Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
2017-2037
(Serial No. 29/404,677)
__________________________________________________________________
IN RE RON MAATITA
____________________________________________________
Nathan K. Kelley
Solicitor
Thomas W. Krause
Deputy Solicitor
William La Marca
Amy J. Nelson
Associate Solicitors
Figure 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. ISSUE PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Borden, In re,
90 F.3d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ..................................................................................... 7, 8, 9
Garbo, In re,
287 F.2d 192 (CCPA 1961) .................................................................................................. 9
Glavas, In re,
230 F.2d 447 (CCPA 1956) .................................................................................................. 9
Harvey, In re,
12 F.3d 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1993) .............................................................................................. 8
Lamb, In re,
286 F.2d 610 (CCPA 1961) .....................................................................................................8
Mann, In re,
861 F.2d 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ............................................................................................ 9
Mygatt, Ex parte,
171 O.G. 1257, 1911 C.D. 186 ............................................................................................ 5
Rosen, In re,
673 F.2d 388 (CCPA 1982) ............................................................................................. 7, 8
Rubinfield, In re,
270 F.2d 391 (CCPA 1959) .............................................................................. 1, 2, 3, 4, 15
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Salsbury, Ex Parte,
38 USPQ 149 (Comm'r Pat., 1938) .................................................................................... 5
Schnell, In re,
46 F.2d 203 (CCPA 1931) ............................................................................................. 2, 13
Yardley, In re,
493 F.2d 1389 (CCPA 1977) ................................................................................................ 8
REGULATIONS
35 U.S.C. § 103.......................................................................................................................... 6
35 U.S.C. § 121...................................................................................................................... 5, 7
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I. ISSUE PRESENTED
This Court’s Order of April 10, 2018 (ECF No. 37) instructs the parties to file
supplemental briefs addressing the standards for determining: (1) whether a design
multiple inventive concepts; and (2) what is patentably distinct in the design patent
involving a single drawing. The Director of the United States Patent and Trademark
Court’s Order.
II. ARGUMENT
are presented by an inventor in separate applications, [and] the Patent Office . . . finds
only one inventive concept to be involved, [it] allows a patent on one application and
rejects the others on the ground of double patenting.” In re Rubinfield, 270 F.2d 391,
395 (CCPA 1959); see also MPEP 1504.06 (discussing both statutory and non-statutory
single application.” Id. The Office will permit multiple embodiments of a design
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presented in a single application but “only if they involve a single inventive concept;
and such concept can be protected by a single claim.” Id. at 396. Thus, when
must determine whether they are patentably distinct (and subject to restriction), or
whether the multiple presented embodiments are indistinct and may stay within a
they are distinct or indistinct. Thus, a single drawing with a two dimensional top-
down plan view does not adequately display multiple embodiments of a design as
embodiments could be envisioned from the single drawing. If the design is two
dimensional, for example, limited to a print on a piece of apparel or other flat surface,
then a two dimensional drawing would be sufficient to show a single two dimensional
embodiment.
abstract but as applied to an article. See In re Schnell, 46 F.2d 203, 208 (CCPA 1931)
(“The invention is not the article and is not the design PER SE, but is the design
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from the article to which it is applied and cannot exist alone merely as a scheme of
surface ornamentation.” MPEP 1502 (Definition of Design). That is, the “thing
invented or produced, for which a [design] patent is given, is that which gives a
applied, or to which it gives form.” Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 525 (1871).
(Figs 1-4 and Figs 5-8) and because the visual appearance of each embodiment was
directed to the same inventive concept they were permitted to stay within a single
(Des. 191,031), figures 1-4 show a first embodiment of a Floor Waxer and figures 5-8
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The court in Rubinfield explained, that “[t]he designs of Figures 1 to 4 and 5 to 8 differ
primarily in that the latter includes certain braces” but the braces could have been
shown with dotted lines “as ‘immaterial’ parts.” See Rubinfield, 270 F.2d at 394. Thus,
even though there were small differences between the two embodiments, they were
found to be directed to a single inventive concept (i.e., indistinct) and the Rubinfield
court permitted them to stay within a single design patent protected by a single claim.
However, the court went on to explain that when individual embodiments are
generic claim without sufficient illustration for each embodiment, such a design claim
is indefinite. See Rubinfield, 270 F.2d at 396 (a “so-called generic claim” purported to
cover “the ‘common appearance’ of two modifications” that “is apparently directed to
some broad concept which is not illustrated”. . .“is indefinite and has no proper place
provides only a single drawing coupled with an allegation that the single drawing
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individual drawing for each embodiment showing its visual impression must first be
provided, and at that point, the Office will perform a comparison to determine
whether to restrict the embodiments and provide the option for them to be filed in
design claim, the Office performs an analysis to determine whether the embodiments
are distinct such that a restriction under 35 U.S.C. § 121 is required. Restriction
Procedure (MPEP). See MPEP 1504.05 (Restriction [in Designs]) (citing Rubinfield).
1
The Office cannot perform a comparison of hypothetical embodiments
without speculating as to their visual impression and it is precisely that type of
speculation that renders such a claim indefinite. Here, there is no dispute that Maatita
seeks a design applied in the three-dimensional configuration context, yet he has only
provided a two-dimensional plan view drawing. Notably, “it has been held that when
contour is an important part of a design, failure to disclose it fully in the drawing will
be fatal to the patent.” See Philco Corp. v. Admiral Corp. 199 F. Supp. 797, 804 (D. Del.
1961) (citing Ex parte Mygatt, 171 O.G. 1257, 1911 C.D. 186 (affirming the examiner’s
finding that a plan-view illustration “does not sufficiently show the configuration of
the article” and that the examiner properly “required a view of the article as seen from
the side, perspective, or elevation” view.)); see also Ex Parte Salsbury, 38 USPQ 149
(Comm’r Pat., 1938) (“With articles which are unsymmetrical and which present
different appearances from different points of view, one figure from a single point,
however well executed, is not sufficient for complete disclosure.”).
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the multiple designs.” See MPEP 1504.05 (II) (Distinct Inventions) at 1500-53. That
illustrations of each embodiment. Multiple embodiments are not distinct if: “(A) the
multiple designs have overall appearances with basically the same design
characteristics; and (B) the differences between the multiple designs are insufficient to
patentably distinguish one design from the other.” Id. Differences between multiple
they are de minimis or obvious to a designer of ordinary skill in the art. Id.
The Office applies “the obviousness standard under 35 U.S.C. § 103” when
multiple embodiments presented with a design application are simply obvious variants
of each other, then they are indistinct and may remain in the same application. If they
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do not meet the obviousness standard, then they are considered patentably distinct
For design patents, “‘the ultimate inquiry under section 103 is whether the
claimed design would have been obvious to a designer of ordinary skill who designs
articles of the type involved.’” MRC Innovations, Inc. v. Hunter Mfg., LLP, 747 F.3d
1326, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted). Thus, the central inquiry is
whether the design would have been obvious to “a designer of ordinary skill who
designs articles of the type involved” with a focus on “the visual impression of the
claimed design as a whole.” In re Borden, 90 F.3d 1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (internal
citations omitted).
The obviousness inquiry is performed in two steps for design patents. First, a
primary reference (i.e., a Rosen reference) must be identified. Titan Tire Corp. v.
Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2009). This primary
basically the same as the claimed design.” Id. at 1381 (citing In re Rosen, 673 F.2d 388,
2
Importantly, any non-elected embodiments later filed as divisional applications
resulting from a restriction are shielded from double patenting. See 35 U.S.C. § 121
(“A patent issuing on an application with respect to which a requirement for
restriction under this section has been made, or on an application filed as a result of
such a requirement, shall not be used as a reference either in the Patent and
Trademark Office or in the courts against a divisional application or against the
original application or any patent issued on either of them, if the divisional application
is filed before the issuance of the patent on the other application.”).
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whether they are distinct or indistinct, the embodiments are compared to determine
whether they have a visual impression that is “basically the same.” The “basically the
same” test requires consideration of the visual impression created by the design as a
whole and not on selected individual features. MRC Innovations, 747 F.3d at 1331;
re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1392-93 (CCPA 1977). Thus, “in order to support a holding
of obviousness, a primary reference must be more than a design concept; it must have
an appearance substantially the same as the claimed design.” See MPEP 1504.03 (II)
(Prima Facie Obviousness) (citing In re Harvey, 12 F.3d 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). Here,
that means for one embodiment to qualify as merely an obvious variant of another
embodiment of a claimed design, it would first need to have “an appearance [that] is
has a visual impression that is “basically the same” as another embodiment), other
references “may be used to modify it to create a design that has the same overall
3
Minor differences between the claimed design and a primary reference may not
defeat a claim of obviousness because, as this Court has recognized, “if the designs
were identical, no obviousness analysis would be required.” MRC Innovations, 747
F.3d at 1332-33 (collecting cases); see also In re Lamb, 286 F.2d 610, 611 (CCPA 1961).
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visual appearance.” Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., Inc., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir.
1996). The teachings of these secondary references may be combined only when “the
designs are ‘so related that the appearance of certain ornamental features in one would
suggest the application of those features to the other.’” Borden, 90 F.3d at 1574-75
See In re Mann, 861 F.2d 1581, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Design patents have almost no
scope. The claim at bar, as in all design cases, is limited to what is shown in the
order “to attain this legal status under these circumstances, the design must have an
In re Garbo, 287 F.2d 192, 193-94 (CCPA 1961). This is because “[t]he only use
Mann, 861 F.2d at 1581. That is, “the thing invented or produced, for which a
[design] patent is given, is that which gives a peculiar or distinctive appearance to the
Mfg. Co., 81 U.S. at 525. Thus, “the use to which an article is to be put has no bearing
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appear, some examples are provided. As shown below in Design Patent No. 471,696,
Figs. 1 and 7 illustrate two embodiments of the same shoe sole design. While there
are small differences shown in the illustrations of the two embodiments, the
perspective view drawings show that the three dimensional configuration is basically
the same and therefore they were found to be indistinct (or directed to the same
inventive concept) and permitted to stay within a single patent and protected by a
single claim:
Similarly, Design Patent No. 434,548 (below) shows Figs. 1-3 (a first
embodiment) and Figs. 4-6 (a second embodiment) of the same shoe design. Again,
perspective view drawings of the various embodiments were provided and reflected
that, although small differences exist, the visual impression of the two embodiments
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were basically the same and found to be indistinct and therefore permitted to stay
In contrast, Design Patent Nos. 518,283, 527,174 and 528,761 (on the
following page) each show separate embodiments of a shoe design that were each
embodiment was then filed separately and issued as a separate patent. Notably, the
drawing for each embodiment reflects the same background environment via dotted
lines (i.e., the background is the same shoe upper), but the solid lines reflect a unique
design for each embodiment that have a distinct visual impression. Accordingly, even
though the overall shoe is the same, the visual impression of the claimed design is
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distinct for each embodiment and therefore a restriction was applied and the
Similarly, Design Patent Nos. 499,871 and 513,861 show two embodiments of
a shoe design found to provide distinct visual impressions and therefore restricted
into separate applications. A separate design patent issued for each embodiment.
Maatita’s design claim on appeal is for “an ornamental design for a Shoe
Bottom as shown and described” in the two-dimensional plan view shown in Figure 1
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Maatita did not present any drawings or views other than a single two dimensional
top-down plan view. Yet Maatita asserts that his design is to be applied to shoe soles
in the three dimensional configuration context. That means, there are many potential
three dimensional design embodiments that can be imagined from the two
See PTO Br. at 5-7 (citing Appx4; Appx70-71; Appx121-122). Notably, Maatita has
configuration4 context. As the examiner pointed out in his answer, Maatita has not
4
Importantly, “[w]here a design is for the form or configuration or involves the
relative proportions of parts of an article of manufacture, said article of manufacture
must necessarily be disclosed in the application.” Schnell, 46 F.2d at 206-07.
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limited his design to “an impression, print, picture or other two dimensional
embodiments covered by his single design claim, they must be assessed for whether
they are distinct or indistinct. And, critically, that assessment depends on comparing
configuration shoe sole design. Even though different shoe soles may look similar
when viewing them in two dimensions that does not mean the three dimensional
configuration designs of those shoe soles do not convey distinct visual impressions.
be permitted to stay within the same applications and protected by a single claim. But
at a minimum Maatita must present illustrations for each embodiment that he seeks to
asserting that it is a broad generic claim that covers “all” embodiments without any
5
As the examiner noted, Maatita “asserts that any of the four hypothetical
embodiments created by the examiner using Appellant’s single plan view, would be
within the scope of the claimed design” and “in three of the four hypothetical
embodiments, the designs created were configuration-type designs wherein the
elements of the claimed design have significant form being situated in different
planes” which “[o]ne would not describe . . . as an impression, picture, or print.” See
Appx136.
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illustration of what those individual embodiments are, Maatita has not provided a
definite claim that can be examined or evaluated for purposes of determining whether
multiple embodiments may stay within a single application. See Rubinfield, 270 F.2d at
396 (a “so-called generic claim” that is alleged to cover “the ‘common appearance’ of
two modifications” and “is apparently directed to some broad concept which is not
(emphasis added).
Respectfully submitted,
Date: April 20, 2018
Thomas J. Krause
Deputy Solicitor
William La Marca
Amy J. Nelson
Associate Solicitors
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on April 20, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, using the Court’s CM/ECF filing system. Counsel for the
Appellant was electronically served by and through the Court’s CM/ECF filing
/s/William La Marca
Office of the Solicitor
U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
Mail Stop 8, P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
Tel: (571) 272-9035