SB10 4F Criminal Law Review Final Wave Titles Eleven To Fourteen Book Two 1

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria C. Garcia
REVISED PENAL CODE: BOOK TWO
TITLE ELEVEN (ARTICLES 333-346): Crimes Against Chastity
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v ROSENDO AMARO

GR No. 199100 | July 18, 2014
TICKLER: AAA (7 years old), bread and banana que; dizzy and passed out
DOCTRINE: The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342
of the Revised Penal Code, are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless
of her age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that she is taken against her will; and (3) that
the abduction is with lewd designs. On the other hand, rape under Article 266-A is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman by: (1) force or intimidation, or (2)
when the woman is deprived of reason or is unconscious, or (3) when she is under
twelve years of age.
FACTS: AAA, who was then only 7 years old, testified that she was walking on her way
home from school when she passed by Boots & Maya store. She met a man, whom
she later identified in court as the appellant, who asked her to buy cigarettes. After
buying the cigarettes and handing it to appellant, the latter gave her bread and banana
cue. After eating them, she suddenly became dizzy and passed out. AAA was brought
to the house of appellant. When she regained consciousness, she saw appellant naked.
Appellant then undressed her, kissed her on the lips and neck, and inserted his penis
into her vagina, causing her to feel pain. AAA cried but appellant covered her mouth
with his hand. AAA was detained for six (6) days and was raped five (5) times by
appellant. AAA clarified that appellant's penis touched the outer portion of her vagina.
During the cross-examination, AAA admitted that she voluntarily went with appellant
because the latter promised to bring her home.
On the last day of her detention, AAA and appellant went out of the house. On their
way to San Jose, a certain Aunt Ruthie saw AAA walking and immediately picked her
up and brought her to the police station. Appellant noticed AAA being taken away but
he did nothing.
Accused denied abducting and raping AAA but admitted that he brought the latter to
his house when AAA approached him asking for bread first, before begging him to take
her with him because she was always being scolded by her parents. Upon reaching his
house, appellant entrusted AAA to the care of Florante Magay's sister. Appellant then
went back to town to attend to his work as a mason. He only decided to go back home
when he heard his name on the radio in connection with the disappearance of a girl.
He picked up the child in Barangay Tagburos and brought her to her house in Buncag.
AAA walked alone towards her house.
CRIME CHARGED: Forcible Abduction with Rape
CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
San Beda College of Law Manila Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
RTC: GUILTY of Forcible Abduction with Rape
CA: GUILTY of Forcible Abduction with Rape
In this appeal, appellant contends that the prosecution's evidence is insufficient to

sustain his conviction. According to appellant, he did not rape AAA because the latter
was not in his custody at the time said incident allegedly happened. Appellant adds that
he entrusted AAA to the custody of Florante Magay's sister because he was working.
Appellant also insists that AAA voluntarily went with him to his house.
ISSUE: Did the prosecution establish from the testimony of the complainant the guilt of
the accused for the crime of forcible abduction with rape beyond reasonable doubt?
RULING: YES. The prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the Revised
Penal Code, are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age,
civil status, or reputation; (2) that she is taken against her will; and (3) that the abduction
is with lewd designs. On the other hand, rape under Article 266-A is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman by: (1) force or intimidation, or (2) when the
woman is deprived of reason or is unconscious, or (3) when she is under twelve years
of age.
The prosecution was able to prove all these elements in this case. The victim, AAA was
a seven (7) year-old girl who was taken against her will by appellant who told her that
he knew her mother and that he would bring her home. At her tender age, AAA could
have easily been deceived by appellant. The employment of deception suffices to
constitute the forcible taking, especially since the victim is an unsuspecting young girl.
It is the taking advantage of their innocence that makes them easy culprits of deceiving
minds. The presence of lewd designs in forcible abduction is established by the actual
rape of the victim.
The fact of sexual intercourse is corroborated by the medical findings that the victim
suffered from laceration on the upper and lower part of the introitus.
In the prosecution of rape cases, conviction or acquittal depends on the complainant's

testimony because of the fact that usually only the participants are witnesses to their
occurrences. The issue therefore boils down to credibility. Significantly, findings of fact
of the trial court should not be disturbed on appeal since conclusions as to the credibility
of witnesses in rape cases lie heavily on the sound judgment of the trial court which is
in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying.
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl,

particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of
tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what
transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which
she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Moreover, AAA testified in a
straightforward manner.
On the other hand, appellant set-up the defense of denial and alibi. It is jurisprudential
that denial and alibi are intrinsically weak defenses which must be buttressed by strong
evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Mere denial, without any strong evidence
to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the child-victim of the
identity of the appellant and his involvement in the crime attributed to him. Alibi is
evidence negative in nature and self-serving and cannot attain more credibility than the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 30 March 2011

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02801 is AFFIRMED, subject to
the MODIFICATION that ROSENDO AMARO shall pay P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages,
plus interest of 6% per annum on the amount of damages, reckoned from the finality of
this decision until full payment.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v MARVIN CAYANAN

G.R. No. 200080 | September 18, 2013
TICKLER: Brother-in-law; Sweetheart defense
DOCTRINE: Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the real objective of
the accused is to rape the victim.
FACTS:
On February 1, 2001 Marvin Cayanan took advantage of 15-year old AAA while
the victim was alone inside her house in Bulacan. Cayanan is the victim's brother-in-
law, being married to her older sister, and the couple lived in a nearby house. AAA was
asleep when she felt someone caressing her. It turned out to be Cayanan. He then
started kissing her and told her to remove her shorts. When she refused, Cayanan
forcibly took it off and after the latter took off his own undergarment, he inserted his
organ into her genitalia. Cayanan, who had a knife with him, threatened to kill AAA if
she resisted and informed anybody of the incident.
On February 26, 2001, AAA was about to enter the school campus with her friend
Armina Adriano (Adriano) when Cayanan arrived on a tricycle driven by his uncle, Boy
Manalastas. Cayanan then pulled AAA towards the tricycle. She tried shouting but he
covered her mouth. They alighted somewhere and boarded a jeep. He brought her to
a dress shop in (…) Bulacan where he asked someone to give her a change of clothes
as she was in her school uniform and later to a Jollibee outlet. He then brought her to
his sister's house in (…) where he raped her inside a bedroom. Afterwards, a certain
couple Putay and Tessie talked to Cayanan and she was brought to the barangay office
where she was asked to execute a document stating that she voluntarily went with
Cayanan. It was the latter's mother and sister-in-law who brought her home later that
evening. She told her mother and brother of the incidents only after her classmate
Adriano informed her family of what happened in school and of the rape incidents. AAA
testified that she did not immediately tell her family because she was still in a state of
shock.
CRIME CHARGED:
1. Qualified Rape (Crim. Case No. 1499-M-2001)
2. Forcible Abduction with Qualified Rape (Crim. Case No. 1498-M-2001)
RTC: CONVICTED Cayanan of the crimes of Qualified Rape (Criminal Case No. 1499-
M-2001) and Forcible Abduction with Qualified Rape (Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2001)
CA: AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION the Consolidated Decision by increasing the

award of damages awarded by the RTC.
ISSUES:
1. Did the RTC err in charging the accused with Forcible Abduction with Qualified
Rape Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2001?
2. Did the CA err in increasing the award of damages?
RULING:
1. YES. Cayanan should be convicted only of Qualified Rape in Criminal Case No.
1498-M-2001. Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the real
objective of the accused is to rape the victim. In this case, circumstances show
that the victim's abduction was with the purpose of raping her. Thus, after
Cayanan dragged her into the tricycle, he took her to several places until they
reached his sister's house where he raped her inside the bedroom. Under these
circumstances, the rape absorbed the forcible abduction.
2. NO. CA did not commit any reversible error in increasing the amount of civil
indemnity and moral damages awarded in Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2001, and
in awarding additional P75,000.00 as moral damages in Criminal Case No.
1499-M-2001 and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in both criminal cases, as
these are in accord with prevailing jurisprudence|||

Additional Notes:
For the Court to even consider giving credence to the sweetheart defense, it must be
proven by compelling evidence. The defense cannot just present testimonial evidence
in support of the theory. Independent proof is required — such as tokens, mementos,
and photographs.
DECISION: Marvin Cayanan is found GUILTY OF QUALIFIED RAPE in Criminal Case

No. 1498-M-2001. In all other respects, the CA Decision is AFFIRMED in toto.

TITLE TWELVE (ARTICLES 347-352): Crimes Against the Civil Status of Persons
JAMES WALTER CAPILI v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 183805 | July 3, 2013
TICKLER: ANG LALAKING hindi sumunod sa three-month rule ni John Lloyd.
DOCTRINE: The crime of bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the

subsequent marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and
void. It is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the
commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until
extinguished as provided by law.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with
the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage
was celebrated.
FACTS: James Capili was lawfully wedded to Karla Medina-Capili. The marriage was
celebrated on September 3, 1999. Three months later, on December 8, 1999, he
married Shirley Tismo-Capili. It was SHIRLEY who filed this case against James.
James was charged with Bigamy before the RTC of Pasig.
In response, James filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that:

(1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second
marriage to Shirley before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by the first wife,
Karla.
(2) in the event that the marriage between him and Karla is declared null and
void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and
(3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second
marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
THE RTC of Pasig reset the arraignment and pre-trial of the bigamy case.
During the interim, the RTC of Antipolo were the rendered a decision declaring the
voidness or incipient invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner and SHIRLEY
on the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the
lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning.
James then filed a Motion to Dismiss the bigamy case before the Pasig RTC. The
PASIG RTC granted James’ Motion.
Shirley APPEALED the Pasig RTC’s Decision before the CA. This time, the CA RULED
in favor of SHIRLEY. It remanded the case back to the Pasig RTC for trial. Hence this
Petition on Certiorari filed by James.

CRIME CHARGED: Bigamy
NOTE: Capili filed a MOTION TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS.
RTC Pasig (Criminal Case): RESET ARRAIGNMENT and PRE-TRIAL
RTC Antipolo (Civil Case): declared VOIDNESS or INCIPIENT INVALIDITY OF THE

SECOND MARRIAGE
NOTE: Capili filed a MOTION TO DISMISS BIGAMY CASE before RTC Pasig.
RTC Pasig (Motion to Dismiss): GRANTED.
CA: REMANDED the BIGAMY CASE back to RTC Pasig for trial
ISSUE: Is the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage a ground for
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy?
RULING:
NO. Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy
as follows:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are:

(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the
Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present
when the Information was filed on June 28, 2004.
The crime of bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage

without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void. It is a settled rule
that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense,
and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law.

Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with
the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage
was celebrated.
DECISION: Petition filed by Capili was DISMISSED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v EDGARDO ODTUHAN

G.R. No. 191566 | July 17, 2013
TICKLER: Odtuhan = Two Hon[ey]; Two Marriages
DOCTRINE: What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to
the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes
the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
FACTS:
1st Marriage: On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina).

2nd Marriage: On October 28, 1993, respondent married Eleanor A. Alagon (Alagon).
Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with
Modina. RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondent’s petition and declared his
marriage with Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. On November
10, 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn
Abesamis Alagon learned of respondent’s previous marriage with Modina. She thus
filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging respondent with Bigamy.
On April 15, 2005, respondent was indicted in an Information for Bigamy.
Respondent moved for the quashal of the information on two grounds, to wit: (1) that
the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action or liability
has been extinguished.
RTC denied respondent’s Omnibus Motion. The RTC held that the facts alleged in the
information – that there was a valid marriage between respondent and Modina and
without such marriage having been dissolved, respondent contracted a second
marriage with Alagon – constitute the crime of bigamy. The trial court further held that
neither can the information be quashed on the ground that criminal liability has been
extinguished, because the declaration of nullity of the first marriage is not one of the
modes of extinguishing criminal liability. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was

likewise denied.
Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court before the CA, assailing the denial of his motion to quash the information
despite the fact that his first marriage with Modina was declared null and void ab initio
prior to the filing of the bigamy case.
CA granted the petition and ordered the RTC to give due course to and receive
evidence on the petitioner’s motion to quash and resolve the case with dispatch.
The CA applied the conclusion made by the Court in Morigo v. People, and held that
there is cogent basis in looking into the motion to quash filed by respondent, for if the
evidence would establish that his first marriage was indeed void ab initio, one essential
element of the crime of bigamy would be lacking. The appellate court further held that
respondent is even better off than Morigo which thus calls for the application of such
doctrine, considering that respondent contracted the second marriage after filing the
petition for the declaration of nullity of his first marriage and he obtained the favorable
declaration before the complaint for bigamy was filed against him.
Hence this petition, contesting, among others, that the subsequent court judgment
declaring respondent’s first marriage void ab initio did not extinguish respondent’s
criminal liability which already attached prior to said judgment
RTC: CONVICTED
CA: REVERSED RTC Ruling. No Bigamy because the subsequent court judgment
declaring respondent’s first marriage void ab initio extinguished respondent’s criminal
liability.
Petitioner contested that subsequent court judgment declaring respondent’s first

marriage void ab initio did not extinguish respondent’s criminal liability which already
attached prior to said judgment.
ISSUE: Does the petition have merit?
RULING: YES. [Guilty of Bigamy; CA reversed and case remanded to RTC]
The issues are not novel and have been squarely ruled upon by the Supreme Court in
Montañez v. Cipriano, Teves v. People, and Antone v. Beronilla. (Discussion can be
found in the full text) The present case stemmed from similar procedural and factual
antecedents as in the above cases.

The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter.
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a
cause of action or a ground for defense. It has been held in a number of cases that a
judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be
contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and
immoral.
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must
be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes
the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
If the SC will allow respondent’s line of defense and the CA’s ratiocination, a person
who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for
the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is
rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him.
➢ Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the
information against him, because he obtained the declaration of nullity of
marriage before the filing of the complaint for bigamy against him—
SC cannot sustain such contention. In addition to the discussion above, settled is the
rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense
and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law and
that the time of filing of the criminal complaint or information is material only for
determining prescription. Thus, as held in Antone:
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner
and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore,
immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for
Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such
defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to
the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the information are matters
of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence.
In view of the foregoing, the CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari filed by
respondent. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion
to quash and to allow him to present evidence to support his omnibus motion.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals

Decision and Resolution are SET ASIDE. Case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.
CELERINA SANTOS v RICARDO SANTOS

G.R. No. 187601 | October 8, 2014
TICKLER: Celerina presumed dead by husband Ricardo.
DOCTRINES:
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous

subsequent marriage may be considered valid when the following are present:
a. The prior spouses had been absent for four consecutive years;
b. The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead;
c. There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absent spouse;
d. There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court
declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief that
the spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as validly
terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage
are generally considered bigamous and void. Only a subsequent marriage contracted
in good faith is protected by law.
Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not
immune from an action to declare his subsequent marriage void for being bigamous.
The prohibition against marriage during the subsistence of another marriage still
applies.
FACTS: In July 2007, RTC Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina Santos
presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo Santos had filed a petition
for declaration of absence or presumptive death for purpose of remarriage. Ricardo
remarried in September 2008.
Ricardo claimed that after their buy and sell business did not prosper, Celerina
convinced him to allow her to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong. After Ricardo
eventually agreed Celerina, she allegedly applied in an employment agency in Ermita
in February 1995. She then left Tarlac two months later and was never heard from
again.

Ricardo likewise claimed that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina, and that it was
almost 12 years from the date of his RTC petition since Celerina left, and believed that
she passed away.
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo’s petition only sometime in October
2008 when she could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief,
or other appropriate remedies.
On November 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court
of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that
she was deprived her day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true
residence (Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City, according to
petitioner), misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac City.
Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac, and never left and worked as a
domestic helper abroad. According to her, she and Ricardo established, and never left
their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City. It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May
2008 to cohabit with another woman.
CRIME CHARGED: N/A.
Note: This is a PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT before the Court of

Appeals.
CA: DISMISSED petition, for being a wrong mode of remedy.
According to the CA, the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil
registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Did the CA err in dismissing Celerina’s petition for annulment of judgment for
being a wrong mode of remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring
presumptive death?
RULING: YES, it erred in so doing.
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four
consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the
absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage
during the subsistence of another marriage.
The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being
terminated by the presumptively dead spouse when he or she reappears. In other
words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of
terminating the subsequent marriage by mere reappearance.

The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse
that his or her marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he or she was
declared absent or presumptively dead.
A close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent
marriage by reappearance is subject to several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a
judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in
the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn
statement of fact and circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of
the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance
must either be undisputed or judicially determined.
The existence of these conditions means the reappearance does not always
immediately cause the subsequent marriage’s termination. Reappearance of the
absent or presumptively dead spouse will cause the termination of the subsequent
marriage only when all the conditions enumerated in the Family Code are present.
The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of determining the
status of the second marriage and the liabilities of the spouses who, in bad faith,
claimed that the other spouses was absent.
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous

subsequent marriage may be considered valid when the following are present:
e. The prior spouses had been absent for four consecutive years;
f. The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead;
g. There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absent spouse;
h. There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court
declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief that
the spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as validly
terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage
are generally considered bigamous and void. Only a subsequent marriage contracted
in good faith is protected by law.
Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not
immune from an action to declare his subsequent marriage void for being bigamous.
The prohibition against marriage during the subsistence of another marriage still
applies.
Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the
termination of the subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its effects. She
contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the

subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration of her presumptive
death and the subsequent marriage.
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the

Family Code is valid until terminated, the “children of such marriage shall be considered
legitimate, and the property relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same
as in valid marriages. If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the
subsequent marriage conceived before the termination shall still be considered
legitimate. Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is a defense against
prosecution for bigamy.
It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent marriage
may nullify the effects of the subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation to the status
of children and the prospect of prosecuting a respondent for bigamy.
However, a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed
solely by the husband or wife. This means that even if Celerina is a real party in interest
who stands to be benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the second
marriage, this remedy is not available to her.
DECISION: The case was REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for determination of
the existence of extrinsic fraud, grounds for nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and
the merits of the petition.
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 200233 | July 15, 2015
TICKLER: Bigamy, no marriage license – cohabited for at least 5 years prior (a lie)
DOCTRINES:
1) Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage
of the accused could she be included in the information as co-accused.
2) A person, whether man or woman, who knowingly consents or agrees to be
married to another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in
the crime of bigamy.
3) SC: We cannot countenance petitioner’s illegal acts of feigning a marriage and,
in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would
only make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage.
FACTS: Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, Leonila
G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded
“not guilty,” while her putative husband escaped the criminal suit.
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela

Galang since 2 June 1974, asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who was a 43-
year-old widow then, married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-
in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she should choose someone
who was “without responsibility.”
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an
accused in the crime of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos
was still single when they got married. She also averred that for there to be a conviction
for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven valid by the prosecution; but
in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage
license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang,
testified for the prosecution. She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March
and April 1997, on which occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of
Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation and averred that she met Galang only in
August and September 1997, or after she had already married Santos.
RTC: GUILTY of Bigamy – Galang’s testimony > Petitioner’s inconsistent statements
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, “her marriage was
celebrated without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the
Family Code, which is an admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the
celebration of their marriage.”
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was
void ab initio for having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family
Code, which provides an exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the
parties have actually lived together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to
the celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos
had not lived together as husband and wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence,
she argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively rendered their marriage
null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy. RTC HELD: The best support to her
argument would have been the submission of a judicial decree of annulment of their
marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their marriage null and void in
these proceedings.
CA: AFFIRMED CONVICTION for bigamy
ISSUE: Should petitioner be a co-accused in the instant case, given that she contends
was not aware of Santos’s previous marriage?
RULING: YES, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner’s knowledge of

Santos’s marriage to Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first

marriage as shown by the totality of the following circumstances: (1) when Santos was
courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly showed their
disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know
of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness compared
with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that
she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of
Santos.
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that
she was validly charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts’
imposition of the principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed,
meted out to her the penalty within the range of prision correccional as minimum
to prision mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla holds that the second
spouse, if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring
to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that “a
person, whether man or woman, who knowingly consents or agrees to be married to
another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of
bigamy.” Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an accomplice to the crime.
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the

misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage
without a license. We thus face an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be
acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a
marriage license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation
requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her marriage
contract.
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each
other for only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have
cohabited for at least five years prior to their marriage.
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal
case of bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured
without a marriage license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a
false Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting that they were exempted from the
license requirement based on their fabricated claim that they had already cohabited as
husband and wife for at least five years prior their marriage. In violation of our law
against illegal marriages, petitioner married Santos while knowing fully well that they
had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the
Family Code. Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow
petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.
Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy
on the ground that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that

case, the Court found that when Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa
Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their marriage
license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated one day before
the issuance of the marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order
to contract a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured
a Certificate of Marriage, and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for
seeking her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this
Court cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.
No less than the present Constitution provides that “marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.” It must
be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. In keeping
therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for
bigamy.
DECISION: Decision AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner found guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY as an ACCOMPLICE. She is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four
years of prision correccional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.
NOEL LASANAS v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 159031 | June 23, 2014
TICKLER: Cohabitation, got married without marriage license, Subsequent marriage,

no bigamy daw kasi first marriage void ab initio.
DOCTRINE: Any person who contracts a second marriage without first having a judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, albeit on its face void and in existent
for lack of a marriage license, is guilty of bigamy as defined and penalized by Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
Judge Carlos B. Salazar of the Municipal Trial Court of San Miguel, Iloilo solemnized
the marriage of accused Noel Lasanas and Socorro Patingo without the benefit of a
marriage license. The records show that Lasanas and Patingo had not executed any
affidavit of cohabitation to excuse the lack of the marriage license. On August 27, 1980,
Lasanas and Patingo reaffirmed their marriage vows in a religious ceremony before Fr.
Rodolfo Tamayo at the San Jose Church in Iloilo City. They submitted no marriage
license or affidavit of cohabitation for that purpose. Both ceremonies were evidenced
by the corresponding marriage certificates. In 1982, Lasanas and Patingo separated
de facto because of irreconcilable differences.

On December 27, 1993, the accused contracted marriage with Josefa Eslaban in a
religious ceremony solemnized by Fr. Ramon Sequito at the Sta. Maria Church in Iloilo
City. Their marriage certificate reflected the civil status of the accused as single.
The accused filed a complaint for annulment of marriage and damages against Socorro
in the RTC. The complaint alleged that Socorro had employed deceit,
misrepresentations and fraud in securing his consent to their marriage; and that
subsequent marital breaches, psychological incompatibilities and her infidelity had
caused him to suffer mental anguish, sleepless nights and social humiliation warranting
the award of damages.
In October 1998, Socorro charged the accused with bigamy in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Iloilo City.
In the meanwhile, on November 24, 1998, the RTC (Branch 39) rendered its judgment
in Civil Case No. 23133 dismissing the accused’s complaint for annulment of marriage,
and declaring the marriage between him and Socorro valid and legal.
RTC: GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of BIGAMY punishable under
Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code, judgment is hereby entered ordering him to serve
an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum.
CA: The accused appealed his conviction to the CA, insisting that the RTC thereby
erred in finding that he had legally married Socorro despite the absence of the marriage
license, affidavit of cohabitation and affidavit of the solemnizing officer.
The accused contended that because he had not been legally married to Socorro, the
first element of bigamy was not established; that his good faith and the absence of
criminal intent were absolutory in his favor; and that he had been of the honest belief
that there was no need for a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage before
he could contract a subsequent marriage.
The CA promulgated its challenged decision, decreeing: WHEREFORE, for lack of

merit, the Court DISMISSES the appeal and AFFIRMS the appealed Decision.
ISSUE: Did the CA correctly affirm the decision of the RTC?
RULING: YES.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the offender has been
legally married; (2) that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to
the Civil Code; (3) that he or she contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4)
that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of the absence of a
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage between the accused and Socorro. The
requirement of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage prior to contracting
a subsequent marriage is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. (n)
The reason for the provision was aptly discussed in Teves v. People:
x x x The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either
as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the
sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity
is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee which
drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to
a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be
the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before
they can be allowed to marry again.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void,
marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity
is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
If petitioner’s contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can simply
evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone
institutes a complaint against him. We note that in petitioner’s case the complaint was
filed before the first marriage was declared a nullity. It was only the filing of the
Information that was overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his first marriage.
Following petitioner’s argument, even assuming that a complaint has been instituted,
such as in this case, the offender can still escape liability provided that a decision
nullifying his earlier marriage precedes the filing of the Information in court. Such cannot

be allowed. To do so would make the crime of bigamy dependent upon the ability or
inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to immediately act on complaints and
eventually file Informations in court. Plainly, petitioner’s strained reading of the law is
against its simple letter.
Pursuant to Teves, the accused’s conviction for bigamy is affirmed. The crime of
bigamy was consummated from the moment he contracted the second marriage
without his marriage to Socorro being first judicially declared null and void, because at
the time of the celebration of the second marriage, his marriage to Socorro was still
deemed valid and subsisting due to such marriage not being yet declared null and void
by a court of competent jurisdiction.
The accused’s defense of acting in good faith deserves scant consideration especially
because the records show that he had filed a complaint for the annulment of his
marriage with Socorro prior to the institution of the criminal complaint against him but
after he had already contracted his second marriage with Josefa. But even such
defense would abandon him because the RTC (Branch 39) dismissed his complaint for
annulment of marriage after the information for bigamy had already been filed against
him, thus confirming the validity of his marriage to Socorro. Considering that the
accused’s subsequent marriage to Josefa was an undisputed fact, the third element of
bigamy was established. Nonetheless, he submits that his marriage to Josefa was
invalid because of lack of a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage. Such argument
had no worth, however, because it was he himself who failed to secure a judicial
declaration of nullity of his previous marriage prior to contracting his subsequent
marriage. In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, the Court has explained that "[s]ince a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void,
the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of
criminal liability for bigamy.
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although
void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences
is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State's
penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure
that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless
women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on August 29, 2002; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

RENE RONULO v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 182438 | July 2, 2014
TICKLER: Illegal marriage ceremony, no marriage license, Aglipayan priest
DOCTRINES:
1. Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall
perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime
are:
a. Authority of the solemnizing officer; and
b. His performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
2. While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a
"marriage ceremony" and what constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3(3)
and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters. Article 6 of the Family Code
provides that "no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the
marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties
to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence
of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband
and wife."
FACTS: Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry on 29 March
2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church in Ilocos Norte. But on the day of the
wedding, the church's officiating priest refused to solemnize the marriage because of
lack of a marriage license. With the couple and the guests already dressed for the
wedding, they headed to an Aglipayan Church. The Aglipayan priest, herein petitioner
Ronulo, conducted a ceremony on the same day where the couple took each other as
husband and wife in front of the guests. This was despite Petitioner's knowledge of the
couple's lack of marriage license.
Petitioner was eventually charged of violating Article 352 of the RPC for performing an
illegal marriage ceremony.
The MTC of Batac, Ilocos Norte did not believe Petitioner's defense that what he did
was an act of blessing and was not tantamount to solemnization of marriage and was
found guilty.
The decision was affirmed by both the RTC and the CA.
CRIME CHARGED: Performance of illegal marriage ceremony (Art. 352)
MTC: GUILTY of violation of Article 352 of the RPC
RTC: AFFIRMED MTC Ruling
CA: AFFIRMED RTC Ruling

ISSUE: Did Petitioner violate Art. 352 of the RPC and commit an illegal marriage?
RULING: YES.
Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform
or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are:
1. Authority of the solemnizing officer; and

2. His performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
The first element is present since Petitioner himself admitted that he has authority to
solemnize a marriage.
The second element is present since the alleged "blessing" by Petitioner is tantamount
to the performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
There is no prescribed form or rite for the solemnization of a marriage. However, Article
6 of the Family Code provides that it shall be necessary:
1. For the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer;
and
2. Declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they
take each other as husband and wife.
The first requirement is present since petitioner admitted to it. The second requirement
is likewise present since the prosecution, through the testimony of its witnesses, proved
that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband
and wife.
The penalty for violating Article 352 of the RPC is in accordance with the provision of
the Marriage Law, specifically Article 44, which states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not
specifically penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities,
shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for
not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court.
As such, Petitioner was held guilty of violating Article 352 and was fined P200 as
penalty.
In the present case, Fr. Ronulo admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage.
Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner
is tantamount to the performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is punishable
under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended,
does not specifically define a "marriage ceremony" and what constitutes its "illegal"
performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters. Article
6 of the Family Code provides that "no prescribed form or religious rite for the

solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the

contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in
the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as
husband and wife."
Pertinently, Article 3(3) mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly defines a
marriage ceremony as that which takes place with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each
other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
The law sets the minimum requirements constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there
should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties before a solemnizing
officer; and second, their declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses
that they take each other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, Fr. Ronulo admitted that the parties appeared before him
and this fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, the prosecution
has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the contracting parties personally
declared that they take each other as husband and wife. The testimonies of Joseph
and Mary Anne, and even Fr. Ronulo's admission regarding the circumstances of the
ceremony, support Florida’s testimony that there had indeed been the declaration by
the couple that they take each other as husband and wife. The solemnization by the
petitioner of this marriage ceremony was illegal.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the
presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, Fr. Ronulo admitted that
he knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of
their relationship. Undoubtedly, Fr.Ronulo conducted the marriage ceremony despite
knowledge that the essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were
lacking.
DECISION: AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals

TITLE THIRTEEN (ARTICLES 353-364): Crimes Against Honor
ROBERTO BRILLANTE v COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 118757 & 121571 | November 11, 2005
TICKLER: Accusations against Binay, Libel, fine only without imprisonment
DOCTRINE: Considering the wide latitude traditionally given to defamatory utterances

against public officials in connection with or relevant to their performance of official
duties or against public figures in relation to matters of public interest involving them.
The foregoing circumstances, in the Court’s view, justify the deletion of the penalty of
imprisonment and the retention of the meted fine only.
FACTS: This case is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by Roberto Brillante (Brillante)
assailing the October 19, 2004 Decision of the SC which convicted him for the crime of
libel and sentenced him to suffer both the penalty of imprisonment and fine.
Brillante avers that his conviction, without the corresponding conviction of the writers,
editors and owners of the newspapers on which the libelous materials were published,
violates his right to equal protection. He also claims that he should have been convicted
only of one count of libel because private respondents were not defamed separately as
each publication was impelled by a single criminal intent. Finally, he claims that there
is a "semblance of truth" to the accusations he hurled at private respondents citing
several instances of alleged violent acts committed by the latter against his person.
Private respondent Jejomar Binay (Binay) on the other hand, maintained that the equal
protection clause does not apply because there are substantial distinctions between
Brillante and his co-accused warranting dissimilar treatment. Moreover, contrary to
Brillante’s claim that he should have been convicted only of one count of libel, Binay
asserts that there can be as many convictions for libel as there are persons defamed.
Besides, this matter should have been raised at the time the separate complaints were
filed against him and not in this motion.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment, stating that the
issues raised in Brillante’s motion have already been discussed and passed upon by
the Court. Hence, the motion should be denied.
CRIME CHARGED: Libel
RTC: None (Motion for Reconsideration of an earlier SC Decision)
CA: None (Motion for Reconsideration of an earlier SC Decision)
ISSUE: Was the imposition of the penalty of imprisonment against petitioner proper?

RULING: NO, petitioner’s actions warrant the imposition of fine only, instead of
both imprisonment and fine, in accordance with Art. 355 of the Penal Code.
As correctly noted by the OSG, the basic issues raised in the instant motion have
already been thoroughly discussed and passed upon by the Court in its Decision. For
this reason, the Court no longer dwelled on it. The Court, however, believes that the
penalty of imprisonment imposed against Brillante should be re-examined and
reconsidered.
Although this matter was neither raised in Brillante’s petition nor in the instant motion,
the Court advert to the well-established rule that an appeal in a criminal proceeding
throws the whole case open for review of all its aspects, including those not raised by
the parties.
In an earlier case of Mari v. Court of Appeals, petitioner therein was found guilty of
slander by deed penalized under Art. 359 of the Revised Penal Code by either
imprisonment or fine. In view of the fact that the offense was done in the heat of anger
and in reaction to a perceived provocation, the Court opted to impose the penalty of
fine instead of imprisonment.
In this case, Brillante claims that on January 6, 1988, his friend’s house was bombed
resulting in the death of three people. This incident allegedly impelled him, out of moral
and social duty, to call a press conference on January 7, 1988 with the intention of
exposing what he believed were terrorist acts committed by private respondents against
the electorate of Makati City.
The Court found that the circumstances surrounding the writing of the open letter on
which the libelous publications were based similarly warrant the imposition of the
penalty of fine only, instead of both imprisonment and fine, in accordance with Art. 355
of the RPC. The intensely feverish passions evoked during the election period in 1988
must have agitated petitioner into writing his open letter.
Moreover, while petitioner failed to prove all the elements of qualified privileged
communication under par. 1, Art. 354 of the RPC, incomplete privilege should be
appreciated in his favor, especially considering the wide latitude traditionally given to
defamatory utterances against public officials in connection with or relevant to their
performance of official duties or against public figures in relation to matters of public
interest involving them. The foregoing circumstances, in the Court’s view, justify the
deletion of the penalty of imprisonment and the retention of the meted fine only.
DECISION: Conviction of libel under the October 19, 2004 SC Decision is affirmed but
the sentence is modified with the deletion of the penalty of imprisonment imposed upon
petitioner.

JOSE BUATIS v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 142509 | March 24, 2006
TICKLER: Letter for Attorney Pieraz. Satan. Senile. Stupid. Carabao English.
DOCTRINES:
1. For an imputation to be libelous, requisites must concur: (DIMP)

(a) it must be defamatory;
(b) the victim must be identifiable;
(c) it must be malicious; and
(d) it must be given publicity.
2. GENERAL RULE under Article 354 is that every defamatory imputation is

presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable
motive for making it is shown. Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, the
prosecution need not prove malice on the part of petitioner (malice in fact), for
the law already presumes that petitioner’s imputation is malicious (malice in law).
FACTS:
Atty. Pieraz's wife retrieved a letter from their mailbox addressed to her husband.
The letter was open, as it was not contained in an envelope, and Atty. Pieraz’ wife put
it on her husband’s desk. It reads:
"Atty. Pieraz: This has reference to your lousy but inutile threatening letter dated
August 18, 1995, addressed to our client; using carabao English. May we remind you
that any attempt on your part to continue harassing the person of Mrs. Teresita Quingco
of No. 1582 Mngo St., Bgy. Manggahan, Pasig City, Metro Manila---undersigned much
to his regrets shall be constrained/compelled to file the necessary complaint for
disbarment against you. You may proceed then with your stupidity and suffer the full
consequence of the law. Needless for you to cite specific provisions of the Revised
Penal Code, as the same is irrelevant to the present case. As a matter of fact, the same
shall be used by no other than the person of Mrs. Quingco in filing administrative charge
against you and all persons behind these nefarious activities. Finally, it is a welcome
opportunity for the undersigned to face you squarely in any courts of justice, so as we
can prove "who is who" once and for all. Trusting that you are properly inform (sic)
regarding these matters, I remain.
Yours in Satan name; JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR."
Atty. Pieraz responded and sent mail to Buatis, Jr. Buatis then dispatched a
second letter. Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis, particularly: "Satan,
Senile, Stupid, English Carabao, "Atty Pieraz filed COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL against
Buatis. The subject letter and its content came to the knowledge not only of his wife but
of his children as well and they chided him telling him: "Ginagawa ka lang gago dito."

DEFENSE:
Buatis testified that he could not recall whether he had signed letter-comment
or if it was even addressed to Atty. Pieraz.
Buatis as well asserted the ruling of People vs Velasco that if the act charged
as libelous is ONLY an INCIDENT IN an act which has another objective, the crime
is not libel. In this case, he claims that his reply was meant to inform Atty. Pieraz
that Ms. Quingco is recognized tenant, and that the communication in whatever
language of lawyer under obligation to defend client’s cause is BUT a privileged
communication.
CRIME CHARGED: Libel
RTC: GUILTY of the crime of LIBEL. Calling a lawyer "inutil", stupid and capable of
using only carabao English, is intended not only for the consumption of respondent but
similarly for others as a copy of the libelous letter was furnished all concerned; the
letter was prejudicial to the good name of respondent and an affront to his standing
as a lawyer; the letter is libelous per se since a defect or vice imputed is plainly
understood as set against the entire message sought to be conveyed; petitioner
failed to reverse the presumption of malice from the defamatory imputation contained
in the letter.
There was PUBLICATION since letter was made known or brought to the
attention and notice of other persons other than the offended party.
The element of IDENTITY was established since the letter was intended to Atty.
Pieraz.
CA: AFFIRMED lower court decision. The words used are uncalled for and defamatory
in character as they impeached the good reputation of respondent as lawyer and that
is malicious.
It rejected Buatis' claim that it is privileged communication since he failed to

come up with valid explanation why he resorted to name calling and downgrading of
lawyer to the extent of ridiculing him.
ISSUES:
3. Is petitioner guilty of libel? YES.
4. Is the imputation defamatory in this case? YES.
RULING:
1. Yes, Buatis is guilty of the crime of LIBEL.
Libel (Article 353) is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or

defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance

tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical

person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
For an imputation to be libelous, requisites must concur: (DIMP)

(a) it must be defamatory;
(b) the victim must be identifiable;
(c) it must be malicious; and
(d) it must be given publicity.
In this case:
PUBLICATION has been established. PUBLICATION means making the
defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other than the person
against whom it has been written. Petitioner’s letter-reply itself states that the
same was copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had dictated the
letter to his secretary. It is enough that the author of the libel complained of
has communicated it to a third person. Furthermore, the letter, when found in
the mailbox, was open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public.
IDENTIFIABLE: the subject letter-reply was addressed to respondent himself.
2. YES, the imputation was defamatory and malicious.
"In determining whether the specified matter is libelous per se, two rules of
construction are conspicuously applicable: (1) That construction must be
adopted which will give to the matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious
in the plain and ordinary sense in which the public would naturally understand
what was uttered. (2) The published matter alleged to be libelous must be
construed as a whole."
In this case, the words used is defamatory--"lousy", "inutile", "carabao English",

"stupidity", and "satan", the letter, as it was written, casts aspersion on the
character, integrity and reputation of respondent as a lawyer which exposed him
to ridicule. No evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove it.
GENERAL RULE under Article 354 is that every defamatory imputation is

presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable
motive for making it is shown. Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, the
prosecution need not prove malice on the part of petitioner (malice in fact), for
the law already presumes that petitioner’s imputation is malicious (malice in law).
There was nothing in the said letter which showed petitioner’s good intention and
justifiable motive for writing the same in order to overcome the legal inference of
malice.
Such letter is not private communication made in the performance of moral

and social duty as attorney-in-fact as claimed by the petitioner. Article 354
provides two exceptions to the general rule that every defamatory imputation is

malicious, when:
i. A private communication made by any person to another in the

performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and
j. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are
not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered
in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the
exercise of their functions.
In order for it to be qualified privileged communication, following requisites must

concur:
1. The person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social
duty to make the communication;
2. The communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior,
having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to
furnish the protection sought; and
3. The statements in the communication are made in good faith and without
malice.
Although Petitioner made the letter out of his social duty BUT he failed to show
any explanation concerning the status of Mrs. Quingco and why she is entitled
to the premises as against the claim of respondent's client. The letter merely
contained insulting words which are totally irrelevant to his defense of Mrs
Quingco's right over the premises. More so, a written letter containing libelous
matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and circulated
among the public. In this case, petitioner admitted that he dictated the letter to
one of her secretaries who typed the same and made a print out of the computer.
And that the reply-letter was copy furnished to all concerned. His lack of
selectivity is indicative of malice and is anathema to his claim of privileged
communication.
DECISION: Petition DISMISSED.
PENALTY: There's alternative penalty either prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods or fine 200-6,000; or both. The courts are given discretion to choose.
In this case, we delete the prison sentence imposed on petitioner and instead impose
a fine of six thousand pesos.
ERWIN TULFO v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 161032 | September 16, 2008
TICKLER: Tulfo, Remate. “Direct Hit.” Corruption, extortion.

DOCTRINES:
1. Elements of fair commentary (to be considered privileged):

a. That it is a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of a statement, report,
or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by
a pulic officer in the exercise of his functions;
b. That it is made in good faith;
c. That it is without any comments or remarks.
2. The mere fact that the subject of an article is a public figure or a matter of public
interest does not mean it is a fair commentary within the scope of qualified
privileged communication, which would automatically exclude the author from
liability.
FACTS:
Atty. Ding So of the Bureau of Customs filed four separate Informations against
Erwin Tulfo, Susan Cambri, Rey Salao, Jocelyn Barlizo, and Philip Pichay, accusing
them of libel in connection with the publication of articles in the column “Direct Hit” of
the daily tabloid Remate. The column accused So of corruption, and portrayed him as
an extortionist and smuggler.
CRIME CHARGED: Four separation Informations for Libel
RTC: Found Tulfo, et al. GUILTY of libel
CA: Affirmed RTC Decision
ISSUES:
1. Why was Borjal v. CA not applied to this case?
2. Are the assailed articles privileged?
3. Are the assailed articles fair commentaries?
RULING:
1. Borjal was not applied to this case because:
a. Borjal stemmed from a civil action for damages based on libel, and
was not a criminal case.
b. The ruling in Borjal was that there was no sufficient identification of
the complainant.
c. The subject in Borjal was a private citizen, whereas in the present
case, the subject is a public official.
d. It was held in Borjal that the articles written by Art Borjal were “fair
commentaries on matters of public interest.”

2. NO. The columns were unsubstantiated attacks on Atty. So, and cannot be
countenanced as being privileged simply because the target was a public official.
a. Even with the knowledge that he might be in error, even knowing of

the possibility that someone else may have used Atty. So’s name, as
Tulfo surmised, he made no effort to verify the information given by
his source or even to ascertain the identity of the person he was
accusing.
b. Although falsity of the articles does not prove malice, the existence of
press freedom must be done “consistent with good faith and
reasonable care.” This was clearly abandoned by Tulfo when he wrote
the subject articles. This is no case of mere error or honest mistake,
but a case of a journalist abdicating his responsibility to verify his story
and instead misinforming the public.
c. Tulfo had written and published the articles with reckless disregard of
whether the same were false or not. The test laid down is the “reckless
disregard” test, and Tulfo failed to meet that test.
d. Evidence of malice: The fact that Tulfo published another article

lambasting Atty. So after the commencement of an action. Tulfo did
not relent nor did he pause to consider his actions, but went on to
continue defaming Atty. So. This is a clear indication of his intent to
malign Atty. So, no matter the cost, and is proof of malice.
3. NO. Good faith is lacking, as Tulfo failed to substantiate or even attempt to verify
his story before publication.
a. They provided no details of the acts committed by the subject. They are plain
and simple baseless accusations, backed up by the word of one unnamed
source.
b. Not “fair” or “true” because “fair” is defined as “having the qualities of
impartiality and honesty.” “True” is defined as “comfortable to fact; correct;
exact; actual; genuine; honest.” Tulfo failed to satisfy these requirements, as
he did not do research before making his allegations, and it has been shown
that these allegations were baseless. The articles are not “fair and true
reports,” but merely wild accusations.
Elements of fair commentary (to be considered privileged):

1. That it is a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of a statement, report,
or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by
a pulic officer in the exercise of his functions;
2. That it is made in good faith;

3. That it is without any comments or remarks.

Journalists may be allowed an adequate margin of error in the exercise of their
profession, but this margin does not expand to cover every defamatory or
injurious statement they may make in the furtherance of their profession, nor
does this margin cover total abandonment of responsibility. The mere fact that
the subject of an article is a public figure or a matter of public interest does not
mean it is a fair commentary within the scope of qualified privileged
communication, which would automatically exclude the author from liability. The
confidentiality of sources and their importance to journalists are accepted and
respected. What cannot be accepted are journalists making no efforts to verify
the information given by a source, and using that unverified information to throw
wild accusations and besmirch the name of possibly an innocent person.
Journalists have a responsibility to report the truth, and in doing so must at least
investigate their stories before publication, and be able to back up their stories
with proof. Journalists are not storytellers or novelists who may just spin tales
out of fevered imaginings, and pass them off as reality. There must be some
foundation to their reports; these reports must be warranted by facts. Freedom
of expression as well as freedom of the press may not be unrestrained, but
neither must it be reined in too harshly.

TITLE FOURTEEN (ARTICLE 365): Quasi-Offenses
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR v HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO and

EVANGELINE PONCE
G.R. No. 172716 | November 17, 2010
TICKLER: 2 Reckless Imprudence cases for same vehicular crash; Double jeopardy
DOCTRINES:
1. Reckless imprudence is a single crime, its consequences on persons and

property are material only to determine the penalty.
2. Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing
to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack
of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
3. Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases
in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger
clearly manifest.
4. Prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense.
FACTS:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner)

was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with
two separate offenses:
(1) Criminal Case No. 82366 - Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent
Ponce); and
(2) Criminal Case No. 82367 - Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C.
Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 7 September
2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 (RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES) and was meted out
the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 (RI-Homicide-DP) for placing him in jeopardy
of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.

After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to

the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari.
Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366 (RI – Homicide – DP), including the arraignment on 17 May 2005,
invoking the petition for review as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner’s
motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s
absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. Seven days later, the MeTC issued
a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his
arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing
of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the
RTC the dismissal of petition for certioriari for petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain
the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
CRIMES CHARGED:
1. Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained
by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce
2. Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the
death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the
spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
MeTC:
1. Convicted – Reckless Imprudence resulting in Physical Injuries
2. Unresolved – Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property
RTC: DISMISSED petition for certiorari, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioner’s
forfeiture of standing to maintain the action arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest
petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 (RI-
Homicide-DP). Thus, without reaching the merits of the petition for certiorari, the RTC
effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved
unavailing.
ISSUES:
1. Did petitioner forfeit his standing to seek relief in the petition for certiorari when
the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 (RI-Homicide-DP)?
2. If in the negative, does petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double
Jeopardy Clause bar further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 (RI-
Homicide-DP)?
RULING: (1) Petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No.

82366 (RI-Homicide-DP) did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition
in S.C.A. 2803 (petition for certiorari).

The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a
pre-arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 (RI-Homicide-DP) finds no basis under
procedural rules and jurisprudence.
The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment

in Criminal Case No. 82366 (RI-Homicide-DP) as proof of his loss of standing becomes
more evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a defendant who
absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders his
bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman
fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and,
should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted.
Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused
underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the
accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.
(2) The protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from

prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense
bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 (RI-Homicide-DP).
(A) Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on Persons and

Property are Material Only to Determine the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted
under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365
defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall

commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted
a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which
would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in
its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in
damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging
from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which
shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon
any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which,
if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound
discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those
provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose
the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which
they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law,

to death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing

to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking
into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases

in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly
manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be
imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help
as may be in this hand to give.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct
species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal
laws, is nothing new.
OLD DOCTRINE
As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to
this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition
that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x"
on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed
to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses
(as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent)
and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:

NEW DOCTRINE
Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing
crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence only by dint of lingering
doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining
Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of
quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related
branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses,
barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior
conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but arising from
the same reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was based.
(B) Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent

Prosecution for the Same Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense
by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal
of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of
jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,
decided in 1954. Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or
acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted
again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence
under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the
consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the
substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result
should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains
one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
CONCLUSION:
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single
charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing
penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each
consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under
Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and
simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated

2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157.
We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler

y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the
ground of double jeopardy.
REYNALDO S. MARIANO v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 178145 | July 7, 2014
TICKLER: Red Toyota pick-up, overtake
DOCTRINES:
1. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more
than a mere negligence in the operation of the motor vehicle, but a willful and
wanton disregard of the consequences is required. The Prosecution must further
show the direct causal connection between the negligence and the injuries or
damages complained of.
2. Rules under Article 365:
a. Had the act been intentional, and would constitute a grave felony, the
offender shall suffer arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period;
b. If it would have constituted a less grave felony, arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; and
c. If it would have constituted a light felony, arresto menor in its maximum
period shall be imposed.
FACTS:
Prosecution: At around 6:30 p.m., Ferdinand De Leon was driving his owner-type jeep
in Angat, Bulacan. He was with his wife and two-year old son. They came from a
baptismal party. Luis de Leon, an uncle of Ferdinand, also came from the baptismal
party and was driving his owner type jeep. Accused Reynaldo Mariano was driving his
Red Toyota pick-up with his wife and helper as passengers.
The Toyota pick-up overtook the jeep of Ferdinand de Leon and almost bumped it.
Ferdinand got mad, overtook the pick-up and blocked its path. Reynaldo Mariano
stopped the pick-up behind the jeep. Ferdinand alighted from his jeep and approached
Reynaldo. Ferdinand claimed that he and Reynaldo had an altercation. However,
Reynaldo insisted that he just stayed inside the pick-up and kept quiet while Ferdinand
hurled invectives at him. Luis De Leon intervened and the parties went their separate
ways.
Instead of proceeding to his house in Norzagaray, Ferdinand decided to drop by his

mother’s house in San Roque, Angat to pick up some items. He parked his jeep in front

of the house of his mother and alighted therefrom. However, he was bumped by a
moving vehicle, thrown four (4) meters away and lost consciousness.
Defense: The jeep of Ferdinand stopped on the road in front of the house of the latter’s
mother about five (5) to six (6) meters away from their pick-up. Reynaldo stopped the
pick-up as he saw an oncoming vehicle, which he allowed to pass. Thereafter,
Reynaldo made a signal and overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. However, Ferdinand
suddenly alighted from his jeep, lost his balance and was sideswiped by the overtaking
pick-up. Reynaldo did not stop his pick-up and he proceeded on his way for fear that
the bystanders might harm him and his companions. After bringing his companions to
their house, Reynaldo proceeded to Camp Alejo S. Santos in Malolos, Bulacan to
surrender and report the incident.
CRIME CHARGED: Frustrated Homicide
RTC: Frustrated Homicide
CA: Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Serious Physical Injuries;
Penalty: (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to (1) year, seven
(7) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as maximum.
When elevated to the SC, Petitioner contends that his guilt for any crime was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt, and claims that Ferdinand’s injuries were the result of a mere
accident. He insists that he lacked criminal intent; that he was not negligent in driving
his pick-up truck; and that the CA should have appreciated voluntary surrender as a
mitigating circumstance in his favor.
ISSUE: In relation to Title XIV:
1. Is Petitioner guilty of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Serious Physical

Injuries?
2. Did the CA err in the imposition of penalty?
RULING:
1. YES, the Petitioner is guilty.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an

act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on
the part of the person performing of failing to perform such act, taking into consideration
his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a
mere negligence in the operation of the motor vehicle, but a willful and wanton disregard

of the consequences is required. The Prosecution must further show the direct causal
connection between the negligence and the injuries or damages complained of.
In the absence of any cogent reasons, therefore, the Court bows to the CA’s
observations that the petitioner had driven his pick-up truck at a fast speed in order to
overtake the jeep of Ferdinand, and in so attempting to overtake unavoidably hit
Ferdinand, causing the latter’s injuries.
2. YES, the CA erred in the imposition of penalty.
The penalty for the offender guilty of reckless imprudence is based on the gravity of the
resulting injuries had his act been intentional.
Rules under Article 365:

a. Had the act been intentional, and would constitute a grave felony, the
offender shall suffer arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period;
b. If it would have constituted a less grave felony, arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; and
c. If it would have constituted a light felony, arresto menor in its maximum
period shall be imposed.
The RPC classifies the felony of serious physical injuries based on the gravity of the
physical injuries:
Article 263. Serious physical injuries. Any person who shall wound, beat, or assault
another, shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision mayor, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the
injured person shall become insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind;
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if in

consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have lost the use
of speech or the power to hear or to smell, or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an
arm, or a leg or shall have lost the use of any such member, or shall have become
incapacitated for the work in which he was therefor habitually engaged;
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if in

consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have become
deformed, or shall have lost any other part of his body, or shall have lost the use thereof,
or shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance of the work in which he as
habitually engaged for a period of more than ninety days;
4. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, if the physical injuries inflicted shall have caused the illness or
incapacity for labor of the injured person for more than thirty days.

If the offense shall have been committed against any of the persons enumerated in
Article 246, or with attendance of any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 248,
the case covered by subdivision number 1 of this Article shall be punished by reclusion
temporal in its medium and maximum periods; the case covered by subdivision number
2 by prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period;
the case covered by subdivision number 3 by prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods; and the case covered by subdivision number 4 by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
With Ferdinand not becoming insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind, his physical injuries
did not fall under Article 263, 1, supra. Consequently, the CA incorrectly considered the
petitioner's act as a grave felony had it been intentional, and should not have imposed
the penalty at arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium
period. Instead, the petitioner's act that caused the serious physical injuries, had it been
intentional, would be a less grave felony under Article 25 of the Revised Penal
Code, because Ferdinand's physical injuries were those under Article 263, 3, supra, for
having incapacitated him from the performance of the work in which he was habitually
engaged in for more than 90 days.
Conformably with Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty is arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which ranges from one to four months. As
earlier mentioned, the rules in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code are not applicable
in reckless imprudence, and considering further that the maximum term of
imprisonment would not exceed one year, rendering the Indeterminate Sentence
Law inapplicable, the Court holds that the straight penalty of two months of arresto
mayor was the correct penalty for the petitioner.
DECISION: AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that: (a) the penalty to be imposed on

the petitioner shall be a straight penalty of two months of arresto mayor; and (b) the
awards for actual and moral damages shall earn 6% interest rate per
annum commencing from the finality of this decision until fully paid.
ROGELIO GONZAGA v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 195671 | January 21, 2015
TICKLER: Motorcycle was bumped by a Toyota land Cruiser.
DOCTRINE: Reckless imprudence, as defined in Article 365 of the RPC, consists in

voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage
results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing
or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons,
time and place.

In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must
be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the
injuries or damages complained of. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act
must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle –
a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required.
FACTS:
At around 6am on June 25,1997 Dionesio Inguito Sr., with his children, were on
their motorcycle on the way to school. While they were ascending the curving road
going to Bocboc on their proper lane on the right side of the road, a Toyota Land Cruiser
driven by Petitioner was swiftly descending the same lane from the opposite direction.
Dionesio, Sr. blew the horn of his motorcycle to signal the Land Cruiser to return to its
proper lane but the Land Cruiser remained. In order to avoid collision, Dionesio, Sr.
tried to swerve to the left, but the Land Cruiser suddenly swerved towards the same
direction and collided head-on with the motorcycle resulting in a collision in which
Dionesio Sr. (he died) was pinned under the Land Cruiser while the 2 children were
thrown over the hood of the Land Cruiser causing injuries to their legs.
Siblings Rolf, Cherry, and Jenny Ann Aquino, who were traversing the same road
aboard their own motorcycle, stopped to help and placed the victims together on the
rightmost side of the road facing Brgy. Bocboc, while Rogelio remained inside the Land
Cruiser.
In his defense, Rogelio claimed that he was driving the Land Cruiser on his proper
lane along the descending curving road towards the direction of Kalilangan, Bukidnon,
when, from a distance of about 70 meters away, he saw the motorcycles driven by
Dionesio, Sr. and Rolf racing towards the curve from the opposite direction.Dionesio,
Sr. was driving his motorcycle in a zigzag manner on the Land Cruiser’s lane while Rolf
was on his proper lane. Undecided which side of the road to take to avoid collision,
Rogelio stopped the Land Cruiser but the motorcycle of Dionesio, Sr., nonetheless,
bumped into it. As a result of the impact, Cherry and Dionesio, Jr. were thrown over the
roof and the hood of the Land Cruiser, respectively, and fell on the side of the road,
while Dionesio, Sr. and the motorcycle were pinned beneath the land Cruiser. With the
use of a jack handle and the assistance of two (2) persons, i.e., Jose Bacus and
Reynaldo Quidato, who arrived at the scene, he was able to retrieve both Dionesio, Sr.
and the motorcycle from beneath the Land Cruiser. Thereafter, they loaded the victims
on board the Land Cruiser so they may be brought tothe hospital, but the vehicle turned
out to have defective brakes, so he asked other persons to secure another vehicle
instead.
CRIME CHARGED: RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE WITH

DOUBLE SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES AND DAMAGE TO PROPERTY "with the
aggravating circumstance that accused failed to lend on the spot to the injured
party such help that was in his hands to give”

RTC: RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE WITH DOUBLE

SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES AND DAMAGE TO PROPERTY punishable under
Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of the RPC.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and was partly considered because the
RTC reconsidered its opinion regarding Rogelio’s claim of having extended aid to the
victims, concluding that the jack handle that was used to get the body of Dionesio, Sr.
beneath the Land Cruiser could have been his in the absence of showing who owned
the same.
CA: REINSTATED the RTC’s first ruling (but without mention of the aggravating
circumstance)
ISSUE: Did the CA correctly affirm the RTC’s first ruling?
RULING: YES.
Reckless imprudence, as defined in Article 365 of the RPC, consists in voluntarily,

but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by
reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing
to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place.
In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it

must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and
the injuries or damages complained of. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the
act must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle
– a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required. Willful, wanton or
reckless disregard for the safety of others within the meaning of reckless driving
statutes has been held to involve a conscious choice of a course of action which injures
another, either with knowledge of serious danger to others involved, or with knowledge
of facts which would disclose the danger to any reasonable person. Verily, it is the
inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious indifference to the consequences of the
conduct which supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of mere negligence and
imprudence under the operation of the penal law, without regard to whether the private
offended party may himself be considered likewise at fault.
In the present case, the RTC and the CA uniformly found that Rogelio’s act of
driving very fast on the wrong side of the road was the proximate cause of the collision,
resulting to the death of Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and
Cherry. Notably, the road where the incident occurred was a curve sloping upwards
towards Brgy. Bocboc where the Inguitos were bound and descending towards the
opposite direction where Rogelio was going. Indeed, the very fact of speeding, under
such circumstances, is indicative of imprudent behavior. As a motorist, Rogelio was
bound to exercise ordinary care in such affair by driving at a reasonable rate of speed

commensurate with the conditions encountered, as this would enable him to keep the
vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using the highway. Moreover, it is
elementary in traffic school that a driver slows down before negotiating a curve as it
may be reasonably anticipated that another vehicle may appear from the opposite
direction at any moment. Hence, excessive speed, combined with other circumstances
such as the occurrence of the accident on or near a curve, as in this case, constitutes
negligence.
DECISION: Consequently, the Court finds that ROGELIO ACTED RECKLESSLY AND
IMPRUDENTLY in driving at a fast speed on the wrong side of the road while
approaching the curve where the incident happened, thereby rendering him
CRIMINALLY LIABLE, as well as CIVILLY ACCOUNTABLE for the material damages
resulting therefrom.
Nonetheless, while the CA and the RTC concurred that the proximate cause of the
collision was Rogelio’s reckless driving, the CA Decision made no mention as to the
presence or absence of the limiting element in the last paragraph of Article 365 of the
RPC, which imposes the penalty next higher in degree upon the offender who "fails to
lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his hands to give."
Based on case law, the obligation under this paragraph: (a) is dependent on the means
in the hands of the offender, i.e., the type and degree of assistance that he/she, at the
time and place of the incident, is capable of giving; and (b) requires adequate proof.
DR. JAIME T. CRUZ v FELICISIMO V. AGAS, JR.

G.R. No. 204095 | June 15, 2015
TICKLER: Medical negligence. Gastroscopy and Colonoscopy at St. Luke’s.
DOCTRINE: A medical negligence case can prosper if the patient can present solid
proof that the doctor, like in this case, either failed to do something which a reasonably
prudent doctor would have done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent
doctor would not have done, and such failure or action caused injury to the patient.
FACTS:
PROSECUTION’S VERSION
In his Complaint-Affidavit for Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence

and Medical Malpractice against Dr. Agas, Dr. Cruz alleged, among others, that
sometime in May 2003, he engaged the services of St. Luke’s Medical Center (SLMC)
for a medical check-up; that after being admitted in SLMC on May 28, 2003,he
underwent stool, urine, blood, and other body fluid tests conducted by the employees
and doctors of the said hospital; that on May 29, 2003, he was sent to the Gastro-

Enterology Department for a scheduled gastroscopy and colonoscopy; that because

the specialist assigned to perform the procedure was nowhere to be found, he gave the
colonoscopy results to the attending female anesthesiologist for the information and
consideration of the assigned specialist; that, thereafter, he was sedated and the
endoscopic examination was carried out; that when he regained consciousness, he felt
that something went wrong during the procedure because he felt dizzy, had cold
clammy perspiration and experienced breathing difficulty; that he could not stand or sit
upright because he felt so exhausted and so much pain in his abdomen; that when he
was about to urinate in the comfort room, he collapsed; that he tried to consult the
specialist who performed the colonoscopy but he was nowhere to be found; and that
his cardiologist, Dra. Agnes Del Rosario, was able to observe his critical condition and
immediately referred him to the surgical department which suspected that he had
hemorrhage in his abdomen and advised him to undergo an emergency surgical
operation.
Dr. Cruz further averred that he agreed to the operation and upon waking up at the ICU
on May 30, 2003, he found out that the doctors did an exploratory laparatomy because
of the internal bleeding; that he learned that the doctors cut a portion of the left side of
his colon measuring 6-8 inches because it had a partial tear of the colonic wall which
caused the internal bleeding; that despite the painkillers, he was under tremendous
pain in the incision area during his recovery period in the ICU and had fever; and that
he had intravenous tubes attached to his arms, subclavian artery on the left part of his
chest and a nasogastric tube through his nose.
Dr. Cruz claimed that Dr. Agas admitted that he was the one who performed the
colonoscopy procedure but the latter insisted that nothing went wrong. On June 7,
2003, he was discharged from SLMC. Nevertheless, he complained that he had a hard
time digesting his food; that he was frequently fed every two hours because he easily
got full; that he had fresh blood stools every time he moved his bowel; that he had lost
his appetite and had gastric acidity; that he slept most of the day; and that he was in
good physical condition before the colonoscopy procedure. He asserted that at the time
of the filing of the complaint, he was still weak, tired and in pain.
DEFENSE’S VERSION
Dr. Agas, on the other hand, countered that Dr. Cruz failed to prove the basic elements
of reckless imprudence or negligence. He averred that Dr. Cruz unfairly made it appear
that he did not know that he would perform the procedure. He explained that before the
start of the colonoscopy procedure, he was able to confer with Dr. Cruz and review his
medical history which was taken earlier by a fellow gastrointestinal physician. He
claimed that the gastroscopy and colonoscopy procedures conducted on Dr. Cruz were
completely successful considering that the latter did not manifest any significant
adverse reaction or body resistance during the procedures and that his vital signs were
normal throughout the procedure.
Dr. Agas added that certifications and sworn statements were submitted by the

Assistant Medical Director for Professional Services, the Director of the Institute of
Digestive Diseases, the anesthesiologist, and the hospital nurse attesting to the fact
that the intraperitonial bleeding which developed after the colonoscopy procedure, was
immediately recognized, evaluated, carefully managed, and corrected; that he provided
an adequate and reasonable standard of care to Dr. Cruz; that the endoscopist followed
all precautionary measures; that the colonoscopy procedure was done properly; that
he was not negligent or reckless in conducting the colonoscopy procedure; that he did
not deviate from any standard medical norm, practice or procedure; and that he
exercised competence and diligence in rendering medical services to Dr. Cruz.
CRIME CHARGED: Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence and

Medical Malpractice
OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR: DISMISSED the complaint.
DOJ (Appeal): AFFIRMED the dismissal.
CA: Complaint DISMISSED.
ISSUE: Did Dr. Agas commit medical negligence?
RULING: NO. In the case at bench, Dr. Cruz failed to show that the DOJ gravely abused
its discretion in finding that there was lack of probable cause and dismissing the
complaint against Dr. Agas for Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence
and Medical Malpractice.
A medical negligence case can prosper if the patient can present solid proof that the
doctor, like in this case, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent doctor
would have done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent doctor would not
have done, and such failure or action caused injury to the patient.
To successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care
provider either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider
would have done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent provider would
not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient. Simply put, the
elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.
In this case, Dr. Cruz has the burden of showing the negligence or recklessness of Dr.
Agas. Although there is no dispute that Dr. Cruz sustained internal hemorrhage due to
a tear in the serosa of his sigmoid colon, he failed to show that it was caused by Dr.
Agas’s negligent and reckless conduct of the colonoscopy procedure. In other words,
Dr. Cruz failed to show and explain that particular negligent or reckless act or omission
committed by Dr. Agas. Stated differently, Dr. Cruz did not demonstrate that there was
"inexcusable lack of precaution" on the part of Dr. Agas.

NAPOLEON SENIT v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 192914 | January 28, 2016
TICKLER: Super 5 Bus
DOCTRINE: The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or
fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be
without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5)
that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition,
and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.
FACTS:
Private complainant Mohinder Toor, Sr. was driving north along Aglayan from the
direction of Valencia on board his Toyota pick-up with his wife Rosalinda Toor, their
three-year-old son Mohinder Toor, Jr., and househelper Mezelle Jane Silayan. He
turned left and was coming to the center of Aglayan when a speeding Super 5 bus
driven by petitioner and coming from Malaybalay headed south towards Valencia,
suddenly overtook a big truck from the right side. Petitioner tried to avoid the accident
by swerving to the right towards the shoulder of the road and applying the brakes, but
he was moving too fast and could not avoid a collision with the pick-up. The bus crashed
into the right side of private complainant's pick-up at a right angle.
All passengers of the pick-up were injured and immediately brought to Bethel Baptist
Hospital, Sumpong, Malaybalay City. However, because of lack of medical facilities,
they were transferred to the Bukidnon Doctor's Hospital in Valencia City, Bukidnon.
Rosalinda Toor sustained an open fracture of the humerus of the right arm and
displaced, closed fracture of the proximal and distal femur of the right lower extremity
which required two surgical operations. She was paralyzed as a result of the accident
and was unable to return to her job as the Regional Manager of COSPACHEM Product
Laboratories. Mohinder Toor, Sr. spent about P580,000.00 for her treatment and
P3,000.00 for Mezelle Jean Silayan, who suffered frontal area swelling as a result of
the accident. Mohinder Toor, Sr. suffered a complete fracture of the scapular'bone of
his right shoulder while his son Mohinder Toor, Jr. sustained abdominal injury and a
wound on the area of his right eye which required suturing. The damage sustained by
the pick-up reached P106,155.00.
CRIME CHARGED: Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property

RTC: Trial ensued. However, after the initial presentation of evidence for the petitioner,
he resigned from his employment and transferred residence. His whereabouts allegedly
became unknown so he was not presented as a witness by his new counsel.
RTC rendered its Decision in absentia CONVICTING the petitioner of the crime
charged.
CA: CA AFFIRMED the decision of the RTC WITH MODIFICATION as to the penalty
imposed.
***Evidence presented by OSG overwhelmingly points to the petitioner as the culprit. A

scrutiny of the records further reveals that the pictures taken after the accident and the
Traffic Investigation Report all coincide with the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, which are in whole consistent and believable thus, debunking the claim of
the petitioner that he was convicted on the mere basis of allegedly biased and hearsay
testimonies which do not establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In addition, there
was no existing evidence to show that there was an improper motive on the part of the
eyewitnesses.
ISSUE: Did the RTC err in convicting the accused?
RULING: NO.
Art.365. Imprudence and negligence. -x x x.

xxxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an

act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on
the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration
his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
xxxx
The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an
act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without
malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that
there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition,
and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.
All elements for the crime of reckless imprudence have been established in the present
case.
The petitioner questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and claims that
their testimonies are biased. He also claims that Toor, Sr. is the real culprit when he
turned left without looking for an incoming vehicle, thus violating traffic rules resulting
to the mishap.
The Court believes that the RTC and CA correctly appreciated the evidence and
testimonies presented in the instant case.
Taken all together, the testimonies of the witnesses conclusively suggest that: (1) the
Super 5 bus was moving fast; (2) the bus overtook a big truck which was moving slowly
from the right side; and (3) when the petitioner saw the pick-up truck turning left, he
applied the brakes but because he was moving fast, the collision became inevitable.
The prosecution sufficiently proved that the Super 5 bus driven by the petitioner
recklessly drove on the right shoulder of the road and overtook another south-bound
ten-wheeler truck that slowed at the intersection, obviously to give way to another
vehicle about to enter the intersection. It was impossible for him not to notice that the
ten-wheeler truck in front and traveling in the same direction had already slowed down
to allow passage of the pick-up, which was then negotiating a left turn to Aglayan public
market. Seeing the ten-wheeler truck slow down, it was incumbent upon the petitioner
to reduce his speed or apply on the brakes of the bus in order to allow the pick-up to
safely make a left turn. Instead, he drove at a speed too fast for safety, then chose to
swerve to the right shoulder of the road and overtake the truck, entering the intersection
and directly smashing into the pick-up. In flagrantly failing to observe the necessary
precautions to avoid inflicting injury or damage to other persons and things, the
petitioner was recklessly imprudent in operating the Super 5 bus.
DECISION: Appealed Decision is AFFIRMED.
VENANCIO M. SEVILLA v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 194390 | August 13, 2014
TICKLER: Former councilor of Malabon, false narration in PDS
DOCTRINE: Reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents is an

offense that is necessarily included in the willful act of falsification of public documents,
the latter being the greater offense. As such, Sevilla can be convicted of reckless
imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents notwithstanding that the
Information only charged the willful act of falsification of public documents.
FACTS:
Venancio Sevilla, a former councilor of Malabon City, was charged with the felony of
falsification of public document, penalized under Article 171(4) of the RPC.

The prosecution alleged that on July 2, 2001, the first day of his term as councilor of
the City of Malabon, Sevilla made a false narration in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS).
That in answer to the question of whether there is a pending criminal case against him,
Sevilla marked the box corresponding to the "no" answer despite the pendency of a
criminal case against him for assault upon an agent of a person in authority before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Malabon City, Branch 55.
On the other hand, Sevilla admitted that he indeed marked the box corresponding to
the "no" answer vis-à-vis the question on whether he has any pending criminal case.
However, he averred that he did not intend to falsify his PDS. He claimed that it was
Editha Mendoza (Mendoza), a member of his staff, who actually prepared his PDS.
According to Sevilla, on July 2, 2001, since he did not have an office yet, he just stayed
in his house. At around two o’clock in the afternoon, he was informed by Mendoza that
he needs to accomplish his PDS and submit the same to the personnel office of the
City of Malabon before five o’clock that afternoon. He then instructed Mendoza to copy
the entries in the previous copy of his PDS which he filed with the personnel office.
After the PDS was filled up and delivered to him by Mendoza, Sevilla claims that he just
signed the same without checking the veracity of the entries therein. That he failed to
notice that, in answer to the question of whether he has any pending criminal case,
Mendoza checked the box corresponding to the "no" answer.
The defense likewise presented the testimony of Edilberto Torres (Torres), a former
City Councilor. Torres testified that Sevilla was not yet given an office space in the
Malabon City Hall on July 2, 2001; that when the members of Sevilla’s staff would then
need to use the typewriter, they would just use the typewriter inside Torres’ office.
Torres further claimed that he saw Mendoza preparing the PDS of Sevilla, the latter
having used the typewriter in his office.
CRIME CHARGED: Falsification of Public Document, penalized under Article 171(4) of

the RPC
SANDIGANBAYAN: SEVILLA is found GUILTY of Falsification of Public Documents

Through Reckless Imprudence and pursuant to Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Sandiganbayan found that Sevilla made an untruthful statement in his PDS, which
is a public document, and that, in so doing, he took advantage of his official position
since he would not have accomplished the PDS if not for his position as a City
Councilor. That being the signatory of the PDS, Sevilla had the responsibility to prepare,
accomplish and submit the same. Further, the Sandiganbayan pointed out that there
was a legal obligation on the part of Sevilla to disclose in his PDS that there was a
pending case against him. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution
was able to establish all the elements of the felony of falsification of public documents.
Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan opined that Sevilla cannot be convicted of
falsification of public document under Article 171(4) of the RPC since he did not act
with malicious intent to falsify the aforementioned entry in his PDS. However,

considering that Sevilla’s PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done, which resulted in
the false entry therein, the Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of falsification of public
document through reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the RPC.
ISSUE: Can Sevilla be convicted of the felony of falsification of public document

through reckless imprudence notwithstanding that the charge against him in the
Information was for the intentional felony of falsification of public document under Article
171(4) of the RPC?
RULING: YES, he can be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of

public documents.
At the outset, it bears stressing that the Sandiganbayan’s designation of the felony
supposedly committed by Sevilla is inaccurate. The Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla
of reckless imprudence, punished under Article 365 of the RPC, which resulted into the
falsification of a public document. However, the Sandiganbayan designated the felony
committed as "falsification of public document through reckless imprudence." The
foregoing designation implies that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply
a modality of committing it. Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the RPC are distinct
and separate crimes and not a mere modality in the commission of a crime.
In Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation v. People, the Court clarified that:

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal negligence "is
treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful
offenses. It is not a question of classification or terminology. In intentional
crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is
principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible. Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use of such
descriptive phrase as ‘homicide through reckless imprudence’, and the
like; when the strict technical sense is, more accurately, ‘reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide’; or ‘simple imprudence causing
damages to property’."
There is need, therefore, to rectify the designation of the offense without disturbing the
imposed penalty for the guidance of bench and bar in strict adherence to precedent.
Thus, the proper designation of the felony should be reckless imprudence resulting
to falsification of public documents and not falsification of public documents through
reckless imprudence.
Having threshed out the proper designation of the felony committed by Sevilla, the
Court now weighs the merit of the instant appeal. Sevilla’s appeal is anchored mainly
on the variance between the offense charged in the Information that was filed against
him and that proved by the prosecution.

In case of variance between the allegation and proof, a defendant may be convicted of
the offense proved when the offense charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved. There is no dispute that a variance exists between the offense alleged
against Sevilla and that proved by the prosecution – the Information charged him with
the intentional felony of falsification of public document under Article 171(4) of the RPC
while the prosecution was able to prove reckless imprudence resulting to falsification
of public documents. Parenthetically, the question that has to be resolved then is
whether reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public document is necessarily
included in the intentional felony of falsification of public document under Article 171(4)
of the RPC.
The Court, in Samson v. Court of Appeals, has answered the foregoing question in the
affirmative. Thus:
While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, but a
distinct crime in itself, designated as a quasi-offense, in our Penal Code, it may
however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under an information
exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the
greater includes the lesser offense.
Thus, Sevilla’s claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him was violated when the Sandiganbayan convicted him of
reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents, when the Information
only charged the intentional felony of falsification of public documents, is untenable. To
stress, reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents is an
offense that is necessarily included in the willful act of falsification of public
documents, the latter being the greater offense. As such, he can be convicted of
reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents notwithstanding that
the Information only charged the willful act of falsification of public documents.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the appeal

is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 26, 2009 and the Resolution dated
October 22, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27925 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
- END OF CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW -

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CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests

Outline by Fiscal Victoria C. Garcia

REVISED PENAL CODE: BOOK TWO

TITLE ELEVEN (ARTICLES 333-346): Crimes Against Chastity

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v ROSENDO AMARO

CRIME CHARGED: Forcible Abduction with Rape

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

RTC: GUILTY of Forcible Abduction with Rape

CA: GUILTY of Forcible Abduction with Rape

In this appeal, appellant contends that the prosecution's evidence is insufficient to

In the prosecution of rape cases, conviction or acquittal depends on the complainant's

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 30 March 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v MARVIN CAYANAN

TICKLER: Brother-in-law; Sweetheart defense

CA: AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION the Consolidated Decision by increasing the

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

DECISION: Marvin Cayanan is found GUILTY OF QUALIFIED RAPE in Criminal Case

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

JAMES WALTER CAPILI v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

TICKLER: ANG LALAKING hindi sumunod sa three-month rule ni John Lloyd.

DOCTRINE: The crime of bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the

In response, James filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that:

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

CRIME CHARGED: Bigamy

NOTE: Capili filed a MOTION TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS.

RTC Pasig (Criminal Case): RESET ARRAIGNMENT and PRE-TRIAL

RTC Antipolo (Civil Case): declared VOIDNESS or INCIPIENT INVALIDITY OF THE

RTC Pasig (Motion to Dismiss): GRANTED.

The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are:

The crime of bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

DECISION: Petition filed by Capili was DISMISSED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v EDGARDO ODTUHAN

TICKLER: Odtuhan = Two Hon[ey]; Two Marriages

1st Marriage: On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina).

On April 15, 2005, respondent was indicted in an Information for Bigamy.

modes of extinguishing criminal liability. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was

CRIME CHARGED: Bigamy

Petitioner contested that subsequent court judgment declaring respondent’s first

ISSUE: Does the petition have merit?

RULING: YES. [Guilty of Bigamy; CA reversed and case remanded to RTC]

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals

CELERINA SANTOS v RICARDO SANTOS

TICKLER: Celerina presumed dead by husband Ricardo.

A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

CRIME CHARGED: N/A.

Note: This is a PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT before the Court of

CA: DISMISSED petition, for being a wrong mode of remedy.

RULING: YES, it erred in so doing.

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the

LEONILA G. SANTIAGO v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

CRIME CHARGED: Bigamy

RTC: GUILTY of Bigamy – Galang’s testimony > Petitioner’s inconsistent statements

CA: AFFIRMED CONVICTION for bigamy

RULING: YES, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner’s knowledge of