Empedoclescc

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1. Introductionc
2. Biographical Informationcc
3. Philosophical Viewscc
3.1. Empedocles as an Eleatic Philosophercc
3.2. Empedocles and the Possibility of Becomingcc
3.3. The Elements as Divine and Sentientcc
3.4. Love and Strifecc
3.5. The Cosmic Cyclecc
3.6. Reincarnationcc

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1. Introductioncc

Parmenides and his school assert that Being is one (monism) and changeless, a
position that contradicts the world of common sense. Empedocles' philosophy seems to
be an attempt to reconcile Parmenides' necessary or self-evident truths with the
testimony of the senses that Being is many (pluralism) and changing. In other words,
Empedocles is a hybrid between a rationalist and an empiricist, seeking to reconcile the
demands of reason with the testimony of his senses. Given Parmenides' adoption of a
"two-truth" theory, it is not surprising that some would seek to reconcile these "two
truths," since it is contradictory both to affirm and deny something.cc

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2. Biographical Informationcc

Empedocles was born in Akgragas, a Greek city in Sicily, sometime in the early fifth
century BCE. He played an important role in the political affairs of his city, being known
as a defender of democracy. He was also reputed to have been a religious teacher and
leader, probably being involved in some form of Pythagoreanism. Empedocles wrote
two philosophical poems entitled º

 and   
, of which several
fragments have survived. Some of the fragments are too brief to be of much use in
reconstructing his philosophical views, but there are others that are longer and quite
useful. In addition, later philosophers summarize Empedocles' view and, in some cases
(e.g., Aristotle), are critical of them. c
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3. Philosophical Viewscc

3.1. Empedocles as an Eleatic Philosopher c

Empedocles accepts Parmenides' view that ultimately there is no generation or

destruction; what is, is and cannot come into being or perish. Frs. 11, 12 says, c

Fools!²for they have no far-reaching thoughts²who deem that what before was not comes into being, or
that anything can perish and be utterly destroyed. For it cannot be that anything can arise from what in no
way is, and it is impossible and unheard of that what is should perish; for it will always be, wherever one
may keep putting it. R. P. 165 a.c
Similarly, in Fr. 8, he says, "There is no substance (phusis) of any of all the things that
perish, nor any cessation for them of baneful death." Empedocles also accepts
Parmenides belief that there can be no void or emptiness in Being, since nothing cannot
exist. In Frs. 13, 14, he says,cc
And in the All there is nothing empty and nothing too full. (13)cc

In the All there is nothing empty. Whence, then, could anything come to increase it? (14)c

There is no emptiness in the All or Being, from which it follows that there could be no
increase in the All, for increase presupposes emptiness.c(For there to be something "too
full" implies that there is "empty space," because there can be differences in the density
of the four elements only if there is empty space). It follows that if there is no empty
space there can be no increase in the four elements. Increase implies empty space into
which more of the same could be added.c

3.2. Empedocles and the Possibility of Becomingcc

Empedocles departs from Eleatic philosophy in that he asserts that Being is not one, but
many. In fact, for him, there are   basic elements, each of which is imperishable and
unchanging, from which all things are composed; he calls these "the roots of all things"
(Fr. 6), and they are identified with fire, earth, water, and air (Fr. 17; 
 , 1. 7;
987a 26-27). Aristotle explains Empedocles' view:cc

Empedocles, then, in contrast with his predecessors, was the first to introduce the dividing of this cause,
not positing one source of movement, but different and contrary sources. Again, he was the first to speak
of four material elements; yet he does not use four, but treats them as two only; he treats fire by itself,
and its opposite²earth, air, and water²as one kind of thing. We may learn this by study of his verses.
(
  1.4; 985a 29-985b 3c
As Aristotle makes clear, Empedocles identifies not one archê but four archai (although
Aristotle comments that actually these four are really two). Moreover, he was the first of
the pre-Socratics to posit that there was a plurality of archai to explain all movement or
becoming.cc
 Empedocles agrees with the Eleatic dictum that there can be no true generation and
destruction: the four elements remain what they are eternally. Nevertheless, he also
asserts that his senses do not deceive him when they tell him that there is becoming,
but this is of an non-ultimate sort. Although what is, in the ultimate sense, is
imperishable and changeless, yet these four archai intermingle with one another in
varying proportions to become all things and so cause non-ultimate or apparent change.
Empedocles says about the archai:cc

For all these are equal and alike in age, yet each has a different prerogative and its own peculiar nature,
but they gain the upper hand in turn when the time comes round. And nothing comes into being besides
these, nor do they pass away; for, if they had been passing away continually, they would not be now, and
what could increase this All and whence could it come? How, too, could it perish, since no place is empty
of these things? There are these alone; but, running through one another, they become now this, now
that and like things evermore. (Fr. 17)c
The four elements are ontologically identical, being equally original, yet each has its
particular nature; through the process of what he calls "running through one another,"
they become one thing and then another, although the elements themselves never
change. In Fr. 50, he writes, "There are these [four elements] alone; but, running
through one another, they become men and the tribes of beasts." (See also Frs. 21,
23.) Fr. 96, for example, provides a description of how bone is formed: "The kindly
earth received in its broad funnels two parts of gleaming Nestis [water] out of the eight,
and four of Hephaestus [fire]. So arose white bones divinely fitted together by the
cement of proportion" (R. P. 175).cAccording to Aristotle, Empedocles teaches that the
four elements are able to "run through one another" because the elements are filled with
pores that allow for their intermingling (K


  324b 30).c

Whether the four elements²fire, earth, water, and air²are continuous and flowing or
whether they were composed of minute, discrete particles is not clear from the extant
fragments. It is not clear, in other words, whether Empedocles adopts some form of
atomism. Aristotle, however, says that Empedocles taught that all composites are made
of small particles of the elements juxtaposed one to another (K


  334a 28-30).
Aetius likewise explains that, "Empedocles said that prior to the four elements were
minimum particles (thrausmata), homeomerous and as it were elements before the
elements" and "He constructs the elements out of smaller bodies (ogkoi), which are the
least of all and as it were elements of the elements" (Aet. 1.13 and 1.17.3). It seems
that the four elements were composed of minute, minimum particles that resembled the
four elements in every way; when enough aggregate together, then the elements
become perceptible.cc

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3.3. The Elements as Divine and Sentientcc

In Fr. 6, Empedocles identifies the four elements with four gods: "Hear first the four
roots of all things: shining Zeus, lifebringing Hera, Aidoneus and Nestis whose tear-
drops are a well-spring to mortals." With the exception of Nestis (probably
Persephone), who represents water, it is not immediately obvious to which elements
these divine beings refer. Hippolytus, however, identifies Zeus with fire, Hera with earth
and Aidoneus with air ( 7. 17). It is probable that Empedocles actually thinks that
the elements are divine, for Aristotle reports that Empedocles considers the elements to
be prior to the gods and to be gods (K


  333b 20-22). He means that the
traditional Greek gods, like everything else, are composed of the elements, and that the
elements of which they are composed are, as it were, more divine than they are, since
they have this ontological priority (see Fr. 21). Presumably the four elements are gods
because they are eternal and indestructible. As divine, the elements are also sentient,
as the gods are depicted in Greek mythology. The attribution of sentience to the four
elements explains the enigmatic sayings in which Empedocles affirms that all things
have thought:cc

Thus have all things thought by fortune's will. (Fr. 103)cc

For know that all things have wisdom and a share of thought. (Fr. 110)c

All things have thought and wisdom because the elements are sentient. Perhaps
Empedocles believes that the sentience of composite things cannot come from non-
sentient elements, since this would be a type of reductionism. Of course, the elements
are not conceived anthropomorphically, although anthropomorphic gods are said to
represent the four divine elements.cc

3.4. Love and Strifecc

Simply positing the existence of four elements composed of minimum particles does not
explain becoming; what is required is a means by which these four elements intermingle
and separate. Unlike the Milesians and others, Empedocles does not assume that the
elements are self-moving, even though they are divine and sentient. He states that
there are two "forces" at work bringing elements together and separating them again;
the former is Love whereas the latter is Strife. This aspect of Empedocles' philosophy
finds its fullest expression in Fr. 17:cc

I shall tell thee a twofold tale. At one time it grew to be one only out of many; at another, it divided up to
be many instead of one. There is a double becoming of perishable things and a double passing away.
The coming together of all things brings one generation into being and destroys it; the other grows up and
is scattered as things become divided. And these things never cease continually changing places, at one
time all uniting in one through Love, at another each borne in different directions by the repulsion of Strife.
Thus, as far as it is their nature to grow into one out of many, and to become many once more, when the
one is parted asunder, so far they come into being and their life abides not. But, inasmuch as they never
cease changing their places continually, so far they are ever immovable as they go round the circle of
existence.cc

* * * * *c
But come, hearken to my words, for it is learning that increaseth wisdom. As I said before, when I
declared the heads of my discourse, I shall tell thee a twofold tale. At one time it grew together to be one
only out of many, at another it parted asunder so as to be many instead of one;²Fire and Water and
Earth and the mighty height of Air; dread Strife, too, apart from these, of equal weight to each, and Love
in their midst, equal in length and breadth. Her do thou contemplate with thy mind, nor sit with dazed
eyes. It is she that is known as being implanted in the frame of mortals. It is she that makes them have
thoughts of love and work the works of peace. They call her by the names of joy and Aphrodite. Her has
no mortal yet marked moving round among them, but do thou attend to the undeceitful ordering of my
discourse. R. P. 166.c

The force that unites the elements to become all things is Love, also called Aphrodite;
Love brings together dissimilar elements into a unity, to become a composite thing.
Love is the same force that human beings find at work in themselves whenever they
feel joy, love and peace. Strife, on the other hand, is the force responsible for the
dissolution of the one back into its many, the four elements of which it was composed.cc

The same semi-mythopoetic portrayal of Love and Strife is found in Frs. 21, 22, 26.cc

Come now, look at the things that bear witness to my earlier discourse, if so be that there was any
shortcoming as to their form in the earlier list. Behold the sun, everywhere bright and warm, and all the
immortal things that are bathed in heat and bright radiance. Behold the rain, everywhere dark and cold;
and from the earth issue forth things close-pressed and solid. When they are in strife all these are
different in form and separated; but they come together in love, and are desired by one another.cc

For out of these have sprung all things that were and are and shall be²trees and men and women,
beasts and birds and the fishes that dwell in the waters, yea, and the gods that live long lives and are
exalted in honor.cc

For there are these alone; but, running through one another, they take different shapes²so much does
mixture change them. (Fr. 21)cc

For all of these²sun, earth, sky, and sea²are at one with all their parts that are cast far and wide from
them in mortal things. And even so all things that are more adapted for mixture are like to one another
and united in love by Aphrodite. Those things, again, that differ most in origin, mixture and the forms
imprinted on each, are most hostile, being altogether unaccustomed to unite and very sorry by the bidding
of Strife, since it hath wrought their birth. (Fr. 22)cc

At one time they are all brought together into one order by Love; at another, they are carried each in
different directions by the repulsion of Strife, till they grow once more into one and are wholly subdued.
Thus in so far as they are wont to grow into one out of many, and again divided become more than one,
so far they come into being and their life is not lasting; but insofar as they never cease changing
continually, so far are they evermore, immovable in the circle. (Fr. 26)c

Empedocles describes how, when Strife is operative, the elements become or remain
unmingled, being naturally attracted to their like: water to water, air to air etc. But when
Love is at work, the elements develop a "desire" for one another and, as a result, come
to together into unities, mortal things, which in time will disintegrate into their component
parts, the four elements, under the renewed influence of Strife. He points out that some
composites are easier to keep together than others, depending on the intensity of either
Love or Strife acting upon them. A thing can be said to be both mortal and immortal.
Considered as its four elements a thing is immortal because its elements are immortal,
but considered as a composite of the four elements it is mortal because the particular
intermingling and arrangement of the elements in relation to one another is temporary.
Simplicius summarizes Empedocles' philosophy as follows:cc
He makes the material elements four in number, fire, air, water and earth, all eternal but changing in bulk
and scarcity through mixture and separation; but his real first principles which impart motion to these are
Love and Strife. These elements are continuously subject to an alternate change, at one time mixed
together by Love, at another separated by Strife; so the first principles are, by his account, six in number."
( 25.21)c
As Simplicius explains it, there are actually six archai through which all else is to be
explained: the four elements and the two opposing forces acting upon the elements.cc

It should be noted that Love and Strife are not forces in the sense of being
incorporeal principles of change. Rather they form part of the mixture, so that there are
really six elements, four passive and two active. This is evident by the fact that
Empedocles describes the six as co-existing, "Fire and Water and Earth and the mighty
height of Air; dread Strife, too, apart from these, of equal weight to each, and Love in
their midst, equal in length and breadth." (Fr. 17). Love and Strife are as spatial and
corporeal as the four elements. Aristotle confirms this interpretation:cc

Empedocles also has a paradoxical view; for he identifies the good with love, but this is a principle both
as mover (for it brings things together) and as matter (for it is part of the mixture). Now even if it happens
that the same thing is a principle both as matter and as mover, still the being, at least, of the two is not the
same. In which respect then is love a principle? It is paradoxical also that strife should be imperishable;
the nature of his 'evil' is just strife. Metaphysic 12. 10; 1075b 2-8c
According to Aristotle, Empedocles (wrongly) understands Love to be both a moving
cause and matter, that upon which a moving cause acts; it is clear that, for
Empedocles, Love (and Strife) are another type of basic element that somehow act
upon the other four elements. He also finds it odd that there should be an eternal "evil"
element, the sole purpose of which is to dissolve composites: how can what dissolves
itself be eternal?. c
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3.5. The Cosmic Cyclecc

According to Empedocles, the cosmos is a sphere and is divine (Hippolytus,  7. 17).
It began in a state of unity in which Love has brought the four elements together into
complete homogenization; Strife was relegated to outmost boundary of the cosmic
sphere. He explains,cc

But now I shall retrace my steps over the paths of song that I have traveled before, drawing from my
saying a new saying. When Strife was fallen to the lowest depth of the vortex, and Love had reached to
the center of the whirl, in it do all things come together so as to be one only; not all at once, but coming
together at their will each from different quarters; and, as they mingled, strife began to pass out to the
furthest limit. Yet many things remained unmixed, alternating with the things that were being mixed,
namely, all that Strife not fallen yet retained; for it had not yet altogether retired perfectly from them to the
outermost boundaries of the circle. Some of it still remained within, and some had passed out from the
limbs of the All. But in proportion as it kept rushing out, a soft, immortal stream of blameless Love kept
running in, and straightway those things became mortal which had been immortal before, those things
were mixed that had before been un-mixed, each changing its path. And, as they mingled, countless
tribes of mortal creatures were scattered abroad endowed with all manner of forms, a wonder to behold.
(35, 36) R. P. 169.c
The next stage in cosmic cycle state sees Strife beginning to affect the sphere from its
banishment to outmost boundary: "But when Strife was grown great in the limbs of the
god and sprang forth to claim his prerogatives, in the fulness of the alternate time set for
them by the mighty oath,«. for all the limbs of the god in turn quaked" (Fr.
31). Simplicius interprets this statement to mean, "As Strife begins to gain once more,
motion begins again in the Sphere" ( 1184. 2). Strife disturbs the motionless unity
of the divine sphere, the complete homogenization of the four elements effected by
.Love; thereby the elements begin to move are then free to become all things by
recombining under the influence of Love. Aristotle points out therefore that, for
Empedocles, Strife is as much a cause of existence as of destruction, because without
Strife there would be only eternal, motionless homogeneity; he also points out that
Empedocles nowhere explains why this cosmic cycle is necessary beyond saying that it
is the nature of Love and Strife to do what they do (
 , 3.4; 1000a 22-1000b
22). Eventually, Strife gains full ascendancy over Love, so that the four elements are
separated from one another presumably into four motionless groups. The cycle then
begins again with a new advance of Love.cc

3.6. Reincarnationcc

In his poem   

, Empedocles states his belief in reincarnation. He writes,cc

There is an oracle of Necessity, an ancient ordinance of the gods, eternal and sealed fast by broad oaths,
that whenever one of the daemons, whose portion is length of days, has sinfully polluted his hands with
blood, or followed strife and forsworn himself, he must wander thrice ten thousand seasons from the
abodes of the blessed, being born throughout the time in all manners of mortal forms, changing one
toilsome path of life for another. For the mighty Air drives him into the Sea, and the Sea spews him forth
on the dry Earth; Earth tosses him into the beams of the blazing Sun, and he flings him back to the eddies
of Air. One takes him from the other, and all reject him. One of these I now am, an exile and a wanderer
from the gods, for that I put my trust in insensate strife. (Fr. 115)c

It seems that Empedocles believes that human beings are actually "daemons" (or
spirits) that are forced to wander from one existence to another because they have
followed "Strife" by acting violently and shedding blood. It follows that all human beings
are in a desperate situation because all are forced into a corporeal life because of the
guilt of past transgressions. Otherwise they would be residing with the immortal gods.cc