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Personal and Impersonal Obligation

How are claims about what people ought to do related to claims about what ought to be
the case? That is, how are claims about of personal obligation, of the form s ought to ,
related to claims about impersonal obligation, of the form it ought to be the case that p?
Many philosophers have held that the former type of claim can be reduced to the latter.
In particular, they have held a view known as the Meinong-Chisholm Thesis, which, on
its simplest formulation, can be stated thus:

MCT: s ought to  if and only if it ought to be the case that s s.1

This thesis, I will argue, is false, and the reason for its falsity is a general problem facing
any related attempt to reduce personal to impersonal obligation.

My argument will turn on a case involving the actions of several agents. But first it
will be useful to consider the following case involving the actions of a single agent.

Lazy Neighbor: Smith’s neighbors need Smith’s assistance, which Smith could easily
provide. His telling them that he is coming would be helpful if it is true, but it would
be harmful otherwise. Hence the best course of action available to Smith involves
going to his neighbors’ assistance and telling them he is coming; the second best
involves going to their assistance and not telling them he is coming; the third best
involves not going to their assistance and not telling them his is coming; and the
worst involves not going to their assistance and telling them his is coming. Smith,
however, is feeling lazy, and decides to stay home.

This case gives rise to what is known as Chisholm’s paradox, a set of four statements that
Chisholm formulates as follows:2

(1) It ought to be that a certain man [Smith] go to the assistance of his neighbors;

(2) It ought to be that if he does go he tell them he is coming; but

(3) If he does not go then he ought not to tell them he is coming; and
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(4) He does not go.

Chisholm claims that these four statements are jointly inconsistent with the following two
principles of deontic logic:

(A1) If it ought to be that a occur, and if it ought to be that if a occur then b occur,
then it ought to be that b occur.

(A2) It is not true to say, of any a, both that a ought to occur and that a ought not to
occur.

Chisholm explains the inconsistency thus:

By applying the first of the above principles to (1) and (2), we may deduce that the man
ought to tell his neighbors he is coming. By applying the rule of detachment to (3) and (4),
we may deduce that he ought not to tell them he is coming. But these two conclusions,
when combined, are inconsistent with the second of the two principles above.

Note that this argument assumes MCT. For what we can directly infer from (1) and (2)
by principle (A1) is not that Smith ought to tell his neighbors he is coming, but rather that
it ought to be (the case) that Smith tells his neighbors he is coming. In order to infer the
former from the latter, we need MCT, or a similar principle connecting personal and
impersonal obligation. Apart from such a principle, (1) through (4) are perfectly
consistent with (A1) and (A2).3

Rejecting MCT, however, is not one of the standard responses to Chisholm’s

paradox. Rather, the usual response has been to insist that insofar as (1) through (4) are
all true, they are true only if some of them are given non-standard readings, readings on
which they are perfectly consistent.4 The inconsistency arises only if (3) is interpreted
straightforwardly as having the following logical form:

(3′) (Smith does not go to his neighbors’ assistance) → (Smith ought not to tell
them his is coming)
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where “→” represents a relation that is at least as strong as material implication. But
there is reason to believe that if (3) is read in this way, then it is false in Lazy Neighbor.
For the following is a very plausible principle:

Principle X: For any agent, s, and any action, , such that it is up to s whether she
s, (s ought to  just in case, in every permissible alternative available to s, she s).

Since we may assume that it is up to Smith whether he tells his neighbors he is coming, it
follows from Principle X that (3′) is true just in case the following is true:

(3″) (Smith does not go to his neighbors’ assistance) → (in every permissible
alternative available to Smith, he does not to tell them he is coming)

And (3″) appears to be false in Lazy Neighbor, since it has a true antecedent and a false
consequent. The consequent is false because there is a permissible alternative available
to Smith in which he goes to his neighbors’ assistance and tells them he is coming. The
fact that Smith fails to go to their assistance simply means that he fails to take this
available alternative, not that no such alternative exists. It seems, therefore, that on the
reading of (3) required for the inconsistency, it is false in Lazy Neighbor. For the
inconsistency among propositions (1) through (4) arises only if (3) is understood to be
equivalent to (3′), and hence as implying (3″), and the latter appears to be false in this
case.

Thus, Chisholm’s paradox can resolved without rejecting MCT. But this resolution
of Chisholm’s paradox cannot be extended to the following case, which is a variant of
Lazy Neighbor involving two agents:

Hostage: Smith’s neighbors are being held hostage along with their three children,
and the hostage-takers are threatening to kill the children. Supposing Smith goes to
their assistance, if the neighbors attempt an escape they will be successful and all
their children will be saved, whereas if they do not attempt an escape, Smith will be
able to save two of their children on his own, but one of their children will be killed.
But supposing Smith does not go to their assistance, if they attempt an escape they
will be unsuccessful and all their children will be killed, whereas if they do not
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attempt an escape, two of their children will be killed. However, though Smith could
safely and easily go to his neighbors’ assistance, he is so lazy that he would not do so
under any circumstance.

In Hostage, it appears that the following four statements are all true:

(1) It ought to be the case that Smith goes to his neighbors’ assistance;

(2*) It ought to be the case that if Smith goes to his neighbors’ assistance, then they
attempt an escape;

(3*) If Smith does not go to his neighbors’ assistance, and if nothing they can do
would change this fact, then they ought not to attempt an escape;

(4*) Smith does not go to his neighbors’ assistance, and nothing they can do would
change this fact.

The set consisting in these four statements, axioms (A1) and (A2), and MCT, is jointly
inconsistent. And so it seems that unless we want to reject one of the standard axioms of
deontic logic, we must reject MCT.

The defender of MCT might respond that MCT is not the real source of the problem
raised by Hostage, since this case gives rise to a related paradox that does not assume
MCT. To formulate this paradox, we must simply replace (3*) with

(3**) If Smith does not go to his neighbors’ assistance, and if nothing they can do
would change this fact, then it ought not to be the case that they attempt an
escape.

But the resulting paradox has no force, since there is every reason to deny that (3**) is
true in Hostage. For, according to standard deontic logic, the consequent of (3**) implies
that it ought not to be the case that (Smith goes to his neighbors’ assistance and they
attempt an escape). Since this implication is false, the consequent of (3**) is false. And
since its antecedent is true, (3**) is false. Thus, the ‘paradox’ that does not require MCT
can be easily resolved by rejecting (3**).
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By contrast, my original formulation of the paradox, as involving (3*) rather than

(3**), cannot be so easily resolved. For there is strong reason to believe that (3*) is true
in Hostage, even on the reading that gives rise to the inconsistency, namely

(3*′) (Smith does not go to his neighbors’ assistance and nothing they can do
would change this fact) → (the neighbors ought not to attempt an escape)

Clearly, the antecedent of (3*′) is true in Hostage. And so Smith’s neighbors are in a
situation in which the only way they can save any of their children is to refrain from
attempting an escape. They should therefore refrain, and so the consequent of (3*′) is
true. Hence, (3*′) is true. Indeed, this conclusion can be derived from Principle X. For
since there is nothing the neighbors can do to procure Smith’s assistance, and since we
may plausibly assume that the neighbors should not act in a way that would result in all
their children being killed, it follows that the only permissible alternatives available to the
neighbors involve not attempting an escape. Therefore, by Principle X, they should not
attempt an escape. Hence, while Principle X implies that (3′) is false in Lazy Neighbor, it
implies that (3*′) is true in Hostage.

And so it appears that (3*) is true in Hostage, even on its problematic reading. And
(1) and (4*) are clearly true. And so it seems the defender of MCT must deny that (2*) is
true in Hostage. But this position is hard to defend. For in Hostage, necessarily, if Smith
goes to his neighbors’ assistance and they do not attempt an escape, then Smith’s
neighbors fail to save a child they are able to save, and so they fail to act as they ought to
act. Therefore, in Hostage, necessarily, if everyone acts as they ought to act, then (if
Smith goes to his neighbors’ assistance, then they attempt an escape). But it would seem
that, for any proposition, p, if, necessarily, (if everyone acts as they ought to act then p),
then it ought to be the case that p. Indeed, this rule follows from these two principles:

Principle Y: It ought to be the case that everyone acts as they ought to act.

Principle Z: For any propositions, p and q, if it ought to be the case that p, and if
(necessarily, p implies q), then it ought to be the case that q.
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Therefore, since, necessarily, if everyone acts as they ought to act then (if Smith goes to
his neighbors’ assistance then they attempt an escape), we may conclude that the latter
conditional ought to obtain, and hence that (2*) is true.

A final option open to the defender of MCT is to claim while there is a way of
understanding Hostage in which (2*) is true, and another way of understanding Hostage
in which (3*) is true on its problematic reading, there is no way of understanding
Hostage in which both are true. She could argue for this claim as follows:

Suppose Smith’s neighbors have sufficient evidence to believe that Smith goes to
their assistance. In this case, they ought to attempt an escape, regardless of whether
Smith in fact goes to their assistance. Hence (3*) is false. Suppose, on the other
hand, that they do not have sufficient evidence to believe that Smith goes to their
assistance. In this case, they ought not to attempt an escape, regardless of whether
Smith in fact goes to their assistance. Hence, on the supposition that the neighbors
lack sufficient evidence to believe that Smith goes to their assistance, it would be
perfectly permissible for Smith to go to their assistance and for the neighbors not to
attempt an escape. And so on this supposition, (2*) is false. Therefore, on either
supposition, (3*) and (2*) are not both true.

This response assumes that what the neighbors ought to do does not depend on what
Smith in fact does, but rather on their epistemic situation. But there is an important sense
of ‘ought’ on which this assumption is false. In what we may call the objective sense of
‘ought,’ what an agent ought to do depends on all those factors outside of her control that
have a bearing on how good or choiceworthy her various options would be. And these
factors can include the actions of other agents. Hence, when ‘ought’ is understood in this
objective sense, how the neighbors ought to act in a situation in which Smith fails to
come to their assistance can differ from how they ought to act in a situation in which
Smith comes to their assistance. More generally, how an agent ought to act in the actual
world can differ from how she ought to act in a situation in which all other agents act as
they ought. Hence, how an agent ought to act can differ from how this agent would act if
everything were as it ought to be. And this means that how an agent ought to act can
differ from how it ought to be the case that she acts. Thus, when ‘ought’ is understood in
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the objective sense, MCT is false.

The basic problem we have encountered with MCT is this: when we ask what an
agent ought to do, we hold fixed everything outside this agent’s control, including the
present actions of other agents, and we ask which of the courses of action available to her
would be best given these circumstances. But when we ask what ought to be the case, we
do not hold fixed the present actions of any agents. It seems, therefore, that in order to
reduce personal obligation to impersonal obligation, we would need to employ a form of
impersonal obligation in which everything outside a given agent’s control is regarded as
fixed. More precisely, we would need to understand claims about what an agent ought to
do in terms of claims about what it ought to be the case that she does conditional on all
the facts that are outside her control. That is, we would need to reduce claims about
unconditional personal obligation to claims about conditional impersonal obligation.
Consequently, if it is the case, as is widely believed,5 that conditional impersonal
obligation cannot be reduced to unconditional impersonal obligation, then we should not
expect unconditional personal obligation to be reducible to unconditional impersonal
obligation. Thus, we should not expect other attempts at such a reduction to be any more
successful than MCT.6

Acknowledgements: Omitted for blind review.

References

Aqvist, L. (2002). Deontic logic. (In D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (Eds.), Handbook of
philosophical logic, 2nd edition, vol. 8 (pp. 147-264). Dordrecht: Kluwer.)

Chisholm, R. (1963). Contrary-to-duty imperatives and deontic logic. Analysis, 24, 33-36

Chisholm, R. (1964). The ethics of requirement. American Philosophical Quarterly, 1,

147-153

Hilpinen, R. (2001). Deontic logic. (In L. Goble (Ed.), Blackwell guide to philosophical
logic (pp. 159-182). Oxford: Blackwell.)

Horty, J. (2001). Agency and deontic logic. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
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Meinong, A. (1917/1972). On emotional presentation, tr. M. L. S. Kalsi. (Evanston:

Northwestern University Press).

von Wright, G. H. (1971). A new system of deontic logic. (In R. Hilpinen (Ed.) Deontic
logic: Introductory and systematic readings (pp. 105-120). Dortrecht: Reidel.)

Williams, B. (1981). Ought and moral obligation. (In B. Williams, Moral luck (pp. 114-
123). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.)
1
Alexius Meinong presents one version of this thesis in [Meinong, 1917/1972] pp. 37, 141. Roderick Chisholm presents
another version in [Chisholm, 1964] p. 149. Bernard Williams gives a defense of this thesis in [Williams, 1981]. For an
important discussion of this thesis, see [Horty, 2001], pp. 44-58.
2
See [Chisholm, 1963] pp. 34-35.
3
There is also a second point at which this argument assumes MCT. For apart from MCT, the conclusion that (Smith ought
to tell his neighbors he is coming and he ought not to tell his neighbors he is coming) does not conflict with (A2), since this
conclusion concerns personal obligation while (A2) concerns impersonal obligation.
4
For a classic expression of the latter approach to the paradox, see [von Wright, 1971].
5
See, for example, [Aqvist, 2002] p. 135, and [Hilpinen, 2001] p. 169.
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