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Effect and Application of Laws

1.PASEI vs. Torres FACTS: Petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order was filed by the Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI, for
short), to prohibit and enjoin the Secretary of DOLE and the Administrator of POEA from enforcing and implementing DOLE Department
Order No. 16, Series of 1991 and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment
by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong and vesting in the DOLE, through the facilities of the POEA,
the task of processing and deploying such workers. This as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino
housemaids employed in Hong Kong

ISSUE: WON the issuance of administrative circulars complied with requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National
Administrative Register

RULING: Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the
National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter
2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided. . . . (Civil Code.)

Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. — The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with the
administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules
and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their
adoption in newspapers of general circulation. (Emphasis supplied, Labor Code, as amended.)

Sec. 3.Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified
copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within
three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Emphasis supplied,
Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)

Sec. 4.Effectivity. — In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book,
each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is
fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence
of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to
make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of
the Administrative Code of 1987).

Once, more we advert to our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 that:

. . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (p. 447.)

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties. (p. 448.)

We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the laws. (p. 448.)
2. Rep. vs.
Extelcom

3. Rep vs. Pilipinas


Shell

4. SEC vs. GMA

Vested Rigts; Substantive & Procedural laws; Retroactive Application


5. Duenas vs. FACTS: Petitioner Gloria Santos Dueñas is the daughter of the late Cecilio J. Santos who, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land
Santos with a total area of 2.2 hectares located at Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. In 1966, Cecilio had the realty subdivided into smaller lots, the
whole forming the Santos Subdivision.

The then Land Registration Commission (LRC) approved the project and the National Housing Authority (NHA) issued the required
Certificate of Registration and License to Sell. At the time of Cecilio’s death in 1988, there were already several residents and
homeowners in Santos Subdivision.

Sometime in 1997, the members of the SSHA submitted to the petitioner a resolution asking her to provide within the subdivision an
open space for recreational and other community activities, in accordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 957,6 as amended by P.D. No.
1216.7 Petitioner, however, rejected the request, thus, prompting the members of SSHA to seek redress from the NHA.

ISSUE: WON P.D. No. 957 should apply retroactively to Santos Subdivision, notwithstanding that the subdivision plans were approved in
1966

RULING: NO

Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon is inapplicable. It is not on all fours with the instant case. The issue in Eugenio was the applicability of P.D.
No. 957 to purchase agreements on lots entered into prior to its enactment where there was non-payment of amortizations, and failure to
develop the subdivision. We held therein that although P.D. No. 957 does not provide for any retroactive application, nonetheless, the
intent of the law of protecting the helpless citizens from the manipulations and machinations of unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers justify its retroactive application to contracts entered into prior to its enactment. Hence, we ruled that the non-
payment of amortizations was justified under Section 23 of the said decree in view of the failure of the subdivision owner to develop the
subdivision project.

Unlike Eugenio, non-development of the subdivision is not present in this case, nor any allegation of non-payment of amortizations.
Further, we have held in a subsequent case30 that P.D. No. 957, as amended, cannot be applied retroactively in view of the absence of
any express provision on its retroactive application. Thus:

…Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. Thus, it is
necessary that an express provision for its retroactive application must be made in the law. There being no such provision in
both P.D. Nos. 957 and 1344, these decrees cannot be applied to a situation that occurred years before their promulgation….

At any rate, our principal concern in this case is Section 31 of P.D. No. 957, an amendment introduced by P.D. No. 1216.
Properly, the question should focus on the retroactivity of P.D. No. 1216 and not P.D. No. 957 per se.

We have examined the text of P.D. No. 1216 and nowhere do we find any clause or provision expressly providing for its retroactive
application. Basic is the rule that no statute, decree, ordinance, rule or regulation shall be given retrospective effect unless explicitly
stated.31 Hence, there is no legal basis to hold that P.D. No. 1216 should apply retroactively.
6. Bernabe vs.
Alejo FACTS: The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo.
The son was born on September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his
wife Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.

On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged
illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he (Adrian) be given his share in Fiscal Bernabe’s estate, which is now being held
by Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.

ISSUE: WON Adrian’s right to an action for recognition, which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had already vested
prior to the enactment of the Family Code And thus, the applicable provisions of the FC cannot be given retroactive effect.

RULING:

A vested right is defined as “one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and
which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency x xx.”i[11]Respondent however contends that the filing of
an action for recognition is procedural in nature and that “as a general rule, no vested right may attach to [or] arise from procedural
laws.”ii[12]

Bustos v. Luceroiii[13]distinguished substantive from procedural law in these words:

“x xx. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous.
Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of
normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the
rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as
opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their
invasion.”iv[14](Citations omitted)

Recently, in Fabian v. Desierto,v[15]the Court laid down the test for determining whether a rule is procedural or substantive:

“[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts,
abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a
right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing
an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.”vi[16]

Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to
file his petition for recognition within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s
right to file an action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.

ADDITIONAL INFO:
Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing an action for recognition, because Article 285 of the Civil Code has been
supplanted by the provisions of the Family Code. She argues that the latter Code should be given retroactive effect, since no
vested right would be impaired. We do not agree.

Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for filing an action for recognition as follows:

“ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed
parents, except in the following cases:

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the
action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;

(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been
heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.

“In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document.”

The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have however been omitted by Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family
Code, which we quote:

“ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.

“In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.”

“ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to
the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five
years within which to institute the action.

“The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.”

“ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as
legitimate children.

“The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.”

Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The
Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the
new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that “illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without
the legitimate family being aware of their existence. x xx The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the
child’s filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead.”vii[10]

Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already vested prior to its enactment should not be prejudiced or
impaired as follows:

“ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”

7. Rep vs. Miller FACTS: On July 29, 1988, the spouses Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller (both American citizen, husband and wife), filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City, a verified petition to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag. On May 12, 1989, the trial
court rendered decision granting the petition for adoption. In due time, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic, interposed an
appeal to the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:WON the court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino child despite the prohibition under the Family Code, viii[4]effective on August 3,
1988ix[5]when the petition for adoption was filed on July 29, 1988, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code x[6]which
allowed aliens to adopt.

RULING: The enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of respondents who are aliens to adopt a
Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then
in force. "A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. The
term expresses the concept of present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State
action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights,
cannot deny."xi[8]"Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new
obligations created after the right has vested."xii[9]

8. Atienza vs. FACTS: Complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr.,
Brillantes Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.

Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati. He stays in
said house, which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila. In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw
respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting with De
Castro.

Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as appearing in his 1986 and
1991 sworn SALN.

For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro. Respondent also denies having been married to
Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony
before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request
of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party
applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single
parent.

Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good
faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.

ISSUE: WON the provision in the FC that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto
can enter into a second marriage is applicable to respondent.

RULING: Yes.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first marriage took place
in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the
Family Code.

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the
first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of
procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
Article 8: Stare Decisis.
9.Ting vs. Velez- FACTS: On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years
Ting old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36
of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their
marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter. Carmen’s allegations of Benjamin’s psychological incapacity consisted of
the following manifestations:
1. Benjamin’s alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamin’s violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family car twice and the property
he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamin’s irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular financial support to his family.24

Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oñate, a psychiatrist.31 Instead of the usual personal interview, however, Dr.
Oñate’s evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of stenographic notes taken during Benjamin’s deposition because the latter
had already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa. After reading the transcript of stenographic notes, Dr.
Oñate concluded that Benjamin’s compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical abuse of respondent are clear indications that
petitioner suffers from a personality disorder.32

To refute Dr. Oñate’s opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist and a consultant at the Department of Psychiatry in
Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, as his expert witness.33 Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamin’s psychological behavior based on
the transcript of stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a psychiatrist from the
University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his (Dr. Obra’s) interview with Benjamin’s brothers. 34 Contrary to Dr. Oñate’s findings, Dr. Obra
observed that there is nothing wrong with petitioner’s personality, considering the latter’s good relationship with his fellow doctors and his
good track record as anesthesiologist.35

RTC- favored Carmen. petitioner appealed to the CA. CA rendered a Decision38 reversing the trial court’s ruling. It faulted the trial court’s
finding, stating that no proof was adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time he
married Carmen since Dr. Oñate’s conclusion was based only on theories and not on established fact,39 contrary to the guidelines set
forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals40 and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina.41

Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case since the Molina decision
was promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or more than five years after she had filed her petition with the RTC. 42 She claimed that the
Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle of stare decisis

ISSUE: WON the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina
cases

RULING: Respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for
being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v.
Pesca,54 and again in Antonio v. Reyes.55 In these cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts
constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different
view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and
have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lexprospicit, non respicit."

ADDITIONAL INFO: The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its
final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and
closed to further argument.49 Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues,50 necessary for two simple reasons:
economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code. 51

This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English courts and was later adopted by the United States.
Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno’s discussion on the historical development of this legal principle in his dissenting
opinion in Lambino v. Commission on Elections52 is enlightening:

The latin phrase stare decisis et non quietamovere means "stand by the thing and do not disturb the calm." The doctrine started with the
English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, "it is an established rule to abide by former precedents
where the same points come again in litigation." As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not be
followed if it were "plainly unreasonable"; (2) where courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of
the decision was the "actual principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision."

The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S. Constitution. According to Hamilton, "strict rules
and precedents" are necessary to prevent "arbitrary discretion in the courts." Madison agreed but stressed that "x xx once the precedent
ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected." Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison
"disagree about the countervailing policy considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent." He added that their ideas
"reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is
this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries."

Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation although stare decisis developed its own life in the
United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the
duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare
decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been
viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed, stare
decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.

It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis — constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis.
Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of
statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice
Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated:
"Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or
departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question once decided." In
the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: "the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not
what we have said about it." In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice
Stevens explains: "after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges
and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself." This stance
reflects both respect for Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts' limited resources.

In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes
judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its
application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and political
understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can
dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.

In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The
most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal doctrine." Plessy
upheld as constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on public transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court,
unanimously held that "separate . . . is inherently unequal." Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme
Court freed the colored Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has likewise refused to be
straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we
reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we
overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are agreed on the factors that should be considered
before overturning prior rulings. These are workability, reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition,
courts put in the balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.

The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v.
Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying
practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences
of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have
the old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen
differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification. 53
Human Relations: Abuse of Rights, Unjust Enrichment; Malicious Prosecution; Art. 2176 NCC
10. Chieng vs. Sy FACTS: Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC, Branch 7, Manila against respondent spouses William and
Tessie Sy (Criminal Case No. 98-969952 against Tessie Sy and Criminal Case No. 98-969953 against William Sy) for issuing to her
Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) Check Nos. 171762 and 71860 for P300,000.00 each, in payment of their loan, both of which were
dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn against a closed account.

Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner, on January 20, 1999, filed against respondents two (2) cases for violation of Batas
PambansaBilang (BP Blg.) 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 25, Manila (Criminal Case Nos. 341458-59).

RTC, Branch 7, Manila dismissed the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. The Order
dismissing Criminal Case No. 98-969952 contained no declaration as to the civil liability of Tessie Sy. xiii[3] On the other hand, the Order
in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 contained a statement, “Hence, if there is any liability of the accused, the same is purely ‘civil,’ not
criminal in nature.”xiv[4]
Later, the MeTC, Branch 25, Manila, dismissed, on demurrer, the BP Blg. 22 cases in its Order xv[5] dated February 7, 2005 on account of
the failure of petitioner to identify the accused respondents in open court. The Order also did not make any pronouncement as to the
civil liability of accused respondents.

On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against respondents before the RTC, Branch 18, Manila, a complaintxvi[6] for collection of a sum of
money with damages (Civil Case No. 05-112452) based on the same loaned amount of P600,000.00 covered by the two PBC checks
previously subject of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases.

ISSUE: WON may petitioner’s action to recover respondents’ civil liability be also allowed to prosper separately after the BP Blg. 22
cases were dismissed?

RULING: The criminal action for violation of BP Blg. 22 includes the corresponding civil action to recover the amount of the checks. It
should be stressed, this policy is intended to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the
reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The
only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules
encourages the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. Thus, where petitioner’s rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings
before the court trying the BP Blg. 22 cases, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted on account of res
judicata, for failure of petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the cases. In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of BP
Blg. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code is not applicable.xvii[19]
xxx

Moreover, we take into consideration the trial court’s observation when it dismissed the estafa charge in Criminal Case No. 98-
969953 that if there was any liability on the part of respondents, it was civil in nature. Hence, if the loan be proven true, the inability of
petitioner to recover the loaned amount would be tantamount to unjust enrichment of respondents, as they may now conveniently evade
payment of their obligation merely on account of a technicality applied against petitioner.

There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with
damages to another. This doctrine simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at another’s
expense. One condition for invoking this principle of unjust enrichment is that the aggrieved party has no other recourse based on
contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision of law. xviii[26]

Court litigations are primarily designed to search for the truth, and a liberal interpretation and application of the rules which will
give the parties the fullest opportunity to adduce proof is the best way to ferret out the truth. The dispensation of justice and vindication
of legitimate grievances should not be barred by technicalities.xix[27] For reasons of substantial justice and equity, as the complement of
the legal jurisdiction that seeks to dispense justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt
their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so,xx[28] we thus rule, pro hac vice, in favor of petitioner.
11. ASJ FACTS: Respondents, (R.M. Sy Chicks), are engaged in the large-scale business of buying broiler eggs, hatching them, and selling their
Corporation vs. hatchlings (chicks) and egg by-products[4]. For the incubation and hatching of these eggs, respondents availed of the hatchery services
Evangelista of ASJ Corp., a corporation duly registered in the name of San Juan and his family. delivered to petitioners various quantities of eggs at
an agreed service fee of 80 centavos per egg, whether successfully hatched or not. Each delivery was reflected in a “Setting Report”

February 3, 1993 - respondent Efren went to the hatchery to pick up the chicks and by-products covered by Setting Report No. 108, but
San Juan refused to release the same due to respondents’ failure to settle accrued service fees on several setting reports starting from
Setting Report No. 90. Nevertheless, San Juan accepted from Efren 10,245 eggs covered by Setting Report No. 113 and P15,000.00 [8]
in cash as partial payment for the accrued service fees.

February 10, 1993 - Efren returned to the hatchery to pick up the chicks and by-products covered by Setting Report No. 109, but San
Juan again refused to release the same unless respondents fully settle their accounts. In the afternoon of the same day, respondent
Maura, with her son Anselmo, tendered P15,000.00[9] to San Juan, and tried to claim the chicks and by-products. She explained that she
was unable to pay their balance because she was hospitalized for an undisclosed ailment. San Juan accepted the P15,000.00, but
insisted on the full settlement of respondents’ accounts before releasing the chicks and by-products. Believing firmly that the total value
of the eggs delivered was more than sufficient to cover the outstanding balance, Maura promised to settle their accounts only upon
proper accounting by San Juan. San Juan disliked the idea and threatened to impound their vehicle and detain them at the hatchery
compound if they should come back unprepared to fully settle their accounts with him.

February 11, 1993 - respondents directed their errand boy, Allan Blanco, to pick up the chicks and by-products covered by Setting
Report No. 110 and also to ascertain if San Juan was still willing to settle amicably their differences. Unfortunately, San Juan was firm in
his refusal and reiterated his threats on respondents. Fearing San Juan’s threats, respondents never went back to the hatchery

ISSUE: WON petitioners’ retention was justified and did not constitute an abuse of rights since it was respondents who failed to comply
with their obligation

RULING: To begin with, petitioners’ obligation to deliver the chicks and by-products corresponds to three dates: the date of hatching, the
delivery/pick-up date and the date of respondents’ payment. On several setting reports, respondents made delays on their payments, but
petitioners tolerated such delay. When respondents’ accounts accumulated because of their successive failure to pay on several setting
reports, petitioners opted to demand the full settlement of respondents’ accounts as a condition precedent to the delivery. However,
respondents were unable to fully settle their accounts.

Respondents’ offer to partially satisfy their accounts is not enough to extinguish their obligation. Under Article 1248[27] of the Civil Code,
the creditor cannot be compelled to accept partial payments from the debtor, unless there is an express stipulation to that effect. More
so, respondents cannot substitute or apply as their payment the value of the chicks and by-products they expect to derive because it is
necessary that all the debts be for the same kind, generally of a monetary character. Needless to say, there was no valid application of
payment in this case.

Furthermore, it was respondents who violated the very essence of reciprocity in contracts, consequently giving rise to petitioners’ right of
retention. This case is clearly one among the species of non-performance of a reciprocal obligation. Reciprocal obligations are those
which arise from the same cause, wherein each party is a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the performance of one is
conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the other.[28] From the moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation, delay by the other
party begins.[29]

Since respondents are guilty of delay in the performance of their obligations, they are liable to pay petitioners actual damages of
P183,416.80, computed as follows: From respondents’ outstanding balance of P102,336.80, as of Setting Report No. 107, we add the
corresponding services fees of P81,080.00[30] for Setting Report Nos. 108 to 113 which had remain unpaid.

Nonetheless, San Juan’s subsequent acts of threatening respondents should not remain among those treated with impunity. Under
Article 19[31] of the Civil Code, an act constitutes an abuse of right if the following elements are present: (a) the existence of a legal right
or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. [32] Here, while petitioners had the
right to withhold delivery, the high-handed and oppressive acts of petitioners, as aptly found by the two courts below, had no legal leg to
stand on. We need not weigh the corresponding pieces of evidence all over again because factual findings of the trial court, when
adopted and confirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive and will not be disturbed on appeal. [33]

12. UP vs. Philab FACTS: Sometime in 1979, the University of the Philippines (UP) decided to construct a Research Complex. As part of the project,
laboratory equipment and furniture were purchased for the National Institute of Biotechnology and Applied Microbiology (BIOTECH) at
the UP Los Baños. Providentially, the Ferdinand E. Marcos Foundation (FEMF) came forward and agreed to fund the acquisition of the
laboratory furniture, including the fabrication thereof and PHILAB has been arranged to do this.

Notwithstanding that contract executed between PHILAB and FEMF, PHILAB made partial deliveries of office and laboratory furniture to
BIOTECH after having been duly inspected by their representatives and FEMF. However, FEMF failed to pay its obligation to PHILAB.
PHILAB filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against UP.

ISSUE: WON petitioner is liable for the claim of the respondent based on the maxim that no one should enrich itself at the expense of
another.

RULING: Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or obligations of others, but instead it
must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully. 39

Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must unequivocally prove that another party knowingly received
something of value to which he was not entitled and that the state of affairs are such that it would be unjust for the person to keep the
benefit.40 Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration of or for property or benefits received
under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable obligation to account for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one must confer
benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or request.41 Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the
enforcement of the doctrine of restitution.42

Article 22 of the New Civil Code reads:

Every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
(Boldface supplied)

In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be present: (1) that the defendant has been enriched, (2) that
the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no
other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.43

An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action, available only when there is no other remedy on contract, quasi-
contract, crime, and quasi-delict. If there is an obtainable action under any other institution of positive law, that action must be resorted
to, and the principle of accion in rem verso will not lie.44

The essential requisites for the application of Article 22 of the New Civil Code do not obtain in this case. The respondent had a remedy
against the FEMF via an action based on an implied-in-fact contract with the FEMF for the payment of its claim. The petitioner legally
acquired the laboratory furniture under the MOA with FEMF; hence, it is entitled to keep the laboratory furniture.

ADDITIONAL INFO: , an implied-in-fact contract of sale was entered into between the respondent and FEMF. A contract implied in fact is
one implied from facts and circumstances showing a mutual intention to contract. It arises where the intention of the parties is not
expressed, but an agreement in fact creating an obligation. It is a contract, the existence and terms of which are manifested by conduct
and not by direct or explicit words between parties but is to be deduced from conduct of the parties, language used, or things done by
them, or other pertinent circumstances attending the transaction. To create contracts implied in fact, circumstances must warrant
inference that one expected compensation and the other to pay.32 An implied-in-fact contract requires the parties’ intent to enter into a
contract; it is a true contract.33 The conduct of the parties is to be viewed as a reasonable man would view it, to determine the existence
or not of an implied-in-fact contract.34 The totality of the acts/conducts of the parties must be considered to determine their intention. An
implied-in-fact contract will not arise unless the meeting of minds is indicated by some intelligent conduct, act or sign.
13. Shinriyo vs. FACTS: Parties executed a “Supply of Manpower, Tools/Equipment, Consumables for the Electrical Works-Power and
RRN Equipment Supply, Bus Duct Installation” for the Phillip Morris Greenfield Project (hereafter Project). The parties also agreed
that respondent will perform variation orders in the Project. In connection with the Project, petitioner supplied manpower
chargeable against respondent.

Respondent was not able to finish the entire works with petitioner due to financial difficulties. Parties had disputes on material back
charges, specifically on the use of manlift equipment.

ISSUE: WON petitioner is it is entitled to payment for respondent's use of its manlift equipment, and even absent proof of the supposed
agreement on the charges petitioner may impose on respondent for the use of said equipment, respondent should be made to pay
based on the principle of unjust enrichment

RULING:
Petitioner's reliance on the principle of unjust enrichment is likewise misplaced. The ruling of the Court in University of the
Philippines v. Philab Industries, Inc.xxi[8] is highly instructive, thus:

Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or obligations of
others, but instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense that the term unjustly could
mean illegally or unlawfully.

Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must unequivocally prove that
another party knowingly received something of value to which he was not entitled and that the state of affairs are
such that it would be unjust for the person to keep the benefit. Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or
effect of failure to make remuneration of or for property or benefits received under circumstances that give rise to
legal or equitable obligation to account for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one must confer benefit by mistake,
fraud, coercion, or request. Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the
enforcement of the doctrine of restitution.

Article 22 of the New Civil Code reads:

Every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or
legal ground, shall return the same to him.

In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be present: (1) that the
defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is
without just or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract,
crime or quasi-delict.

An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action, available only when there is no other
remedy on contract, quasi-contract, crime, and quasi-delict. If there is an obtainable action under any other
institution of positive law, that action must be resorted to, and the principle of accion in rem verso will not lie.xxii[9]

As found by both the CIAC and affirmed by the CA, petitioner failed to prove that respondent's free use of the manlift was
without legal ground based on the provisions of their contract. Thus, the third requisite, i.e., that the enrichment of respondent is without
just or legal ground, is missing. In addition, petitioner's claim is based on contract, hence, the fourth requisite − that the plaintiff has no
other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict − is also absent. Clearly, the principle of unjust enrichment is not
applicable in this case.
14. Hyatt elevators FACTS: Elevators and Escalators Corporation entered into an “Agreement to Service Elevators” (Service Agreement) xxiii[4] with
vs. Cathedral respondent Cathedral Heights Building Complex Association, Inc., where petitioner was contracted to maintain four passenger elevators
Heights installed in respondent's building. Under the Service Agreement, the duties and obligations of petitioner included monthly inspection,
adjustment and lubrication of machinery, motors, control parts and accessory equipments, including switches and electrical wirings.xxiv[5]
Section D (2) of the Service Agreement provides that respondent shall pay for the additional charges incurred in connection with the
repair and supply of parts.

Petitioner claims that during the period of April 1997 to July 1998 it had incurred expenses amounting to Php 1,161,933.47 in the
maintenance and repair of the four elevators as itemized in a statement of account.xxv[6] Petitioner demanded from respondent the
payment of the aforesaid amount allegedly through a series of demand letters, the last one sent on July 18, 2000. xxvi[7] Respondent,
however, refused to pay the amount.

ISSUE:

RULING:

15. LBP vs. Ong FACTS: spouses Johnson and Evangeline Sy secured a loan from LBP in the amount of PhP 16 million. The loan was secured by
three (3) residential lots, five (5) cargo trucks, and a warehouse. Subsequently, however, the Spouses Sy found they could no longer
pay their loan. On December 9, 1996, they sold three (3) of their mortgaged parcels of land for PhP 150,000 to Angelina Gloria Ong,
Evangeline’s mother, under a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.

Evangeline’s father, petitioner Alfredo Ong, later went to Land Bank to inform it about the sale and assumption of mortgage. xxvii[3] Atty.
Edna Hingco, the Legazpi City Land Bank Branch Head, told Alfredo and his counsel Atty. Ireneo de Lumen that there was nothing
wrong with the agreement with the Spouses Sy but provided them with requirements for the assumption of mortgage. They were also
told that Alfredo should pay part of the principal which was computed at PhP 750,000 and to update due or accrued interests on the
promissory notes so that Atty. Hingco could easily approve the assumption of mortgage. Two weeks later, Alfredo issued a check for
PhP 750,000 and personally gave it to Atty. Hingco. A receipt was issued for his payment. He also submitted the other documents
required by Land Bank, such as financial statements for 1994 and 1995. Atty. Hingco then informed Alfredo that the certificate of title
of the Spouses Sy would be transferred in his name but this never materialized. No notice of transfer was sent to him. xxviii[4]

Alfredo later found out that his application for assumption of mortgage was not approved by Land Bank. The bank learned from its
credit investigation report that the Ongs had a real estate mortgage in the amount of PhP 18,300,000 with another bank that was past
due. Alfredo claimed that this was fully paid later on. Nonetheless, Land Bank foreclosed the mortgage of the Spouses Sy after
several months. Alfredo only learned of the foreclosure when he saw the subject mortgage properties included in a Notice of
Foreclosure of Mortgage and Auction Sale at the RTC in Tabaco, Albay. Alfredo’s other counsel, Atty. Madrilejos, subsequently talked
to Land Bank’s lawyer and was told that the PhP 750,000 he paid would be returned to him.xxix[5]

On December 12, 1997, Alfredo initiated an action for recovery of sum of money with damages against Land Bank.
ISSUE: WON there is unjust enrichment on the part of LBP for not returning the P750,00

RULING: We rule that Land Bank is still liable for the return of the PhP 750,000 based on the principle of unjust enrichment. Land Bank
is correct in arguing that it has no obligation as creditor to recognize Alfredo as a person with interest in the fulfillment of the obligation.
But while Land Bank is not bound to accept the substitution of debtors in the subject real estate mortgage, it is estopped by its action of
accepting Alfredo’s payment from arguing that it does not have to recognize Alfredo as the new debtor.

We turn then on the principle upon which Land Bank must return Alfredo’s payment. Unjust enrichment exists “when a person unjustly
retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of
justice, equity and good conscience.”xxx[18] There is unjust enrichment under Art. 22 of the Civil Code when (1) a person is unjustly
benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another.xxxi[19]

Additionally, unjust enrichment has been applied to actions called accion in rem verso. In order that the accion in rem verso may prosper,
the following conditions must concur: (1) that the defendant has been enriched; (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss; (3) that the
enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground; and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-
contract, crime, or quasi-delict.xxxii[20] The principle of unjust enrichment essentially contemplates payment when there is no duty to pay,
and the person who receives the payment has no right to receive it.xxxiii[21]

The principle applies to the parties in the instant case, as, Alfredo, having been deemed disqualified from assuming the loan, had no duty
to pay petitioner bank and the latter had no right to receive it.

Moreover, the Civil Code likewise requires under Art. 19 that “[e]very person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” Land Bank, however, did not even bother to
inform Alfredo that it was no longer approving his assumption of the Spouses Sy’s mortgage. Yet it acknowledged his interest in the loan
when the branch head of the bank wrote to tell him that his daughter’s loan had not been paid. xxxiv[22] Land Bank made Alfredo believe
that with the payment of PhP 750,000, he would be able to assume the mortgage of the Spouses Sy. The act of receiving payment
without returning it when demanded is contrary to the adage of giving someone what is due to him. The outcome of the application would
have been different had Land Bank first conducted the credit investigation before accepting Alfredo’s payment. He would have been
notified that his assumption of mortgage had been disapproved; and he would not have taken the futile action of paying PhP 750,000.
The procedure Land Bank took in acting on Alfredo’s application cannot be said to have been fair and proper.

16. Flores vs. Sps. FACTS: Edna Lindo (Edna) obtained a loan from Arturo Flores (petitioner) amounting to P400,000 payable on 1 December 1995 with
Lindo 3% compounded monthly interest and 3% surcharge in case of late payment. To secure the loan, Edna executed a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage4 (the Deed) covering a property in the name of Edna and her husband Enrico (Enrico) Lindo, Jr. (collectively, respondents).
Edna also signed a Promissory Note5 and the Deed for herself and for Enrico as his attorney-in-fact.

Edna issued three checks as partial payments for the loan. All checks were dishonored for insufficiency of funds, prompting petitioner to
file a Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage with Damages against respondents. The RTC, Branch 33 ruled that petitioner was not
entitled to judicial foreclosure of the mortgage. The RTC, Branch 33 found that the Deed was executed by Edna without the consent and
authority of Enrico. On 8 September 2004, petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against respondents.

ISSUE: WON whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in dismissing the complaint for collection of sum of money on
the ground of multiplicity of suits (foreclosure and collection case)

RULING: In Chieng v. Santos,20 this Court ruled that a mortgage-creditor may institute against the mortgage-debtor either a personal
action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. The Court ruled that the remedies are alternative and not cumulative and held
that the filing of a criminal action for violation of Batas PambansaBlg. 22 was in effect a collection suit or a suit for the recovery of the
mortgage-debt.21 In that case, however, this Court pro hac vice, ruled that respondents could still be held liable for the balance of the
loan, applying the principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another. 22

The principle of unjust enrichment is provided under Article 22 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession
of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.

There is unjust enrichment “when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property
of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.” 23 The principle of unjust enrichment requires two
conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of
another.24

The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of another without
just cause or consideration.25 The principle is applicable in this case considering that Edna admitted obtaining a loan from petitioners,
and the same has not been fully paid without just cause. The Deed was declared void erroneously at the instance of Edna, first when
she raised it as a defense before the RTC, Branch 33 and second, when she filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC, Branch
93. Petitioner could not be expected to ask the RTC, Branch 33 for an alternative remedy, as what the Court of Appeals ruled that he
should have done, because the RTC, Branch 33 already stated that it had no jurisdiction over any personal action that petitioner might
have against Edna.

Considering the circumstances of this case, the principle against unjust enrichment, being a substantive law, should prevail over the
procedural rule on multiplicity of suits. The Court of Appeals, in the assailed decision, found that Edna admitted the loan, except that she
claimed it only amounted to P340,000. Edna should not be allowed to unjustly enrich herself because of the erroneous decisions of the
two trial courts when she questioned the validity of the Deed. Moreover, Edna still has an opportunity to submit her defenses before the
RTC, Branch 42 on her claim as to the amount of her indebtedness.
17. Ilusorio vs. FACTS:
Bildner
18 Ilusorio vs. ISSUE:
Bildner

RULING:
19. Valley Golf vs.
Caram
20. Manaloto vs. FACTS: Petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against respondent for failure to pay rentals on the leased property owned by
Veloso petitioners. MeTC decided in favor of the petitioners. While the respondent’s appeal of the MeTC’s decision is pending before the RTC,
respondent filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages with the RTC(another branch). On the complaint for damages,
respondent alleged that he supposedly suffered embarrassment and humiliation when petitioners distributed copies of the above-
mentioned MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer case to the homeowners of Horseshoe Village while respondent’s appeal was still
pending.

ISSUE: WON the respondent is entitled for an award of damages (moral & exemplary)

RULING: No.

Petitioners are obliged to respect respondent’s good name even though they are opposing parties in the unlawful detainer
case. As Article 19 of the Civil Code requires, “[e]very person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” A violation of such principle constitutes an abuse of rights, a
tortuous conduct. We expounded in Sea Commercial Company, Inc. v. Court of Appealsxxxv[24] that:

The principle of abuse of rights stated in the above article, departs from the classical theory that “he who
uses a right injures no one.” The modern tendency is to depart from the classical and traditional theory, and to grant
indemnity for damages in cases where there is an abuse of rights, even when the act is not illicit.

Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law. If mere fault
or negligence in one’s acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason should
abuse or bad faith make him liable. The absence of good faith is essential to abuse of right. Good faith is an honest
intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through the forms or technicalities
of the law, together with an absence of all information or belief of fact which would render the transaction
unconscientious. In business relations, it means good faith as understood by men of affairs.

While Article 19 may have been intended as a mere declaration of principle, the “cardinal law on human
conduct” expressed in said article has given rise to certain rules, e.g. that where a person exercises his rights but
does so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs his duties in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty and good faith,
he opens himself to liability. The elements of an abuse of rights under Article 19 are: (1) there is a legal right or
duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. xxxvi[25]

Petitioners are also expected to respect respondent’s “dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind” under Article 26 of the
Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce
a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of
birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

Thus, Article 2219(10) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages for acts and actions referred to in Article 26,
among other provisions, of the Civil Code.

In Concepcion v. Court of Appeals,xxxvii[26] we explained that:

The philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil law. The Code Commission
stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personality must be exalted. The sacredness of human personality
is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of the
culture and civilization of every country, is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from
being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not exalted - then the laws are indeed defective. Thus,
under this article, the rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a person’s
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind.
It is petitioner’s position that the act imputed to him does not constitute any of those enumerated in Arts.
26 and 2219. In this respect, the law is clear. The violations mentioned in the codal provisions are not exclusive
but are merely examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous acts. Damages therefore are allowable for
actions against a person’s dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive language. Under
Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury, although incapable of
pecuniary computation, may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or
omission.xxxviii[27]

And third, respondent alleged that the distribution by petitioners to Horseshoe Village homeowners of copies of the MeTC
decision in the unlawful detainer case, which was adverse to respondent and still on appeal before the RTC-Branch 88, had no apparent
lawful or just purpose except to humiliate respondent or assault his character. As a result, respondent suffered damages – becoming the
talk of the town and being deprived of his political career.

Petitioners reason that respondent has no cause of action against them since the MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer case
was part of public records.

It is already settled that the public has a right to see and copy judicial records and documents. xxxix[28] However, this is not a
case of the public seeking and being denied access to judicial records and documents. The controversy is rooted in the dissemination
by petitioners of the MeTC judgment against respondent to Horseshoe Village homeowners, who were not involved at all in the unlawful
detainer case, thus, purportedly affecting negatively respondent’s good name and reputation among said homeowners. The unlawful
detainer case was a private dispute between petitioners and respondent, and the MeTC decision against respondent was then still
pending appeal before the RTC-Branch 88, rendering suspect petitioners’ intentions for distributing copies of said MeTC decision to non-
parties in the case. While petitioners were free to copy and distribute such copies of the MeTC judgment to the public, the question is
whether they did so with the intent of humiliating respondent and destroying the latter’s good name and reputation in the community.

Nevertheless, we further declare that the Court of Appeals erred in already awarding moral and exemplary damages in
respondent’s favor when the parties have not yet had the chance to present any evidence before the RTC-Branch 227. In civil cases, he
who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it by a preponderance of evidence. It is incumbent upon the party claiming affirmative relief
from the court to convincingly prove its claim. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence are not equivalent to proof under our Rules.
In short, mere allegations are not evidence.xl[29]

At this point, the finding of the Court of Appeals of bad faith and malice on the part of petitioners has no factual basis. Good
faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is
manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and
unscrupulous advantage of another. Bad faith, on the other hand, does not simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence. It
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motive or
interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an
intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.xli[30]

We cannot subscribe to respondent’s argument that there is no more need for the presentation of evidence by the parties
since petitioners, in moving for the dismissal of respondent’s complaint for damages, hypothetically admitted respondent’s allegations.
The hypothetical admission of respondent’s allegations in the complaint only goes so far as determining whether said complaint should
be dismissed on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. A finding that the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action does
not necessarily mean that the complaint is meritorious; it shall only result in the reinstatement of the complaint and the hearing of the
case for presentation of evidence by the parties.
21. Meralco vs. LIM FACTS: Respondent is an employee (administrative clerk) of the petitioner. The subject matter of the case was an anonymous letter
posted at the door of the Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO which imputed respondent’s disloyalty to the
company and demanding her to leave. On this ground, Meralco’s head HR directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang
Sector in Muntinlupa in light of the receipt of "… reports that there were accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown
individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and security. Consequently, respondent filed a writ of habeas data to
provide her with details or information about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly received concerning threats to her safety
and security, and respondent prayed for the issuance of a TRO enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer.

ISSUE: WON an employee may invoke the remedies available under writ of habeas data where an employer decides to transfer her
workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted therein ─ imputing to her disloyalty to the company and calling for her to
leave, which imputation it investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereof?

RULING: NO.

The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus
safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information
technology.

XXX Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided
under prevailing Rules.13

Castillo v. Cruz14 underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario15 that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue
to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or
doubtful.16 Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution.17 It is evident that
respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one’s
employment - are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably
lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.

In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of
respondent’s right to privacyvis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of
reports allegedly received on the threats to respondent’s safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative.
Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008
letter as "highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all." 18 And she even suspects that her transfer to another
place of work "betray[s] the real intent of management]" and could be a "punitive move." Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue
is labor-related.
22. Uy vs. PEA FACTS: Respondent Public Estates Authority (PEA) was designated as project manager by the Bases Conversion Development
Authority (BCDA), primarily tasked to develop its 105-hectare demilitarized lot in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City into a first-class memorial
park to be known as Heritage Park. PEA then engaged the services of Makati Development Corporation (MDC) to undertake the
horizontal works on the project; and Uy, doing business under the name and style Edison Development and Construction (EDC), to do
the landscaping.

During the course of the project, PEA continuously incurred delay in the turnover of work areas, because the horizontal works of MDC
were still ongoing. As a result, EDC claimed additional cost for additional rental costs for the equipment, which were kept on standby,
and labor costs for the idle manpower. He added that the delay by PEA caused the topsoil at the original supplier to be depleted; thus,
he was compelled to obtain the topsoil from a farther source, thereby incurring extra costs. He also claims that he had to mobilize water
trucks for the plants and trees which had already been delivered to the site. Furthermore, it became necessary to construct a nursery
shade to protect and preserve the young plants and trees prior to actual transplanting to the landscaped area.

On the other hand, the Performance Audit Committee (PAC) reviewed the progress report submitted by the works engineer and noted
that the EDC’s landscaping works were behind schedule by twenty percent (20%). The PAC considered this delay unreasonable and
intolerable, and immediately recommended to BCDA the termination of the landscaping contract.xlii[8] The BCDA adopted PAC’s
recommendation and demanded from PEA the termination of the contract with EDC. In compliance, PEA terminated the agreement on
November 29, 1999.

PEA fully paid all the progress billings, but it did not heed EDC’s additional claims

ISSUE: WON hold PEA liable based on solutioindebiti, the legal maxim that no one should enrich itself at the expense of another.

RULING: NO.

As we explained in Powton Conglomerate, Inc. v. Agcolicol,xliii[35]


the principle of unjust enrichment cannot be validly invoked by the respondent who, through his own act or omission, took the risk of
being denied payment for additional costs by not giving the petitioners prior notice of such costs and/or by not securing their written
consent thereto, as required by law and their contract
23. Manzanal vs. FACTS: The case is a complaint for damages filed by Ramon K. Ilusorio (respondent) against petitioners Dennis R. Manzanal and
Ilusorio Baguio Country Club Corporation (BCCC) on the basis of Statement of Acoount sent by the latter which the latter disputed contending
that it has no basis and that letter as a form of harassment from his family who was utilizing Manzanal and BCCC (petitioners) for that
purpose.

ISSUE: WON the complaint for damages may be given merit.

RULING. NO

The Court finds from the tenor of the demand letters, which respondent annexed to his complaint, that it did not deviate from the
standard practice of pursuing the satisfaction of a club member’s obligations. As an exclusive organization which primarily derives life
from membership fees and charges, BCCC is expected to enforce claims from members in default of their contractual obligations.

Even under the principle of abuse of rights, Cebu Country Club, Inc. v. Elizagaque11 which expounds as follows:

In GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona, we expounded Article 19 and correlated it with Article 21, thus: This article, known to contain what is
commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s
rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to
observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such,
may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social
order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
(citation omitted, underscoring supplied),

respondent cannot seek refuge.


24. Continental vs. FACTS: Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of
Montano respondent NagkakaisangManggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and
Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for
dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union, The claim was based
on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she
was in the 38th week of pregnancy.

Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death
benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance.

ISSUE: WON Hortillano is entitled to bereavement and death and accident insurance.

RULING: YES.
The issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be
applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil personality, which reads:

Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every
natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is
acquired and may be lost.

We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person are not
in issue. It is not a question before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that
were passed on to or assumed by the child’s parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case
pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s death.

Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code
expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired
juridical personality could die.

And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.xliv[24] Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not
acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,xlv[25] that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn
already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is
“one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else.” Under said
general definition,xlvi[26] even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its
gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in
question that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single
employee. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have
acquired civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general
sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.

The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child’s status in relation to his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya,xlvii[27]
we have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz:

A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful
union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be
more emphatic on the matter: “Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.”
(Emphasis ours.)

Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,xlviii[28] we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:

The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the Family
Code. Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the
rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are
illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)

It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child
attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their
child was conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception.

Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element entitling him to death and accident
insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death certificate of his unborn child.

Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA, Hortillano’s claims for
the same should have been granted by Continental Steel.

We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible,
lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and
sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery,
is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.
25. Duenas vs. FACTS: Petitioner Gloria Santos Dueñas is the daughter of the late Cecilio J. Santos who, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land
Santos with a total area of 2.2 hectares located at Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. In 1966, Cecilio had the realty subdivided into smaller lots, the
whole forming the Santos Subdivision.

The then Land Registration Commission (LRC) approved the project and the National Housing Authority (NHA) issued the required
Certificate of Registration and License to Sell. At the time of Cecilio’s death in 1988, there were already several residents and
homeowners in Santos Subdivision.

Sometime in 1997, the members of the SSHA submitted to the petitioner a resolution asking her to provide within the subdivision an
open space for recreational and other community activities, in accordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 957,6 as amended by P.D. No.
1216.7 Petitioner, however, rejected the request, thus, prompting the members of SSHA to seek redress from the NHA.

ISSUE: WON the this suit was filed by an unauthorized entity against a non-existent person, as SSHA and Santos Subdivision are not
juridical entities, authorized by law to institute or defend against actions

RULING: Article 4425 of the Civil Code enumerates the various classes of juridical persons. Under said Article, an association is
considered a juridical person if the law grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its members. 26 The records of the present
case are bare of any showing by SSHA that it is an association duly organized under Philippine law. It was thus an error for the HLURB-
NCR Office to give due course to the complaint in HLURB Case No. REM-070297-9821, given the SSHA’s lack of capacity to sue in its
own name. Nor was it proper for said agency to treat the complaint as a suit by all the parties who signed and verified the complaint. The
members cannot represent their association in any suit without valid and legal authority. Neither can their signatures confer on the
association any legal capacity to sue. Nor will the fact that SSHA belongs to the Federation of Valenzuela Homeowners Association,
Inc., suffice to endow SSHA with the personality and capacity to sue. Mere allegations of membership in a federation are insufficient and
inconsequential. The federation itself has a separate juridical personality and was not impleaded as a party in HLURB Case No. REM-
070297-9821 nor in this case. Neither was it shown that the federation was authorized to represent SSHA. Facts showing the capacity of
a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized
association of persons that is made a party, must be averred. 27 Hence, for failing to show that it is a juridical entity, endowed by law with
capacity to bring suits in its own name, SSHA is devoid of any legal capacity, whatsoever, to institute any action.
27. Bayot vs. CA FACTS: Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the
Marriage Certificate6 identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen7 born in Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong
Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.

On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente
and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the
Dominican Republic.

On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court ordered the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving them to remarry after
completing the legal requirements," but giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same court would
issued an order settling the couple's property relations pursuant to an Agreement they executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement
specifically stated that the "conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the
improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa.

March 14, 1996 - Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition12 dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity
of marriage, (Civil Case No. 96-378.) Rebecca, however, later moved13 and secured approval14 of the motion to withdraw the petition

March 21, 2001 - Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage16 on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity (Civil Case No. 01-094). Rebecca also sought the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered
to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix

June 5, 2001 - Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of her application for support pendente lite

June 8, 2001 - Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss17 on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by
the prior judgment of divorce.

ISSUES: WON petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on
February 22, 1996; and second, whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?

RULING:

Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case

-(1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory granting American citizenship to
those who are born there; and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport

- Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine
Passport. n its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed been recognized as a Filipino citizen. However,
that such recognition was given only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of Rebecca's recognition pursuant
to the Order of Recognition issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza. What begs the question is, however, how the
above certificate could have been issued by the Bureau on October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the required
affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for this patent aberration. There seems to be no error with the date of the
issuance of the 1stIndorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice that he was the Secretary of Justice
from February 16, 2000 to January 22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the certificate in question must be
spurious. Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on June 13, 2000, or five days after then
Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1stIndorsement confirming the order of recognition.

When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One

- Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996
judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.

Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her original petition for declaration of obviously because she could not show proof of her alleged Filipino
citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that petition shows that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC on
March 14, 1996 or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the foreign divorce decree in question. There was
no mention about said divorce in the petition. Significantly, the only documents appended as annexes to said original petition were: the
Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract and Birth Certificate of Alix . If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued
on October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece of document be appended to form part of the petition, the question of
her citizenship being crucial to her case?

As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the withdrawn first petition,
also did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as attachment

Validity of Divorce Decree

The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of
Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign
divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or
not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the
citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained. 42

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction.
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He
cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca. The issue of back support for
Alix, which allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way,
the actual figure for the support of Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can
thus determine what Vicente owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her
education.
28. Morigo vs. FACTS: Appellant LucioMorigo and Lucia Barrete were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan,
People Pilar, Bohol. On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by
the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant LucioMorigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago4 at the Virgensa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, (Civil
Case No. 6020). The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that
no marriage ceremony actually took place.

On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information5 filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol.6

ISSUE: WON petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.

RULING: No.

Elements of bigamy:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially
declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead,
what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court
thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 322 and 423 of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-
G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the
first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never
married."24 The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision
had long become final and executory.

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the
petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a
marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal
effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the
marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is
but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must,
perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.25 In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally
contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of
bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void." 26

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge where a
marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first
marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
29. San Luis vs. FACTS: The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the
San Luis Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17,
1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15,
1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorcexlix[5] before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973.l[6]

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William
Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. li[7] He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On
December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administrationlii[8] before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP.
Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.

February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismissliii[9] on the
grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration
should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He
further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo
since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee

ISSUE: WON (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration.

RULING:
Under Section 1,liv[39] Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be
filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province “in which he resides at the time of his death.” In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of
Appeals,lv[40] we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:

[T]he term “resides” connotes ex vi termini “actual residence” as distinguished from “legal residence or domicile.”
This term “resides,” like the terms “residing” and “residence,” is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the
object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules –
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word “domicile” still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile
in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms “residence” and “domicile” but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
“inhabitant.” In other words, “resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal,
actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in
a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.lvi[41]
(Emphasis supplied)

while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a
residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute
Salelvii[44] dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statementslviii[45]
from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of
Felicisimo at “100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa.” Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the
Ayala Alabang Village Associationlix[46] and Ayala Country Club, Inc.,lx[47] letter-envelopeslxi[48] from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s
children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling cards lxii[49] stating that his home/city address is at “100 San Juanico,
Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa” while his office/provincial address is in “Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.”

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Courtlxiii[50]
which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time,
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had
territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3.lxiv[51] Thus, the
subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

--

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue
of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s
marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this
issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient
jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.lxv[52] involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was
subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the
alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however,
recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after
the divorce. Thus:

In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American
law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in
Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

“The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and
wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the
law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry
again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former
marriage.”

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.
As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.lxvi[53]

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse.
Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.lxvii[54] (Emphasis added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Someralxviii[55]where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino
wife. The Court stated that “the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other,hence
the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.”lxix[56]

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals,lxx[57]the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse,
the ruling in Van Dorn applies.lxxi[58] Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when
the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied.
The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to
remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr.
Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that “if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.”lxxii[59] InGarcia v. Recio,lxxiii[60]the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26.lxxiv[61]

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III,lxxv[62]the historical background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article
26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the “Family Code,” which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to
Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

x xxx
Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein
that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.lxxvi[63](Emphasis added)

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse.
With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through
judicial precedent.

NOTE: the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio,lxxvii[70]the Courtlaid down the specific guidelines
for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that
proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.lxxviii[71]

With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage
Certificate and the annotated textlxxix[72] of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged
and proved.lxxx[73]

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee
and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal
personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

30. Ugdoracion vs. FACTS: Ugdoracion and private respondent, Ephraim Tungol, were rival mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Albuquerque,
COMELEC Province of Bohol in the May 14, 2007 elections. Both filed their respective Certificates of Candidacy (COC).

On April 11, 2007, Tungol filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Jose Ugdoracion, Jr., contending
that Ugdoracion’s declaration of eligibility for Mayor constituted material misrepresentation because Ugdoracion is actually a “green card”
holder or a permanent resident of the United States of America (USA). Specifically, Ugdoracion stated in his COC that he had resided in
Albuquerque, Bohol, Philippines for forty-one years before May 14, 2007 and he is not a permanent resident or an immigrant to a foreign
country.

It appears that Ugdoracion became a permanent resident of the USA on September 26, 2001. Accordingly, the United States
Immigration and Naturalization Serviceslxxxi[2] (USINS) issued him Alien Number 047-894-254.lxxxii[3]

ISSUE: WON the representations contained in Ugdoracion’s COC, specifically, that he complied with the residency requirement and that
he does not have “green card” holder status, are false.

RULING: YES

We ruled in Caasi v. Court of Appealslxxxiii[10]that a Filipino citizen’s acquisition of a permanent resident status abroad constitutes an
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. In short, the “green card” status in the USA is a renunciation of one’s
status as a resident of the Philippines.lxxxiv[11]

We agree with Ugdoracion that residence, in contemplation of election laws, is synonymous to domicile. Domicile is the place
where one actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return (animus revertendi) and remain (animus manendi).lxxxv[12] It consists not only in the intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. lxxxvi[13]

Domicile is classified into (1) domicile of origin, which is acquired by every person at birth; (2) domicile of choice, which is
acquired upon abandonment of the domicile of origin; and (3) domicile by operation of law, which the law attributes to a person
independently of his residence or intention.

In a controversy such as the one at bench, given the parties’ naturally conflicting perspectives on domicile, we are guided by
three basic rules, namely: (1) a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) domicile, once established, remains until a new
one is validly acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at any given time.lxxxvii[14]

The general rule is that the domicile of origin is not easily lost; it is lost only when there is an actual removal or change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with such
purpose.lxxxviii[15] In the instant case, however, Ugdoracion’s acquisition of a lawful permanent resident status in the United States
amounted to an abandonment and renunciation of his status as a resident of the Philippines; it constituted a change from his domicile of
origin, which was Albuquerque, Bohol, to a new domicile of choice, which is the USA.

31. Limbona vs. FACTS: Petitioner NorlainieMitmugLimbona (Norlainie), her husband, Mohammad G. Limbona (Mohammad), and respondent Malik
COMELEC "Bobby" T. Alingan (Malik) were mayoralty candidates in Pantar, Lanaodel Norte during the 2007 Synchronized National and Local
Elections.

Mohammad and Norlainie filed their certificates of candidacy with Acting Election Officer, Alauya S. Tago, on January 22, 2007 and
March 29, 2007, respectively; while Malik filed his certificate of candidacy with the Office of the Election Officer on March 26, 2007.

On April 2, 2007, Malik filed a petition to disqualify Mohammad for failure to comply with the residency requirement. Subsequently, or on
April 12, 2007, Malik filed another petition to disqualify Norlainie also on the ground of lack of the one-year residency requirement. The
petition was docketed as SPA No. 07-611.[3]

On April 21, 2007, Norlainie filed an Affidavit of Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy.[4] Thereafter, or on May 2, 2007, she filed before
the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor a Motion to Dismiss [5] the petition for disqualification in SPA No. 07-611 on the ground
that the petition had become moot in view of the withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy. The Comelecen banc granted the withdrawal
of Norlainie's certificate of candidacy

Meanwhile, the First Division of Comelec issued on May 24, 2007 a Resolution[7] in SPA No. 07-188 granting the petition filed by Malik
and disqualifying Mohammad from running as municipal mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte for failing to satisfy the one year residency
requirement and for not being a registered voter of the said place

Consequently, Norlainie filed a new certificate of candidacy as substitute candidate for Mohammad which was given due course by the
Comelecen banc

Thus, Malik filed a second petition for disqualification against Norlainie docketed as SPA No. 07-621.

After the elections, Norlainie emerged as the winning candidate and accordingly took her oath and assumed office.

However, on September 4, 2007, the Second Division of Comelec in SPA No. 07-611 disqualified Norlainie on three grounds: lack of the
one-year residency requirement; not being a registered voter of the municipality; and, nullity of her certificate of candidacy for having
been filed at a place other than the Office of the Election Officer.

ISSUE: WON COMELEC’s action of disqualifying norlaine is proper.

RULING: Yes

The Comelec correctly found that petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year residency requirement. The term "residence" as used in the
election law is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.[18] The manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to exclude
a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective
office to serve that community.[19]

For purposes of election law, the question of residence is mainly one of intention. There is no hard and fast rule by which to determine
where a person actually resides.[20] Three rules are, however, well established: first, that a man must have a residence or domicile
somewhere; second, that where once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and third, a man can have but one domicile at a
time.[21]

In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain
there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.[22] A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not
be deemed lost until a new one is established.[23]

To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
In other words, there must basically be animus manendicoupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile
of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for
the new domicile must be actual.[24]

Petitioner's claim that she has been physically present and actually residing in Pantar for almost 20 months prior to the elections,[25] is
self-serving and unsubstantiated.

Further, We find no other act that would indicate respondent's intention to stay in Pantar for an indefinite period of time. The filing of her
Certificate of Candidacy in Pantar, standing alone, is not sufficient to hold that she has chosen Pantar as her new residence. We also
take notice of the fact that in SPA No. 07-611, this Commission has even found that she is not a registered voter in the said municipality
warranting her disqualification as a candidate.[26]

We note the findings of the Comelec that petitioner's domicile of origin is Maguing, Lanao del Norte, [27] which is also her place of birth;
and that her domicile by operation of law (by virtue of marriage) is Rapasun, Marawi City. The Comelec found that Mohammad,
petitioner's husband, effected the change of his domicile in favor of Pantar, Lanaodel Norte only on November 11, 2006. Since it is
presumed that the husband and wife live together in one legal residence, [28] then it follows that petitioner effected the change of her
domicile also on November 11, 2006. Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code provide:

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt
one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the
exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (Emphasis ours)

Considering that petitioner failed to show that she maintained a separate residence from her husband, and as there is no evidence to
prove otherwise, reliance on these provisions of the Family Code is proper and is in consonance with human experience
i[11]Reyes v. Commission on Audit, 305 SCRA 512, 518, March 29, 1999, per Pardo, J.
ii[12] Medina Investigation & Security Corporation v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 144074, March 20, 2001, per Gonzaga-Reyes,
J.
iii[13]81 Phil. 648, March 8, 1949.
iv[14]Ibid., pp. 649-650, per Tuason, J.
v[15]295 SCRA 470, 492, September 16, 1998.
vi[16]Ibid., p. 492, per Regalado, J.
vii[10]Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code (1995 ed.), p. 282.
viii[4]Executive Order No. 209, dated July 6, 1987
ix[5]Modequillo vs. Breva, 185 SCRA 766.
x[6]Presidential Decree No. 603.
xi[8]Ayogvs. Cusi, 118 SCRA 492, 499.
xii[9]16A Am. Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, 651.
xiii[3]
Id. at 45-47.
xiv[4]
Id. at 48-50.
xv[5]
Id. at 42-44.
xvi[6]
Id. at 51-53.
xvii[19]
Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corp., G.R. No. 163597, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 454, 461-462.
xviii[26]
Chieng v. Santos, G.R. No. 169647, August 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 730, 747-748.
xix[27]
LCK Industries, Inc. v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 170606, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 634, 653.
xx[28]
Id. at 652.

xxiii[4]
Id. at 46-49.
xxiv[5]
Id. at 47.
xxv[6]
Id. at 50-51.
xxvi[7]
Id. at 52.
xxxv[24]
377 Phil. 221 (1999).
xxxvi[25]
Id. at 229-230.
xxxvii[26]
381 Phil. 90 (2000).
xxxviii[27]
Id. at 99.
xxxix[28]
Hilado v. Judge Reyes, 496 Phil. 55, 68 (2005).
xl[29]
Mayor v. Belen, G.R. No. 151035, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 561, 567.
xli[30]
Arra Realty Corporation v. Guarantee Development Corporation and Insurance Agency, G.R. No. 142310, September 20, 2004, 438
SCRA 441, 469.