcreationbut
ratherone musician'smessageto anotherabout it, a hint about
how to secure in performancea convincingtransmissionof the
work's feeling content without destroyingits emotional and
intellectualcommunity,"saysa well-knowncomposerand critic.8
And the conductor,Furtwängler, is certainlyrightin statingthat
the composer'stext "cannot give any indicationas to the really
intendedvolume of a forte,the reallyintendedspeed of a tempo,
since everyforteand everytempohas to be modifiedin practice
in accordancewith the place of the performanceand the setting
and the strengthof the performing group" and that "the expres-
sion markshave intentionally a merelysymbolicvalue withrespect
to the whole workand are not intendedto be valid forthe single
instrumentwhereforean 'ff'for the bassoon has quite another
9
meaning than for the trombone."
Thus, all musicalnotationremainsof necessityvague and open
to manifoldinterpretations and it is up to thereaderor performer
to decipher thehintsin thescore and to definetheapproximations.
These limitsvarywidelyin the course of the historicaldevelop-
ment of musical culture. The more closely we approach the
presentin the studyof the historyof music,the lowerthe level of
the general musical culture of performers and of listeners,and
the strongerthe tendencyof the composerto make his systemof
notationas exact and preciseas possible,that is, to limit more
and moretheperformer's freedomof interpretation.To be sure,
all signsof musical notationare conventional;but, as has been
shown,the systemof musical notationis more or less accidental
to the processof musical communication. A social theoryof
musictherefore does not have to be foundedon the conventional

8 VirgilThompson,The Art of JudgingMusic (New York 1948) p. 296.

9 WilhelmFurtwängler, - eine musikalische
"Interpretation in Das
Schicksalfrage,"
der
Atlantisbuch Musik (Zurich 1934) pp. 609 ff.

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 MAKING MUSIC TOGETHER 85
characterof the visual signsbut ratheron the sum total of what
we have just called musical culture against the backgroundof
which the reader's or performer'sinterpretationof these signs
takesplace.

m
To make this web of social relationshipscalled musical culture
clearer,let us imagine a lonely performerof a piece of music
sittingat his piano beforethe scoreof a sonataby a minormaster
of the nineteenthcenturywhich,we assume,is entirelyunknown
to him. Furthermore, we assumethatour piano playeris equally
proficient as a technician and sightreaderand thatconsequently
no mechanicalor otherexternalobstacle will hinder the fluxof
his performance.
Yet, having hardlymade these two assumptions,we hesitate.
Are theyindeedcompatiblewitheach other? Can we reallymain-
tain thatthe sonata in question is entirelyunknownto our per-
former? He could not be an accomplishedtechnicianand sight
readerwithouthavingattaineda certainlevel of musical culture
enablinghim to read offhanda piece of musicof the typeof that
beforehim. Consequently,although this particularsonata and
perhapsall the otherworksof thisparticularcomposermightbe
unknownto him,he will nevertheless have a well-foundedknowl-
edge of the type of musical form called ' 'sonata within the
meaningofnineteenthcenturypiano music,"of thetypeof themes
and harmoniesused in such compositionsof that period, of the
expressionalcontentshe may expect to find in them- in sum,
of the typical' 'style"in which music of this kind is writtenand
in whichit has to be executed. Even beforestartingto play or
to read the firstchordour musicianis referredto a more or less
clearlyorganized,more or less coherent,more or less distinctset
of his previousexperiences,which constitutein their totalitya
kindof preknowledgeof the piece of musicat hand. To be sure,
thispreknowledge refersmerelyto thetypeto whichthisindividual
piece of music belongs and not to its particular and unique

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86 SOCIAL RESEARCH
individuality. But the player's general preknowledgeof its
typicalitybecomesthe schemeof referenceforhis interpretation
of its particularity.This scheme of referencedetermines,in a
generalway,the player'santicipationsof whathe mayor maynot
findin thecompositionbeforehim. Such anticipationsare more
or less empty;theymay be fulfilledand justifiedby the musical
eventshe will experiencewhen he startsto play the sonata or
theymay "explode" and be annihilated.
In more general terms,the player approaching a so-called
unknownpiece of musicdoes so froma historically - in one's own
- determinedsituation,determinedby his
case,autobiographically
stockof musicalexperiencesat hand in so faras theyare typically
relevantto the anticipatednovel experiencebeforehim.10 This
stockof experiencesrefersindirectlyto all his past and present
fellowmen whoseacts or thoughtshave contributedto the build-
ing up ofhis knowledge. This includeswhathe has learnedfrom
his teachers,and his teachersfromtheir teachers;what he has
taken in fromotherplayers'execution; and what he has appro-
priated fromthe manifestations of the musical thoughtof the
composer. Thus, the bulk of musical knowledge - as of knowl-
edge in general- is socially derived. And within this socially
derived knowledgethere stands out the knowledgetransmitted
fromthoseupon whomthe prestigeof authenticity and authority
has been bestowed,thatis, fromthegreatmastersamongthecom-
posersand the acknowledgedinterpreters of theirwork. Musical
knowledge transmittedby them is not only sociallyderived; it is
10All thisis by no meanslimitedto the situationunderscrutiny.Indeed,our
analysishas so farbeen merelyan applicationof Husserl'smasterful
investigations
intothestructure of our experience.Accordingto him the factualworldis always
experiencedas a worldof preconstitutedtypes. To embarkupon the importance
of this discoveryby Husserl,especiallyfor the conceptof type,so fundamen-
tal for all social sciences,is not within the scope of the present paper.
This theoryhas been touchedupon in Husserl'sIdeas: GeneralIntroductionto
Pure Phenomenology, translated
by W. R. BoyceGibson (London-NewYork 1931)
§ 47» P- *49»and nas been fuUydevelopedin his Erfahrungund Urteil(Prague
1939)PP- 35 ff-139-43»394-4O3-

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 MAKING MUSIC TOGETHER 87
also sociallyapproved,11being regardedas authenticand there-
foremorequalifiedto becomea patternforothersthanknowledge
originatingelsewhere.

IV

In the situationwe have chosen to investigate - the actual per-

-
formanceof a piece of music the genesisof the stockof knowl-
edge at hand withall its hidden social referencesis, so to speak,
prehistoric. The web of sociallyderived and sociallyapproved
knowledgeconstitutesmerely the setting for the main social
relationshipinto which our piano player (and also any listener
or mere readerof music) will enter: that with the composerof
thesonatabeforehim. It is thegraspingof thecomposer'smusical
thoughtand its interpretation by re-creationwhich stand in the
centerof the player'sfieldof consciousnessor, to use a phenome-
nologicalterm,whichbecome "thematic"forhis ongoingactivity.
This thematickernelstandsout againstthehorizonof preacquired
knowledge,which knowledgefunctionsas a schemeof reference
and interpretation for the graspingof the composer'sthought.
It is now necessaryto describethe structureof thissocial relation-
ship betweencomposerand beholder,12 but beforeenteringinto
its analysisit mightbe well to forestalla possiblemisunderstand-
ing. It is by no means our thesisthat a work of music (or of
art in general) cannot be understoodexcept by referenceto its
individualauthoror to thecircumstances - biographicalor other-
in which he created this particularwork. It is certainlynot a
prerequisitefor the understandingof the musical contentof the
so-calledMoonlightSonatato takecognizanceof thesillyanecdotes
whichpopularbeliefattachesto thecreationof thiswork;it is not
even indispensableto know that the sonata was composed by a
man called Beethovenwho lived thenand thereand wentthrough
11With regard to the conceptsof socially derived and socially approved
knowledge, see my paper,"The Well-informed Citizen,"in Social Research,vol.
13, no. 4 (December1946) pp. 463-78,especially475 ff.
12The term"beholder"shall include the player,listener,and readerof music.

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88 SOCIAL RESEARCH
such and such personal experiences. Any work of art, once
accomplished,existsas a meaningfulentityindependentof the
personal life of its creator.13 The social relationshipbetween
composerand beholder as it is understoodhere is established
exclusivelyby the factthata beholderof a piece of music partici-
pates in and to a certainextentre-createsthe experiencesof the
- let us suppose,anonymous - fellowman who createdthiswork
not only as an expressionof his musical thoughtsbut with com-
municativeintent.
For our purposes a piece of music may be defined14 - very
roughlyand tentatively, -
indeed as a meaningfularrangementof
tonesin innertime. It is the occurrencein innertime,Bergson's
durée,whichis the veryformof existenceof music. The fluxof
tones unrollingin inner time is an arrangementmeaningfulto
both the composerand the beholder,because and in so far as it
evokesin the streamof consciousnessparticipatingin it an inter-
play of recollections,retentions,protentions,and anticipations
which interrelatethe successive elements. To be sure, the
sequence of tones occurs in the irreversibledirectionof inner
time,in the direction,as it were, fromthe firstbar to the last.
But thisirreversiblefluxis not irretrievable.The composer,by
the specificmeans of his art,15has arrangedit in such a way that
13This problemhas been discussedforthe realmof poetryby E. M. W. Tillyard
and C. S. Lewisin theirwittyand profound book,The PersonalHeresy,a Controversy
(London-NewYork 1939).
14An excellentsurveyof philosophicaltheoriesof musiccan be foundin Susanne
K. Langer,Philosophyin a New Key (Cambridge1942),Ch. 8, "On Significance in
Music,"and Ch. 9, "The Genesisof ArtisticImport,"althoughthe author'sown
positionseemsunsatisfactory. It may be summedup in the followingquotation:
"Music has all the earmarksof a truesymbolism, exceptone: the existenceof an
assigned connotation.... It is a limitedidiomlike an artificial
language,onlyeven
less successful; for music at its highest, though clearly a symbolic form, is an
unconsunvmated symbol.Articulationis itslifebut notassertion;expressiveness,
not
expression."
15borneor thesespecincmeansare essentialto any Kina or music,otnersDeiong
merelyto a particularmusicalculture. Rhythm, melody,tonalharmony, technique
of diminution,and the so-calledformsbased on what Tovey calls the larger
harmony, such as Sonata,Rondo,Variations, and so on, are certainlycharacteristic
of themusicalcultureof thenineteenth century.It maybe hoped thatintensified

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 MAKING MUSIC TOGETHER 89
the consciousnessof the beholderis led to referwhat he actually
hears to what he anticipateswill followand also to what he has
just been hearingand what he has heard ever since this piece of
music began. The hearer,therefore, listensto the ongoing flux
of music,so to speak,not only in the directionfromthe firstto
the last bar but simultaneouslyin a reversedirectionback to the
firstone.16
It is essentialforour problemto gain a clearerunderstanding
of thetimedimensionin whichmusicoccurs. It was statedabove
that the inner time,the durée, is the veryformof existenceof
music. Of course,playingan instrument,listeningto a record,
readinga page of music- all theseare eventsoccurringin outer
time,the time thatcan be measuredby metronomesand clocks,
that is, the time that the musician "counts" in order to assure
the correct"tempo." But to make clear why we considerinner
time the verymediumwithinwhich the musical flowoccurs,let
us imaginethat the slow and the fastmovementof a symphony
each filla twelve-inch record. Our watchesshow thatthe playing
of eitherrecordtakesabout threeand a half minutes. This is a
fact which might possibly interest the program maker of a
broadcastingstation. To the beholder it means nothing. To
him it is not truethatthe timehe lived throughwhile listeningto
the slow movementwas of "equal length" with that which he
dedicatedto thefastone. While listeninghe lives in a dimension
of time incomparablewith that which can be subdivided into
homogeneousparts. The outer time is measurable; there are
piecesofequal length;thereare minutesand hoursand the length
of the grooveto be traversedby the needle of the recordplayer.
There is no such yardstickfor the dimensionof inner time the
listenerlives in; thereis no equalitybetweenits pieces, if pieces
researchin the phenomenology of musicalexperiencewill shed some light upon
the difficultproblemwhichof thesemeans of meaningfularrangement of tones
is essentialto musicin general,regardlessof what its particularhistoricalsetting
maybe.
io This insighthas been formulated
in an unsurpassable wayby St. Augustinein
Book XI, Ch. 38, of his Confessions.

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go SOCIAL RESEARCH
therewere at all.17 It may come as a completesurpriseto him
that the main theme of the second movementof Beethoven's
PianoforteSonata in d-minor,Op. 31, No. 2, takesas much time
in the mere clock sense- namely,one minute- as the last move-
mentof the same sonataup to the end of the exposition.18
The precedingremarksserve to clarifythe particularsocial
relationshipbetweencomposerand beholder. Althoughseparated
by hundredsof years,the latter participateswith quasi simul-
taneityin theformer'sstreamofconsciousnessby performing with
him step by step the ongoingarticulationof his musical thought.
The beholder,thus,is unitedwiththecomposerby a timedimen-
sion commonto both,whichis nothingotherthana derivedform
ofthevividpresentsharedby thepartnersin a genuineface-to-face
relation19 such as prevailsbetween speaker and listener.
But is thisreconstruction of a vivid present,thisestablishment
of a quasi simultaneity, specificto the relationshipbetween the
streamof consciousnessof the composerand thatof the beholder?
Can it not also be foundin therelationshipbetweenthe readerof
a letterwith its writer,the studentof a scientificbook with its
author,the high school boy who learns the demonstration of the
rule of the hypotenusewith Pythagoras? Certainly,in all these
cases the single phases of the author's articulatedthoughtare
polythetically- thatis, stepby step- coperformed or reperformed
by the recipient, and thus a quasi simultaneity of both streamsof
thoughttakesplace. The readerof a scientific book, forinstance,
builds up word by word the meaningof a sentence,sentenceby
sentencethat of a paragraph,paragraphby paragraphthat of a
17We do not need the reference to the specificexperienceof listeningto music
in orderto understand theincommensurability of innerand outertime. The hand
of our watchmay run equally over half the dial, whetherwe wait beforethe
door of a surgeonoperatingon a persondear to us or whetherwe are havinga
good timein congenialcompany. All theseare well-known facts.
is Donald FrancisTovey,Beethoven(London-NewYork 1945) p. 57.
19This term,hereand in the following paragraphs, is not used in the sensethat
CharlesHortonCooleyused it in Social Organization(New York 1937)^ns- 3~5»*it
signifiesmerelythattheparticipants in such a relationsharetimeand space while
it lasts. An analysisof Cooley'sconceptcan be foundin my article,"The Home-
comer,"in AmericanJournalof Sociology,vol. 50, no. 5 (March 1945) p. 37.

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 MAKING MUSIC TOGETHER 91
chapter. But once havingcoperformed thesepolythetic stepsof
constituting theconceptualmeaningof thissentence(paragraph,
chapter), readermaygraspthe outcomeof thisconstitutive
the
process,the resulting conceptualmeaning,in a singleglance -
monothetically, 20
-
as Husserlputsit thatis,independently ofthe
polythetic steps in which and by which this has
meaning been
constituted.In the same way I maygraspmonothetically the
meaning of the Pythagorean theorem a2-j-b2=:c2, without restart-
ingto perform thesinglementaloperations ofderivingit stepby
step from certain assured premises, and I maydo so evenif I have
forgottenhowto demonstrate thetheorem.
The meaningof a musicalwork,21 however, is essentiallyof a
polytheticalstructure. It cannot be graspedmonothetically. It
consistsin thearticulated step-by-step occurrence in innertime,
in theverypolythetic constitutional process itself. I maygivea
nameto a specific piece of music,callingit "MoonlightSonata"
or "NinthSymphony"; I mayevensay,"Thesewerevariations with
a finalein theformof a passacaglia,"or characterize, as certain
program notesare proneto do, theparticular moodor emotion
thispieceof musicis supposedto have evokedin me. But the
musicalcontent itself,itsverymeaning, can be graspedmerelyby
reimmersing oneself in the ongoingflux,by reproducing thus
thearticulated musicaloccurrence as it unfoldsin polythetic steps
in innertime,a processitselfbelonging to thedimension ofinner
time. Anditwill"takeas muchtime"toreconstitute theworkin
recollectionas to experience it forthefirst time. In bothcasesI
haveto re-establish thequasi simultaneity of mystreamof con-
sciousnesswiththatof the composerdescribedhereinbefore.22
20Husserl,Ideas (citedabove) §§ 118, 119,pp. 334 ff.
21Also of othertime-objectssuch as dance or poetry(see footnote22).
22This thesisis simplya corollaryto the other - that the meaningcontext
of musicis not relatedto a conceptualscheme. A poem, for instance,may also
have a conceptualcontent,and this,of course,may be graspedmonothetically.
I can tell in one or two sentencesthe storyof the ancientmariner,and in fact
thisis donein theauthor'sgloss.But in so faras thepoeticalmeaningof Coleridge's
poem surpassesthe conceptualmeaning - that is, in so far as it is - I can
poetry
onlybringit beforemymindby recitingor readingit frombeginningto end.

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92 SOCIAL RESEARCH
We have therefore the followingsituation: two seriesof events
in innertime,one belongingto the streamof consciousnessof the
composer,theotherto thestreamof consciousnessof thebeholder,
are lived throughin simultaneity,
whichsimultaneity is createdby
the ongoingfluxof the musical process. It is the thesisof the
presentpaper thatthissharingof theother'sfluxof experiencesin
innertime,thislivingthrougha vivid presentin common,consti-
tuteswhat we called in our introductory paragraphsthe mutual
tuning-inrelationship,the experienceof the "We," which is at
thefoundationof all possiblecommunication. The peculiarityof
the musical processof communicationconsistsin the essentially
polythetic characterof thecommunicatedcontent,thatis to say,in
the factthatboth the fluxof the musicaleventsand the activities
by which they are communicated,belong to the dimension of
inner time. This statementseems to hold good for any kind of
music. There is, however,one kind of music- the polyphonic
music of the westernworld- which has the magic power of
realizingby its specificmusical means the possibilityof living
simultaneouslyin two or more fluxesof events. In polyphonic
writingeach voice has its particularmeaning; each representsa
seriesof, so to speak, autarchicmusical events; but this flux is
designedto roll on in simultaneitywith other series of musical
events,not less autarchicin themselves,but coexistingwith the
formerand combiningwiththemby thisverysimultaneity into a
new meaningfularrangement.23
So far we have investigatedthe social relationshipbetween
composerand beholder. What we have foundto be the outstand-
ing featureof musical communication - that is, the sharing of
the ongoingfluxof the musicalcontent - holds good whetherthis
processoccursmerelyin the beholder'srecollection,24 or through
23See, for instance, the Brahms song, "Wir wandelten wir zwei zusammen," in
the introductionof which the walking togetherof the two lovers is expressed by
the specific musical means of a canon, or the same device used in the Credo of
Bach's B-minor Mass for expressingthe mysteryof the Trinity ("Et in unum").
24In this connection, one recalls Brahm's dictum: "If I want to listen to a
fine performanceof 'Don Giovanni,' I light a good cigar and stretch out on my
sofa."

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 MAKING MUSIC TOGETHER 93
his reading the score,or with the help of audible sounds. To
believe that the visible signsof musical notationare essentialto
thisprocessis no more erroneousthan to assert,as even Husserl
does, that a symphonyexists merelyin its performanceby an
orchestra.To be sure,the participationin the processof musical
communicationby means other than audible sounds requires
eithera certainnaturalgiftor special trainingon the part of the
beholder. It is the eminentsocial functionof the performer -
-
the singeror player of an instrument to be the intermediary
betweencomposerand listener. By his re-creationof the musical
processthe performer partakesin the streamof consciousnessof
the composeras well as of the listener. He therebyenables the
latterto becomeimmersedin theparticulararticulationof theflux
of innertimewhichis the specificmeaningof the piece of music
in question. It is of no greatimportancewhetherperformer and
listenershare togethera vivid presentin face-to-face relation or
whetherthroughthe interpositionof mechanical devices, such
as records,only a quasi simultaneitybetween the streamof con-
sciousnessof the mediatorand the listenerhas been established.
The lattercase alwaysrefersto theformer.The difference between
thetwoshowsmerelythattherelationshipbetweenperformer and
audience is subject to all variationsof intensity,intimacy,and
anonymity.This can be easily seen by imaginingthe audience
as consistingof one single person,a small group of personsin a
privateroom, a crowd fillinga big concerthall, or the entirely
unknownlistenersof a radio performanceor a commerciallydis-
tributedrecord. In all thesecircumstances performerand listener
are "tuned-in"to one another,are living togetherthroughthe
same flux,are growingolder togetherwhile the musical process
lasts. This statementapplies not only to the fifteenor twenty
minutesof measurableouter time required for the performance
of this particularpiece of music, but primarilyto the coper-
formancein simultaneityof the polytheticsteps by which the
musicalcontentarticulatesitselfin inner time. Since, however,
all performance as an act of communicationis based upon a series

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94 SOCIAL RESEARCH
ofeventsin theouterworld- in our case thefluxofaudible sounds
- it can be said thatthesocialrelationshipbetweenperformerand
listeneris foundedupon the commonexperienceof living simul-
taneouslyin severaldimensionsof time.
v
The samesituation,thepluridimensionality oftimesimultaneously
lived throughby man and fellowman, occursin the relationship
betweentwo or more individualsmakingmusic together,which
we are now preparedto investigate. If we accept Max Weber's
famous definition,according to which a social relationshipis
"the conduct of a pluralityof personswhich accordingto their
subjectivemeaningare mutuallyconcernedwith each otherand
orientedbyvirtueof thisfact,"thenboth therelationshipprevail-
ingbetweenintermediary and listenerand thatprevailingbetween
coperformers fallunderthisdefinition.But thereis an important
differencebetween them. The listener'scoperformingof the
polytheticsteps in which the musical contentunfoldsis merely
an internalactivity(althoughas an "action involvingthe action
of othersand being orientedby themin its course" undoubtedly
a social actionwithinWeber'sdefinition). The coperformers(let
us say a soloistaccompaniedby a keyboardinstrument)have to
executeactivitiesgearinginto the outerworldand thusoccurring
in spatializedoutertime. Consequently,each coperformer's action
is orientednotonlyby thecomposer'sthoughtand his relationship
to the audience but also reciprocallyby the experiencesin inner
and outertimeofhis fellowperformer.Technically,each of them
findsin the music sheet before him only that portion of the
musical contentwhich the composerhas assigned to his instru-
mentfortranslationinto sound. Each of themhas, therefore, to
take into account what the otherhas to execute in simultaneity.
He has not only to interprethis own part,whichas such remains
necessarilyfragmentary, but he has also to anticipatethe other
player'sinterpretation of his- the other's
- part and, even more,
the other'santicipationsof his own execution. Either'sfreedom

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 MAKING MUSIC TOGETHER 95
of interpretingthe composer'sthoughtis restrainedby the free-
dom grantedto the other. Either has to foreseeby listeningto
the other,by protentionsand anticipations,any turn the other's
interpretationmaytake and has to be preparedat any time to be
leaderor follower. Both sharenot onlythe innerdurée in which
the contentof the music played actualizes itself; each, simul-
taneously,sharesin vivid presentthe other'sstreamof conscious-
nessin immediacy.This is possiblebecausemakingmusictogether
occursin a trueface-to-face - inasmuchas the partici-
relationship
pantsare sharingnot only a sectionof time but also a sectorof
space. The other'sfacialexpressions,his gesturesin handlinghis
instrument, in shortall the activitiesof performing,gear into
the outerworldand can be graspedby the partnerin immediacy.
Even if performedwithoutcommunicativeintent,theseactivities
are interpretedby him as indicationsof what the otheris going
to do and therefore as suggestionsor even commandsforhis own
behavior. Any chamber musician knows how disturbingan
arrangementthat preventsthe coperformersfrom seeing each
othercan be. Moreover,all the activitiesof performingoccur
in outer time,the time which can be measuredby countingor
the metronomeor the beat of the conductor'sbaton. The coper-
formers mayhaverecourseto thesedeviceswhenforone reasonor
another the flux of inner time in which the musical content
unfoldshas been interrupted.
Such a close face-to-face relationshipcan be established in
immediacyonlyamonga small numberof coperformers.Where
a largernumberof executantsis required,one of them- a song
leader, concertmaster,or continuo player- has to assume the
leadership,that is, to establishwith each of the performersthe
contact which they are unable to find with one another in
immediacy. Or a nonexecutant,theconductor,has to assumethis
function. He does so by action in the outer world, and his
evocativegesturesinto which he translatesthe musical events
goingon in innertime,replace foreach performer the immediate
graspingof the expressiveactivitiesof all his coperformers.

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g6 SOCIAL RESEARCH
Our analysisof makingmusic togetherhas been restrictedto
what Halbwachs calls the musician's music. Yet there is in
principle no differencebetween the performanceof a modern
orchestraor chorus and people sittingaround a campfireand
singingto the strummingof a guitar or a congregationsinging
hymnsunder the leadership of the organ. And there is no
differencein principle between the performanceof a string
quartetand the improvisations at a jam sessionof accomplished
jazz players. These examples simplygive additional supportto
our thesisthatthesystemofmusicalnotationis merelya technical
device and accidentalto the social relationshipprevailingamong
the performers.This social relationshipis founded upon the
partakingin commonof different dimensionsof time simultane-
ouslylived throughby the participants. On the one hand, there
is the innertimein which the fluxof the musicaleventsunfolds,
a dimensionin whicheach performer in polytheticsteps
re-creates
themusicalthought of the (eventuallyanonymous)composerand
by which he is also connectedwith the listener. On the other,
makingmusictogetheris an eventin outertime,presupposingalso
a face-to-facerelationship,that is, a communityof space, and it
is thisdimensionwhichunifiesthe fluxesof inner time and war-
rantstheirsynchronization into a vivid present.

VI

At thebeginning of thispaper,thehope was expressed thatthe

analysisof the social relationship involved in makingmusic
together mightcontribute of thetuning-in
to a clarification rela-
tionshipand theprocessof communication as such. It appears
thatall possiblecommunication presupposes a mutual tuning-in
relationshipbetweenthecommunicator and theaddresseeof the
communication. Thisrelationshipis established bythereciprocal
sharing oftheother'sfluxofexperiences in innertime,byliving
through a vividpresenttogether,byexperiencing thistogetherness
as a "We." Onlywithinthisexperience doestheother'sconduct
becomemeaningful to the partner tuned in on him- that is,

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 MAKING MUSIC TOGETHER 97
the other'sbodyand its movementscan be and are interpretedas
a field of expressionof events within his inner life. Yet not
everything thatis interpretedby the partneras an expressionof
an eventin theother'sinnerlifeis meantby theotherto express -
-
that is, to communicateto the partner such an event. Facial
expressions, gait,posture,waysof handlingtoolsand instruments,
withoutcommunicativeintent,are examplesof such a situation.
The processof communicationproperis bound to an occurrence
in the outer world,whichhas the structureof a seriesof events
polythetically built up in outer time. This series of events is
intendedby the communicatoras a scheme of expressionopen
to adequate interpretation by the addressee. Its verypolythetic
characterwarrantsthe simultanietyof the ongoing flux of the
communicator'sexperiencesin inner time with the occurrences
in the outerworld,as well as the simultaneity of thesepolythetic
occurrencesin the outer world with the addressee'sinterpreting
experiencesin innertime. Communicatingwithone anotherpre-
supposes,therefore, the simultaneouspartakingof the partnersin
variousdimensionsof outerand inner time- in shortin growing
oldertogether.This seemsto be valid forall kindsofcommunica-
tion, the essentiallypolytheticones as well as those conveying
meaningin conceptualterms - thatis, thosein whichtheresultof
the communicativeprocesscan be graspedmonothetically.
It is hardly necessaryto point out that the remarksin the
precedingparagraphreferto communicationwithin the face-to-
face relationship. It can, however,be shown that all the other
formsofpossiblecommunicationcan be explainedas derivedfrom
thisparamountsituation. But this,as well as the elaborationof
the theoryof the tuning-inrelationship,must be reservedfor
anotheroccasion.

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