ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (ADMIN)
60. VILLAFLOR V CA
[G.R. No. 95694. October 9, 1997]
FACTS:
In 1940, Cirilo Piencenaves, in a Deed of Absolute Sale, sold
to Vicente Villafor, a parcel of agricultural land (planted with
Abaca) containing an area of 50 hectares. The deed states that
the land was sold to Villaflor in 1937, but no formal document
was then executed, and since then until the present time,
Villaflor has been in possession and occupation of the same.
Before the sale of said property, Piencenaves inherited said
property from his parents and was in adverse possession of
such without interruption for more than 50 years. On the same
day, Claudio Otero, in a Deed of Absolute Sale sold to Villaflor
a parcel of agricultural land (planted with corn), containing an
area of 24 hectares. HermogenesPatete, in a Deed of Absolute
Sale sold to Villaflor, a parcel of agricultural land (planted with
abaca and corn), containing an area of 20 has., more or less.
Both deed state the same details or circumstances as that of
Piencenaves’. In 1940, Fermin Bocobo, in a Deed of Absolute
Sale sold to Villaflor, a parcel of agricultural land (planted with
abaca), containing an area of 18 hectares, more or less.
In 1946, Villaflor leased to Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc. a parcel of
land, containing an area of 2 has, together with all the
improvements existing thereon, for a period of 5 years at a
rental of P200.00 per annum to cover the annual rental of
house and building sites for 33 houses or buildings.In 1948, in
an “Agreement to Sell” Villaflor conveyed to Nasipit Lumber, 2
parcels of land.From said day, the parties agreed that Nasipit
Lumber shall continue to occupy the property not anymore in
concept of lessee but as prospective owners.
On 7 December 1948, Villaflor and Nasipit Lumber executed
an “Agreement,” confirming an Agreement to Sell, but with
reference to the Sales Application filed with the Bureau of
Land. Sales Application of Villaflor were rejected for having
leased the property to another even before he had acquired
transmissible rights thereto. In August 1950, Villaflor executed
a document, denominated as a “Deed of Relinquishment of
Rights,” in favor on Nasipit Lumber, in consideration of the
amount of P5,000 that was to be reimbursed to the former
representing part of the purchase price of the land, the value of
the improvements Villaflor introduced thereon, and the
expenses incurred in the publication of the Notice of Sale; in
light of his difficulty to develop the same as Villaflor has moved
to Manila. Pursuant thereto Nasipit Lumber filed a Sales
Application over the 2 parcels of land. “Order of Award” was
then issued in favor of Nasipit Lumber. In 1973, Villafor wrote a
letter to Nasipit Lumber, reminding the latter of their verbal
agreement in 1955; but the new set of corporate officers
refused to recognize Villaflor’s claim.
In a formal protest dated 31 January 1974 which Villaflor filed
with the Bureau of Lands, heprotested the Sales Application of
Nasipit Lumber, claiming that the company has not paid him
P5,000.00 as provided in the Deed of Relinquishment of Rights
dated 16 August 1950. The Director of Lands found that the
payment P5,000.00 in the Deed and the consideration in the
Agreement to Sell were duly proven, and ordered the dismissal
of Villaflor’s protest.
In 1978, Villaflor filed a complaint in the trial court for
“Declaration of Nullity of Contract (Deed of Relinquishment of
Rights), Recovery of Possession (of two parcels of land subject
of the contract), and Damages”. In 1983, he died. The trial
court ordered his widow, Lourdes D. Villaflor, to be substituted
as petitioner. CFI dismissed the complaint. The heirs of
petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however,
rendered judgment against them. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: W/N THE FINDINGS OF THE BUREAU OF LANDS
ARE BINDING TO THE COURTS.
HELD: YES.
Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate courts is the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction; i.e., courts cannot and will not
resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact.
The rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
finds application in this case, since the questions on the
identity of the land in dispute and the factual qualification of
private respondent as an awardee of a sales application
require a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands as
the administrative agency with the expertise to determine such
matters. Because these issues preclude prior judicial
determination, it behooves the courts to stand aside even
when they apparently have statutory power to proceed, in
recognition of the primary jurisdiction of the administrative
agency.
One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is
that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of
private rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial
function, exercisable only by our regular courts
The primary jurisdiction of the director of lands and the minister
of natural resources over the issues regarding the identity of
the disputed land and the qualification of an awardee of a sales
patent is established by Sections 3 and 4 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act
Reliance by the trial and the appellate courts on the factual
findings of the Director of Lands and the Minister of Natural
Resources is not misplaced. By reason of the special
knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over
matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better
position to pass judgment thereon; thus, their findings of fact in
that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality,
[29] by the courts. [30] The findings of fact of an administrative
agency must be respected as long as they are supported by
substantial evidence, even if such evidence might not be
overwhelming or even preponderant.
61. COMMISSIONER V NAVARRO
G.R. No. L-33146 May 31, 1977
FACTS:
The Commissioner of Customs sought to nullify and set aside
order of respondent Judge Pedro C. Navarro 2 dated January
4, 1971, issuing a writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for by
private respondents Juanito S. Flores and Asiatic Incorporated
the importers of 1,350 cartons of fresh fruits, restraining
petitioners from proceeding with the auction sale of such
perishable goods. Classified as non-essential consumer
commodities, they were banned by Central Bank Circulars
Nos. 289, 294 and 295 as prohibited importation or importation
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contrary to law and thus made subject to forfeiture proceedings
by petitioner Collector of Customs pursuant to the relevant
sections of the Tariff and Customs Code. 3 In a detailed and
specific fashion, petitioners pointed out how violative was the
assumption of jurisdiction by respondent Judge over an
incident of a pending seizure and forfeiture proceeding which,
as held in a number of decisions, was a matter falling within
the exclusive competence of the customs authorities.
ISSUE: W/N THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS
JURISDICTION OVER SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE
PROCEEDINGS.
HELD: NONE.
The question of seizure and forfeiture is for the administrative
in the first instance and then the Commissioner of Customs.
This is a field where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
controls. Thereafter an appeal may be taken to the Court of
Tax Appeals. A court of first instance is thus devoid of
competence to act on the matter. There is further judicial
review, but only by this Court in the exercise of its certiorari
jurisdiction.
The latest categorical declaration of such a rule appears in the
opinion of Justice Teehankee, speaking for the Court, in
Seneres v. Frias 34 in these words: "It is the settled law and
jurisprudence in this jurisdiction that the customs authorities
acquire exclusive jurisdiction over goods sought to be imported
into the Philippines, for the purpose of enforcement of
Philippine customs laws, from the moment the goods are
actually under their possession and control, even if no warrant
for seizure or detention thereof has previously been issued by
the port
collector of customs."
62. CENTENO V CENTENO
[G.R. No. 140825. October 13, 2000]
FACTS:
Respondent IgnaciaCenteno is the owner of 2 parcels of
riceland. The said parcels of land were the subject of an earlier
case filed by respondent against petitioners before the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), for cancellation of
certificates of land transfer (CLT). In said case, it was
established that petitioners, through fraud and
misrepresentation, obtained CLTs in their names, i.e., CLT No.
10186 for Lot No. 122 and CLT No. 10185 for one-half portion
of Lot No. 111 for Cipriano Centeno, and CLT No. 10184 for
the other half of Lot No. 111 for LeonidaCalonzo (sic). On
November 15, 1986, the then Minister, now Secretary, of
Agrarian Reform issued an order directing the recall and
cancellation of petitioners' CLTs.
The instant case has its roots in a complaint filed by herein
respondent IgnaciaCenteno with the Department of Agrarian
Reform and Adjudication Board (DARAB), Region III, Malolos,
Bulacan, for "Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer
for Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction, Ejectment and
Damages." Respondent allegedthat, despite the decision of the
DAR recognizing her ownership over Lot Nos. 111 and 122, as
affirmed by the Office of the President, herein petitioners
Cipriano Centeno, LeonilaCalonzo and Ramona Adriano have
interfered with and prevented respondent from exercising acts
of possession over the landholdings earlier adjudicated to her
(Lot Nos. 111 and 122) and kept on harassing, molesting and
disturbing her peaceful possession as well as the enjoyment of
the fruits thereof, to her great damage and prejudice.
In their answer, petitioners insisted that they are better entitled
to the possession of the lots in dispute, having been allegedly
in long possession thereof, with their houses thereon. On the
other hand, the award of said lots to respondent is
unauthorized, not only because she has no possession thereof
but also because she has other landholdings in the locality.
They averred that the complaint should be dismissed for lack
of cause of action and for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
DARAB over the case.
ISSUE: W/N DARAB HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
HELD: YES.
The Court of Appeals correctly observed that the present case
for maintenance of peaceful possession with prayer for
restraining order/preliminary injunction is a mere off-shoot of
the suit for cancellation of Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs)
filed by herein respondent against herein petitioners before the
DARAB. That previous case culminated in a decision
upholding respondent's entitlement to an award of the subject
landholdings under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
The case at bar is for the maintenance of her peaceful
possession of the premises and to prevent the petitioners from
further harassing her and disturbing her possession and
enjoyment thereof. Hence, the appellate court was correct in
holding that the present case is an incident flowing from the
earlier decision of the administrative agency involving the
same parties and relating to the same lands.
Having found therefore, that the instant case is related to and
is a mere off-shoot of the said previous case for cancellation of
CLTs which was decided in favor of herein respondent, we
believe and so hold that the DAR continues to have jurisdiction
over the same. As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals, under
Section 50 of R.A. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988), the DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall
have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of the agrarian reform program. The rule is that
the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian
dispute or any incident involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
63. NUESA V CA
[G.R. No. 132048. March 6, 2002]
FACTS:
On May 25, 1972, then Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued
an Order of Award in favor of Jose Verdillo over two (2) parcels
of agricultural land, Lots 1932 and 1904 of the Buenavista
Estate, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, covering 14,496 and 19,808
square meters, respectively, under the following conditions:
That within a period of six (6) months from receipt of a copy,
the awardee(s) shall personally cultivate xxx or otherwise
develop at least one-fourth of the area xxx or occupy and
construct his/her house in case of residential lot and pay at
least the first installment xxx; failure on his/her part to comply
with this requirement shall be sufficient cause for cancellation
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of this order and for allocation xxx in favor of any qualified xxx
applicant;
On August 26, 1993, or after twenty-one years, private
respondent filed an application with the Regional Office of the
Department of Agrarian Reform for the purchase of said lots
claiming that he had complied with the conditions set forth in
the Order.
Restituto Rivera, herein petitioner, filed a letter of protest
against private respondent claiming that contrary to the
manifestation of private respondent, it is petitioner who had
been in possession of the land and had been cultivating the
same. [3] Petitioner had filed his own application for said
parcels in opposition to that of private respondent.
a representative of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Regional Office undertook an investigation to look into the
conflicting claims of the petitioner and the private respondent.
Based on said investigation, it was found that:
In the investigation...it was undoubtedly established that Lots
1932 (pt.) and 1904, Psd-52045, were in possession/cultivation
of tenants or other persons exclusive of Jose Verdillo...It is
crystal clear that Jose Verdillo has culpably violated the terms
and conditions of the Order of Award issued in his favor for lots
covered thereby.
Petitioner Nuesa, Regional Director of DAR, issued an order
cancelling the order of award issued in favor of Verdillo.
Aggrieved by the cancellation of his award, private respondent
then filed on March 20, 1994, a Petition with the Provincial
Adjudication Board, Region III, for Annulment of said Order.
Instead of filing an Answer to the Petition, herein petitioners
(as respondents below) filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition
on the ground that the proper remedy was an appeal to the
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform from the
Order of the Regional Director, under DAR Memorandum
Circular No. 5-87, and not by a Petition with the DARAB
Provincial Adjudicator, hence, the aforesaid Order had become
final and executory.
The DARAB Provincial Adjudicator, however, chose to resolve
the case on the merits and on October 14, 1994, promulgated
a Decision denying the petitioners Motion to Dismiss and
reversing the Order of the Regional Director
ISSUE: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
denying petitioners claim that in this case, the Board
(DARAB) acted in grave abuse of discretion tantamount to
lack or excess of its jurisdiction.
HELD: YES.
P.D. 946 [24] provides that matters involving the administrative
implementation of the transfer of the land to the tenant-farmer
under P.D. No. 27 [25] and amendatory and related decrees,
orders, instructions, rules and regulations, shall be exclusively
cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, including: xxx
(5) issuance, recall or cancellation of certificates of land
transfer in cases outside the purview of P.D. No. 816.
The revocation by the Regional Director of DAR of the earlier
Order of Award by the Secretary of Agriculture falls under the
administrative functions of the DAR. The DARAB and its
provincial adjudicator or board of adjudicators acted
erroneously and with grave abuse of discretion in taking
cognizance of the case, then overturning the decision of the
DAR Regional Director and deciding the case on the merits
without affording the petitioner opportunity to present his case.
In the case at bar, petitioner and private respondent had no
tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever that
could have brought this controversy between them within the
ambit of the abovecited provision. Consequently, the DARAB
had no jurisdiction over the controversy and should not have
taken cognizance of private respondents petition in the first
place.
Note that Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1990, governs
the distribution and titling of lots in landed estates administered
by the DAR.
64. REGIONAL DIRECTOR V CA
G.R. No. 110193 January 27, 1994
FACTS:
The private respondents, together with other Negros Oriental
public school teachers, held, starting 19 September 1990 and
lasting until 21 September 1990, a mass action, or a strike
from their school classes, to demand the release of their
salaries by the Department of Budget.
A return-to-work order was promptly issued by one of the
petitioners, Regional Director Teofilo Gomez of the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports ("DECS"), with a warning that
if the "striking" school teachers were not to resume their
classes within twenty-four hours, administrative charges would
be filed. Since the order was not heeded, administrative
complaints against the teachers concerned were thereupon
filed.
Prior to the start of the hearings by the DECS Investigating
Team, the private respondents filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 42, Dumaguete City, a
complaint for injunction, prohibition and damages with prayer
for preliminary injunction. On 26 March 1991, the court a quo
issued the writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT HAS THE
AUTHORITY TO ISSUE RESTRAINING ORDERS AGAINST
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS.
HELD: NO.
The issuance, however, of the restraining orders by the lower
court against further proceedings of the administrative
complaints is inappropriate inasmuch as the authority of the
DECS Regional Director to issue the return to work
memorandum, to initiate the administrative charges, as well as
to constitute the investigating panel, can hardly be disputed;
The court cases and the administrative matters being closely
interrelated, if not interlinked, it behooves the court, in the
interest of good order and conformably with the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, to suspend its action on the cases before it
pending the final outcome of the administrative charges.
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65) Laguna CATV vs Maraan
GR No. 139492, November 19, 2002
FACTS
Private respondents filed with the DOLE Regional
Office separate complaints for underpayment of wages and
non-payment of other employee benefits. Impleaded as
respondent was their employer, Laguna CATV Network Inc.
The complaints were filed pursuant to Visitorial and
Enforcement Powers of the Secretary of Labor or his duly
authorized representatives under Art. 128 of the Labor Code.
The Regional Director found that the employer
violated the laws on payment of wages and other benefits. He
ordered the employer to correct its errors.
Due to failure of the employer to comply with the
Order, the Regional Director issued a writ of execution. Laguna
CATV filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal was proper.
RULING
No. The appeal should have been filed first with the
Secretary of Labor.
Article 128(b) of the Labor Code provides, among
others, that “an order issued by the duly authorized
representative of the Secretary of Labor and Employment
under this article may be appealed to the latter.” Moreover, the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that
courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not
entertain suits unless the available remedies have first been
resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an
appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if
any, committed in the administrative forum.
The doctrine ensures an orderly procedure which
favors a preliminary sitting process, particularly with respct to
matters peculiarly within the competence of the administrative
agency, avoidance of interference with functions of the
administrative agency by withholding judicial action until the
administrative process had run its course, and prevention of
attempts to swamp the courts by a resort to them in the first
instance.
66) Corpus vs Cuaderno, Sr.
GR No. L-16969, April 30, 1966
FACTS
R. Marino Corpus was appointed Economist in the
Department of Economic Research of the Central Bank.
Thereafter, he received promotions in position in salary. He
became Director of the Dept of Loand and Credit and Rural
Banks Administration.
However, he was found guilty on five counts of
administrative cases filed against him. The Governor of the
Central Bank, Miguel Cuaderno, Sr., recommended that he
Corpus be penalized with suspension without pay.
After suspension, Corpus was informed by Cuaderno
that the former had been reinstated in the service with the
designation of Technical Assistant to the Governor. He was
then appointed to Special Assistant to the Governor.
Another administrative complaint was filed against
Corpus. He was again suspended.
Corpus now instituted an action for damages in the
Court of First Instance alleging that his suspension was
unwarranted and had been brought about by Cuaderno’s
malicious machinations.
Meanwhile, the administrative case against Corpus
was dismissed by the Monetary Board.
The CFI ruled that Cuaderno is not liable for damages
but Corpus is liable for damages for having committed libel
against Cuaderno.
ISSUE
Whether or not Cuaderno maliciously caused the
suspension of Corpus.
RULING
No. It is the Monetary Board of the Central Bank
which has authority to discipline its employees.
The removal was embodied in a resolution of the
Monetary Board, upon apellee’s recommendation as Governor
of the Bank. The procedure adopted was in accordance with
the provision of the bank charter that the Monetary Board shall
on the recommendation of the Governor, appoint, fix the
remunerations and remove all officers and employees of the
Central Bank. Under this provision, the Board has the power to
adopt or reject the recommendation. The decisive action
belonged to the Board, not to appellee.
67) Madrigal vs Lecaroz
GR No. L-46218, October 23, 1990
FACTS
The public respondents abolished Joventino
Madrigal’s position as a permanent construction capataz in the
office of the Provincial Engineer from the annual Roads
Bridges Fund Budget for fiscal year 1971-1972 by virtue of
Resolution No. 204. The abolition was allegedly due to the
poor financial condition of the province and it appearing that
his position was not essential.
Madrigal appealed to the Civil Service Commission
which declared the removal as illegal and ordered his
reinstatement. However, the Provincial Board refused to
reinstate Madrigal.
ISSUE
Whether or not the appeal by Madrigal to the CSC
was proper.
RULING
No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply.
It is fundamental that in a case where pure questions
of law are raised, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies cannot apply because issues of law cannot be
resolved with finality by the administrative officer. Appeal to the
administrative officers of orders involving questions of law
would be an exercise in futility since administrative officers
canot decide such issues with finality.
In the present case, the legal question is whether or
not the abolition of Madrigal’s position was in accordance with
law.
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68) Cabada vs Alunan
GR No. 119645, August 22, 1996
FACTS
Mario Valdez filed a complaint for grave misconduct,
arbitrary detention, and dishonesty against SPO3 Noel Cabada
and SPO3 Rodolfo De Guzman with the Office of the
Commission on Human Rights. The complaint was referred to
the PNP Eighth Regional Command which, after conducting its
own investigation, filed an administrative charge of grave
misconduct against the petitioners and instituted summary
dismissal proceedings.
The Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8 found
petitioners guilty of grave misconduct and issued Special Order
No. 174 which ordered their dismissal from the police service.
The decision was appealed to the Regional Arbitration
Board 8 (RAB 8) which affirmed the decision.
Another appeal was filed with the Secretary of DILG
and a petition for review with the Chairman of the
NAPOLCOM.
The NAPOLCOM denied due course to the peititoners
because of lack of jurisdiction for the Decision and Resolution
of the RAB had become final and executory.
Petitioners now filed a special civil action for certiorari
with the Supreme Court alleging that the NAPOLCOM
committed grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE
Whether or not this petition for certiorari is proper
RULING
Yes. The petition for certiorari is a remedy when there
is grave abuse of discretion.
In this case, the NAPOLCOM did not have the power
or authority to issue a decision denying due course to the
appeal and petition for review filed by petitioners for lack of
jurisdiction because of Section 5, Rule III of NAPOLCOM
Memorandum Circular No. 91-006 and Section 23, Rule I of
NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-002. In other
words, NAPOLCOM has no appellate jurisdiction over
decisions of the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8 and RAB
8. Its appellate jurisdiction is limited to police benefits.
Thus, petitioners could properly invoke the original
jurisdiction of the SC to issue the writ of certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court and would not violate the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
69) Datilles & Co vs Sucaldito
GR No. L-42380, June 22, 1990
FACTS
Petitioner has in its favor a fishpond lease agreement
where the Republic of the Philippines, through the Secretary of
Agriculure and Natural Resources agreed to lease 175
hectares, 99 acres and 59 centares of public land in Batu,
Siay, Zamboanga del Sur, for fishpond purposes.
Meanwhile, the private respondents Jesus
Deypalubos and Daniel Cabdieza refused to obey orders of the
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources to vacate that
portion of the area covered by FLA No. 1902 which they were
occupying without a fishpond permit and the knowledge and
consent of petitioner.
Petitioner filed a complaint for injunction with writ of
possession with preliminary prohibitory injunction with
Damages with the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Del Sur
which the trial court granted.
The Barrio Council of Batu, Slay, Zamboanga del Sur
prepared and submitted to the Bureau a resolution which
attests that the 9 hectare controverted fishpond area was
never occupied by the Datilles family )petitioner’s predecessor)
and that it was Deypalubos who cleared the same and
constructed all the improvements therein. The resolution
further requests that the original grant of 175.9959 hectares to
petitioner be reduced to 50 hectares only in accordance with a
presidential decree limiting the cultivation of a fishpond to
about 50 hectares, with the remaining area to be distributed to
poor families.
The Bureau Director issed a memorandum addressed
to the Regional Director Guieb, directing an immediate formal
investigation those issues involved in the foregoing resolution
and the protest of Jesus Deypalubos and not touched upon in
the civil case.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Regional Director has jurisdiction
to investigate the subject fishpond conflict.
RULING
No.
It is a well-settled rule that for prohibition to lie against
an executive officer, the petitioner must first exhaust
administrative remedies. This doctrine rests upon the
assumption that the administrative body, if given the chance to
correct its mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given
matter.
In the present case, however, there is no
administrative order or act as above described, that can be
appealed from. The Regional Director has not rendered any
decision, or made any final finding of any sort, and is in fact
just about to conduct an investigation which happens to be the
very act sought to be prevented. Consequently, administrative
remedies that must be exhausted, although available, cannot
be resorted to. There being urgency in stopping public
respondent Guieb’s investigation but no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitoner’s
recourse to the respondent court for reliev by way of a petition
for prohibition was proper.
70. NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY and ROMEO G. DAVID
v. CA
G.R. Nos. 115121-25
February 9, 1996
FACTS:
In 1990, NFA, through then Administrator Pelayo J. Gabaldon,
conducted a public bidding to award security contracts for the
protection of its properties and facilities all over the country.
Twelve security agencies were awarded one-year contracts.
among whom were private respondents.
In August 1992, petitioner Romeo G. David became NFA
Administrator. He caused a review of all security service
contracts, procedures on the accreditation of private security
agencies and the bidding for security services. Pending this
review, Administrator David extended the services of private
respondents and the other incumbent security agencies on a
periodic basis.
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Administrator David created a Prequalification, Bids and
Awards Committee (PBAC) to undertake the prequalification of
prospective bidders, conduct the bidding, evaluate the bids
tendered and recommend to the Administrator the bids
accepted. Notices for prequalification and bidding for security
services were published in a newspaper of national circulation.
All incumbent security contractors were required to prequalify
and only those prequalified were to be allowed to participate in
the prebidding and bidding.
Forty-one security agencies, composed of the incumbents and
new applicants, including private respondent Masada Security
Agency, submitted the necessary documents for
prequalification.
Meanwhile, however, two of the applicants who failed to
prequalify, namely Lanting Security and Watchman Agency
and respondent Lasala, filed separate complaints with the
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City to restrain Administrator
David and the PBAC from proceeding with the public bidding.
On respondent Lasalas application, the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 93, Quezon City issued on July 20, 1993 a preliminary
injunction ordering the PBAC to refrain from proceeding with
the bidding until the merits of the case shall have been heard
and resolved.
During the effectivity of the writ of preliminary injunction,
Administrator David sent to all incumbent security agencies,
including four of herein private respondents, notices of
termination. They were thus instructed to withdraw their
security guards from all NFA installations.
On August 4, 1993, Administrator David contracted the
services of seven new security agencies starting August 16,
1993 on a month-to-month basis pending resolution of the
injunction against the bidding.
Private respondents forthwith filed separate complaints with
the RTC for prohibition, mandamus and damages with a prayer
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and restraining
order.
These orders were challenged by NFA and David in separate
petitions before the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of
discretion by respondent judges.
CA affirmed injunction to prevent awarding of new security
contracts.
ISSUE: Whether private respondent’s complaint is premature
and legally deficient for failing to exhaust available
administrative remedies.
HELD: No.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a
hard and fast rule. It is subject to some limitations and
exceptions. In this case, private respondent’s contracts were
terminated in the midst of bidding preparations and their
replacements hired barely five days after their termination. In
fact, respondent Masada, a prequalified bidder, submitted all
requirements and was preparing for the public bidding only to
find out that contracts had already been awarded by
negotiation. Indeed, an appeal to the NFA Board or Council of
Trustees and the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the
provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 was not a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
The urgency of the situation compelled private respondents to
go to court to stop the implementation of these negotiated
security contracts.
71. GRAVADOR VS. EUTIQUIO MAMIGO
G.R. No. L-24989
July 21, 1967
FACTS: The petitioner Pedro Gravador was the principal of the
Sta. Catalina Elementary School in Sta. Catalina, Negros
Oriental on August 15, 1964 when he was advised by the then,
Superintendent of Schools of his separation from the service
on the ground that he had reached the compulsory retirement
age of 65.
A few days later the respondent Eutiquio Mamigo was
designated teacher-in-charge of the said elementary school.
On August 31, 1964 the petitioner wrote the Director of Public
Schools, protesting his forced retirement on the ground that the
date of his birth is not November 26, 1897 but December 11,
1901.
On October 19, 1964 the petitioner wrote to the Division
Superintendents of Schools, reiterating his claim that he had
not reached the age of 65 and enclosing some papers in
support thereof.
On April 13, 1965 he filed this suit for quo warranto,
mandamus and damages in the Court of First Instance of
Negros Oriental.
He asked the court to adjudge him entitled to the office of
principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School and to order
payment to him of not only his back salaries but also damages.
The trial court concluded that the petitioner was born on
December 11, 1901 accordingly granted his petition.
Immediate execution was ordered, as a result of which the
petitioner was reinstated.
The respondents appealed directly to this Court.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner's action was prematurely brought
because he had not availed of all administrative remedies.
HELD: No.
This argument is without merit. Suit for quo warranto to recover
a public office must be brought within one year. Before filing
this case the petitioner waited for eight months for the school
officials to act on his protest. To require him to tarry a little
more would obviously be unfair to him since on April 13, 1965,
when this case was filed, he had only four months left within
which to bring the case to court. There was neither manner nor
form of assurance that the decision of the Director of Public
Schools would be forthcoming. The rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply where insistence on its
observance would result in the nullification of the claim being
asserted.
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72. ALMINE VS. CA
G.R. No. 80719
September 26, 1989
FACTS:
On December 25, 1975, petitioner filed a sworn application for
retention of her riceland or for exemption thereof from the
Operation Land Transfer Program with the then Ministry of
Agrarian Reform (MAR), After due hearing, Atty. Cidarminda
Arresgado of the said office filed an investigation report for the
cancellation of the Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) of private
respondent who appears to be petitioner's tenant over her
riceland. Upon failure of the Ministry to take the necessary
action, petitioner reiterated her application alleging that her
tenant deliberately failed and refused to deliver her
landowner's share from 1975 up to the time of the filing of the
said application and that the latter had distributed his
landholding to his children.
Regional Director Salvador Pejo manifested his concurrence
with the report holding that the properties of the petitioner
consist of 4.3589 hectares as evidenced by Transfer
Certificates of Title and hence not covered by the Operation
Land Transfer Program. However, in the order dated February
13, 1986, then Minister Conrado Estrella denied petitioner's
application for retention.
Petitioner appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court
(IAC); Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal.
However, it was denied in an order dated May 28, 1986. A
motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied. The
Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the appeal on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner's posture is that it is an error for the respondent
appellate court to dismiss the appeal on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction since under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
said appellate court is vested with the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all decisions, resolutions, or orders of quasi-
judicial agencies except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the CA has jurisdiction? Yes
2. Whether the failure to appeal the order of the MAR to the
office of the president is violative of exhaustion of
administrative remedies? No
HELD:
1. A perusal of the provision above cited reveals that
questions as to whether a landowner should or should not be
allowed to retain his landholdings are exclusively cognizable by
the Minister (now Secretary) of Agrarian Reform whose
decision may be appealed to the Office of the President and
not to the Court of Agrarian Relations. These cases are thus
excluded from those cognizable by the then CAR, now the
Regional Trial Courts. There is no appeal from a decision of
the President. However, the said decision may be reviewed by
the courts through a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus, as the case may be under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.
Thus, the respondent appellate court erred in holding that it
has no jurisdiction over the petition for review by way of
certiorari brought before it of a decision of the Minister of
Agrarian Reform allegedly made in grave abuse of his
discretion and in holding that this is a matter within the
competence of the Court of Agrarian Reform. The Court of
Appeals has concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and the
Regional Trial Court over petitions seeking the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.
2. The failure to appeal to the Office of the President from the
decision of the Minister of Agrarian Reform in this case is not a
violation of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
as the latter is the alter ego of the President.
73. SMART COMMUNICATIONS V. NTC
74. U.P. BOARD OF REGENTS V. HON. JAINAL D. RASUL
G.R. No. 91551 August 16, 1991
FACTS: That on June 26, 1986, plaintiff Dr. Felipe A. Estrella,
Jr., was appointed by the defendant Board of Regents BOR as
Director of the Philippine General Hospital; that the defendant
U.P. Board of Regents intended to have the plaintiff serve his
full term, as Director, since any other arrangement would
impede the hospital's development, not to mention the
continuity of its service operations.
On September 16, 1987, barely two (2) weeks after assuming
the presidency of the University of the Philippines defendant
Jose V. Abueva submitted a memorandum to the Board of
Regents to reorganize the U.P. Manila including the Philippine
General Hospital with a draft resolution for approval of the
Board of Regents, recommending that certain key positions of
UP Manila including that of plaintiff be declared vacant.
On April 29, 1988, defendant Dr. Ernesto Domingo acting on
instruction of defendant Dr. Jose v. Abueva, U.P. President,
issued a memorandum creating the Nomination Committee for
the UP-PGH Medical Center Director; that on May 10, 1988,
defendant-members of the Nomination Committee thus
created, are scheduled to nominate plaintiff s replacement as
Director;
that consequently on May 2, 1988, plaintiff filed with this Court,
his complaint for Injunction with Preliminary Injunction of
temporary restraining Order, seeking to enjoin defendants
Abueva, Domingo, the Nomination Committee and the ITP
Board of Regents from proceeding with the nomination of UP-
PGH medical Center Director, in order to forestall the
consequent removal/dismissal of the plaintiff Dr. Felipe A.
Estrella, Jr., incumbent PGH Director, even before the
expiration of his term of office on April 30, 1992 without any
cause provided by law.
ISSUE: W/N there was a failure to exhaust administrative
remedies?
HELD: No. We hold that this case has special circumstances
that made it fall under the jurisprudentially accepted exceptions
to the rule. As the facts show, respondent Dr. Estrella was
about to be replaced by the Nomination Committee. He must
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have believed that airing his protest with the Board of Regents
would only be fruitless and that unless he goes to the courts,
irreparable damage or injury on his part will be caused by the
implementation of the proposed reorganization.
Respondent Judge, based on the evidence presented,
concluded that the reorganization of PGH was done in bad
faith. Accordingly, the lower court ruled that respondent Dr.
Estrella cannot be removed from office as a result of such
defective abolition of the position to which he was appointed.
Respondent Judge did not commit any reversible error much
less grave abuse of discretion. The facts as supported by
evidence established may no longer be disturbed.
75. ARROW TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION VS.
BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION
G.R. No. L-39655
March 21, 1975
FACTS: Both petitioner and private respondent Sultan Rent-a-
Car are domestic corporations. The former has in his favor a
certificate of public convenience to operate a public utility bus
air-conditioned-auto-truck service from Cebu City to Mactan
International Airport and vice-versa with the use of twenty (20)
units. Private respondent on September 12, 1974 filed a
petition with the respondent Board for the issuance of a
certificate of public convenience to operate a similar service on
the same line. Eight days later, without the required
publication, the Board issued an order granting it provisional
permit to operate such auto-truck service on the line applied
for.
There was a motion for reconsideration and for the cancellation
of such provisional permit filed on October 21, 1974, but
without awaiting final action thereon, this petition was filed.
This is the explanation: "That petitioner has not waited for the
resolution of his Motion for Reconsideration before going to
this Court considering that the question involved herein is
purely a legal one, aside from the fact that the issuance of the
Order without the Board having acquired jurisdiction of the
case yet, is patently illegal or was performed without
jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether the controversy is ripe for judicial
determination?
HELD: Yes. For it is undeniable that at the time the petition
was filed. there was pending with the respondent Board a
motion for reconsideration. Ordinarily, its resolution should be
awaited. Prior thereto, an objection grounded on prematurity
can be raised. Nonetheless, counsel for petitioner would stress
that certiorari lies as the failure to observe procedural due
process ousted respondent Board of whatever jurisdiction it
could have had in the premises. This Court was impelled to
go into the merits of the controversy at this stage, not only
because of the importance of the issue raised but also
because of the strong public interest in having the matter
settled.
As was set forth in Executive Order No. 101 which prescribes
the procedure to be followed by respondent Board, it is the
policy of the State, as swiftly as possible, to improve the
deplorable condition of vehicular traffic, obtain maximum
utilization of existing public motor vehicles and eradicate the
harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators, as well as
update the standard of those carrying such business, making it
"imperative to provide, among other urgently needed
measures, more expeditious methods in prescribing,
redefining, or modifying the lines and mode of operation of
public utility motor vehicles that now or thereafter, may operate
in this country.
It is essential then both from the standpoint of the firms
engaged as well as of the riding public to ascertain whether or
not the procedure followed in this case and very likely in others
of a similar nature satisfies the procedural due process
requirement. Thus its ripeness for adjudication becomes
apparent.
To paraphrase what was said in Edu v. Ericta where the
validity of a legislation was passed upon in a certiorari
proceeding to annul and set aside a writ of preliminary
injunction, to so act would be to conserve both time and effort.
Those desiring to engage in public utility business as well as
the public are both vitally concerned with the final
determination of the standards to be followed in the procedure
that must be observed. There is, to repeat, a great public
interest in a definitive outcome of the crucial issue involved.
76. MARIA NATIVIDAD VDA. DE TAN V.
VETERANS BACKPAY COMMISSION
G.R. No. L-12944
March 30, 1959
FACTS: Petitioner is of legal age, widow, and a resident of
Tondo, Manila; is the widow of the late Lt. Tan Chiat Bee, a
Chinese national, and a bona fide member of the 1st
Regiment, United States-Chinese Volunteers in the
Philippines;
That Tan Chiat Bee alias Tan Lian Lay died in the service on
April 4, 1945 in the battle at Ipo Dam, Rizal Province,
Philippines; he was duly recognized as a guerrilla veteran and
certified to by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as having
rendered meritorious military services during the Japanese
occupation;
That petitioner as the widow of the said recognized deceased
veteran, filed an application for back pay under the provisions
of Republic Act No. 897, the resolution of the Veterans Back
Pay Commissions;
That the Adjutant, Armed Forces of the Philippines, has
verified and certified that deceased veteran has rendered
service as a recognized guerrilla for the period indicated in his
•(Adjutant's) indorsement to the Chief, Finance Service Armed
Forces of the Philippines;
Likewise, the Chief of Finance Service, Camp Murphy, has
computed the backpay due the petitioner and the same was
passed in audit by representatives of the Auditor General;
That after due deliberation respondent revoked its previous
stands and ruled that aliens are not entitled to back pay;
That on February 13, 1957, the respondent Veterans Back Pay
Commission, made a formal reply to the aforesaid claim of the
herein petitioner denying her request on the ground that aliens
are not entitled to back pay;
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That upon refusal of the Veterans Back Pay Commission the

petitioner brought the case direct to this Honorable Court by
way of mandamus

ISSUE: W/N petitioner failed to exhaust available

administrative remedies?

HELD: No.

It is further contended by the Commission that the petitioner

should have first exhausted her administrative remedies by
appealing to the President of the Philippines, and that her
failure to do so is a bar to her action in court. The respondent
Commission is in estoppel to invoke this rule, considering
that in its resolution (Annex F of the Stipulation of Facts)
reiterating its obstinate refusal to abide by the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice, who is the legal adviser of the Executive
Department, the Commission declared that —

The opinions promulgated by the Secretary of Justice are

advisory in nature, which may either be accepted or
ignored by the office seeking the opinion, and any
aggrieved party has the court for recourse, (Annex F)

thereby leading the petitioner to conclude that only a final

judicial ruling in her favor would be accepted by the
Commission.

Neither is there substance in the contention that the petition is,

in effect, a suit against the government without its consent. the
relief prayed for is simply "the recognition of the petitioner-
appellee" under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of Republic
Act No. 897, and consists in "directing an agency of the
government to perform an act . . . it is bound to perform."
Republic Act Nos. 304 and 897 necessarily embody state
consent to an action against the officers entrusted with the
implementation of said Acts in case of unjustified refusal to
recognize the rights of proper applicants.