© Academy of Management Journal

2000, Vol. 43, No. 3, 403-427.

ENVIRONMENTAL SCANNING BEHAVIOR IN A

TRANSITIONAL ECONOMY:
EVIDENCE FROM RUSSIA
RUTH C. MAY
University of Dallas

WAYNE H. STEWART, JR.

Clemson University

ROBERT SWEO
University of Maryland University College

We examined the effects of perceived strategic uncertainty in seven environmental

sectors on the scanning behavior of Russian executives. Strategic uncertainty was
highest in sectors influenced by transition and was moderated by perceptions of
accessibility in determining scanning frequency, a relationship that held in predicting
sources of information scanned. The perceived importance of environmental condi-
tions was central to the relationships, suggesting that decomposition of the strategic
uncertainty construct facilitates more insightful analysis of scanning behavior.

A common theme in organization science
schools of thought, ranging from strategic choice to
environmental determinism, is that environmental
complexity and volatility significantly influence
organization maintenance, structure, and decision
making (Child, 1972; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983;
Hannan & Freeman, 1989; Lawrence & Lorsch,
1967; Miles & Snow, 1978; Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978]. Major environmental change can create or-
ganizational maladjustment, a tension that pushes
an organization to reestablish congruence with new
environmental conditions (cf. Bluedorn, Johnson,
Cartwright, & Barringer, 1994). The basis for correc-
tive strategic action is managerial problem sensing
(Kiesler & SprouU, 1982), consisting of activities
associated with noticing, interpreting, and incorpo-
rating environmental stimuli. This process enables
an organization to adapt to its environment (Daft &
Weick, 1984; Hambrick, 1981b; Milliken, 1990),
thereby reestablishing an equilibrium that en-
hances organizational performance (Venkatraman,
1989; Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990).
Environmental scanning, the search mechanism
by which managers discover important events and
trends outside their organizations (Farh, Hofftnan,
The authors were equal contributors to the article and
are listed in alphabetical order. We thank William Luker
and Caron St. John for their valuable suggestions. The
article also benefited from the helpful comments of Mike
Wright, special research forum guest editor, and three
anonymous reviewers.
403
& Hegarty, 1984; Hambrick, 1982), is tJie first step
in this problem-solving sequence (Daft & Weick,
1984; Hambrick, 1982). Because scanning influ-
ences the subsequent perceptions and actions that
enable organizational adaptation and is necessary
in establishing goals and primary strategies (Dess,
1987), it is an indispensable activity in tbe strategic
management process (Fabey & Narayanan, 1986;
Hambrick, 1981a; Schneider & De Meyer, 1991).
With a few exceptions (e.g., Auster & Choo, 1993;
Elenkov, 1997; Cbosbal, 1988; Hoffman & Hegarty,
1985; Sawyerr, 1993), empirical studies of execu-
tives' scanning behavior have been limited to tbe
United States, despite evidence tbat Western theo-
ries focusing on organizations and tbeir environ-
ments are more likely to suffer from a weak fit in
developing economies than are Western theories
related to organization tasks and technology (Kig-
gundu, Jorgensen, & Hafsi, 1983). Because cultures
differ concerning perceptions of environmental fac-
tors (Bluedorn et al., 1994; Miller, 1993; Sallivan &
Nonaka, 1988; Schneider & De Myer, 1991), and
cultural assumptions influence strategy formula-
tion (O'Sbaugbnessy, 1985; Schneider, 1989),
Western tbeories need reassessment in other con-
texts, especially wbere political ideologies and so-
cial demands exert acute institutional influences
on managerial activities (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
Sucb is tbe case witb developing countries, partic-
ularly tbose of the former Soviet bloc, where an
array of conditions differentiates these environ-
ments from tbose of the West (Dadak, 1995;
404 Academy of Management Journal
EJenkov, 1994; Handelman, 1995; Lawrence & Vla-
cboutsicos, 1990; Peng & HeatJi, 1996; Puffer, Mc-
Carthy, & Zbuplev, 1996; Stewart & May, 1998).
Tbese factors include unstable economic and polit-
ical environments and a higb degree of political
and ideological influence on business (Elenkov,
1997), producing an institutional environment con-
spicuously different from tbat encountered by the
typical Western firm (Ericson, 1991).
In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union,
managers in fhe Russian Federation face unparal-
leled environmental discontinuity, complexity,
and concomifanf uncerfainfy (WorJd Bank, 1996).
This precipitous environmental cbange should
stimulate more extensive searches for environmen-
tal information (Dutton, Fahey, & Narayanan,
1983), but this proposition is untested in Russia.
Accordingly, building primarily on the work of
Daft, Sormunen, and Parks (1988), we sougbt to
investigate bow perceptions of tbe environment in-
fluence tbe scanning bebavior of executives in the
Russian Federation in order to examine tbis impor-
tant strategy process in an environment marked by
discontinuous cbange. Empirically testing Western
models of organization-environment relations in
countries witb bigbly constrained, transitional en-
vironments is an important step in tbe develop-
ment of botJi theory and practice. Such inquiry
affords potential for insigbt into the compreben-
siveness of extant scanning theory by "incorporat-
ing local idiosyncratic situations into tbe concep-
tualization, thereby testing external validity and
revising and extending existing theories" (Kim &
Lim, 1988: 821).
RUSSIA'S TRANSITIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Gorbachev's sweeping reforms introduced pri-
vafe ownership via small free cooperafives for such
enterprises as restaurants and repair sbops and eco-
nomically autonomous production units in large
state enterprises for tbe first time in Soviet bistory
(Shlapentokh, 1988). Upon taking control of the
Russian Federation in 1991, Yeltsin declared the
Communist Party illegal on Russian territory, and
over 80 ministries tbat bad controlled tbe Soviet
economy collapsed (Sbama & Sementsov, 1992).
Yeltsin's decision to institute rapid market reforms
in Russia by abolishing controls over prices, re-
source allocation, wages, and employment resulted
in extraordinary levels of instability and uncer-
tainty (Holt, Ralston, & Terpstra, 1994).
Tbrougbout tbe 1990s, individual sectors of tbe
Russian environment resembled bigb-velocity
environments (Bourgeois & Eisenbardt, 1988),
wherein dynamism (Dess & Beard, 1984) or volatil-
June
ity (Bourgeois, 1985) is continuous and is overlaid
by sbarp, discontinuous cbange (Meyer, 1982).
During tbis period, tbe growtb in unemployment
(30 percent in 1992) was only surpassed by tbat in
inflation (2,324%); both subsided (to 15 and 11
percent, respectively) in 1997. Industrial output
fell 40 to 50 percent, and a burdensome tax system
spurred growtb in tbe underground economy,
whicb accounted for approximately 40 percent of
Russia's gross domestic producf (GDP; Business Jn-
formation Service for the Newly Independent
States [BISNIS], 1998). Political conditions were
also unpredictable, as the Communists expanded
fheir sphere of influence by gaining a majority in
the lower bouse of the state duma (parliament).
Given the unpredictability of Yeltsin's bealth, his
propensity to summarily dismiss entire segments of
his government, and tbe unpredictability of leader
succession, Russia's political landscape remained a
point of critical uncertainty for both foreign and
domestic firms [Economist, 1998). Organized crime
reacbed pandemic levels among politicians, cor-
rupt government bureaucrats and quasi-business
entities, tbat, left unchecked, could turn Russia
into a "criminal syndicalist state," constituting a
direct security threat to otber nations (Center for
Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], 1997;
73). Within tbis context, social conditions deterio-
rated, witb bomicide, suicide, divorce, arid alco-
bolism rising sbarply (Katz, 1996; Powell &
Palcbikoff, 1997) and life expectancy declining
(Dixon & Polyakov, 1997). Overall, tbese conditions
underscored tbe economic, political and sociocul-
tural turbulence that characterized the Yeltsin ad-
ministration and continue to plague transition in
tbe Russian Federation.
Meanwbile, working witbin tbe largest sector of
insider-owned and controlled firms in the world,
Russian managers of privatized organizations are
poorly equipped to cope with the cballenges of tbe
bigbly turbulent environment tbat bas resulted
from market reforms (Holt et al., 1994; May & Bor-
mann, 1993; Puffer, 1994; Sbama, 1993; Wrigbt,
Hoskisson, Filatotcbev, & Buck, 1998). Particularly
challenging is managers' limited knowledge of stra-
tegic management processes (Franz & Klepper,
1994; Jenner & Gappa, 1991; Jones & Moskoff,
1991). Although the extent of reform varies across
enterprises, recent evidence points to widespread
strategic inertia among Russian managers, and to
tbe need to devote greater managerial attention to
strategic issues of firms and their environments
(Wrigbt et al., 1998). Environmental scanning in
tbe embryonic free market system seems central to
addressing tbis deficiency.
2000 May, Stewart, and Sweo
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Most researcb definitions of organizational envi-
ronment bave been based on tbe work of Duncan
(1972), wbo defined tbe environment as all of tbe
relevant factors outside an organization's bound-
aries tbat are incorporated into its decision making.
Environmental uncertainty arises from an individ-
ual's perceived inability to predict an organiza-
tion's environment (Milliken, 1987), a dilemma
created by a lack of information about organiza-
tions, activities, and events in tbe environment
(Huber & Daft, 1987), often stemming from dyna-
mism and complexity (Dess & Beard, 1984; Duncan,
1972). Milliken (1987) defined environmental un-
certainty in terms of tbree different constructs. Per-
ceived environmental uncertainty is described as
state uncertainty, or being unable to predict the
environment, a concept distinct from effect uncer-
tainty (not knowing what tbe impact of an environ-
mental condition will be) and response uncertainty
(not knowing bow to respond to an environmental
condition). State uncertainty would appear to bave
the most direct influence on scanning bebavior.
Milliken (1987) wrote tbat administrators who are
experiencing a bigb degree of state uncertainty will
spend a greater amount of time and resources on
environmental scanning and forecasting tlian will
administrators wbo are more confident in their un-
derstanding of the environment.
Effective strategic decision making becomes
more problematic wben tbe salient decision vari-
ables and tbeir interrelations are indeterminate (Al-
dricb, 1979), the degree of environmental stability
being one of the prime considerations (Duncan,
1972; Lindsay & Rue, 1980). Environmental issues
are often ambiguous (Dutton et al., 1983), entailing
perceptions and requiring interpretation (Daft &
Weick, 1984; Smircicb & Stubbart, 1985) for issue
diagnosis. Tbese perceptions of tbe environment,
as opposed to objective environmental conditions,
determine managerial decision making (Anderson
& Paine, 1975; Bourgeois, 1980; Boyd, Dess, &
Rasbeed, 1993; Cbild, 1972; Daft & Weick, 1984;
Dutton & Duncan, 1987; Miles, Snow, & Pfeffer,
1974; Starbuck, 1976). Moreover, top managers typ-
ically scan according to tbeir perceptions concern-
ing the necessity of information (Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978). Daft and colleagues (1988) proposed tbat
only when perceived uncertainty (complexity and
rate of cbange) was deemed important to a firm's
goal attainment would tbe pbenomenon actually
create strategic uncertainty in environmental sec-
tors for top managers. According to tbe authors,
strategic uncertainty necessitates seeking informa-
405
tion and diagnosing environmental conditions,
thereby precipitating environmental scanning.
HYPOTHESES
Uncertainty in Environmental Sectors
An organization's environment can be divided
into two distinct strata (Bourgeois, 1980), witb tbe
distinction based upon tbe directness of influence
on operations and upon organizational goal attain-
ment (Daft et al., 1988). Tbe task environment in-
volves sectors in wbicb tbere is direct interaction
with the organization (suppliers, customers, and
competitors are examples). Tbe general environ-
ment includes sectors with indirect interaction
witb tbe organization (sucb as government, eco-
nomic conditions, and sociocultural factors) and
may influence its long-term decisions. Researchers
bave attempted to clarify wbetber tbe task or tbe
general environment bas more influence on scan-
ning bebavior.
Daft and colleagues (1988) proposed that sectors
in the task environment would create greater per-
ceived strategic uncertainty for top executives tban
would sectors in tbe general environment because
tbe task environment changed more rapidly, was
more complex, and was perceived as more impor-
tant tban the general environment. Tbe results of
their work, bowever, indicated tbat the task and
general environments did not differ significantly in
terms of perceived strategic uncertainty, a finding
corroborated in Nigeria (Sawyerr, 1993) and in Bul-
garia (Elenkov, 1997). In fact, only one study pro-
vides support for tbe idea tbat task environment
sectors are perceived as more strategically uncer-
tain tban general environment sectors. Auster and
Cboo (1993), in a survey of 115 Canadian CEOs in
tbe telecommunications and publishing industries,
found that tbree sectors of tbe task environment,
wbicb they called customer, technological, and
competition, were rated bigber on perceived stra-
tegic uncertainty tban tbree general environment
sectors (regulatory, economic, and sociocultural).
Recent evidence from Russia indicates tfiat execu-
tives perceive higb levels of environmental turbu-
lence and that tbey consider tbe political/legal,
customer, economic, and resource sectors of tbe
environment to be tbe sectors most important to
organizational success (May & Stewart, 1998), but
not nec'essarily the most uncertain.
During the Soviet era, enterprise managers relied
beavily on personal contacts and informal interor-
ganizational links as a means of securing scarce
resources and supplies necessary to meet the often
unrealistic goals set by tbe State Planning Commit-
406 Academy of Management Journal
tee (Linz, 1988). Personal relationships were also
essential in currying political favor witbin tbe
Communist Party bierarchy for the interests of en-
terprise and personal career advancement (Puffer &
McCarthy, 1995). Tbus, Russian managers bave a
tradition of exploiting highly politicized condi-
tions in tbe political/legal sector of the environ-
ment and tigbtly connected supplier networks in
tbe resource sector (Sanna, 1993). What may be
most unfamiliar, and tbus generate tbe greatest per-
ceived uncertainty, are those environmental sectors
that did not exist during tbe Soviet era, and tbose
tbat existed in sucb an entirely different form as to
render unrecognizable tbe current models, namely
tbe market economy, customers, and competitors
(May, Bormann-Young, & Ledgerwood, 1998;
Puffer et al., 1996; Shama, 1993; Warner, Denezh-
kina, & Campbell, 1994; Wright et al., 1998). Tbus,
we expected to find a mix of levels of perceived
strategic uncertainty across task and general envi-
ronment sectors in Russia that would be consistent
witb previous findings. Moreover, we anticipated
tbat tbe sectors generating tbe greatest perceived
strategic uncertainty would be tbose sectors least
familiar to Russian managers;
Hypothesis 1. Environmental sectors ranked in
order of Russian managers' perceived strategic
uncertainty will reflect a mixed pattern of task
and general sectors.
Hypothesis 2. The customer, competitor, and
economic sectors of the Russian environment
will generate the highest levels of perceived
strategic uncertainty.
Scanning Frequency
Daft and bis coautbors (1988) advanced scanning
tbeory by proposing that the multiplicative con-
struct of strategic uncertainty (rate of cbange plus
complexity, weighted by importance) predicts
scanning bebavior, botb in scope and frequency.
Tbeir results, along witb tbose of Auster and Cboo
(1993), provide support for tbe theory tbat higb
levels of perceived strategic uncertainty will lead to
an increase in scanning frequency across environ-
mental sectors, at least among managers from Nortb
American firms. More recently, Boyd and Fulk
(1996) contributed evidence that indicates tbat tbe
Daft et al. (1988) composite measure of strategic
uncertainty masks tbe components' individual ef-
fects on scanning frequency, suggesting tbat re-
searcbers sbould disaggregate tbe strategic uncer-
tainty construct in order to examine its individual
components. Boyd and Fulk's (1996) proposition
was primarily based on Milliken's (1987) assertion
June
tbat the components of perceived uncertainty, and
tbus, of strategic uncertainty, bave unique impli-
cations for scanning and sbould be examined as
separate constructs. Tbe cited autbors found sig-
nificant support for tbeir proposed positive rela-
tionship between perceived importance and scan-
ning frequency, botb as a main effect and as an
interaction witb perceived variability.
Altbougb tbese findings raise important ques-
tions concerning the appropriateness of relying
solely on tbe Daft et al. (1988) strategic uncertainty
composite measure to predict scanning, we know
of no additional empirical studies tbat bave tested
tbe relationsbip between perceived uncertainty
and scanning witb a disaggregated approacb.
Ratber, tbe scanning literature, particularly the em-
pirical examinations of non-Western samples rele-
vant to our research, bas relied on the composite
measure of strategic uncertainty supported by Daft
and his colleagues (1988) as the central predictor of
scanning behavior.
Sawyerr (1993) and Elenkov (1997) replicated
Daft and colleagues' (1988) researcb by testing tbe
relationsbip between strategic uncertainty and
scanning frequency in non-Western environments
cliaracterized by significant political and economic
transition. Tbe results were inconclusive, with
Sawyerr (1993) concluding that Nigerian managers
increased scanning frequency in response to in-
creased perceptions of strategic uncertainty in four
of seven environmental sectors, and Elenkov (1997)
failing to find support for tbe proposed relationsbip
in Bulgaria. Tbe conflicting results from the West-
ern and non-Western studies led us to believe tbat
tbe key to explaining scanning frequency migbt lie
in the unique situational characteristics of the tran-
sitional environment.
A potentially important explanatory factor of
scanning activity, largely excluded from researcb
since tbe early 1980s, is the construct of perceived
information accessibility. O'Reilly (1982) provided
evidence for the importance of accessibility as a
determinant of information usage for managerial
decision making, and Culnan's (1983) results indi-
cated tbat tbe frequency of usage of essentially all
information sources is positively related to tbeir
perceived accessibility. More recently, Auster and
Cboo (1993) incorporated accessibility into tbeir
conceptual framework for explaining scanning be-
bavior among Canadian managers, but the results
did not support tbe proposed relationsbip between
tbe perceived accessibility of information and scan-
ning mode frequency.
Since Russia's adoption of a free market orienta-
tion in tbe early 1990s, one of tbe most cballenging
obstacles for businesses bas been a severe shortage
2000 May, Stewart, and Sweo
of relevant market data (BISNIS, 1997). This prob-
lem exists not only for industry (Puffer & Sheksh-
nia, 1996; Shekshnia, 1994), but also for many busi-
ness schools in Russian universities (Mockler,
Chao, & Dologite, 1996). Use of on-line resources
via the Internet lags behind that in the West largely
because of the antiquated telecommunications in-
frastructure in Russia and a shortage of personal
computers in most businesses (BISNIS, 1997).
Perhaps the critical shortage of information ex-
plains why many Russian executives w^ho go
abroad for training exhibit voracious appetites for
data of all kinds regardless of its particular rele-
vance for the Russian business environment (May
et al., 1998; Warner et al., 1994). This behavior
raises questions concerning whether Russian man-
agers possess the knowledge and skills necessary to
acquire and discriminate among sources of relevant
information about their environments, even if in-
formation is readily accessible. Elenkov (1997)
noted that Bulgarian managers underutilized cer-
tain information resources because they lacked the
knowledge necessary to handle complex business
documentation and management information sys-
tems. Sawyerr (1993) also observed that two of the
characteristic features of developing countries are
the lack of systematic information sources and the
absence of the social and political infrastructures
necessary to support scanning. Hence, accessibility
of information as a possible influence on scanning
behavior should be viewed not only as a pure sup-
ply issue, but also as an issue of individuals know-
ing where and how to access information.
In light of the previous disparate findings con-
cerning the antecedents of scanning, Bluedorn,
Johnson, Cartwright, and Barringer (1994) coun-
seled that it would be prudent to consider accessi-
bility of information as a potential moderator in
future scanning research. Given the documented
shortages of data in Russia, one might expect
perceptions of information accessibility among
Russian executives to moderate the relationship
between environmental perceptions and environ-
mental scanning. Thus, we propose an extension of
the Daft et al. (1988) model to include an interac-
tion between strategic uncertainty and source ac-
cessibility, such that Russian managers who per-
ceive high levels of strategic uncertainty and
believe that the information they need is accessible
will be more likely to expend time and effort on
scanning activities than will executives who sense
a high level of strategic uncertainty, but do not
perceive that they have access to affordable, perti-
nent information.
407
Hypothesis 3a. Higher levels of perceived stra-
tegic uncertainty will be associated with higher
levels of scanning frequency among Russian
executives.
Hypothesis 3b. The interaction of strategic un-
certainty and perceived source accessibility
will be positively related to the scanning fre-
quency of Russian executives.
Modes of Scanning
Modes of scanning, or sources of information, are
defined by the nature and acquisition of data, de-
pending on an organization's mode of interpreta-
tion (Daft & Weick, 1984). Environmental informa-
tion is obtained from internal or external sources,
and from personal or impersonal sources (Aguilar,
1967; Daft & Lengel, 1986; Keegan, 1974). An inter-
nal source is within the organization; an external
source is outside it. Impersonal sources include
documents like internal reports and externally gen-
erated documents such as newspapers and govern-
ment reports, and personal sources involve direct
communication with other individuals either
within or outside of the organization.
Top managers tend to seek information about the
environment from personal sources (Aguilar, 1967;
Keegan, 1974), particularly in changing environ-
ments (Eisenhardt, 1989), where interaction with
outsiders affords an opportunity to avoid the man-
agers' selective biases (Van de Ven, 1986) and to
draw upon richer information with which to revise
or develop strategies (Daft & Lengel, 1986). In a
dynamic, uncertain environment, managers also
tend to prefer verbal over written sources of envi-
ronmental information (Kurke & Aldrich, 1983) and
to rely more on personal sources of information
to interpret unclear issues (Daft & Weick, 1984;
Weick, 1979). Managers in cultures dominated by
social or group orientations are more likely to use
personal and subjective sources (Schneider, 1989;
Yoshino, 1979).
Although substantial evidence points to an in-
creased use of personal sources as uncertainty in-
creases. Daft and colleagues (1988) and Auster and
Choo (1993) discovered that higher levels of strate-
gic uncertainty were associated with increased fre-
quency of scanning in both the personal and im-
personal modes. Outside North America, however,
Sawyerr (1993) reported that increased perceptions
of strategic uncertainty among Nigerian managers
were associated with more frequent scanning of
impersonal sources, but not personal sources. Con-
versely, Elenkov's (1997) findings in Bulgaria sup-
ported the relationship between strategic uncer-
408 Academy of Management Journal
tainty and the use of personal information sources,
but not impersonal sources. Elenkov (1997) rea-
soned that because personal connections and infor-
mal influence are so crucial to the accomplishment
of organizational goals in the business culture of
Eastern Europe (Beamish, 1992; Pearce, 1991;
Puffer, 1994], it is logical to expect Bulgarian man-
agers to rely more heavily on personal sources of
information when strategic uncertainty is per-
ceived to be high.
Because Russians have a similar tradition of
heavy reliance on personal connections with peo-
ple in influential positions, sometimes referred to
as seeking Wat (Puffer & McCarthy, 1995], we ex-
pected that Russian managers w^ould increase scan-
ning among personal sources when higher levels of
strategic uncertainty were perceived. We also ex-
pected to see an increase in the use of impersonal
sources of information, given that managers may
perceive the need to look beyond their long-stand-
ing personal contacts to acquire information about
the nascent free market environment in Russia. Ad-
ditionally, evidence indicates that Russian firms
place a high premium on written material acquired
through Western consultants, market-oriented
business schools, and training and development
programs (May et al., 1998; Mockler et al., 1996;
Warner et al., 1994]. The degree to which personal
and impersonal modes of information are used by
Russian managers is likely to depend, at least in
part, on their proximity to influential persons and
the funding and/or knowledge they possess with
which impersonal sources of information can be
accessed. Thus, we propose that perceived source
accessibility is likely to moderate the relationship
between strategic uncertainty and the use of per-
sonal and impersonal sources of information by
Russian managers.
Hypothesis 4a. Higher levels of perceived stra-
tegic uncertainty will be associated with higher
levels of scanning of personal sources of infor-
mation by Russian executives.
Hypothesis 4b. The interaction of perceived
strategic uncertainty and perceived accessibil-
ity of personal sources will be positively re-
lated to scanning of personal sources of infor-
mation by Russian executives.
Hypothesis 4c. Higher levels of perceived stra-
tegic uncertainty will be associated with higher
levels of scanning of impersonal sources of
information by Russian executives.
Hypothesis 4d. The interaction of perceived
strategic uncertainty and perceived accessibil-
ity of impersonal sources will be positively re-
June
lated to scanning of impersonal sources by
Russian executives.
Daft and Weick (1984] posited that when the
environment is perceived to be less analyzable,
managers are more likely to use external informa-
tion gleaned from personal contacts, particularly in
organizations that are undirected in their scanning.
In addition, evidence indicates that multinational
companies (Keegan, 1974) and those with high per-
formance (Thomas, Clark, & Gioia, 1993] rely more
on external information than on information ac-
quired internally. Daft and colleagues [1988] and
Auster and Choo (1993) found that managers from
the United States and Canada increased scanning
frequency in both external and internal information
modes when strategic uncertainty escalated. Saw-
yerr (1993) and Elenkov (1997), however, found
support only for the relationship between strategic
uncertainty and use of external sources in their
non-Western samples. Because neither study de-
tected a relationship between strategic uncertainty
and the frequency of scanning internal sources, and
because the Russian situation shares many similar-
ities with both the Nigerian and Bulgarian situ-
ations, we did not expect to find a relationship
between strategic uncertainty and scanning of in-
ternal sources either. Given that Russian executives
have little experience functioning in a market-
oriented econoniy and frequently encounter short-
ages of relevant business/market data, we antici-
pated that these managers would rely more on
external sources for information. Additionally, we
expected managers' efforts to obtain external infor-
mation to be conditioned by their perceptions of
source accessibility.
Hypothesis 5a. Higher levels of perceived stra-
tegic uncertainty will be associated with higher
levels of scanning external sources of informa-
tion by Russian executives.
Hypothesis 5b. The interaction of strategic un-
certainty and the perceived accessibility of ex-
ternal sources will be positively related to the
scanning of external sources by Russian exec-
utives.
Hypothesis 6. There will be no relationship
between perceived strategic uncertainty and
the scanning of internal sources of information
by Russian executives.
METHODS
Sample and Data Collection
A primary obstacle to the research was collecting
data in Russia, where researchers must overcome
2000 May, Stewart, and Sweo
the inefficiencies of tbe postal system, a deartb of
dependable, systematic a priori lists of potential
respondents, and most importantly, tbe inberent
suspicion of surveys and reticence that remain
from the Soviet era (Vlacboutsicos & Lawrence,
1996). Therefore, to support the requirements of tbe
researcb, we determined tbat tbese conditions ne-
cessitated a departure from the traditional mail sur-
veys tbat bave been used in scanning researcb.
Alternatively, we asked senior-level business stu-
dents in Russia to solicit participation in the study
and to collect survey data. Tbe rationale for tbis
decision was twofold. First, we believed that Rus-
sian students, familiar witb tbe cultural intricacies
associated witb approaching potential respon-
dents, would be better received than would foreign
researchers. Second, owing to company sponsor-
ship of students in the academic program, the stu-
dents had personal contacts with Russian manag-
ers. We reasoned that these relationships would
increase the likelihood of ca:reful, forthright re-
sponses to the questionnaire, thereby also reducing
nonresponse bias and increasing tbe resulting sam-
ple size.
Over 40 students in a joint degree program of-
fered by tbe Siberian-American Department of
Management at Irkutsk University voluntarily par-
ticipated in data collection. Before beginning tbis
process, the students were exposed to the concepts
of environmental scanning as part of their instruc-
tion in a strategic management class taught by one
of the authors. The requirements for an executive's
participation in the study were then outlined to the,
students who opted to collect data. Students were
instructed to use their personal contacts to access
senior-level managers (vice presidents or higher) in
firms with more than five employees that operated
in a primary line of business. We asked students to
solicit participation across multiple industries, a
recommendation made by Hambrick (1981b) for
extending scanning researcb, and to approacb only
one executive per firm.
During the last week of March and the first week
of April, 1998, the survey was administered to Rus-
sian executives, primarily individuals from central
Siberia, most of whom were from the Irkutsk re-
gion. Irkutsk is a city of 700,000 people in the
center of the Irkutsk region [oblast] of approxi-
mately 2.8 million people. Although Irkutsk has
recently surpassed St. Petersburg to rank second to
tbe Moscow region in terms of GDP per capita
(Irkutsk Oblast Department of Economics, 1998), it
remains beavily dependent on otber parts of Russia
for most of its food and manufactured products.
The area is also vulnerable to swings in world
market commodity prices of its three primary ex-
409
ports, aluminum, cellulose, and timber, wbich
must be transported from Irkutsk on an overbur-
dened and oft;en inefficient Trans-Siberian Rail-
way. More than 80 percent of the 35,000 business
entities and 4,000 industrial enterprises in the re-
gion have been started or privatized since 1993,
creating a massive shift of control and increased
uncertainty. A severe cash crunch has been an
added burden, forcing many barter-based transac-
tions between businesses. "For a people wbo were
used to no unemployment, very little crime and a
fixed pace of growtb, the economic changes of the
past few years have come as a shock. Managers are
still trying to adjust to a very different climate than
the one they were trained to deal with" (Irkutsk
Oblast Department of Economics, 1998: 5).
As a result of student involvement, the survey
was administered to 106 Russian executives. We
purged two responses because of missing data.
Also, there were eight cases where more than one
individual from a firm completed the survey, a
violation of the sampling rules. In these cases, we
retained the higher-ranking manager in the sample
and discarded the other response. The resulting
final usable data set consisted of 96 executives.
Sixty-one men and 35 women ranging in age from
20 to 63 comprised tbe sample, with the average
age being 39. Individuals identified themselves by
position as follows; 33 as either owner or general
director (president), 22 as deputy director (execu-
tive vice president), and 41 as vice president. Tbe
executives bad worked for their respective firms
over time periods that ranged from two months to
41.5 years, with the average firm tenure being 8
years. Tbe 96 firms were from a cross section of six
industry categories, and the firms ranged in age
from 1 to 71 years, with an average firm age of 14
years. On average, the firms had 50 to 100 employ-
ees and annual revenues of $1,000,000 to
$5,000,000, making the sample comparable in
terms of organization size to tbose of previous scan-
ning studies (e.g.. Daft et al., 1988; Elenkov, 1997;
Sawyerr, 1993).
Although the sample was one of convenience,
several benefits accrued from our sampling tech-
nique. First, the rate of response, estimated from
student feedback, was approximately 95 percent.
Given that the response rate for the typical mail
survey of top executives averages between 10 and
12 percent (Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson,
1993), the degree of participation in this study in-
dicates less concern with nonresponse bias than
there is in the usual mail survey. Also, under the
aforementioned circumstances, the use of personal
contacts may have facilitated more forthright re-
sponses from the executives to the survey ques-
410 Academy of Management Journal
tions. Finally, the respondents were not anony-
mous, and we carefully inspected the returned
surveys and verified each response.
Variables and Instrumentation
We reviewed several scanning instruments de-
signed in the West that use hypothetical scenarios
as items for assessing perceived environmental un-
certainty in various sectors (e.g., Boyd & Fulk,
1996; Hambrick, 1981b; Miles & Snow, 1978). Tbe
known poor reliability of scenario-type scales in
countries outside tbat of their origin (Buchko, 1994;
Ireland, Hitt, Bettis, & de Porras, 1987) would be
exacerbated in tbe post-Communist environment in
which neophyte Russian executives operate. There-
fore, following the methods of Daft et al. (1988) and
Sawyerr (1993), we developed an instrument that
more directly measured the perceived rate of
change, complexity, and importance of seven envi-
ronmental sectors [political/legal, competition,
economic, sociocultural, technology, customer/
market, and resources) and the frequency of scan-
ning across the four different information modes;
impersonal external, personal external, impersonal
internal, and personal internal.
We measured the perceptions of change, com-
plexity, and importance using Daft and colleagues'
(1988) five-point Likert scale (5 = very high, 1 =
very low) with seven items (one per sector) for each
variahle. Rate of change was defined as "the fre-
quency and speed of change that you see in the
trends, issues and conditions in each environmen-
tal sector," and complexity was defined as "the
number and diversity of events occurring in envi-
ronmental sectors outside the operations of your
company." Tbis measurement of complexity fo-
cused on heterogeneity. Two potential subdimen-
sions of complexity, predictability and analyzabil-
ity, were problematic in Russia because of
translation problems. More importantly, tbese as-
sessments were not a part of Russian managers'
roles and experience under the centrally planned
system, posing measurement equivalency prob-
lems. To assess perceived importance, we asked the
executives the following: "How important do you
consider each environmental sector to be in accom-
plishing your company's goals?" Respondents were
also asked to evaluate the accessibility of each in-
formation mode on a five-point scale adapted from
Culnan (1983; 5 = extremely accessible, 1 = not
very accessible at all), resulting in a four-item mea-
sure of total perceived accessibility. Accessibility
was defined as "tbe ease with which you can ac-
quire this information at reasonable to no cost, and
June
the extent to which you are readily aware of where
to get the information."
The respondents were asked to evaluate the rate
of change and level of complexity for each of the
seven environmental sectors and then to indicate
the level of importance for accomplishing organi-
zational goals attributable to each sector. Therefore,
a total of 21 items, 7 per variable, comprised the
measures of the three main environmental vari-
ables. Using Daft et al.'s (1988) formula, we tben
multiplied the sum of the rate-of-change items and
the complexity items by the sum of the importance
items to create the strategic uncertainty variable, as
follows; strategic uncertainty = [rate of change +
complexity) X importance.
Following the evidence that a frequency ap-
proach to scanning measurement is more valid than
using estimates of hours devoted to the task (Farh et
al., 1984), we focused on the measurement of scan-
ning frequency, a decision that also enhanced com-
parison to Daft and colleagues' (1988) work. Using
a matrix format similar to theirs, we measured the
frequency with which participants collected or re-
ceived information about each of the seven envi-
ronmental sectors on a five-point scale (5 = daily,
4 = weekly, 3 = monthly, 2 = a few times per year,
1 = less than once a year). Four matrixes comprised
the survey instrument, one for each mode of infor-
mation scanning; there were 7 items per matrix, for
a total of 28 items measuring scanning. This format
allowed examination of the frequency of scanning
on a per environmental sector basis or a per infor-
mation mode basis, as well as examination of total
scanning across all sectors and modes. The final
portion of the survey included questions about the
individuals and their firms so that we could control
for potential demographic confounds.
Measurement equivalency. We carefully con-
sidered the possibility that the environment con-
structs would not have the same meaning in Russia,
a conceptual equivalency issue that has plagued
cross-cultural research (Drenth, 1985; Sekaran,
1981; Steers, 1989). Therefore, following the advice
of Riordan and Vandenberg (1994), we attempted to
strengtben measurement equivalency by first over-
seeing tbe translation of the instrument into
Russian and then obtaining an independent back-
translation into English. Throughout the process,
ail identified problems in the Russian version, or
inconsistencies between it and the English version,
were noted and corrected. This technique should
have limited misunderstandings due to language
differences, but it did not guarantee conceptual
equivalency (Peng, Peterson, & Shyi, 1991). There-
fore, we did a pilot study of the survey with a group
of bilingual students to verify the conceptual equiv-
2000 May, Stewart, and Sweo
alence of the two versions of the instrument. These
students also sought input from managers who did
not participate in the survey in order to ensure
functional equivalence in instrumentation. Addi-
tionally, we provided thorough explanations of the
constructs in the questionnaire, which the students
reviewed with the respondents. Overall, given
the comhined effect of careful translation, hack-
translation, pilot study, and careful explanation of
the operational definitions, we believe that the Rus-
sian questionnaire was conceptually and function-
ally equivalent to its English counterpart and that it
was consistently interpreted hy the respondents.
Measurement validation. Previous studies from
which the instrumentation was drawn provide lim-
ited evidence of the psychometric properties of the
scales. Therefore, we used confirmatory factor anal-
ysis to assess the measurement properties of the
primary predictors. In so doing, we first specified a
recursive four-factor model corresponding to the
four theoretically derived predictors: rate of
change, complexity, importance, and accessibility.
Second, because of divergent validity concerns as-
sociated with the significant correlation between
rate of change and complexity, we also specified a
rival three-factor model in order to comparatively
assess the dimensionality of measurement.
The most common estimation methods in struc-
tural equation modeling are based on the assump-
tion of large samples. Thus, parameter estimates
may be inaccurate in samples of less than 200
(Marsh, Balla, & MacDonald, 1988), particularly in
producing a chi-square distribution (Kelloway,
1998). Therefore, instead of chi-square, we used the
root-mean-square' error of approximation (RMSEA)
as the index of absolute and comparative model fit.
The RMSEA has the advantages of being indepen-
dent of sample size and adjusting for model com-
plexity, thereby generating a better estimate of com-
parative parsimonious model fit (Kelloway, 1998).
The index is normed and produces a confidence
interval (C.I.) for the point estimate. A range of
RMSEA values from .05 to .10 represents a good fit
to the data (Stieger, 1990).
The results support the proposed four-factor
model (RMSEA = .10; CL, .08, .13) over the three-
factor model (RMSEA = .13; C.I., .11, .15). Because
model fit does not address the validity of the indi-
vidual predictions within the model (Joreskog,
1993), we also examined the variance accounted for
in the four-factor model. The adjusted population
gamma index (equivalent to a multiple squared cor-
relation [R^]) was .73 (C.I., .69, .78), an acceptable
level. Moreover, at an alpha level of .05, condition
9 tests of the parameters of the model (Kelloway,
1998) indicated that all of the items significantly
411
loaded as expected with critical t-values above the
1.96 level, with the exception of the resource sector
item on complexity, v^rhich had a t-score of 1.90,
significant at the .10 level. Finally, Cronbach alpha
estimates for rate of change, complexity, impor-
tance, and accessibility were .66, .66, .73, and .60,
respectively, and the alpha for scanning frequency
was .94, providing additional evidence of construct
validity (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).
Control variables. A number of demographic
variables can affect perceptions and strategic activ-
ities. Accordingly, we collected information on the
age, years of formal education, firm tenure (Ham-
brick & Mason, 1984), functional career background
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Keegan, 1974), and man-
agement position (Hambrick, 1981b; Ireland et al.,
1987) of each respondent. We also asked each re-
spondent to identify his or her firm's primary in-
dustry group (Daft et al., 1988; Duncan, 1972; Fa-
hey & King, 1977), number of employees, annual
revenues, and year of founding. Given the stark
differences in the predominant ideologies of the
Soviet and free market eras, we suspected that there
might be significant differences in the perceptions
and behavior of executives employed by firms that
had operated under years of Soviet control and
those that had emerged in the post-perestroika era.
RESULTS
Correlations, means and standard deviations for
all variables are presented in Table 1. As expected,
significant correlations exist among some of the
demographic characteristics and among many of
the constructs of primary interest. Given that stra-
tegic uncertainty is a combination of perceived rate
of change, complexity, and importance, the aggre-
gate construct is significantly related to its compo-
nents, as are the main effect variables with the
interaction terms. The same holds true for the four
scanning modes and the combination variable, total
scanning. As subsequently discussed, we ad-
dressed the accompanying multicollinearity con-
cerns through our data analytic technique.
Environmental Sectors
The first hypothesis predicts that, ranked in or-
der of perceived strategic uncertainty, task and gen-
eral sectors will show a mixed pattern. Hypothesis
2 indicates the expectation that the economic, com-
petitor, and customer sectors will generate the
highest levels of perceived strategic uncertainty.
Table 2 presents the results of the paired t-tests and
compares the rankings with those of other studies.
As predicted in the hypotheses, the results indicate
412 Academy of Management Journal June

TABLE 1
Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics for All Variables in Regression Analyses"
Variable Mean S.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

1. Position'' 1.08 0.87

2. Age 39.25 8.75 .03
3. Tenure'^ 96.86 96.95 .17 .57***
4. Education'' 15.05 3.27 -.05 .28** .05
5. Age of organization 14.25 15.72 .26** .30** • .62*** .01
6. Rate of change 21.79 4.22 -.02 -.35*** -.26** -.06 -.26**
7. Complexity 22.98 4.06 .03 -.19+ .01 -.10 .03 .51***
8. Importance 25.61 4.43 -.04 -.15 -.07 .05 -.15 .16 .25**
9. Strategic uncertainty 1,154.44 306.61 -.01 -.29** -.12 -.02 -.18 .62*** .67*** .81***
10. Accessibility, all modes 15.42 2.36 -.06 -.26** -.32*** -.04 -.11 .25** .09 .29** .28**
11. Strategic uncertainty X 18,012.81 6,001.09 -.03 -.32*** -.20^ -.01 -.17 .59*** .58*** .76*** .92***
accessibility, all modes
12. Importance X 398.18 101.87 -.05 -.23** -.21* .03 -.15 .23** .21* .84*** .70***
accessibility, all modes
13. Accessibility, personal 7.69 1.29 -.02 -.26** -.22** -.05 -.10 .23** .11 .31** .29**
14. Accessibility, 7.72 1.46 -.08 -.18 -.32*** -.02 -.10 .20+ .06 .20+ .20+
impersonal
15. Accessibility, external 7.10 1.51 -.09 -.19^ -.32*** .03 -.11 .13 -.06 .11 .08
16. Accessibility, internal 8.32 1.36 -.01 -.23** -.20+ -.11 -.07 .28** .22** .38*** .40***
17. Strategic uncertainty X 99.46 25.94 -.03 -.23** -.16 .01 -.14 .23** .21* .83*** .70***
accessibility, personal
18. Strategic uncertainty X 99.63 28.04 -.07 -.20^ -.23** .04 -.14 .21* .17 .76*** .63***
accessibility, impersonal
19. Strategic uncertainty x 91.36 26.45 -.09 -.20+ -.25** .08 -.15 .16 .08 .68*** .53***
accessibility, external
20. Strategic uncertainty X 107.72 29.04 -.02 -.21* -.14 -.02 -.12 .25** .28** .85*** .75***
accessibility, internal
21. Scanning frequency, all 22.40 4.66 .11 -.14 -.15 .05 -.02 .03 .01 .40*** .28**
modes
22. Scanning frequency. 45.31 10.31 .10 -.13 -.11 .03 .01 .06 .01 .32** .25**
personal
23. Scanning frequency. 44.30 9.74 .11 -.14 -.16 .05 -.04 -.01 .01 .39*** .28**
impersonal
24. Scanning frequency. 43.95 9.23 .07 -.09 -.14 .05 -.02 -.02 -.01 .39*** .26**
external
25. Scanning frequency. 45.65 10.82 .13 -.17 -.13 .03 -.01 .06 .03 .32*** .27**
internal

° N = 96 individuals/firms.
^ Coding: 3 = owner, director general, or president; 2 = deputy director; 1 = vice president.
"^ In months.
•^ In years.
+ p < .10
* p < .05
**p < .01
***p < .001

a mixed pattern of task and general environment
sector effects, with the customer, competitor, and
economic sectors producing significantly higher
levels of strategic uncertainty. The results support
the expectation that the sectors in which reforms
have produced the most sweeping changes are
those that Russian executives perceive as generat-
ing the most strategic uncertainty. As illustrated in
Table 2, these results are generally comparable to
the sector rankings from previous studies, particu-
larly those of Daft and colleagues (1988), and are
also comparable to rankings found for the custom-
er/market (Elenkov, 1997; Sawyerr, 1993) and eco-
nomic (Sawyerr, 1993) sectors in other developing
economies.
We used hierarchical set regression analysis to
test the remaining hypotheses in order to conduct
an independent examination of the unique effects
of each of the variables on scanning frequency and
scanning modes, a recommended analysis of de-
composed effects (Boyd & Fulk, 1996), Also, the
technique allows for variance partitioning of corre-
lated independent variables, wherein each step
presents the unique variance explained, thereby
2000 May, Stewart, and Sweo 413

TABLE 1 (continued)

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

.62***

.76*** .87***

.83*** .55*** .66***

.87*** .52*** .64*** .45***

.84*** .40*** .56*** .64*** .78***

.80*** .63*** .69*** .73*** .64*** .34***
.68*** .82*** .94*** .78*** .40*** .46*** .67***

.75*** .82*** .95*** .47*** .78*** .59*** .64*** .78***

.77*** .75*** .91*** .62*** .69*** .79*** .45*** .82*** .89***

.63*** .85*** .93*** .59*** .49*** .25** .81*** .90*** .85*** .68***

.29** .37*** .45*** .18 .30** .32*** .14 .38*** .47*** .50*** .34***

.31** .36*** .43*** .24** .29** .36*** .14 .38*** .43*** .49*** .30** .94***

.22** .33*** .41*** .09 .27** .23** .11 .33*** .44*** .43*** .33*** .93*** .73***

.24** .33*** .43*** .15 .25** .33*** .05 .37*** .44*** .51*** .29** .92*** .86*** .86***

.29** .36*** .41*** .18 .30** .28** .19+ .34*** .43*** .42*** .33*** .94*** .88*** .87*** .73***

eliminating the effects of multicoUinearity and in-
creasing the stability of the estimates (Cohen &
Cohen, 1983). The effectiveness of the hierarchical
procedure in dealing with multicoUinearity was
confirmed by diagnostics of the regression models,
which indicated high tolerance levelsTb^lhe pre-
dictors and acceptable variance inflationVactors
(Hays, 1994), Additionally," oUr-^focus on sets of
variables and concomitant use of Fisher's prjstected
t-tests reduced me "experimentwise" likelihood of
making a Type l^em)r and maxiinized the extrac-
tion of causal inference (CcrheTr& Cohen, 1983).
Before specifying and analyzing the hierarchical
models, we first checked the potential confounds
for any significant effects. One-way analyses of
variance (ANOVAs) indicated that career path [F =
0.94, p = .49), industry (F = 1,06, p = ,39), and firm
size, in terms of both number of employees (F =
0,92, p = .47) and annual sales (F = 1.67, p = .15),
had no statistically significant influences on scan-
ning frequency across modes. In the interest of
model parsimony, these variables were excluded
from further analysis.
We then constructed the hierarchy of analysis in
accordance with existing theory, the priorities of
the research, and the guidelines for causal se-
quence. Because demographic variables are likely
candidates for causal priority in behavioral studies
(Cohen & Cohen, 1983), and because we wanted to
control for their effects, we entered the demo-
graphic variables first. Next, we entered all possible
permutations of the three components of strategic
uncertainty (rate of change, complexity, and impor-
tance). In each case the results were the same. We
present the hierarchical sequence that is most con-
sistent with Daft and colleagues' (1988) formula-
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2000 May, Stewart, and Sweo
tion of strategic uncertainty and the concomitant
presumptive logic of causality: individual demo-
graphics, firm age, rate of change, complexity, im-
portance, the composite strategic uncertainty score,
source accessibility, and the multiplicative interac-
tion of strategic uncertainty and source accessibil-
ity, entered after the main effects, as recommended
by Cohen and Cohen (1983) and by Jaccard, Turrisi,
and Wan (1990). In assessing the models, we first
analyzed each fully partialled model and, when it
was significant, tested the significance of each step
in the hierarchy by examining the change in R^
associated with that step. At each step, the focus
centers on the direct effects of the set that has just
been entered into the model. When the step was
significant, we then assessed the individual t-test
for the variable or variables in the set. An exami-
nation of residuals showed no violations of regres-
sion assumptions.
Scanning Frequency
Hypothesis 3a posits that higher levels of per-
ceived strategic uncertainty will be related to
higher levels of scanning frequency. Hypothesis 3b
predicts that scanning will be more frequent when
strategic uncertainty is high and the source of in-
formation is perceived as more accessible. Table 3
presents the results of the analysis. None of the
individual demographic variables or firm age sig-
nificantly influenced scanning. Notably, there was
a significant effect for one component of the strate-
gic uncertainty construct, importance, but there
were no significant, direct effects for rate of change
or complexity. Neither were there any significant
main effects for strategic uncertainty, a finding fail-
ing to support Hypotheses 3a; however, the inter-
action with perceived accessibility was significant,
supporting Hypothesis 3b. The effects of strategic
uncertainty on scanning frequency were condi-
tioned by how accessible the source of information
was perceived to be. Simple slope analysis (Aiken
& West, 1991; Jaccard et al., 1990) revealed that
higher levels of strategic uncertainty led to a signif-
icant increase in scanning when the sources of
information were perceived to be more accessible.
Given that there was no significant main effect
for strategic uncertainty and that the importance
component displayed a highly significant, unique
effect, we respecified the model, excluding strate-
gic uncertainty, to conduct a post hoc analysis. The
results, also displayed in Table 3 for comparison,
demonstrate that the parsimonious revised model
marginally outperforms the original model. In con-
cordance with the position of Boyd and Fulk
(1996), the results demonstrate the value of decom-
415
posing the strategic uncertainty construct into its
component parts for analysis. Here, the signifi-
cance of importance explained the majority of the
variance in scanning frequency, as Boyd and Fulk
(1996) suggested, and produced a more highly sig-
nificant interaction term with accessibility as it
bears on scanning frequency.
Scanning Modes
Hypothesis 4a posits that, across environmental
sectors, higher levels of perceived strategic uncer-
tainty will be positively associated with the use of
personal information sources, and Hypothesis 4b
predicts that the relationship will be moderated by
perceived source accessibility. Similarly, Hypothe-
sis 4c suggests that higher perceptions of strategic
uncertainty will be associated with more frequent
scanning of impersonal sources, and Hypothesis 4d
elaborates, stating that this relationship will be
moderated by perceived source accessibility. Like
the results of the previous analysis, the results re-
ported in Table 4 showed no significant effects for
the demographic variables or for rate of change and
complexity. Again, there was a strong direct effect
for perceived importance for both personal and im-
personal sources, but no significant main effect for
strategic uncertainty or perceived accessibility. As
a result. Hypotheses 4a and 4c were not supported.
Step 8, containing the interaction term in both
models, was significant in both instances, support-
ing Hypotheses 4b and 4d. When personal and
impersonal sources are perceived to be more acces-
sible, strategic uncertainty prompts scanning of
both sources of information.
Because of the significance of importance, we
again respecified the models for post hoc examina-
tion, excluding strategic uncertainty and incorpo-
rating an interaction term for importance and per-
ceived accessibility into the last step. These
interaction terms for the personal (AB^ = .06, p <
.01; t = 2.56, p = .012) and impersonal [AR^ = .05,
p < .05; t = 2.39, p = .019) modes were significant.
The post hoc analysis suggests that importance,
conditioned by perceived source accessibility, in-
creases the use of both personal and impersonal
sources of information. If an issue is deemed im-
portant, and people or documentation are per-
ceived to be accessible, Russian managers appear to
tap both sources of information about the environ-
ment.
In Hypothesis 5a, we predicted that, across envi-
ronmental sectors, perceived strategic uncertainty
would be positively correlated with the use of ex-
ternal sources. Hypothesis 5b posits that the rela-
tionship between strategic uncertainty and the use
416 Academy of Management Journal June

TABLE 3
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses of Scanning Frequency
Daft, Sormunen, and Parks Model with Accessibility Post Hoc Revised Model

Variable b s.e. t Variable b s.e. t

Step 1 Step 1
Constant 22.50 2.93 7.68 Constant 22.50 2.93 7.68
Position 0.14 0.55 1.31 Position 0.14 0.55 1.31
Age -0.11 0.07 -0.84 Age -0.11 0.07 -0.84
Tenure -0.11 0.01 -0.87 Tenure -0.11 0.01 -0.87
Education 0.09 0.15 0.84 Education 0.09 0.15 0.84
^R^ .05** Afl^ .05**
AF 1.22 AF 1.22

Step 2 Step 2
Age of organization 0.09 0.04 0.64 Age of organization 0.09 0.04 0.64
.01 Afl^ .01
AF -0.17 AF -0.17

Step 3 Step 3
Rate of change -0.03 0.12 -0.23 Rate of change -0.03 0.12 -0.23
Ai?2 .00 Afl2 .00
AF -0.17 AF -0.17

Step 4 Step 4
Complexity 0.01 0.14 0.10 Complexity 0.01 0.14 0.10
Afl^ .00 Afl' .00
Af -0.13 AF -0.13

Step 5 Step 5
Importance 0.41 0.11 4.05*** Importance 0.41 0.11 4.05***
Afl^ .15*** Afl^ .15***
AF 2.07 AF 2.07

Step 6 Step 6
Strategic uncertainty 0.93 0.01 1.20 Strategic uncertainty 0.16 0.21 1.48
Afl^ .01 AR" .02
AF -0.15 AF -0.03

Step 7 Step 7
Accessibility 0.20 0.22 1.83^ Importance X accessibility 2.67 0.04 3.30***
Afl2 .03 Afl^ .08***
AF 0.14 AF 1.10

Step 8
Strategic uncertainty X 2.00 0.00 2.40**
accessibility
Afl^ .05*
AF 0.41

Overall R^ .30 Overall R^ .31

Adjusted R^ .20 Adjusted R^ .23
Model F 3.21*** Model F 3.88***

^p < .10
p < .05
p < .01
p< .001

of external sources will be moderated by percep- internal sources. Table 5 shows that, as with per-
tions of the accessibility of external sources. Hy- sonal and impersonal sources of information, there
pothesis 6 suggests that there will be no relation- was a significant, direct effect for perceived impor-
ship between strategic uncertainty and the use of tance for both the external and internal modes, but
2000 May, Stewart, and Sweo 417

TABLE 4
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses of Scanning Personal and Impersonal Modes
Personal Mode Impersonal Mode

Variable s.e. Variable b s.e. t

Step 1 Step 1
Constant 46.44 6.52 7.12 Constant 43.54 6.10 7.14
Position 0.11 0.12 1.09 Position 0.14 1.15 1.37
Age -0.12 0.16 -0.89 Age -0.09 0.15 -0.66
Tenure -0.07 0.01 -0.51 Tenure -0.14 0.01 -1.13
Education 0.07 0.34 0.69 Education 0.09 0.32 0.87
Afl^ .04** Afl' .06**
AF 0.83 AF 1.34

Step 2 Step 2
Age of organization 0.09 0.09 0.70 Age of organization 0.06 0.08 0.48
^R^ .00 Ai?" .00
AF -0.07 AF -0.23

Step 3 Step 3
Rate of change 0.02 0.28 0.20 Rate of change -0.07 0.26 -0.67
^R'' .00 Afl^ .00
^F -0.13 AF -0.12

Step 4 Step 4
Complexity -0.02 0.32 -0.18 Complexity 0.05 0.30 0.38
Afl^ .00 Afl^ .00
AF -0.09 AF -0.13

Step 5 Step 5
Importance 0.35 0.24 3.35*** Importance 0.42 0.22 4.13***
Afl^ .11*** Afl' .16***
AF 1.39 AF 2.16

Step 6 Step 6
Strategic uncertainty 0.77 0.03 0.94 Accessibility 0.96 0.03 1.24
Afl^ .01 Afl' .01
AF -0.12 AF -0.15

Step 7 Step 7
Accessibility 0.16 0.89 1.39 Accessibility 0.20 0.69 l.Ol'^
Afl^' .02 Afl^ .03^
AF 0.03 AF 0.16

Step 8 Step 8
Strategic uncertainty X 1.41 0.01 1.71* Strategic uncertainty X 1.31 0.00 1.77*
accessibility accessibility
.03^ AR' .03^
AF 0.14 AF 0.11

Overall R^ .21 Overall R^ .29

Adjusted R'^ .10 Adjusted R^ .20
Model F 1.98* Model F 3.11***

Post hoc revised model Post hoc revised model

Overall R" .22 Overall R' .29
Adjusted R^ .13 Adjusted R'^ .21
Model F 2.43* Model F 3.48***

^p < .10
*p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
418 Academy of Management Journal June

TABLE 5
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses of Scanning External and Internal Modes
External Mode Internal Mode

Variable b s.e. t Variable b s.e. t

Step 1 Step 1
Constant 42.42 5.85 7.25 Constant 47.56 6.76 7.04
Position 0.10 1.11 0.96 Position 0.15 1.28 1.45
Age -0.04 0.14 -0.30 Age -0.16 0.16 -1.20
Tenure -0.14 0.01 -1.05 Tenure -0.08 0.01 -0.60
Education 0.08 0.31 0.71 Education 0.09 0.35 0.84
.03* .06**
AF 0.78 AF 1.41

Step 2 Step 2
Age of organization 0.09 0.08 0.68 Age of organization 0.07 0.09 0.52
.01 .00
AF -0.07 AF -0.23

Step 3 Step 3
Rate of change -0.06 0.25 -0.51 Rate of change 0.00 0.29 0.04
.00 .00
AF -0.08 AF -0.21

Step 4 Step 4
Complexity 0.01 0.28 0.11 Complexity 0.01 0.33 0.08
.00 .00
AF -0.09 AF -0.15

Step 5 Step 5
Importance 0.43 0.21 4.28*** Importance 0.34 0.25 3.26**
.17*** .10**
AF 2.32 AF 1.30

Step 6 Step 6
Strategic uncertainty 0.49 0.02 0.62 Strategic uncertainty 1.19 0.03 1.47'^
.00 .02
AF -0.30 AF 0.03

Step 7 Step 7
Accessibility 0.29 0.62 2.86** Accessibility 0.08 0.90 0.71
.07*** .01
AF 0.76 AF -0.17

Step 8 Step 8
Strategic uncertainty x 1.60 0.00 2.30* Strategic uncertainty X 1.85 0.01 2.17*
accessibility accessibility
Afl^ .04* .04*
AF 0.33 AF 0.32

Overall R^ .32 Overall R^ .23

Adjusted R^ .24 Adjusted R^ .13
Model F 3.65*** Model F 2.30*

Post boc revised model Post boc revised model

Overall R^ .35 Overall R^ .21
Adjusted R^ .27 Adjusted R^ .12
Model F 4.56*** Model F 2.28*

•"p < .10

* p < .05
** p < .01
**p < .001
2000 May, Stewart, and Sweo
the nonsignificance of the direct effect of strategic
uncertainty failed to support Hypothesis 5a. The
main effect for perceived accessibility was also
highly significant for external sources of informa-
tion. Step 8, significant in both models, shows that
the interaction between strategic uncertainty and
perceived source accessibility is significant. This
finding supports Hypothesis 5b in terms of the ef-
fect on the use of external sources, but the signifi-
cant interaction between strategic uncertainty and
perceived source accessibility was not predicted
for internal sources, as stated in Hypothesis 6. Ap-
parently, if strategic uncertainty is high and infor-
mation is believed to be accessible, the executives
will increase their use of both external and internal
sources of information.
As with the previous hypotheses, we conducted
post hoc analyses because perceived importance
was significant. The revised model outperformed
the original model, with the interaction between
importance and accessibility significant for the ex-
ternal mode (Afl^ = .08, p < .01; t = 3.24, p = .002)
as well as for the internal mode (Afl^ = .05, p < .05;
t = 2.24, p = .028). Perceived source accessibility
appears to condition how importance translates
into the gathering of information either inside or
outside a firm. If a source is perceived to be more
accessible and a sector is deemed important, exec-
utives increase the frequency of the scanning of
both internal and external sources.
DISCUSSION
Our primary purpose was to test Western envi-
ronmental scanning theory in the context of the
discontinuous economic, political, and social
changes that characterize the current environment
of the Russian Federation. Although there are sim-
ilarities, the results suggest that the scanning be-
haviors of Russian executives experiencing these
conditions depart from those of Western managers.
Unfortunately, a theoretical basis for explaining the
differences is somewhat limited owing to the afore-
mentioned lack of knowledge about strategic man-
agement practices in Russia and to concerns about
the applicability of Western theory.
As anticipated, the Russian executives ranked
the sectors that are newest to the Russian environ-
ment as highest in strategic uncertainty (customer/
market, economic, and competition), irrespective
of the sectors' classification in either the task or
general environment category. Yet the finding that
perceived strategic uncertainty across sectors does
not appear to prompt executives to scan more fre-
quently in the form suggested by Daft and col-
leagues (1988) was not expected. Those authors
419
showed that rate of change and complexity alone
are insufficient for explaining scanning frequency
if the importance of the environmental sectors to an
organization are not considered. Our results, how-
ever, indicate that among Russian executives, rate
of change and complexity are not only insufficient,
but are also not necessary for predicting scanning
behavior. In fact, importance alone, moderated by
perceptions of source accessibility, is the superior
predictor of scanning frequency.
The primacy of importance in predicting Russian
scanning frequency is compatible with Western ev-
idence indicating that managers have little interest
in external events unless they are considered im-
portant to organizational performance (Aaker,
1983; Aguilar, 1967; Ansoff, 1975; Boyd & Fulk,
1996; Daft et al., 1988; Dutton & Freedman, 1984;
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Given that rate of change
(Bourgeois, 1985; Duncan, 1972; Lindsay & Rue,
1980) and complexity (Boyd & Fulk, 1996) have
been supported in studies as antecedents of scan-
ning frequency, the noticeable absence of any ef-
fects for these two constructs in the Russian sample
emphasizes the need to reevaluate Western models
of strategic behavior in the context of the transi-
tional environmental turbulence that currently
dominates much of the global arena. Perhaps when
one is managing in the midst of unfamiliar, chaotic,
and often threatening conditions, the most effective
means of coping is to disregard the pace of change
and complexity and to focus instead on what is
deemed most important to organizational survival.
In relatively stable environments, executives may
be more reactive to changing events and increasing
complexity hecause they have not become desensi-
tized to these phenomena. In environments charac-
terized by stability, abrupt change and periods of
intense complexity are more the exception than the
rule. Alternatively, these two dimensions of envi-
ronmental uncertainty may lose some of their
power to prompt scanning in transitional environ-
ments.
Theory developed in the West suggests that,
when managers face threatening, unknown condi-
tions, their response is typically threat rigidity,
which truncates information gathering and solu-
tion generation and culminates in tightened.con-
trol, restricted information flows, and centralized
decision making (D'Aunno & Sutton, 1992; Glad-
stein & Reilly, 1985; Griffin, Tesluk, & Jacobs, 1995;
Miller, Droge, & Vickery, 1997; Staw, Sandelands,
& Dutton, 1981). Threatened individuals may fail to
heed warnings (Wolfenstein, 1957) or may freeze
up (Glass, 1955), therehy narrowing their attention
to only the most dominant cues (Easterhrook, 1959;
Eysenck, 1976; Wachtel, 1968; Wine, 1971). Our
420 Academy of Management Journal
results indicate that the most dominant or strategi-
cally important cues in the sectors of Russian ex-
ecutives' environment, conditioned by the per-
ceived accessibility of information, are motivating
scanning behavior.
From a Western perspective, the cost and time
required for external information search as part of a
comprehensive decision process may not always
benefit organizations in volatile environments
(Fredrickson, 1984; Fredrickson & Iaquinto, 1989;
Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984). Managers may be
forced to abandon rational, comprehensive analysis
owing to cognitive and resource limits (Cyert &
March, 1963; Simon, 1957) and may instead focus
on considering several alternatives, an approach
that is effective in fast-paced environments (Eisen-
hardt, 1989). The traditional way to avoid strategic
errors during fast-paced environmental change is to
imitate competitors or wait to see how conditions
unfold (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988). All of these
perspectives may be germane to the experience of
Russian executives, who are attempting to cope in a
reconfigured system that is an enigma to most and
is highly unpredictable at best.
We found no effect for the composite measure of
strategic uncertainty on the use of any of the four
information modes. Instead, perceived importance
across environmental sectors emerged again as a
significant predictor of information mode scan-
ning. The post hoc analyses support Boyd and
Fulk's (1996) contention that the components of
environmental uncertainty should be examined for
their unique effects and also demonstrate the value
of considering accessibility of information sources
when examining scanning behavior in environ-
ments where the information infrastructure is un-
like those of Western countries. Perhaps the reason
that Sawyerr (1993) and Elenkov (1997) found in-
conclusive evidence to support the proposed rela-
tionship between strategic uncertainty and scan-
ning in personal and impersonal modes in their
non-Western samples is because they only exam-
ined the relationship with the composite measure
of strategic uncertainty, rather than the individual
components of the construct. In addition, they did
not consider the possibility that source accessibil-
ity might have significant bearing on executives'
propensity to choose from personal and/or imper-
sonal information sources.
We found the proposed moderating effect of per-
ceived source accessibility on strategic uncertainty
to be significant in predicting the use of personal,
impersonal, and external information sources. In
addition, strategic uncertainty, moderated by per-
ceived source accessibility, emerged as a signifi-
cant predictor of the executives' use of internal
June
sources. Although we had not expected executives
to turn to internal sources when perceptions of
strategic uncertainty increased, our results indicate
that Russian managers will attempt to scan infor-
mation obtained internally as well as externally as
long as the information source is perceived to be
accessible. In the new market economy of Russia,
power and influence still remain highly concen-
trated in informal networks both at the regional and
national levels, and information sharing occurs pri-
marily within the context of close personal alli-
ances. Our results point to such in-group informa-
tion hoarding, a phenomenon typically found in
coUectivist cultures (Espinoza & Garza, 1985). Con-
sistent with evidence that Russians rely on per-
sonal trust in network contacts to reduce uncer-
tainty in a changing environment (Burawoy &
Krotov, 1992), this finding highlights the potential
importance of trust among in-group members (Peng
& Heath, 1996; Triandis, 1967) as an underlying
explanatory factor for the propensity of Russian
executives to seek information internally as well as
externally.
The evidence that information source accessibil-
ity appears to condition scanning activities for
these high-level executives, even within their own
companies, is most likely due to the aforemen-
tioned information shortage issues in Russia. It also
reiterates the concern noted by Sawyerr (1993) and
Elenkov (1997) as to whether executives in devel-
oping countries are prepared to collect and inter-
nally manage complex market data. Longitudinal
evidence over a six-year period from China indi-
cates that state-owned enterprises undergoing mar-
ket transition have yet to adapt their organizational
information systems for strategic advantage, partic-
ularly for capturing information about the external
environment (Dologite, Fang, Chen, Mockler, &
Chao, 1997; Franz, Wynne, & Fu, 1991). Similarly,
we would expect that even if Russian managers
understood the potential value of creating internal
customer/market databases, for instance, that many
firms would not have the necessary funds or the
requisite knowledge to determine their particular
information system needs in order to make the
most effective use of such an investment.
Limitations and Future Research
The potential limitations of the study are primar-
ily those associated with the lack of control in a
survey of a sample of convenience, and those in-
herent in relying on self-report items on a single
questionnaire. A Harman's single-factor test of the
primary variables in the study did not produce a
single factor or a general factor explaining the mar
2000 May, Stewart, and Sweo
jority of covariance in predictor and criterion vari-
ables, conditions indicative of common method
variance (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). This indication
that common method variance did not drive the
results of the study may be due to sample variation
across an array of individual and organizational
contexts, circumstances that reduce method vari-
ance (Mitchell, 1985). Nevertheless, we had no con-
trol over selection and the conditions during re-
sponse, and the research context precluded
multimethod data collection, common circum-
stances in field research. We did attempt to
strengthen our case by paying careful attention to
measurement equivalence and by providing ex-
plicit guidelines for survey administration and
thorough explication of the constructs. Although a
relatively high rate of response across a wide array
of industries and individuals may cancel chance
imbalances (Isaac & Michael, 1990) and enhance
generalizability (Neale & Liebert, 1986), the poten-
tial limitations should be considered.
There is no consensus on how organization en-
vironments and uncertainty should be conceptual-
ized and measured (cf. Boyd et al., 1993). We de-
cided to focus on measurement precision and
equivalency and on achieving direct comparability
with previous research by following the measure-
ment framework of Daft and his colleagues (1988)
and the two non-Western scanning studies by Saw-
yerr (1993) and Elenkov (1997). Although we be-
lieve this decision maximized the outcomes of the
study, it did involve trade-offs. First, we used one
item per environmental sector to tap perceptions
about each of the three environmental constructs
(seven items per construct). Yet, in light of the
nature of the environment in Russia, the use of
multiple items per environmental sector could pro-
vide more insight, particularly in drawing con-
clusions about the relative consequences of the en-
vironmental sectors. Second, the use of this
instrumentation precluded the measurement of
proposed subdimensions of complexity, such as
predictability and analyzability. As a result, the
theoretical breadth of the complexity construct was
necessarily circumscribed to include environmen-
tal heterogeneity only. We deemed this decision
prudent because of the aforementioned cross-
cultural measurement equivalency concerns asso-
ciated with using the scenario-based instrumenta-
tion that examines the subdimensions of
complexity, a concern substantiated in the pilot
testing of the survey. In summary, although we do
not believe that these measurement limitations
jeopardize the usefulness of our findings, they
should be considered in evaluating the results.
421
Moreover, additional research is needed to substan-
tiate and extend our conclusions.
Future research probing the issues of organiza-
tion-environment relationships with elaborated
construct conceptualizations drawn from grounded
theory and addressing contextual measurement
complexities is needed for further refinement of
environmental scanning theory. Our results sup-
port Boyd and Fulk's (1996) warning that relying
only on the composite measure of strategic uncer-
tainty to predict scanning, as opposed to its indi-
vidual components, may lead to inconclusive or
misleading results. A decomposed approach to the
analysis of scanning, like the one presented here,
would seem to be particularly important for inquiry
in transitional environments where even less is
known about the perceptions of environmental un-
certainty dimensions and their potential role in
explaining scanning behavior. The results pre-
sented here provide a baseline for assessing change
in scanning behavior over time as Russian man-
agers become more experienced and adept at
managing within a market economy.
The results have broad implications for theory
extension, but we limit the following discussion to
two primary areas of investigation. The first is re-
fining understanding of scanning activities and
their antecedents, particularly in non-Western con-
texts. Given the evidence that source accessibility
is a significant moderator of scanning frequency
among Russian executives, it is likely that other
individual or situational variables may mediate or
moderate scanning behavior, particularly in transi-
tional settings. For example, in formerly Commu-
nist countries, individual control expectations may
affect the perceived value and frequency of scan-
ning, given the empirical evidence of a significant
relationship between managers' locus of control
and their scanning behavior (Hodgkinson, 1992;
Miller, Kets de Vries, & Toulouse, 1982). Percep-
tions of the quality and reliability of information
sources (Auster & Choo, 1993) might also influence
scanning frequency and the choice of information
modes. Evidence also indicates that scanning be-
havior is influenced by organizational strategy
(Hambrick, 1982; Hrebiniak & Joyce, 1985), as well
as by a firm's structure and processes (Hodgkinson
& Johnson, 1994; Weick, 1979). Investigation of the
effects of these factors on scanning and other
boundary-spanning activities in different environ-
mental contexts may be instructive. Finally, the
recommendation by Bluedorn and colleagues
(1994) that researchers consider how executives
scan their internal environments would also be par-
ticularly interesting to examine in transitional con-
texts. Because organizations in Russia and other
422 Academy of Management Journal
emerging markets have been open for investigation
for such a relatively short period, it would be
worthwhile, albeit extremely challenging, to more
thoroughly examine scanning processes directed at
components of the internal environment.
The second primary research area involves the
outcomes of scanning activities. The environment
has a substantial influence on strategic decision
processes (cf. Rajagopalan, Rasheed, & Datta, 1993).
In the West, environmental instability is a funda-
mental determinant of strategy, structure, and orga-
nizational outcomes (cf. Keats & Hitt, 1988), but
little is known about the effects of instability in
transitional contexts. Daft and Weick (1984) hy-
pothesized that the interpretation of problems or
opportunities by key decision makers influences
the majority of organizational outcomes. This infor-
mation processing is driven by cognitive schema
(Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Jackson & Dutton, 1988),
and different interpretations lead to alternative de-
cision processes and behaviors (Cowan, 1986; Dut-
ton et al., 1983; Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Nutt,
1984). In turn, managerial interpretation (Staw et
al., 1981) may be influenced by national culture
(Sallivan & Nonaka, 1988; Schneider & De Meyer,
1991), and perceptual congruence with actual en-
vironmental conditions enhances organizational
performance (Bourgeois, 1985; Dess & Keats, 1987).
The influence of environmental dynamism on the
rationality of strategic decision processes (Eisen-
hardt, 1989; Priem, Rasheed, & Kotulic, 1995) is
unclear and warrants further investigation in non-
Western environments. Understanding how scan-
ning influences diagnosis, strategy, and perfor-
mance in different environmental circumstances,
particularly transitional contexts, is salient to ro-
bust theory.
In The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels
aptly, if ironically, described the current transfor-
mation under way in many emerging countries in
their passionate portrayal of the turbulent spread of
capitalism in the nineteenth century: "Constant
revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted dis-
turbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncer-
tainty and agitation. All that is solid melts into air"
(World Bank, 1996: 1). Perhaps it is true, then, at
least in the bardak (chaos) emanating from the tran-
sition in the Russian Federation, that the more
things change, the more they stay the same.
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Ruth C. May is an assistant professor of international
management at the University of Dallas Graduate School
of Management. She earned her Ph.D. in organizational
theory and policy at the University of North Texas. Her
current research interests include environmental scan-
ning, work behaviors, and organizational change in tran-
sitional economies of the former Soviet Union.
Wayne H. Stewart, Jr. is an assistant professor of man-
agement at Clemson University. He earned his Ph.D. in
organizational theory and policy at the University of
North Texas. His current research interests include en-
trepreneurial dispositions and cognition, strategic
change, and managerial issues in the transitional econo-
mies of Europe.
Robert Sweo is an associate dean for undergraduate pro-
grams at University of Maryland University College
(UMUC). His duties include oversight of UMUG's two
Russian joint venture programs. He earned his Ph.D. in
organizational theory and policy at the University of
North Texas. His current research interests include meth-
ods to increase access to higher education and ways
of adapting higher education administration to a high-
technology, rapid-growth environment.