De Luna v.
Abrigo Furthermore, while the judicial action for the rescission of a contract is generally not
G.R. No. L-57455, January 18, 1990, 181 SCRA 150
FACTS: Prudencio de Luna donated a portion of a lot of the Cadastral Survey of
Lucena to the Luzonian University Foundation. The donation was embodied in a Deed
of Donation Intervivos and made subject to certain terms and conditions and
provided for the automatic reversion to the donor of the donated property in case of
violation or non-compliance. The foundation failed to comply with the conditions of
the donation. De Luna "revived" the said donation in favor of the foundation, in a
document entitled "Revival of Donation Intervivos" subject to terms and conditions
which among others, required it to construct a chapel, a nursery and a kindergarten
school in the donated property within five (5) years from execution. The automatic
reversion to the donor of the donated area in case of violation of the conditions was
also provided. The foundation, through its president, accepted the donation. A "Deed
of Segregation" was later executed by De Luna and the foundation whereby the area
donated was adjudicated to the foundation. The heirs of de Luna later filed a
complaint with the trial court alleging that the terms and conditions of the donation
were not complied with by the foundation. Thus, it prayed for the cancellation of the
donation and the reversion of the donated land to the heirs. The foundation invoked,
among others, the defense of prescription of action. The court dismissed the
complaint. It ruled that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions to revoke a
donation on the ground of non-compliance with any of the conditions of the donation
shall prescribe in four years (4) counted from such non-compliance. In the instant
case, the four-year period for filing the complaint for revocation commenced on April
9, 1976 and expired on April 9, 1980. Since the complaint was brought on September
23, 1980 or more than five (5) months beyond the prescriptive period, it was already
barred by prescription.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint is one for judicial decree of revocation of the
donation in question as contemplated in Article 764 of the New Civil Code and which
prescribes in four (4) years and not an action to enforce a written contract which
prescribes in ten (10) years.
HELD: The donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause. It was made
subject to the burden requiring the donee to construct a chapel, a nursery and a
kindergarten school in the donated property within five years from execution of the
deed of donation. It is true that under Article 764, actions for the revocation of a
donation must be brought within for (4) years from the non-compliance of the
conditions of the donation. However, the said article does not apply to onerous
donations in view of the specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous
donations are governed by the rules on contracts. Therefore, the rules on contracts
and the general rules on prescription and not the rules on donations are applicable
in the case at bar.
necessary where the contract provides that it may be automatically revoked and
cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions, however, where one of the
parties contests or denies the rescission, judicial intervention is necessary not for
purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed
rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial
intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper.
Judicial action will be necessary as without it, the extrajudicial resolution will remain
contestable and subject to judicial invalidation, unless attack thereon should become
barred by acquiescence, estoppel or prescription.
In the instant case, trial court was therefore not correct in holding that the complaint
is barred by prescription under Article 764 because Article 764 does not apply to
onerous donations. As provided in the donation executed on April 9, 1971,
compliance with the terms and conditions of the contract of donation, shall be made
within five (5) years from its execution. The complaint which was filed on September
23, 1980 was then well within the ten (10) year prescriptive period to enforce a
written contract pursuant to Article 1144 par. 1, counted from April 9, 1976.
Reyes v. Mosqueda
G.R. No. L-45262, July 23, 1990
FACTS: On May 15, 1969, Dr. Emilio Pascual executed a Deed of Donation of real
property located at 1109-1111 R. Papa St. Tondo, Manila in favor of Ofelia Parungao,
a minor, with her mother, Rosario Duncil, accepting the gift and donation for and in
her behalf. However, Ursula Pascual alleged that Dr. Pascual during his lifetime on
November 2, 1966 executed a Donation mortis causa in her favor covering the said
property. Parungao, upon reaching the age of majority was able to register the Deed
of Donation with the Register of Deeds in Manila and was issued a TCT.
On September 23, 1976, Ursula executed a deed of absolute sale over the Tondo
property in favor of Benjamin, Oscar, Jose, and Emmanuel Reyes. Benjamin filed a
complaint for the declaration of nullity of the TCT of Parungao and/or reconveyance
of the deed of title. The CFI of Manila declared the TCT in the name of Parungao null
and void and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the title. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals ruled that the 1966 donation to Ursula was inter vivos, which meant that
the property was already transferred to Ursula at that time.
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation to Ursula was Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa.
HELD: It was a Donation Inter Vivos. The title given by the donor in the deed of
donation is not a determinative factor which makes the donation inter vivos or mortis
causa. It is the body of the document of donation and the statements contained
therein and not the title that should be considered in ascertaining the intent of the
donor. In the case, the donor used the term donation Mortis Causa but from the
stipulations of the deed, it can be clearly inferred that he was actually executing a
donation Inter Vivos to Ursula.
The transfer of ownership over the properties donated to Ursula was immediate and
independent of the death of Dr. Pascual since it was a donation Inter Vivos. The
provision as regards the reservation of properties for the donor's subsistence in
relation to the other provisions of the deed of donation confirms the intention of the
donor to give the naked ownership of the properties to Ursula immediately after the
execution of the deed of donation. Hence, he could not have donated the property
again in 1969 in favor of Parungao since the lot was already transferred to Ursula at
that time.
Liguez v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-11240, December 18, 1957, 102 Phil. 577
FACTS: The case began upon complaint filed by petitioner-appellant against the
widow and heirs of the late Salvador P. Lopez to recover a parcel of land in barrio
Davao. Plaintiff averred to be its legal owner, pursuant to a deed of donation of said
land, executed in her favor by the late owner, Salvador P. Lopez, on 18 May 1943.
The defense interposed was that the donation was null and void for having an illicit
causa or consideration, which was the plaintiff's entering into marital relations with
Salvador P. Lopez, a married man; and that the property had been adjudicated to the
appellees as heirs of Lopez by the court of First Instance, since 1949.
It was ascertained by the Court of Appeals that the donated land originally belonged
to the conjugal partnership of Salvador P. Lopez and his wife, Maria Ngo; that the
latter had met and berated Conchita for living maritally with her husband, sometime
during June of 1943; that the widow and children of Lopez were in possession of the
land and made improvements thereon; that the land was assessed in the tax rolls first
in the name of Lopez and later in that of his widow.; and that the deed of donation
was never recorded.
Upon these facts, the Court of Appeals held that the deed of donation was
inoperative, and null and void (1) because the husband, Lopez, had no right to donate
conjugal property to the plaintiff appellant; and (2) because the donation was tainted
with illegal cause or consideration, of which donor and donee were participants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation is valid.
HELD: In the present case, it is scarcely disputable that Lopez would not have
conveyed the property in question had he known that appellant would refuse to
cohabit with him. The cohabitation was an implied condition to the donation, and
being unlawful, necessarily tainted the donation itself.
The rule that parties to an illegal contract, if equally guilty, will not be aided by the
law but will both be left where it finds them, has been interpreted by this Court as
barring the party from pleading the illegality of the bargain either as a cause of action
or as a defense. Memo auditor propriam turpitudinem allegans.
The appellant seeks recovery of the disputed land on the strength of a donation
regular on its face. To defeat its effect, the appellees must plead and prove that the
same is illegal. But such plea on the part of the Lopez heirs is not receivable, since
Lopez, himself, if living, would be barred from setting up that plea; and his heirs, as
his privies and successors in interest, can have no better rights than Lopez himself.
Appellees, as successors of the late donor, being thus precluded from pleading the
defense of immorality or illegal causa of the donation, the total or partial
ineffectiveness of the same must be decided by different legal principles. In this
regard, the Court of Appeals correctly held that Lopez could not donate the entirety
of the property in litigation, to the prejudice of his wife Maria Ngo, because said
property was conjugal in character and the right of the husband to donate
community property is strictly limited by law
Pershing Tan Queto v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-35648, March 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 54
FACTS: Herein private respondent Restituta Tacalinar Guangco de Pombuena
received the questioned lot from her mother Basilides Tacalinar either as a purported
donation or by way of purchase with P50 as the alleged consideration thereof. The
donation or sale was consummated while Restituta was already married to her
husband Juan Pombuena. Juan then filed for himself and his supposed co-owner
Resitituta an application for a Torrens Title over the land which was later on granted
pronouncing him (‘married to Resitiuta’) as the owner of the land.
A contract of lease over the lot was entered into between petitioner, Pershing Tan
Queto and Restituta with the consent of her husband for a period of 10 years. The
lease of contract having expired, Restituta filed for unlawful detainer against Tan
Queto. The unlawful detainer case was won by the spouses in the Municipal Court
but on appeal in the CFI the entire case was dismissed because of a barter agreement
whereby Tan Queto became the owner of the disputed lot and the spouses became
the owners of a parcel of land with the house thereon previously owned before the
barter by Tan Queto. After the barter agreement, Tan Queto constructed on the
disputed land a concrete building without any objection from Restituta. Afterwards
Restituta sued both Juan and Tan Queto for reconveyance of the title over the
registered but disputed lot, for annulment of the barter, and for recovery of the land
with damages.
The respondent court’s decision which later on was affirmed by the Supreme court
led to the reformation of the Contract of Sale of the disputed lot from Basilides to
Restituta from a sale to a conveyance of the share of Restituta in the future
hereditary estate of her parents. Hence, this petition for a motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conveyance of the share of Restituta in the future
hereditary estate of her parents was valid hence a paraphernal property.
HELD: No. The court ruled that the land is conjugal, not paraphernal. The oral
donation of the lot cannot be a valid donation intervivos because it was not executed
in a public instrument (Art. 749, Civil Code), nor as a valid donation mortis causa for
the formalities of a will were not complied with. The allegation that the transfer was
a conveyance to RESTITUTA of her hereditary share in the estate of her mother (or
parents) cannot be sustained for the contractual transmission of future inheritance
is generally prohibited.
The fact is ownership was acquired by both JUAN and RESTITUTA by tradition
(delivery) as a consequence of the contract of sale (See Art. 712, Civil Code) with
P50.00 (then a considerable amount) as the cause or consideration of the
transaction. The lot is therefore conjugal, having been acquired by the spouses thru
onerous title (the money used being presumably conjugal there being no proof that
RESTITUTA had paraphernal funds of her own).
Pajarillo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 72908, August 11, 1989, 176 SCRA 340
FACTS: Perfecta Balane de Cordero died intestate in 1945 and leaving a tract of 28
hectares of land with buildings and improvements in the Quezon Province. On May
20, 1946, perfecta’s siblings Juana and Felipe executed a public instrument entitled “
Extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the decease Perfecta Balane de Cordero.”
In it they disposed that in according to Perfecta’s wishes and in consideration of love
and affection, the said property be donated to private respondent Salud Suterio de
Matias, Perfecta’s niece, who will assume the encumbrance/obligation to the
Philippine National Bank in the amount of P 1,000. In the same document, the done
accepted the donation in a public instrument. The instrument was never registered
nor the title transferred to Salud’s name although she immediately took possession
of the land. Sometime in 1951, Salud transferred the possession of the land to her
mother Juana, who was then staying with her brother Claudio and his family. During
the period they were occupying the land, Claudio paid realty taxes thereon. On May
25, 1956, Juana executed a deed of absolute sale conveying the land to Claudio. Two
years later, Claudio had the land registered in his name. Claudio died in 1961 and his
mother in 1963. On June 30, 1965, the private respondents Salud and Pedro Matias
filed a complaint for the reconveyance of the property on the ground that the deed
of sale in favour of Claudio was fictitious and the registration in his name was null
and void. Salud claimed that no compensation was paid by Claudio and that the
transaction was deliberately concealed from her by her brother and the defendants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the extra-judicial settlement was a donation.
HELD: Yes. Felipe and Juana had declared themselves the heirs of Perfecta and the
owners of the property in question. As such, they were free to give the land to
whomever they pleased and for whatever reason they saw fit. Hence, if they choose
to respect Perfecta’s wishes and carry out her intentions by donating the land to
Salud, there was no legal impediment to their doing so. There is no question that
Felipe and Juana could have simply disregarded their sister’s sentiments and decided
not to donate the property to Salud. The fact that they did no do this speaks well of
their integrity and their loyalty to their deceased sister. The extra-judicial settlement
also reflects their own affection for Salud which constituted the valid consideration
for their own act of liberality.
Cruz v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-58671, November 22, 1985, 140 SCRA 245
FACTS: In 1973, Eduvigis Cruz, a childless widow, donated a 235.5 sq. m. residential
lot in San Isidro, Taytay, Rizal together with the two-door apartment erected thereon
to her grandnieces (private respondents Teresita, Lydia and Cecilia, all surnamed De
Leon). The property was accordingly transferred to the names of private
respondents.
In 1974, Cruz judicially adopted Cresencia Ocreto, a minor, after which she
extrajudicailly tried to revoke the donation, but the donee resisted, alleging that: (1)
the property in question was co-owned by Eduvigis Cruz and her brother, the late
Maximo Cruz, grandfather of the donees, hence the latter own 1/2 of the property
by inheritance; and (2) Eduvigis owns another property, an agricultural land of more
than two hectares situated in Barrio Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, hence the donation did
not impair the presumptive legitime of the adoptive child.
Petitioner filed a complaint against the donees for revocation of donation, invoking
Article 760, par. 3 of the NCC. The trial court rendered a decision revoking the
donation. On appal, The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and dismissed the
complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the complaint to
annul the subject donation.
HELD: Yes. In the case of the subsequent adoption of a minor by one who had
previously donated some or all of his properties to another, the donor may sue for
the annulment or reduction of the donation within 4 years from the date of adoption,
if the donation impairs the legitime of the adopted, taking into account the whole
estate of the donor at the time of the donation of the child (Articles 760, 761 and 763
of the NCC). Of course, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff-donor, who must allege
and establish the requirements prescribed by law, on the basis of which annulment
or reduction of the donation can be adjudged. Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the
complaint for annulment does not allege that the subject donation impairs the
legitime of the adopted child. Indeed, it contains no indication at all of the total assets
of the donor.
Nor is there proof of impairment of legitime. On the contrary, there is unrebutted
evidence that the donor has another piece of land worth P273,420 in 1977. The legal
situation of petitioner-donor is made worse by the factual finding of the Court of
Appeals that the grandfather of the donees was the owner pro indiviso of one-half of
the donated land, the effect of which is to reduce the value of the donation which
can then more easily be taken from the portion of the estate within the free disposal
of petitioner.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 77425, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 300
FACTS: On August 23, 1930, the spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta
executed a deed of donation in favor of herein petitioner Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Manila covering a parcel of land located at Cavite. The deed of donation provides
that the donee shall not dispose or sell the property within a period of 100 years from
the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise a violation of such condition would
render ipso facto null and void the donation and the property would revert to the
estate of the donors.
However, on June 30, 1980 while within the prohibitive period to dispose, petitioner
executed a deed of absolute sale of the property subject of the donation in favor of
the petitioner-spouses Florencio and Soledad Ignao in consideration of the sum of
P114,000.00. Hence, private respondents filed a complaint for the nullification of the
deed of donation. In their answer, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss based on
the grounds that the action has been barred by prescription because the complaint
was filed four years after the sale, and that the complaint states no cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation in favor of the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila may be revoked.
HELD: No. The complaint in the case at bar cannot be barred by prescription because
the applicable prescriptive period is not the 4-year period provided in Article 764 of
the New Civil Code, rather it is the 10-year period ordinary prescription shall apply
because the deed of donation provides for the automatic reversion of the property
to the original owner in case of violation of any condition. The Court in the previous
case of De Luna v. Abrigo has already settled such prescriptive period.
However, although the action cannot be dismissed on the ground of prescription, the
same should be dismissed for lack of cause of action.
The cause of action of the private respondents is based on the fact that the petitioner
sold the lot during the 50th year of the prohibitive period of 100 years. Such
prohibitive period imposed by the respondents was unreasonable because applying
in analogy Articles 494 and 870 of the New Civil Code, the donor cannot order a
prohibitive period of disposition exceeding 20 years. As such, the said condition
regarding the prohibitive period being contrary to law shall be considered as null and
void pursuant to Art. 727 of the New Civil Code but the donation shall remain valid
and subsisting. Thus, respondents cannot anymore revoke the donation, and the sale
of the property by the petitioner to the Ignao spouses shall be valid and with legal
effects.
Eduarte v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 105944, February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 391
FACTS: Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of
12,199 square meters. He executed a deed entitled “Donation InterVivos” ceding
one-half portion thereof to his niece Helen S. Doria. Eventually, the whole parcel of
land was ceded to Doria by Calapine. Doria then donated a portion of 157 square
meters to the Calauan Christian Reformed Church. He also sold, transferred and
conveyed unto the spouses Eduarte the parcel of land, saving the 700 square meters
on which Doria’s house was erected. However, Pedro Calapine filed a complaint
against Doria, the Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc. and the spouses Eduarte
claiming that his signature to the deed of donation was a forgery. He prays for the
revocation of the donation made in favour of Doria, to declare null and void the deeds
of donation and sale that she had executed in favor of the Calauan Christian
Reformed Church, Inc. and the spouses Eduarte.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are buyers in bad faith of the donated
property.
HELD: No. The rule is well-settled that mere possession cannot defeat the title of a
holder of a registered torrens title to real property. When herein petitioners
purchased the subject property from Helen Doria, the same was already covered by
TCT No. T-23205 under the latter's name. And although Helen Doria's title was
fraudulently secured, such fact cannot prejudice the rights of herein petitioners
absent any showing that they had any knowledge or participation in such irregularity.
Thus, they cannot be obliged to look beyond the certificate of title which appeared
to be valid on its fade and sans any annotation or notice of private respondents'
adverse claim. Contrary therefore to the conclusion of respondent Court, petitioners
are purchasers in good faith and for value as they bought the disputed property
without notice that some other person has a right or interest in such property, and
paid a full price for the same at the time of the purchase or before they had notice of
the claim or interest of some other person in the property. And having established
beyond doubt that Helen Doria fraudulently secured her title over the disputed
property which she subsequently sold to petitioners, Helen Doria should instead be
adjudged liable to private respondents, and not to petitioners as declared by the trial
court and respondent Court of Appeals, for the resulting damages to the true owner
and original plaintiff, Pedro Calapine.
Petition granted.
Quilala v. Alcantara
G.R. No. 132681, December 3, 2001, 371 SCRA 311
FACTS: On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a "Donation of Real Property
Inter Vivos" in favor of Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land. The "Donation of Real
Property Inter Vivos" consists of two pages. The first page contains the deed of
donation itself, and is signed on the bottom portion by Catalina Quilala as donor,
Violeta Quilala as donee, and two instrumental witnesses. The second page contains
the Acknowledgment, which states merely that Catalina Quilala personally appeared
before the notary public and acknowledged that the donation was her free and
voluntary act and deed. There appear on the left-hand margin of the second page the
signatures of Catalina Quilala and one of the witnesses, and on the right-hand margin
the signatures of Violeta Quilala and the other witness The deed of donation was
registered with the Register of Deeds and, in due course, TCT No. 17214 was
cancelled and TCT No. 143015 was issued in the name of Violeta Quilala.
On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala likewise died on May 22,
1984. Petitioner Ricky Quilala alleges that he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala.
Meanwhile, respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan
Reyes, claiming to be Catalina's only surviving relatives within the fourth civil degree
of consanguinity, executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate, dividing and
adjudicating unto themselves the above-described property.
On September 13, 1984, respondents instituted against petitioner and Guillermo T.
San Pedro, the Registrar of Deeds of Manila, an action for the declaration of nullity
of the donation inter vivos. The trial court found that the deed of donation, although
signed by both Catalina and Violeta, was acknowledged before a notary public only
by the donor, Catalina. Consequently, there was no acceptance by Violeta of the
donation in a public instrument, thus rendering the donation null and void. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming with modification the
decision of the trial court by dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action
without prejudice to the filing of probate proceedings of Catalina's alleged last will
and testament.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation is void for lack of acceptance on the part
of the donee Violeta Quilala.
HELD: No. As stated above, the second page of the deed of donation, on which the
Acknowledgment appears, was signed by the donor and one witness on the left-hand
margin, and by the donee and the other witness on the right hand margin. Surely, the
requirement that the contracting parties and their witnesses should sign on the left-
hand margin of the instrument is not absolute. The intendment of the law merely is
to ensure that each and every page of the instrument is authenticated by the parties.
The requirement is designed to avoid the falsification of the contract after the same
has already been duly executed by the parties. Hence, a contracting party affixes his
signature on each page of the instrument to certify that he is agreeing to everything
that is written thereon at the time of signing.
Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is merely directory. The
fact that one of the parties signs on the wrong side of the page does not invalidate
the document. The purpose of authenticating the page is served, and the
requirement in the above-quoted provision is deemed substantially complied with.
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary
public does not also render the donation null and void. The instrument should be
treated in its entirety. It cannot be considered a private document in part and a public
document in another part. The fact that it was acknowledged before a notary public
converts the deed of donation in its entirety a public instrument. The fact that the
donee was not mentioned by the notary public in the acknowledgment is of no
moment. To be sure, it is the conveyance that should be acknowledged as a free and
voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the second page, which contains the
Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the first page
of the notarized deed of donation, was made in a public instrument.
Hemedes v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 107132, October 8, 1999, 316 SCRA 347
FACTS: Jose Hemedes, father of Maxima Hemedes and Enrique D. Hemedes. Jose
Hemedes executed a document entitled "Donation Inter Vivos With Resolutory
Conditions" whereby he conveyed ownership over the subject land, together with
all its improvements, in favor of his third wife, Justa Kausapin, subject to the following
resolutory conditions that upon her death or marriage, the DONEE shall revert the
said property to anyone of Jose Hemedes children.
On September 27, 1960 a "Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by
Reversion" conveying to Maxima Hemedes. She had it titled and mortgage it to R &
B Insurance with an annotation of USUFRUCT favor of her stepmother,Justa
Kausapin. Unable to pay the mortgage, R & B Insurance extra-judicially foreclosed
the property. However, Justa Kausapin executed another agreement or Kasunduan
on May 27, 1971 to his stepson, Enrique D. Hemedes. He obtained tax declarations
and pay realty taxes from thereon. The Ministry of Agrarian Reform Office conducted
a cadastral survey and indicated Enrique Hemedes as the owner.
Enrique Hemedes sold the property to Dominium Realty Const. Corp.(Dominium), a
sister company of Asia Brewery. Asia Brewery started to introduce some
improvements already when R & B insurance informed them that they are the
owners of the property where these improvements are being built.
ISSUE: Whether or not the kasunduan executed by Justa Kausapin in favor of Enrique
D. Hemedes valid.
HELD: The court dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the CA. It held
that Maxima failed to comply with the requirements of Art. 1332 of the civil code and
also failed to repudiate Justa Kausapin’s allegation that she did not execute such a
deed and she never allowed to use the land as security for the loan. It was found that
the deed of conveyance to Maxima was spurious and it follows that the original title
she had for the property was also null and void so as the mortgage to R & B
Insurance. On the other hand, Kausapin executed an affidavit to affirm the
authenticity of the kasundudan in favor of his stepson, Enrique Hemedes whom she
is dependent from for her financial support.
Siguan v. Lim
G.R. No. 134685, November 19, 1999, 318 SCRA 725
FACTS: On 2 July 1991, a Deed of Donation conveying parcels of land and purportedly
executed by LIM on 10 August 1989 in favor of her children, Linde, Ingrid and Neil
was registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cebu City. On 23 June
1993, petitioner filed an accion pauliana against LIM and her children to rescind the
questioned Deed of Donation and to declare as null and void the new transfer
certificates of title issued for the lots covered by the questioned Deed. Petitioner
claimed therein that sometime in July 1991, LIM, through a Deed of Donation,
fraudulently transferred all her real property to her children in bad faith and in fraud
of creditors, including her; that LIM conspired and confederated with her children in
antedating the questioned Deed of Donation, to petitioner's and other creditors'
prejudice; and that LIM, at the time of the fraudulent conveyance, left no sufficient
properties to pay her obligations. The RTC ruled in favor of Siguan and rescinded the
Contract, but was reversed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Donation executed by respondent may be
rescinded for being in fraud of her alleged creditor.
HELD: We resolve these issues in the negative. Art. 1381 of the Civil Code enumerates
the contracts which are rescissible, and among them are "those contracts undertaken
in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot in any other manner collect the claims
due them."
The action to rescind contracts in fraud of creditors is known as accion pauliana. For
this action to prosper, the following requisites must be present: (1) the plaintiff
asking for rescission has a credit prior to the alienation, although demandable later;
(2) the debtor has made a subsequent contract conveying a patrimonial benefit to a
third person; (3) the creditor has no other legal remedy to satisfy his claim; (4) the
act being impugned is fraudulent; (5) the third person who received the property
conveyed, if it is by onerous title, has been an accomplice in the fraud. The general
rule is that rescission requires the existence of creditors at the time of the alleged
fraudulent alienation, and this must be proved as one of the bases of the judicial
pronouncement setting aside the contract. Without any prior existing debt, there can
neither be injury nor fraud. While it is necessary that the credit of the plaintiff in the
accion pauliana must exist prior to the fraudulent alienation, the date of the
judgment enforcing it is immaterial. Even if the judgment be subsequent to the
alienation, it is merely declaratory, with retroactive effect to the date when the credit
was constituted. In the instant case, the alleged debt of LIM in favor of petitioner was
incurred in August 1990, while the deed of donation was purportedly executed on 10
August 1989. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner became a creditor of LIM prior
to the celebration of the contract of donation, still her action for rescission would not
fare well because the third requisite was not met. Under Article 1381 of the Civil
Code, contracts entered into in fraud of creditors may be rescinded only when the
creditors cannot in any manner collect the claims due them. It is, therefore, "essential
that the party asking for rescission prove that he has exhausted all other legal means
to obtain satisfaction of his claim. 20 Petitioner neither alleged nor proved that she
did so. On this score, her action for the rescission of the questioned deed is not
maintainable even if the fraud charged actually did exist."
Noceda vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 119730, September 2, 1999, 313 SCRA 504
FACTS: Celestino Arbizo died in 1956 leaving behind a parcel of land having an area
of 66,530 square meters. His heirs plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo
Noceda, and Maria Arbizo extrajudicially settled the partition of the land with Directo
getting 11,426 square meters, Noceda got 13,294 square meters, and Arbizo got
41,810 square meters. Plaintiff Directo donated 625 square meters of her share to
defendant Noceda, who is her nephew being the son of her deceased sister However
another extrajudicial settlement-partition was executed. Three fifths of the said land
went to Maria Arbizo while plaintiff Directo and defendant Noceda got only one-fifth
each.
Sometime in 1981, Noceda constructed his house on the land donated to him by
Directo. Directo fenced the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement,
excluding the donated portion, and constructed thereon three huts. But in 1985,
Noceda removed the fence earlier constructed by Directo, occupied the three huts
(3) and fenced the entire land of plaintiff Directo without her consent. Directo
demanded from Noceda to vacate her land, but the latter refused. Hence, Directo
filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership and
rescission/annulment of donation, against defendant Noceda

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of Noceda constitute ingratitude to warrant
revocation of the donation.
HELD: Yes. It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the portion
donated to him by private respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the
whole area of Lot C which belongs to private respondent Directo, thus petitioner's
act of occupying the portion pertaining to private respondent Directo without the
latter's knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation which is an offense against the
property of the donor and considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the
donor. The law does not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that the offense
be proved in the action for revocation.
The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude prescribes within one (1) year to be
counted from the time (a) the donor had knowledge of the fact; (b) provided that it
was possible for him to bring the action. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show
proof of the concurrence of these two conditions in order that the one (1) year period
for bringing the action be considered to have already prescribed. No competent proof
was adduced by petitioner to prove his allegation.
Heirs of Cesario Velasquez v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 126996, February 15, 2000, 325 SCRA 552
FACTS: Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died intestate sometime in
1945 and 1947, respectively and were childless, leaving 6 parcels of land situated in
Pangasinan. Leoncia De Guzman was survived by her sisters Anatalia de Guzman and
Tranquilina de Guzman.
Sometime in 1989, the Meneses(heirs of Anatalia de Guzman) filed a complaint for
annulment, partition and damages against the heirs of Cesario Velasquez(son of
Tranquilina de Guzman) for the latters' refusal to partition the properties of the
Spouses Aquino.
The complaint alleged that before Leoncia’s death, she told that the documents of
donation and partition which she and her husband earlier executed were not signed
by them as it was not their intention to give away all the properties to Cesario
Velasquez because Anatalia de Guzman who is one of her sisters had several children
to support; and that Cesario Velasquez and his mother allegedly promised to divide
the properties equally and to give the plaintiffs one-half thereof. Plaintiffs further
claim that after the death of Leoncia, defendants forcibly took possession of all the
properties and despite plaintiffs' repeated demands for partition, defendants
refused.
Plaintiffs prayed for the nullity of the documents covering the properties in question
since they do not bear the genuine signatures of the Aquino spouses, to order the
partition of the properties between plaintiffs and defendants in equal shares and to
order the defendants to render an accounting of the produce of the land from the
time defendants forcibly took possession until partition shall have been effected.
Defendants filed their answer with counterclaim alleging that during the lifetime of
spouses Aquino, they had already disposed of their properties in favor of petitioners'
predecessors-in-interest, Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman, and petitioners
Anastacia and Jose Velasquez in the following manner:
(1) The third and sixth parcels were conveyed to defendants' late parents
Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman, by virtue of a Escritura de
Donation Propter Nuptias dated February 15, 1919;
(2) The second parcel was conveyed to defendants' late parents Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman by virtue of a deed of conveyance dated
July 14, 1939;
(3) The first parcel was likewise conveyed to defendants Jose Velasquez and
Anastacia Velasquez by virtue of a deed of conveyance (Donation Intervivos)
dated April 10, 1939;
(4) As to the fourth and fifth parcels, the same were owned and possessed
by third parties.
The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, giving credibility to Santiago Meneses’
testimony; declaring the Donation Intervivos, the Deed of Sale, the Deed of Donation,
the Deed of Sale to third parties over the 4th and 5th parcels as null and void insofar
as 1/2 of the 6 parcels are concerned legitimately belong to the plaintiffs; and
ordering the defendants to pay damages. Defendants appealed the decision to
respondent CA which affirmed the same. A motion for reconsideration was filed by
the petitioners but the same was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have acquired absolute and exclusive
ownership of the properties in question.
HELD: Yes. Private respondent Santiago Meneses failed to prove the nullity of the
Deeds of Conveyance executed by the Aquino spouses in favor of petitioners and
their predecessors-in-interest Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman since he
failed to adduce any evidence to support his claim other than his bare allegations of
its nullity. On the other hand, petitioners were able to show by documentary
evidence that the Aquino spouses during their lifetime disposed of the four parcels
of land subject of the complaint, to wit: (a) Escritura de donation propter nuptias, (b)
Deed of donation inter vivos, (c) Escritura de Compreventa with a P500
consideration: (d) Deed of Conveyance with a consideration of P600 and confirming
in the same Deed the Escritura de donation propter nuptias and Escritura de
compraventa abovementioned. It was reversible error for the court to overlook the
probative value of these notarized documents.
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title
over the property from the donor to the donee and the donation is perfected from
the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. Once a donation is
accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.
The donation of the first parcel made by the Aquino spouses to petitioners Jose and
Anastacia Velasquez who were then 19 and 10 years old respectively was accepted
through their father Cesario Velasquez, and the acceptance was incorporated in the
body of the same deed of donation and made part of it, and was signed by the donor
and the acceptor. Legally speaking there was delivery and acceptance of the deed,
and the donation existed perfectly and irrevocably. The donation inter vivos may be
revoked only for the reasons provided in Articles 760, 764 and 765 of the Civil Code.
The donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman
over the third and sixth parcels including a portion of the second parcel became the
properties of the spouses Velasquez since 1919. The deed of donation propter
nuptias can be revoked by the non-performance of the marriage and the other causes
mentioned in Article 86 of the Family Code. The alleged reason for the repudiation of
the deed, i.e., that the Aquino spouses did not intend to give away all their properties
since Anatalia had several children to support is not one of the grounds for revocation
of donation either inter vivos or propter nuptias, although the donation might be
inofficious.
The Escritura compraventa over another portion of the second parcel and the Deed
of conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor of Cesario and Camila Velasquez over the
remaining portion of the second parcel is also valid. In fact in the deed of sale, the
Aquino spouses ratified and confirmed the rights and interests of Cesario Velasquez
and Camila de Guzman including the previous deeds of conveyance over the second
parcel in the complaint and such deed of sale became the basis for the issuance of
TCT in the names of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman. The best proof of the
ownership of the land is the certificate of title and it requires more than a bare
allegation to defeat the face value of TCT which enjoys a legal presumption of
regularity of issuance. Notably, during the lifetime of Cesario Velasquez, he entered
into contracts of mortgage and lease over the property as annotated at the back of
the certificate of title which clearly established that he exercised full ownership and
control over the property.
Petitioners were able to establish that these four parcels of land were validly
conveyed to them by the Aquino spouses, hence, they no longer formed part of the
conjugal properties of the spouses at the time of their deaths. As regards the fourth
and fifth parcels, petitioners alleged that these were also conveyed to third persons
and they do not claim any right thereto.
In view of the foregoing, the action of partition cannot be maintained. The properties
sought to be partitioned by private respondents have already been delivered to
petitioners and therefore no longer part of the hereditary estate which could be
partitioned. No co-ownership exists between private respondents and petitioners.
Gonzales v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 110335, June 18, 2001, 358 SCRA 598
FACTS: Deceased spouses Ignacio and Marina Gonzales were registered owners of
two parcels of agricultural land. Petitioners are the successors-in-interest or the
children and grandchildren of the deceased spouses. On the other hand, private
respondents are the farmers and tenants of said spouses who have been cultivating
the parcels of land even before World War II either personally or through their
predecessors-in-interest. Marina Gonzales died intestate and appointed as
administratix was petitioner Lilia Gonzales. Prior to the partition of said estate,
Ignacio Gonzales executed a Deed of Donation in favor of his grandchildren but was
not registered. When Presidential Decree No. 27 took effect, the landholdings of the
said spouses were placed under Operation Land Transfer. Private respondents were
then issued the corresponding Certificates of Land Transfer. The administratix of the
spouses’ estate, Lilia Gonzales filed an application for retention requesting that their
property be excluded from the Operation Land Transfer. Initially, it was denied but
was approved due to the deed of donation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property subject of the deed of donation which was not
registered when P.D. No. 27 took effect, should be excluded from the Operation Land
Transfer.
HELD: No. Article 749 of the Civil Code provides inter alia that “in order that the
donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document,
specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the done
must satisfy.” Corollarily, Article 709 of the same Code explicitly states that “the titles
of ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed
or annotated in the Registry of Property shall not prejudice third persons.” From the
foregoing provisions, it may be inferred that as between the parties to a donation of
immovable property, all that is required is for said donation to be contained in a
public document. Registration is not necessary for it to be contained in a public
document. It is not necessary for it to be considered valid and effective. However, in
order to bind third persons, the donation must be registered in the Registry of
Property. In the case at bar, the donation executed by Ignacio Gonzales in favor of
his grand children, although in writing and duly notarized, has not been registered in
accordance with law. For this reason, it shall not be binding upon private respondents
who did not participate in said deed nor had no actual knowledge thereof.
Imperial v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112483, October 8, 1999, 316 SCRA 393
FACTS: Leoncio Imperial was the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 32,837 sq.
m. and located in Albay. On July 7, 1951, Leoncio sold the lot for Php 1.00 to his
acknowledged natural son, petitioner in this case. Petitioner and Victor Imperial,
adopted son of Leoncio, agreed that despite the designation of the contract as Deed
of Absolute Sale, the transaction is in fact a Donation. Two years after, Leoncio filed
a complaint for the Annulment of Donation. It was however resolved through a
compromise agreement under the following terms and conditions: (1) Leoncio
recognized and agreed the legality and validity of the rights of petitioner; and (2)
petitioner agreed to sell a designated 1,000 sq.m. portion of the donated land.
Leoncio died leaving only two heirs: petitioner and Victor Imperial. On March 8, 1962,
Victor was substituted in the complaint for annulment. He moved for the execution
of judgment and it was granted. After 15 years, Victor died and was survived only by
his natural father, Ricardo Villalon. Ricardo Villalon is a lessee of the portion of the
subject property. Villalon died leaving his heirs, Cesar and Teresa Villalon,
respondents in this case. In 1986, respondents filed a complaint for the annulment
of the donation. Allegedly, it impairs the legitime of Victor Imperial.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the respondents have the right to question the inofficious
donation and seek its reduction.
2.) Whether or not the 30-year prescriptive period is applicable in the reduction of
the inofficious donation.
HELD: 1.) Yes. At the time of the substitution, the judgment approving the
compromise agreement has already been rendered. Victor merely participated in the
execution of the compromise judgment. He was not a party to the compromise
agreement. When Victor substituted Leoncio, he was not deemed to have renounced
his legitime. He was therefore not precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking
the reduction. Nor are Victor’s heirs, upon his death, precluded from doing so. This
is in accordance with Articles 772 and 1053 of the new Civil Code, to wit:
Article 772. Only those who at the time of the donor’s death have a right to the
legitime and their heirs and successors in interest may ask for the reduction of the
inofficious donation xxx.
and
Article 1053. If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the
inheritance, his rights shall be transmitted to his heirs.
2.) No. Under Article 1144 of the New Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created
by law must be brought within ten years from the right of action accrues. Thus, the
10-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations
required under Article 771 of the New Civil Code to the extent that they impair the
legitime of compulsory heirs.
The cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-
decedent. Clearly so, since only then that the net estate may be ascertained and on
which basis, the legitimes may be determined. It took 24 years since the death of
Leoncio to initiate this case. Thus, the action has long prescribed. Not only has
prescription set in, they are also guilty of estoppel and laches. Fifteen years after the
death of Leoncio, Victor died. Ricardo Villalon, Victor’s sole heir, died four years later.
While Victor was alive, he gave no indication of any interest to contest the donation
of his deceased father.
Republic of the Philippines v. Silim
G.R. No. 140487, April 2, 2001, 356 SCRA 1
FACTS: Respondent Spouses Silim and Mangubat donated a 5,600 square meter
parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools of the Municipality of Malangas,
Zamboanga del Sur. In the Deed of Donation, the respondents imposed the condition
that the said property should be “used exclusively and forever for school purposes
only.” This donation was accepted by the District Supervisor of the Bureau, through
an Affidavit of Acceptance and/or Confirmation of Donation.
A school building was thereafter constructed on the donated land. However, another
school building that was also supposed to be allocated for the donated parcel of land
could not be released since the government required that it be built upon a 1 hectare
parcel of land. By reason of this, the District Supervisor and the vice-mayor’s wife
entered into a Deed of Exchange whereby the donated lot was exchanged with a
bigger lot owned by the latter. Consequently, the school buildings were constructed
on this new school site and the school building previously erected on the donated
land was dismantled and transferred to the new location. One day, respondents were
surprised when he saw the vice-mayor constructing a house on the donated land.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not there was a valid donation despite non-notation of the acceptance
in the Deed of Donation, as required in Article 749.
2.) Whether or not the condition on the donation was violated.
HELD: 1.) Yes. The purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance of a donation
is to ensure that such is duly communicated to the donor. In the case at bar, a school
building was immediately constructed after the donation was executed. Respondents
had knowledge of the existence of the school building put up on the donated lot. The
actual knowledge by respondents of the construction and existence of the school
building fulfilled the legal requirement that the acceptance of the donation by the
donee be communicated to the donor.
2.) No. There was no violation even after the donated lot was exchanged for another
one. The purpose of the donation remains the same, which is for the establishment
of a school. The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected. In fact, the
exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance and enhancement of
the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the
release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could
not be accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.
Gestopa v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 111904, October 5, 2000, 342 SCRA 105
FACTS: Spouses Danlag were the owners of six parcels of unregistered lands. They
executed three deeds of donation mortis causa, two of which were in favor of
Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil. All deeds contained the reservation of the rights of the
donors to amend, cancel or revoke the donation during their lifetime, and to sell,
mortgage, or encumber the properties donated during the donors' lifetime, if
deemed necessary. The spouses then executed another deed of donation inter vivos
in favor of Mercedes which contained the condition that the donors, Danlag spouses,
shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land during their lifetime and that the donee
enjoy the fruits of the land during their lifetime and that the donee cannot sell or
dispose of the land during the lifetime of the donors without their prior consent and
approval. Consequently, Mercedes caused the transfer of the parcels of land's tax
declaration to her name and paid the taxes on them.
Spouses Danlag sold two parcels of lots to Spouses Agripino and Isabel Gestopa and
executed a deed of revocation recovering the six parcels of land subject to the deed
of donation inter vivos. Mercedes Pilapil filed with the Regional Trial Court against
the Spouses Danlag and Gestopa, for quieting of title over the parcels of land and
alleged that the land was donated to her by Diego Danlag and that she accepted the
donation openly and publicly exercised rights of ownership over the donated
properties, and transferred the tax declarations to her name. She also alleged that
the donation inter vivos was coupled with conditions and, according to Mercedes,
since its perfection, she had complied with all of them; that she had not been guilty
of any act of ingratitude; and that Diego Danlag had no legal basis to revoke the
donation and then in selling the two parcels of land to the Gestopa spouses.
In their opposition, the spouses Gestopa and the Danlag averred that the deed of
donation was null and void because it was obtained by Mercedes through
machinations and undue influence. Even assuming it was validly executed, the
intention was for the donation to take effect upon the death of the donor and that
the donation was void for it left the donor, Diego Danlag, without any property at all.
ISSUE: Whether the donation is a donation inter vivos or a donation mortis causa.
HELD: The Court Rules that it was a donation inter vivos. The Court affirmed the Court
of Appeals' decision that the reservation by the donor of lifetime usufruct indicated
that he transferred to Mercedes the ownership over the donated properties; that the
right to sell belonged to the donee, and the donor's right referred to that of merely
giving consent; that the donor changed his intention by donating inter vivos
properties already donated mortis causa; that the transfer to Mercedes' name of the
tax declarations pertaining to the donated properties implied that the donation was
inter vivos; and that Mercedes did not purchase two of the six parcels of land donated
to her.
In ascertaining the intention of the donor, all of the deed's provisions must be read
together. The granting clause shows that Diego donated the properties out of love
and affection for the donee. This is a mark of a donation inter vivos. Second, the
reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor intended to transfer the
naked ownership over the properties. Third, the donor reserved sufficient properties
for his maintenance in accordance with his standing in society, indicating that the
donor intended to part with the six parcels of land. Lastly, the donee accepted the
donation.
An acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a
requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of
a will, are not required to be accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime. The
right to dispose of the properties belonged to the donee. The donor's right to give
consent was merely intended to protect his usufructuary interests. The limitation on
the right to sell during the donors' lifetime implied that ownership had passed to the
donees and donation was already effective during the donors' lifetime. Hence, the
moment that it was accepted by Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil, ownership of the
properties was transferred.
Esperanza C. Carinan vs Spouses Gavino Cueto and Carmelita Cueto
G.R. No. 198636
October 8 2014
Facts:
The respondent spouses alleged that in May 1986 that the petitioner and her
husband acquired the rights to a parcel of land in Laguna under the name of the GSIS
and were to assume payment of the monthly amortizations. The petitioner and her
husband did not pay several amortizations, thus the GSIS planned to cancel the
conditional sale in 2005.
Petitioner, who was widowed by then, went to Gavino, her brother, for financial help
and the respondents paid the total obligation to GSIS along with the payment for
transfer and renovation of the residential house. The petitioner and Jazer, the
petitioner's son, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with the condition to buy the land
back within three years. The petitioner surrendered the TCT to the respondents.
The respondents demanded from the petitioner to fulfill the transfer of the property
through the deed of sale by the petitioner and her son did not comply. The
respondents filed with the RTC seeking refund of the total expenses paid plus
damages and attorney's fees.
Petitioner countered saying that it was donation and the payment was made out of
generosity and pity towards the petitioner and there was no written or oral
agreement for transfer or repayment.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents reasoning that such a large amount paid
by the respondent was a loan, not a donation, and if the intention was donation, the
petitioner should have kept possession of the title. The RTC cannot compel the
petitioner to transfer the property since it was unenforceable as it was not in writing.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
WON the agreement was a contract of loan or donation
Held:
The SC affirmed the decision of the RTC and CA
The SC ruled that the purely gratuitous act was not supported by records citing the
Civil Code that any donation over Php5000 shall be in writing otherwise it is void. The
formal requirements are mandatory according to Article 748 and non compliance
results in a void donation.
Although giving help to someone in need, it does not mean such help equates to a
donation and would not contradict a claim for the return of the aid given. The
petitioner imputed deceit on the part of the respondent, a serious charge that cannot
be proven by mere allegation.
The factual findings of the trial court and affirmed by the CA will not be disturbed.
Such findings are conclusive upon the SC when supported by evidence on record. The
petitioner also introduced the issues of co-ownership and builders in bad faith. Such
factual issues cannot be raised on a petition for reviews on certiorari and such
defenses cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
CERILA J. CALANASAN, represented by TEODORA J. CALANASAN as Attorney-in-
Fact, Petitioner, vs.
SPOUSES VIRGILIO DOLORITO and EVELYN C. DOLORITO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 171937
November 25, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Cerila J. Calanasan, took care of her orphan niece, respondent Evelyn C.
Dolorita, since childhood. In 1982, when Evelyn was already married to respondent
Virgilio Dolorita, the petitioner donated to Evelyn a parcel of land which had earlier
been mortgaged for Pl5,000.00. The donation was conditional: Evelyn must redeem
the land and the petitioner was entitled to possess and enjoy the property as long as
she lived. Evelyn signified her acceptance of the donation and its terms in the same
deed. Soon thereafter, Evelyn redeemed the property, had the title of the land
transferred to her name, and granted the petitioner usufructuary rights over the
donated land. On August 15, 2002, the petitioner, assisted by her sister Teodora J.
Calanasan, complained with the RTC that Evelyn had committed acts of ingratitude
against her. She prayed that her donation in favor of her niece be revoked; in their
answer, the respondents denied the commission of any act of ingratitude. The
petitioner died while the case was pending with the RTC. Her sisters, Teodora and
Dolores J. Calanasan, substituted for her. After the petitioner had rested her case,
the respondents filed a demurrer to evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner may dissolve the donation
RULING:
Article 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on
contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as
regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed."
The SC agree with the CA that since the donation imposed on the donee the burden
of redeeming the property for P15,000.00, the donation was onerous. As an
endowment for a valuable consideration, it partakes of the nature of an ordinary
contract; hence, the rules of contract will govern and Article 765 of the New Civil
Code finds no application with respect to the onerous portion of the donation.
Insofar as the value of the land exceeds the redemption price paid for by the donee,
a donation exists, and the legal provisions on donation apply. Nevertheless, despite
the applicability of the provisions on donation to the gratuitous portion, the
petitioner may not dissolve the donation.
GR No. 196470, April 20, 2016
Rosario Victoria and Elma Pidlaoan (Petitioners) v Normita Pidlaoan et al.
(Respondents)
FACTS:
The petitioners Rosario Victoria and Elma lived together since 1978 until
Rosario left for Saudi Arabia. In 1984, Elma bought a parcel of land in Lucena City and
was issued Transfer Certificate of Title. When Rosario came home, she caused the
construction of a house on the lot but she left again after the house was built. Elma
allegedly mortgaged the house and lot. When the properties were about to be
foreclosed, Elma allegedly asked for help from her sister-in-law, Eufemia Pidlaoan, to
redeem the property. On her part, Eufemia called her daughter abroad, Normita, to
lend money to Elma. Normita agreed to provide the funds. Elma allegedly sought to
sell the land. When she failed to find a buyer, she offered to sell it to Eufemia or her
daughter. On March 21, 1993, Elma executed a deed of sale entitled "Panananto ng
Pagkatanggap ng Kahustuhang Bayad" transferring the ownership of the lot to
Normita. The document was signed by Elma, Normita, and two witnesses but it was
not notarized. When Elma and Normita were about to have the document notarized,
the notary public advised them to donate the lot instead to avoid capital gains tax.
On the next day, Elma executed a deed of donation in Normita's favor and had it
notarized. TCT No. T-50282 was cancelled and TCT No. T-70990 was issued in
Normita's name. Since then, Normita had been paying the real property taxes over
the lot but Elma continued to occupy the house. Rosario found out about the
donation and petitioners filed a complaint for reformation of contract, cancellation
of TCT, and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction against respondents.
The petitioners argue that the deed of donation was simulated and that the
parties entered into an equitable mortgage. On the other hand, the respondents
deny the claim of equitable mortgage and argue that they validly acquired the
property via sale. The RTC ruled that there was donation but only as to half of the
property. The CA agreed with the respondents that the deed of donation was not
simulated, relying on the presumption of regularity of public documents.
ISSUE:
What was the nature of the transaction entered into between Elma and
Normita.
RULING:
On the nature of the transaction between Elma and Normita, the Court
found that the deed of donation was simulated and the parties' real intent was to
enter into a sale.
We first dwell on the genuineness of the deed of donation. There are two
types of simulated documents — absolute and relative. A document is absolutely
simulated when the parties have no intent to bind themselves at all, while it is
relatively simulated when the parties concealed their true agreement. The true
nature of a contract is determined by the parties' intention, which can be ascertained
from their contemporaneous and subsequent acts. In the present case, Elma and
Normita's contemporaneous and subsequent acts show that they were about to have
the contract of sale notarized but the notary public ill-advised them to execute a deed
of donation instead. Following this advice, they returned the next day to have a deed
of donation notarized. Clearly, Elma and Normita intended to enter into a sale that
would transfer the ownership of the subject matter of their contract but disguised it
as a donation. Thus, the deed of donation subsequently executed by them was only
relatively simulated. Considering that the deed of donation was relatively simulated,
the parties are bound to their real agreement. The records show that the parties
intended to transfer the ownership of the property to Normita by absolute sale. This
intention is reflected in the un-notarized document entitled "Panananto ng
Pagkatanggap ng Kahustuhang Bayad."
GR 195990, AUG 5, 2015
HEIRS OF RAFAEL GOZO REPRESENTED BY CASTILLO GOZO AND RAFAEL GOZO,
JR. v. PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION CORPORATION OF THE SEVENTH DAY
ADVENTIST CHURCH (PUMCO), SOUTH PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION OF SDA
(SPUMCO) AND SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST CHURCH AT SIMPAK, LALA, LANAO DEL
NORTE REPRESENTED BY BETTY PEREZ
Facts: Petitioners claim that they are the heirs of the Spouses Rafael and Concepcion
Gozo (Spouses Gozo) who, before their death, were the original owners of a parcel
of land located in Lanao del Norte. The respondents claim that they own a 5,000
square-meter portion of the property. The assertion is based on the 28 February 1937
Deed of Donation in favor of respondent Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the
Seventh Day Adventist (PUMCO-SDA). Respondents took possession of the subject
property by introducing improvements thereon through the construction of a church
building, and later on, an elementary school.
On the date the Deed of Donation is executed in 1937, the Spouses Gozo were not
the registered owners of the property yet although they were the lawful possessors
thereof. It was only in 1953 that the Original Certificate of Title covering the entire
property was issued in the name of Rafael Gozo (Rafael) married to Concepcion Gozo
(Concepcion).
In view of Rafael's prior death, however, his heirs, Concepcion, and their six children
caused the extrajudicial partition of the property. in 1992, Concepcion caused the
survey and the subdivision of the entire property including the portion occupied by
PUMCO-SDA. It was at this point that respondents brought to the attention of
Concepcion that the 5,000 square-meter portion of the property is already owned by
respondent PUMCO-SDA in view of the Deed of Donation she executed together with
her husband in their favor in 1937.
When Concepcion, however, verified the matter with the Register Deeds, it appeared
that the donation was not annotated in the title. The absence of annotation of the
so-called encumbrance in the title prompted petitioners not to recognize the
donation claimed by the respondents. The matter was left unresolved until
Concepcion died and the rest of the owners continued to pursue their claims to
recover the subject property from the respondents.
A compromise was initially reached by the parties wherein the petitioners were
allowed by respondents to harvest from the coconut trees planted on the subject
property but a misunderstanding ensued causing respondents to file a case for
qualified theft against the petitioners. Around six decades after the Deed of Donation
was executed, petitioners filed an action against the respondents.
Issue: Whether or not the contract of donation executed by the donor who has no
proprietary right over the object of the contract is null and void
RULING:
The Deed of Donation was executed by the Spouses Gozo on 28 February 1937, the
subject property was part of the inalienable public domain. It was only almost after
two decades later or on 5 October 1953 that the State ceded its right over the land
in favor of the Spouses Gozo by granting their patent application and issuing an
original certificate of title in their favor. Prior to such conferment of title, the Spouses
Gozo possessed no right to dispose of the land which, by all intents and purposes,
belongs to the State.
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in Article XII, Section 2 of our
Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source
of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public
lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land
or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public
domain.
The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the executive
department of the government and not the Courts. In the absence of such
classification, the land remains as an unclassified land until it is released therefrom
and rendered open to disposition. This is in consonance with the Regalian doctrine
that all lands of the public domain belong to the State and that the State is the source
of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.
All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong
to the State. Accordingly, all public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State
remain part of the alienable public domain. As already well-settled in jurisprudence,
no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or
implied, from the government; and it is indispensable that the person claiming title
to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any other
mode of acquisition recognized by law. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of
a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators, and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a
certification from the Government that the land applied for is alienable and
disposable.
It is beyond question that at the time the gratuitous transfer was effected by the
Spouses Gozo on 28 February 1937, the subject property was part of the public
domain and is outside the commerce of man. It was only on 5 October 1953 that the
ownership of the property was vested by the State to the Spouses Gozo by virtue of
its issuance of the OCT pursuant to the Homestead Patent granted by the President
of the Philippines on 22 August 1953. Hence, the donation of the subject property
which took place before 5 October 1953 is null and void from the very start.
As a void contract, the Deed of Donation produces no legal effect whatsoever. Quod
nullum est, nullum producit effectum. That which is a nullity produces no effect
Logically, it could not have transferred title to the subject property from the Spouses
Gozo to PUMCO-SDA and there can be no basis for the church's demand for the
issuance of title under its name. Neither does the church have the right to
subsequently dispose the property nor invoke acquisitive prescription to justify its
occupation. A void contract is not susceptible to ratification, and the action for the
declaration of absolute nullity of such contract is imprescriptible.