BORGJIE B.

DISTURA

1) AGTARAP vs. AGTARAP (G.R. No. 177099. June 8, 2011) (Settlement of Estate)

(1) FACTS. Decedent Joaquin contracted 2 marriages and left real estate properties.

(2) RTC ruled in an intestate estate proceeding that bulk of estate property were acquired during
Joaquin and second wife’s marriage.

(3) ISSUE. WON RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction has jurisdiction to
determine questions of ownership which belongs to another court with general jurisdiction?

(4) RULING. As a general rule, no, because the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or
an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of question
of ownership that arise during the proceeding.

(5) However, as an exception and justified by expediency and convenience, the jurisdiction of a
probate extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the state,
such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is
conjugal or exclusively property of the deceased spouse.
_______________

(6) First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice
to the final determination of ownership in a separate action.

(7) Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court is
competent to resolve issues on ownership.

2) ALVARICO vs. SOLA (G.R. No. 138953. June 6, 2002) (Reversion/Escheat)

(1) FACTS. ALVARICO is the natural father of SOLA while LOPEZ is ALVARICO’s aunt, and
also SOLA's adoptive mother.

(2) LOPEZ transferred a parcel of land subject of a Miscellaneous Sales Agreement (sale without
public auction of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain for residential purpose) in
favor of SOLA who assumed payment and the Bureau of Lands issued OCT in favor of SOLA.

(3) ALVARICO sued for conveyance of said lot because according to him Fermina donated the land
to him but SOLA argued that the donation to ALVARICO is void because of lack of approval
from the Bureau of Lands.

(4) ISSUE. WON a private individual can institute a reversion proceeding under the rules?

(5) RULING. NO, only the State can institute reversion proceedings because under Sec. 101 of the
Public Land Act which provides that “All actions for reversion to the Government of lands of the
public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer
acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.”

(6) HERE, since SOLA's title originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter
 between the grantor and the grantee.

(7) HENCE, ALVARICO has no standing at all to file the reversion proceedings.

3) TOMASA VDA DE JACOB vs. CA, PEDRO PILAPIL et al. (G.R. No. 135216. August 19, 1999)
(Adoption)

(1) FACTS. TOMASA VDA DE JACOB claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr.
Alfredo E. Jacob while PEDRO PILAPIL on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted
son of Alfredo.

(2) ISSUE. WON defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob under the
laws on adoption?

(3) RULING. NO, the claimed adoption of PILAPIL is declared nonexistent because he failed to
discharge the burden of proof in establishing adoption as he is the one claiming such relationship
under the rules on adoption.

4) LACSON et al. vs. PEREZ (G.R. No. 147780. May 10, 2001) (Habeas Corpus)

(1) FACTS. This case stems from the issuance of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there is a state of rebellion in the NCR (on May 1, 2001) and
warrantless arrest of several alleged leaders and promotors of the rebellion were thereafter
effected.

(2) LACSON, et al. filed several petitions including petition for habeas corpus against such
proclamation and for the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof.

(3) JUSTICE SECRETARY PEREZ denies such allegations saying that ordinary procedure applies
(that means, obtaining regular warrants of arrests from courts and thereafter preliminary
investigation will be conducted) for all acts committed during the said state of rebellion.

(4) ISSUE. WON a petition for habeas corpus may be availed of to prevent an impending unlawful
warrantless arrest?

(5) RULING. NO, the relief is clearly premature considering that as of this date (May 10, 2001) no
complaints or charges have been filed against any of the petitioners for any crime.

(6) The application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is manifest that the writ is not called
for since its purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint is a matter which remains
speculative to this very day.

5) REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN (G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008) (Change of Name)

(1) FACTS. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN has Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) a condition
where the person thus afflicted is characterized by inappropriate manifestations of male
characteristics although genetically female.

(2) On December 11, 2003, JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN filed a petition for Correction of Entries
in Birth Certificate before the RTC of Laguna so that her name be changed to “Jeff” and her
 gender to “male”.

(3) ISSUE. WON the correction of entries in her birth certificate can be granted under the laws on
changing one’s name?

(4) RULING. YES, the court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.

(5) The Court ruled that the governing law with respect to change of name and gender is RA 9048
and the Court views that where a person is biologically or naturally intersex (those with CAH
included), the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual,
having reached the age of maturity, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.

(6) CAGANDAHAN here is an intersex who reached the age of majority and thinks of himself as a
male considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones and there is preponderant
biological support for considering him as a male.

6) BURGOS vs. ESPERON (G.R. No. 178497, February 04, 2014) (Writ of Amparo)