(1) Tanada vs.
Tuvera Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no
TG.R. No. L-63915, 24 April 1985
FACTS:
Petiioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent government officials to publish and/ or cause
the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders. The petitioners are
invoking the right to be informed on matters of public concern (Sec. 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution).
The petitioners are also invoking that for laws to be valid and enforceable, they must be published in the
Official Gazette.
The respondents contended that the case should be dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have
no legal standing to carry out such petition since they are not personally and directly prejudiced by the
non-publication of the issuances in question. Respondents also contended that the publication in the
Official Gazette is a non-requirement for laws which provide their own affectivity date. Since the issuances
in question contain the date of effectivity, publication is not necessary.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have the legal personality or standing to carry out the instant petition and
whether publication is necessary for laws which have its own effectivity date.
HELD:
The Court recognizes a private citizen’s legal personality since the right sought to be enforced by the
petitioners is a public right recognized by the Constitution.
The Court anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code which states that:
“Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided.”
Publication is indispensable because without such publication, there would be no adequate notice to the
general public of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conducts as citizens. It would
render injustice to punish or burden a citizen for the transgression of law which he had no notice. It is the
respondent officials’ duty to enforce the Constitutional rights of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern. Thus, the publication of all presidential issuances of “public nature” or of general
applicability” is mandated by law. Unless so published, laws shall have no binding force or effect.
(3) De Roy vs. CA
Facts: The firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners Feliza P. De Roy and Virgilio Ramos
collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of the respondent Luis Bernal resulting
in injuries to private respondents to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter.
Private respondents had been warned by petitionersto vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the
weakened wall but the former failed to do. In the RTC, petitioners were found guilty of gross negligence.
The trial court’s order was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. On the last day of the 15 days period to
file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied because it was no longer
within the grace period. Petitioners now contend that the rule in the Habaluyas case should not be made to
apply to the case at bar owing to the nonpublication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette at the
time of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette before they can
be binding.
HELD:
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment
and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas
Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No.
70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteenday period for appealing or for filing a motion for
reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration,
promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may
be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound
discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. There is no law requiring the publication of
Supreme Court decision in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their
becoming effective. It is bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of
decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and
published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law
journals.
RELATED NEW CIVIL CODE PROVISION: ARTICLE 2
(3) People vs. Que Po Lay
G.R. No. L-6791, 29 March 1954
FACTS:
Que Po Lay was convicted at the Court of First Instance of Manila for violating Central Bank Circular No. 20
in connection with Section 34 of Republic No. 265. The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange
consisting of U.S dollars, checks and money orders amounting to about $ 7,000. He failed to sell the said
currency to the Central Bank through its agents one day following the receipt of such currency as required
by Circular No.20. The appellant was sentenced to six months imprisonment and a fine of Php 1, 000.
The appellant based the appeal on the claim that said circular was not published on the Official Gazette
prior to the act of omission of the appellant, thus, said circular has no force and effect.
Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949. It was not published until November 1951,
or after three months after appellant’s conviction of its violation.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank, not being a statute or a law should be subjected to
publication requirement stated in Article 2 of the Civil Code;
The appellant is liable to the said Circular No. 20 when the latter was only published after about three
months of his conviction.
HELD:
Circular No. 20 is not a statute or a law but it is being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing
its issuance, therefore it has the force and effect of the law. Circulars and regulations which prescribe a
penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. It is based on the general principle
that before the public is bound by penal provisions, the people should be officially informed of its contents
and penalties.
Appellant could not be held liable for the violation of Circular No. 20 for it was not binding at the time he
was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange.
(4) NPC vs. Pinatubo Commercial
G.R. No. 176006, March 26, 2010
FACT:
The National Power Corporation (NPC) questions the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Mandaluyong City, declaring items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 unconstitutional, which [allow]
only partnerships or corporations that directly use aluminum as the raw material in producing finished
products either purely or partly out of aluminum, to participate in the bidding for the disposal of ACSR
wires as unconstitutional for being violative of substantial due process and the equal protection clause of
the Constitution as well as for restraining competitive free trade and commerce.

(5) Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a
contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the
supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S.
$ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic
of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de
Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to
push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one
hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC
tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he
informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs
Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and
detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
Pimentel vs. Senate Committee on the Whole
G.R. No. 187714: March 8, 2011
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., et al., Petitioner, v. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE REPRESENTED BY
SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Respondent.
FACTS:
On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706, which directed the Senate Ethics
Committee to investigate the alleged double insertion of P200 million by Senator Manny Villar into the C5
Extension Project. After the election of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as Senate President, the Ethics Committee
was reorganized, but the Minority failed to name its representatives to the Committee, prompting a delay in
the investigation. Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee.
In another privilege speech, Senator Villar stated he will answer the accusations before the Senate, and not
with the Ethics Committee. Senator Lacson, then chairperson of the Ethics Committee, then moved that the
responsibility of the Ethics Committee be transferred to the Senate as a Committee of the Whole, which was
approved by the majority. In the hearings of such Committee, petitioners objected to the application of the
Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole. They also questioned the quorum, and
proposed amendments to the Rules. Senator Pimentel raised the issue on the need to publish the rules of
the Senate Committee of the Whole.
ISSUES:
Whether publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required for their effectivity.
HELD:
The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the
House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need not
be published,unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take effect.
Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules
must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required under the
Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules
expressly mandate their publication.
PARTIALLY GRANTED
Garcia v. Recio
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
Grace J. Garcia, Petitioner
vs.
Rederick A. Recio, Respondent
FACTS: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian family court
issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989. On
January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help
Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets
were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. Grace
filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming
that she learned only in November 1997, Rederick’s marriage with Editha Samson.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the divorce between the Recio and his first wife is admissible as legal evidence to prove
his legal capacity to marry again and absolved him of bigamy
HELD:
The case was REMANDED for the purpose of receiving further evidence to conclusively show respondent’s
legal capacity to marry the petitioner.
1. Under Article 3, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. However, the
provision only applies to Philippine Law, as foreign laws, which include divorce, do not prove
themselves in the Philippines. They must be proven as fact based on the evidence provided. On
this case Recio, the respondents claim that divorced with his first wife should be proven based
on documents and evidence. Respondent provided that Australian divorce decree is a public
document and therefore authenticity and due execution should not be questioned. Due to the
petitioner’s lack of objection regarding the decree, the court ruled that the decree is admissible
evidence. The respondent, as an Australian citizen is no longer subject to Philippine Laws.
(6) Valeroso v. people
GR 164815 February 22, 2008
(focusing on PROSPECTIVITY)
Petitioner: PSINSP JERRY C VALEROSO
Respondent: The People of the Philippines
FACTS:
On July 10, 1996, SPO2 Antonio Disuanco of the Criminal Investigation Section Division, Central Police
District Command received a dispatch order which directed him and three (3) other personnel to serve a
warrant of arrest against petitioner in a case for kidnapping with ransom. After briefing, team conducted
necessary surveillance on petitioner, checking his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan and Bulacan. Then, the team
proceeded to the Integrated National Police Central Station in Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw
petitioner as he was about to board a tricycle. SPO2 Disuanco and his team approached petitioner. They put
him under arrest, informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. Found tucked in his
waist was a Charter Arms, bearing Serial Number 52315 with five (5) live ammunition.
Petitioner was brought to the police station for questioning. A verification of the subject firearm at the
Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed that it was not issued to the petitioner but to
another person. Petitioner was then charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under PD
No. 1866 as amended.
On May 6, 1998 trial court found petitionerguilty as charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
prision correccional in its maximum plus fine. Petitioner moved to reconsider but his motion was denied.
He appealed to the CA. On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed the RTC disposition.
SC affirmed CAs decision.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not retroactive application of the law is valid taken into account that the commission of the
offense was on July 10, 1996 wherein the governing law was PD 1866 which provides the penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
HELD:
(1) YES. RA 8294 amended PD 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with the trial court.
The law looks forward, never backward (prospectivity). Lex prospicit, non respicit. A new law has a
prospective, not retroactive, effect. However, penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not a habitual
criminal, shall be given retroactive effect.(Exception and exception to the exception on effectivity of laws).
(7) PNB vs. Office of the President
G.R. No. 164815 September 3, 2009
Philippine National Bank, Petitioner
Office of the President, et.al, Respondent
FACTS:
Private respondents are buyers on installment of subdivision. However, the subdivision developer
mortgaged the lands in favor of the petitioner even though the sale of land was already executed. Unaware
of the foregoing facts, the private respondents continued to comply with their obligation as buyers. The
subdivision developer later on defaulted and PNB foreclosed on the mortgage and became the owner of the
lots. A decision by the HLURB and OAALA ruled that PNB may collect from private respondents only the
remaining amortization payment and cannot compel them to pay again for the lots they had already bought
from the subdivision developer. The Office of the President affirmed this decision by declaring Presidential
Decree 957*.
ISSUE/S:
Whether Presidential Decree 957 applies to sale of land prior to its enactment
HELD/DECISION:
Under Article 4 of the Civil Code, there shall be no retroactive effect of the law unless the contrary is
provided. PD 957, though implied, intended to include real estate mortgages executed prior to its
enactment and therefore must take effect to protect the innocent purchasers from swindling and fraudulent
manipulations and
illegal scheme of subdivision developers. The court ascertained that they will not follow the letter of the
statue if it will not reflect the intent and purpose of the legislature, which is to uphold social justice and the
protection of human rights. It would also be illogical if PD 957 which seeks to oust the fraudulent practices
would not be applied to existing mortgage contract due to some a technicality.
*Section 18: Mortgages. No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner or developer without
prior written approval of the Authority. Such approval shall not be granted unless it is shown that the
proceeds of the mortgage loan shall be used for the development of the condominium or subdivision
project and effective measures have been provided to ensure such utilization. The loan value of each lot or
unit covered by the mortgage shall be determined and the buyer thereof, if any, shall be notified before the
release of the loan. The buyer may, at his option, pay his installment for the lot or unit directly to the
mortgagee who shall apply the payments to the corresponding mortgage indebtedness secured by the
particular lot or unit being paid for, with a view to enabling said buyer to obtain title over the lot or unit
promptly after full payment thereto;
(8) Commisioner on Internal Revenue v Phil Health Care
FACTS:
On 1987, CIR issued VAT Ruling No. 231-88 stating that Philhealth, as a provider of medical services, is
exempt from the VAT coverage. When RA 8424 or the new Tax Code was implemented it adopted the
provisions of VAT and E-VAT. On 1999, the BIR sent Philhealth an assessment notice for deficiency VAT and
documentary stamp taxes for taxable years 1996 and 1997. After CIR did not act on it, Philhealth filed a
petition for review with the CTA. The CTA withdrew the VAT assessment. The CIR then filed an appeal with
the CA which was denied.
ISSUES:
Whether Philhealth is subject to VAT.
Whether VAT Ruling No. 231-88 exempting Philhealth from payment of VAT has retroactive application.
RULING:
YES. Section 103 of the NIRC exempts taxpayers engaged in the performance of medical, dental, hospital,
and veterinary services from VAT. But, in Philhealth's letter requesting of its VAT-exempt status, it was held
that it showed Philhealth provides medical service only between their members and their accredited
hospitals, that it only provides for the provision of pre-need health care services, it contracts the services of
medical practitioners and establishments for their members in the delivery of health services.
Thus, Philhealth does not fall under the exemptions provided in Section 103, but merely arranges for such,
making Philhealth not VAT-exempt. YES. Generally, the NIRC has no retroactive application except when:
where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his return or in any document
required of him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue where the facts subsequently gathered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue are materially different from the facts on which the ruling is based, or where the taxpayer
acted in bad faith. The Court held that Philhealth acted in good faith. The term health maintenance
organization was first recorded in the Philippine statute books in 1995. It is apparent that when VAT
Ruling No. 231-88 was issued in Philhealth's favor, the term health maintenance organization was
unknown and had no significance for taxation purposes. Philhealth, therefore, believed in good faith that it
was VAT exempt for the taxable years 1996 and 1997 on the basis of VAT Ruling No. 231-88. The rule is
that the BIR rulings have no retroactive effect where a grossly unfair deal would result to the prejudice of
the taxpayer.
(9) DM Consunji vs. CA
[G.R. No. 137873. April 20, 2001]
FACTS:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14
floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed a report dated
November 25, 1990. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised,
among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. On appeal by D.M.
Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
D.M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the following grounds:
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POLICE REPORT WAS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
OF THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONER.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR [sic] IS
APPLICABLE TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS PRESUMED NEGLIGENT UNDER
ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE, AND
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM
RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.[3]
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the
instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity
of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege
negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish
negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of
the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to
the injured person.
The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar.
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur, but argues
that the presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise since it proved that it exercised due
care to avoid the accident which befell respondents husband.
Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death benefits provided under
the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceaseds employer damages under the
Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice of
action between availing themselves of the workers right under the Workmens Compensation Act and suing
in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the
employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers.
HELD:
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmens Compensation
Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became
cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners
only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of
government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress
under the Workmens Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The
choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was
not an intelligent choice.
(10) Cui vs. Arellano University
FACTS:
Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University. He then enrolled in its College of Law
from first year (SY1948-1949) until first semester of his 4th year. During these years, he was awarded
scholarship grants of the said university amounting to a total of P1,033.87. He then transferred and took
his last semester as a law student at Abad Santos University. To secure permission to take the bar, he
needed his transcript of records from Arellano University. The defendant refused to issue the TOR until he
had paid back the P1,033.87 scholarship grant which Emetrio refunded as he could not take the bar without
Arellano’s issuance of his TOR.
On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38 addressing all heads of
private schools, colleges and universities. Part of the memorandum states that “the amount in tuition and
other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient
students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be
offered merely to attract and keep students in a school”.
ISSUE: Whether or not Emetrio Cui can refund the P1,033.97 payment for the scholarship grant provided
by Arellano University.
HELD:
The memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law where the provision set therein was
advisory and not mandatory in nature. Moreover, the stipulation in question, asking previous students to
pay back the scholarship grant if they transfer before graduation, is contrary to public policy, sound policy
and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights and hence, null and void.
The court sentenced the defendant to pay Cui the sum of P1,033.87 with interest thereon at the legal rate
from Sept.1, 1954, date of the institution of this case as well as the costs and dismissing defendant’s
counterclaim.
(11) Mecano v. Commission on Audit
GR NO 103982
Date: December 11, 1992
Petitioner: Antonio Mecano
Respondent: COA
FACTS:
Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under
Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC). Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman, in
his 7th Indorsement, denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed
by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292), solely for the reason that the same section was
not restated nor re-enacted in the latter. Petitioner also anchored his claim on Department of Justice
Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by Secretary Drilon stating that “the issuance of the Administrative Code did not
operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code. The COA, on the other hand,
strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 operated to revoke or supplant
in its entirety the RAC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the RAC
HELD:
NO, RAC was not repealed by AC 1987.
As a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not substitute for the first act and
will continue so for as the two acts are the same from the time of first enactment. Thus, before there can be
a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law
was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest. It is settled that repeal of a
statute by implication is not favoured. The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the
legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or
conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be read in pari materia.
It is clear that the earlier law is chosen in a general repeal clause. In the absence of an expressed repeal,
there will be an implied repeal only if the later law and the earlier law are clearly and convincingly
irreconcilable. However, there is no implied repeal in this case because the later and earlier laws can be
reconciled through a reasonable construction of a statute.
Wherefore, the Court granted the petition and ordered the respondent to reimburse the petitioner’s claim
for benefits.
(12) People v. Licera
Facts
Rafael Licera appealed to the Court of Appeals the error of the municipal court finding him guilty of
possession of firearm and assault upon an agent of a person in authority. He was accused guilty on the
former. However, Licera maintained that he was exempt from the requirements relating to issuance of
license to possess on these two grounds: First, his appointment as a secret agent was due to the command
by the Governor of Batangas equating Licera to a ‘peace officer’ and secondly, that at the time of Licera’s
designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his apprehension for possession of the Winchester
rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor in 1965, the Macarandang rule — the Courts
interpretation of section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code — formed part of our jurisprudence and,
hence, of this jurisdiction’s legal system.People v. Mapa 2 which held that section 879 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides no exemption for persons appointed as secret agents by provincial governors
from the requirements relating to firearm licenses was mistakenly applied by the ruling court.
Issue: Is Licera guilty of the possession of firearm under People v Mapa judicial interpretation of the
Revised Administrative Code?
Held. No. Because at the time of Licera’s designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his
apprehension for possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor in
1965, the Macarandang rule — the Courts interpretation of section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code
— formed part of our jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdiction’s legal system. Mapa revoked the
Macarandang precedent only in 1967. Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new
doctrine should operate prospectively only and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule,
especially those who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof.
Licera was acquitted.
(13) Chu Jan v. Bernas
Facts: Plaintiff Chu Jan brought suit against Bernas in the justice of the peace of court of Tabaco, Albay
asking that his own rooster be declared the winner in the cockfight held on June 26, 1913 wherein Bernas'
cock was declared the winner by the referee. The justice of the peace court decided that the bout was a
draw, a decision which prompted the defendant to appeal to the Court of First Instance of the province. The
purposes of the appeal include that the court to render judgement ordering the defendant to abide by and
comply with rules and regulations governing cockfights, to pay the stipulated wager of P160; to return the
other like amount, and to assess the costs of both instances against the defendant. On September 11, 1913,
the said Court of First Instance rendered judgement dismissing the appeal without special finding as to
costs.
The ground for the dismissal pronounced by the lower court in the judgement appealed from ere that the
court has always dismissed cases of this nature, that he is not familiar with the rules governing cockfights
and the duties of referees thereof; that he does not know where to find the law on the subject and that he
knows of no law whatever that governs the rights to the plaintiff and the defendant in questions concerning
cockfights.
Issue: Whether it is justifiable for the judge to dismiss the case on the occasion that he is not acquainted
with the rules regarding cockfighting.
Ruling: It is not excusable for the court to terminate the proceedings of the appeal by dismissing them
without deciding the issue due to lack of knowledge about the rules applicable to the subject of the appeal
that must be decided, and due to lack of knowledge as to where to find the law relative to the case.
Under the Article 6 of the Civil Code, foreseeing that a case might arise to which no law would be exactly
applicable, the customs of the place shall be observed, and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of
law.
Judgement REVERSED and REMANDED to the court from whence they came for due trial and judgement as
provided by law. No special finding is made with regards to costs.
(14) People v. Purisima
86 SCRA 542 November 20,1978
Topic: Art 10 of NCC (Doubtful Statutes)
Facts: Information were filed to 26 individuals from Manila and Samar, individually and separately, before
the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Samar for illegal possession of deadly weapon or violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9 pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept 21 and 23, 1973. On the motion to
quash by the accused, the three respondent judges: Judge Purisima and Judge Macaren, both of CFI of
Manila; and Judge Polo of CFI of Samar, issued in the respective cases filed before them an order to quash or
dismiss the informations on a common ground – Lack of essential elements to constitute an offense
penalized by PD No. 9. The respondent judges stated that to constitute the said offense, two elements must
be present; (1) possession of any bladed, blunt or pointed weapon outside of residence as stated in par 3;
(2) and intended to use it to commit or abet subversion, rebellion, etc as stated in the preamble of the said
PD. The People, as petitioners, thru the Solicitor General, contended that the prohibited acts need not be
related to subversive activities and the intent of the accused are irrelevant since its is a statutory offense
and punishing the possession of such deadly weapon is not only to eradicate subversive acts but also
criminality in general. The petitioners also argued that the preamble is not an essential part of an act and
cannot prevail over the text of the law itself.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners arguments as to the intention of PD 9 (3) correct?
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court says that the intention of PD No. 9 (3) is to penalize the acts which are those
related to the desired result of Proc. No. 1081 and Gen. Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are to suppress those
who commit or abet lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts and the like. The preamble of PD No. 9 also
clearly concurs to that, though the preamble is not a part of the statute, it is the key to determine what is
the intent and spirit of the decree and determine what acts fall within the purview of a penal statute.
When ambiguity exsist, it becomes a judicial task to construe and interpret the true meaning and scope of
the measure, guided by the basic principle that penal statutes at are to be construed and applied liberraly in
favor of the accused and strictly against the state. In the construction or interpretation of the of a
legeslative measure - a presidential decree - the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and
spirit of law, and this can be found among others the preamble or "whereas"clauses which enumerates the
facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and tiff sanctions stated therein.
(15) Martinez v. Van Buskirk
18 Phil 79
FACTS
On September 11, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen Ong De Martinez, was riding a carromata in Ermita, Manila
when a delivery wagon owned by the defendant, came from the opposite direction, while their carromata
went close to the sidewalk in order to let the delivery wagon pass by. However, instead of merely passing
by, the horses ran into the carromata occupied by the plaintiff with her child and overturned it, causing a
serious cut upon the plaintiff’s head. The defendant contends that the cochero, who was driving his delivery
wagon at the time of the accident, was actually a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable
cochero. However, a vehicle passed by the driver and made noises that frightened the horses causing them
to run.
From the aforementioned facts, the court ruled that the defendant was guilty of negligence and required
him to pay for Php 442.50 with 6% per anum interest. The court
specifically cited a paragraph of Articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. Hence, the defendant wishes to
reverse such decision.
ISSUE
WON the employer is responsible for the alleged negligence of the cochero
HELD
No. The employer is not liable. Cochero was not negligent. What happened was an accident. The court
further held that it is a universal practice of merchants during that time to deliver products through horse-
drawn vehicles; and it is also considered universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they
were left during the accident. It has been practiced for a long time and generally has not been the cause of
accidents or injuries. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice has acquiesced for years.
Hence, the defendant cannot be considered as unreasonable or imprudent.
(16)Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales
Facts:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national died on January 17, 1977. He has been residing in the Caloocan City and has left
properties here in the Philippines worth approximately Php 300, 00. Subsequently. Aida Sy-Gonzales,
Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of Rizal
Branch 33 in Caloocan City. They contended that, first, they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion
Gillego, second, to their knowledge their father died unrepresented, third, they do not recognize Sy Kiat’s
marriage to Yao Keenor the filiation of her children to him and they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for
appointment as administratix of the intestate of the deceased. Said petition was opposed by the party of
Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen. They claim that first, Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy
Kiat whom he marrie din China, second, the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased
with Yao Kee ad Sze Wook Wah as the eldest offspring of the two is desirous to become the administratix of
the estate.
The probate court ruled in favor of Yao Kee’s party and appointed Sze Sook Wah as the administratix of the
intestate estate of the deceased. However, the Court of Appeals modified this decision. They declare Aida
Sy-Gonzales and her siblings as well as Sze Sook Wah and his siblings both natural children of the deceased.
Yao Kee’s children are only declared as natural children because the legality of her marriage with Sy Kiat
was not proven valid under the laws of China.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee is valid in accordance with Chinese law and
custom and is conclusively proven
Held:
No. The marriage between Sy Kiat to Yao Kee is not valid in accordance with Chinese law and custom and is
not conclusively proven. The Court held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be
proven, which are the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact and the alleged foreign marriage by
convincing evidence. Yao Kee did not present any competent evidence which will prove that her marriage is
in accordance with the law and custom of China. The testimonies given by Yao Kee and Gan Chang, her
younger brother is self-serving evidence. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and the validity of
the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat, their marriage cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. The
reason for which is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They
must be alleged and proven as fact.
(17) Commision on Internal Revenue vs. Primetown
G.R. 162155, August 28, 2007
Facts:
On March 11, 1999, Vice Chair of Primetown Property Group, Inc. Gilbert Yap applied for a refund or credit
of income tax which the firm paid in 1997. He claimed that they are entitled for a refund because they
suffered losses that year due to the increase of cost of labor and materials, etc. However, despite the losses,
they still paid their quarterly income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to
BIR. Hence, they were claiming for a refund. On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Santos required
Primetown to submit additional documents to which Primetown complied with. However, its claim was not
acted upon which prompted it to file a petition for review in CTA on April 14, 2000. CTA dismissed the
petition as it was filed beyonf the 2-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund
according to Sec 229 of NIRC. According to CTA, the two-year period is equivalent to 730 days pursuant to
Art 13 of NCC. Since Primetown filed its final adjustment return on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a
leap year, the petition was filed 731 days after Primetown filed its final adjusted return. Hence, beyond the
reglementary period. Primetown appealed to CA. CA reversed the decision of CTA. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition was filed within the two-year period
Held:
According to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, a year shall be understood to be 12 calendar
months. The SC defined a calendar month as a month designated in the calendar without regard to the
number of days it may contain. The court held that Administrative Code of 1987 impliedly repealed Art 13
of NCC as the provisions are irreconcilable. Primetown is entitled for the refund since it is filed within the
2-year reglementary period.
(18) Miciano vs. Brimo 50 Phil 867
CITATION: GR No.22595, November 1, 1927| 50 Phil 867
FACTS:
Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one
of the brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo) opposed Miciano’s participation in the inheritance. Joseph
Brimo is a Turkish citizen.
ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimo’s
estates.
HELD:Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be made and disposed of in
accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition, described as impossible
conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner
whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as
those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary
dispositions. The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such
manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.
(19) Van Dorn vs. Ronillo, Jr. et al., 139 SCRA 139
VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO
139 SCRA 139
FACTS: Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino married Richard Upton, a U.S. citizen in Hongkong in 1972. They
had two children. They got divorced in Nevada U.S.A in 1982 and both certified that they do not have any
community property to divide. Alice remarried to Theodore Van Dorn. Upton filed a suit in June 1983
stating that Reyes’ business in Manila is conjugal property. He demands to render an accounting to the
business and declare his right to manage the business. Reyes moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
the action is barred by the previous judgment in Nevada divorce wherein they both acknowledged having
no community property as of June 11, 1982. Reyes’ motion was denied by the lower court stating that the
property is located in the Philippines so that the divorce decree has no bearing.
ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign divorce of the parties to their property in the Philippines?
HELD: Pursuant to his national law, Upton is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He has no standing to
sue in the case where the husband is entitled to control over conjugal assets.
The divorce obtained abroad being valid in his country’s court may be recognized in the Philippines. The
divorce decree granted in Nevada released Reyes from the marriage for the marriage had been severed by
one party ceases to bind either.
Getting a divorce decree in the US court and contending that it is not valid and binding in the Philippines
being contrary to local law and public policy estopped
Upton’s declaration.
(20) Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera 174 SCRA 653
174 SCRA 653
FACTS:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married in Germany to private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling,
a German national. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling.
Private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany on
January 1983.The divorce decree was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of
marriage of the
petitioner.
Six months after the divorce was granted private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City
Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to
Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua
sometime in 1983”.
ISSUE: Whether a person could still be prosecuted of bigamy after a divorce decree was already issued?
HELD: The law specifically provides that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared
that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country and said
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines. In the same consideration and rationale,
private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
(21) Barreto vs. Gonzales
58 ,Phil 67
Facts: Plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the Philippine Islands and at present residents of the City of
Manila. They were married in the City of Manila on January 19, 1919, and lived together as man and wife in
the Philippine Islands until the spring of 1926. They voluntarily separated and since that time have not
lived together as man and wife. Of this union four children were born who are now 11, 10, 8 and 6 years of
age. Negotiations between the parties, both being represented by attorneys, continued for several months,
whereupon it was mutually agreed to allow the plaintiff for her support and that of her children, five
hundred pesos (P500) monthly; this amount to be increased in case of illness or necessity, and the title of
certain properties to be put in her name. Shortly after this agreement the husband left the Islands, betook
himself to Reno, Nevada, and secured in that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion,
which decree was dated November 28, 1927.
Shortly thereafter the defendant moved to California and returned to these Islands in August 1928, where
he has since remained. On the same date that he secured a divorce in Nevada he went through the forms of
marriage with another citizen of these Islands and now has three children as a result of that marriage.
Defendant, after his departure from these Islands, reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly for
the support of his wife and four minor children and has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as
alimony.
Shortly after his return his wife brought action in the Court of First Instance of Manila requesting that the
courts of the Philippine Islands confirm and ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courts of the State of
Nevada; that section 9 of Act No. 2710, which reads as follows:
The decree of divorce shall dissolve the community of property as soon as such decree becomes final, but
shall not dissolve the bonds of matrimony until one year thereafter.
The bonds of matrimony shall not be considered as dissolved with regard to the spouse who, having
legitimate children, has not delivered to each of them or to the guardian appointed by the court, within said
period of one year, the equivalent of what would have been due to them as their legal portion if said spouse
had died intestate immediately after the dissolution of the community of property.
be enforced, and that she and the defendant deliver to the guardian ad litem the equivalent of what would
have been due to their children as their legal portion from the respective estates had their parents did
intestate on November 28, 1927. It is also prayed that the community existing between plaintiff and
defendant be declared dissolved and the defendant be ordered to render an accounting and to deliver to the
plaintiff her share of the community property, that the defendant be ordered to pay the plaintiff alimony at
the rate of five hundred pesos (P500) per month, that the defendant be ordered to pay the plaintiff, as
counsel fees, the sum of five thousand pesos (P5000), and that the defendant be ordered to pay plaintiff the
expenses incurred in educating the three minor sons.
A guardian ad litem was appointed for the minor children, and they appear as intervenors and join their
mother in these proceedings. The Court of First Instance, after hearing, found against the defendant and
granted judgment as prayed for by the plaintiff and intervenors, with the exception of reducing attorneys
fees to three thousand, and also granted costs of the action against the defendant. From this judgment
defendant appeals and makes the following assignment of errors:
I. The lower court erred in not declaring that paragraph 2 of section 9 of the Philippine Divorce Law, is
unconstitutional, null and void.
II. The lower court erred in holding that section 9 of Act No. 2710 (Divorce Law) applies to the Nevada
decree of divorce issued in favor of appellant Augusto C. Gonzalez, said decree being entitled to
confirmation and recognition.
III. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint in intervention for lack of cause of action against
appellant and appellee.
IV. The lower court erred in not declaring the notice of lis pendens filed by intervenors to be null and void.
V. The lower court erred in ordering the appellant to pay the sum of P500 per month for the support not
only of his children but also of his ex-wife, appellee herein, Manuela Barretto.
VI. The lower court erred in not holding that plaintiff- appellee, Manuela Barretto, is not entitled to support
from her ex-husband, herein appellant, over and beyond the alimony fixed by the divorce decree in Exhibit
A.
VII. The lower court erred in condemning defendant appellant to pay to plaintiff-appellee P3,000 attorney's
fees.
VIII. The lower court erred in denying appellant's motion for new trial.
While the parties in this action are in dispute over financial matters they are in unity in trying to secure the
courts of this jurisdiction to recognize and approve of the Reno divorce. On the record here presented this
can not be done. The public policy in this jurisdiction on the question of divorce is clearly set forth in Act
No. 2710, and the decisions of this court: Goitia vs. Campos Rueda (35 Phil., 252); Garcia Valdez vs.
Soteraña Tuason (40 Phil., 943-952); Ramirez vs. Gmur (42 Phil., 855); Chereau vs. Fuentebella (43 Phil.,
216); Fernandez vs. De Castro (48 Phil., 123); Gorayeb vs. Hashim (50 Phil., 22); Francisco vs. Tayao (50
Phil., 42); Alkuino
Lim Pang vs. Uy Pian Ng Shun and Lim Tingco (52 Phil., 571); and the late case of Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer,
decided March 21, 1931, and reported in 55 Phil., 851.
The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted to this
court, in which they all prayed that the Reno divorce be ratified and confirmed, clearly indicates a purpose
to circumvent the laws of the Philippine Islands regarding divorce and to secure for themselves a change of
status for reasons and under conditions not authorized by our law. At all times the matrimonial domicile of
this couple has been within the Philippine Islands and the residence acquired in the State of Nevada by the
husband of the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence and did not confer jurisdiction
upon the Court of that State to dissolve the bonds if matrimony in which he had entered in 1919. While the
decisions of this court heretofore in refusing to recognize the validity of foreign divorce has usually been
expressed in the negative and have been based upon lack of matrimonial domicile or fraud or collusion, we
have not overlooked the provisions of the Civil Code now in force in these Islands. Article 9 thereof reads as
follows:
The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity or persons, are
binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country.
And article 11, the last part of which reads:
. . . the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and those intended to promote
public order and good morals, shall nor be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or judgments or by
anything done or any agreements entered into a foreign country. It is therefore a serious question whether
any foreign divorce relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction,
except it be for a cause, and under conditions for which the courts of Philippine Islands would grant a
divorce. The lower court in granting relief as prayed for frankly stated that the securing of the divorce, the
contracting of another marriage and the bringing into the world of innocent children brings about such a
condition that the court must grant relief. The hardships of the existing divorce laws of the Philippine
Islands are well known to the members of the Legislature. It is of no moment in this litigation what he
personal views of the writer on the subject of divorce may be. It is the duty of the courts to enforce the laws
of divorce as written by the Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws
are too strict or too liberal.
Litigants by mutual agreement can not compel the courts to approve of their own actions or permit the
personal relations of the citizens of these Islands to be affected by decrees of foreign courts in a manner
which our Government believes is contrary to public order and good morals. Holding the above views it
becomes unnecessary to discuss the serious constitutional question presented by appellant in his first
assignment of error.
The judgment of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila must therefore be reversed and defendant
absolved from the demands made against him in this action.
This, however, without prejudice to any right of maintenance that plaintiff and the intervenors may have
against defendant. No special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

(22) Govt. vs. Frank. 13 Phil 238
G. R. No. 2935
March 23, 1909
FACTS: In 1903, in the city of Chicago, Illinois, Frank entered into a contract for a period of 2 years with the
Plaintiff, by which Frank was to receive a salary as a
stenographer in the service of the said Plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to be paid in advance the
expenses incurred in traveling from the said city of Chicago to Manila, and one-half salary during said
period of travel. Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms on the part of
Frank, he should become liable to the Plaintiff for the amount expended by the Government by way of
expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila and the one-half salary paid during such period.
Frank entered upon the performance of his contract and was paid half-salary from the date until the date of
his arrival in the Philippine Islands.
Thereafter, Frank left the service of the Plaintiff and refused to make a further compliance with the terms of
the contract.
The Plaintiff commenced an action in the CFI-Manila to recover from Frank the sum of money, which
amount the Plaintiff claimed had been paid to Frank as expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to
Manila, and as half-salary for the period consumed in travel.
It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws No. 80 and No. 224 should constitute
a part of said contract.
The Defendant filed a general denial and a special defense, alleging in his special defense that
(1) the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended Laws No. 80 and No. 224 and had thereby
materially altered the said contract, and also that
(2) he was a minor at the time the contract was entered into and was therefore not responsible under the
law.
the lower court rendered a judgment against Frank and in favor of the Plaintiff for the sum of 265. 90
dollars
ISSUE:
1. Did the amendment of the laws altered the tenor of the contract entered into between Plaintiff and
Defendant?
2. Can the defendant allege minority/infancy?
HELD: the judgment of the lower court is affirmed
1. NO; It may be said that the mere fact that the legislative department of the Government of the Philippine
Islands had amended said Acts No. 80 and No. 224 by Acts
No. 643 and No. 1040 did not have the effect of changing the terms of the contract made between the
Plaintiff and the Defendant. The legislative department of the
Government is expressly prohibited by section 5 of the Act of Congress of 1902 from altering or changing
the terms of a contract. The right which the Defendant had acquired by virtue of Acts No. 80 and No. 224
had not been changed in any respect by the fact that said laws had been amended. These acts, constituting
the terms of the contract, still constituted a part of said contract and were enforceable in favor of the
Defendant.
2. NO; The Defendant alleged in his special defense that he was a minor and therefore the contract could
not be enforced against him. The record discloses that, at the time the contract was entered into in the State
of Illinois, he was an adult under the laws of that State and had full authority to contract. Frank claims that,
by reason of the fact that, under that laws of the Philippine Islands at the time the contract was made, made
persons in said Islands did not reach their majority until they had attained the age of 23 years, he was not
liable under said contract, contending that the laws of the Philippine Islands governed. It is not disputed —
upon the contrary the fact is admitted — that at the time and place of the making of the contract in question
the Defendant had full capacity to make the same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing
upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are determined b the law of the place where
the contract is made. Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the
place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of evidence,
and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought.
(23) Barnuevo vs. Fuster, 29 Phil 606
Facts:
Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yanez were married in Spain. Fuster came to thePhilippines,
settled, and acquire property. After several years, Yanez also went to the Philippines to live with his
husband. Subsequently, they made an agreement in a public instrument by which they resolved to live
apart and Fuster authorizing Yanez to go back to Spain and reside therein. Fuster also undertook to gave
Yanez a monthly allowance for support. Yanez returned to the Philippines and commenced divorce
proceedings against her husband. She prayed that she be granted a decree of divorce; that the court order
the separation of the properties of the plaintiff and the defendant, to date from the date of the said
decree; that the conjugal society be therefore liquidated, and after the amount of the conjugal property
had been determined, that one-half thereof be adjudicated to her; furthermore, as to the amount of pension
owing for her support but not paid to her, that the defendant be ordered to pay her the sum of 36,000
Spanish pesetas. As a special preferred defense, Fuster alleged that neither the trial court nor any other
court in the Philippine Islands has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, because,as to the
allowance for support, since neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant are residents of Manila, or of any other place in the Philippine Islands In deciding the case, the
Court of First Instance of the city of Manila held itself to have jurisdiction, decreed the suspension of life in
common between the plaintiff and defendant. Both parties appealed from this judgment
Issue:
Whether the courts of the Philippines are competent or have jurisdiction to decree the divorce now on
appeal
Ruling:
The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce is not comprised within the personal
status of the husband and wife, simply because the whole theory of the statute sand of the rights which
belong to everyone does not go beyond the sphere of private law, and the authority and jurisdiction of the
courts are not a matter of the private law of persons, but of the public or political law of the nation. "The
jurisdiction of courts and other questions relating to procedure are considered to be of a public nature and
consequently are generally submitted to the territorial principle. The provisions of article 80 of the Civil
Law of Spain is only binding within the dominions of Spain. It does not accompany the persons of the
Spanish subject wherever he may go. He could not successfully invoke it if he resided in Japan, in China, in
Hongkong or in any other territory not subject to the dominion of Spain. Foreign Catholics domiciled in
Spain,subject to the ecclesiastical courts in actions for divorce according to the said article 80 of theCivil
Code, could not allege lack of jurisdiction by invoking, as the law of their personal statute, alaw of their
nation which gives jurisdiction in such a case to territorial courts, or to a certain court within or without the
territory of their nation. In the present action for divorce the Court of FirstInstance of the city of Manila
did not lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for, although Spanish Catholic subjects, they
were residents of this city and had their domicile herein.
(24) Testate Estate of Bohanan vs. Bohanan, et al., 106 Phil 997
Facts: On April 24, 1950, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo, presiding, admitted to
probate a last will and testament of C. O. Bohanan, executed by him on April 23, 1944 in Manila. The court
finds that the testator,was at the time of his death a citizen of the United States and of the State of Nevada
and declares that his will and testament, Exhibit A, is fully in accordance with the laws of the state of
Nevada and admits the same to probate. The Philippine Trust Fund, the executor, filed a project of partition
in accordance with the provisions of the will.
The provisions are as follows:
(1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A. in trust only for the benefit of testator's grandson Edward George Bohanan, which consists of several
mining companies; (2) the other half of the residuary estate to the testator's brother, F.L. Bohanan, and his
sister, Mrs. M. B. Galbraith, share and share alike. This consist in the same amount of cash and of shares of
mining stock similar to those given to testator's grandson; (3) legacies of P6,000 each to his (testator) son,
Edward Gilbert Bohana, and his daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly installments; (4)
legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward, P2,000; Beulah Fox, P4,000; and
Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000;
It will be seen from the above that out of the total estate (after deducting administration expenses) of
P211,639.33 in cash, the testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares of stock of several
mining companies and to his brother and sister the same amount. To his children he gave a legacy of only
P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000. To his former wife, Magdalena C. Bohanan, he gave none. The wife
Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children question the validity of the testamentary provisions
disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that they have been deprived of the
legitimate that the laws of the form concede to them.
Issue: Whether or not the testamentary provisions of the will are valid or not.
Held: Yes. The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944,expressly
provides that successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law ofthe person
whose succession is in question.Article 10 of the old Civil Code provides that the validity of testamentary
dispositions are to be governedby the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not
disputed that the national lawof the testator is that of the State of Nevada, already indicated above, which
allows a testator to disposeof all his property according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the
court approving the project of partition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions.
(25) Bellis vs. Bellis, 20 SCRA 358
FACTS
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas. He had 5 legitimate children by his first wife, Mary E.
Mellen, whom he divorced: Edward, George, Henry, Anna and Alexander Bellis. By his second wife, Violet
Kennedy, who survived him, he had 3 legitimate children: Edwin, Walter, and Dorothy Bellis. Finally, he had
three illegitimate children: Amos Jr, Maria Christina, and Miriam Palma Bellis. 6 years prior to his death
Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his distributable estate should be divided in trust in
the following manner:
a. $240, 000 to his 1st wife, Mary Mallen
b. $120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at $40,000 each
c. Apportioning the remainder of his estate and properties to his seven surviving children by his 1st and
2nd wives. Amos Bellis died as a resident of Texas. His will was admitted to probate in the Philippines. The
People’s Bank and Trust Company, an executor of will, paid the entire bequest therein.
The appellants (three illegitimate children) filed their oppositions to the project of partition claiming that
they have been deprived of their legitimates to which they were entitled according to the Philippine law.
Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law,
thus the creation of two separate wills.
ISSUE:
Whether the Philippine or Texas law must apply in determination of the illegitimate children’s successional
rights?
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the Texas law,
which is the national law of the deceased.
Amos Bellis was both a national and domicile of Texas at the time of his death. Assuming that Texan has a
conflict of law rule providing that domiciary law should govern successional rights, the same would not
result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would still refer to Texas Law.
However, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) which calls for the application of
the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties involved are
found in the Philippines. In the absence, however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should
be presumed different from our appellants, position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.
Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance to the Philippine law, and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in view of those matters that Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law should
govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be
governed by the national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimates, then his will, which deprived
his illegitimate children of legitimates, is valid.
(26) Aznar vs. Garcia 7 SCRA 95
Facts:
Edward Christensen is a citizen of the State of California and domiciled in the Philippines. He executed in
his will acknowledging his natural daughter Maria Lucy Christensen as sole heir but left a legacy of some
money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who is declared by the Supreme Court in its decision as
acknowledged natural daughter of Edward C. Counsel of Helen asserts that her claim must be increased in
view of the successional rights of illegitimate children under Phil. law. Counsel of Maria insists that Art. 16
(2) provides that the NATIONAL LAW OF THE PERSON applies in intestate and testamentary successions
and since Edward C. is a citizen of CA, its law should be applied. Lower court ruled that CA law should be
applied thus this petition for review.
Issue:
What law should be applicable – Philippine or California Law?
Ruling:
The court refers to Art. 16 (2) providing that intestate and testamentary successions with respect to order
of succession and amt. of successional right is regulated by the NATIONAL LAW OF THE PERSON.
California Probate Code provides that a testator may dispose of his property in the form and manner he
desires.
Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California provides that if no law on the contrary, the place where the personal
property is situated is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the LAW OF HIS
DOMICILE.
These provisions are cases when the Doctrine of Renvoi may be applied where the question of validity of
the testamentary provision in question is referred back to the decedent’s domicile – the Philippines.
S.C. noted the California law provides 2 sets of laws for its citizens: One for residents therein as provided by
the CA Probate Code and another for citizens domiciled in other countries as provided by Art. 946 of the
Civil Code of California.
The conflicts of law rule in CA (Art. 946) authorize the return of question of law to the testator’s domicile.
The court must apply its own rule in the Philippines as directed in the conflicts of law rule in CA, otherwise
the case/issue will not be resolved if the issue is referred back and forth between 2 states.
The SC reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case back to it for decision with an
instruction that partition be made applying the Philippine law.
(27) Roehr vs. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr is a German citizen who married respondent Carmen Rodriguez in Hamburg
Germany on December 11, 1980; this marriage was ratified in Negros Occidental in early 1981. They had
two children. Rodriguez filed a petition for nullity of marriage before RTC Court in Makati on August 28
1996 which was denied. The next year, Roehr obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance
of Hamburg-Blankenese. The custody of the children was granted to him. Issues on property relations and
custody where tackled upon the setting aside of the motion to dismiss. Petitioner alleged that the court
lacks discretion and there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Philippine courts can determine legal effects of a decree of divorce from a foreign country?
HELD:
Yes. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our
jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody,
care and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the
effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court,
it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on
grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court.
In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997 has not been
challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental custody, even the trial court
recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby endowing private respondent the capacity to
remarry. Thus, the present controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two children to
petitioner.
(28) Uypitching vs. Quiamco, 510 SCRA 172
In 1982, respondent Quiamco was approached by Davalan, Gabutero and Generoso to settle the civil aspect
of a criminal case for robbery filed by Quiamco against them.
They surrendered to him a red Honda motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of registration.
Respondent asked for the original certificate of registration but the three accused never came to see him
again. Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in an open space inside respondent‘s business establishment,
where it was visible and accessible to the public.It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had
been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by Uypitching Sons, Inc. And to secure its payment, the
motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner corporation.
When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, Davalan assumed the obligation and continued the
payments. In September 1982, however, Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments.Nine years
later, petitioner Uypitching, accompanied by policemen, went to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover the
motorcycle.
The leader of the police team talked to the clerk in charge and asked for respondent. While P/Lt. Vendiola
and the clerk were talking, petitioner Uypitching paced back and forth inside the establishment uttering
"Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle."
Unable to find respondent, the policemen on petitioner Uypitching‘s instructionand over the clerk‘s
objection, took the motorcycle.
Petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law
against respondent but was dismissed.
Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners in the RTC
The trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioner Uypitching was motivated with malice and ill will
when he called respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed a baseless complaint
for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the
CA affirmed the trial court‘s decision.
ISSUE: WON the filing of a complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law warranted
the award of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney‘s fees and costs in favor of respondent.
HELD: YES. They were held liable for damages not only for instituting a groundless complaint against
respondent but also for making a slanderous remark and for taking the
motorcycle from respondent’s establishment in an abusive manner .Petitioners Abused Their Right of
Recovery as Mortgagee(s) A mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable it to
enforce or protect its foreclosure right there on. There is, however, a well-defined procedure for the
recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged
property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover such possession as a
preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure .Petitioner corporation failed to bring the
proper civil action necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uypitching
descended on respondent‘s establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle
without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle,
petitioner Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous statement.
Petitioners‘ acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper norms of human
relations.
The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code .Article 19, also known as
the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to
honesty and good faith ,otherwise he opens himself to liability. There is an abuse of right when it is
exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the
purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be nointention
to harm another. In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners‘ instance was
not only attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in
conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged
vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent.
Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent.
(29) Wassmer vs. Velez, 12 SCRA 648
FACTS: In 1954, Beatriz Wassmer and Francisco Velez arranged their marriage to be held on September 4
of the same year. The bride-to-be has been devoted with all the preparations for their wedding. However,
two days before their marriage, ‘Paking’ left a note that they must postpone the marriage for his mother
was against it. A day before their wedding, Paking wrote again that the wedding shall push through. Worse,
Paking did not show up on their wedding day causing Wassmer to be publicly humiliated.
The breach of promise to marry made by Velez prompted Wassmer to file a civil suit against the former.
Velez never filed an answer, thus, awarding moral and exemplary damages to Wassmer. Velez appealed on
the court and stated that he failed to attend the wedding day because of fortuitous events. He also insisted
that he cannot be civilly
liable for there is no law that acts upon the breach of promise to marry. He also contested the award of
moral and exemplary damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not moral or exemplary damages may be awarded in a breach of promise to marry suit.
HELD: A mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. Howver, Wassmer has already made
preparations for the wedding. Velez’s failure to appear on the wedding day is contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy which is embodied on Article 21 of the Civil Code. Under the law, the injured
party is entitled to moral damages as well as to exemplary damages because Velez’s acted in wanton,
reckless and oppressive manner (Article 2232) in breaching his promise to marry Wassmer.
(30) Nikko Hotel Manila Garden, et all vs. Reyes G.R. No. 154259, Feb. 28, 2005
FACTS: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of Nikko Hotel was
approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to
join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotel’s former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff
agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket of fruits, the latter’s gift. He lined up at the
buffet table as soon as it was ready but to his embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotel’s Executive Secretary, asked
him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the people around them. He was escorted by a
policeman out of the hotel. All these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation. Ms.
Ruby Lim admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner claimed by the plaintiff. Ms.
Lim approached several people including Dr. Filart’s sister, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as
the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filart’s group. She wasn’t able to ask it
personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking over the phone and doesn’t want to interrupt. She
asked Mr. Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically ordered that the party should be intimate
consisting only of those who part of the list. She was even polite in asking the plaintiff to finish his food
then leave the party.
During the plaintiff’s cross-examination, he was asked how close Ms.Lim was when she approached him at
the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered “very close because we nearly kissed each other”. Considering the
close proximity, it was Ms. Lim’s intention to relay the request only be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who
made a scene causing everybody to know what happened.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.
HELD: Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.
Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all the necessary
precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave the party. Petitioners
cannot be held liable for damages brought under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
Under the doctrine of violenti non fit injuria, to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury. The
doctrine refers to self-inflicted injuries or to consent to it which precludes the recovery of damages by one
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger.
(31) Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA, 219 SCRA 115
FACTS: Private respondent Marilou Gonzales filed a complaint for damages against Gasheem Shookat, an
Iranian Citizen, of breach of promise to marry. She said that both of them agreed to marry after the end of
the school semester and the petitioner asked the approval of her parents. She stated that the petitioner
forced to live with him in his apartments. Respondent was a virgin before she was forced to live with the
Iranian (petitioner). A week before she filed her complaint, petitioner maltreated, assaulted and asked not
to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City.
On the petitioner’s counterclaim, he said that he never proposed marriage with the private
respondent; he neither forced her to live with him and he did not maltreat her but only told her to stop
from coming into his apartment because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money
and passport. He insisted that he must be awarded for damages for he suffered mental anxiety and a
besmirched reputation due to the complaint of the private respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is to be held liable for damages for breach of promise to marry.
HELD: A breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. This court held that where a man’s
promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself in a
sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a
subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry
but because of fraud and deceit and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. Such act done by the petitioner is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of the country. The court ordered that
the petition be denied with costs against the petitioner.
(32) Pe vs. Pe, 5 SCRA 200
FACTS: The defendant was regarded as a family member so he was allowed to visit the plaintiffs’ house and
to ask Lolita to teach him to pray the rosary. Defendant, a married man, had a clandestine love affair with
Lolita, the 24 year old unmarried woman. When the family learnt about their secret affair, defendant was
forbidden to visit their house and to see Lolita. However, their affair still continued. On April 1957, Lolita
disappeared from her brother’s house in Quezon City. A note written by the defendant was seen on the
aparador of Lolita. The family filed an action for damages in pursuant with Article 21 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the injury caused to the family of Lolita by the defendant is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.
HELD: The court held that there can be no other conclusion that can be drawn from this chain of events that
the defendant succeeded in winning the heart of Lolita through clever strategies. Knowing that he is a
married man, the wrong that he had done to her and to the family is immeasurable. Verily, he has
committed and injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as
contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.
(33) Globe Mackay Cable vs. CA, 176 SCRA 778
FACTS: Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay in dual capacity
as purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager. In 1972, the
respondent discovered fraudulent anomalies and transactions in the said corporation for which it lost
several hundred thousands of pesos. The private respondent reported to his superiors including Henry, the
petitioner. However, he was confronted by Hendry stating that Tobias was the number one suspect. He was
ordered to take a one week forced leave. When he returned to work, Hendry called him ‘crook’ and
‘swindler’, and left a scornful remark to the Filipinos. The petitioners also charged six criminal cases against
the respondent—five cases of estafa and one for violating Article 290 of the RPC (Discovering Secrets
through Seizure of Correspondence). The petitioner also sent a poison letter to RETELCO causing the
respondent to be unemployed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are liable for damages to the respondent.
HELD: Petitioners invoked the right of damnun absque injuria or the damage or loss which does not
constitute a violation of legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable. However, this is not
applicable in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might have had the right to
dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong
for which petitioners must be held liable.
The court awarded Tobias the following: Php 80, 000 as actual damages, Php 200, 000 as moral damages,
Php 20, 0000 as exemplary damages; Php 30, 000 as attorney’s fees; and, costs. Petition was denied and the
decision of CA is AFFIRMED.
(34) University of the East vs. Jader, G.R. No. 132344, Feb 7, 2000
FACTS: Romeo Jader took his law proper at UE from 1984-88. During the first semester of his last year in
law school, he failed to take the examination for Practice Court I in which he obtained an incomplete grade.
He filed an application for removal of the incomplete grade given by Prof. Carlos Ortega on February 1,
1988 which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after the payment of required fees. He took the
exam on March 28 and on May 30, the professor gave him a grade of 5. His name was still on the tentative
list of candidates for graduation. Likewise, his named appeared in the invitation for the commencement
exercises which was held on April 16, 1988. When he learnt of his deficiency, he dropped from his Bar
Review classes thereby made him ineligible to take the bar exam.
He filed a civil suit against UE for damages because he suffered moral shock, mental anguish, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and sleepless nights due to UE’s negligence. The
petitioner denied liability arguing that it never led respondent to believe that he completed the
requirements for an LlB degree when his name was included in the tentative list of graduating students.
The court ruled in favor of the respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not UE be held liable for damages to the respondent.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
The court ruled that the petitioner’s liability arose from its failure to promptly inform the result of the
examination and in misleading respondent into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements
for graduation. However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the
latter’s actual damages, we hold that respondent should not have been awarded moral damages. As a senior
law student respondent should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically
those pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of CA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ordered to pay
the sum of Php 35, 470 with legal interest of 6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the
complaint until fully paid; the amount of Php 5000 as attorney’s fees and the cost of the suit. The award of
moral damages is deleted.
SO ORDERED.
(35) Carpio v. Valmonte, G.R. No. 151866, 9 September 2004
GR No. 151866 September 9, 2004
FACTS:
Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon Sierra engaged her
services for their church weddinng on October 10, 1996. At about
43 0 pm on that day, Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel and when she arrived at Suite 326-A, several
persons were already there including Soledad Carpio, the aunt of the bride.
After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite to go to the recepti on hall to give the meal
allowance to the band and to pay the suppliers. Upon entering the suite, Valmonte noticed the people
staring at her and it was at this juncture that Soledad Carpio allegedly uttered the following words to
Valmonte: "Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang ang
lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha." It turned out that after Valmonte left the room to attend to her
duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry which she placed ins i de the comfort room in a
paper bag were lost and these include diamond rings, earrings, bracelet and diamong necklace with a total
value of about 1M pesos. Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched, interrogated and trailed by the police
officers, but the pe titioner kept on saying the words " Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto ". Valmonte's car
was also searched but the search yielded nothing.
Few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter from Valmonte demanding a formal letter of
apology which she wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds' relatives and guests to redeem her smeared
reputation but the petitioner did not respond. Valmonte filed a suit for damages.The trial court dismissed
the complaint and ruled that when sought investigation for the loss of her jewelry, she was merely
exercising her right and if damage results from a person exercising his legal right, it is damnum absque
injuria. It added that no proof was presented by Valmonte to show that petitioner acted maliciously and in
bad fai th in pointing to her as the culprit.
The CA ruled out differently and opined that Valmonte has clearly established that she was singled out by
the petitioner as the one responsible for the loss of her jewelry. However, the court find no sufficient
evidenc e to justify the award of actual damages.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is entitled to the award of actual and moral damages
HELD: The Court ruled that the respondent in entitled to moral damages but not to actual damages. In the
sphere of our law on human relations, one of the fundamental precepts is the principle known as " abuse of
rights " under Article 19 of the Civil Code. To find existence of an abuse of right, the following elements
must be present: 1) there is lega l right or duty; 2) which is exercised in bad faith; 3) for the sole intent or
prejudicing or injuring another. Thus, a person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate
exercise of his right, that is when he acts with prudence and good faith ; but not when he acts with
negligence or abuse. The Court said that petitioner's verbal reproach against respondent was certainly
uncalled for considering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of
jewelry inside the pape r bag. This being the case, she had no right to attack respondent with her innuendos
which were not merely inquisitve but outrightly accusatory. By openly accusing respondent as the only
person who went out of the room before the loss of the jewelry in th e presence of all the guests therein,
and ordering that she be immediately bodily searched, petitioner virtually branded respondent as the thief.
Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner which is contrary to morals and good
customs. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article 20 for which
she should be held accountable.
(36) Villalva v. RCBC Savings Bank, G.R. No. 163661, 28 August 2006
FACTS:The petitioners in this case are spouses, Mario and Corazon Villalva. They issued 48 checks
amounting to P547, 392.00 to cover installment payments due on promissory notes executed in favor of
Toyota, Quezon Avenue (TQA) for the purchase of a 1993 Toyota Corolla. The promissory notes were
secured by a Chattel Mortgage executed by the petitioners on the vehicle in favor of TQA. Under the Deed
of Chattel Mortgage, petitioners were to insure the vehicle against loss or damage by accident, theft and
fire. They are to endorse and deliver the policies to the mortgagee, which is the respondent, RCBC Savings
Bank. On June 22, 1993, promissory notes and chattel mortgage were assigned to Rizal
Commercia Banking Corporation (RCBC). They were later assigned by RCBC to RCBC Savings Bank. All the
48 checks issued by the petitioner were encashed by the respondent. From August 14, 1996 to August 14,
1997, petitioners procured the necessary insurance but did not deliver the same to the respondent until
January 17, 1997. As a consequence, respondent had the mortgaged vehicle insured for the period of
October 21, 1996 to October 21, 1997 and paid an insurance premium worth P14, 523.36. The insurance
policy obtained by the respondent was later cancelled due to the insurance policy secured by petitioners
over the mortgaged vehicle. And so the respondent was reimbursed P10, 939.86 by the Malayan Insurance
Company since the amount paid by the respondentexceeded by P3, 583.50. On February 10, 1999, the
respondent sent a letter of demand to the petitioners for the amount ofP12, 361.02 representing unpaid
obligations on the promissory notes and mortgage as of January 31, 1999. And they demanded that
petitioners surrender the mortgaged vehicle within five days from notice.
The petitioners ignored the demand letter.
On April 5, 1999, the respondent filed a complaint for recovery of possession with replevin with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City in order for them to get the Toyota Corolla car. Two weeks later, the
respondent caused the enforcement of a writ of replevin and recovered the car. On June 18, 1999, the
petitioners filed their
answer with compulsory counterclaim for moral damages, exemplarydamages, and attorney’s fees. They
assert that they insured the mortgaged vehicle and complied with the Deed for Chattel Mortgage. The MTC
rendered a decision in favor of petitioners and ordered respondent to pay the former P100,000 in moral
damages, P50,000 in exemplary damages, P25,000 in attorney’s fees, and the costs and expenses of
litigation. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and it was denied. The respondent then appealed
the decision to the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The RTC affirmed thejudgment of the MTC.The
respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals assailing the decisionof the RTC. The CA
reversed the decision of the RTC and ordered the petitioners to pay the respondent theamount of P3,
583.50 within 30 days of the finality of the decision and issued a writ of replevin with regard to the
mortgaged vehicle. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and it was denied. Thus, they filed a
petition for certiorari.
According to the petitioners, the CA erred when it failed to recognize the two pieces of evidence: an
acknowledgement receipt which shows that the premium for the second insurance policy has been
refunded to the respondent, and an endorsement by the Malayan Insurance Company which shows that the
petitioners delivered the required insurance policy to the respondent. On the other hand, the respondents
contend that the CA did not make reversible errors and that setting aside its decision would result in the
unjust enrichment of the petitioners.
ISSUES: Whether the petitioners failed to comply with their obligation to insure the vehicle under the Deed
ofChattel Mortgage. Whether or not the petitioners unjustly enriched themselves.
RULING: Petition was granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution are reversed and set
aside. The resolution of the Metropolitan Trial Court and the decision of the Regional Trial Court were
reinstated. The petitioners had not failed to comply or defaulted on the their obligation to insure the
mortgaged vehicle under the Deed of Chattel Mortgage. For the second issue, the petitioners were not
enriched when the respondent obtained insurance coverage for the mortgaged vehicle as the petitioners
had already obtained the required insurance coverage for the vehicle.
PRINCIPLES/DOCTRINE OF LAW:
As a rule, demand is required before a party may be considered in default. The respondent failed to
demandthat petitioners should comply with their obligation to secure insurance coverage for the
mortgaged vehicle.The respondent’s right to pay the insurance premium over the mortgaged vehicle has
not been established. Enrichment consists of every patrimonial, physical or moral advantage, so long as it
isappreciable in money. It may also take the form of avoidance of expenses and other indispensable
reductions in the patrimony ofa person or even prevention of a loss or injury.
(37) Tenchavez v. Escano, 13 SCRA 355
G.R. No. L-19671, 29 November 1965
FACTS:Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escano were secretly married by a military chaplain in one of Pastor’s
friend’s house. Upon learning about the secret marriage, Vicenta’s parents arranged for them to be married
properly in a church so as to validate their marriage as advised by a priest. Vicenta opposed to a second
marriage after receiving an anonymous letter alleging that Pastor and is having an amorous relationship
with matchmaker Pacita Noel. Vicenta continued to live with her parents and Pastor went back to work in
Manila. Although still solicitous of her husband’s welfare in her letters, she was not as endearing and
becomes less and less until they became estranged.
Vicenta filed for a petition to annul her marriage but it was dismissed for non-prosecution because she
never went to any of the set hearings. Without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating
in her application that she was single and left for the United States. She filed for divorce (1950) against
Pastor in Nevada on the ground of “extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character” which the Nevada court
granted even when she was not yet an American citizen (1958). Tenchavez had initiated a complaint in the
against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having
dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections. He asked for
legal separation and one million pesos in damages.
ISSUES: Whether or not the divorce decree granted by the Nevada Court is valid
Can the parents be held liable for the failure of the marriage
HELD: That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, is not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party. That the remarriage of divorced
wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal
separation conformably to Philippine law;
That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one party entitles the other to recover
damages; That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the
absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
(38) St Loius Realty v. CA
Facts:
St. Luis Realty caused to be published with the permission of Arcadio S. Arcadio (but without the
permission of Doctor Aramil) in the issue of the Sunday Times of December 15, 1968, an advertisement
with the heading "WHERE THE HEART IS." Below that heading was the photograph of the residence of
Doctor Aramil and the Arcadio family and then below the photograph was the following write-up:
"Home is where the heart is. And the heart of MR> AND MRS. ARCADIO S. ARCADIO and their family had
been captured by BROOKSIDE HILLS. They used to rent a small 2-bedroom house in a cramped
neighborhood, sadly inadequate for the needs of a large family. They dream(ed) of a more pleasant place,
free from the din and dust of city life, yet near all their friends. Plans took shape when they heard of
BROOKSIDE HILLS. With thrift and determination, they bought a lot and built their dream house... for P31,
000. The Arcadios are now part of the friendly, thriving community of BROOKSIDE HILLS.... a beautiful first-
class subdivision planned for wholesome family living."
The same advertisement appeared in the Sunday Times dated January 5, 1969. Dr. Conrado Aramil, a
neuropsychiatrist and member of the faculty of UE Ramon Magsaysay Medical Center, seek to recover
damage for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times where St Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented his
house with Mr. Arcadio. The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages and P20,000 as moral
damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees. St. Louis Realty Appealed to the Court of Appeals, The Appellate
Court confirmed the judgement.
ISSUE: Whether St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil.
HELD: St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely circulated publication.
Furthermore, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with
a cavalier "rectification ". The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral
damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees. When St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals, CA
affirmed the judgement for the reason that “St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under
articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house
which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that contretemps”.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
(39) Capili v. People, G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013
Quick Facts:
Petitioner was charged with bigamy. There is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second
marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by the first wife. Petitioner moved for suspension of
proceedings arguing that the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage
serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case. The RTC declared the bigamous nature of the
second marriage. Petitioner filed a MTD criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the
second marriage between him and private respondent had already been declared void by the RTC.
Issue: WON the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the
criminal case for bigamy. NO.
Doctrine: The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s second marriage had no bearing upon
the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is
required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage is contracted.
The crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the second marriage with
private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s second marriage
does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.
(40) Pimentel v. People, G.R. No. 172060, 13 September 2010
Facts: Respondent, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel, filed an action for frustrated parricide against petitioner,
Joselito R. Pimentel. The Information for Frustrated
Parricide was dated 30 August 2004 and was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004. The pre-trial
and trial was set on 14 February 2005. She also filed on 5 November 2004, a petition, dated 4 November
2004, for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity Petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
City on 7 February 2005, for the pre-trial and trial of the Civil Case. He then filed an urgent motion to
suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial
question asserting that the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide,
the outcome of Civil Case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon
City. The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The Court of Appeals also denied the
petition holding that the issue in the criminal case for frustrated parricide differs from the issue in the civil
action for annulment of marriage. It ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent
would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of
nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. At the
time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.
Issue: Whether or not the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide.
Ruling: The elements of a prejudicial question under Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed, were not met. Civil action must be instituted first before
the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the
criminal case for frustrated parricide. Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question
that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action. There is a prejudicial question when a civil action
and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the
civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide. However,
the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case
for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt
or innocence of the accused. The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was
charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would
have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case is
granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the
marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could
still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to
respondent.
(41) Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 15075, 18 February 2004
FACTS: Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990.
Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991,
when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on
November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and
Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared
with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner
contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third
marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a
handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with
Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his second
marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot
be charged for bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.
HELD: Individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is criminally liable for bigamy notwithstanding the declaration of the second marriage as void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
(42) Te v. Court of Appeals 346 SCRA 122
Facts:
1.Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on 1988 (Sept. 14). They did not live together after
marriage although they would meet eachother regularly.
2. 1989, Liliana gave birth to a girl. Thereafter, Arthur stopped visiting her.
3.1990 (May 20) Arthur contracted a second marriage while marriage withLiliana was subsisting.
4. Liliana filed bigamy case against Arthur and subsequently anadministrative case (revocation of
engineering license for grossly immoralact) against Arthur and
Julieta Santella (2nd wife of Arthur)
5.Arthur petitioned for the nullity of his marriage with Liliana.
6. RTC and Board rendered decision while the petition for annulment of firstmarriage was pending.
Issue: Marriage annulment case had to be resolved first before criminal and administrative case be
rendered judgment?
Held: NO.
1. P. v. Mendoza and P. v. Aragon ruling (no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a
marriage which is ab initio) was overturned.
2. Family Code Art. 40 is the prevailing rule: the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked
for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
3. Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable,shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
RD: Absence of Impediment.
FC. Art. 5: any male or female of the age of 18yrs or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned
under art. 37 & 38, may contract marriage.Case: Since it was deemed that the marriage of Arthur and
Liliana was valid,bigamous marriage between Arthur and Julieta is void. (see. NCC Art. 80)
(43) Mercado v. Tan 337 SCRA 122
Mercado vs. Tan
337 SCRA 122
FACTS: Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he contracted
marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not know. Tan filed bigamy against
Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against Oliva. The
decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and void.
ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the former
marriage.
HELD: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be
legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as
“void.” In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva right after
Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. He contracted second
marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the first marriage is void from the
beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.
(44) Morigo v. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004
G.R. No. 145226, 6 February 2004
FACTS: Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates for 4 years, after which they lost
contact with each other. They reconnected again in 1984 and became sweethearts when Lucia was in
Singapore until she went to Canada in 1986. They got married in Aug.1990, the following month Lucia went
back to Canada leaving Lucio behind. Lucia filed for divorce in Canada which was granted by the court to
take effect on Feb 17, 1992. On Oct. 4, 1992, Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago.
September 21, 1993, Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage with Lucia, on the
ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
Lucio was charged with Bigamy in information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
Lucio filed a petition for certiorari seeking a reversal of his conviction. He should not be faulted for relying
in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. The OSG counters that petitioner’s contention
that he was in good faith in relying on the divorce decree is negated by his act of filing a petition for a
judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
HELD: The elements of bigamy are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the first marriage has not
been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially
declared presumptively dead; (3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4) the subsequent marriage
would have been valid
had it not been for the existence of the first.
The trial court held that the marriage of Lucio and Lucia is void ab initio, in accordance with the Family
Code. What transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a
solemnizing officer.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this
case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete.
Petitioner has not committed bigamy. His defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent is now moot and
academic.
(45) Quimiging v. Icao, G.R. No. L-26795, July 31, 1970
34 SCRA 132
FACTS:
The petitioner Carmen Quimiguing and the defendant Felix Icao, were neighbors in Dapitan City. They had
close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to have carnal
knowledge with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation and without her consent. Carmen got
pregnant despite of the drugs supplied by defendant. As a consequence, Carmen stopped studying.
Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages and attorney’s fees. The complaint was
dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground of lack of cause of action. Plaintiff
moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court
ruled that “no amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of action”.
ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim support and damages.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that “a conceive child, yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality
of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines”. The conceive child may also receive donations and be accepted by those persons who will
legally represent them if they were already born as prescribed in Article 742. Lower court’s theory on
article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children does
not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates article 40 aforementioned.
Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not his wife to
yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of
Carmen’s rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.
(46) Geluz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961
2 SCRA 801
FACTS:
Respondent Oscar Lazo’s wife Nita Villanueva, came to know petitioner physician Antonio Geluz, through
her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950 before she and Oscar were legally
married. To conceal the pregnancy from her parents, she decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had an
abortion again on October 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC.
After two years, on February 21, 1955, she got pregnant again and had yet another abortion at Geluz’ clinic.
Oscar at this time was in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He
doesn’t have any idea nor has he given consent on the abortion.
ISSUE: Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from
the physician who caused the same.
HELD: The concept of provisional personality cannot be invoked to obtain damages in behalf of an aborted
child. Both trial court and Court of Appeals were unable to find any basis for an award of moral damages.
Oscar’s indifference to the previous abortions of Nita clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the
frustration of his parental affections. Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case against Geluz, he
turned his wife’s indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of which not only he but,
including his wife would be the beneficiaries.
It shows that his real motive is to obtain large money from the payment to be made since he sued Geluz for
P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorney’s fees that serves as indemnity claim, which under the
circumstances was clearly exaggerated.
(47) Limjoco v. Estate of Pedro Fragente, G.R. No. L-770, 27 April 1948
CITATION: 45 OG No. 9, p.397
FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public convenience to
install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining
the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate
Estate of the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator,
appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner
claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality.
HELD: The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the Civil
Code, “estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose of the
settlement and distribution of his properties”. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical
administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his
death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending application for public convenience before the
Public Service Commission.
Supreme Court is of the opinion that “for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public
Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must
be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with
the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed”.
(48) Dumlao v. Quality Plastics, G.R. No. L-27956, April 30, 1976
G.R. No. L-27956, 30 April 1976
FACTS: On February 28, 1962 the CFI of Pangasinan rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente
Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag and Juana Darang to pay solidarity Quality
Plastic Products, Inc. the sum of P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from November, 1958. The lower
court directed that in case the defendants failed to pay the said amount before its decision became final,
then Quality Plastic Products, Inc. “is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond, Exhibit A, in accordance with
law, for the satisfaction of the judgment”.
Upon defendants’ failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after the decision had become final, the
lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic Products, Inc., ordered the “foreclosure” of the surety bond and
the sale at public auction of the land of Pedro Oria which he had given as security under the bond. The sale
was confirmed by the lower court in its order of November 20, 1962.
It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 when the action was filed. Oria’s
death was not known to Quality Plastic AND that Testate Estate of the deceased Pedro Oria, was pending.
On March 1, 1963 all testamentary heirs in Oria’s duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc., for
the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land.
ISSUE: Does the Court have jurisdiction for the execution of Oria’s estate?
HELD:
The lower court’s judgment against Oria is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He had no more civil
personality and his juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost
through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).
The execution sale of Oria’s land is also void. However, Quality plastics cannot be held liable for damages
and other costs because they were in good faith in including Oria as defendant for no one informed them of
his death.
(49) Moy Ya Lim Yao v. CID, 41 SCRA 292
41 SCRA 292
FACTS: Lau Yuen Yeng came to the Philippines from Hongkong in a temporary visitor’s visa good for 1
month. She was asked to pay a bond of P1, 000 with the condition to depart on before the expiration period
to stay. She was able to obtain repeated extensions until Feruary 13 1962, in a period of 10 months. On
January 1962, she got married to Mo Ya Lim Yao a.k.a Edilberto Aguinaldo, a Filipino citizen. 18 months
after her first arrival, the Comm. On Immigration confiscated her bond and ordered immediate arrest and
deportation on the grounds of expiration of authorized stay. Defendant filed for injunction but was denied.
Comm. On Immigration allege that marriage to Lim is an evidence of evading the expiration of her
authorized stay. They also contended that Lau Yuen Yeung is disqualified for naturalization because she
cannot read nor write English or Tagalog and lastly, being a temporary visitor, she should depart and get
the necessary visa for permanent stay before reentering the Philippines.
ISSUES: Can the Court rightfully allege that the marriage was done for convenience?
Is the inability to speak or write English or Tagalog a ground for disqualification to be a citizen? Does
marriage to a Filipino citizen automatically makes an alien into a citizen?
HELD: No one, not even the Court can rightfully allege that a marriage is done for convenience to avoid
deportation. Marriage is a sacred vow between two people in accordance with law and no person can be a
judge to the motives of those who contract marriage. Lau Yuen Yeung became a citizen of the Philippines
by virtue of her marriage to Edilberto Aguinaldo. The Comm. of Immigration or any of its representatives is
permanently enjoined from causing the arrest and deportation and the confiscation of the bond of Lau
Yuen Yeung.
(50) Republic v. Batuigas, G.R. No. 183110, October 7, 2013
(51) Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996
G.R No. 120295, 28 June 1996
FACTS:
Juan Frivaldo filed a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) on March 20, 1995. Raul Lee made a petition to cancel
the COC for being disqualified to seek public office because he was not a Filipino Citizen, which was granted
by the COMELEC. Frivaldo filed a motion for reconsideration which remained unacted upon until after May
1995 election. His candidacy continued and he was elected as Governor. However, the COMELEC affirmed
his disqualification on May 11, 1995. Raul Lee having garnered the 2nd highest number of votes was
proclaimed Governor. Frivaldo filed a petition to annul the proclamation on the grounds that: 1. He took an
Oath of Allegiance on June 30 as his petition for naturalization in September 1994 had been granted; 2.
There is no more legal impediment for his proclamation; 3. The Vice Governor and not Lee should occupy
the seat as Governor in case of vacancy due to disqualification.
ISSUE: Is Juan Frivaldo a Filipino Citizen during his election as Governor?
HELD: Yes. It is true that he was disqualified by the Court in the 1988 and 1992 elections on the issue of his
citizenship and he was stateless when he filed his COC for the 1995 elections, thus making him ineligible to
hold public office. But his case is unique and the law should be interpreted liberally on his favor. He sought
American citizenship to escape prosecution of the Martial Law, not to denounce his being a Fiipino.
He took an Oath of Allegiance every time he files his COC despite being denied several times. He
demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-acquire his citizenship despite technical setbacks.
Assured of a life of ease and plenty as an American Citizen he opted on returning and serving his country
which gives no doubt as to his loyalty and dedication to this country.
The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times which makes him deserving to govern
the people.
Frivaldo was upheld as the rightful Governor of Sorsogon and granted Filipino citizenship.
(52) Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300
248 SCRA 300
FACTS: Imelda was a little over 8 years old when her parents established domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. She
finished her studies and got her degree in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still
in Tacloban. She went to Manila in 1952 to work for her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his
office at the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was
still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and consequently became a registered voter there. When Pres. Marcos
was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency,
they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of
the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was
running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy
Montejo, also a candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification” with
the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she
sought to rectify by adding the words “since childhood” in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that “she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the
Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1 year residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court favors the
conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the
First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following
reasons:
A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of law
when her father brought them to Leyte;
Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does
not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her
domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium. Assuming that Imelda
gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of
Pres. Marcos, her action of returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile
of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in
Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and
other important milestones.
The petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First
District of Leyte.