FIRST DIVISION

RE: REPORT ON THE A.M. No. P-06-2177

FINANCIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED (Formerly A.M. No. 06-4-268-RTC)
ON THE BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO, CLERK OF COURT IV,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ORAS, EASTERN SAMAR
April 19, 2007

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

In our resolution dated June 27, 2006, we found Atty. Raquel G. Kho, former clerk of court of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Oras, Eastern Samar, guilty of gross misconduct for his failure to
make a timely remittance of judiciary funds in his custody as required by OCA Circular No. 8A-
93.[1] We ordered him to pay a fine of P10,000 for his transgression. The matter did not end
there, however. Because his malfeasance prima facie contravened Canon 1, Rule 1.01[2] of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, we ordered him to show cause why he should not be
disciplined as a lawyer and as an officer of the court. Atty. Kho submitted his explanation in
compliance with our directive. We shall now resolve this pending matter and bring to a close this
regrettable chapter in his career as a government lawyer.

In his explanation, Atty. Kho admitted that his failure to make a timely remittance of the cash
deposited with him was inexcusable. He maintained, however, that he kept the money in the
courts safety vault and never once used it for his own benefit.

Atty. Khos apparent good faith and his ready admission of the infraction, although certainly
mitigating, cannot negate the fact that his failure to remit P65,000 in judiciary funds for over a
year was contrary to the mandatory provisions of OCA Circular 8A-93. That omission was a
breach of his oath to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities[3] and of his duties under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE

LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR
LEGAL PROCESSES.

RULE 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

It is no accident that these are the first edicts laid down in the Code of Professional Responsibility
for these are a lawyers foremost duties. Lawyers should always keep in mind that, although
upholding the Constitution and obeying the law is an obligation imposed on every citizen, a
lawyers responsibilities under Canon 1 mean more than just staying out of trouble with the law.
As servants of the law and officers of the court, lawyers are required to be at the forefront of
observing and maintaining the rule of law. They are expected to make themselves exemplars
worthy of emulation.[4] This, in fact, is what a lawyers obligation to promote respect for law and
legal processes entails.

The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is to refrain from engaging in unlawful
conduct.[5] By definition, any act or omission contrary to law is unlawful.[6] It does not necessarily
imply the element of criminality although it is broad enough to include it.[7] Thus, the presence of
evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential in order to bring his act or omission within the
terms of Rule 1.01 which specifically prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct.
Atty. Khos conduct was not only far from exemplary, it was unlawful as well. For this, he must be
called to account. However, his candid and repentant admission of his error, his lack of intent to
gain and the fact that this is his first offense should temper his culpability considerably. Under the
circumstances, a fine of P5,000 should suffice.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Raquel G. Kho is hereby found GUILTY of unlawful conduct in violation of
the Attorneys Oath, Section 20(a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He is ordered to pay a FINE of P5,000 within ten days from
receipt of this resolution.

The Financial Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, is hereby DIRECTED to
deduct from Atty. Khos accrued leave credits as a former clerk of court of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 5, Oras, Eastern Samar the fines imposed in this resolution and in the resolution
dated June 27, 2006. SO ORDERED.

MAGDALENA ARCIGA VS SEGUNDINO MANIWANG

106 SCRA 591 – Legal Ethics – Gross Immoral Conduct

In 1970, when Maniwang was still a law student, he had a relationship with Arciga, then a medical
technology student. They started having a sexual relationship in 1971. In 1973, Arciga got
pregnant. The two then went to Arciga’s hometown to tell the latter’s parent about the pregnancy.
They also made Arciga’s parents believe that they were already married but they would have to
have the church wedding in abeyance until Maniwang passes the bar exams. Maniwang secured
a copy of his birth certificate in preparation of securing a marriage license.
In 1975, Maniwang passed the bar. But after his oath taking, he stopped communicating with
Arciga. Arciga located his whereabouts and there she found out that Maniwang married another
woman. Arciga confronted Maniwang’s wife and this irked Maniwang so he inflicted physical
injuries upon Arciga.
Arciga then filed a disbarment case against Maniwang grounded on gross immoral conduct.
Maniwang admitted that he is the father of Arciga’s child; that he did promise to marry Arciga
many times; that he broke those promises because of Arciga’s shady past because apparently
Arciga had an illegitimate child even before her son with Maniwang was born.
ISSUE: Whether or not Maniwang should be disbarred.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Maniwang’s case is different from the cases of Mortel
vs Aspiras and Almirez vs Lopez, and other cases therein cited. Maniwang’s refusal to marry
Arciga was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment (though not much discussion
was provided by the ponente as to why). But the Supreme Court did say that it is difficult to state
with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is “grossly immoral conduct” or to
specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a
member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the
straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has
been defined as “that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community”.

REYES VS WONG
63 SCRA 667 – Legal Ethics – Grossly immoral Act
Reyes and Wong were classmates in the college of law at MLQ University in 1960. Wong and
Reyes became sweethearts. Later on, Wong requested Reyes to fill out an application for a
marriage license which the latter did. Later on still, Wong requested Reyes to sign a marriage
contract, and the marriage contract made it also appear that their solemnizing officer was a
Supreme Court justice. Apparently, Reyes believed that she’s already married to Wong by virtue
of those papers she was made to sign. So she gave in to Wong’s request to have sexual
intercourse in hotels. Reyes became pregnant twice and she gave birth to two daughters.
Eventually, Wong became a lawyer while Reyes was still in the college of law. Wong’s
engagements as a lawyer kept the couple apart. But later on, Reyes found out that Wong got
married somewhere. This also led to her discovery that her marriage with Wong was not
registered. She now comes before the Supreme Court asking for Wong’s disbarment on the
ground of grave immorality.
ISSUE: Whether or not Wong should be disbarred.
HELD: No. The acts imputed against him may constitute immorality for surely, cohabitation is
immoral for lack of marriage. But the same is not sufficient to disbar him for in order for such
result to take place, the act complained of must not merely be immoral; it must be “grossly
immoral” — “it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree”. And the same must be established by clear and convincing
proof, disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its
disciplinary power. In the case at bar, it’s highly impossible that Reyes actually believed that she’s
married to Wong. She’s a law student and as early as the first year of law studies, the essential
requisites of marriage is discussed. She could have not believed that there was a valid marriage
considering that no celebration actually took place plus other infirmities in the alleged “marriage”.
Further, the Supreme Court said:

Intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married, is neither so corrupt as to constitute
a criminal act nor so unprincipled as to warrant disbarment or disciplinary action against the man
as a member of the Bar.

NARAG VS NARAG

FACTS:

Atty. Dominador Narag was alleged to have abandoned his family for his paramour who was once
his student in tertiary level. The administrative complaint of disbarment was filed by her wife, Mrs.
Julieta Narag. Respondent filed motion to dismiss because allegedly the complainant fabricated
the story as well as the love letters while under extreme emotional confusion arising from
jealousy. The case took an unexpected turn when another complaint was filed, the wife as again
the complainant but now together with their seven children as co-signatories. After several
hearings, the facts became clear, that the respondent indeed abandoned his family as against
morals, based on testimonial evidences. In addition, the assailed relationship bore two children.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immorality and for having violated and the Code of
Ethics for Lawyers culpable for disbarment.

HELD:

YES. Respondent disbarred.

RATIO:
The complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent
breached the high and exacting moral standards set for the members of the law profession.

Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing
qualification for all members of the bar.

CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.

Undoubtedly, the canons of law practice were violated.

ADVINCULA VS MACABATA

A.C. No. 7204 March 7, 2007

CYNTHIA ADVINCULA vs. ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA
Facts: Sometime on 1st week of December 2004 complainant [Cynthia Advincula] seek the legal
advice of the respondent [Atty. Macabata], regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel and
Tours. As promised, he sent Demand Letter dated December 11, 2004 (copy attached as Annex
"I") to the concerned parties.
On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas Morato, Quezon City to discuss
the possibility of filing the complaint against Queensway Travel and Tours because they did not
settle their accounts as demanded. After the dinner, respondent sent complainant home and
while she is about to step out of the car, respondent hold (sic) her arm and kissed her on the
cheek and embraced her very tightly.
Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning, she met respondent at Starbucks
coffee shop in West Avenue, Quezon City to finalize the draft of the complaint to be filed in Court.
After the meeting, respondent offered again a ride, which he usually did every time they met.
Along the way, complainant was wandering (sic) why she felt so sleepy where in fact she just got
up from bed a few hours ago. At along Roosevelt Avenue immediately after corner of Felipe St.,
in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City when she was almost restless respondent stopped his
car and forcefully hold (sic) her face and kissed her lips while the other hand was holding her
breast. Complainant even in a state of shocked (sic) succeeded in resisting his criminal attempt
and immediately manage (sic) to go (sic) out of the car.

In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent informing him that she
decided to refer the case with another lawyer and needs (sic) to get back the case folder from
him. The communications transpired was recorded in her cellular phone and read as follows:

Sent by complainant - forget the case. I decided to refer it with other lawyer
At 5:33:46 pm
replied by respondent - "does this mean I can not c u anymore"
at 6:16:11 pm (Does this mean I cannot see you
anymore)
sent by complainant - I feel bad. I can’t expect that u will take advantage of the situation.
at 6:17:59 pm
Follow-up message - wrong to kiss a girl especially in the lips if you don’t have
Sent by complainant relationship with her.
 At 6:29:30 pm
Replied by respondent - "I’m veri sri. It’s not tking advantage of the situation, 2 put it rightly it
At 6:32:43 pm s an expression of feeling. S sri" (I’m very sorry. Its not taking
advantage of the situation, to put it rightly it is an expression of
feeling)
Follow up message - I’m s sri. Il not do it again. Wil u stil c me s I can show u my
by respondent sincerity" (I’m so sorry. I’ll not do it again. Will you still see me so I
at 6:42:25 pm can show you my sincerity)

On the following day, March 7, 2005 respondent sent another message to complainant at 3:55:32
pm saying "I don’t know wat 2 do s u may 4give me. "Im realy sri. Puede bati na tyo." (I don’t
know what to do so you may forgive me. I’m really sorry. Puede bati na tayo).
Respondent replied "talk to my lawyer in due time." Then another message was received by her
at 4:06:33 pm saying "Ano k ba. I’m really sri. Pls. Nxt ime bhave n me." (Ano ka ba. I’m really
sorry. Please next time behave na ko), which is a clear manifestation of admission of guilt.

Issue: Whether or not act done by respondents constitute gross immorality and likewise hold him
liable for disbarment.

Held: While respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not
motivated by malice. We come to this conclusion because right after the complainant expressed
her annoyance at being kissed by the respondent through a cellular phone text message,
respondent immediately extended an apology to complainant also via cellular phone text
message. The exchange of text messages between complainant and respondent bears this out.
Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were several people in the
vicinity considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If respondent
truly had malicious designs on complainant, he could have brought her to a private place or a
more remote place where he could freely accomplish the same. All told, as shown by the above
circumstances, respondent’s acts are not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible to warrant
disbarment or suspension. The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty
reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct which seriously affect the standing and character
of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss
of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which neither affect
nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are
of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer’s unfitness to continue in the
practice of law. The dubious character of the act charged as well as the motivation which induced
the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted
out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the offense
should also be considered.

Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature. It
is also imposed for some minor infraction of the lawyer’s duty to the court or the client.37 In the
Matter of Darell Adams,38 a lawyer was publicly reprimanded for grabbing a female client, kissing
her, and raising her blouse which constituted illegal conduct involving moral turpitude and
conduct which adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law. Based on the circumstances of
the case as discussed and considering that this is respondent’s first offense, reprimand would
suffice. We laud complainant’s effort to seek redress for what she honestly believed to be an
affront to her honor. Surely, it was difficult and agonizing on her part to come out in the open and
accuse her lawyer of gross immoral conduct. However, her own assessment of the incidents is
highly subjective and partial, and surely needs to be corroborated or supported by more objective
evidence.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for
alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED to be
more prudent and cautious in his dealing with his clients with a STERN WARNING that a more
severe sanction will be imposed on him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the
future. SO ORDERED.

TOLEDO VS ABALOS

MELO, J.:

This is a case of a lawyer who borrowed money without paying it back. On July 9, 1981, Atty.
Erlinda Abalos obtained a loan of P20,000.00 from Priscila Toledo, payable within six months
from date, plus interest of 5% per month. To guarantee the payment of said obligation,
respondent executed a Promissory Note (Exhibit B). After the lapse of six months, and despite
repeated demands, respondent failed to pay her obligation. Afraid that she will not recover her
money, Ms.Toledo sought the help of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which referred
the matter to the Commission on Bar Discipline.

On February 1, 1995, the Commission issued an order directing Atty. Abalos to file her Answer to
the letter-complaint of Ms. Toledo. Despite receipt of said order, respondent did not answer the
complaint.

On August 17, 1995, Investigating Commissioner Benjamin B. Bernardino, issued an order

setting the case for hearing on September 29, 1995 at 2 p.m. Despite due notice, respondent
failed to appear. Accordingly, complainant was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte after
which, the case was considered submitted for resolution. Respondent received this order as
shown by the registry return. However, she again did not do anything about it.

On June 19, 1999, the Commission passed a resolution recommending the suspension from the
practice of law of respondent for a period of six months for her flouting resistance to lawful orders
of the Court and illustrating her despiciency of her oath of office as a lawyer. The Commission,
however, declined to discipline her for failing to meet her financial obligation, the same having
been incurred in her private capacity.

We agree with the Commission that respondent may not be disciplined either by the IBP or by
this Court for failing to pay her obligation to complainant. Complainants remedy is to file a
collection case before a regular court of justice against respondent. The general rule is that a
lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction
to discipline him, for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil.
569 [1923]; Lizaso vs. Amante, 198 SCRA 1 [1991]). We, however, find the recommendation to
suspend respondent from the practice of law for six months to be grossly disproportionate to the
act complained of , i.e., her failure to appear before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP.
With her legal knowledge and expertise, respondent may have known all along that the
Commission has no jurisdiction over a complaint for collection of a sum of money which she
borrowed in her private capacity. Hence, her adamant refusal to appear before said body.

We do not, of course, ignore the fact that by virtue of ones membership in the IBP, a lawyer thus
submits himself to the disciplinary authority of the organization. However, as the complaint lodged
against the respondent in the case at hand did not pertain to an act that she committed in the
exercise of her profession, the IBP need not assume jurisdiction to discipline respondent. As the
Commission on Bar Discipline correctly suggested, complainants remedy is to file the necessary
collection case in court for her to recover the amount respondent owed her.

It was, however, still necessary for respondent to acknowledge the orders of the Commission in
deference to its authority over her as a member of the IBP. Her wanton disregard of its lawful
orders subjects her to disciplinary sanction. Thus, her suspension from the practice of law for one
month is warranted.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Erlinda Abalos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of ONE MONTH from the date of the finality of this Resolution. Copies of this
Resolution shall be furnished all courts of the land and the Office of the Bar Confidant. This
Resolution shall likewise be spread on the personal record of respondent attorney. SO
ORDERED.

LAO VS MEDEL
A.C. No. 1109. April 27, 2005

Facts: Ernesto Araneta issued two checks to Elena Moreno for his indebtedness which amounts
to P11, 000.00, the checks were dishonored. It was dishonored because the account against
which is drawn is closed. Thereafter the case was forwarded to the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. The Commission recommended the
suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months. On 15 October 2002, IBP Director for
Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez, transmitted the records of this case back to this Court
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the Rules of Court. Thereafter, the Office of the Bar
Confidant filed a Report regarding various aspects of the case. The Report further made mention
of a Resolution from this Court indefinitely suspending the respondent for having been convicted
by final judgment of estafa through falsification of a commercial document.

Issue: Whether or not Araneta should be disbarred due to the issuance of checks drawn against a
closed account.

Held: The Court held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the
issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is a manifestation of moral turpitude. In Co v.
Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we held that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer may be
sanctioned with one year’s suspension from the practice of law, or a suspension of six months
upon partial payment of the obligation. In the instant case, however, herein respondent has,
apparently been found guilty by final judgment of estafa thru falsification of a commercial
document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for which he has been indefinitely suspended.
Considering that he had previously committed a similarly fraudulent act, and that this case
likewise involves moral turpitude, we are constrained to impose a more severe penalty. In fact,
we have long held that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of a
crime involving moral turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v.
Narciso N. Jaramillo, “the review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The
judgment not only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary
to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice
it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the
administration of justice.”

ORONCE VS CA

Facts:
Private respondent Priciliano B. Gonzales Development Corporation was the registered
owner of a parcel of land at No. 52 Gilmore Street, New Manila, Quezon City.
In June 1988, it obtained a four million peso loan from the China Banking Corporation. To
guarantee payment of the loan, private respondent mortgaged the Gilmore property and all its
improvements to said bank. Due to irregular payment of amortization, interests and penalties on
the loan accumulated through the years.

On April 13, 1992, private respondent, through its president, Antonio B. Gonzales, signed
and executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage covering the Gilmore property and
its improvements, in favor of petitioners Rosita Flaminiano and Felicidad L. Oronce

The deed, states that the sale was in consideration of the sum of P5,400,000.00 and that private
respondent will deliver said property after expiration of 1 year from date of sale.
On the other hand, petitioners bound themselves to pay private respondent’s indebtedness with
China Banking Corporation. In fulfillment of the terms and conditions embodied in the Deed of
Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, petitioners paid private respondent’s indebtedness with the
bank. However, private respondent reneged on its obligation to deliver possession of the
premises to petitioners upon the expiration of the one-year period from April 13, 1992. Almost
six months later since the execution of the instrument or on October 2, 1992, petitioners caused
the registration of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage with the Register of Deeds.
Simultaneously, they obtained a new title, consistent with the fact that they are the new owners of
the property.

Sometime in July 1993, they paid the real estate taxes. On November 12, 1993, petitioners sent
private respondent a demand letter asking it to vacate the premises. Said letter, just like three
other consecutive notices sent through the Quezon City post office, was unclaimed. Hence, on
April 11, 1994, petitioners filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, a complaint for
unlawful detainer against private respondent. In its answer to the complaint, private respondent
raised the issue of ownership over the property. It impugned petitioners’ right to eject, alleging
that petitioners had no cause of action against it because it was merely a mortgagee of the
property. It argued that when the parties executed the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage, its real intention was to forge an equitable mortgage and not a sale. It pointed out
three circumstances indicative of an equitable mortgage, namely: inadequacy of the purchase
price, continued possession by private respondent of the premises, and petitioners’ retention of a
portion of the purchase price. MTC ruled in favor of petitioners Flaminiano and Oronce. On
appeal to the RTC, it affirmed the decision of MTC. On Dec q2 1995 private respondent filed with
the CA a petition for certiorari with TRO and preliminary injunction. CA ruled in favor of private
respondents and granted the TRO and Preliminary Injunction enjoining the implementation of the
writ of execution and the decision of the RTC which is the basis of this petition.
However, pending litigation in this Court, private respondent filed an urgent motion to
cite petitioner Rosita L. Flaminiano and her husband, Atty. Eduardo B. Flaminiano, in contempt
of court.

The motion was founded on an affidavit of Dr. Tadeo Gonzales who resided at the
contested property, deriving his right to do so from private respondent corporation that is owned
by his family. Gonzales alleged that on September 20, 1997, petitioner Flaminiano and her
husband entered the property through craftiness and intimidation. At around 5:30 p.m. on that
day, two (2) men knocked at the gate. When the houseboy, Luis R. Fernandez, opened the gate
for pedestrians tentatively, the two men told him that they would like to visit Gonzales’ mother
who was ailing. Once inside, the two men identified themselves as policemen and opened the
gate for twenty (20) men, two (2) trucks and an L-300 van to enter. When Gonzales went outside
the house, he saw thirty (30) to forty (40) men and two (2) trucks entering the driveway. The
person he asked regarding the presence of those people inside the property turned out to be the
brother of petitioner Flaminiano. That person said, “Kami ang may-ari dito. Matagal na kaming
nagtitiis, kayo ang dapat sa labas.” After Gonzales had told him that the property was still under
litigation before this Court, the man said, “Walang Supreme Court – Supreme Court.” When
Gonzales asked petitioner Flaminiano, who was inside the premises, to order the people to leave,
she said, “Papapasukin namin ito dahil sa amin ito. Maglalagay ako ng tao diyan sa loob, sa
harap, sa likod. Wala ng pakiusap.” When a power generator was brought inside the
property and Gonzales pleaded that it be taken out because the noise it would create would
disturb his ailing mother, Emiliana Gonzales, petitioner Flaminiano said, “Walang awa-
awa sa akin.” Atty. Flaminiano butted in and, referring to Gonzales’ mother, said, “Ialis mo
na, matanda na pala.” When Gonzales prevented the switching on of some lights in the house
due to faulty wiring, Atty. Flaminiano suggested, “Bakit hindi mo ipasunog ito? May insurance pa
kayo 5 million, madali lang ‘yan. Short circuit.” Since the Flaminianos and their crew were not
about to leave the property, Gonzales called up his brother, Atty. Antonio Gonzales, and informed
himof what happened. However, instead of confining themselves in the driveway, the
Flaminianos and their group entered the terrace, bringing in food.

Gonzales was all the while concerned about his 81-year-old mother who had just been
discharged from the hospital. However, the Flaminianos stayed until the next day, September 22,
1997, using the kitchen, furniture and other fixtures in the house. Gonzales took pictures of
Flaminiano and his companions. When Atty. Flaminiano arrived, he confronted Gonzales and
told him, “Hindi ako natatakot kahit kanino ka pa mag-report, kahit pa sa Supreme Court, gusto
ko nga mag-reklamo kayo para matapos ang kaso. Sa September 25, may shooting dito,
gagawin ko ang gusto ko dito.” Also, the Flaminianos committed additional contumacious
acts in preventing another member of the family, Mrs. Cipriana Gonzales, from entering the
property. Mrs. Gonzales said that the Flaminianos and their people used “the whole house,
except the bedrooms, for their filming activities.

Thereafter, private respondent filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with this Court to enjoin petitioners, Atty.
Flaminiano and their representatives and agents from preventing private respondent, its agents
and representatives from entering the property and to cease and desist from occupying the
property or from committing further acts of dispossession of the property. On October 13, 1997,
this Court issued the temporary restraining order prayed for. However, instead of complying with
this Court’s order, petitioners continued occupying the property. On October 16, 1997, after
receiving a copy of the TRO, petitioners put up a huge billboard in front of the property stating
that it is the national headquarters of the People’s Alliance for National Reconciliation and Unity
for Peace and Progress (PANRUPP).

In their comment on the motion for contempt, petitioners noticeably did not controvert the
facts set forth by private respondent in said motion. Instead, it reasserted its claim of ownership
over the property.

They informed the Court that they are now leasing the property to PANRUPP from October
1, 1997 to September 30, 1998. They alleged, however, that the property is in a “deplorable state
of decay and deterioration” that they saw the need “to act swiftly and decisively to prevent
further destruction” of the property where they “invested millions of pesos of their life-time
savings to acquire the same.” Hence, they sought the assistance of barangay officials in
Barangay Mariana, New Manila who helped them effect “the peaceful entry into the property of
the petitioners without the use of strategy, force and intimidation contrary to what was alleged” in
the motion for contempt. They “peacefully took over” possession of the property on September
20, 1997 but allowed the immediate members of the family of private respondent’s president to
stay on. The family finally agreed to vacate the premises on October 5, 1997 “upon the offer of
the petitioners to shoulder partially the expenses for the hospitalization of the ailing mother at the
St. Luke General Hospital where she was brought by an ambulance accompanied by a doctor” at
petitioners’ expense.

Petitioners questioned the issuance by this Court of the TRO on October 13, 1997, asserting
that when it was issued, there were “no more acts to restrain the illegal occupants of the subject
property (as they) had already peacefully vacated the premises on October 5, 1997 or more than
a week after the said TRO was issued by the Third Division” of this Court. They prayed that the
motion for contempt be denied for lack of merit and that the TRO issued be lifted and set aside.
Issue: WON the acts of Atty Flaminiano are appropriate

The issue of ownership has not been definitively resolved for the provisional determination
of that issue that should have been done by the MTC at the earliest possible time, would only be
for the purpose of determining who has the superior right to possess the property. Inasmuch as
this Court has resolved that the rightful possessor should have been private respondent and its
representatives and agents, the TRO issued by this Court on October 13, 1997 should not be
lifted. That the TRO was issued days before private respondent left the property is immaterial.
What is in question here is lawful possession of the property, not possession on the basis of self-
proclaimed ownership of the property. For their part, petitioners should cease and desist from
further exercising possession of the same property which possession, in the first place, does not
legally belong to them.

IN RE:SANTIAGO

LAUREL, J.:

This is an administrative case initiated upon complaint of the Solicitor-General against the
respondent Roque Santiago, charging the latter with malpractice and praying that disciplinary
action be taken against him.

It appears that one Ernesto Baniquit, who was living then separately from his wife Soledad
Colares for some nine consecutive years and who was bent on contracting a second marriage,
sought the legal advice of the respondent, who was at the time a practicing and notary public in
the Province of Occidental Negros. The respondent, after hearing Baniquit's side of the case,
assured the latter that he could secure a separation from his wife and marry again, and asked
him to bring his wife on the afternoon of the same day, May 29, 1939. This was done and the
respondent right then and there prepared the document Exhibit A in which it was stipulated,
among other things, that the contracting parties, who are husband and wife authorized each other
to marry again, at the same time renouncing or waiving whatever right of action one might have
against the party so marrying. After the execution and acknowledgment of Exhibit A by the
parties, the respondent asked the spouses to shake hands and assured them that they were
single and as such could contract another and subsequent marriage. Baniquit then remarked,
"Would there be no trouble?" Upon hearing it the respondent stood up and, pointing to his
diploma hanging on the wall, said: "I would tear that off if this document turns out not to be valid."
Relying on the validity of Exhibit A, Ernesto Baniquit, on June 11, 1939, contracted a second
marriage with Trinidad Aurelio. There is also evidence to show that the respondent tried to collect
for this service the sum of P50, but as the evidence on this point is not clear and the same is not
material in the resolution of the present case, we do not find it necessary to make any express
finding as to whether the full amount or any portion thereof was paid or, as contended by the
respondent, the service were rendered free of charge.

The respondent did not deny the preparation of Exhibit A, put up the defense that he had the idea
that seven years separation of husband and wife would entitle either of them to contract a second
marriage and for that reason prepared Exhibit A, but immediately after the execution of said
document he realized that he had made a mistake and for that reason immediately sent for the
contracting parties who, on June 30, 1939, came to his office and signed the deed of cancellation
Exhibit A.

There is no doubt that the contract Exhibit A executed by and between the spouses Ernesto
Baniquit and Soledad Colares upon the advice of the respondent and prepared by the latter as a
lawyer and acknowledged by him as a notary public is contrary to law, moral, and tends to
subvert the vital foundation of the family. The advice given by the respondent, the preparation
and acknowledgment by him of the contract constitute malpractice which justifies disbarment from
the practice of law. The admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is upon the implied condition
that his continued enjoyment of the privilege conferred is dependent upon his remaining a fit and
safe person to society. When it appears that he, by recklessness or sheer ignorance of the law, is
unfit or unsafe to be entrusted with the responsibilities and obligations of a lawyer, his right to
continue in the enjoyment of this professional privilege should be declared terminated. In the
present case, respondent was either ignorant of the applicable provision of the law or carelessly
negligent in giving the complainant legal advice. Drastic action should lead to his disbarment and
this is the opinion of some members of the court. The majority, however, have inclined to follow
the recommendation of the investigator, the Honorable Sotero Rodas, in view of the
circumstances stated in the report of said investigator and the fact that immediately after
discovering his mistakes, respondent endeavored to correct it by making the parties sign another
document cancelling the previous one.

The respondent Roque Santiago is found guilty of malpractice and is hereby suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one year. So ordered.
DE YASI III VS NLRC

231 SCRA 173 – Legal Ethics – Duty of a Lawyer To Encourage Settlement of Suits
Jon De Ysasi and Jon De Ysasi III are father and sons respectively. The elder Ysasi owns a
hacienda in Negros Occidental. De Ysasi III is employed in the hacienda as the farm
administrator. In November 1982, De Ysasi III underwent surgery and so he missed work. He was
confined and while he’s nursing from his infections he was terminated, without due process, by
his father. De Ysasi III filed against his father for illegal dismissal before the National Labor
Relations Commission. His father invoked that his son actually abandoned his work.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Ysasi III abandoned his work.
HELD: No. His absence from work does not constitute abandonment. To constitute
abandonment, there must be a.) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable
reason, and b.) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second
element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. No such
intent was proven in this case.
The Supreme Court, in making its decision, noted that the lawyers for both camps failed to exert
all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in
consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients especially
considering that the parties involved are father and son. This case may have never reached the
courts had there been an earnest effort by the lawyers to have both parties find an off court
settlement but records show that no such effort was made. The useful function of a lawyer is not
only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding
suit. He is often called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every
phase of life. He should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a
virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation.
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that “(a) lawyer shall
encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.”
Both counsel fell short of what was expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of
the court. In the same manner, the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has been less
than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter “shall exert all
efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction.” If he ever did
so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious records of the proceedings in this controversy
are barren of any reflection of the same.

MELENDREZ VS DECENA

Facts:
There was two charged filed against Atty. Decena. First was about a 4k loan obtained by the spo
uses secured by a real estate mortgage. However, it appeared on the real estate mortgage docu
ment that the amount loaned to complainants was P5,000.00 instead of 4k. He said that the signi
ng of the documents was just for formality. so, they did. The spouses religiously paid 10% or 500
as interest for only 3months because of financial reverses. Consequently, Atty. Decena made a s
econd real estate mortgage document and the loan extended to complainants had escalated to P
10,000.00. Again, on the assurance that it was only for formality, the spouses signed the new RE
M document.

After 3 years, they learned that their lot was already sold to someone. So they tried to raise the 1
0k and went to Atty. Decena’s house but the latter did not accept the money and instead gave the
m a sheet of paper indicating that the total indebtedness had soared to 20,400.

The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his professional capacity, that is, d
one at a time when he was counsel for the complainants in a criminal case for estafa against acc
used. It was alleged that Atty. Decena effected a compromise agreement concerning the civil liabi
lity of accused without the consent and approval of the complainants and that he received the am
ount of P500.00 as an advance payment and he did not inform the spouses about this. And even
after he was confronted, he still did not turn over the money.

Issue:

Ruling:
As to the first charge, the SC held that Atty. Decena indeed deceived the spouses.From the facts
obtaining in the case, it is clear that the complainants were induced to sign the Real Estate Mortg
age documents by the false and fraudulent representations of respondent that each of the succes
sive documents was a are formality.

While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate, respondent, being a lawyer, should
have at least explained to complainants the legal implications of the provisions of the real estate
mortgage, particularly the provision appointing him as the complainants’ attorney-in
fact in the event of default in payments on the part of complainants.

As to the second charge, repondent is presumed to be aware of Section 23 Rule 138 that lawyers
cannot “without special authority, compromise their clients’ litigation or receive anything in discha
rge of a client’s claim, but the full amount in cash.” Respondent’s failure to turn over to spouses th
e partial payment underscores his lack of honesty and candor in dealing with his clients.

The SC reiterated that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
practice of law but a continuing requirement. Atty. Decena was disbarred.

DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS VS BAYOT

A.C. No. L-1117 March 20, 1944

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant, 
 vs.
 ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT,

respondent.

OZAETA, J.:

The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an
advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:

Marriage

license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if
desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor.
Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service 
 12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105 
 Tel.

2-41-60.

Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement;
but subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the
indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the
future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he
alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had
any case at law by reason thereof.

Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of
the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25
of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is
highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares.
Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops
to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the
public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the
period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing
circular letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations
were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent.

Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the
opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.

IN RE: SYCIP

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander
Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who
died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their
firms, the names of partners who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2,
1976, both Petitions were ordered consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:

1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name
which includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly
sanctions the practice when it provides in the last paragraph that: têñ.£îhqwâ£

The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership name, or the
name of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual property of the
deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such person or partnership. 1

2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has
authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of
the name of a deceased partner; 2 the legislative authorization given to those engaged in the
practice of accountancy — a profession requiring the same degree of trust and confidence in
respect of clients as that implicit in the relationship of attorney and client — to acquire and use a
trade name, strongly indicates that there is no fundamental policy that is offended by the
continued use by a firm of professionals of a firm name which includes the name of a deceased
partner, at least where such firm name has acquired the characteristics of a "trade name." 3

3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of a
deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares that: têñ.£îhqwâ£

... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local
custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced
through this use. ... 4

4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective

deceased partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several days;
the stationeries now being used by them carry new letterheads indicating the years when their
respective deceased partners were connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading
national and international law directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners' deaths.
5

5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional
firm's name; 6 there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila
Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily Identifies the individual members
of the firm. 7

6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships has
been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of
most countries in the world. 8

The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court in 1953
when a law firm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice of including in its firm name that of
a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was resolved with this Court advising the firm to
desist from including in their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston, who has long been
dead."

The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964, entitled
Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of Perkins & Ponce
Enrile moved to intervene as amicus curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of
April 15, 1957, stated that it "would like to be informed why the name of Perkins is still being used
although Atty. E. A. Perkins is already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law firm
of Perkins and Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those now being raised
by petitioners, prayed that the continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held
proper.

On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: têñ.£îhqwâ£

After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates
for their continued use of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court found no reason to
depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and
Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist from including in their firm designation, the name of C. D.
Johnston, deceased. The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of
the relations between attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of
professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise
to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the name
"PERKINS" from their firm name.

Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the Court.

The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.

A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De
Leon, Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their partnership names of the names of
deceased partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil Code which provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not include the
name of one or more of the partners.

Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm name, shall be
subject to the liability, of a partner.

It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either be
those of living partners and. in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be
subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from including
his name in the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs of a
deceased partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm
particularly where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
"prohibits an agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a
percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from the future business of the deceased
lawyer's clients, both because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and because such
payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part of the recipient. " Accordingly,
neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death of
their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no corresponding
liability.

Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of the
names of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend
to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer
without connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able
lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by
deceased partners.

B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by petitioners, supra, the
first factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and
Winding Up." The Article primarily deals with the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved
partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person
or partnership which continues the business using the partnership name or the name of the
deceased partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-over situation
preparatory to formal reorganization.

Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather
than of a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on
the personal qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable
goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional partnership
consisting of lawyers. 9têñ.£îhqwâ£

As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding partners or
parties have the right to carry on the business under the old name, in the absence of a stipulation
forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial partnership is a partnership asset inseparable
from the good will of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, têñ.£îhqwâ£

... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends or; the individual skill of the
members, such as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good win to be distributed as a
firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill and reputation may be,
especially where there is no provision in the partnership agreement relating to good will as an
asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)

C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other
professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use of
a trade name in connection with the practice of accountancy. 10 têñ.£îhqwâ£

A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for
a particular purpose. ... It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or
business or of holding property." 11 Thus, it has been stated that "the use of a nom de plume,
assumed or trade name in law practice is improper. 12

The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable to the practice of law
from those pertaining to business is that the law is a profession.

Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the Legal Profession, (The
Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession as "a group of men pursuing a
learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public service, — no less a public service because
it may incidentally be a means of livelihood."

xxx xxx xxx

Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one may attain
the highest eminence without making much money.

2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity,

integrity, and reliability.

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to
resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing
directly with their clients. 13

"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or
franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. 15 The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal
standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and
partaking of the nature of a public trust." 16

D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar
Association" in support of their petitions.

It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a
deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is
permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use.

It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use
of a deceased or former partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under
our custom, Identify the more active and/or more senior members or partners of the law firm. A
glimpse at the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this country would show
how their firm names have evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of the
partnership changed. têñ.£îhqwâ£

The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the partners designated by it
is proper only where sustained by local custom and not where by custom this purports to Identify
the active members. ...

There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to the propriety of adding
the name of a new partner and at the same time retaining that of a deceased partner who was
never a partner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis
supplied).

The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a
deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel
might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.

E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a deceased
partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because it is sanctioned by
custom.

In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which
petitioners Salazar, et al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court sustained
the use of the firm name Alexander & Green even if none of the present ten partners of the firm
bears either name because the practice was sanctioned by custom and did not offend any
statutory provision or legislative policy and was adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court
stated therein: têñ.£îhqwâ£

The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and offends no statutory
provision or legislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of both the
American Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association provides in part as follows:
"The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner, when permissible by local
custom is not unethical, but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced
through this use." There is no question as to local custom. Many firms in the city use the names
of deceased members with the approval of other attorneys, bar associations and the courts. The
Appellate Division of the First Department has considered the matter and reached The conclusion
that such practice should not be prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice in question. The use of the
firm name herein is also sustainable by reason of agreement between the partners. 18

Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has
been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as
a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom
must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A local custom as a source of
right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by
competent evidence like any other fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of a local custom,
and of the elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something
is done as a matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of
adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social custom. The
former can supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such statute. Not so with the
latter.

Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal system. 22
When the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions directing lawyers
to desist from including the names of deceased partners in their firm designation, it laid down a
legal rule against which no custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is
not to speak of our civil law which clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death of
any partner. 23 Custom which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be
countenanced. 24

The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should
not be considered like an ordinary "money-making trade." têñ.£îhqwâ£

... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service. A trade ...
aims primarily at personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers beneficial to mankind. If,
as in the era of wide free opportunity, we think of free competitive self assertion as the highest
good, lawyer and grocer and farmer may seem to be freely competing with their fellows in their
calling in order each to acquire as much of the world's good as he may within the allowed him by
law. But the member of a profession does not regard himself as in competition with his
professional brethren. He is not bartering his services as is the artisan nor exchanging the
products of his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn. There should be no such thing
as a lawyers' or physicians' strike. The best service of the professional man is often rendered for
no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent and it is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of
his profession even if done with no expectation of reward, This spirit of public service in which the
profession of law is and ought to be exercised is a prerequisite of sound administration of justice
according to law. The other two elements of a profession, namely, organization and pursuit of a
learned art have their justification in that they secure and maintain that spirit. 25

In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must bow
to legal and ethical impediment.

ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names
"SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names may, however, be
included in the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years
during which they served as such.

SO ORDERED.

IN RE: TAGORDA

MALCOLM, J.:

The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of
Isabela, admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in
Spanish and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows:

LUIS B. TAGORDA
 Attorney
 Notary Public
 CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
 Province of
Isabela

(NOTE. — As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase of land as
required by the cadastral office; can renew lost documents of your animals; can make your
application and final requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a
lawyer, he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or
against you. Come or write to him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and
is willing to help and serve the poor.)

The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio
in his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows:

ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928

MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our induction into
office as member of the Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next month. Before my induction
into office I should be very glad to hear your suggestions or recommendations for the good of the
province in general and for your barrio in particular. You can come to my house at any time here
in Echague, to submit to me any kind of suggestion or recommendation as you may desire.

I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence here in
Echague. I will attend the session of the Board of Ilagan, but will come back home on the
following day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer and notary public. Despite
my election as member of the Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal profession as a lawyer
and notary public. In case you cannot see me at home on any week day, I assure you that you
can always find me there on every Sunday. I also inform you that I will receive any work regarding
preparations of documents of contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary
public even on Sundays.

I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the belief
that my residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be disqualified
to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the case and I would make
it clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here
in Echague.

I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your
meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with
you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in your locality have not as yet
contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their land titles, I
would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for every
registration.

Yours respectfully,

(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA
 Attorney 
 Notary Public.

The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions. Section
21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of members of
the bar. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said codal section was
amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice."

The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by
the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27
and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide:

27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. — The most worthy and effective advertisement
possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of
a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but
must be the outcome of character and conduct. The publication or circulation of ordinary simple
business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience,
is not per se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal
communications or interview not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally
unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real
estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering
retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect
advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the
manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's
position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling,
and are intolerable.

28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. — It is unprofessional for

a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood,
relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only
unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or
other causes of action and inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit, or to breed
litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds
of action in order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to
pay or reward directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his
office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or
others who may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the
criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his professional services. A duty
to the public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of
such practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the
offender may be disbarred.

Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals was a
crime at the common law, and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an
attorney was disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same evil have been provided in a
number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar itself, and have been upheld as
constitutional. The reason behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a
profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or
through others for to do so would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17
Ann. Cas., 625; People vs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)

It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by
lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that
profession. It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of
the bar. It results in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined
citizens.

The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. That

should be distinctly understood.

Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the respondent
stands convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. Accordingly,
the only remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the action which should here be taken. The
provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom joined the representative of the Attorney-General in the
oral presentation of the case, suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded. We think that
our action should go further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this character of
which unfortunately the respondent's is only one. The commission of offenses of this nature
would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating, circumstances working
in favor of the respondent there are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of
his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a
similar mistake in the future. A modest period of suspension would seem to fit the case of the
erring attorney. But it should be distinctly understood that this result is reached in view of the
considerations which have influenced the court to the relatively lenient in this particular instance
and should, therefore, not be taken as indicating that future convictions of practice of this kind will
not be dealt with by disbarment.

In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis
B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of
one month from April 1, 1929.

ULEP VS LEGAL CLINIC

23 SCRA 378 – 42 SCAD 287 – Legal Ethics – Advertisement in the Legal Profession – Practice
of Law

In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to Nogales
was to move toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the services of big
law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of the
latter’s advertisements which contain the following:

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041
8:30am – 6:00pm
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. &
Special Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption.
Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy
Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767
It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled “Rx for Legal Problems” in Star
Week of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal Clinic is composed of
specialists that can take care of a client’s problem no matter how complicated it is even if it is as
complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion situation. He said that he and his staff of
lawyers, who, like doctors, are “specialists” in various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic,
Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family
law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counselors and attorneys.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in the US
which now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that besides, the
advertisement is merely making known to the public the services that The Legal Clinic offers.
ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether such is
allowed; whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.
HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is not
allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered include
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to
complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond
the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of
law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services being offered by Legal Clinic which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. The standards of the legal
profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating
the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to promote divorce,
secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of law which their experts can
facilitate. Such is highly reprehensible.
The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best advertising
possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust,
which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a
client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention.
That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and
reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily
sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda. The Supreme Court also enumerated the following as allowed forms of
advertisement:
1. Advertisement in a reputable law list
2. Use of ordinary simple professional card
3. Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization

KHAN JR. SIMBILLO

FACTS:
An advertisement in Philippine Daily Inquirer came out which reads:
“ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE SPECIALIST 532-4333/521-2667.”
SC ordered its staff to call the number and ask some information.
Espeleta called the number and the wife of Atty. Rizalino Simbillo answered who
said that his husband was an expert in handling annulment cases and guarantees a
court decree within 4-6 month. The services of Atty. Simbillo is for P48,000. half of
which is payable at the filing of the case and the balance after the decision has been
rendered.
Similar advertisement also appeared in The Philippine Star and Manila Bulletin.
Khan, Assist. Court Administrator, filed a case against Simbillo for violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 2.03 and 3.01.
Simbillo admitted that he caused the advertisement but he argued that solicitation
and advertisement is not prohibited per se and that it is about time to change our
views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation. He also said that the
interest of the public is not served by the prohibition and suggested that the ban be
lifted.
IBP recommended that Simbillo be suspended for 1 year and that repetition of
similar act will be dealt with more severely.
While the case was being investigated upon by the court, Simbillo again advertised
his legal services, for 2 times, in the Buy & Sell Free Ads Magazine.

ISSUE:
W/N Simbillo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

HELD:
YES! Rule 2.03 provides a lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily
to solicit legal business while Rule 3.01 states that a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any
false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services. It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of
law is not a business. It is a profession in which the duty to public service, not money, is the
primary consideration. The gaining of livelihood should be a secondary consideration.

Aside from advertising himself as an “Annulment of Marriage Specialist,” his assurance of his
clients that an annulment may be obtained in 4-6 months from the filing of the case encourages
people, who might other have 2nd thought, to dissolve their marriage.

Solicitation of legal business is not proscribed. However, solicitation must be compatible with the
dignity of the legal profession. The use of simple signs stating the name/s of the lawyers, the
office and residence address and the fields of expertise, as well as advertisement in legal
periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible.

The use of calling cards is now acceptable.

PANGAN VS RAMOS
93 SCRA 87 – Legal Ethics – Lack of Candor by a Lawyer – Proper name to be used by a lawyer
In 1979, a pending administrative case filed by Santa Pangan against Atty. Dionisio Ramos was
delayed because Atty. Ramos allegedly appeared before a court in Manila. When the records of
the said case was checked (one which Atty. Ramos appeared in), it was found that he used the
name “Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos”. In his defense, Atty. Ramos said he has the right to use such
name because in his birth certificate, his name listed was Pedro Dionisio Ramos. “D.D.” stands
for Dionisio Dayaw with Dayaw being his mother’s surname. However, in the roll of attorneys, his
name listed was Dionisio D. Ramos.
ISSUE: Whether or not what Atty. Ramos did was correct.
HELD: No. The attorney’s roll or register is the official record containing the names and
signatures of those who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name
other than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law. The official oath obliges
the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no falsehood. As an officer in the temple of justice,
an attorney has irrefragable obligations of truthfulness, candor and frankness. In representing
himself to the court as “Pedro D.D. Ramos” instead of “Dionisio D. Ramos”, respondent has
violated his solemn oath and has resorted to deception. The Supreme Court hence severely
reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a similar infraction will warrant suspension or
disbarment.

DACANAY VS BAKER & MC KENZIE

AQUINO, J.:

Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought to
enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker &
McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.

In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker
& McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release
of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.

Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to
Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie
"and if not, what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office." Not having
received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.

We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines
(Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker
& McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and
associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the
Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates
of Baker & Mckenzie.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie
constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services
of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade
and investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not
authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)

WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker &
McKenzie.

SO ORDERED.

DULALIA JR VS CRUZ

JUAN DULALIA, JR. v. ATTY. PABLO C. CRUZ

(2007)

The primary duty of lawyers is to be well-informed of the existing laws, o keep abreast with legal
developments, recent enactments, and jurisprudence, and be conversant with basic legal
principles.

Susan Soriano Dulalia (Susan), wife of Juan, applied for a permit in the Municipal Government to
build a high rise building in Bulacan. The permit was not released due to the opposition of Atty.
Cruz who sent a letter to the Municipal Engineers office, claiming that the building impedes the
airspace of their property which is adjacent to the Dulalia’s property. Juan Dulalia (Juan) filed a
complaint for disbarment against Atty. Pablo Cruz (Cruz) for immoral conduct.

Juan also claimed that Cruz’s illicit relationship with a woman while still married is in violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Cruz invokes good faith, claiming to have had the
impression that the applicable provision at the time was Article 83 of the Civil Code, for while
Article 256 of the Family Code provides that the Code shall have retroactive application, there is a
qualification.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cruz violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

HELD:

Cruz’s claim that he was not aware that the Family Code already took effect on August 3, 1988 as
he was in the United States from 1986 and stayed there until he came back to the Philippines
together with his second wife on October 9, 1990 does not lie, as “ignorance of the law excuses
no one from compliance therewith.”

Immoral conduct which is proscribed under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
as opposed to grossly immoral conduct, connotes “conduct that shows indifference to the moral
norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.” Gross
immoral conduct on the other hand must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal processes. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-
informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments
and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they
faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently
their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing
mistakes.
The Court therefore concludes that Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and Canon
5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is suspended from the practice of law for one
year.

GUEVARRA VS EALA

A.C. No. 7136

August 1, 2007

Facts: On March 4, 2002 a complaint of disbarment was filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala for
grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer’s oath. In the Complaint,
Guevarra first met the respondent in January 2000 when his then fiancée Irene Moje introduced
respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne Tantoco with whom he had three
children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, Complainant noticed that from January to March
2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent Cellphone calls, as well as messages some
which read “I love you,” “I miss you,” or “Meet you at Megamall.” He also noticed that Irene
habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and
sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked her whereabouts, she replied that she
slept at her parent’s house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and Respondent together on two occasions.
On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal
house. On April 22, 2001 complainant went uninvited to Irene’s birthday celebration at which he
saw her and the respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger
and humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal
house and hauled off all her personal belongings. Complainant later found a handwritten letter
dated October 7, 2007, the day of his wedding to Irene, Complainant soon saw respondent’s car
and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B11 Street, New Manila where as he was later learn
sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that when his
friends saw Irene on about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was
pregnant.

Issue: Whether Concubinage or Adulterous relationship, be the reason for the disbarment of Atty.
Jose Emmanuel Eala.

Held: Lawyer’s oath stated that a lawyer should support the Constitution and obey the laws,
Meaning he shall not make use of deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral
conduct, or be convicted in any crime involving moral turpitude. In the case at bar Atty. Eala was
accused of Concubinage, under ART. 334 of the Revised Penal Code, “ Any husband who shall
keep a mistress in a conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous
circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place,
shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium period. Section 2 of ART.
XV states that “Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the state. Respondent’s grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the
constitution and the laws, that he as a lawyer has sworn to uphold. Hence the court declared Atty.
Jose Emmanul M. Eala DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office,
and violation of canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.