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Prohibition

Montes v. DOST
GR No. 143797, May 4, 2006

Facts: Imelda Rodriguez and Elizabeth Fontanilla filed an administrative complaint against petitioner for grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service. Previously, petitioner filed a complaint for
misconduct against Rodriguez and Fontanilla before the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption.
On the said investigation, petitioner produced a taped conversation of their conversation with the DOST Secretary
without the latter’s knowledge. The Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and suspended him
for one year and Ombudsman held that he is also guilty of violation of the Anti-Wirtetapping Law (RA 4200).
Montes (Petitioner) filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied so he filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 with a prayer for a TRO. The same was dismissed but upon MR the CA issued a resolution requiring the
Ombudsman to file a comment. Meanwhile, DOST issued the suspension order. Hence, this petition for
Prohibition.

Issue: WON the petition is proper

Ruling: No. At the outset, we find that Montes transgressed the proscription against forum shopping. There is
forum shopping when a party seeks to obtain remedies in an action in one court, which had already been solicited,
and in other courts and other proceedings in other tribunals. Forum shopping is also the act of one party against
another when an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another and possibly favorable
opinion in another forum other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari; or the institution of two or
more acts or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make
a favorable disposition.

Forum shopping is an act of malpractice, as the litigants trifle with the courts and abuse their processes. It is
improper conduct and degrades the administration of justice. If the act of the party or its counsel clearly
constitutes willful and deliberate forum-shopping, the same shall constitute direct contempt, and a cause for
administrative sanctions, as well as a ground for the summary dismissal of the case with prejudice.

In the case at bar, when Montes filed the petition for prohibition against the suspension order on 19 July 2000,
his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition for certiorari was still pending before the appellate
court. In fact, in a Resolution dated 22 June 2000, the Court of Appeals directed the Ombudsman to file his
comment indicating that Montes motion for reconsideration has not been fully resolved.

Montes petition for certiorari prayed, among others, that the appellate court issues an order restraining the
Honorable Secretary, Department of Science and Technology from implementing the Order dated 02 March 2000.
Montes motion for reconsideration likewise prayed that (t)he implementation of the suspension for one year from
the service without pay of the herein petitioner be restrained (subject of the assailed OMB Decision and Order).
In the present petition, Montes prays that (a)n order be issued to restrain the Honorable Secretary, DOST from
implementing the Suspension Order on the herein petitioner.

Clearly, the relief sought from the appellate court is the same as the relief prayed for in the present petition that
is, that an order be issued restraining the DOST Secretary from implementing the Ombudsman Order. In filing
the instant petition without awaiting the resolution of his pending motion before the appellate court, Montes asked
for simultaneous remedies in two different fora. This act is censurable and serves as a ground for the dismissal of
the instant case with prejudice.

Moreover, we find that Montes failed to adequately show that there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to warrant the issuance of a writ of prohibition.
For a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed
against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal,
corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion;
and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Mandamus

UP vs Regino
GR No. 88167, May 3, 1993

Facts: Private respondent Pamplina was a mimeograph operator at UP and was dismissed on the grounds of
dishonesty and grave misconduct. He appealed before the UP Board of Regents but the appeal was denied.
Subsequently, he sought relief from the Merit Standards Board (MSB), UP now filed a motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction contending that the UP Board off Regent has the exclusive jurisdiction to discipline UP employees
invoking institutional autonomy. MSB exonerated Pamplina and ordered his reinstatement. UP appealed before
the CSC but sustained the decision of the MSB. A Motion for the execution of judgment was filed and the same
was granted but Pamplina was not yet reinstated by UP. Pamplina filed before the RTC the issuance of a writ of
mandamus to reinstate Pamplina. Hence, this petition

Issued: WON the issuance of a writ of mandamus by the RTC is proper

Ruling. Yes. The assailed orders having become final and executory, Pamplina had every right to seek mandamus
to compel their execution. Respondent Judge Regino was quite correct when he issued the questioned writ.

The case cited repeatedly by the petitioners, viz., University of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,9 cannot
apply to the present controversy. The reason is that at the time it was promulgated on January 28, 1971, PD 807
had not yet been enacted. PD 807 took affect only in 1975.

In ruling in that case "that the President and Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines possess full
and final authority in the disciplining, suspension and removal of the civil service employees of the University,
including those of the Philippine General Hospital, independently of the Commissioner of Civil Service and the
Civil Service Board of Appeals," Justice J.B.L. Reyes relied on the Civil Service Law of 1959, which then
empowered the Civil Service Commission:

Except as otherwise provided by law, to have final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension
of all permanent officers and employees in the competitive or classified service and upon all matters relating to
the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such officers and employees; and to prebcribe standards, guidelines and
regulations governing the administration of discipline; (Emphasis supplied)

Article V, Section 9(j), of PD 807 simply gives the Commission the power to decide administrative disciplinary
cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal," without the qualifying
phrase appearing in the above-quoted provision. The petitioners cannot invoke that phrase to justify the special
power they claim under Act 1870.

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