G.R. No. L-6266 February 2, 1953
671,
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, SR., ETC., ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE GELLA, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., Lorenzo M. Tañada, Claro M. Recto, Jose P. Laurel,
Jesus Barrera and Leon Ma. Guerrero for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo
for respondents.
PARAS, C.J.:
As a fitting foreword, it may be recalled that on a previous occasion, on
August 26, 1949 to be exact, this court had already passed upon the status
of Commonwealth Act No. 671, approved on December 16, 1941, "declaring
a state of total emergency as a result of war involving the Philippines and
authorizing the President to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such
emergency." Five members held that the Act ceased to be operative in its
totality, on May 25, 1946 (when the Congress convened in special session)
according to Chief Justice Moran. Justice Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor,
Reyes and Torres in effect concluded that the powers delegated to the
President had been withdrawn as to matters already legislated upon by the
Congress or on which the latter had demonstrated its readiness or ability to
act. Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating house and lot
rentals, No. 192 (dated December 24, 1948) regulating exports, Nos. 225
and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first appropriation funds for the operation
of the Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and the second
appropriating funds for election expenses in November 1949, were therefore
declared null and void for having been issued after Act No. 671 had lapsed
and/or after the Congress had enacted legislation on the same subjects.1
More or less the same considerations that influenced our pronouncement of
August 26, 1949 are and should be controlling in the case now before us,
wherein the petitioners seek to invalidate Executive Orders Nos. 545 and
546 issued on November 10, 1952, the first appropriating the sum of
P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting
aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by
typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other
calamities.
Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in times of war or
other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy."
1
Accordingly the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No.
declaring (in section 1) the national policy that "the existence of war between
the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the
Philippines makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary
powers in order to meet the resulting emergency," and (in section 2)
authorizing the President, "during the existence of the emergency, to
promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry
out the national policy declared in section 1."
As the Act was expressly in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has
to be assumed that the National Assembly intended it to be only for a limited
period. If it be contended that the Act has not yet been duly repealed, and
such step is necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers delegated to
the President, the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may
never be repealed by the Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so,
the President may wield his veto. This eventuality has in fact taken place
when the President disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealing all
Emergency Powers Acts. The situation will make the Congress and the
President or either as the principal authority to determine the indefinite
duration of the delegation of legislative powers, — in palpable repugnance to
the constitutional provision that any grant thereunder must be for a limited
period, necessarily to be fixed in the law itself and not dependent upon the
arbitrary or elastic will of either the Congress or the President.
Although House Bill No. 727, had been vetoed by the President and did not
thereby become a regular statute, it may at least be considered as a
concurrent resolution of the Congress formally declaring the termination of
the emergency powers. To contend that the Bill needed presidential
acquiescence to produce effect, would lead to the anomalous, if not absurd,
situation that, "while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority,
it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it
would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back.
This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law."2
Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the
consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be
compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be
forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it
be suggested that the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest.
The logical view consistent with constitutionality is to hold that the powers
lasted only during the emergency resulting from the last world war which
factually involved the Philippines when Act No. 671 was passed on
December 16, 1941. That emergency, which naturally terminated upon the
ending of the last world war, was contemplated by the members of the
National Assembly on the foresight that the actual state of war could prevent
it from holding its next regular session. This is confirmed by the following
statement of President Quezon: "When it became evident that we were
completely helpless against air attack and that it was most unlikely the
Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open
on January 1, 1942, the National Assembly passed into history approving a
resolution which reaffirmed the abiding faith of the Filipino people in, and
their loyalty to, the United States. The Assembly also enacted a law granting
the President of the Philippines all the powers that under the Philippine
Constitution may be delegated to him in time of war."3 When President
Quezon said "in time of war", he an doubtedly meant such factual war as
that then raging.
As early as July 26, 1948, the Congress categorically declared that "since
liberation conditions have gradually returned to normal, but not so with
regard to those who have suffered the ravages of war and who have not
received any relief for the loss and destruction resulting therefrom," and that
"the emergency created by the last war as regards these war sufferers being
still existent, it is the declared policy of the state that as to them the debt
moratorium should be continued in force in a modified form."4 It is important
to remember that Republic Act No. 342 in which this declaration was made
bore the approval of the President. Indeed, the latter in his speech delivered
on July 4, 1949, plainly proclaimed that "what emergencies it (the Republic)
faces today are incidental passing rains artificially created by seasonal
partisanship, very common among democracies but will disappear with the
rains that follow the thunderclaps not later than November 8 of this year," —
an admission, that such emergencies not only are not total but are not the
result of the last war as envisaged in Act No. 671.
If more is necessary to demonstrate the unmistakable stand of the legislative
department on the alleged existence of emergency, reference may be had to
House Bill No. 727, hereinbefore referred to, repealing all Emergency
Powers Acts.
Moreover, section 26 of Article VI of the constitution, in virtue of which Act
No. 671 was passed, authorizes the delegation of powers by the Congress
(1) in times of war or (2) other national emergency. The emergency
expressly spoken of in the title and in section 1 of the Act is one "in time of
war," as distinguished from "other national emergency" that may arise as an
after-effect of war or from natural causes such as widespread earthquakes,
typhoons, floods, and the like. Certainly the typhoons that hit some
provinces and cities in 1952 not only did not result from the last world war
but were and could not have been contemplated by the legislators. At any
rate, the Congress is available for necessary special sessions, and it cannot
let the people down without somehow being answerable thereover.
2
As a matter of fact, the President, in returning to the Congress without his
signature House Bill No. 727, did not invoke any emergency resulting from
the last world war, but only called attention to an impending emergency that
may be brought about by present complicated and troubled world conditions,
and to the fact that our own soldiers are fighting and dying in Korea in
defense of democracy and freedom and for the preservation of our Republic.
The emergency thus feared cannot, however, be attributed to the war
mentioned in Act No. 671 and fought between Germany and Japan on one
side and the Allied Powers on the other; and indications are that in the next
world war, if any, the communist countries will be aligned against the
democracies. No departure can be made from the national policy declared in
section 1 of Act No. 671. New powers may be granted as often as
emergencies contemplated in the Constitution arise.
There is no point in the argument that the Philippines is still technically at
war with Japan pending the ratification of the peace treaty. In the first place,
Act No. 671 referred to a factual war. In the second place, the last world war
was between the United States and Japan, the Philippines being involved
only because it was then under American sovereignty. In the third place, the
United States had already signed the peace treaty with Japan, and the
Philippines has become an independent country since July 4, 1946.
It is pointed out that the passage of House Bill No. 727 is inconsistent with
the claim that the emergency powers are non-existent. But, from the debates
in the House, it is patent that the Bill had to be approved merely to remove
all doubts, especially because this Court had heretofore failed, for lack of
necessary majority, to declare Act No. 671 entirely inoperative.
Reliance is placed on the petition of about seventy Congressmen and
Senators and on House Resolution No. 99, urging the President to release
and appropriate funds for essential and urgent public works and for relief in
the typhoon-stricken areas. It is enough to state, in reply, that the said
petition and resolution cannot prevail over the force and effect of House Bill
No. 727 formally passed by two chambers of the Congress. If faith can be
accorded to the resolution of one house, there is more reason for accepting
the solemn declarations of two houses.
Even under the theory of some members of this court that insofar as the
Congress had shown its readiness or ability to act on a given matter, the
emergency powers delegated to the President had been pro tanto
withdrawn, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 must be declared as having
no legal anchorage. We can take judicial notice of the fact that the Congress
has since liberation repeatedly been approving acts appropriating funds for
the operation of the Government, public works, and many others purposes,
with the result that as to such legislative task the Congress must be deemed
to have long decided to assume the corresponding power itself and to
withdraw the same from the President. If the President had ceased to have
powers with regards to general appropriations, none can remain in respect
of special appropriations; otherwise he may accomplish indirectly what he
cannot do directly. Besides, it is significant that Act No. 671 expressly limited
the power of the President to that continuing "in force" appropriations which
would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, so that, even assuming that
the Act is still effective, it is doubtful whether the President can by executive
orders make new appropriations. The specific power "to continue in force
laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become
inoperative" is a limitation on the general power "to exercise such other
powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfill its
responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority." Indeed, to hold
that although the Congress has, for about seven years since liberation, been
normally functioning and legislating on every conceivable field, the President
still has any residuary powers under the Act, would necessarily lead to
confusion and overlapping, if not conflict.
Shelter may not be sought in the proposition that the President should be
allowed to exercise emergency powers for the sake of speed and
expediency in the interest and for the welfare of the people, because we
have the Constitution, designed to establish a government under a regime of
justice, liberty and democracy. In line with such primordial objective, our
Government is democratic in form and based on the system of separation of
powers. Unless and until changed or amended, we shall have to abide by
the letter and spirit of the Constitution and be prepared to accept the
consequences resulting from or inherent in disagreements between, inaction
or even refusal of the legislative and executive departments. Much as it is
imperative in some cases to have prompt official action, deadlocks in and
slowness of democratic processes must be preferred to concentration of
powers in any one man or group of men for obvious reasons. The framers of
the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful in allowing
delegation of legislative powers to the President for a limited period "in times
of war or other national emergency." They had thus entrusted to the good
judgment of the Congress the duty of coping with any national emergency by
a more efficient procedure; but it alone must decide because emergency in
itself cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the hope and
survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials
and in their faithful adherence to the Constitution.
Wherefore, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 are hereby declared null
and void, and the respondents are ordered to desist from appropriating,
releasing, allotting, and expending the public funds set aside therein. So
ordered, without costs.
3
Feria, Pablo and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, J., concur in the result.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
"All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills . . . shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments."1 "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law."2 The authority or power to
appropriate government funds to be spent for public purposes is lodged
exclusively in the Congress because it is purely and essentially a legislative
function. The legislative power to appropriate government funds for public
purposes lodged exclusively in the Congress may, however, be delegated to
the President "in times of war or other national emergency," "for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe," "to carry out a
declared national policy."3 This constitutional provision has no counterpart in
the Constitution of the United States of America and in those patterned after
it. Under this provision of the Constitution several emergency powers acts,
notably Com. Acts Nos. 600 and 671, were passed.4 Being a deviation from
the principle of separation of powers the delegation of legislative powers
authorized by the Constitution may validly be made only by adhering strictly
to its spirit and letter. Pursuant thereto the legislative authority or power to
be granted or delegated to the President by the Congress must be "in times
of war or other national emergency" and "for a limited period and subject to
such restrictions as it may prescribe," and the Congress has to pass a law
for that purpose. The reason why the Constitution is silent on or does not
provide for the manner the delegation of legislative powers may be
withdrawn, revoked or ended, is because if it is for a limited period it lapses
at the end of the period and because if the war or other national emergency
which prompted it ceases the delegation of legislative powers ceases also
ipso facto. A law which delegates such powers to the President for an
indefinite period would be unconstitutional because it is against the express
provision of the Constitution. It would be an abdication of legislative powers.
If the law which delegates legislative powers does not fix or provide for a
period of time within or during which the President may exercise them and
there is dispute or doubt as to whether the national emergency which
prompted the Congress to pass the law delegating legislative powers to the
President continues or has ceased, such dispute or doubt may be
determined in an appropriate case by the courts. Another way of terminating
such delegation is by the Congress itself which made the delegation. To
withdraw, terminate or revoke the delegation of legislative powers to the
President a concurrent resolution would be sufficient.5 The concurrence of
the President is superfluous and unnecessary, for if it be required then the
law which delegated legislative powers to him would suffer from a fatal
defect, vice, or infirmity which would render such delegation unconstitutional
for lack of time limitation prescribed and ordained by the Constitution.
It is claimed that just as the delegation of legislative powers to the President
is to be made by means of a law which requires the concurrence of the
President, so the withdrawal, termination or revocation of the legislative
powers delegated to him must also be with his concurrence and approval.
The reason for the requirements that a law be passed to make the
delegation of legislative powers valid and effective is the fact that whereas
the Congress may deem it wise and expedient to make the delegation, the
President may hold a different view. In other words, he has to concur and
accept the powers delegated to him by the Congress. But when it comes to
withdrawal, termination or revocation of the legislative powers delegated to
him his concurrence or consent is not necessary. The absence of
constitutional provision on how it should be done and carried out is not due
to an oversight or to an intention of the members of the Constitutional
Convention to require the concurrence of the President to make there
vocation valid and effective, because, as heretofore stated, if such
concurrence be required to make the revocation valid and effective, the law
which delegated legislative powers to the President would or might offend
against the very provision of the Constitution which requires and ordains that
such delegation be for a limited period of time only, and because the refusal
to concur in by a President bent on or inclined to continue exercising
legislative powers delegated to him would result in a delegation of legislative
powers, at least during his incumbency or tenure of office, regardless of
whether the reason or reasons for the grant of the authority to exercise such
legislative powers have ceased to exist.
It is contended, however, that in withdrawing, terminating or revoking the
legislative powers delegated to the President the Congress did so by
passing a bill evincing its intention to have his assent, which he refused to
give, and for that reason the revocation of the legislative powers delegated
to him was ineffective for lack of such concurrence. To determine what the
Congress intended when it passed the bill repealing the Emergency Powers
Acts — the Senate approved it unanimously — form must give way to
substance. If the contention that in passing the bill repealing the Emergency
Powers Acts the Congress intended to have the concurrence of the
President be upheld, such a construction would render the bill contradictory
in itself, because in the explanatory notes of H. No. 692 introduced by
Congressman Roy and H. No. 727 by Congressman Zosa, upon which the
consolidated bill passed is based, it is declared "that war had long ended,"
that "the need for the grant of such unusual powers to the President has
disappeared," and that for that reason the Congress repealed all Emergency
4
Powers Acts. The congress could not have meant or intended to subordinate
its opinion or judgment that the war had ended and that the national
emergency had ceased to exist to that of the President, the legislative and
not the executive being the department of the Government exclusively
clothed or vested with the authority and power to make such a declaration.
In passing the bill the Congress committed a mistake in the matter of form
but not of substance because the latter is there in the explanatory note of the
bill passed by both houses, to wit: "that war had long ended," that "the need
for the grant of such unusual powers to the President has disappeared," and
that for that reason it repealed all the Emergency Powers Acts. After the
Congress had made that declaration the President could no longer exercise
the legislative powers delegated to him. It was a complete and absolute
revocation of the delegation of such powers. His veto of the bill could not
and did not have the effect of reviving or continuing the delegation of
legislative powers which had been revoked by the Congress, the only
constitutional body empowered and authorized to make the revocation.
For this reasons I am of the opinion that Executive Orders No. 545 and 546
which appropriate government funds for public works and relief for the
victims of typhoons in some provinces of the Republic are of no validity and
legal effect because the President no longer had the authority to issue such
executive orders under the Emergency Powers Act which had been
withdrawn or revoked by the Congress. The writ of prohibition prayed for
should be granted.
BENGZON, J., concurring:
I have signed the majority opinion. But I also agree to the above views of Mr.
Justice Padilla.
Labrador, J., concurs.
REYES, J., concurring:
It being repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution to let Commonwealth Act
No. 671 degenerate into a grant in perpetuity of legislative powers to the
Executive, and taking House Bill No. 727, approved by the Congress but
vetoed by the President, as a for-the-record pronouncement on the part of
the legislative branch of the Government that the emergency which impelled
it to delegate, through the said Commonwealth Act, legislative powers to the
President had already ceased, so that there was no longer any need for the
exercise of those delegated powers, and, lastly, considering that said Act
does not have to be repealed by another Act because, as an emergency
measure, it repeals itself with the cessation of the emergency, I concur in
this opinion of Mr. Justice Padilla.

JUGO, J., concurring:
In addition to the reasons set forth by Chief Justice Paras and Associate
Justice Padilla, I would like to make a few brief remarks:
Section 26 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution provides as follows:
In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions
as it may prescribed, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a
declared national policy.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 671, which is entitled "An Act Declaring
a State of Total Emergency as a Result of War Involving the Philippines and
Authorizing the President to Promulgate Rules and Regulations to Meet
such Emergency," reads as follows:
The existence of war between the United States and other countries of
Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to
invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting
emergency.
Section 2 of said Commonwealth Act No. 671 invoking section 26, Article VI,
of the Constitution above-quoted, authorized the President during the
existence of the emergency caused by said war to promulgate rules and
regulations, etc.
Executive Order No. 545, dated November 10, 1952, appropriating funds for
urgent and essential public works, states in its preamble, in justification of
said order, that the Congress in its last special session had failed to appraise
funds for the immediate repairs and reconstruction of certain public buildings
and public works, damages by the recent typhoons, floods, and other
calamities.
Executive Order No. 564, dated November 10, 1952, also declared as its
cause that the Congress had failed in its last special session to provide
funds for relief to the victims of the recent typhoons, floods, draughts,
earthquakes, etc.
It will be seen that the authority given by the Constitution to the Congress to
delegate certain legislative powers to the President was for a limited time.
This was naturally so, because an emergency cannot be of a long, unlimited
or indefinite duration, for otherwise it would not be an emergency.
5
Commonwealth Act No. 671 was passed on December 16, 1941. Executive
Orders Nos. 545 and 546 were issued on November 10, 1952; that is,
almost eleven years from the date Commonwealth Act No. 671 was enacted.
It is hard to conceive of an emergency which has lasted almost eleven
years.
The emergency contemplated by Commonwealth Act No. 671 was not same
emergency invoked in said executive orders, for, whereas Commonwealth
Act No. 671 refers to the emergency created by the existence of war
between the United States and other countries of Europe involving the
Philippines, the executive order above-mentioned deal with the damages
wrought by the recent typhoons, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, etc., and
the failure of the Congress to provide funds for the repair and reconstruction
of damaged buildings and public works and the relief of the victims. The
recent typhoons, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, etc. and the failure of the
Congress to provide for them have nothing to do with the war mentioned in
said Commonwealth Act No. 671 and are not the consequences of said war.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the majority opinion.
MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
With the majority I agree that Executive Order Nos. 545 and 546, — the first
appropriating P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, the second
appropriating P11,367,600 for relief — are invalid, for the same reasons
given by me in dissenting opinion in cases G.R. No. L-2044,* L-2756,* and
L-3054-56* commonly called the "Emergency Cases of 1949", namely, that
the legislature had already withdrawn from the realm of presidential
legislation or regulation under the emergency powers to delegate by
Commonwealth Act No. 671, the power to appropriate funds for the
expenses of the Government and for other purposes.
To me, however, the more important point involved in the present case is not
the validity of the two executive orders but rather the question of whether or
not Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still has emergency powers under said
Act. And the parties herein, not excluding the Chief Executive and the
Legislature, it is to be presumed, want this point definitely settled. So, I
proposed to devote the considerations in this modest dissenting opinion to
this matter. The majority opinion states that in the emergency cases of 1949,
five members of this tribunal held that Commonwealth Act 671 was still in
force. Mr. Justice Padilla concurred in that opinion. With the concurrence of
Mr. Justice Torres in my concurring and dissenting opinion I also held that
Commonwealth Act. 671 was still in force. Mr. Justice Bengzon in his
dissenting opinion in those emergency cases said that although he was
favorably impressed by the reasons set forth by Mr. Justice Reyes and
particular point — the existence or non-existence of the emergency powers
of the President. So that even if we do not include Mr. Justice Bengzon, we
can correctly say that four justices voted in those emergency cases in favor
of the existence of emergency powers of the President.
In those emergency cases of 1949 I prepared a more or less extensive
opinion in support of the theory that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was still in
force. I wish to embody said opinion in the present opinion by reference,
without prejudice to reproducing portions of the same.
I agree with the majority that Commonwealth Act 671 was to be in force only
for a limited period of time, otherwise be unconstitutional; and that limited
period was co-extensive with the existence of the emergency. But I
emphatically disagree with the majority when it says:
That emergency, which naturally terminated upon the ending of the last
world war, was contemplated by the members of the National Assembly on
the foresight that the actual state of war would prevent it from holding its
next regular session.
As regards the majority's view that emergency Act 671 because due to war
delegated by Commonwealth Act 671 because due to emergency the
National Assembly would be unable to hold its regular session, I discussed
and I hope I refused this theory in my dissenting opinion in the 1949
emergency cases and I take the liberty of quoting a pertinent portion thereof:
I believe that, as I already had occasion to state though incidentally, the real
reason for the delegation of legislative powers to the Chief Executive is not
only because the Legislature is unable to meet due to a national emergency
but also because although it could and does actually meet, whether in
regular or special session, it is not in a position and able to cope with the
problems brought about by and raising from the emergency, problems which
require urgent and immediate action. Certainly, one man can act more
quickly and expeditiously than about one hundred members of the
Legislature, especially when they are divided into Legislative chambers. That
is why in times of emergency, much as we in democratic countries dislike
the system or idea of dictatorship, we hear of food dictator, fuel dictator,
transportations which ordinarily belong to a council or board or to a
legislative body, are entrusted under certain limitations to one single official
or individual.
Supposing that during a national emergency and while the legislature is in
session, the legislature woke up one morning to find that there was extreme
scarcity of imported foods, fuel, building materials, equipment required in
agriculture and industry, etc., because of a monopoly, hoarding, injurious
6
speculations, manipulations, private controls and profiteering, or that there
were widespread lockouts and strikes paralyzing transportation, commerce
and industry, or rampant espionage or sabotage endangering the very life
security of the necessary legislation in order to cope with the situation and
pass the necessary emergency measures?
We are all familiar with the practice and routine of enacting laws. A bill is
introduced in the Legislature; it is referred to the corresponding committee, it
is studied by said committee, which in some cases holds public hearings; the
committee discusses the bill and sometimes introduces amendments; if the
bill is not killed in the committee or shelved, it is submitted to the chamber
for study, discussion, and possible amendment by all the members; it is
finally voted and if approved, it is sent to the other house where it undergoes
the same process; and if it is finally approved by both houses of Congress, it
is submitted to the Chief Executive for his study and approval or veto. All this
may consume weeks or months as a result of which, ordinarily, many bills
finally approved by Congress could be sent to the President for approval or
veto only after adjournment of the legislative session. And we should not
overlook the fact that in some cases for lack of time or due to disagreement
among the legislators or between the two houses of Congress, important
pieces of legislations like the annual appropriation law for the fiscal year
1949-50, appropriation founds for the elections to be held in November,
1949, contained in Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, involved in the
present cases, and the proposed amendment to the Election Code etc.,
have not been passed by Congress in its last session ending last May, 1949,
which session lasted one hundred days. If we were to rely on the ordinary
process of legislation to meet a national emergency, by the time the
necessary and needed law is passed, the situation sought to be remedied,
or the problem sought to be solved may have become disastrous or ended in
calamity or gone beyond legislations or any remedy. It would be too late. It
would be like locking the stable door after the horse had been stolen.
Now, for some retrospect, The Philippine National Assembly delegated its
legislative powers because of the existence of a state of national emergency
as early as the year 1939. During it second special session of that year, it
promulgated the following laws: (Commonwealth Acts Nos. 494, 496, 498
and 500).
At that time, September, 1939, the second world war was only in Europe,
quite far from the Philippines and had just begun. There was then no
likelihood of the Philippines being involved in the war. In fact, the Philippines
did not get involved in the war until more than two years, in December, 1941.
The National Assembly was then free to meet either in regular or special
sessions to enact legislation to meet the emergency. In fact, it met in regular
session in January, 1940 lasting 100 days, excluding the several special
sessions held during those two years. And yet the Assembly delegated
legislative powers to the President under section 26, Article VI of the
Constitution. This is clear proof that, contrary to the theory of the majority
opinion, the legislature delegated legislative powers to the President even
when it could meet and it actually met several times.
After passing the Acts just mentioned delegating legislative powers to the
President, the Assembly in its fourth special session on August 19, 1940
repeated and reiterated this practice and policy by passing Commonwealth
Act No. 600 delegating additional and more extensive legislative powers to
the President in spite of the fact that the war was still far away in Europe and
there was no danger or prospect of involving the Philippines, and the
legislature was still free to meet as in fact it met again in regular session in
January, 1941. During its regular session begun that month and year,
instead of stopping or ending the legislative powers delegated to the
President, because according to the theory of the majority opinion, the
Legislature was able to meet, the Assembly allowed them to continue by
passing Commonwealth Act No. 620 which merely amended section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 600. I repeat that all this, far from supporting the
view of the President only because it could not meet, fairly and squarely
refutes said view.
As to the proposition in the majority opinion that the emergency terminated
with the war. I am afraid the majority confuses war with emergency. They
are two different and separate things and events. Even the Constitution
(Article VI, section 26) which for purposes of reference is reproduced below,
considers war and emergency as separate and distinct:
SEC. 26. In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by
law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry
out a declared national policy.
There maybe a national emergency without war. And so, when on the
occasion of a war, a national emergency ensues and is recognized and
declared by Congress, said emergency may continue even if and when the
war that started it is ended. War may and generally create an emergency,
but the emergency thus created does not necessarily end with the war. A
war may last only several weeks or months but with the use of the modern
weapons of warfare it may cause such devastation, desolation and national
suffering and collapse not only economically but socially and morally that the
resulting emergency may last for years. A destructive flood, tornado, tidal
wave or volcanic eruption may last only minutes or hours but the destruction
that it leaves in its wake may take weeks, months or years to repair, and the
emergency thereby created may last that long.
7
To bolster its contention the majority cites President Quezon's book "The
Good Fight" pp. 204-205, wherein he speaks in time of war. I am afraid the
citation proves nothing. He merely said that the delegation was made in time
of war. He did not say or mean that the powers thus delegated were to be
exercised only during the war. The main thing to be considered and which
calls for the exercise of the powers delegated is the emergency, not the war
that merely started or caused it. Commonwealth Act 671 itself in its section 2
says that the President will exercise his emergency powers during the
existence of the emergency. It does not say during the existence of the war.
President Quezon is hardly the authority that the majority should quote to
support its theory that emergency powers are given to the Chief Executive
just because due to the emergency, the Legislature is unable to meet. It was
President Quezon who was given emergency powers as early as 1939
under Commonwealth Acts Nos. 494, 496, 498 and 500 when the war was
still far away in Europe and we were not yet involved and the National
Assembly could still meet and actually did meet several times in two years,
1940 and 1941, in regular and special sessions, and during those two years
when the National Assembly was holding its sessions, he was exercising his
emergency powers and enacting legislation by means of Executive Orders.
Evidently, he did not see any incompatibility in the grant and exercise of
emergency powers with the ability of the Legislature to meet and in actually
holding session, this, all contrary to the majority's contention.
Hostilities incident to the last Pacific war have long ended since 1945; it
does not however necessarily mean that the emergency resulting from said
war has ceased and that the disruption of trade dislocation of the economy
of the country, the destruction of public and private property, the breakdown
in honesty and morality and the collapse of peace and order, all resulting
from that war have disappeared, and that everything has returned to
normalcy. In support of its theory that the emergency has ceased the
majority makes reference to Republic Act 342 wherein it is stated that
conditions have gradually returned to normal. But this same law clearly says
that the emergency created by the last war as regards war sufferers who
have not received any relief for the loss or destruction resulting from the war,
still exists and so postpones payment of their debts or monetary obligations
contracted before the war, for a period of eight (8) years from and after the
settlement of their war damage claims by the United States-Philippine War
Damage Commission. In other words, the Congress of the Philippines
believes that at least as regards war sufferers, the emergency resulting from
the last war still exists, and will exists not only up to the time that their war
damage claims are paid but for a period of eight years thereafter. This hardly
supports the majority's theory that everything is normal, and that there no
longer is any emergency because the war has long ended.

In connection with this question of whether or not there is still an emergency
resulting from the last war and whether or not things and conditions have
returned to normal, I permit myself to reproduce a portion of my dissenting
opinion in the 1949 emergency cases:
The last logical question that one will naturally ask is: has the emergency
resulting from the war passed or does it still exists? This is a fair and
decisive question inasmuch as the existence of the emergency is, in my
opinion, the test and the only basis of the operation or cessation of Act 671.
The existence or non-existence of the emergency resulting from the war is
question of fact. It is based on conditions obtaining among the people and in
the country and perhaps even near and around it. It is a highly controversial
question on which people may honestly differ. There are those who in all
good faith believe and claim that conditions have returned to normal; that the
people have now enough to eat, sometime even more than they had before
the war; that people nowadays especially in the cities are better nourished
and clothed and transported and better compensated for their labor, and that
the President himself in his speeches, chats and messages had assured the
public that normal times have returned, that the problem of peace and order
had been solved, that the finances of the Government and the national
economy are sound, and that there is an adequate food supply. It is,
therefore, claimed that there is no longer any emergency resulting from the
war.
On the other hand, it is asserted with equal vehemence in the opposite camp
that conditions are still far from normal; that the picture painted by the
President in cheerful and reassuring colors is based on over optimism and,
as to be expected, calculated to show in bold relief the achievements of the
administration, and so should be considered with some allowance; that we
are now importing more rice than before the war for the reason that many
rice farms are idle because of the farmers fear of or interference by
dissidents; that the problem of peace and order is far from solved as shown
by the frequent hold-ups, kidnappings, lootings and killing and organized
banditry not only in Luzon but also in the Visayas and Mindanao; that
whereas before the war, the Constabulary force consisting of only about
6,000 officers and men could provide complete protection to life and property
was adequate in all respects to enforce peace and order, now this
Constabulary enlarged to about 20,000 men, provided with modern weapons
and equipment and with the aid of thousands of civilian guards and of the
Philippine Army and Air Force cannot solve the peace and order problem;
that the dissidents who are well-organized, armed and disciplined even
attack and sack towns and sometimes openly defy and engage the armed
Government forces; that as long as more than 100,000 firearms are loose
and in the hands of irresponsible parties, not excluding the seemingly
8
regular mysterious supply to them of additional firearms and ammunitions,
there can be no peace and order; and as to the barrio folk in Central Luzon
and now, even in provinces bordering Central Luzon whose parents and
relatives had been killed by dissidents, whose women folk had been
outraged by the same elements, whose homes had been looted and burned
and whose very lives had been subjected to constant terror and peril,
compelling them to leave their homes and their farms and evacuate to and
be concentrated in the poblaciones to live there in utter discomfort and
privation, it is said that it would be difficult to convince these unfortunate
people that normalcy has returned and that there is no longer emergency
resulting from the war. To further support the claim of the existence of an
emergency, the menace of communism not only at home, particularly in
Central Luzon but from abroad, especially China, is invoked. And it is
asserted that all this is a result of the war.
To the above are those who claim and will add that since 1949 up to the
present time, although rehabilitation progressed substantially, there are still
many people who have not achieved rehabilitation. The economy of the
country is still far from what it was before the war. It is being bolstered
temporarily by the millions of pesos being received by war veterans, their
widows and children in the form of pensions or insurance; by the millions
being spent by the Mutual Security Agent (MSA) in the Philippines to
rehabilitate agriculture, industry, commerce, etc.; by the millions being sent
here by the United States in war materials, equipment, etc. in relation with
the United States military aid to the Philippines, and with the enforcement of
the Import Control, Exchange Control and other laws all of a temporary
nature intended to temper and minimize the financial and economic crisis
which otherwise would overwhelm the country. The coastwise trade is being
maintained with ships originally built for and used during the war, converted
provisionally into inter-island freight and passenger boats; and land
transportation specially in the centers of population like Manila is operated in
great measure with vehicles (used jeeps) obtained from the Surplus Property
Commission. Everything is on a provisional basis. What will happen after
these boats and motor vehicles wear out and become junk? Could they be
readily replaced by their owners or operators? Sunken boats will clutter the
harbors of the country particularly Manila Bay, constituting a menace to
navigation. Squatters in great number are still a problem, claiming that they
have nowhere to go to live. Government and private buildings, and churches
are still ruins, tenanted by squatters. Intramuros, the Walled City, in the very
City of Manila is a living example of non-rehabilitation, with the hundreds and
thousands of owners of lots therein either financially unable to reconstruct or
prohibited from rebuilding until the Government has completed its plan about
its reconstruction.
The War Damage Commission has paid war damage claims, it is true, but
only a portion of the amounts of the claims; and with prices as they are and
the low purchasing power of the peso, complete rehabilitation of war
sufferers and substantial repair of the war damage is impossible. The
country is claiming reparations from Japan in the amount of eight (8) billion
dollars. It is not known if Japan can or will ever pay them and when. That is
why the legislature in Republic Act 342 wisely postponed payment of debts
and monetary obligations of sufferers, not up to the payment of their war
damage claims, but eight years thereafter, realizing perhaps that the
amounts paid for war damage claims are inadequate to achieve complete
rehabilitation. So the Legislature says that as to these war sufferers, the
emergency still exists. And who has not suffered damage during the last
war?
We have not yet completely risen from the low level into which we had sunk
during and immediately after the war, in public and private morality, decency,
honesty and personal integrity as witnessed by the more or less rampant
misappropriations and defalcations by public officials, corruption and
malfeasance, bribery, ten percentage, guerrilla recognition and veterans
benefits rackets, dynamite fishing, etc.
When the President makes his inspections, especially in the troubled area,
he is escorted by contingents of fully armed soldiers, sometimes with
machine guns and tanks. High officials of the Government using low plate
numbers of their cars, use high plate numbers called "security plate
numbers" when travelling in the provinces to minimize the danger hold-ups
and attacks by dissidents who are said to be after the high government
officials. People are advised not to travel at night over certain provincial
highways even national roads.
Peace and order still leaves much to be desired. In 1949 when the
emergency cases were decided, five justices held the opinion that there no
longer was any emergency. But conditions of peace and order actually
worsened thereafter. There was an uprising or rebellion in Batangas by
Medrano and his men after November, 1949, and it is said that unable to
cope with the uprising and bring the rebels to justice the Government was
compelled to offer them amnesty. Since 1949 the HUKS and the
communists became stronger, in fact became so strong that they actually
threatened the existence of the Government which was forced to increase its
army and wage campaigns not only in the field but also in centers of
population where it was able to arrest and prosecute those whom it claims to
be high officials of the POLITBURO. In Sulu, the Government waged an
intensive campaign against Kamlon and his men spending several million
pesos and losing quite a number of soldiers and officers, with no decisive
result, and it was only after Kamlon and his men had been promised
executive clemency that they surrendered to the authorities, stood trial, were
9
convicted and promptly pardoned. Some of Kamlon's relatives with their
followers are said to be still in the mountains and forests and refuse to
surrender unless offered the same conditions. Not long ago several hundred
Chinese said to be dangerous communists were rounded up in several
towns and cities in the Philippines. About two or three weeks ago, according
to the papers the army authorities said that up to that time they had through
confiscation, capture, surrender and purchase, been able to collect about
40,000 loose firearms but that there still remained about 100,000 more to be
accounted for. The other day the Provincial Commander of Lanao said that
he is faced with the problem of eliminating or capturing ten outlaw bands in
the province with about 700 followers, The hold-ups, massacres, raids and
ambushes in different provinces, even near Manila have not ceased. As long
as over 100,000 loose firearms are still in the hands of lawless or
irresponsible persons, there can be no complete peace and order in the
country. Before the war about 5,000 Constabulary soldiers and officers with
an appropriation of about three million pesos was able to maintain peace
and order throughout the country. The Armed Forces of the Philippines
including the Constabulary of the country in 1949 numbered 37,000.
Realizing that this number was unable to maintain peace and order it was
increased substantially so that in 1952, it went up to 56,000 men and officers
with an appropriation of over P151,000,000, an amount by far larger than the
appropriation for the Department of Public Schools which gives instruction
and education to school children and students. With the help of thousands of
temporary and special policemen, civilian guards and commandos the army
and the constabulary are still battling dissidents, communists and bandits.
Hundreds and thousands of families from Central Luzon, particularly
Pampanga are still marooned in Manila, Baguio and other centers of
population, unable and afraid to return to their homes, and a number of them
more fearless and optimistic, who thought that peace and order in Central
Luzon had been restored, returned to their homes there but were kidnapped
and liquidate. Farmers harvesting rice in some barrios in Central Luzon have
to be guarded by the armed forces so as not to be molested by the
dissidents. Only yesterday the papers carried the news that 14,000 soldiers
and officers have started an intensive campaign in Central and Southern
Luzon against lawless elements. All this, many people still honestly believe.
Considering all this, one may well doubt that peace and order in the country
has gone back to normal, and that there is no longer any emergency. And
this emergency clearly is the result of the last war. The HUKS movement
was born during that war and the hundreds of thousands of loose firearms
were also released and distributed indiscriminately during that war.
Lawlessness and banditry always follow a war, and it takes several years
thereafter to restore peace and order. In the face of all the foregoing which
may regard as facts and realities, the majority without any data in the form of
evidence received at a hearing or trial, but based perhaps on judicial notice
and personal knowledge and observation holds that everything has gone
back to normal and that no longer is any emergency.
Personally, I cannot say that the emergency resulting from the last war still
exists, but neither am I prepared to say that it no longer exists. It is such a
controversial question upon which people may not and could honestly differ.
There are authorities to the effect that the existence or non-existence of an
emergency calling for the exercise of emergency powers is a political
question which can be decided only by the political department, and that the
courts are not called upon, neither are they authorized to pass upon the
question. This was one of the views maintained in the concurring and
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Alex. Reyes concurred in by Mr. Justice
Padilla in the 1949 emergency cases. But assuming for a moment that this
court had the authority to pass upon this point and to bind the executive and
legislative department with is finding, I believe that we have no data or
evidence on which to base our finding. If the findings of courts on questions
of facts are given authority or binding effect it is because those findings are
based on facts established during the hearing by means of evidence
adduced by both parties who given the right to present, cross-examine and
impeach witnesses, object to questions and object to the admission of
evidence in general. In the present case no such hearing or trial for the
reception of evidence was ever had. Consequently, in my opinion we are not
warranted in finding that there still exist or there no longer exists any
emergency resulting from the last Pacific War.
It is the Legislature that granted or delegated the emergency powers or the
Chief Executive to whom the delegation was made that decide whether or
not the emergency continues. There has been lack of agreement between
the two departments on this point since the last session of the Legislature.
While the President up to a few weeks ago has been exercising his
emergency still existed, because Commonwealth Act 671 provides that he
may exercise those powers only during the emergency, the Legislature has
passed House Bill No. 727 in an attempt to withdraw said emergency
powers on the theory that the emergency has ceased. To end and definitely
settle this disagreement, we are called upon to render decision.
In my dissenting opinion in the 1949 emergency cases I held that the
President still had the emergency powers delegated to him under
Commonwealth Act 671. Three justices of this court held that same view as I
did excluding one Justice who was favorably impressed with that view
though he preferred not to vote directly upon it. Today, tho it seems in the
tribunal, I am the lone dissenter on this proposition and so mine is reduced
so to speak to the "voice in the wilderness," I still maintain the same view,
and there is reason to believe that there are many others who subscribe to
the same opinion. The Legislature in passing during its last session House
10
Bill No. 727 repealing the latest Commonwealth Acts including
Commonwealth Act No. 671, delegating emergency powers to the Chief
Executive, must have believed and been satisfied that the President still had
those emergency powers otherwise, there would have been no need of
going to all the trouble and the tedious process of approving a bill
withdrawing said powers from him. There would have been no necessity for
the Legislature to repeal a law which it believed to be no longer operative.
There is no reason or point in withdrawing something that is not there or that
no longer exists.
In previous sessions of the Legislature after Liberation there had been talk or
move to enact legislation withdrawing said emergency powers by
presumably the atmosphere was not favorable or the necessary votes to
pass the corresponding measure was not available. It was in the last session
of the Legislature that a bill was finally approved by both House of Congress.
The Chief Executive, however, vetoed it and it was not repassed over his
veto. In spite of this, did the Legislature succeed in withdrawing his
emergency powers? The majority through a process of interpretation which
to me, is strained and unwarranted, voted in the affirmative. I disagree. We
should not forget that in House Bill No. 727 the Legislature was not only
expressing its wish and desire to withdraw the emergency powers of the
President. It wanted to repeal the law or laws delegating said emergency
powers. A law can be repealed only by another law. Consequently, since
House Bill No 727 did not become a law because of the veto of the
President, it could not repeal the law or laws which it sought to abrogate.
I agree with the majority and also with Mr. Justice Padilla that the emergency
powers delegated to the President could be withdrawn by means of a mere
concurrent resolution. It is true that to delegate emergency powers under
section 26, Art. VI of the Constitution, a law is necessary. It is because the
Constitution expressly says so. Moreover, it is not only convenient but
equally necessary that a law should be passed for that purpose in whose
approval the Chief Executive takes part, because after all he is the one to
whom the delegation is made and who would later exercise the powers so
delegated. If he believes that there is no emergency or that even if there
were, it is not of sufficient magnitude and seriousness as to call for the
delegation and the exercise of emergency powers, he may veto the bill of
delegation and that would be the end of it. It is far from likely that the bill
would be repassed over his veto because it would be futile and pointless to
make delegation of powers to an unwilling delegate who later would decline
and refuse to exercise them. But if he approves the bill of delegation and it
becomes a law then the delegation is complete, successful and effective for
the exercise of the powers by the President would be assured. Not so with
the withdrawal of the powers delegated. The Constitution does not say or
require a law for such withdrawal and it may be withdrawn at any time even
when the emergency which motivated said delegation still exists. In such a
case, the Legislature is the sole judge as to the necessity and advisability of
the continuance or cessation of the exercise of emergency powers by its
delegate, the President.
But how did the Legislature go about his attempt to withdraw the President's
emergency powers? It had the choice of approving a mere concurrent
resolution or passing a bill. Both houses of the Legislature are graced with
the presence of constitutional lawyers and legal luminaries for whom I have
great respect. They must have known that a concurrent resolution was
sufficient for the purpose. Atty. Recto, counsel for the petitioners and
member of the Senate knew it and in his oral argument before this Tribunal,
he said that the Legislature merely made a mistake because it could have
just as well approved a concurrent resolution instead of passing a regular
bill.
But to me, it is highly possible and not improbable that the Legislature
knowing that it could withdraw the President's emergency powers by means
of a concurrent resolution or by means of a law, deliberately and intentionally
chose the latter for reasons of its own. The mistake committed by the
Legislature if any was that perhaps it believed that the Chief Executive would
not veto the bill; but veto it, he did and I am afraid the Legislature has to
abide by the consequences. The Legislature knew that in passing the bill
and in submitting it to the Chief Executive as required by the Constitution, it
had to be approved by him either with his signature or by letting it become a
law without any action on his part. He may also veto it. This was a hazard
and a risk which the Legislature assumed and of which it must have been
perfectly aware. But they are willing to take the risk. Another possible reason
why the Legislature chose to pass a bill instead of a mere concurrent
resolution was that it sought and wanted the intervention and participation of
the Chief Executive himself in the withdrawal of the emergency powers so
that he would also share in the credit and the responsibility for said
withdrawal. If he approved the bill there would be complete understanding
between the two departments of the Government, and no hard feelings.
Another reason not entirely improbable is that the decision to withdraw the
emergency powers from the Chief Executive was a compromise
arrangement between the two parties in the Legislature. We must remember
that our government is run on the basis of the party system. The President at
present happens to be the head of one of the two major parties in the
Legislature. His party is in the minority in the Senate by two or three votes
but is in the majority by quite a number of votes in the lower house. It is not
conceivable that his party men in the two houses consented and agreed to
have the emergency powers withdrawn provided that the Chief Executive
consented to and approved of it. And so, they agreed to pass the bill for this
purpose, but that they would not agree to concurrent resolution where the
11
Chief Executive would be ignored and his emergency powers summarily
withdrawn without consultation and without his approval. This last view is in
some measure supported and borne out by the attitude of the Legislature
when the House bill No. 727 was vetoed. The members of Congress knew
that the remedy was to override his veto if they wanted to. The Senate
approved the bill unanimously and judging from that unanimity, at least in the
upper house the 2/3 votes necessary to override the veto was available. But
the fact is that the Legislature did not only fail to override the veto but it did
not even make any attempt whatsoever to repass it over the President's
veto. Added to this, it was a fact that, and this is by no means unimportant,
in the month of September, 1952, that is, about two months after the veto of
the bill, about sixty-seven Congressman and two Senators filed a petition
addressed to the President in which they not only recognized the existence
of his emergency powers but even asked him to exercise the same for the
purpose of releasing funds for public works projects. Excluding the two
Senators, the signers constituted more than the majority of the membership
of the lower house. In other words, after the veto of the bill and after a failure
whether intentionally or otherwise of the Legislative to override the veto, the
majority of all the members of the lower house believed that Congress failed
to withdraw the President's emergency powers and consequently, believed
that he still had those powers, and was even requested to exercise the
same. And on November 8, 1952, the lower house of the Legislature passed
Resolution No. 99 strongly urging the President to exercise his emergency
powers and authorize the expenditure of funds for the relief to provinces
visited by typhoons and floods and other calamities and for other urgent
essential public works projects. This official action of the Lower House
shows that one of the two Houses of Congress officially believes that the
emergency powers of the President had not been withdrawn. One view of
this action or inaction of the Legislature on the veto was that it could not get
the 2/3 votes in both houses to override the veto because some members
who voted in favor of the House Bill No. 727, particularly members of the
party of the Chief Executive vetoing the bill and so either approved the stand
taken by him or acquiesced in it and took it in good grace and let the matter
rest, at least for the time being.
In the foregoing considerations on this point are true or could have been
true, then there would absolutely be no reason or warrant for the majority's
interpreting and considering House Bill No. 727 as a concurrent resolution
sufficient to repeal the several laws mentioned in the bill and withdraw the
emergency powers of the President. In effect, the majority decided to think
for the Legislature and to do for the latter what it failed or perhaps did not
want to do, namely, to withdraw the emergency powers by means of a
concurrent resolution. I repeat that both houses of Congress with the legal
talent and constitutional authorities, not only among its distinguished
members but also among its legal experts and assistants, did neither wish
nor intend to approve a mere concurrent resolution but deliberately and
intentionally chose to pass a bill, — House Bill No. 727 with full realization of
the possibilities and chances of its approval or rejection by the Chief
Executive to whom it was submitted. Under these circumstances, the action
of the majority is practically telling the Legislature what it should have one
and in finally doing it for said Legislature in order to most easily achieve its
purpose or wish might be regarded by some as not only unwarranted but
officious and uncalled for.

In view of the foregoing reasons, I beg to disagree with the majority.

12
G.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919
RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,
vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.
D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.
MALCOLM, J.:
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional
History (Worcester vs. Georgia [1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall,
the first luminary of American jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to
the status of an Indian) with words which, with a slight change in
phraseology, can be made to introduce the present opinion — This cause, in
every point of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest. The
legislative power of state, the controlling power of the constitution and laws,
the rights if they have any, the political existence of a people, the personal
liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be considered.
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline
and proceed first, to introduce the facts and the issues, next to give a history
of the so called "non-Christians," next to compare the status of the "non-
Christians" with that of the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the
constitutional questions presented.
I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other
Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are
being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that
province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation
established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to
be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan
for having run away form the reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:
1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted
resolution No. 25 which is as follows:
The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following
resolution:
13
"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the
advancement of the non-Christian people of Mindoro, which were all a
failure,
"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure
is taken for the Mangyan work of this province, no successful result will be
obtained toward educating these people.
"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one place in
order to make a permanent settlement,
"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take
up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him
and approved by the provincial board.
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on
Lake Naujan is a place most convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now,
therefore be it
"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares
of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for
the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval
of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and
"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this
reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously
recommended by the provincial governor."
2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of
Mindoro was approved by the Secretary of the Interior of February 21, 1917.
3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued
executive order No. 2 which says:
"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current series, has
selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent
settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.
"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable, the
Secretary of the Interior, on February 21, 1917.
"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro,
pursuant to the provisions of section 2145 of the revised Administrative
Code, do hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and
Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts
of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the
site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than December 31, 1917.
"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon
conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with
section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code."
4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph
1 and the executive order of the governor of the same province copied in
paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes
of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and
to introduce civilized customs among them.
5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling
within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished in accordance
with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.
6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being
detained by the sheriff of Mindoro but if he is so detained it must be by virtue
of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711.
It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial
board thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation
in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial
governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in
accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was
duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the
Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount question
which the court is called upon the decide.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial
governor. — With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial
governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law
and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial
board.
In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted
section 2759 of the same Code, which read as follows:
14
SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. —
Any non-Christian who shall refuse to comply with the directions lawfully
given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section two thousand one
hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation upon a site
designated by said governor shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a
period not exceeding sixty days.
The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to
Philippine law. The genealogical tree of this section, if we may be permitted
to use such terminology, would read: Section 2077, Administrative Code of
1916; section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of various special provincial laws,
notably of Act No. 547, specifically relating to the Manguianes; section 69,
Act No. 387.
Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians."
This word, as will later be disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other
laws of the Philippine Islands. In order to put the phrase in its proper
category, and in order to understand the policy of the Government of the
Philippine Islands with reference to the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it
is well first of all to set down a skeleton history of the attitude assumed by
the authorities towards these "non-Christians," with particular regard for the
legislation on the subject.
II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED
STATES.
The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject
at hand are compiled in Book VI, Title III, in the following language.
LAW I.
The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21,
1551. Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on
September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on November 10, 1568. Ordinance 149
of the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578,
THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES"
COMMUNITIES).
In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and
the evangelical law, and in order that they may forget the blunders of their
ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that they may live in harmony and in
a civilized manner, it has always been endeavored, with great care and
special attention, to use all the means most convenient to the attainment of
these purposes. To carry out this work with success, our Council of the
Indies and other religious persons met at various times; the prelates of new
Spain assembled by order of Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in the
year one thousand five hundred and forty-six — all of which meetings were
actuated with a desire to serve God an our Kingdom. At these meetings it
was resolved that indios be made to live in communities, and not to live in
places divided and separated from one another by sierras and mountains,
wherein they are deprived of all spiritual and temporal benefits and wherein
they cannot profit from the aid of our ministers and from that which gives rise
to those human necessities which men are obliged to give one another.
Having realized that convenience of this resolution, our kings, our
predecessors, by different orders, have entrusted and ordered the viceroys,
presidents, and governors to execute with great care and moderation the
concentration of the indios into reducciones; and to deal with their doctrine
with such forbearance and gentleness, without causing inconveniences, so
that those who would not presently settle and who would see the good
treatment and the protection of those already in settlements would, of their
own accord, present themselves, and it is ordained that they be not required
to pay taxes more than what is ordered. Because the above has been
executed in the greater part of our Indies, we hereby order and decree that
the same be complied with in all the remaining parts of the Indies, and the
encomederos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner and form
prescribed by the laws of this title.
xxx xxx xxx
LAW VIII.
Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10,
1618.
THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.
The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should
have the facilities of waters. lands, and mountains, ingress and egress,
husbandry and passageway of one league long, wherein the indios can have
their live stock that they may not be mixed with those of the Spaniards.
LAW IX.
Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.
15
THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE
LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM.
With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated in
reducciones. Provided they shall not be deprived of the lands and granaries
which they may have in the places left by them. We hereby order that no
change shall be made in this respect, and that they be allowed to retain the
lands held by them previously so that they may cultivate them and profit
therefrom.
xxx xxx xxx
LAW XIII.
THE SAME AS ABOVE.
THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF
THE KING, VICEROY, OR COURT.
No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the
right to alter or to remove the pueblos or the reducciones once constituted
and founded, without our express order or that of the viceroy, president, or
the royal district court, provided, however, that the encomenderos, priests, or
indios request such a change or consent to it by offering or giving
information to that en. And, because these claims are often made for private
interests and not for those of the indios, we hereby order that this law be
always complied with, otherwise the change will be considered fraudulently
obtained. The penalty of one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the
judge or encomendero who should violate this law.
LAW XV.
Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES,"
WHO SHALL BE "INDIOS."
We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be
an indio of the same reduccion; if there be more than eighty houses, there
should be two mayors and two aldermen, also indios; and, even if the town
be a big one, there should, nevertheless, be more than two mayors and four
aldermen, If there be less than eighty indios but not less than forty, there
should be not more than one mayor and one alderman, who should annually
elect nine others, in the presence of the priests , as is the practice in town
inhabited by Spaniards and indios.
LAW XXI.
Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar,
on May 8, 1581. At Madrid, on January 10, 1589. Philip III, at Todesillas, on
July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on October 1 and December 17, 1646.
For this law and the one following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.
THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO
SPANIARDS, NEGROES, "MESTIZOS," AND MULATTOES.
We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores, or mestizos
to live to live in the reducciones and towns and towns of the indios, because
it has been found that some Spaniards who deal, trade, live, and associate
with the indios are men of troublesome nature, of dirty ways of living;
robbers, gamblers, and vicious and useless men; and, to avoid the wrongs
done them, the indios would leave their towns and provinces; and the
negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes, besides maltreating them and utilizing
their services, contaminate them with their bad customs, idleness, and also
some of their blunders and vices which may corrupt and pervert the goal
which we desire to reach with regard to their salvation, increase, and
tranquillity. We hereby order the imposition of grave penalties upon the
commission of the acts above-mentioned which should not be tolerated in
the towns, and that the viceroys, presidents, governors, and courts take
great care in executing the law within their powers and avail themselves of
the cooperation of the ministers who are truly honest. As regards the
mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-breeds (zambaigos), who are children
of indias and born among them, and who are to inherit their houses and
haciendas, they all not be affected by this law, it appearing to be a harsh
thing to separate them from their parents. (Law of the Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228,
229, 230, 231.)
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts
to improve the condition of the less advanced inhabitants of the Islands by
concentrating them in "reducciones," is found in the Decree of the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as follows:
It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a
territory recognized as an integral part of a nation should respect and obey
the laws in force therein; while, on other hand, it is the duty to conscience
and to humanity for all governments to civilize those backward races that
might exist in the nation, and which living in the obscurity of ignorance, lack
of all the nations which enable them to grasp the moral and material
advantages that may be acquired in those towns under the protection and
vigilance afforded them by the same laws.
16
It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the
separation and isolation of the non-Christian races from the social life of the
civilized and Christian towns; to allow any longer the commission of
depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is located the seat of
the representative of the Government of the, metropolis.
It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied
themselves with this most important question, and that much has been
heretofore accomplished with the help and self-denial of the missionary
fathers who have even sacrificed their lives to the end that those degenerate
races might be brought to the principles of Christianity, but the means and
the preaching employed to allure them have been insufficient to complete
the work undertaken. Neither have the punishments imposed been sufficient
in certain cases and in those which have not been guarded against, thus
giving and customs of isolation.
As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state
of things, taking into account the prestige which the country demands and
the inevitable duty which every government has in enforcing respect and
obedience to the national laws on the part of all who reside within the
territory under its control, I have proceeded in the premises by giving the
most careful study of this serious question which involves important interests
for civilization, from the moral and material as well as the political
standpoints. After hearing the illustrious opinions of all the local authorities,
ecclesiastics, and missionaries of the provinces of Northern Luzon, and also
after finding the unanimous conformity of the meeting held with the
Archbishop of Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and Cebu, and the provincial
prelates of the orders of the Dominicans, Agustinians, Recoletos,
Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the meeting of the Council of Authorities,
held for the object so indicated, I have arrived at an intimate conviction of the
inevitable necessity of proceeding in a practical manner for the submission
of the said pagan and isolated races, as well as of the manner and the only
form of accomplishing such a task.
For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these
objects, I hereby promulgate the following:
DECREE.
1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this
date, to be governed by the common law, save those exceptions prescribed
in this decree which are bases upon the differences of instructions, of the
customs, and of the necessities of the different pagan races which occupy a
part of its territory.

2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races —
which may be divided into three classes; one, which comprises those which
live isolated and roaming about without forming a town nor a home; another,
made up of those subdued pagans who have not as yet entered completely
the social life; and the third, of those mountain and rebellious pagans —
shall be published in their respective dialects, and the officials, priests, and
missionaries of the provinces wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in
the work of having these races learn these rules. These rules shall have
executive character, beginning with the first day of next April, and, as to their
compliance, they must be observed in the manner prescribed below.
3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed,
from now on, with all the means which their zeal may suggest to them, to the
taking of the census of the inhabitants of the towns or settlement already
subdued, and shall adopt the necessary regulations for the appointment of
local authorities, if there be none as yet; for the construction of courts and
schools, and for the opening or fixing up of means of communication,
endeavoring, as regards the administrative organization of the said towns or
settlements, that this be finished before the first day of next July, so that at
the beginning of the fiscal year they shall have the same rights and
obligations which affect the remaining towns of the archipelago, with the only
exception that in the first two years they shall not be obliged to render
personal services other than those previously indicated.
4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands
appropriate for cultivation, the inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to
move their dwelling-houses; and only in case of absolute necessity shall a
new residence be fixed for them, choosing for this purpose the place most
convenient for them and which prejudices the least their interest; and, in
either of these cases, an effort must be made to establish their homes with
the reach of the sound of the bell.
5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be
established an armed force composed precisely of native Christian, the
organization and service of which shall be determined in a regulations based
upon that of the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of the Guardia Civil).
6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns
understand all the rights and duties affecting them and the liberty which they
have as to where and now they shall till their lands and sell the products
thereof, with the only exception of the tobacco which shall be bought by the
Hacienda at the same price and conditions allowed other producers, and
with the prohibition against these new towns as well as the others from
engaging in commerce of any other transaction with the rebellious indios, the
17
violation of which shall be punished with deportation.
7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the
territory of the rebellious indios shall be fixed; and whoever should go
beyond the said limits shall be detained and assigned governmentally
wherever convenient.
8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the
fraternity of the Catholic Church, all by this fact along be exempt for eight
years from rendering personal labor.
9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not
subdued (aetas and mountains igorrots the following advantages in returns
for their voluntary submission: to live in towns; unity among their families;
concession of good lands and the right to cultivate them in the manner they
wish and in the way them deem most productive; support during a year, and
clothes upon effecting submission; respect for their habits and customs in so
far as the same are not opposed to natural law; freedom to decide of their
own accord as to whether they want to be Christians or not; the
establishment of missions and families of recognized honesty who shall
teach, direct, protect, and give them security and trust them; the purchase or
facility of the sale of their harvests; the exemption from contributions and
tributes for ten years and from the quintas (a kind of tax) for twenty years;
and lastly, that those who are governed by the local authorities as the ones
who elect such officials under the direct charge of the authorities of the
province or district.
10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the
advantages offered, shall, in return, have the obligation of constituting their
new towns, of constructing their town hall, schools, and country roads which
place them in communication with one another and with the Christians;
provided, the location of these towns be distant from their actual residences,
when the latter do not have the good conditions of location and cultivations,
and provided further the putting of families in a place so selected by them be
authorized in the towns already constituted.
11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the
tribes, that, disregarding the peace, protection, and advantages offered
them, continue in their rebellious attitude on the first of next April, committing
from now on the crimes and vexations against the Christian towns; and for
the this purposes, the Captain General's Office shall proceed with the
organization of the divisions of the Army which, in conjunction with the rural
guards (cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the territory of such tribes. On the
expiration of the term, they shall destroy their dwelling-houses, labors, and
implements, and confiscate their products and cattle. Such a punishment
shall necessarily be repeated twice a year, and for this purpose the military
headquarters shall immediately order a detachment of the military staff to
study the zones where such operations shall take place and everything
conducive to the successful accomplishment of the same.
12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities, and
other subordinates to my authorities, local authorities, and other
subordinates to may authority, civil as well as military authorities, shall give
the most effective aid and cooperation to the said forces in all that is within
the attributes and the scope of the authority of each.
13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the
provinces in the southern part of the Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the
preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied to them.
14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-
Royal Patron, a council or permanent commission which shall attend to and
decide all the questions relative to the application of the foregoing
regulations that may be brought to it for consultations by the chiefs of
provinces and priests and missionaries.
15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to
the foregoing, in brining about due compliance with this decree, shall be
promulgated by the respective official centers within their respective
jurisdictions. (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la Administracion,
vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)
B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.
Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the
question as to the best method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has
been a perplexing one.
1. Organic law.
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American
Government in the Philippines was President McKinley's Instructions to the
Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly approved and ratified by section
1 of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions of these
instructions have remained undisturbed by subsequent congressional
legislation. One paragraph of particular interest should here be quoted,
namely:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should
adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our
18
North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government
and under which many of these tribes are now living in peace and
contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling
to conform. Such tribal governments should, however, be subjected to wise
and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and
active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and
introduce civilized customs.
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the
nature of an Organic Act for the Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the
Philippine Bill was to provide for a legislative body and, with this end in view,
to name the prerequisites for the organization of the Philippine Assembly.
The Philippine Legislature, composed of the Philippine Commission and the
Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction over the Christian portion of
the Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain exclusive jurisdiction of
that part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is
the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones
Law. This transferred the exclusive legislative jurisdiction and authority
theretofore exercised by the Philippine Commission, to the Philippine
Legislature (sec. 12). It divided the Philippine Islands into twelve senatorial
districts, the twelfth district to be composed of the Mountain Province,
Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was authorized to appoint
senators and representatives for the territory which, at the time of the
passage of the Jones Law, was not represented in the Philippine Assembly,
that is, for the twelfth district (sec. 16). The law establish a bureau to be
known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes" which shall have general
supervision over the public affairs of the inhabitants which are represented in
the Legislature by appointed senators and representatives( sec. 22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line
between the territory not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes,
and the territory which Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory
which is inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
2. Statute law.
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts
of the Philippine Commission and Legislature. The most notable are Acts
Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province of Benguet and the Igorots; Act NO.
82, the Municipal Code; ;Act no. 83, the Provincial Government Act; Act No.
183, the Character of the city of Manila; Act No. 7887, providing for the
organization and government of the Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the
Special Provincial Government Act; Act No. 1397, the Township
Government Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the organization of settlements;
Act No. 1963, the Baguio charger; and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act of the
Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The major portion of these laws have
been carried forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 an d1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the
government of the primitive peoples. Beginning with Act No. 387, sections
68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United States Philippine
Commission, having reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos.
4111, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 4568,
1306 were enacted for the provinces of Abra, Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte,
Ilocos Sur, Isabela. Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya,
Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As an
example of these laws, because referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act
No. 547:
No. 547. — AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL
CIVIL GOVERNMENTS FOR THE MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF
MINDORO.
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine
Commission, that:
SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not
progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them
under any form of municipal government, the provincial governor is
authorized, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in dealing
with these Manguianes to appoint officers from among them, to fix their
designations and badges of office, and to prescribe their powers and duties:
Provided, That the powers and duties thus prescribed shall not be in excess
of those conferred upon township officers by Act Numbered Three hundred
and eighty-seven entitled "An Act providing for the establishment of local civil
Governments in the townships and settlements of Nueva Vizcaya."
SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial
governor is further authorized, when he deems such a course necessary in
the interest of law and order, to direct such Manguianes to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and
approved by the provincial board. Manguianes who refuse to comply with
such directions shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not
exceeding sixty days.
SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of
his province to acquire the knowledge and experience necessary for
19
successful local popular government, and his supervision and control over
them shall be exercised to this end, an to the end that law and order and
individual freedom shall be maintained.
SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any
settlement of Manguianes has advanced sufficiently to make such a course
practicable, it may be organized under the provisions of sections one to
sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven, as
a township, and the geographical limits of such township shall be fixed by
the provincial board.
SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the
passage of the same is hereby expedited in accordance with section two of
'An Act prescribing the order of procedure by the Commission in the
enactment of laws,' passed September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.
SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, December 4, 1902.
All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed
by Act No. 1396 and 1397. The last named Act incorporated and embodied
the provisions in general language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed by
the Administrative Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes retained the
provisions in questions.
These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the
Philippines and a settled and consistent practice with reference to the
methods to be followed for their advancement.
C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in
varying forms.
"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to
the Commission.
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian
tribes." These words are to be found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in
section 22 of the Jones Law. They are also to be found in Act No. 253 of the
Philippines Commission, establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and
in Act No. 2674 of the Philippine Legislature, carried forward into sections
701-705 of the Administrative Code of 1917, reestablishing this Bureau.
Among other laws which contain the phrase, there can be mentioned Acts
Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397, 1639, and 2551.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian
Filipinos" have been the favorite nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word
"tribes," since the coming into being of a Filipinized legislature. These terms
can be found in sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative Code of
1916; sections 701-705, 2145, 2422, 2426, Administrative Code of 1917;
and in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine Legislatures, as
well as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian"
shall include Mohammedans and pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code
of 1917; sec. 2561, Administrative Code of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408,
sec. 3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would
of course result in giving to it a religious signification. Obviously, Christian
would be those who profess the Christian religion, and non-Christians, would
be those who do not profess the Christian religion. In partial corroboration of
this view, there could also be cited section 2576 of the last Administrative
Code and certain well-known authorities, as Zuñiga, "Estadismo de las Islas
Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine Tribes and
Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan Filipinos." (See
Blair & Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300, note;
Craig-Benitez, "Philippine Progress prior to 1898," vol. I. p. 107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate
further to ascertain what is its true meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly
to be seen by the provisions of many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine
Bill, the authority of the Philippine Assembly was recognized in the "territory"
of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Again,
the Jones Law confers similar recognition in the authorization of the twelfth
senatorial district for the "territory not now represented in the Philippine
Assembly." The Philippines Legislature has, time and again, adopted acts
making certain other acts applicable to that "part" of the Philippine Islands
inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the
Administrative Code. The first section of this article, preceding section 2145,
makes the provisions of the article applicable only in specially organized
provinces. The specially organized provinces are the Mountain Province,
20
Nueva Vizcaya, Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These are the provinces to
which the Philippine Legislature has never seen fit to give all the powers of
local self-government. They do not, however, exactly coincide with the
portion of the Philippines which is not granted popular representation.
Nevertheless, it is still a geographical description.
It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live
persons some of who are Christians and some of whom are not Christians.
In fact, the law specifically recognizes this. ( Sec. 2422, Administrative Code
of 1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical
conception is likewise inadquate. The reason it that the motive of the law
relates not to a particular people, because of their religion, or to a particular
province because of its location, but the whole intent of the law is predicated
n the civilization or lack of civilization of the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic
words usually introduce the term. "The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite
expression. The Secretary of the Interior who for so many years had these
people under his jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact
designation, speaks of the "backward Philippine peoples, commonly known
as the 'non-Christian tribes."' (See Hearings before the Committee on the
Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third session on
H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose of the People of the United
States as to the future political status of the Philippine Islands and to provide
a more autonomous government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of the
Secretary of the Interior of June 30, 1906, circulated by the Executive
Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of
civilization, is substantiated by reference to legislative, judicial, and
executive authority.
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and
2674, and sections 701 et seq, and sections 2422 et seq, of the
Administrative Code of 1917. For instance, Act No. 253 charged the Bureau
of non-Christian tribes to conduct "systematic investigations with reference
to non-Christian tribes . . . with special view to determining the most
practicable means for bringing about their advancement in civilization and
material property prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of United States vs. Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The
question here arose as to the effect of a tribal marriage in connection with
article 423 of the Penal code concerning the husband who surprises his wife
in the act of adultery. In discussing the point, the court makes use of the
following language:
. . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a
tribal marriage of so-called non-Christians or members of uncivilized tribes,
celebrated within that province without compliance with the requisites
prescribed by General Orders no. 68. . . . We hold also that the fact that the
accused is shown to be a member of an uncivilized tribe, of a low order of
intelligence, uncultured and uneducated, should be taken into consideration
as a second marked extenuating circumstance.
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who
have been called upon to interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as
a member of the Philippine Commission, drafted much of the legislation
relating to the so-called Christians and who had these people under his
authority, was the former Secretary of the Interior. Under date of June 30,
1906, this official addressed a letter to all governor of provinces, organized
under the Special Provincial Government Act, a letter which later received
recognition by the Governor-General and was circulated by the Executive
Secretary, reading as follows:
Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether
people who were originally non-Christian but have recently been baptized or
who are children of persons who have been recently baptized are, for the
purposes of Act 1396 and 1397, to be considered Christian or non-
Christians.
It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these
islands which are not advanced far in civilization, to hit upon any suitable
designation which will fit all cases. The number of individual tribes is so great
that it is almost out of the question to enumerate all of them in an Act. It was
finally decided to adopt the designation 'non-Christians' as the one most
satisfactory, but the real purpose of the Commission was not so much to
legislate for people having any particular religious belief as for those lacking
sufficient advancement so that they could, to their own advantage, be
brought under the Provincial Government Act and the Municipal Code.
The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of
civilization to which the person baptized has attained at the time the act of
baptism is performed. For practical purposes, therefore, you will give the
member of so-called "wild tribes" of your province the benefit of the doubt
even though they may recently have embraced Christianity.
The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain
21
under the jurisdiction of regularly organized municipalities or what form of
government shall be afforded to them should be the degree of civilization to
which they have attained and you are requested to govern yourself
accordingly.
I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who
concurs in the opinion above expressed and who will have the necessary
instructions given to the governors of the provinces organized under the
Provincial Government Act. (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214.)
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member
of this court, has the following to say on the subject:
As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but
while no other better classification has as yet been made the present
classification should be allowed to stand . . . I believe the term carries the
same meaning as the expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the Interior
(of June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is indicative of the degree of civilization
rather than of religious denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of
religious denomination will make the law invalid as against that
Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.
Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians,
was the Collector of Internal Revenue. The question arose for ruling relatives
to the cedula taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas. Thereupon, the view of
the Secretary of the Interior was requested on the point, who, by return
indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of the Collector of Internal
Revenue. This Construction of the Collector of Internal Revenue can be
found in circular letter No. 188 of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, dated
June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214):
The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from
the payment of cedula taxes. The Collector of Internal Revenue has
interpreted this provision of law to mean not that persons who profess some
form of Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and that all
other person are exempt; he has interpreted it to mean that all persons
preserving tribal relations with the so-called non-Christian tribes are exempt
from the cedula tax, and that all others, including Jews, Mohammedans,
Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject to said tax so long as they live in
cities or towns, or in the country in a civilized condition. In other words, it is
not so much a matter of a man's form of religious worship or profession that
decides whether or not he is subject to the cedula tax; it is more dependent
on whether he is living in a civilized manner or is associated with the
mountain tribes, either as a member thereof or as a recruit. So far, this
question has not come up as to whether a Christian, maintaining his
religious belief, but throwing his lot and living with a non-Christian tribe,
would or would not be subject to the cedula tax. On one occasion a
prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed to this office that he was exempt from
the cedula tax, inasmuch as he was not a Christian. This Office, however,
continued to collect cedula taxes from all the Jews, East Indians, Arabs,
Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large proportion of the cedula
taxes paid in this city are paid by men belonging to the nationalities
mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs and other s are quite widely scattered
throughout the Islands, and a condition similar to that which exist in Manila
also exists in most of the large provincial towns. Cedula taxes are therefore
being collected by this Office in all parts of these Islands on the broad
ground that civilized people are subject to such taxes, and non-civilized
people preserving their tribal relations are not subject thereto.
(Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD,
Collector of Internal Revenue.
On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed
circular letter No. 327, approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice, to
all provincial treasurers. This letter in part reads:
In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers
regarding cedula taxes due from members of non-Christian tribes when they
come in from the hills for the purposes of settling down and becoming
members of the body politic of the Philippine Islands, the following
clarification of the laws governing such questions and digest of rulings
thereunder is hereby published for the information of all concerned:
Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by
reason of the fact that they do not profess Christianity, but because of their
uncivilized mode of life and low state of development. All inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands classed as members of non-Christian tribes may be
divided into three classes in so far as the cedula tax law is concerned . . .
Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and
uncivilized mode of life, severs whatever tribal relations he may have had
and attaches himself civilized community, belonging a member of the body
politic, he thereby makes himself subject to precisely the same law that
governs the other members of that community and from and after the date
when he so attaches himself to the community the same cedula and other
taxes are due from him as from other members thereof. If he comes in after
the expiration of the delinquency period the same rule should apply to him
as to persons arriving from foreign countries or reaching the age of eighteen
subsequent to the expiration of such period, and a regular class A, D, F, or H
cedula, as the case may be, should be furnished him without penalty and
22
without requiring him to pay the tax for former years.
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in
determining whether or not a man is subject to the regular cedula tax is not
the circumstance that he does or does not profess Christianity, nor even his
maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with some of the well
known wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of advancement in civilization
and connection or lack of connection with some civilized community. For this
reason so called "Remontados" and "Montescos" will be classed by this
office as members of non-Christian tribes in so far as the application of the
Internal Revenue Law is concerned, since, even though they belong to no
well recognized tribe, their mode of life, degree of advancement and so forth
are practically the same as those of the Igorrots and members of other
recognized non-Christina tribes.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,
Collector of Internal Revenue,
Approved:
(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,
Secretary of Finance and Justice.
The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of
Internal Revenue Regulations No. 1, promulgated by Venancio Concepcion,
Acting Collector of Internal Revenue, and approved on April 16, 1915, by
Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of Finance and Justice. Section 30 of
the regulations is practically a transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The
Chief of Constabulary request the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the
status of a non-Christian who has been baptized by a minister of the Gospel.
The precise questions were these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he
entitled to the privileges of a Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors,
does he commit an infraction of the law and does the person selling same
lay himself liable under the provision of Act No. 1639?" The opinion of
Attorney-General Avanceña, after quoting the same authorities hereinbefore
set out, concludes:
In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that is
probable that the person in question remains a non-Christian, so that, in
purchasing intoxicating liquors both he and the person selling the same
make themselves liable to prosecution under the provisions of Act No. 1639.
At least, I advise you that these should be the constructions place upon the
law until a court shall hold otherwise.
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:
With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has
in the provisions of the Administrative code which we are studying, we
submit that said phrase does not have its natural meaning which would
include all non-Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether Filipino or
strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but simply refers to those uncivilized
members of the non-Christian tribes of the Philippines who, living without
home or fixed residence, roam in the mountains, beyond the reach of law
and order . . .
The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the
inhabitants of the Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as
distinguished from the common Filipinos which carry on a social and civilized
life, did not intended to establish a distinction based on the religious beliefs
of the individual, but, without dwelling on the difficulties which later would be
occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression which the Spanish
legislation employed to designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of
the Philippines.
The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077
and 2741 of Act No. 2657 (articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as
equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes of the Philippines, not only
because this is the evident intention of the law, but because to give it its
lateral meaning would make the law null and unconstitutional as making
distinctions base the religion of the individual.
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority
than De. David P. Barrows, then "Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian
Tribes," divides the population in the Christian or Civilized Tribes, and non-
Christian or Wild Tribes. (Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp.
411 et seq). The present Director of the Census, Hon. Ignacio Villamor,
writes that the classification likely to be used in the Census now being taken
is: "Filipinos and Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer and
Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, prepared in the Bureau of
Insular Affairs, War Department, a sub-division under the title non-Christian
tribes is, "Physical and Political Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes,"
which sufficiently shows that the terms refers to culture and not to religion.
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and
different executive officials, specifically, join in the proposition that the term
"non-Christian" refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way , to geographical
area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a law grade of
23
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.
E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization.
The Philippine Census of 1903 divided them into four classes. Of the third
class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro.
Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his
Etimilogia de los nombres de Rozas de Filipinas, says:
In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage," "mountainer,"
"pagan," "negro." It may be that the use of this word is applicable to a great
number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it has been applied only to certain
inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in primitive times without doubt this name was
given to those of that island who bear it to-day, but its employed in three
Filipino languages shows that the radical ngian had in all these languages a
sense to-day forgotten. In Pampango this ending still exists and signifies
"ancient," from which we can deduce that the name was applied to men
considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were pushed
back into the interior by the modern invaders, in whose language they were
called the "ancients."
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito
blood and have not advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a
peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people. They number approximately
15,000. The manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as
indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed sufficiently in
civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal
government. (See Census of the Philippine (Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23,
460.)
III. COMPARATIVE — THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to
the policy adopted by the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods
followed by the Government of the Philippines Islands in its dealings with the
so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically
identical with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings
with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an
investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have
been treated as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the
Government of the United States and the Indians may be described as that
of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the
guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the
plenary authority of the United States.
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore
mentioned, tells how the Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting
those humane designs of civilizing the neighboring Indians." After quoting
the Act, the opinion goes on — "This act avowedly contemplates the
preservation of the Indian nations as an object sought by the United States,
and proposes to effect this object by civilizing and converting them from
hunters into agriculturists."
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United
States vs. Kagama ([1886], 118 U.S., 375). Reference is herein made to the
clause of the United States Constitution which gives Congress "power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian tribes." The court then proceeds to indicate a brief history of
the position of the Indians in the United States (a more extended account of
which can be found in Marshall's opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, supra),
as follows:
The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States,
both before and since the Revolution, to the people of the United States, has
always been an anomalous one and of a complex character.
Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of
American towards the Indians who were found here, the colonies before the
Revolution and the States and the United States since, have recognized in
the Indians a possessory right to the soil over which they roamed and
hunted and established occasional villages. But they asserted an ultimate
title in the land itself, by which the Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or
transfer it to other nations or peoples without the consent of this paramount
authority. When a tribe wished to dispose of its lands, or any part of it, or the
State or the United States wished to purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was
the only mode in which this could be done. The United States recognized no
right in private persons, or in other nations, to make such a purchase by
treaty or otherwise. With the Indians themselves these relation are equally
difficult to define. They were, and always have been, regarded as having a
semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as
States, not as nation not a possessed of the fall attributes of sovereignty, but
as a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social
relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State
within whose limits they resided.
The opinion then continues:
24
It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of
Congress. These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. The are
communities dependent on the United States. dependent largely for their
daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the
States, and receive from the no protection. Because of the local ill feeling,
the people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest
enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the
course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in
which it has been promised, there arise the duty of protection, and with it the
power. This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress,
and by this court, whenever the question has arisen . . . The power of the
General Government over these remnants of race once powerful, now weak
and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the
safety of those among whom they dwell. it must exist in that government,
because it never has existed anywhere else, because the theater of its
exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has
never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the
tribes.
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the
question to be considered was whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and
their lands was such that Congress could prohibit the introduction of
intoxicating liquor into those lands notwithstanding the admission of New
Mexico to statehood. The court looked to the reports of the different
superintendent charged with guarding their interests and founds that these
Indians are dependent upon the fostering care and protection of the
government "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the court said
"that during the Spanish dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated
as wards requiring special protection, where subjected to restraints and
official supervisions in the alienation of their property." And finally, we not the
following: "Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to
regulate commerce with the Indians tribes, but long-continued legislative and
executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions have
attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized nation the power
and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent
Indian communities within its borders, whether within its original territory or
territory subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the limits of a
state."
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not
within the power of the courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very
good reason, the subject has always been deemed political in nature, not
subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the government.
(Matter of Heff [1905], 197 U.S., 488; U.S. vs. Celestine [1909], 215 U.S.,
278; U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra; Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; U.S. vs.
Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; the Cherokee Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall, 616;
Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S., 218; Thomas vs. Gay [1898], 169 U.S..,
264; Lone Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553; Wallace vs. Adams
[1907], 204 U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216 U.S., 84; Tiger vs.
Western Invest. Co. [1911], 221 U.S., 286; U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U.S..,
598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29 Okla, 281; 35 L.R.A. [N. S.], 795.) Whenever,
therefore, the United States sets apart any public land as an Indian
reservation, it has full authority to pass such laws and authorize such
measures as may be necessary to give to the Indians thereon full protection
in their persons and property. (U.S. vs. Thomas [1894], 151 U.S., 577.)
All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an
unbroken line of judicial decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally,
might result in the issuance of habeas corpus, is that of United States vs.
Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a hearing upon return to a
writ of habeas corpus issued against Brigadier General George Crook at the
relation of Standing Bear and other Indians, formerly belonging to the Ponca
Tribe of Indians. The petition alleged in substance that the relators are
Indians who have formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians, now
located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time previously withdrawn
from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal relations therewith, and
had adopted the general habits of the whites, and were then endeavoring to
maintain themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or assistance
from the general government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and
without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the United States, they
were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent,
George Crook. The substance of the return to the writ was that the relators
are individual members of, and connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians;
that they had fled or escaped form a reservation situated some place within
the limits of the Indian Territory — had departed therefrom without
permission from the Government; and, at the request of the Secretary of the
Interior, the General of the Army had issued an order which required the
respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian
Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused the relators to
be arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory.
The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal
imprisonment by habeas corpus. The second question, of much greater
importance, related to the right of the Government to arrest and hold the
relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory
from which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In discussing this question,
the court reviewed the policy the Government had adopted in its dealing with
25
the friendly tribe of Poncase. Then, continuing, the court said: "Laws passed
for the government of the Indian country, and for the purpose of regulating
trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer upon certain officers of
the Government almost unlimited power over the persons who go upon the
reservations without lawful authority . . . Whether such an extensive
discretionary power is wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or
not , need not be questioned. It is enough to know that the power rightfully
exists, and, where existing, the exercise of the power must be upheld." The
decision concluded as follows:
The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:
1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United
States, and has, therefore, the right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a
federal court, or before a federal judge, in all cases where he may be
confined or in custody under color of authority of the United States or where
he is restrained of liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the United
States.
2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the
military department of the Platte, has the custody of the relators, under color
of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws therefore.
3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to
the Indian Territory, as the respondent has been directed to do.
4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the
more fortunate white race, and have the inalienable right to "life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness," so long as they obey the laws and do not trespass
on forbidden ground. And,
5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States,
and in violation of the laws thereof, the relators must be discharged from
custody, and it is so ordered.
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used
as authority to determine that Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a
citizen of the Philippine Islands, is a "person" within the meaning of the
Habeas Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine
courts. (See also In re Race Horse [1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so decide.
As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case
are not exactly identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known
to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have
been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these
reservation, without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and
that, when once so located, they have been made to remain on the
reservation for their own good and for the general good of the country. If any
lesson can be drawn form the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the
determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of
the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not
interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as
may forceful reasons exists for the segregation as existed for the
segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature
could not delegate this power to provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is
contended, the Philippine Legislature has abdicated its authority and
avoided its full responsibility.
That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative
power should be zealously protected, we agree. An understanding of the
rule will, however, disclose that it has not bee violated in his instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided
by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of case, namely: "The
true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no
valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs.
Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice
Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed
by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature
may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof,
to whom t has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of
fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the
decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by
the enactment of section 21454 of the Administrative Code? Has not the
Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval
of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as
to the execution of the law? Is not this "necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for
26
mandamus to require the Secretary of the Interior to approve the selection
and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by the relator out of the lands
ceded to the United States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians.
Section 463 of the United States Revised Statutes provided: "The
Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary of
the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President may
prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs, and of all matters
arising out to the Indian relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate
a good deal, especially in view of the long established practice of the
Department, before saying that this language was not broad enough to
warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of the rather helpless
people concerned. The power of Congress is not doubted. The Indians have
been treated as wards of the nation. Some such supervision was necessary,
and has been exercised. In the absence of special provisions naturally it
would be exercised by the Indian Department." (See also as corroborative
authority, it any is needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204 U.S.., 364,
reviewing the previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court: U.S.
vs. Lane [1914], 232 U.S., 598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive.
An exception to the general rule. sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits
the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities.
The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of
Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official
representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge "when such as
course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order?" As officials
charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its
inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the
conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune
of being in a backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful
delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial
official and a department head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted
on behalf of his unknown clients, says that — "The statute is perfectly clear
and unambiguous. In limpid English, and in words as plain and unequivocal
as language can express, it provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians'
and none other." The inevitable result, them, is that the law "constitutes an
attempt by the Legislature to discriminate between individuals because of
their religious beliefs, and is, consequently, unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable —
the Legislature must be understood to mean what it has plainly expressed;
judicial construction is then excluded; religious equality is demanded by the
Organic Law; the statute has violated this constitutional guaranty, and Q. E.
D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free to discard the
long continued meaning given to a common expression, especially as
classification of inhabitants according to religious belief leads the court to
what it should avoid, the nullification of legislative action. We hold that the
term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippines Islands of a low
grade of civilization, and that section 2145 of the Administrative Code of
1917, does not discriminate between individuals an account of religious
differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAWS.
The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the
President's instructions of to the Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the
Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." This
constitutional limitation is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution — and these provisions, it has been said "are
universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction,
without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick Wo
vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356.) The protection afforded the individual is
then as much for the non-Christian as for the Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:
Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible
with the possession of like liberty by every other. (Spencer, Social Statistics,
p. 94.)
Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized
licentiousness that trespasses on right. That authorized licentiousness that
trespasses on right. It is a legal and a refined idea, the offspring of high
civilization, which the savage never understood, and never can understand.
Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more restraint on
others to keep off from us, the more liberty we have . . . that man is free who
is protected from injury. (II Webster's Works, p. 393.)
Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not
27
being forced to do what one ought not do desire. (Montesque, spirit of the
Laws.)
Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to ac
according to one's own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions
essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others. (Field, J., in
Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S., 86.)
Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times
and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold
restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good.
On any other basis, organized society could not exist with safety to its
members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself
would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all
could not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right
of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or
his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others . . . There is,
of course, a sphere with which the individual may asserts the supremacy of
his own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government —
especially of any free government existing under a written Constitution — to
interfere with the exercise of that will. But it is equally true that in very well-
ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its
members, the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times,
under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint to be
enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may
demand." (Harlan, J., In Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.S., 11.)
Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason
and the upright and honorable conscience of the individual. (Apolinario
Mabini.)
Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be
enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of
like freedom in others. The right to Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution
includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from
physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the
right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by this
Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common
welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right of
the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live an work
where he will; to earn his livelihood by an lawful calling; to pursue any
avocations, an for that purpose. to enter into all contracts which may be
proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a
successful conclusion. The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to
contract, the right to choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the
right of locomotion.
In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those
things which are ordinarily done by free men. (There can be noted
Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277; Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829], 2
Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U.S., 274; Allgeyer vs. Louisiana
[1896], 165, U.S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 114 Wis., 530. See 6
R.C.L., 258, 261.)
One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is
plainly apparent. It is this: "Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not
license; it is "Liberty regulated by law." Implied in the term is restraint by law
for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order
of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.
Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is
necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common
good. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if
exercises without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also
and equally natural, such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law.
The Liberty of the citizens may be restrained in the interest of the public
health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope
of the police power. (See Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U.S., 539;
Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz [1914], 189 Al., 66.)
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of
law. Daniel Webster, in the course of the argument in the Dartmouth College
Case before the United States Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic
literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen
shall hold his life, liberty, property, an immunities under the protection of the
general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," as
has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some
instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is
especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the
administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. (See McGehee,
Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and blind
sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority,
whether sanctioned by age and customs, or newly devised in the discretion
of the legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which regards and
preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due
process of law." (Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due
process of law" means simply . . . "first, that there shall be a law prescribed
in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the
Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third,
28
that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of
the state or to all of a class." (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104,
affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 1) "What is due
process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter
and necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peablody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.)
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is
not infringed by a statute which is applicable to all of a class. The
classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in
nature.
We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to
be made later on.
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen
Amendment to the United States Constitution particularly as found in those
portions of Philippine Organic Law providing "That slavery shall not exist in
said Islands; nor shall involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." It is quite possible
that the Thirteenth Amendment, since reaching to "any place subject to" the
"jurisdiction" of the United States, has force in the Philippine. However this
may be, the Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with necessary
modifications, of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States Criminal
Code, prescribed the punishment for these crimes. Slavery and involuntary
servitude, together wit their corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition of
enforced, compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906],
203 U.S., 1.) The term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It
has been applied to any servitude in fact involuntary, no matter under what
form such servitude may have been disguised. (Bailey vs. Alabama [1910],
219 U.S., 219.)
So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which
petitioners rely for their freedom. Next must come a description of the police
power under which the State must act if section 2145 is to be held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary
to note at this moment is the farreaching scope of the power, that it has
become almost possible to limit its weep, and that among its purposes is the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals,
education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase
the industries of the State, develop its resources and add to is wealth and
prosperity. (See Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27.) What we are not
interested in is the right of the government to restrain liberty by the exercise
of the police power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power
coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the 'law of
overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in
the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety
and welfare of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70
Ill., 191.) Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely
attempt to dam the on rushing power of legislative discretion, provided the
purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security
for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the
individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority
the right to exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of the
general welfare and the public interest. "There can be not doubt that the
exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the
Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and
those fundamental principles which lie at the foundation of all republican
forms of government." (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580;
U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before
us, before finally deciding whether any constitutional provision has indeed
been violated by section 2145 of the Administrative Code, we should
endeavor to ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting this section.
If legally possible, such legislative intention should be effectuated.
F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set
apart the Tigbao reservation, it will be remembered, assigned as reasons
fort the action, the following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the
advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only
successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live
in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The
protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which
they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the
Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of
the motives for its selection, the following:
29
To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken
together to Tigbao, the Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918,
made a trip to the place. There he found that the site selected is a good one;
that creditable progress has been made in the clearing of forests,
construction of buildings, etc., that there appears to be encouraging reaction
by the boys to the work of the school the requirements of which they appear
to meet with enthusiastic interest after the first weeks which are necessarily
a somewhat trying period for children wholly unaccustomed to orderly
behaviour and habit of life. He also gathered the impression that the results
obtained during the period of less than one year since the beginning of the
institution definitely justify its continuance and development.
Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation.
Such was naturally to be expected. But the Secretary of the Interior, upon
his return to Manila, made the following statement to the press:
"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer
to live a nomadic life and evade the influence of civilization. The Government
will follow its policy to organize them into political communities and to
educate their children with the object of making them useful citizens of this
country. To permit them to live a wayfaring life will ultimately result in a
burden to the state and on account of their ignorance, they will commit
crimes and make depredation, or if not they will be subject to involuntary
servitude by those who may want to abuse them."
The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision
of all the non-Christian people, has adopted as the polaris of his
administration — "the advancement of the non-Christian elements of our
population to equality and unification with the highly civilized Christian
inhabitants." This is carried on by the adoption of the following measures:
(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of
seminomadic race are induced to leave their wild habitat and settle in
organized communities.
(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public
health throughout the regions inhabited by the non-Christian people.
(c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to
facilitate their development and the extention of government control.
(d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among
non-Christians, to promote social and commercial intercourse and maintain
amicable relations among them and with the Christian people.

(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially
agriculture.
( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private
capital in, the fertile regions of Mindanao and Sulu.
The Secretary adds:
To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued
among the non-Christian people. These people are being taught and guided
to improve their living conditions in order that they may fully appreciate the
benefits of civilization. Those of them who are still given to nomadic habits
are being persuaded to abandon their wild habitat and settle in organized
settlements. They are being made to understand that it is the purpose of the
Government to organize them politically into fixed and per manent
communities, thus bringing them under the control of the Government, to aid
them to live and work, protect them from involuntary servitude and abuse,
educate their children, and show them the advantages of leading a civilized
life with their civilized brothers. In short, they are being impressed with the
purposes and objectives of the Government of leading them to economic,
social, and political equality, and unification with the more highly civilized
inhabitants of the country. (See Report of the Department for 1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly
relations with the so-called non-Christians, and to promote their educational,
agricultural, industrial, and economic development and advancement in
civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in
reestablishing the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes, defines the aim of the
Government towards the non-Christian people in the following unequivocal
terms:
It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the
work for advancement and liberty in favor of the region inhabited by non-
Christian Filipinos and foster by all adequate means and in a systematical,
rapid, and complete manner the moral, material, economic, social, and
political development of those regions, always having in view the aim of
rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between, and complete fusion
of, all the Christian and non-Christian elements populating the provinces of
the Archipelago. (Sec. 3.)
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United
States, proper wards of the Filipino people? By the fostering care of a wise
Government, may not these unfortunates advance in the "habits and arts of
civilization?" Would it be advisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan,
30
carefully formulated, and apparently working out for the ultimate good of
these people?
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the
Government is evident. Here, we have on the Island of Mindoro, the
Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making depredations on their more
fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing
nothing for the advancement of the Philippine Islands. What the Government
wished to do by bringing than into a reservation was to gather together the
children for educational purposes, and to improve the health and morals —
was in fine, to begin the process of civilization. this method was termed in
Spanish times, "bringing under the bells." The same idea adapted to the
existing situation, has been followed with reference to the Manguianes and
other peoples of the same class, because it required, if they are to be
improved, that they be gathered together. On these few reservations there
live under restraint in some cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few
thousands of the uncivilized people. Segregation really constitutes protection
for the manguianes.
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal.
Practically, we know that the axiom is not precisely accurate. The
Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men are free, and they
are not the equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are
citizens, with many but not all the rights which citizenship implies. And true,
indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as surely, the Manguianes are citizens of
a low degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon the progress
of the State.
In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the
purposes of the Legislature in enacting the law, and of the executive branch
in enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops and
persons protected from predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is no
argument to say that such crimes are punished by the Penal Code, because
these penalties are imposed after commission of the offense and not before.
If immigrants are to be encouraged to develop the resources of the great
Islands of Mindoro, and its, as yet, unproductive regions, the Government
must be in a position to guarantee peace and order.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the
interest of the State. Illiteracy and thriftlessness are not conducive to
homogeneity. The State to protect itself from destruction must prod on the
laggard and the sluggard. The great law of overwhelming necessity is all
convincing.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the
Interior:
Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of
civilization, they (the manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction
— burning and destroying the forests and making illegal caiñgins thereon.
Not bringing any benefit to the State but instead injuring and damaging its
interests, what will ultimately become of these people with the sort of liberty
they wish to preserve and for which they are now fighting in court? They will
ultimately become a heavy burden to the State and on account of their
ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will
be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty
and does not practice liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the
right to do anything they will — going from one place to another in the
mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal caiñgins
thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how
can they allege that they are being deprived thereof without due process of
law?
xxx xxx xxx
But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his
liberty without due process of law' apply to a class of persons who do not
have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practise liberty in a rightful
way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of
such class of persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar,
that the Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare
and advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this
people should be let along in the mountains and in a permanent state of
savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in
its true and noble sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the
Government has been placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or
guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure was adopted as
the one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience.
xxx xxx xxx
The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended
31
more and more towards the education and civilization of such people and
fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those people under the tutelage
of the Government is indeed encouraging and the signs of the times point to
a day which is not far distant when they will become useful citizens. In the
light of what has already been accomplished which has been winning the
gratitude of most of the backward people, shall we give up the noble work
simply because a certain element, believing that their personal interests
would be injured by such a measure has come forward and challenged the
authority of the Government to lead this people in the pat of civilization?
Shall we, after expending sweat, treasure, and even blood only to redeem
this people from the claws of ignorance and superstition, now willingly retire
because there has been erroneously invoked in their favor that
Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without
due process of law? To allow them to successfully invoke that Constitutional
guaranty at this time will leave the Government without recourse to pursue
the works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus
left in a permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point to
attack by those who doubt, nay challenge, the ability of the nation to deal
with our backward brothers.
The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao.
There they are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions.
They are being made to understand that they object of the government is to
organize them politically into fixed and permanent communities. They are
being aided to live and work. Their children are being educated in a school
especially established for them. In short, everything is being done from them
in order that their advancement in civilization and material prosperity may be
assured. Certainly their living together in Tigbao does not make them slaves
or put them in a condition compelled to do services for another. They do not
work for anybody but for themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary
servitude.
But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some
other places under penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this connection is
invited to the fact that this people, living a nomadic and wayfaring life, do not
have permanent individual property. They move from one place to another
as the conditions of living warrants, and the entire space where they are
roving about is the property of the nation, the greater part being lands of
public domain. Wandering from one place to another on the public lands,
why can not the government adopt a measure to concentrate them in a
certain fixed place on the public lands, instead of permitting them to roam all
over the entire territory? This measure is necessary both in the interest of
the public as owner of the lands about which they are roving and for the
proper accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the government.
For as people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long to return
to the mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is
provinced for, you can not make them live together and the noble intention of
the Government of organizing them politically will come to naught.
G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.
Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific
objections and to reach a general conclusion.
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally
speaking, to go where he pleases. Could be not, however, be kept away
from certain localities ? To furnish an example from the Indian legislation.
The early Act of Congress of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian
reservation. Those citizens certainly did not possess absolute freedom of
locomotion. Again the same law provided for the apprehension of marauding
Indians. Without any doubt, this law and other similar were accepted and
followed time and again without question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak
and defenseless people confined as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous
official. What, it is asked, would be the remedy of any oppressed Manguian?
The answer would naturally be that the official into whose hands are given
the enforcement of the law would have little or not motive to oppress these
people; on the contrary, the presumption would all be that they would
endeavor to carry out the purposes of the law intelligently and patriotically. If,
indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus confined, there always exists the
power of removal in the hands of superior officers, and the courts are always
open for a redress of grievances. When, however, only the validity of the law
is generally challenged and no particular case of oppression is called to the
attention of the courts, it would seems that the Judiciary should not
unnecessarily hamper the Government in the accomplishment of its laudable
purpose.
The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with
freedom, may the right and liberties of the individual members of society be
subordinated to the will of the Government? It is a question which has
assailed the very existence of government from the beginning of time. Now
purely an ethical or philosophical subject, nor now to be decided by force, it
has been transferred to the peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such
an issue, the Judiciary must realize that the very existence of government
renders imperatives a power to restrain the individual to some extent,
dependent, of course, on the necessities of the class attempted to be
benefited. As to the particular degree to which the Legislature and the
Executive can go in interfering with the rights of the citizen, this is, and for a
along time to come will be, impossible for the courts to determine.
32
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual,
as axioms of economics and political theory, are of the past. The modern
period has shown as widespread belief in the amplest possible
demonstration of governmental activity. The courts unfortunately have
sometimes seemed to trial after the other two branches of the government in
this progressive march.
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts
cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. it is,
indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an
equally drastic remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered
without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered.
They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the
Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed.
To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the
law, there exists a law ; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced
according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies
alike to all of a class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case
of doubt, would lead to the determination that section 2145 is valid. it the
attitude which the courts should assume towards the settled policy of the
Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord, Gambles vs.
Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:
We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio
decidendi. Every really new question that comes before the courts is, in the
last analysis, determined on that theory, when not determined by
differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of
analogies furnished by such prior case. In balancing conflicting solutions,
that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will best
promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or
principle. But public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is wise enough to
forecast its influence in all possible contingencies. Distinctions must be
made from time to time as sound reason and a true sense of justice may
dictate."
Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the
so-called non-Christians has been in vain, if we fail to realize that a
consistent governmental policy has been effective in the Philippines from
early days to the present. The idea to unify the people of the Philippines so
that they may approach the highest conception of nationality. If all are to be
equal before the law, all must be approximately equal in intelligence. If the
Philippines is to be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro must be populated,
and its fertile regions must be developed. The public policy of the
Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the
Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this
governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their
own good and the good of the country.
Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of
the Philippine Legislature, a coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole
tendency of the best considered case is toward non-interference on the part
of the courts whenever political ideas are the moving consideration. Justice
Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly famous, said that
"constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take some
chances." (Blinn vs. Nelson [1911], 222 U.S., 1.) If in the final decision of the
many grave questions which this case presents, the courts must take "a
chance," it should be with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the
effectuation of the general governmental policy, and with a view to the
court's performing its duty in no narrow and bigoted sense, but with that
broad conception which will make the courts as progressive and effective a
force as are the other departments of the Government.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the
Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due
process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws,
and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does
not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the
opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion
of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United
States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty.
Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue. This is the true ruling of the court.
Costs shall be taxes against petitioners. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Avanceña, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CARSON, J., concurring:
I fully concur in the reasoning and the conclusions of Justice Malcolm as set
forth in the prevailing, opinion.
33
The words "non-Christian' have a clear, definite and well settled signification
when used in the Philippine statute-book as a descriptive adjective, applied
to "tribes," "people," or "inhabitants," dwelling in more or less remote districts
and provinces throughout the Islands.
Justice Malcolm, as I think, correctly finds that these words, as used in this
connection in our statute-book, denote the 'low grace of civilization" of the
individuals included in the class to which they are applied. To this I would
add that the tests for the determination of the fact that an individual or tribes
is, or is not of the "non-Christian" are, and throughout the period of American
occupation always have been, "the mode of life, the degree of advancement
in civilization, and connection or lack of connection with some civilized
community." (Cf. letter of Collector of Internal Revenue dated September 17,
1910, and set out in the principal opinion.)
The legislative and administrative history of the Philippine Islands clearly
discloses that the standard of civilization to which a specific tribe must be
found to have advanced, to justify its removal from the class embraces with
the descriptive term "non-Christian," as that term is used in the Philippine
statute-book, is that degree of civilization which results in a mode of life
within the tribe, such that it is feasible and practicable to extend to, and
enforce upon its membership the general laws and regulations,
administrative, legislative, and judicial, which control the conduct of the
admitted civilized inhabitants of the Islands; a made of life, furthermore,
which does not find expression in tribal customs or practices which tend to
brutalize or debauch the members of the tribe indulging in such customs or
practices, or to expose to loss or peril the lives or property of those who may
be brought in contact with members of the tribe.
So the standard of civilization to which any given number or group of
inhabitants of particular province in these Islands, or any individual member
of such a group, must be found to have advanced, in order to remove such
group or individual from the class embraced within the statutory description
of "non-Christian," is that degree of civilization which would naturally and
normally result in the withdrawal by such persons of permanent allegiance or
adherence to a "non-Christian" tribe, had they at any time adhered to or
maintained allegiance to such a tribe; and which would qualify them whether
they reside within or beyond the habitat of a "non-Christian" tribe, not only to
maintain a mode of life independent of a apart from that maintain by such
tribe, but a mode of life as would not be inimical to the lives or property or
general welfare of the civilized inhabitants of the Islands with whom they are
brought in contact.
The contention that, in this particular case, and without challenging the
validity of the statute, the writ should issue because of the failure to give
these petitioners, as well as the rest of the fifteen thousand Manguianes
affected by the reconcentration order, an opportunity to be heard before any
attempt was made to enforce it, begs the question and is, of course,
tantamount to a contention that there is no authority in law for the issuance
of such an order.
If the fifteen thousand manguianes affected by the order complained of had
attained that degree of civilization which would have made it practicable to
serve notice upon, and give an opportunity for a real hearing, to all the
members of the tribe affected by the order, it may well be doubted whether
the provincial board and the Secretary of the Interior would have been
justified in its enforcement By what proceeding known to the law, or to be
specially adopted in a particular case, could the offices of any province
provide for a genuine hearing upon a proposal to issue a reconcentration
order upon a head-hunting tribe in the north of the Island of Luzon; or upon
one of the nomadic tribes whose habitat is in the mountain fastnesses of
Mindanao, and whose individual members have no fixed or known place of
residence, or upon the fifteen thousand Manguianes roaming in the wilds of
Mindoro.
Of course, friendly headmen or chief might and, as a rule, should be
consulted, after the practice in the United States when tribes or groups of
American Indians have been placed upon reservations; but since non-
Christian head men and chiefs in the Philippines have no lawful authority to
bind their acts or their consent, the objection based on lack of a hearing,
would have the same force whether the issuance of a reconcentration order
was or was not preceded by a pow-wow of this kind.
The truth of the mater is that the power to provide for the issuance of such
orders rests upon analogous principles to those upon which the liberty and
freedom or action of children and persons of unsound minds is restrained,
without consulting their wishes, but for their own good and the general
welfare. The power rests upon necessity, that "great master of all things,"
and is properly exercised only where certain individuals or groups of
individual are found to be of such a low grade of civilization that their own
wishes cannot be permitted to determine their mode of life or place of
residence.
The status of the non-Christian inhabitants of these Islands, and the special
and necessarily paternal attitude assume toward them by the Insular
Government is well illustrated by the following provisions found in the
Administrative Code of 1917:
SEC. 705. Special duties and purposes of Bureau (of non-Christian tribes).
— It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to continue the
34
work for advancement and liberty in favor of the regions inhabited by non-
Christian Filipinos and to foster by all adequate means and in a systematic,
rapid, and completely manner the moral, material, economic, social and
political development of those regions, always having in view the aim of
rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between and complete fusion of
all the Christian and non-Christian elements populating the provinces of the
Archipelago.
SEC. 2116. Township and settlement fund. — There shall be maintained in
the provincial treasuries of the respective specially organized provinces a
special fund to be known as the township and settlement fund, which shall
be available, exclusively, for expenditures for the benefit of the townships
and settlements of the province, and non-Christian inhabitants of the
province, upon approval of the Secretary of the Interior.
As I understand it, the case at bar does not raise any real question as to the
jurisdiction of the courts of these Islands in habeas corpus proceedings, to
review the action of the administrative authorities in the enforcement of
reconcentration orders issued, under authority of section 2145 of the
Administrative Code, against a petitioner challenging the alleged fact that he
is a "non-Christian" as that term is used in the statute. I, therefore, express
no opinion on that question at this time.
JOHNSON, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The petitioners were deprived of their liberty without a hearing.
That fact is not denied. I cannot give my consent to any act which deprives
the humblest citizen of his just liberty without a hearing, whether he be a
Christian or non-Christian. All persons in the Philippine Islands are entitled to
a hearing, at least, before they are deprived of their liberty.
MOIR, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
I realize that a dissenting opinion carries little weight, but may sense of
justice will not permit me to let this decision go on record without expressing
may strong dissent from the opinion of Justice Malcolm, concurred in by a
majority of the court. I shall not attempt to analyze the opinion or to go into
the question in detail. I shall simply state, as briefly as may be, the legal and
human side of the case as it presents itself to my mind.
The facts are that one Rubi and various other Manguianes in the Province of
Mindoro were ordered by the Provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their
residence from their native habitat and to establish themselves on a
reservation at Tigbao in the Province of Mindoro and to remain there, or be
punished by imprisonment if they escaped. This reservation, as appears
from the resolution of the provincial board, extends over an area of 800
hectares of land, which is approximately 2,000 acres, on which about three
hundred manguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes, Dabalos,
escaped from the reservation and was taken in hand by the provincial sheriff
and placed in prision at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the
reservation. The Manguianes used out a writ of habeas corpus in this court,
alleging that they are deprived of their liberty in violation of law.
The Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands makes return to the writ
copied in the majority opinion which states that the provincial governor of
Mindoro with the prior approval of his act by the Department Secretary
ordered the placing of the petitioners and others on a reservation.
The manguianes, it is stated on page 694 of the majority opinion, "are very
low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced
beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are peaceful, timid, primitive,
seminomadic people. They number approximately 15,000 (?). The
manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as indicated in
the preamble to Act No. 547, have no progressed sufficiently in civilization to
make it practicable to bring them under any for of municipal government."
It may be well to add that the last P.I. Census (1903) shows that the Island
of Mindoro (not including smaller islands which together make the Province
of Mindoro) has an area of 3,851 square miles and a populations of 28, 361
of which 7, 369 are wild or uncivilized tribes (Manguianes). This appears to
be the total Mangyan population of the province. The total population was
less than seven to the mile (Vol. 2, P.I. Census, pp. 30 and 407).
The Island is fertile, heavily wooded and well watered.
It has no savage population, but it is sparsely settled by Christian Filipinos
along the coast and by Manguianes.
The Manguianes roamed its mountains and valleys, fishing and hunting at
will long before Magallanes [Magellan] anchored his boats in the water of
Cebu. They have made little or no progress in the ways of civilization. "They
are a peaceful, timid, primitive, seminomadic people," whom the
Government of the Philippines Islands would bring under the beneficient
influence of civilization and progress.
The law provides for it in section 2145 of the Administrative Code, and for
those who like Dadalos do not take kindly to the ways provided for civilizing
them section 2759 provides the punishment.
35
The attorney for the petitioners has raised various constitutional questions,
but only the fundamental one will be considered by me. It is that the sections
of the Administrative Code, 2145 and 2759, quoted in the majority opinion,
are in violation of the first paragraph of section 3 of the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916, which reads as follows:
That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person
of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or deny to any person
therein the equal protection of the laws.
It is not necessary to argue that a Mangyan is one of the persons protected
by that provision.
The Attorney-General argues that the treatment provided for the
Manguianes is similar to that accorded the Indians in the United States, and
reference is made all through the court's decision to the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court with reference to the Indians. It is not
considered necessary to go into these cases for the simple reason that all
the Indians nations in the United States were considered as separate
nations and all acts taken in regard to them were the result of separate
treaties made by the United States Government with the Indian nations, and,
incompliance with these treaties, reservations were set apart for them on
which they lived and were protected form intrusion and molestation by white
men. Some these reservations were larger than the Islands of Luzon, and
they were not measured in hectares but in thousands of square miles.
The Manguianes are not a separate state. They have no treaty with the
Government of the Philippine Islands by which they have agreed to live
within a certain district where they are accorded exclusive rights. They are
citizens of the Philippine Islands. Legally they are Filipinos. They are entitled
to all the rights and privileges of any other citizen of this country. And when
the provincial governor of the Province of Mindoro attempted to take them
from their native habitat and to hold them on the little reservation of about
800 hectares, he deprived them of their rights and their liberty without due
process of law, and they were denied the equal protection of the law.
The majority opinion says "they are restrained for their own good and the
general good of the Philippines."
They are to be made to accept the civilization of the more advanced Filipinos
whether they want it or not. They are backward and deficient in culture and
must be moved from their homes, however humble they may be and "bought
under the bells" and made to stay on a reservation.
Are these petitioners charged with any crime? There is no mention in the
return of the Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands of any crime having
been committed by these "peacefully, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people."
A memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands is
copied in extenso in the majority opinion, and from it I gather the nature of
their offense which is that —
Living a nomadic and wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization,
they (the manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction — burning
and destroying the forests and making illegal caiñgins thereon. No bringing
any benefit to the State but, instead, injuring and damaging its interests,
what will ultimately become of those people with the sort of liberty they wish
to preserve and for which they are not fighting in court? They will ultimately
become a heavy burden to the State and, on account of their ignorance, they
will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to
involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right conception of
liberty and does not practice liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty
as the right to do anything they will — going from one place to another in the
mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal caiñgins
thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how
can they are being deprived thereof without due process of law?
xxx xxx xxx
But does the constitutional guaranty that "no person shall be deprived of his
liberty without due process of law" apply to a class of persons who do not
have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practise liberty in a rightful
way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of
such class of persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar,
that the Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare
and advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this
people be let alone in the mountains and in a permanent state of savagery
without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true
and noble sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the
Government has been placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or
guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure was adopted as
36
the one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience.
xxx xxx xxx
The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended
more and more towards the education and civilization of such people and
fitting them to be citizens.
There appear to be two intimations or charges in this memorandum; one is
that the Manguianes destroy the forest by making a caiñgin. What is a
"caiñgin?" Simply this. These people move their camp or place of abode
frequently and when they do move to a new place, it is necessary to clear
the land in order to plant corn and camotes (sweet potatoes) and they cut
down the smaller trees and burn these around the larger ones, killing them,
so that they can plant their crops. The fires never spread in the tropical
undergrowth of an island like Mindoro, but the trees within the caiñgin are
killed and crops are planted and harvested. This land may be abandoned
later on — due to superstition, to a lack of game in the neighborhood, to
poor crops from exhausted fertility, or to a natural desire to move on.
Granting that the Manguianes do make caiñgins or clear lands in spots and
then abandon them for the more fertile lands, which every man knows to be
just over the hills, we cannot see that they are committing such a great
abuse as to justify incarcerating them on a small tract of land — for
incarceration it is and nothing less.
The second intimation or charge is that "they will become a heavy burden to
the state and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and
make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude
by those who want to abuse them." They have never been a burden to the
state and never will be. They have not committed crimes and, when they do,
let the law punish them." The authorities are anticipating too much from
these "peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people." Their history does
not demonstrate that we must expect them to commit crimes and jail them to
prevent the possibility. But the Secretary says "they will be subjected to
involuntary servitude by those want to abuse them." Are they more liable to
be subjected to involuntary servitude when left free to roam their native hills
and gain a livelihood as they have been accustomed to for hundreds of
years, than they will be if closely confined on a narrow reservation from
which they may not escape without facing a term in jail? Is not more likely
that they will be glad to exchange their "freedom" on a small reservation for
the great boon of binding themselves and their children to the more fortunate
Christian Filipinos who will feed them and clothe them in return of their
services.?
It think it not only probable but almost a certainty that they will be all be
subjected to involuntary personal servitude if their freedom is limited as it
has been. How will they live? There may be persons who are willing to lend
them money with which to buy food on the promise that they will work for
them. And if they accept the loan and do not work for the lender we have
another law on the statute books, Act No. 2098, into whose noose they run
their necks, and they may be fined not more than two hundred pesos or
imprisonment for not exceeding six months or both, and when the sentence
expires they must again go into debt or starve, and if they do not work will
again go to jail, and this maybe repeated till they are too old to work and are
cast adrift.
The manguianes have committed no offenses and are charged with none. It
does not appear they were ever consulted about their reconcentration. It
does not appear that they had any hearing or were allowed to make any
defense. It seems they were gathered here and there whenever found by the
authorities of the law and forcibly placed upon the reservation, because they
are "non-Christian," and because the provincial governor ordered it. Let it be
clear there is no discrimination because of religion. The term "non-Christian"
means one who is not a Christian Filipino, but it also means any of the so-
called "wild" or backward tribes of the Philippines. These non-Christian tribes
are Moros, Igorrotes, Bukidnons, Ifugaos, Manguianes and various others,
about one millions souls all together. Some of them, like the Moros,
Tinguianes and Ifugaos, have made great progress in civilization. The have
beautiful fields reclaimed by hard labor — they have herds of cattle and
horses and some few of them are well educated. Some of the non-
Christians, like the Aetas and the Negritos, are very low in the scale of
civilization, but they are one and all "non-Christians," as the term is used and
understood in law and in fact.
All of them, according to the court's opinion under the present law, may be
taken from their homes and herded on a reservation at the instance of the
provincial governor, with the prior approval of the department head. To state
such a monstrous proposition is to show the wickedness and illegality of the
section of the law under which these people are restrained of their liberty.
But it is argued that there is no probability of the department head ever
giving his approval to such a crime, but the fact that he can do it and has
done it in the present case in what makes the law unconstitutional. The
arbitrary and unrestricted power to do harm should be the measure by which
a law's legality is tested and not the probability of doing harm.
It has been said that this is a government of laws and not of men; that there
is no arbitrary body of individuals; that the constitutional principles upon
which our government and its institutions rest do not leave room for the play
and action of purely personal and arbitrary power, but that all in authority are
37
guided and limited by these provisions which the people have, the through
the organic law, declared shall be the measure and scope of all control
exercised over them. In particular the fourteenth amendment, and especially
the equal protection clause, thereof, forbids that the individual shall be
subjected to any arbitrary exercise of the powers of government; it was
intended to prohibit, and does prohibit, any arbitrary deprivation of life or
liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property.
As we have seen, a statute which makes a purely arbitrary or unreasonable
classification, or which singles out any particular individuals or class as the
subject of hostile and discriminating legislation, is clearly unconstitutional as
being opposed to the fourteenth amendment and especially to the equal
protection clause thereof. This is a plain case, and requires no further
discussion. (Vol. 4, Encyclopedia of U.S. Supreme Court Reports, p. 366.)
When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of
government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and
review the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that
they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal
and arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for its
is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers
are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with
the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. And the
law is the definition and limitation of power. It is, indeed, quite true, that there
must always be lodged somewhere, and in some person or body, the
authority of final decision; and, in many cases of mere administration the
responsibility is purely political, no appeal lying except to the ultimate
tribunal of the public judgment, exercised either in the pressure of opinion or
by means of the suffrage. But the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness, considered as individual possessions, are secured by
those maxims of constitutional law which are the monuments showing the
victorious progress of the race in securing to men the blessings of civilization
under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the famous language of
Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the Government of Commonwealth "may be a
government of law and not of men." For the very idea that one man may be
compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right
essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be
intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of
slavery itself. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U.S., 374.)
It is said that the present law is an old Act being substance Act No. 547 of
the Philippine Commission. But it has never been brought before this court
for determination of its constitutionality. No matter how beneficient the
motives of the lawmakers if the lawmakers if the law tends to deprive any
man of life, liberty, or property without due process law, it is void.

In may opinion the acts complained of which were taken in conformity with
section 2145 of the Administrative Code not only deprive these Manguianes
of their liberty, without due process of law, but will in all probability deprive
them of their life, without due process of law. History teaches that to take a
semi-nomadic tribe from their native fastnesses and to transfer them to the
narrow confines of a reservation is to invite disease an suffering and death.
From my long experience in the Islands, I should say that it would be a crime
of title less magnitude to take the Ifugaos from their mountain homes where
they have reclaimed a wilderness and made it a land of beauty and
fruitfulness and to transfer them to the more fertile, unoccupied, malaria
infested valleys which they look down upon from their fields — than it would
be to order their decapitation en masse.
There can be no denial that the Ifugaos are "non-Christians," or "wild tribes"
and are in exactly the same category as the Manguianes. If the Manguianes
may be so taken from their native habitat and reconcentrated on a
reservation — in effect an open air jail — then so may the Ifugaos, so may
the Tinguianes, who have made more progress than the Ifugaos, and so
may the Moros.
There are "non-Christian" in nearly every province in the Philippine Islands.
All of the thirty-nine governors upon the prior approval of the head of the
department, have the power under this law to take the non-Christian
inhabitants of their different provinces form their homes and put them on a
reservation for "their own good and the general good of the Philippines," and
the court will grant them no relief. These unfortunate citizens of the
Philippine Islands would hold their liberty, and their lives, may be, subject to
the unregulated discretion of the provincial governor.
And who would be safe?
After the reservation is once established might not a provincial governor
decide that some political enemy was a non-Christian, and that he would be
safer on the reservation. No matter what his education and culture, he could
have no trial, he could make no defense, the judge of the court might be in a
distant province and not within reach, and the provincial governor's fiat is
final.
The case of the United States vs. Crook (Federal Cases 14891), cited in the
majority opinion, should be quoted at length. District Judge Dundy said:
During the fifteen years in which I have been engaged in administering the
laws of my country, I have never been called upon to hear or decide a case
that appealed so strongly to my sympathy as the one now under
38
consideration. On the one side, we have a few of the remnants of a once
numerous and powerful, but now weak, insignificant, unlettered, and
generally despised race; and the other, we have the representative of one of
the most powerful, most enlightened, and most christianized nations of
modern times. On the one side, we have the representatives of this wasted
race coming into this national tribunal of ours, asking for justice and liberty to
enable them to adopt our boasted civilization, and to pursue the arts of
peace, which have made us great and happy as a nation; on the other side,
we have this magnificent, if not magnanimous, government, resisting this
application with the determination of sending these people back to the
country which is to them less desirable perpetual imprisonment in their own
native land. But I think it is creditable to the heart and mind of the brave and
distinguished officer who is made respondent herein to say that he has no
sort of sympathy in the business in which he is forced by his position to bear
a part so conspicuous; and, so far as I am individually concerned, I think it
not improper to say that, if the strongest possible sympathy could give the
relators title to freedom, they would have been restored to liberty the
moment the arguments in their behalf were closed. no examination or further
thought would then have been necessary or expedient. But in a country
where liberty is regulated by law, something more satisfactory and enduring
than mere sympathy must furnish and constitute the rule and basis of judicial
action. It follows that this case must be examined and decided on principles
of law, and that unless the relators are entitled to their discharge under the
constitution or laws of the United States, or some treaty, they must be
remanded to the custody of the officer who caused their arrest, to be
returned to the Indian Territory which they left without the consent of the
government.
On the 8th of April, 1879, the relators Standing Bear and twenty-five others,
during the session of the court held at that time of Lincoln, presented their
petition, duly verified, praying for the allowance of a writ of habeas corpus
and their final discharged from custody thereunder.
The petition alleges, in substance, that the relators are Indians who have
formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians now located in the Indian
Territory; that they had some time previously withdrawn from the tribe, and
completely severed their tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the
general habits of the whites, and were then endeavoring to maintain
themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or assistance from the
general government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and without being
guilty of violating any of the laws of the United States, they were arrested
and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent, George Crook.
The writ was issued and served on the respondent on the 8th day of April,
and, the distance between the place where the writ was made returnable
and the place where the relators were confined being more than twenty
miles, ten days were alloted in which to make return.
On the 18th of April the writ was returned, and the authority for the arrest
and detention is therein shown. The substance of the return to the writ, and
the additional statement since filed, is that the relators are individual
members of, and connected with, the Ponca Tribe of Indians; that they had
fled or escaped from a reservation situated in some place within the limits of
the indian Territory — had departed therefrom without permission from the
government; and, at the request of the secretary of the interior, the general
of the army had issued an order which required the respondent to arrest and
return the relators to their tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to
the said order, he had caused the relators to be arrested on the Omaha
Indian reservation, and that they were in his custody for the purpose of being
returned to the Indian Territory.
It is claimed upon the one side, and denied upon the other, that the relators
had withdrawn and severed, for all time, their connection with the tribe to
which they belonged; and upon this point alone was there any testimony
produced by either party hereto. The other matter stated in the petition and
the return to the writ are conceded to be true; so that the questions to be
determined are purely questions of law.
On the 8th of Mar, 1859, a treaty was made by the United States with the
Ponca tribe of Indians, by which a certain tract of country, north of the
Niobrara river and west of the Missouri, was set apart for the permanent
home of the aid Indians, in which the government agreed to protect them
during their good behaviour. But just when or how, or why, or under what
circumstances, the Indians left their reservation in Dakota and went to the
Indian Territory does not appear.
xxx xxx xxx
A question of much greater importance remains for consideration, which,
when determined, will be decisive of this whole controversy. This relates to
the right of the government to arrest and hold the relators for a time, for the
purpose of being returned to a point in the Indian Territory from which it is
alleged the Indians escaped. I am not vain enough to think that I can do full
justice to a question like the one under consideration. But, as the mater
furnishes so much valuable material for discussion, and so much food for
reflection, I shall try to present it as viewed from my own standpoint, without
reference to consequences or criticisms, which, though not specially invited,
will be sure to follow.
xxx xxx xxx
39
On the 15th day of August, 1876, congress passed the general Indian
appropriation bill, and in it we find a provision authorizing the secretary of the
interior to use $25,000 for the removal of the Poncas to the Indian Territory,
and providing them a home therein, with consent of the tribe. (19 Sta., 192.)
xxx xxx xxx
The Poncas lived upon their reservation in southern Dakota, and cultivated a
portion of the same, until two or three years ago, when they removed
therefrom, but whether by force or otherwise does not appear. At all event,
we find a portion of them, including the relators, located at some point in the
Indian Territory. There, the testimony seems to show, is where the trouble
commenced. Standing Bear, the principal witness, states that out of five
hundred and eighty-one Indians who went from the reservation in Dakota to
the Indian Territory, one hundred and fifty-eight died within a year or so, and
a great proportion of the others were sick and disabled, caused, in a great
measure, no doubt, from change of climate; and to save himself and the
survivors of his wasted family, and the feeble remnant of his little band of
followers, he determined to leave the Indian Territory and return to his old
home, where, to use his own language, "he might live and die in peace, and
be buried with his fathers." He also stated that he informed the agent of their
final purpose to leave, never to return, and that he and his followers had
finally, fully, and forever severed his and their connection with the Ponca
tribe of Indians, and had resolved to disband as a tribe, or band of Indians,
and to cut loose from the government, go to work, become self-sustaining,
and adopt the habits and customs of a higher civilization. To accomplish
what would seem to be a desirable and laudable purpose, all who were able
to do so went to work to earn a living. The Omaha Indians, who speak the
same language, and with whom many of the Poncas have long continued to
intermarry, gave them employment and ground to cultivate, so as to make
them self-sustaining. And it was when at the Omaha reservation, and when
thus employed, that they were arrested by order of the government, for the
purpose of being taken back to the Indian Territory. They claim to be unable
to see the justice, or reason, or wisdom, or necessity, of removing them by
force from their own native plains and blood relations to a far-off country, in
which they can see little but new-made graves opening for their reception.
The land from which they fled in fear has no attractions for them. The love of
home and native land was strong enough in the minds of these people to
induce them to brave every peril to return and live and die where they had
been reared. The bones of the dead son of Standing Bear were not to
repose in the land they hoped to be leaving forever, but were carefully
preserved and protected and formed a part of what was to them melancholy
procession homeward. Such instances of parental affections, and such love
home and native land, may be heathen in origin, but it seems to that they are
not unlike Christian in principle.

And the court declared that the Indians were illegally held by authority of the
United States and in violation of their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness, and ordered their release from custody.

This case is very similarly to the case of Standing Bear and others.

I think this Court should declare that section 2145 and 2759 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 are unconstitutional, null and void, and that the
petitioners are illegally restrained of their liberty, and that they have been
denied the equal protection of the law, and order the respondents
immediately to liberate all of the petitioners.

40
G.R. No. L-10202 March 27, 1917
The contention of the plaintiff is not well founded. The delegation of the
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS EX REL. THE power referred to on the Governor-General does not involve an abdication of
MUNICIPALITY OF CARDONA, plaintiff, legislative functions on the part of the legislature with regard to the particular
vs. subject-matter with which it authorizes the Governor-General to deal. It is
THE MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN, ET AL., defendants. simply a transference of certain details with respect to provinces,
municipalities, and townships, many of them newly created, and all of them
Modesto Reyes and Eliseo Ymzon for plaintiff. subject to more or less rapid change both in development and centers of
Moreno and Guevara for defendants. population, the proper regulation of which might require not only prompt
action but action of such a detailed character as not to permit the legislative
MORELAND, J.: body, as such, to take it efficiently. We find no provision of the Act applicable
so far as it touches this case which is in violation of the Act of Congress of
The plaintiff amended his complaint in this action after a demurrer thereto July 1, 1902.
had been sustained. No new or additional facts have been alleged and the
case stands precisely where it stood before the amended complaint was The demurrer is sustained and the complaint is finally dismissed, with costs.
filed. A demurrer having been offered to the amended complaint, that also So ordered.
must be sustained.
Torres, Carson, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.
The plaintiff still insists with great vigor that section 1 of Act No. 1748;
entitled "An Act authorizing the adjustment of provincial and municipal
boundaries and authorizing the change of capitals of provinces and
subprovinces, as may be necessary from time to time to serve the public
convenience and interest," is in violation of the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, in that it delegates legislative powers to the Governor-General,
whereas the Act of Congress referred to lodges those powers in the
Philippine Legislature.

Section 1 of the Act referred to provides in substance that, whenever in the

judgment of the Governor-General the public welfare requires, he may, by
executive order, enlarge, contract, or otherwise change the boundary of any
province, subprovince, municipality, or township or other political
subdivision, or separate any such subdivision into such portions as may be
requires, merge any of such subdivisions with another, divide, any province
into one or more subdivisions as may be required, name any new
subdivision so created, change the seat of government within any
subdivision existing or created thereunder, to such place therein as the
public interests require, and shall fix in such executive order the date when
the change, merger, separation or other action shall take effect. The section
also provides that whenever the Governor-General creates a new political
subdivision he shall appoint such officers for the new subdivision with such
powers and duties as may be required by the existing provisions of law
applicable to the case and fix their salaries; and that such appointees shall
hold office until their successors are appointed or elected and qualify.
Successors to the elective offices shall be elected at the next general
election following such appointment.

41
G.R. No. 47065 June 26, 1940
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
C. de G. Alvear for petitioner.
Evaristo R. Sandoval for respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty years in the business of
transporting passengers in the Province of Pangasinan and Tarlac and, to a
certain extent, in the Province of Nueva Ecija and Zambales, by means of
motor vehicles commonly known as TPU buses, in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the certificates of public convenience issued in its
favor by the former Public Utility Commission in cases Nos. 24948, 30973,
36830, 32014 and 53090. On August 26, 1939, the petitioner filed with the
Public Service Commission an application for authorization to operate ten
additional new Brockway trucks (case No. 56641), on the ground that they
were needed to comply with the terms and conditions of its existing
certificates and as a result of the application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. In
the decision of September 26, 1939, granting the petitioner's application for
increase of equipment, the Public Service Commission ordered:
Y de acuerdo con que se provee por el articulo 15 de la ley No. 146 del
Commonwealth, tal como ha sido enmendada por el articulo 1 de la Ley No.
454, por la presente se enmienda las condiciones de los certificados de
convenciencia publica expedidos en los expedientes Nos. 24948, 30973,
36831, 32014 y la authorizacion el el expediente No. 53090, asi que se
consideran incorporadas en los mismos las dos siguientes condiciones:
Que los certificados de conveniencia publica y authorizacion arriba
mencionados seran validos y subsistentes solamente durante de veinticinco
(25) anos, contados desde la fecha de la promulgacion de esta decision.
Que la empresa de la solicitante porda ser adquirida por el Commonwealth
de Filipinas o por alguna dependencia del mismo en cualquier tiempo que lo
deseare previo pago del precio d costo de su equipo util, menos una
depreciacion razonable que se ha fijar por la Comision al tiempo de su
adquisicion.
Not being agreeable to the two new conditions thus incorporated in its
existing certificates, the petitioner filed on October 9, 1939 a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the Public Service Commission on
42
November 14, 1939. Whereupon, on November 20, 1939, the present
petition for a writ of certiorari was instituted in this court praying that an order
be issued directing the secretary of the Public Service Commission to certify
forthwith to this court the records of all proceedings in case No. 56641; that
this court, after hearing, render a decision declaring section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 454 unconstitutional and void; that, if this court
should be of the opinion that section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454 is
constitutional, a decision be rendered declaring that the provisions thereof
are not applicable to valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to June 8,
1939. Stated in the language of the petitioner, it is contended:
1. That the legislative powers granted to the Public Service Commission by
section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454, without limitation, guide or rule
except the unfettered discretion and judgment of the Commission, constitute
a complete and total abdication by the Legislature of its functions in the
premises, and for that reason, the Act, in so far as those powers are
concerned, is unconstitutional and void.
2. That even if it be assumed that section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454,
is valid delegation of legislative powers, the Public Service Commission has
exceeded its authority because: (a) The Act applies only to future certificates
and not to valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to June 8, 1939,
when said Act took effect, and (b) the Act, as applied by the Commission,
violates constitutional guarantees.
Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 454, invoked by the respondent Public Service
Commission in the decision complained of in the present proceedings, reads
as follows:
With the exception to those enumerated in the preceding section, no public
service shall operate in the Philippines without possessing a valid and
subsisting certificate from the Public Service Commission, known as
"certificate of public convenience," or "certificate of convenience and public
necessity," as the case may be, to the effect that the operation of said
service and the authorization to do business will promote the public interests
in a proper and suitable manner.
The Commission may prescribed as a condition for the issuance of the
certificate provided in the preceding paragraph that the service can be
acquired by the Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumentality
thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful equipment, less
reasonable depreciation; and likewise, that the certificate shall valid only for
a definite period of time; and that the violation of any of these conditions
shall produce the immediate cancellation of the certificate without the
necessity of any express action on the part of the Commission.
In estimating the depreciation, the effect of the use of the equipment, its
actual condition, the age of the model, or other circumstances affecting its
value in the market shall be taken into consideration.
The foregoing is likewise applicable to any extension or amendment of
certificates actually force and to those which may hereafter be issued, to
permits to modify itineraries and time schedules of public services and to
authorization to renew and increase equipment and properties.
Under the first paragraph of the aforequoted section 15 of Act No. 146, as
amended, no public service can operate without a certificate of public
convenience or certificate of convenience and public necessity to the effect
that the operation of said service and the authorization to do business will
"public interests in a proper and suitable manner." Under the second
paragraph, one of the conditions which the Public Service Commission may
prescribed the issuance of the certificate provided for in the first paragraph is
that "the service can be acquired by the Commonwealth of the Philippines or
by any instrumental thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful
equipment, less reasonable depreciation," a condition which is virtually a
restatement of the principle already embodied in the Constitution, section 6
of Article XII, which provides that "the State may, in the interest of national
welfare and defense, establish and operate industries and means of
transportation and communication, and, upon payment of just compensation,
transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be
operated by the Government. "Another condition which the Commission may
prescribed, and which is assailed by the petitioner, is that the certificate
"shall be valid only for a definite period of time." As there is a relation
between the first and second paragraphs of said section 15, the two
provisions must be read and interpreted together. That is to say, in issuing a
certificate, the Commission must necessarily be satisfied that the operation
of the service under said certificate during a definite period fixed therein "will
promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner." Under section
16 (a) of Commonwealth Act. No. 146 which is a complement of section 15,
the Commission is empowered to issue certificates of public convenience
whenever it "finds that the operation of the public service proposed and the
authorization to do business will promote the public interests in a proper and
suitable manner." Inasmuch as the period to be fixed by the Commission
under section 15 is inseparable from the certificate itself, said period cannot
be disregarded by the Commission in determining the question whether the
issuance of the certificate will promote the public interests in a proper and
suitable manner. Conversely, in determining "a definite period of time," the
Commission will be guided by "public interests," the only limitation to its
power being that said period shall not exceed fifty years (sec. 16 (a),
43
Commonwealth Act No. 146; Constitution, Art. XIII, sec. 8.) We have already
ruled that "public interest" furnishes a sufficient standard. (People vs.
Fernandez and Trinidad, G. R. No. 45655, promulgated June 15, 1938;
People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeña, G. R. Nos. 46076 and 46077,
promulgated June 12, 1939, citing New York Central Securities Corporation
vs. U.S.A., 287 U.S. 12, 24, 25, 77 Law. ed. 138, 145, 146; Schenchter
Poultry Corporation vs. I.S., 295, 540, 79 Law. ed. 1570, 1585; Ferrazzini vs.
Gsell, 34 Phil., 697, 711-712.)
Section 8 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides, among other things, that
no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation
of a public utility shall be "for a longer period than fifty years," and when it
was ordained, in section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 454, that the Public Service Commission may
prescribed as a condition for the issuance of a certificate that it "shall be
valid only for a definite period of time" and, in section 16 (a) that "no such
certificates shall be issued for a period of more than fifty years," the National
Assembly meant to give effect to the aforesaid constitutional mandate. More
than this, it has thereby also declared its will that the period to be fixed by
the Public Service Commission shall not be longer than fifty years. All that
has been delegated to the Commission, therefore, is the administrative
function, involving the use discretion, to carry out the will of the National
Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of "public interests in a
proper and suitable manner." The fact that the National Assembly may itself
exercise the function and authority thus conferred upon the Public Service
Commission does not make the provision in question constitutionally
objectionable.
The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to
secure action and at the same time to forestall overaction which necessarily
results from undue concentration of powers, and thereby obtain efficiency
and prevent deposition. Thereby, the "rule of law" was established which
narrows the range of governmental action and makes it subject to control by
certain devices. As a corollary, we find the rule prohibiting delegation of
legislative authority, and from the earliest time American legal authorities
have proceeded on the theory that legislative power must be exercised by
the legislature alone. It is frankness, however, to confess that as one delves
into the mass of judicial pronouncement, he finds a great deal of confusion.
One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of
separation of powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non potest
delegari or delegata potestas non potest delegari, attributed to Bracton (De
Legius et Consuetedinious Angliae, edited by G. E. Woodbine, Yale
University Press, 1922, vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized in
principle in the Roman Law (D. 17.18.3), has been made to adapt itself to
the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within
certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the
United States and England but in practically all modern governments.
(People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeña, G. R. Nos. 46076 and 46077,
promulgated June 12, 1939.) Accordingly, with the growing complexity of
modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation,
and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly
growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature,
and toward the approval of the practice by the court. (Dillon Catfish Drainage
Dist, v. Bank of Dillon, 141 S. E. 274, 275, 143 S. Ct. 178; State vs. Knox
County, 54 S. W. 2d. 973, 976, 165 Tenn. 319.) In harmony with such
growing tendency, this Court, since the decision in the case of Compañia
General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioner
(34 Phil., 136), relied upon by the petitioner, has, in instances, extended its
seal of approval to the "delegation of greater powers by the legislature."
(Inchausti Steamship Co. vs. Public Utility Commissioner, 44 Phil., Autobus
Co. vs. De Jesus, 56 Phil., 446; People vs. Fernandez & Trinidad, G. R. No.
45655, promulgated June 15, 1938; People vs. Rosenthal & Osmeña, G. R.
Nos. 46076, 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939; and Robb and Hilscher vs.
People, G. R. No. 45866, promulgated June 12, 1939.).
Under the fourth paragraph of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 454, the power of the Public Service
Commission to prescribed the conditions "that the service can be acquired
by the Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumentality thereof
upon payment of the cost price of its useful equipment, less reasonable,"
and "that the certificate shall be valid only for a definite period of time" is
expressly made applicable "to any extension or amendment of certificates
actually in force" and "to authorizations to renew and increase equipment
and properties." We have examined the legislative proceedings on the
subject and have found that these conditions were purposely made
applicable to existing certificates of public convenience. The history of
Commonwealth Act No. 454 reveals that there was an attempt to suppress,
by way of amendment, the sentence "and likewise, that the certificate shall
be valid only for a definite period of time," but the attempt failed:
xxx xxx xxx
Sr. CUENCO. Señor Presidente, para otra enmienda. En la misma pagina,
lineas 23 y 24, pido que se supriman las palabras 'and likewise, that the
certificate shall be valid only for a definite period time.' Esta disposicion del
proyecto autoriza a la Comision de Servicios Publicos a fijar un plazo de
vigencia certificado de conveniencia publica. Todo el mundo sabe que bo se
puede determinar cuando los intereses del servicio publico requiren la
explotacion de un servicio publico y ha de saber la Comision de Servisios, si
en un tiempo determinado, la explotacion de algunos buses en cierta ruta ya
44
no tiene de ser, sobre todo, si tiene en cuenta; que la explotacion de los
servicios publicos depende de condiciones flutuantes, asi como del volumen
como trafico y de otras condiciones. Ademas, el servicio publico se concede
por la Comision de Servicios Publicos el interes publico asi lo exige. El
interes publico no tiene duracion fija, no es permanente; es un proceso mas
o menos indefinido en cuanto al tiempo. Se ha acordado eso en el caucus
de anoche.
EL PRESIDENTE PRO TEMPORE. ¿Que dice el Comite?
Sr. ALANO. El Comite siente tener que rechazar esa enmienda, en vista de
que esto certificados de conveniencia publica es igual que la franquicia:
sepuede extender. Si los servicios presentados por la compañia durante el
tiempo de su certificado lo require, puede pedir la extension y se le
extendera; pero no creo conveniente el que nosotros demos un certificado
de conveniencia publica de una manera que podria pasar de cincuenta
anos, porque seria anticonstitucional.
xxx xxx xxx
By a majority vote the proposed amendment was defeated. (Sesion de 17 de
mayo de 1939, Asamblea Nacional.)
The petitioner is mistaken in the suggestion that, simply because its existing
certificates had been granted before June 8, 1939, the date when
Commonwealth Act No. 454, amendatory of section 15 of Commonwealth
Act No. 146, was approved, it must be deemed to have the right of holding
them in perpetuity. Section 74 of the Philippine Bill provided that "no
franchise, privilege, or concession shall be granted to any corporation except
under the conditions that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or
repeal by the Congress of the United States." The Jones Law, incorporating
a similar mandate, provided, in section 28, that "no franchise or right shall be
granted to any individual, firm, or corporation except under the conditions
that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress
of the United States." Lastly, the Constitution of the Philippines provided, in
section 8 of Article XIII, that "no franchise or right shall be granted to any
individual, firm, or corporation, except under the condition that it shall be
subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the National Assembly when
the public interest so requires." The National Assembly, by virtue of the
Constitution, logically succeeded to the Congress of the United States in the
power to amend, alter or repeal any franchise or right granted prior to or
after the approval of the Constitution; and when Commonwealth Acts Nos.
146 and 454 were enacted, the National Assembly, to the extent therein
provided, has declared its will and purpose to amend or alter existing
certificates of public convenience.

Upon the other hand, statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities,
being a proper exercise by the state of its police power, are applicable not
only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but
likewise to those already established and in operation.
Nor is there any merit in petitioner's contention, that, because of the
establishment of petitioner's operations prior to May 1, 1917, they are not
subject to the regulations of the Commission. Statutes for the regulation of
public utilities are a proper exercise by the state of its police power. As soon
as the power is exercised, all phases of operation of established utilities,
become at once subject to the police power thus called into operation.
Procedures' Transportation Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251 U. S. 228, 40
Sup. Ct. 131, 64 Law. ed. 239, Law v. Railroad Commission, 184 Cal. 737,
195 Pac. 423, 14 A. L. R. 249. The statute is applicable not only to those
public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to those
already established and in operation. The 'Auto Stage and Truck
Transportation Act' (Stats. 1917, c. 213) is a statute passed in pursuance of
the police power. The only distinction recognized in the statute between
those established before and those established after the passage of the act
is in the method of the creation of their operative rights. A certificate of public
convenience and necessity it required for any new operation, but no such
certificate is required of any transportation company for the operation which
was actually carried on in good faith on May 1, 1917, This distinction in the
creation of their operative rights in no way affects the power of the
Commission to supervise and regulate them. Obviously the power of the
Commission to hear and dispose of complaints is as effective against
companies securing their operative rights prior to May 1, 1917, as against
those subsequently securing such right under a certificate of public
convenience and necessity. (Motor Transit Co. et al. v. Railroad Commission
of California et al., 209 Pac. 586.)
Moreover, Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 are not only the organic
acts of the Public Service Commission but are "a part of the charter of every
utility company operating or seeking to operate a franchise" in the
Philippines. (Streator Aqueduct Co. v. et al., 295 Fed. 385.) The business of
a common carrier holds such a peculiar relation to the public interest that
there is superinduced upon it the right of public regulation. When private
property is "affected with a public interest it ceased to be juris privati only."
When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has
an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must
submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of
the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discounting
the use, but so long as he maintains the use he must submit to control.
Indeed, this right of regulation is so far beyond question that it is well settled
45
that the power of the state to exercise legislative control over public utilities
may be exercised through boards of commissioners. (Fisher vs. Yangco
Steamship Company, 31 Phil., 1, citing Munn vs. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113;
Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. vs. Smith, 128 U.S. 174; Budd vs. New York, 143
U.S. 517; New York etc. R. Co. vs. Bristol 151 U.S. 556, 571; Connecticut
etc. R. Co. vs. Woodruff, 153 U.S. 689; Louisville etc. Ry Co. vs. Kentucky,
161 U.S. 677, 695.) This right of the state to regulate public utilities is
founded upon the police power, and statutes for the control and regulation of
utilities are a legitimate exercise thereof, for the protection of the public as
well as of the utilities themselves. Such statutes are, therefore, not
unconstitutional, either impairing the obligation of contracts, taking property
without due process, or denying the equal protection of the laws, especially
inasmuch as the question whether or not private property shall be devoted to
a public and the consequent burdens assumed is ordinarily for the owner to
decide; and if he voluntarily places his property in public service he cannot
complain that it becomes subject to the regulatory powers of the state. (51
C. J., sec. 21, pp. 9-10.) in the light of authorities which hold that a certificate
of public convenience constitutes neither a franchise nor contract, confers no
property right, and is mere license or privilege. (Burgess vs. Mayor &
Alderman of Brockton, 235 Mass. 95, 100, 126 N. E. 456; Roberto vs.
Commisioners of Department of Public Utilities, 262 Mass. 583, 160 N. E.
321; Scheible vs. Hogan, 113 Ohio St. 83, 148 N. E. 581; Martz vs. Curtis [J.
L.] Cartage Co. [1937], 132 Ohio St. 271, 7 N. E. [d] 220; Manila Yellow
Taxicab Co. vs. Sabellano, 59 Phil., 773.)
Whilst the challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid
and constitutional, we are, however, of the opinion that the decision of the
Public Service Commission should be reversed and the case remanded
thereto for further proceedings for the reason now to be stated. The Public
Service Commission has power, upon proper notice and hearing, "to amend,
modify or revoke at any time any certificate issued under the provisions of
this Act, whenever the facts and circumstances on the strength of which said
certificate was issued have been misrepresented or materially changed."
(Section 16, par. [m], Commonwealth Act No. 146.) The petitioner's
application here was for an increase of its equipment to enable it to comply
with the conditions of its certificates of public convenience. On the matter of
limitation to twenty five (25) years of the life of its certificates of public
convenience, there had been neither notice nor opportunity given the
petitioner to be heard or present evidence. The Commission appears to
have taken advantage of the petitioner to augment petitioner's equipment in
imposing the limitation of twenty-five (25) years which might as well be
twenty or fifteen or any number of years. This is, to say the least, irregular
and should not be sanctioned. There are cardinal primary rights which must
be respected even in proceedings of this character. The first of these rights
is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In
the language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., (304 U.S. 1, 58 S.
Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129), "the liberty and property of the citizen shall
be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play." Not only must the
party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan vs. U.S.,
298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 :Law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this
Court in Edwards vs. McCoy (22 Phil., 598), "the right to adduce evidence,
without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain.
Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the
evidence is presented can thrust it aside without or consideration." While the
duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to
support it is a nullity, at least when directly attacked. (Edwards vs. McCoy,
supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental principle that the
genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited
power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.

The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case remanded to
the Public Service Commission for further proceedings in accordance with
law and this decision, without any pronouncement regarding costs. So
ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.

46
G.R. No. L-4043 May 26, 1952
CENON S. CERVANTES, petitioner,
vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
Cenon Cervantes in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar
for respondent.
REYES, J.:
This is a petition to review a decision of the Auditor General denying
petitioner's claim for quarters allowance as manager of the National Abaca
and Other Fibers Corporation, otherwise known as the NAFCO.
It appears that petitioner was in 1949 the manager of the NAFCO with a
salary of P15,000 a year. By a resolution of the Board of Directors of this
corporation approved on January 19 of that year, he was granted quarters
allowance of not exceeding P400 a month effective the first of that month.
Submitted the Control Committee of the Government Enterprises Council for
approval, the said resolution was on August 3, 1949, disapproved by the
said Committee on strenght of the recommendation of the NAFCO auditor,
concurred in by the Auditor General, (1) that quarters allowance constituted
additional compensation prohibited by the charter of the NAFCO, which fixes
the salary of the general manager thereof at the sum not to exceed P15,000
a year, and (2) that the precarious financial condition of the corporation did
not warrant the granting of such allowance.
On March 16, 1949, the petitioner asked the Control Committee to
reconsider its action and approve his claim for allowance for January to June
15, 1949, amounting to P1,650. The claim was again referred by the Control
Committee to the auditor General for comment. The latter, in turn referred it
to the NAFCO auditor, who reaffirmed his previous recommendation and
emphasized that the fact that the corporation's finances had not improved. In
view of this, the auditor General also reiterated his previous opinion against
the granting of the petitioner's claim and so informed both the Control
Committee and the petitioner. But as the petitioner insisted on his claim the
Auditor General Informed him on June 19, 1950, of his refusal to modify his
decision. Hence this petition for review.
The NAFCO was created by the Commonwealth Act No. 332, approved on
June 18, 1939, with a capital stock of P20,000,000, 51 per cent of which was
to be able to be subscribed by the National Government and the remainder
to be offered to provincial, municipal, and the city governments and to the
47
general public. The management the corporation was vested in a board of
directors of not more than 5 members appointed by the president of the
Philippines with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. But the
corporation was made subject to the provisions of the corporation law in so
far as they were compatible with the provisions of its charter and the
purposes of which it was created and was to enjoy the general powers
mentioned in the corporation law in addition to those granted in its charter.
The members of the board were to receive each a per diem of not to exceed
P30 for each day of meeting actually attended, except the chairman of the
board, who was to be at the same time the general manager of the
corporation and to receive a salary not to exceed P15,000 per annum.
On October 4, 1946, Republic Act No. 51 was approved authorizing the
President of the Philippines, among other things, to effect such reforms and
changes in government owned and controlled corporations for the purpose
of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operation Pursuant
to this authority, the President on October 4, 1947, promulgated Executive
Order No. 93 creating the Government Enterprises Council to be composed
of the President of the Philippines as chairman, the Secretary of Commerce
and Industry as vice-chairman, the chairman of the board of directors and
managing heads of all such corporations as ex-officio members, and such
additional members as the President might appoint from time to time with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments. The council was to advise the
President in the excercise of his power of supervision and control over these
corporations and to formulate and adopt such policy and measures as might
be necessary to coordinate their functions and activities. The Executive
Order also provided that the council was to have a Control Committee
composed of the Secretary of Commerce and Industry as chairman, a
member to be designated by the President from among the members of the
council as vice-chairman and the secretary as ex-officio member, and with
the power, among others —
(1) To supervise, for and under the direction of the President, all the
corporations owned or controlled by the Government for the purpose of
insuring efficiency and economy in their operations;
(2) To pass upon the program of activities and the yearly budget of
expenditures approved by the respective Boards of Directors of the said
corporations; and
(3) To carry out the policies and measures formulated by the Government
Enterprises Council with the approval of the President. (Sec. 3, Executive
Order No. 93.)
With its controlling stock owned by the Government and the power of
appointing its directors vested in the President of the Philippines, there can
be no question that the NAFCO is Government controlled corporation
subject to the provisions of Republic Act No. 51 and the executive order (No.
93) promulgated in accordance therewith. Consequently, it was also subject
to the powers of the Control Committee created in said executive order,
among which is the power of supervision for the purpose of insuring
efficiency and economy in the operations of the corporation and also the
power to pass upon the program of activities and the yearly budget of
expenditures approved by the board of directors. It can hardly be questioned
that under these powers the Control Committee had the right to pass upon,
and consequently to approve or disapprove, the resolution of the NAFCO
board of directors granting quarters allowance to the petitioners as such
allowance necessarily constitute an item of expenditure in the corporation's
budget. That the Control Committee had good grounds for disapproving the
resolution is also clear, for, as pointed out by the Auditor General and the
NAFCO auditor, the granting of the allowance amounted to an illegal
increase of petitioner's salary beyond the limit fixed in the corporate charter
and was furthermore not justified by the precarious financial condition of the
corporation.
It is argued, however, that Executive Order No. 93 is null and void, not only
because it is based on a law that is unconstitutional as an illegal delegation
of legislature power to executive, but also because it was promulgated
beyond the period of one year limited in said law.
The second ground ignores the rule that in the computation of the time for
doing an act, the first day is excluded and the last day included (Section 13
Rev. Ad. Code.) As the act was approved on October 4, 1946, and the
President was given a period of one year within which to promulgate his
executive order and that the order was in fact promulgated on October 4,
1947, it is obvious that under the above rule the said executive order was
promulgated within the period given.
As to the first ground, the rule is that so long as the Legislature "lays down a
policy and a standard is established by the statute" there is no undue
delegation. (11 Am. Jur. 957). Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the
President of the Philippines, among others, to make reforms and changes in
government-controlled corporations, lays down a standard and policy that
the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies attendant upon the
establishment of the free and independent government of the Philippines
and to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operations. The
standard was set and the policy fixed. The President had to carry the
mandate. This he did by promulgating the executive order in question which,
tested by the rule above cited, does not constitute an undue delegation of
legislative power.
48
It is also contended that the quarters allowance is not compensation and so
the granting of it to the petitioner by the NAFCO board of directors does not
contravene the provisions of the NAFCO charter that the salary of the
chairman of said board who is also to be general manager shall not exceed
P15,000 per anum. But regardless of whether quarters allowance should be
considered as compensation or not, the resolution of the board of the
directors authorizing payment thereof to the petitioner cannot be given effect
since it was disapproved by the Control Committee in the exercise of powers
granted to it by Executive Order No. 93. And in any event, petitioner's
contention that quarters allowance is not compensation, a proposition on
which American authorities appear divided, cannot be insisted on behalf of
officers and employees working for the Government of the Philippines and
its Instrumentalities, including, naturally, government-controlled corporations.
This is so because Executive Order No. 332 of 1941, which prohibits the
payment of additional compensation to those working for the Government
and its Instrumentalities, including government-controlled corporations, was
in 1945 amended by Executive Order No. 77 by expressly exempting from
the prohibition the payment of quarters allowance "in favor of local
government officials and employees entitled to this under existing law." The
amendment is a clear indication that quarters allowance was meant to be
included in the term "additional compensation", for otherwise the
amendment would not have expressly excepted it from the prohibition. This
being so, we hold that, for the purpose of the executive order just mentioned,
quarters allowance is considered additional compensation and, therefore,
prohibited.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for review is dismissed, with costs.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Bautista
Angelo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965
EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
Zulueta, Gonzales, Paculdo and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of
the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126
to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin.1
Soon after the date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964 petitioner
Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer,
instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as
his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any
disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the
ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No.
2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Respondent
maintains the contrary view and avers that the present action is premature
and that not all proper parties — referring to the officials of the new political
subdivisions in question — have been impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors
of several municipalities adversely affected by the aforementioned executive
orders — because the latter have taken away from the former the barrios
composing the new political subdivisions — intervened in the case.
Moreover, Attorneys Enrique M. Fernando and Emma Quisumbing-
Fernando were allowed to and did appear as amici curiae.
The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names
changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:
All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under
the provisions hereof.
49
Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio
may be created or the name of an existing one may be changed by the
provincial board of the province, upon recommendation of the council of the
municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The
recommendation of the municipal council shall be embodied in a resolution
approved by at least two-thirds of the entire membership of the said council:
Provided, however, That no new barrio may be created if its population is
less than five hundred persons.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became
effective, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their
names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding
provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas
affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or
municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Petitioner argues,
accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a
barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios,
since barrios are units of municipalities?"
Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory that a new
municipality can be created without creating new barrios, such as, by placing
old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new municipality. This theory
overlooks, however, the main import of the petitioner's argument, which is
that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio
implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of
which consists of several barrios. The cogency and force of this argument is
too obvious to be denied or even questioned. Founded upon logic and
experience, it cannot be offset except by a clear manifestation of the intent
of Congress to the contrary, and no such manifestation, subsequent to the
passage of Republic Act No. 2379, has been brought to our attention.
Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the
disputed executive orders are based, provides:
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order
define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince,
municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and
increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province
into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a
province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of such
subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created,
and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such
place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the
authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall
first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to
be defined or any province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces.
When action by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines in
accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the
jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-
General) President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice
of the head of the Department having executive control of such officer, shall
redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers
to the new districts so formed.
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the
foregoing authority, an equitable distribution of the funds and obligations of
the divisions thereby affected shall be made in such manner as may be
recommended by the (Insular Auditor) Auditor General and approved by the
(Governor-General) President of the Philippines.
Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities
under this section does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative
power, relying upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan
(36 Phil. 547), which, he claims, has settled it. Such claim is untenable, for
said case involved, not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere
transfer of territory — from an already existing municipality (Cardona) to
another municipality (Binañgonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior
to said transfer (See Gov't of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of Cardona vs.
Municipality, of Binañgonan [34 Phil. 518, 519-5201) — in consequence of
the fixing and definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common
boundaries of two municipalities.
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common
boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between
adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature —
involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the
law creating said municipalities — the authority to create municipal
corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other
courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" (State ex rel. Higgins vs. Aicklen,
119 S. 425, January 2, 1959) or "solely and exclusively the exercise of
legislative power" (Udall vs. Severn, May 29, 1938, 79 P. 2d 347-349). As
the Supreme Court of Washington has put it (Territory ex rel. Kelly vs.
Stewart, February 13, 1890, 23 Pac. 405, 409), "municipal corporations are
purely the creatures of statutes."
Although1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government
the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration
of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of
powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate2 — and
50
(b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of
his functions.2a Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the
delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the
essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there
would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the
delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.2b Hence, he
could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law,
but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures
inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus
nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our
Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well
settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in
the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out
or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently
precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do
not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the first sentence of
Section 68, the President:
... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such
place therein as the public welfare may require.
It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as
the public welfare may require" qualified, not the clauses preceding the one
just quoted, but only the place to which the seat of the government may be
transferred. This fact becomes more apparent when we consider that said
Section 68 was originally Section 1 of Act No. 1748,3 which provided that,
"whenever in the judgment of the Governor-General the public welfare
requires, he may, by executive order," effect the changes enumerated
therein (as in said section 68), including the change of the seat of the
government "to such place ... as the public interest requires." The opening
statement of said Section 1 of Act No. 1748 — which was not included in
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code — governed the time at
which, or the conditions under which, the powers therein conferred could be
exercised; whereas the last part of the first sentence of said section referred
exclusively to the place to which the seat of the government was to be
transferred.
At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is
concerned, even if we assumed that the phrase "as the public welfare may
require," in said Section 68, qualifies all other clauses thereof. It is true that
in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil.
328), this Court had upheld "public welfare" and "public interest,"
respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the authority to
execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these cases — as all judicial
pronouncements — must be construed in relation to the specific facts and
issues involved therein, outside of which they do not constitute precedents
and have no binding effect.4 The law construed in the Calalang case
conferred upon the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the power to issue rules
and regulations to promote safe transit upon national roads and streets.
Upon the other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the
Insular Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or
permits for the sale of speculative securities. Both cases involved grants to
administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their
administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions of fact.
Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. As above
indicated, the creation of municipalities, is not an administrative function, but
one which is essentially and eminently legislative in character. The question
of whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of such power is not
one of fact. it is "purely a legislative question "(Carolina-Virginia Coastal
Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310-313, 315-318), or a
political question (Udall vs. Severn, 79 P. 2d. 347-349). As the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin has aptly characterized it, "the question as to whether
incorporation is for the best interest of the community in any case is
emphatically a question of public policy and statecraft" (In re Village of North
Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1033, 1035-1037).
For this reason, courts of justice have annulled, as constituting undue
delegation of legislative powers, state laws granting the judicial department,
the power to determine whether certain territories should be annexed to a
particular municipality (Udall vs. Severn, supra, 258-359); or vesting in a
Commission the right to determine the plan and frame of government of
proposed villages and what functions shall be exercised by the same,
although the powers and functions of the village are specifically limited by
statute (In re Municipal Charters, 86 Atl. 307-308); or conferring upon courts
the authority to declare a given town or village incorporated, and designate
its metes and bounds, upon petition of a majority of the taxable inhabitants
thereof, setting forth the area desired to be included in such village (Territory
ex rel Kelly vs. Stewart, 23 Pac. 405-409); or authorizing the territory of a
town, containing a given area and population, to be incorporated as a town,
on certain steps being taken by the inhabitants thereof and on certain
determination by a court and subsequent vote of the inhabitants in favor
thereof, insofar as the court is allowed to determine whether the lands
embraced in the petition "ought justly" to be included in the village, and
whether the interest of the inhabitants will be promoted by such
51
incorporation, and to enlarge and diminish the boundaries of the proposed
village "as justice may require" (In re Villages of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W.
1035-1037); or creating a Municipal Board of Control which shall determine
whether or not the laying out, construction or operation of a toll road is in the
"public interest" and whether the requirements of the law had been complied
with, in which case the board shall enter an order creating a municipal
corporation and fixing the name of the same (Carolina-Virginia Coastal
Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310).
Insofar as the validity of a delegation of power by Congress to the President
is concerned, the case of Schechter Poultry Corporation vs. U.S. (79 L. Ed.
1570) is quite relevant to the one at bar. The Schechter case involved the
constitutionality of Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act
authorizing the President of the United States to approve "codes of fair
competition" submitted to him by one or more trade or industrial associations
or corporations which "impose no inequitable restrictions on admission to
membership therein and are truly representative," provided that such codes
are not designed "to promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small
enterprises and will not operate to discriminate against them, and will tend to
effectuate the policy" of said Act. The Federal Supreme Court held:
To summarize and conclude upon this point: Sec. 3 of the Recovery Act is
without precedent. It supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity.
It does not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular
states of fact determined by appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of
prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe
them. For that legislative undertaking, Sec. 3 sets up no standards, aside
from the statement of the general aims of rehabilitation, correction and
expansion described in Sec. 1. In view of the scope of that broad
declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the
discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus
enacting laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the
country, is virtually unfettered. We think that the code making authority thus
conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in the President a
discretion that is "virtually unfettered." and, consequently, tantamount to a
delegation of legislative power, it is obvious that "public welfare," which has
even a broader connotation, leads to the same result. In fact, if the validity of
the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there would no
longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the
President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be required by public
welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a virtual
abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would
bring about a total collapse of the democratic system established by our
Constitution, which it is the special duty and privilege of this Court to uphold.
It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in question were issued
after the legislative bills for the creation of the municipalities involved in this
case had failed to pass Congress. A better proof of the fact that the issuance
of said executive orders entails the exercise of purely legislative functions
can hardly be given.
Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may
be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to
interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the
officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by
the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are
concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to
wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local
governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by
statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local
governments, so long as the same or its officers act Within the scope of their
authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has
failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed
thereto by law, although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial
officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote,
set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of
its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He may not even
suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary
action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding
provincial board.5
Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in
effect, remove any of its officials, by creating a new municipality and
including therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his
office would thereby become vacant.6 Thus, by merely brandishing the
power to create a new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it,
he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect,
exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.
Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive
departments, bureaus or offices implies no more than the authority to
assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of
52
discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the
authority either to abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a
new one. As a consequence, the alleged power of the President to create
municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an
authority even greater than that of control which he has over the executive
departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional
mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the President less power over local
governments than that vested in him over the executive departments,
bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by
conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which
he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.
In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it
certainly does, said Section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code,
approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent
adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and
inconsistent with said statutory enactment.7
There are only two (2) other points left for consideration, namely,
respondent's claim (a) that "not all the proper parties" — referring to the
officers of the newly created municipalities — "have been impleaded in this
case," and (b) that "the present petition is premature."
As regards the first point, suffice it to say that the records do not show, and
the parties do not claim, that the officers of any of said municipalities have
been appointed or elected and assumed office. At any rate, the Solicitor
General, who has appeared on behalf of respondent Auditor General, is the
officer authorized by law "to act and represent the Government of the
Philippines, its offices and agents, in any official investigation, proceeding or
matter requiring the services of a lawyer" (Section 1661, Revised
Administrative Code), and, in connection with the creation of the
aforementioned municipalities, which involves a political, not proprietary,
function, said local officials, if any, are mere agents or representatives of the
national government. Their interest in the case at bar has, accordingly, been,
in effect, duly represented.8
With respect to the second point, respondent alleges that he has not as yet
acted on any of the executive order & in question and has not intimated how
he would act in connection therewith. It is, however, a matter of common,
public knowledge, subject to judicial cognizance, that the President has, for
many years, issued executive orders creating municipal corporations and
that the same have been organized and in actual operation, thus indicating,
without peradventure of doubt, that the expenditures incidental thereto have
been sanctioned, approved or passed in audit by the General Auditing Office
and its officials. There is no reason to believe, therefore, that respondent
would adopt a different policy as regards the new municipalities involved in
this case, in the absence of an allegation to such effect, and none has been
made by him.
WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null
and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in
audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive
Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so
ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Dizon, JJ.,
concur.
Zaldivar, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring and dissenting:
A sign of progress in a developing nation is the rise of new municipalities.
Fostering their rapid growth has long been the aim pursued by all three
branches of our Government.
So it was that the Governor-General during the time of the Jones Law was
given authority by the Legislature (Act No. 1748) to act upon certain details
with respect to said local governments, such as fixing of boundaries,
subdivisions and mergers. And the Supreme Court, within the framework of
the Jones Law, ruled in 1917 that the execution or implementation of such
details, did not entail abdication of legislative power (Government vs.
Municipality of Binañgonan, 34 Phil. 518; Municipality of Cardona vs.
Municipality of Binañgonan, 36 Phil. 547). Subsequently, Act No. 1748's
aforesaid statutory authorization was embodied in Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code. And Chief Executives since then up to the present
continued to avail of said provision, time and again invoking it to issue
executive orders providing for the creation of municipalities.
From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the
Philippines issued executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities
pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public funds
thereby stood to be disbursed in implementation of said executive orders.
Suing as private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed
in this Court a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction against the
Auditor General. It seeks to restrain the respondent or any person acting in
53
his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of the executive orders aforementioned.
Petitioner contends that the President has no power to create a municipality
by executive order. It is argued that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917, so far as it purports to grant any such power, is invalid or, at
the least, already repealed, in light of the Philippine Constitution and
Republic Act 2370 (The Barrio Charter).
Section 68 is again reproduced hereunder for convenience:
SEC. 68. General authority of [Governor-General) President of the
Philippines to fix boundaries and make new subdivisions. — The [Governor-
General] President of the Philippines may by executive order define the
boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality,
[township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or
diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or
more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into
such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or
portions with another, name any new subdivision so created, and may
change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein
as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the
[Philippine Legislature] Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained
whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or
any province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by
the [Governor-General] President of the Philippines in accordance herewith
makes necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any
administrative officer or any judicial officer, the [Governor-General] President
of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the
Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the
territory of the several officers to the new districts so formed.
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the
foregoing authority, an equitable distribution of the funds and obligations of
the divisions thereby affected shall be made in such manner as may be
recommended by the [Insular Auditor] Auditor General and approved by the
[Governor-General] President of the Philippines.
From such working I believe that power to create a municipality is included:
to "separate any political division other than a province, into such portions as
may be required, merge any such subdivisions or portions with another,
name any new subdivision so created." The issue, however, is whether the
legislature can validly delegate to the Executive such power.
The power to create a municipality is legislative in character. American
authorities have therefore favored the view that it cannot be delegated; that
what is delegable is not the power to create municipalities but only the power
to determine the existence of facts under which creation of a municipality will
result (37 Am. Jur. 628).
The test is said to lie in whether the statute allows any discretion on the
delegate as to whether the municipal corporation should be created. If so,
there is an attempted delegation of legislative power and the statute is
invalid (Ibid.). Now Section 68 no doubt gives the President such discretion,
since it says that the President "may by executive order" exercise the
powers therein granted. Furthermore, Section 5 of the same Code states:
SEC. 5. Exercise of administrative discretion — The exercise of the
permissive powers of all executive or administrative officers and bodies is
based upon discretion, and when such officer or body is given authority to do
any act but not required to do such act, the doing of the same shall be
dependent on a sound discretion to be exercised for the good of the service
and benefit of the public, whether so expressed in the statute giving the
authority or not.
Under the prevailing rule in the United States — and Section 68 is of
American origin — the provision in question would be an invalid attempt to
delegate purely legislative powers, contrary to the principle of separation of
powers.
It is very pertinent that Section 68 should be considered with the stream of
history in mind. A proper knowledge of the past is the only adequate
background for the present. Section 68 was adopted half a century ago.
Political change, two world wars, the recognition of our independence and
rightful place in the family of nations, have since taken place. In 1917 the
Philippines had for its Organic Act the Jones Law. And under the setup
ordained therein no strict separation of powers was adhered to.
Consequently, Section 68 was not constitutionally objectionable at the time
of its enactment.
The advent of the Philippine Constitution in 1935 however altered the
situation. For not only was separation of powers strictly ordained, except
only in specific instances therein provided, but the power of the Chief
Executive over local governments suffered an explicit reduction.
Formerly, Section 21 of the Jones Law provided that the Governor-General
"shall have general supervision and control of all the departments and
bureaus of the government in the Philippine Islands." Now Section 10 (1),
Article VII of the Philippine Constitution provides: "The President shall have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise
54
general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law,
and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
In short, the power of control over local governments had now been taken
away from the Chief Executive. Again, to fully understand the significance of
this provision, one must trace its development and growth.
As early as April 7, 1900 President McKinley of the United States, in his
Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission, laid down the policy that
our municipal governments should be "subject to the least degree of
supervision and control" on the part of the national government. Said
supervision and control was to be confined within the "narrowest limits" or so
much only as "may be necessary to secure and enforce faithful and efficient
administration by local officers." And the national government "shall have no
direct administration except of matters of purely general concern." (See
Hebron v. Reyes, L-9158, July 28, 1958.)
All this had one aim, to enable the Filipinos to acquire experience in the art
of self-government, with the end in view of later allowing them to assume
complete management and control of the administration of their local affairs.
Such aim is the policy now embodied in Section 10 (1), Article VII of the
Constitution (Rodriguez v. Montinola, 50 O.G. 4820).
It is the evident decree of the Constitution, therefore, that the President shall
have no power of control over local governments. Accordingly, Congress
cannot by law grant him such power (Hebron v. Reyes, supra). And any
such power formerly granted under the Jones Law thereby became
unavoidably inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution.
It remains to examine the relation of the power to create and the power to
control local governments. Said relationship has already been passed upon
by this Court in Hebron v. Reyes, supra. In said case, it was ruled that the
power to control is an incident of the power to create or abolish
municipalities. Respondent's view, therefore, that creating municipalities and
controlling their local governments are "two worlds apart," is untenable. And
since as stated, the power to control local governments can no longer be
conferred on or exercised by the President, it follows a fortiori that the power
to create them, all the more cannot be so conferred or exercised.
I am compelled to conclude, therefore, that Section 10 (1), Article VII of the
Constitution has repealed Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code as
far as the latter empowers the President to create local governments.
Repeal by the Constitution of prior statutes inconsistent with it has already
been sustained in De los Santos v. MaIlare, 87 Phil. 289. And it was there
held that such repeal differs from a declaration of unconstitutionality of a
posterior legislation, so much so that only a majority vote of the Court is
needed to sustain a finding of repeal.

Since the Constitution repealed Section 68 as far back as 1935, it is

academic to ask whether Republic Act 2370 likewise has provisions in
conflict with Section 68 so as to repeal it. Suffice it to state, at any rate, that
statutory prohibition on the President from creating a barrio does not, in my
opinion, warrant the inference of statutory prohibition for creating a
municipality. For although municipalities consist of barrios, there is nothing in
the statute that would preclude creation of new municipalities out of pre-
existing barrios.

It is not contrary to the logic of local autonomy to be able to create larger

political units and unable to create smaller ones. For as long ago observed
in President McKinley's Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission,
greater autonomy is to be imparted to the smaller of the two political units.
The smaller the unit of local government, the lesser is the need for the
national government's intervention in its political affairs. Furthermore, for
practical reasons, local autonomy cannot be given from the top downwards.
The national government, in such a case, could still exercise power over the
supposedly autonomous unit, e.g., municipalities, by exercising it over the
smaller units that comprise them, e.g., the barrios. A realistic program of
decentralization therefore calls for autonomy from the bottom upwards, so
that it is not surprising for Congress to deny the national government some
power over barrios without denying it over municipalities. For this reason, I
disagree with the majority view that because the President could not create
a barrio under Republic Act 2370, a fortiori he cannot create a municipality.

It is my view, therefore, that the Constitution, and not Republic Act 2370,
repealed Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code's provision giving
the President authority to create local governments. And for this reason I
agree with the ruling in the majority opinion that the executive orders in
question are null and void.

In thus ruling, the Court is but sustaining the fulfillment of our historic desire
to be free and independent under a republican form of government, and
exercising a function derived from the very sovereignty that it upholds.
Executive orders declared null and void.

Makalintal and Regala, JJ., concur.

55
G.R. No. L-19850 January 30, 1964
VIGAN ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioner.
Federico S. Arlos and P. H. del Pilar for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an original action for certiorari to annul an order of respondent Public
Service Commission. Upon the filing of the petition and the submission and
approval of the corresponding bond, we issued a writ of injunction restraining
said respondent from enforcing the order complained of Republic Act No.
316, approved on June 19, 1948, granted petitioner Vigan Electric Light
Company, Inc., a franchise to construct, maintain and operate an electric
light, heat and/or power plant for the purpose of generating and distributing
light, heat and/or power, for sale within the limits of several municipalities of
the province of Ilocos Sur. Accordingly, petitioner secured from respondent
on May 31, 1950, a certificate of public convenience to render electric light,
heat and/or power services in said municipalities and to charge its
customers and/or consumers the following rates:
FLAT RATE
1 — 20 watt bulb per month ............................................................
P2.30
1 — 25 watt bulb per month ............................................................
1 — 40 watt bulb per month ............................................................
1 — 50 watt bulb per month ............................................................
1 — 60 watt bulb per month ............................................................
1 — 75 watt bulb per month ............................................................
1 — 80 watt bulb per month ............................................................
1 — 100 watt bulb per month ............................................................
1 — 150 watt bulb per month ............................................................
13.00
1 — 200 watt bulb per month ............................................................
17.00
METER RATE
For the first 15
For the first 15 Kw. hrs. ............................................................ P0.40
For the next 35 Kw. hrs. ............................................................ .30
For the next 50 Kw. hrs. ............................................................ .25
For all over 100 Kw. hrs. ............................................................
Minimum Charge: P6.00 per month for connection of 200 watts
or less; plus P0.01 per watt per month for connection in excess
of 200 watts.
TEMPORARY RATE
P0.01 per watt per night.
On May 22, 1957, petitioner, acting with respondent's approval, entered into
a contract for the purchase of electric power and energy from the National
Power Corporation, for resale, in the course of the business of said
petitioner, to its customers, to whom, in fact, petitioner resold said electric
power and energy, in accordance with the above schedule of rates. About
five (5) years later, or on January 16, 1962, respondent advised petitioner of
a conference to be held on February 12, 1962 for the purpose of revising its
authorized rates. Soon thereafter, petitioner received a letter of respondent
informing the former of an alleged letter-petition of "Congressman Floro
Crisologo and 107 alleged residents of Vigan Ilocos Sur", charging the
following:
We also denounce the sale of TWO THOUSAND (2,000) ELECTRIC
METERS in blackmarket by the Vigan Electric Light Company to Avegon
Co., as anomalous and illegal. Said electric meters were imported from
Japan by the Vigan Electric Light Company in behalf of the consumers of
electric current from said electric company. The Vigan Electric Light
Company has commercialized these privilege which property belong to the
people.
3.00
4.50 We also report that the electric meters in Vigan used by the consumers had
5.50 been installed in bad faith and they register excessive rates much more than
6.50 the actual consumption.1äwphï1.ñët
7.50
8.00 and directing the petitioner to comment on these charges. In reply to said
9.00 communications, petitioner's counsel wrote to respondent, on February 1,
1962, a letter asking that the conference scheduled for February 12 be
postponed to March 12, and another letter stating inter alia:
In connection therewith, please be informed that my client, the Vigan Electric
Light Co., Inc., has not had any dealing with the Avegon Co., Inc., relative to
the 2,000 electric meter mentioned in the petition. Attached hereto as Annex
"1" and made an integral part thereof is a certification to that effect by
Avegon Co., Inc.
Furthermore, as counsel for Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc., I wish to inform
.20 this Honorable Commission that the charge that said company installed the
56
electric meters in bad faith and that said meters registered excessive rates
could have no valid basis because all of these meters have been inspected
checked, tested and sealed by your office.
On March 15, 1962, petitioner received a communication form the General
Auditing Office notifying him that one Mr. Cesar A. Damole had "been
instructed to make an audit and examination of the books and other records
of account" of said petitioner, "under the provisions of Commonwealth Act
No. 325 and in accordance with the request of the Public Service
Commission contained in its letter dated March 12, 1962", and directing
petitioner to cooperate with said Mr. Damole "for the successful
accomplishment of his work". Subsequently, respondent issued a subpoena
duces tecum requiring petitioner to produce before the former, during a
conference scheduled for April 10, 1962, certain books of account and
financial statements specified in said process. On the date last mentioned
petitioner moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum. The motion was not
acted upon in said conference of April 10, 1962. However, it was then
decided that the next conference be held on April 30, 1962, which was later
postponed to May 21, 1962. When petitioner's representatives appeared
before respondent, on the date last mentioned, they were advised by the
latter that the scheduled conference had been cancelled, that the petition to
quash the subpoena duces tecum had been granted, and that, on May 17,
1962, respondent had issued an order, from which we quote:
We now have the audit report of the General Auditing Office dated May 4,
1962, covering the operation of the Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. in Vigan,
Bantay and Cagayan, Ilocos Sur, for the period from January 1 to December
31, 1961. We find from the report that the total invested capital of the utility
as of December 31, 1961, entitled to return amounted to P118,132.55, and
its net operating income for rate purposes of P53,692.34 represents 45.45%
of its invested capital; that in order to earn 12% per annum, the utility should
have a computed revenue by rates of P182,012.78; and that since it realized
an actual revenue by rates of P221,529.17, it had an excess revenue by
rates of P39,516.39, which is 17.84% of the actual revenue by rates and
33.45% of the invested capital. In other words, the present rates of the Vigan
Electric Light Co., Inc. may be reduced by 17.84%, or in round figure, by
18%.
Upon consideration of the foregoing, and finding that the Vigan Electric Light
Co., Inc. is making a net operating profit in excess of the allowable return of
12% on its invested capital, we believe that it is in the public interest and in
consonance with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3043 that reduction of its
rates to the extent of its excess revenue be put into effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. is hereby ordered to reduce the
57
present meter rates for its electric service effective upon the billing for the
month of June, 1962, to wit:
METER RATE — 24-HOUR SERVICE
For the first 15 kwh per month at P0.328 per kwh
For the next 35 kwh per month at P0.246 per kwh
For the next 50 kwh per month at P0.205 per kwh
For all over 100 kwh per month at P0.164 per kwh
Minimum Charge: P4.90 per month for connection of 200 was or less plus
P0.01 per watt per month for connection in excess of 200 watts.
TEMPORARY LIGHTING
P0.01 per watt per night.
Minimum Charge: P1.00
Billings to customers shall be made to the nearest multiple of five centavos.
The above rates may be revised, modified or altered at anytime for any just
cause and/or in the public service.
Soon later, or on June 25, 1962, petitioner herein instituted the present
action for certiorari to annul said order of May 17, 1962, upon the ground
that, since its Corporate inception in 1948, petitioner it "never was able to
give and never made a single dividend declaration in favor of its
stockholders" because its operation from 1949 to 1961 had resulted in an
aggregate loss of P113,351.523; that in the conference above mentioned
petitioner had called the attention of respondent to the fact that the latter had
not furnished the former a "copy of the alleged letter-petition of
Congressman Crisologo and others"; that respondent then expressed the
view that there was no necessity of serving copy of said letter to petitioner,
because respondent was merely holding informal conferences to ascertain
whether petitioner would consent to the reduction of its rates; that petitioner
objected to said reduction without a hearing, alleging that its rates could be
reduced only if proven by evidence validly adduced to be excessive; that
petitioner offered to introduce evidence to show the reasonableness of its
aforementioned rates, and even the fairness of its increase; that petitioner
was then assured that it would be furnished a copy of the aforementioned
letter-petition and that a hearing would be held, if a reduction of its rates
could not be agreed upon; that petitioner had not even been served a copy
of the auditor's report upon which the order complained of is based; that
such order had been issued without notice and hearing; and that,
accordingly, petitioner had been denied due process.
In its answer respondent admitted some allegations of the complaint and
denied other allegations thereof, particularly the conclusions drawn by
petitioner. Likewise, respondent alleged that it granted petitioner's motion to
quash the aforementioned subpoena duces tecum because the documents
therein referred to had already been audited and examined by the General
Auditing Office, the report on which was on file with said respondent; that the
latter had directed that petitioner be served a copy of said report; and that,
although this has not, as yet, been actually done, petitioner could have seen
and examined said report had it really wanted to do so. By way of special
defenses, respondent, moreover, alleged that the disputed order had been
issued under its delegated legislative authority, the exercise of which does
not require previous notice and hearing; and that petitioner had not sought a
reconsideration of said order, and had, accordingly, failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies.
In support of its first special defense respondent maintains that rate-fixing is
a legislative function; that legislative or rule-making powers may
constitutionally be exercised without previous notice of hearing; and that the
decision in Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil., 635) — in
which we held that such notice and hearing are essential to the validity of a
decision of the Public Service Commission — is not in point because, unlike
the order complained of — which respondent claims to be legislative in
nature — the Ang Tibay case referred to a proceeding involving the exercise
of judicial functions.
At the outset, it should be noted, however, that, consistently with the
principle of separation of powers, which underlies our constitutional system,
legislative powers may not be delegated except to local governments, and
only to matters purely of local concern (Rubi vs. Provincia Board, 39 Phil.,
660; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S. 370). However, Congress may delegate to
administrative agencies of the government the power to supply the details in
the execution or enforcement of a policy laid down by a which is complete in
itself (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726; Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs. Public
Service Commission, 70 Phil., 221; People vs. Rosenthal, 68 Phil., 328;
People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56; Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil. 234; Alegre vs.
Collector of Customs, 53 Phil., 394; U.S. vs. Ang Tang Ho 43 Phil., 1;
Schechter vs. U.S., 295 U.S., 495 Mulford vs. Smith, 307 U.S., 38; Bowles
vs. Willingham, 321 U.S., 503). Such law is not deemed complete unless it
lays down a standard or pattern sufficiently fixed or determinate, or, at least,
determinable without requiring another legislation, to guide the
administrative body concerned in the performance of its duty to implement or
enforce said Policy (People vs. Lim Ho, L-12091, January 28, 1960; Araneta
58
vs. Gatmaitan, L-8895, April 30, 1957; Cervantes vs. Auditor General, L-
4043, May 26, 1952; Philippine Association of Colleges vs. Secretary of
Education, 51 Off. Gaz., 6230; People vs. Arnault, 48 Off. Gaz., 4805;
Antamok Gold Fields vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 68 Phil., 340; U.S. vs.
Barrias, 11 Phil., 327; Yakus vs. White, 321 U.S., 414; Ammann vs.
Mallonce, 332 U.S., 245; U.S. vs. Rock Royal Corp. 307 U.S., 533; Mutual
Film Corp. vs. Industrial Commission, 276 U.S., 230). Otherwise, there
would be no reasonable means to ascertain whether or not said body has
acted within the scope of its authority, and, as a consequence, the power of
legislation would eventually be exercised by a branch of the Government
other than that in which it is lodged by the Constitution, in violation, not only
of the allocation of powers therein made, but, also, of the principle of
separation of powers. Hence, Congress his not delegated, and cannot
delegate legislative powers to the Public Service Commission.
Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates
— when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a
given kind throughout the Philippines — may partake of a legislative
character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the
same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated
upon the finding of fact — based upon a report submitted by the General
Auditing Office — that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its
invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled
to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to
disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as
well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other
words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function
partaking of a quasi-judicial character the valid exercise of which demands
previous notice and hearing.
Indeed, sections 16(c) and 20 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 146, explicitly
require notice Indeed hearing. The pertinent parts thereof provide:
SEC. 16. The Commission shall have the power, upon proper notice and
hearing in accordance with the rules and provision of this Act, subject to the
limitations and exception mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, tolls charges, classifications,
or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage kilometrage, and
other special rates which shall be imposed, observed, and followed
thereafter by any public service: Provided, That the Commission may in its
discretion approve rates proposed by public services provisionally and
without necessity of any hearing; but it shall call a hearing thereof within
thirty days thereafter, upon publication and notice to the concerns operating
in the territory affected: Provided, further, That in case the public service
equipment of an operator is use principally or secondarily for the promotion
of a private business the net profits of said private business shall be
considered in relation with the public service of such operator for the
purpose of fixing the rates.
SEC. 20. Acts requiring the approval of the Commission. — Subject to
established limitations and exception and saving provisions to the contrary, it
shall be unlawful for any public service or for the owner, lessee or operator
thereof, without the approval and authorization of the Commission previously
had —
(a) To adopt, establish, fix, impose, maintain, collect or carry into effect any
individual or joint rates, commutation mileage or other special rate, toll, fare,
charge, classification or itinerary. The Commission shall approve only those
that are just and reasonable and not any that are unjustly discriminatory or
unduly preferential, only upon reasonable notice to the public services and
other parties concerned, giving them reasonable opportunity to be heard, ... .
(Emphasis supplied.)
motion for reconsideration thereof is not an absolute prerequisite to the
institution of the present action for certiorari (Ayson vs. Republic. 50 Off.
Gaz., 5810). For this reason considering that said order was being made
effective on June 1, 1962, or almost immediately after its issuance (on May
17, 1962), we find that petitioner was justified in commencing this
proceedings without first filing said motion (Guerrero vs. Carbonell, L-7180,
March 15, 1955).
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and the preliminary injunction
issued by this Court hereby made permanent. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes,
Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., took no part.

Since compliance with law must be presumed, it should be assumed that

petitioner's current rates were fixed by respondent after proper notice and
hearing. Hence, modification of such rates cannot be made, over petitioner's
objection, without such notice and hearing, particularly considering that the
factual basis of the action taken by respondent is assailed by petitioner. The
rule applicable is set forth in the American Jurisprudence the following
language:

Whether notice and a hearing in proceedings before a public service

commission are necessary depends chiefly upon statutory or constitutional
provisions applicable to such proceedings, which make notice and hearing,
prerequisite to action by the commission, and upon the nature and object of
such proceedings, that is, whether the proceedings, are, on the one hand,
legislative and rule-making in character, or are, on the other hand,
determinative and judicial or quasi-judicial, affecting the rights an property of
private or specific persons. As a general rule, a public utility must be
afforded some opportunity to be heard as to the propriety and
reasonableness of rates fixed for its services by a public service
commission.(43 Am. Jur. 716; Emphasis supplied.)

Wherefore, we hold that the determination of the issue involved in the order
complained of partakes of the nature of a quasi-judicial function and that
having been issued without previous notice and hearing said order is clearly
violative of the due process clause, and, hence, null and void, so that a

59
G.R. No. L-27811 November 17, 1967
LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JOSE PAÑO, HON. JUAN PAJO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary,
and HON. JUAN DE G. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, defendants-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera for plaintiff-appellant.
Victorio Advincula for defendant Jose Paño.
Office of the Solicitor General for defendant Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and Executive Secretary.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The question — May the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the
President, reverse a decision of the Director of Lands that had been affirmed
by the Executive Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources — yielded
an affirmative answer from the lower court.1
Hence, this appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals upon the
provisions of Sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
The undisputed controlling facts are:
In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-
hectare pasture land situated in Tamlangon, Municipality of Bansalan,
Province of Davao.
On January 9, 1953, Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a portion
(392,7569 hectares) of the above public land to plaintiff.
On April 13, 1954, the portion Magallanes ceded to plaintiff was officially
released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared agricultural land.
On January 26, 1955, Jose Paño and nineteen other claimants2 applied for
the purchase of ninety hectares of the released area.
On March 29, 1955, plaintiff corporation in turn filed its own sales application
covering the entire released area. This was protested by Jose Paño and his
nineteen companions upon the averment that they are actual occupants of
the part thereof covered by their own sales application.
The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict, rendered a
decision on July 31, 1956 giving due course to the application of plaintiff
60
corporation, and dismissing the claim of Jose Paño and his companions. A
move to reconsider failed.
On July 5, 1957, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources — on
appeal by Jose Paño for himself and his companions — held that the appeal
was without merit and dismissed the same.
The case was elevated to the President of the Philippines.
On June 25, 1958, Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, "[b]y authority of the
President" decided the controversy, modified the decision of the Director of
Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
and (1) declared that "it would be for the public interest that appellants, who
are mostly landless farmers who depend on the land for their existence, be
allocated that portion on which they have made improvements;" and (2)
directed that the controverted land (northern portion of Block I, LC Map
1749, Project No. 27, of Bansalan, Davao, with Latian River as the dividing
line) "should be subdivided into lots of convenient sizes and allocated to
actual occupants, without prejudice to the corporation's right to
reimbursement for the cost of surveying this portion." It may be well to state,
at this point, that the decision just mentioned, signed by the Executive
Secretary, was planted upon the facts as found in said decision.
Plaintiff corporation took the foregoing decision to the Court of First Instance
praying that judgment be rendered declaring: (1) that the decision of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has full force and effect; and
(2) that the decision of the Executive Secretary is contrary to law and of no
legal force and effect.
And now subject of this appeal is the judgment of the court a quo dismissing
plaintiff's case.
1. Plaintiff's mainstay is Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 141. The precept
there is that decisions of the Director of Lands "as to questions of facts shall
be conclusive when approved" by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. Plaintiff's trenchment claim is that this statute is controlling not
only upon courts but also upon the President.
Plaintiff's position is incorrect. The President's duty to execute the law is of
constitutional origin.3 So, too, is his control of all executive departments.4
Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power
to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure.
Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go
over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department
secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule
on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary.
Particularly in reference to the decisions of the Director of Lands, as affirmed
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the standard practice
is to allow appeals from such decisions to the Office of the President.5 This
Court has recognized this practice in several cases. In one, the decision of
the Lands Director as approved by the Secretary was considered
superseded by that of the President's appeal.6 In other cases, failure to
pursue or resort to this last remedy of appeal was considered a fatal defect,
warranting dismissal of the case, for non-exhaustion of all administrative
remedies.7
Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President
reposes upon the President's power of control over the executive
departments.8 And control simply means "the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter."9
This unquestionably negates the assertion that the President cannot undo
an act of his department secretary.
2. Plaintiff next submits that the decision of the Executive Secretary herein is
an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, petitioner asserts, does not
contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be
delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional
duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.
It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the President
must exercise in person.10 Not as correct, however, is it so say that the
Chief Executive may not delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the
Constitution does not command that he perform in person.11 Reason is not
wanting for this view. The President is not expected to perform in person all
the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The Office of the
Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule
which has thus gained recognition is that "under our constitutional setup the
Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the
President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse
any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including
the Director of Lands, may issue.12
3. But plaintiff underscores the fact that the Executive Secretary is equal in
rank to the other department heads, no higher than anyone of them. From
this, plaintiff carves the argument that one department head, on the pretext
that he is an alter ego of the President, cannot intrude into the zone of action
61
allocated to another department secretary. This argument betrays lack of
appreciation of the fact that where, as in this case, the Executive Secretary
acts "[b]y authority of the President," his decision is that of the President's.
Such decision is to be given full faith and credit by our courts. The assumed
authority of the Executive Secretary is to be accepted. For, only the
President may rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not authorized to
do so. Therefore, unless the action taken is "disapproved or reprobated by
the Chief Executive,"13 that remains the act of the Chief Executive, and
cannot be successfully assailed.14 No such disapproval or reprobation is
even intimated in the record of this case.
For the reasons given, the judgment under review is hereby affirmed. Costs
against plaintiff. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,
Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
The learned opinion of Justice Sanchez possesses merit and inspires
assent. A further observation may not be amiss concerning that portion
thereof which speaks of "the standard practice" allowing appeals from
[decisions of Secretary of Natural Resources affirming the action taken by
the Director of Lands] to the Office of the President. That for me is more than
a "standard practice." It is sound law. The constitutional grant to the
President of the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus
and offices yields that implication.1
If this were all, there would be no need for an additional expression of my
views. I feel constrained to do so however in order to emphasize that the
opinion of the Court appears to me to reflect with greater fidelity the
constitutional intent as embodied in the above provision vesting the power of
control in the Presidency.
The question asked in the opening paragraph of the opinion — "May the
Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse a decision
of the Director of Lands that had been affirmed by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources [?]" — merits but one answer. It must be
in the unqualified affirmative. So the Court holds. That is as it should be. Any
other view would be highly unorthodox.
Nonetheless, the thought seems to lurk in the opinion of a respectable
number of members of the bar that a provision as that found in the Public
Land Act to the effect that decisions of Director of Lands on questions of
facts shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources2 constitute a limitation of such power of control. This
view might have gained plausibility in the light of Ang-Angco vs. Castillo,3
where the procedure set forth in the Civil Service Act in 1959 was held
binding in so far as the President is concerned in the case of disciplinary
action taken against non-presidential appointees.
The argument that what the then Executive Secretary acting for the
President did was justified by the constitutional grant of control elicited no
favorable response. The Court apparently was not receptive to a more
expansive view of such executive prerogative. This is not to say that what
was there decided was entirely lacking in justification. It is merely to suggest
that it may contain implications not in conformity with the broad grant of
authority constitutionally conferred on the President.
It is well-worth emphasizing that the President unlike any other official in the
Executive Department is vested with both "constitutional and legal
authority"4 as Justice Laurel noted. Care is to be taken then lest by a too
narrow interpretation what could reasonably be included in such competence
recognized by the Constitution be unduly restricted. If my reading of the
opinion of Justice Sanchez is correct, then there is a more hospitable scope
accorded such power of control. For me this is more in keeping with the
fundamental law. Moreover there would be a greater awareness on the part
of all of the broad range of authority the President possesses by virtue of
such a provision.
Reference to the words of Justice Laurel, who was himself one of the
leading framers of the Constitution and thereafter, as a member of this
Court, one of its most authoritative expounders in the leading case of Villena
vs. Secretary of Interior,5 is not inappropriate. Their reverberating clang, to
paraphrase Justice Cardozo, should drown all weaker sounds. Thus: "After
serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the contention of the
government in this case on the broad proposition, albeit not suggested, that
under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and
considering the departmental organization established and continued in
force by paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department,
the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of
the Chief Executive, and except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of
the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through
the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business,
62
are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively
the acts of the Chief Executive. (Runkle vs. United States [1887], 122 U.S.,
543; 30 Law. ed., 1167; 7 Sup. St. Rep. 1141; see also U.S. vs. Eliason
[1839], 16 Pet., 291; 10 Law. ed., 968; Jones vs. U.S. [1890], 137 U.S. 202;
34 Law. ed., 691; 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 80; Wolsey vs. Chapman [1880], 101
U.S. 775; 25 Law. ed. 915; Wilcox vs. Jackson [1836], 13 Pet. 498; 10 Law.
ed. 264.)"
The opinion of Justice Laurel continues: "Fear is expressed by more than
one member of this court that the acceptance of the principle of qualified
political agency in this and similar cases would result in the assumption of
responsibility by the President of the Philippines for acts of any member of
his cabinet, however illegal, irregular or improper may be these acts. The
implications, it is said, are serious. Fear, however, is no valid argument
against the system once adopted, established and operated. Familiarity with
the essential background of the type of govenment established under our
Constitution, in the light of certain well-known principles and practices that
go with the system, should offer the necessary explanation. With reference
to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which
is crystal clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial
searchlight, and that is, the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive.
The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive
Department, begin with the enunciation of the principle that 'The executive
power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines.' This means that the
President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the
Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive departments occupy
political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the
language of Thomas Jefferson, 'should be of the President's bosom
confidence' (7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and, in the language of Attorney-
General Cushing, (7 Op., Attorney-General, 453), 'are subject to the
direction of the President.' Without minimizing the importance of the heads of
the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of
that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by
Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United States, 'each head of a
department is, and must be the President's alter ego in the matters of that
department where the President is required by law to exercise authority'
(Myers vs. United States, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 21 at 30; 272 U.S. 52 at 133; 71
Law. ed., 160). Secretaries of departments, of course, exercise certain
powers under the law but the law cannot impair or in any way affect the
constitutional power of control and direction of the President. As a matter of
executive policy, they may be granted departmental autonomy as to certain
matters but this is by mere concession of the executive, in the absence of
valid legislation in the particular field. If the President, then, is the authority in
the Executive Department, he assumes the corresponding responsibility.
The head of a department is a man of his confidence; he controls and directs
his acts; he appoints him and can remove him at pleasure; he is the
executive, not any of his secretaries. It is therefore logical that he, the
President, should be answerable for the acts of administration of the entire
Executive Department before his own conscience no less than before that
undefined power of public opinion which, in the language of Daniel Webster,
is the last repository of popular government. These are the necessary
corollaries of the American presidential type of government, and if there is
any defect, it is attributable to the system itself. We cannot modify the
system unless we modify the Constitution, and we cannot modify the
Constitution by any subtle process of judicial interpretation or construction."

Concepcion, C.J. and Castro, J., concur.

63
G.R. Nos. L-32370 & 32767 April 20, 1983
SIERRA MADRE TRUST, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, DIRECTOR OF MINES, JUSAN TRUST MINING
COMPANY, and J & S PARTNERSHIP, respondents.
Lobruga Rondoz & Cardenas Law Offices for petitioner.
Fortunato de Leon for respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is a petition to review a decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources dated July 8, 1970, in DANR Cases Numbered 3502 and
3502-A. The decision affirmed a decision of the Director of Mines dated
November 6, 1969.
The appeal was made pursuant to Sec. 61 of the Mining Law (C.A. No. 137,
as amended) which provides: "... Findings of facts in the decision or order of
the Director of Mines when affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources shall be final and conclusive, and the aggrieved party or
parties desiring to appeal from such decision or order shall file in the
Supreme Court a petition for review wherein only questions of law may be
raised."
The factual background is given in the brief of the petitioner-appellant which
has not been contradicted by the respondents-appellees and is as follows:
On July 26, 1962, the Sierra Madre Trust filed with the Bureau of Mines an
Adverse Claim against LLA No. V-7872 (Amd) of the Jusan Trust Mining
Company over six (6) lode mineral claims, viz.: (1) Finland 2, (2) Finland 3,
(3) Finland 5, (4) Finland 6, (5) Finland 8 and (6) Finland 9, all registered on
December 11, 1964 with the office of the Mining Recorder of Nueva Vizcaya,
and all situated in Sitio Maghanay, Barrio Abaca Municipality of Dupax,
Province of Nueva Vizcaya.
The adverse claim alleged that the aforementioned six (6) lode minerals
claims covered by LLA No. V-7872 (Amd) encroached and overlapped the
eleven (11) lode mineral claims of the herein petitioner Sierra Madre Trust,
viz., (1) A-12, (2) H-12, (3) JC-11, (4) W-11, (5) JN-11, (6)WM-11, (7) F-10,
(8) A-9, (9) N-9, (10) W-8, and (11) JN-8, all situated in Sitio Taduan Barrio
of Abaca, Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, and duly
registered with the office of the Mining Recorder at Bayombong, Nueva
64
Vizcaya on May 14, 1965.
The adverse claim prayed for an order or decision declaring the above-
mentioned six (6) lode mineral claims of respondent Jusan Trust Mining
Company, null, void, and illegal; and denying lode lease application LLA No.
V-7872 over said claims. Further, the adverse claimant prayed for such other
reliefs and remedies available in the premises.
This adverse claim was docketed in the Bureau of Mines as Mines
Administrative Case No. V-404, and on appeal to the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources as DANR Case No. 3502.
Likewise, on the same date July 26, 1966, the same Sierra Madre Trust filed
with the Bureau of Mines an Adverse Claim against LLA No. V-9028 of the J
& S Partnership over six (6) lode mineral claims viz.: (1) A-19, (2) A-20, (3)
A-24, (4) A-25, (5) A-29, and (6) A-30, all registered on March 30, 1965 and
amended August 5, 1965, with the office of the Mining Recorder of Nueva
Vizcaya, and situated in Sitio Gatid, Barrio of Abaca Municipality of Dupax,
Province of Nueva Vizcaya.
The adverse claim alleged that the aforementioned six (6) lode mineral claim
covered by LLA No. V-9028, encroached and overlapped the thirteen (13)
lode mineral claims of herein petitioner Sierra Madre Trust, viz.: (1) Wm-14,
(2) F-14, (3) A-13, (4) H-12 (5) Jc-12, (6) W-12, (7) Jn-11, (8) Wm-11, (9) F-
11, (10) Wm-11, (11) F-11; (12) H-9 and (13) Jc-9, all situated in Sitio
Taduan, Barrio of Abaca Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya
and duly registered with the office of the Mining Recorder at Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya, on May 14,1965.
The adverse claim prayed for an order or decision declaring the above-
mentioned six (6) claims of respondent J & S Partnership, null void, and
illegal; and denying lode lease application LLA No. V-9028 over the said
claims. Further, the adverse claimant prayed for such other reliefs and
remedies available in the premises.
This adverse claim was docketed in the Bureau of Mines as Mines
Administrative Case No. V-404, and on appeal to the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources as DANR Case No. 3502A.
These two (2) adverse claims, MAC Nos. V-403 and V-404 were jointly
heard in the Bureau of Mines, and also jointly considered in the appeal in the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
The dispositive portion of the decision rendered by the Director of Mines
reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Office believes and so holds that the
respondents have the preferential right over their "Finland-2", "Finland- 3",
"Finland-5", "Finland-6", "Finland-8", "Finland-9", "A-19", "A-20", "A-24", "A-
25", "A-29" and "A-30" mining claims. Accordingly, the protests (adverse
claims) filed by protestant Sierra Madre Trust should be, as hereby they are,
DISMISSED.
And that of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reads:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal interposed by the
appellant, Sierra Madre Trust is hereby dismissed and the decision of the
Director of Mines dated November 6, 1969, affirmed. "
The adverse claims of Sierra Madre Trust against Jusan Trust Mining
Company and J and S Partnership were based on the allegation that the
lode lease applications (LLA) of the latter "encroached and overlapped" the
former's mineral claims, However, acting on the adverse claims, the Director
of Mines found that, "By sheer force of evidence, this Office is constrained to
believe that there exists no conflict or overlapping between the protestant's
and respondents' mining claims. " And this finding was affirmed by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources thus: "Anent the first
allegation, this Office finds that the Director of Mines did not err when he
found that the twelve (12) claims of respondents Jusan Trust Mining
Company and J & S Partnership did not encroach and overlap the eighteen
(18) lode mineral claims of the appellant Sierra Madre Trust. For this fact
has been incotrovertibly proven by the records appertaining to the case."
It should be noted that according to the Director of Mines in his decision,
"during the intervening period from the 31st day after the discovery [by the
respondents] to the date of location nobody else located the area covered
thereby. ... the protestant [petitioner herein] did not establish any intervening
right as it is our findings that their mining claims do not overlap respondents'
mining claims."
After the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources had affirmed the
factual findings of the Director of Mines to the effect that there was no
overlapping of claims and which findings were final and conclusive, Sierra
Madre Trust should have kept its peace for obviously it suffered no material
injury and had no pecuniary interest to protect. But it was obstinate and
raised this legal question before Us: "May there be a valid location of mining
claims after the lapse of thirty (30) days from date of discovery, in
contravention to the mandatory provision of Section 33 of the New Mining
Law (Com. Act No. 137, as amended)?" It also raised ancillary questions.
65
We see no reason why We have to answer the questions in this petition
considering that there is no justiciable issue between the parties. The
officers of the Executive Department tasked with administering the Mining
Law have found that there is neither encroachment nor overlapping in
respect of the claims involved. Accordingly, whatever may be the answers to
the questions will not materially serve the interests of the petitioner. In
closing it is useful to remind litigation prone individuals that the interpretation
by officers of laws which are entrusted to their administration is entitled to
great respect.' In his decision, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources said: "This Office is in conformity with the findings of the Director
of Mines that the mining claims of the appellees were validly located,
surveyed and registered."
Finally, the petitioner also asks: "May an association and/or partnership
registered with the Mining Recorder of a province, but not registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, be vested with juridical personality to
enable it to locate and then lease mining claims from the government?"
Suffice it to state that this question was not raised before the Director of
Mines and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. There is also
nothing in the record to indicate whether or not the appellees are registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. For these reasons, even
assuming that there is a justiciable issue between the parties, this question
cannot be passed upon.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, De Castro and Escolin JJ.,
concur.
Aquino, J., is on leave.
G.R. No. L-50444 August 31, 1987
ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, HON. G.V. TOBIAS, in his
capacity as General Manager of the National Housing Authority, THE HON.
JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant and
VIRGILIO A. YUSON, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
By virtue of a Contract to Sell dated 18 August 1970, Jose Hernando
acquired prospective and beneficial ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of
the Ponderosa Heights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, from the petitioner
Antipolo Realty Corporation.
On 28 August 1974, Mr. Hernando transferred his rights over Lot No. 15 to
private respondent Virgilio Yuson. The transfer was embodied in a Deed of
Assignment and Substitution of Obligor (Delegacion), executed with the
consent of Antipolo Realty, in which Mr. Yuson assumed the performance of
the vendee's obligations under the original contract, including payment of his
predecessor's installments in arrears. However, for failure of Antipolo Realty
to develop the subdivision project in accordance with its undertaking under
Clause 17 of the Contract to Sell, Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages
pertaining to the period up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and
stopped all monthly installment payments falling due thereafter Clause 17
reads:
Clause 17. — SUBDIVISION BEAUTIFICATION. To insure the beauty of the
subdivision in line with the modern trend of urban development, the SELLER
hereby obligates itself to provide the subdivision with:
a) Concrete curbs and gutters
b) Underground drainage system
c) Asphalt paved roads
d) Independent water system
e) Electrical installation with concrete posts.
f) Landscaping and concrete sidewall
g) Developed park or amphi-theatre
66
h) 24-hour security guard service.
These improvements shall be complete within a period of two (2) years from
date of this contract. Failure by the SELLER shall permit the BUYER to
suspend his monthly installments without any penalties or interest charges
until such time that such improvements shall have been completed. 1
On 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private
respondent Yuson advising that the required improvements in the
subdivision had already been completed, and requesting resumption of
payment of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15. For his part, Mr. Yuson
replied that he would conform with the request as soon as he was able to
verify the truth of the representation in the notice.
In a second letter dated 27 November 1976, Antipolo Realty reiterated its
request that Mr. Yuson resume payment of his monthly installments, citing
the decision rendered by the National Housing Authority (NHA) on 25
October 1976 in Case No. 252 (entitled "Jose B. Viado Jr., complainant vs.
Conrado S. Reyes, respondent") declaring Antipolo Realty to have
"substantially complied with its commitment to the lot buyers pursuant to the
Contract to Sell executed by and between the lot buyers and the
respondent." In addition, a formal demand was made for full and immediate
payment of the amount of P16,994.73, representing installments which,
Antipolo Realty alleged, had accrued during the period while the
improvements were being completed — i.e., between September 1972 and
October 1976.
Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October 1976 monthly
installments but agreed to pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo
Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and claiming the
forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson.
Aggrieved by the rescission of the Contract to Sell, Mr. Yuson brought his
dispute with Antipolo Realty before public respondent NHA through a letter-
complaint dated 10 May 1977 which complaint was docketed in NHA as
Case No. 2123.
Antipolo Realty filed a Motion to Dismiss which was heard on 2 September
1977. Antipolo Realty, without presenting any evidence, moved for the
consolidation of Case No. 2123 with several other cases filed against it by
other subdivision lot buyers, then pending before the NHA. In an Order
issued on 7 February 1978, the NHA denied the motion to dismiss and
scheduled Case No. 2123 for hearing.
After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the
reinstatement of the Contract to Sell under the following conditions:
l) Antipolo Realty Corporation shall sent [sic] to Virgilio Yuzon a statement of
account for the monthly amortizations from November 1976 to the present;
m) No penalty interest shall be charged for the period from November 1976
to the date of the statement of account; and
n) Virgilio Yuzon shall be given sixty (60) days to pay the arrears shown in
the statement of account. 2
Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for Reconsideration asserting: (a) that it had
been denied due process of law since it had not been served with notice of
the scheduled hearing; and (b) that the jurisdiction to hear and decide Mr.
Yuson's complaint was lodged in the regular courts, not in the NHA, since
that complaint involved the interpretation and application of the Contract to
Sell.
The motion for reconsideration was denied on 28 June 1978 by respondent
NHA General Manager G.V. Tobias, who sustained the jurisdiction of the
NHA to hear and decide the Yuson complaint. He also found that Antipolo
Realty had in fact been served with notice of the date of the hearing, but that
its counsel had failed to attend the hearing. 3 The case was submitted for
decision, and eventually decided, solely on the evidence presented by the
complainant.
On 2 October 1978, Antipolo Realty came to this Court with a Petition for
certiorari and Prohibition with Writ of Preliminary Injunction, which was
docketed as G.R. No. L-49051. Once more, the jurisdiction of the NHA was
assailed. Petitioner further asserted that, under Clause 7 of the Contract to
Sell, it could validly terminate its agreement with Mr. Yuson and, as a
consequence thereof, retain all the prior installment payments made by the
latter. 4
This Court denied certiorari in a minute resolution issued on 11 December
1978, "without prejudice to petitioner's pursuing the administrative remedy."
5 A motion for reconsideration was denied on 29 January 1979.
Thereafter, petitioner interposed an appeal from the NHA decision with the
Office of the President which, on 9 March 1979, dismissed the same through
public respondent Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave. 6
In the present petition, Antipolo Realty again asserts that, in hearing the
complaint of private respondent Yuson and in ordering the reinstatement of
67
the Contract to Sell between the parties, the NHA had not only acted on a
matter beyond its competence, but had also, in effect, assumed the
performance of judicial or quasi-judicial functions which the NHA was not
authorized to perform.
We find the petitioner's arguments lacking in merit.
It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies
exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited
extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to
administrative agencies (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the National Labor Relations Commission) is well recognized in our
jurisdiction, 7 basically because the need for special competence and
experience has been recognized as essential in the resolution of questions
of complex or specialized character and because of a companion recognition
that the dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged.
In Spouses Jose Abejo and Aurora Abejo, et al. vs. Hon. Rafael dela Cruz,
etc., et al., 8 the Court, through Mr. Chief Justice Teehankee, said:
In the fifties, the Court taking cognizance of the move to vest jurisdiction in
administrative commissions and boards the power to resolve specialized
disputes in the field of labor (as in corporations, public transportation and
public utilities) ruled that Congress in requiring the Industrial Court's
intervention in the resolution of labor management controversies likely to
cause strikes or lockouts meant such jurisdiction to be exclusive, although it
did not so expressly state in the law. The Court held that under the "sense-
making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot
or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply
with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered" (Pambujan Sur
United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil, 932, 941 [1954]).
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative
boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and
capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or
essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse
of discretion has become well nigh indispensable. Thus, in 1984, the Court
noted that 'between the power lodged in an administrative body and a court,
the unmistakeable trend has been to refer it to the former, "Increasingly, this
Court has been committed to the view that unless the law speaks clearly and
unequivocably, the choice should fall on fan administrative agency]" ' (NFL v.
Eisma, 127 SCRA 419, 428, citing precedents). The Court in the earlier case
of Ebon vs. De Guzman (113 SCRA 52, 56 [1982]), noted that the
lawmaking authority, in restoring to the labor arbiters and the NLRC their
jurisdiction to award all kinds of damages in labor cases, as against the
previous P.D. amendment splitting their jurisdiction with the regular courts,
"evidently, . . . had second thoughts about depriving the Labor Arbiters and
the NLRC of the jurisdiction to award damages in labor cases because that
setup would mean duplicity of suits, splitting the cause of action and possible
conflicting findings and conclusions by two tribunals on one and the same
claim."
In an even more recent case, Tropical Homes, Inc. vs. National Housing
Authority, et al., 9 Mr. Justice Gutierrez, speaking for the Court, observed
that:
There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in
an administrative agency over certain disputes and controversies falling
within the agency's special expertise. The very definition of an administrative
agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The ever
increasing variety of powers and functions given to administrative agencies
recognizes the need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in
matters calling for technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies
which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts.
In general the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an
administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such
agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may
exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the
statute creating or empowering such agency. 10 In the exercise of such
powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts
and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. One thrust
of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of
contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a
uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts.
Thus, the extent to which the NHA has been vested with quasi-judicial
authority must be determined by referring to the terms of Presidential Decree
No. 957, known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Decree." 11
Section 3 of this statute provides as follows:
National Housing Authority. — The National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in
accordance with the provisions of this decree (emphasis supplied)
The need for and therefore the scope of the regulatory authority thus lodged
in the NHA are indicated in the second and third preambular paragraphs of
68
the statute which provide:
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision
owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their
representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision
roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems lighting systems and other similar
basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot
buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and
fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the
buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate
taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent
purchasers for value — . (emphasis supplied)
Presidential Decree No. 1344 12 clarified and spelled out the quasi-judicial
dimensions of the grant of regulatory authority to the NHA in the following
quite specific terms:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade
and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential
Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices:
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by sub- division lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker
or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against
the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. (emphasis supplied.)
The substantive provisions being applied and enforced by the NHA in the
instant case are found in Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 957 which
reads:
Sec. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. — No installment payment made by a
buyer in a subdivision or condominium project for the lot or unit he
contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or developer when
the buyer, after due notice to the owner or developer, desists from further
payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to develop the
subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans and
within the time limit for complying with the same. Such buyer may, at his
option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization and
interests but excluding delinquency interests, with interest thereon at the
legal rate. (emphasis supplied.)
Having failed to comply with its contractual obligation to complete certain
specified improvements in the subdivision within the specified period of two
years from the date of the execution of the Contract to Sell, petitioner was
not entitled to exercise its options under Clause 7 of the Contract. Hence,
petitioner could neither rescind the Contract to Sell nor treat the installment
payments made by the private respondent as forfeited in its favor. Indeed,
under the general Civil Law, 13 in view of petitioner's breach of its contract
with private respondent, it is the latter who is vested with the option either to
rescind the contract and receive reimbursement of an installment payments
(with legal interest) made for the purchase of the subdivision lot in question,
or to suspend payment of further purchase installments until such time as
the petitioner had fulfilled its obligations to the buyer. The NHA was
therefore correct in holding that private respondent's prior installment
payments could not be forfeited in favor of petitioner.
Neither did the NHA commit any abuse, let alone a grave abuse of discretion
or act in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered the reinstatement of the
Contract to Sell between the parties. Such reinstatement is no more than a
logical consequence of the NHA's correct ruling, just noted, that the
petitioner was not entitled to rescind the Contract to Sell. There is, in any
case, no question that under Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was
legally empowered to determine and protect the rights of contracting parties
under the law administered by it and under the respective agreements, as
well as to ensure that their obligations thereunder are faithfully performed.
We turn to petitioner's assertion that it had been denied the right to due
process. This assertion lacks substance. The record shows that a copy of
the order denying the Motion to Dismiss and scheduling the hearing of the
complaint for the morning of 6 March 1978, was duly served on counsel for
petitioner, as evidenced by the annotation appearing at the bottom of said
copy indicating that such service had been effected. 14 But even if it be
assumed, arguendo, that such notice had not been served on the petitioner,
nevertheless the latter was not deprived of due process, for what the
fundamental law abhors is not the absence of previous notice but rather the
absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. 15 In the instant case, petitioner
was given ample opportunity to present its side and to be heard on a motion
for reconsideration as well, and not just on a motion to dismiss; the claim of
denial of due process must hence sound even more hollow. 16
We turn finally to the question of the amount of P16,994.73 which petitioner
69
insists had accrued during the period from September 1972 to October
1976, when private respondent had suspended payment of his monthly
installments on his chosen subdivision lot. The NHA in its 9 March 1978
resolution ruled that the regular monthly installments under the Contract to
Sell did not accrue during the September 1972 — October 1976 period:
[R]espondent allowed the complainant to suspend payment of his monthly
installments until the improvements in the subdivision shall have been
completed. Respondent informed complainant on November 1976 that the
improvements have been completed. Monthly installments during the period
of suspension of payment did not become due and demandable Neither did
they accrue Such must be the case, otherwise, there is no sense in
suspending payments. If the suspension is lifted the debtor shall resume
payments but never did he incur any arrears.
Such being the case, the demand of respondent for complainant to pay the
arrears due during the period of suspension of payment is null and void.
Consequently, the notice of cancellation based on the refusal to pay the s
that were not due and demandable is also null and void. 17
The NHA resolution is probably too terse and in need of certification and
amplification. The NHA correctly held that no installment payments should
be considered as having accrued during the period of suspension of
payments. Clearly, the critical issue is what happens to the installment
payments which would have accrued and fallen due during the period of
suspension had no default on the part of the petitioner intervened. To our
mind, the NHA resolution is most appropriately read as directing that the
original period of payment in the Contract to Sell must be deemed extended
by a period of time equal to the period of suspension (i.e., by four (4) years
and two (2) months) during which extended time (tacked on to the original
contract period) private respondent buyer must continue to pay the monthly
installment payments until the entire original contract price shall have been
paid. We think that such is the intent of the NHA resolution which directed
that "[i]f the suspension is lifted, the debtor shall resume payments" and that
such is the most equitable and just reading that may be given to the NHA
resolution. To permit Antipolo Realty to collect the disputed amount in a
lump sum after it had defaulted on its obligations to its lot buyers, would tend
to defeat the purpose of the authorization (under Sec. 23 of Presidential
Decree No. 957, supra) to lot buyers to suspend installment payments. As
the NHA resolution pointed out, [s]uch must be the case, otherwise, there is
no sense in suspending payments." Upon the other hand, to condone the
entire amount that would have become due would be an expressively harsh
penalty upon the petitioner and would result in the unjust enrichment of the
private respondent at the expense of the petitioner. It should be recalled that
the latter had already fulfilled, albeit tardily, its obligations to its lot buyers
under their Contracts to Sell. At the same time, the lot buyer should not be
regarded as delinquent and as such charged penalty interest. The
suspension of installment payments was attributable to the petitioner, not the
private respondent. The tacking on of the period of suspension to the end of
the original period precisely prevents default on the part of the lot buyer. In
the words of the NHA resolution, "never would [the buyer] incur any arrears."

WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The NHA decision

appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and clarified as providing for the
lengthening of the original contract period for payment of installments under
the Contract to Sell by four (4) years and two (2) months, during which
extended time private respondent shall continue to pay the regular monthly
installment payments until the entire original contract price shall have been
paid. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr.,

Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

70
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN G.R. No. 162070
REFORM,
- versus' -
DELIA T. SUTTON, ELLA T.
SUTTON-SOLIMAN and Promulgated:
HARRY T. SUTTON,
' Respondents. October 19, 2005
x-----------------------------------x
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated
September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004, respectively, which declared
DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1993, null and void for
being violative of the Constitution.
The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by
respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding.
On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program
of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS)[1] their
landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took
effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and
swine.
On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v.
Secretary of DAR,[2] this Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and
poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land. Hence,
we declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as
they included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform.
In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a
formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted
exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the
71
CARL.[3]
On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy,
Masbate, inspected respondents' land and found that it was devoted solely
to cattle-raising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it
be exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal
of their VOS and requested the return of the supporting papers they
submitted in connection therewith.[4] Petitioner ignored their request.
On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993,[5] which
provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the
coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the
A.O. fixed the following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e., 1
hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be retained by the landowner),
and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads
of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL.
On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised
him to consider as final and irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS as,
under the Luz Farms doctrine, their entire landholding is exempted from the
CARL.[6]
On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an
Order[7] partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from
the coverage of CARL. Applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O.
No. 9, petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents' land for grazing
purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Petitioner
ordered the rest of respondents' landholding to be segregated and placed
under Compulsory Acquisition.
Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire
landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising.
Their motion was denied.[8] They filed a notice of appeal[9] with the Office of
the President assailing: (1) the reasonableness and validity of DAR A.O. No.
9, s. 1993, which provided for a ratio between land and livestock in
determining the land area qualified for exclusion from the CARL, and (2) the
constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, in view of the Luz Farms case
which declared cattle-raising lands excluded from the coverage of agrarian
reform.
On October 9, 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the impugned Order
of petitioner DAR.[10] It ruled that DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, does not run
counter to the Luz Farms case as the A.O. provided the guidelines to
determine whether a certain parcel of land is being used for cattle-raising.
However, the issue on the constitutionality of the assailed A.O. was left for
the determination of the courts as the sole arbiters of such issue.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It
declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for being contrary to the intent of the
1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the land
reform program of the government. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, DAR Administrative Order No. 09,
Series of 1993 is hereby DECLARED null and void. The assailed order of
the Office of the President dated 09 October 2001 in so far as it affirmed the
Department of Agrarian Reform's ruling that petitioners' landholding is
covered by the agrarian reform program of the government is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Hence, this petition.
The main issue in the case at bar is the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9,
series of 1993, which prescribes a maximum retention limit for owners of
lands devoted to livestock raising.
Invoking its rule-making power under Section 49 of the CARL, petitioner
submits that it issued DAR A.O. No. 9 to limit the area of livestock farm that
may be retained by a landowner pursuant to its mandate to place all public
and private agricultural lands under the coverage of agrarian reform.
Petitioner also contends that the A.O. seeks to remedy reports that some
unscrupulous landowners have converted their agricultural farms to livestock
farms in order to evade their coverage in the agrarian reform program.
Petitioner's arguments fail to impress.
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature, i.e.,
the power to make rules and regulations. They have been granted by
Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a
law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making has become a practical
necessity in modern governance due to the increasing complexity and
variety of public functions. However, while administrative rules and
regulations have the force and effect of law, they are not immune from
judicial review.[12] They may be properly challenged before the courts to
72
ensure that they do not violate the Constitution and no grave abuse of
administrative discretion is committed by the administrative body concerned.
The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative
rules and regulations must be issued by authority of a law and must not
contravene the provisions of the Constitution.[13] The rule-making power of
an administrative agency may not be used to abridge the authority given to it
by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power
of the administrative agency beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and
statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may
be promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of their
regulations.[14]
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes
the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including
them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum
retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987
Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands
exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The Court
clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are
industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of 'agriculture or
'agricultural activity. The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different
from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A
great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial
fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage,
waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts
and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other
supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants
augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water
tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.[15]
Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have
been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It
has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.
The subsequent case of Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR[16] reiterated our ruling
in the Luz Farms case. In Natalia Realty, the Court held that industrial,
commercial and residential lands are not covered by the CARL.[17] We
stressed anew that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the CARL
shall cover all public and private agricultural lands, the term agricultural land
does not include lands classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial
or industrial. Thus, in Natalia Realty, even portions of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision, which are arable yet still undeveloped, could not be considered
as agricultural lands subject to agrarian reform as these lots were already
classified as residential lands.
 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision and
A similar logical deduction should be followed in the case at bar. Lands Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February
devoted to raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as 4, 2004, respectively, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
industrial, not agricultural, lands and thus exempt from agrarian reform.
Petitioner DAR argues that, in issuing the impugned A.O., it was seeking to
address the reports it has received that some unscrupulous landowners
have been converting their agricultural lands to livestock farms to avoid their SO ORDERED.
coverage by the agrarian reform. Again, we find neither merit nor logic in this
contention. The undesirable scenario which petitioner seeks to prevent with
the issuance of the A.O. clearly does not apply in this case. Respondents'
family acquired their landholdings as early as 1948. They have long been in
the business of breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly known as the
cattle-breeding capital of the Philippines.[18] Petitioner DAR does not
dispute this fact. Indeed, there is no evidence on record that respondents
have just recently engaged in or converted to the business of breeding cattle
after the enactment of the CARL that may lead one to suspect that
respondents intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed that what
the CARL prohibits is the conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural
purposes after the effectivity of the CARL. There has been no change of
business interest in the case of respondents.

Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the

reenactment of a statute by Congress without substantial change is an
implied legislative approval and adoption of the previous law. On the other
hand, by making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one.
[19] In the case at bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress
enacted R.A. No. 7881[20] which amended certain provisions of the CARL.
Specifically, the new law changed the definition of the terms 'agricultural
activity and 'commercial farming by dropping from its coverage lands that are
devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising.[21] With this
significant modification, Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of
our agrarian laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to
exclude livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform.

In sum, it is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony

with the provisions of the Constitution. They cannot amend or extend the
Constitution. To be valid, they must conform to and be consistent with the
Constitution. In case of conflict between an administrative order and the
provisions of the Constitution, the latter prevails.[22] The assailed A.O. of
petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges
the coverage of agrarian reform beyond the scope intended by the 1987
Constitution.

73
A.C. No. 4634 September 24, 1997
JESUS CABARRUS, JR., complainant,
vs.
JOSE ANTONIO S. BERNAS, respondent.
TORRES, JR., J.:
On August 30, 1996, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus, Jr. filed an administrative
complaint for disbarment against Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas for alleged
violations of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code and Code of Professional
Responsibility. In his complaint-affidavit 1 dated August 12, 1996,
complainant alleged as follows:
A. That on April 16, 1996, respondent Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., subscribed
under oath before Marie Lourdes T. Sia Bernas, a notary public in Makati
City, wife of lawyer Jose Antonio Bernas, a verification and certification of
non-forum shopping which was appended to a complaint for reconveyance
of property and damages, denominated as Civil Case No. 65646, filed before
the Regional Trial Court in National Capital Region, RTC, which case was
raffled to RTC Branch 159 in Pasig City. A photocopy of said complaint is
hereto attached and marked as Annexex (sic) A, A-1, A-3, A-4, A-5 and A-6;
B. That as basis for the instant complaint for falsification of public document,
I am hereto quoting verbatim, the test (sic) of Annex A-6, the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping which states:
Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., under oath, depose and states:
He is the plaintiff in this case, and certify that he cause the preparation of the
foregoing pleading, the content of which are true to his personal knowledge
and that he has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the
same issues in any court, including the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency. If he should learn that a similar
action of (sic) proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme
Court or any other Tribunal agency, he undertake to report to (sic) that fact
within Five (5) days from notice to this notice (sic) to this Honorable Court.
Emphasis supplied.
C. That the cause of action relied upon by the respondent in Civil Case No.
65646 is fraud, facilitated by forgery as gleaned from paragraphs 15, 16, and
22;
D. That contrary to the tenor, import and meanoing (sic) of the allegation
under 1-B of the instant complaint, respondent and his counsel Jose Antonio
74
Bernas caused the preparation and filing of a criminal complaint for
falsification of a public document on April 11, 1996, (three days before the
filing of the aforecited Civil Case) at the AOED of the National Bureau of
Investigation if (sic) Taff (sic) Ave., a xerox copy of said complaint is hereto
attached and marked as Annex "B".
D-1. That as stated in Annex "B", the gravaman of the affidavit complaint of
the respondent is forgery, the same legal issue in Civil Case No. 65646;
D-2. That as early as August 14, 1995, respondent counsel, Jose Antonio
Bernas filed a written complaint at the NBI for the same cause of action
which was reiterated in another letter submitting to the NBI standard
specimen signatures dated October 1995, copies of said letter complaint are
hereto attached and marked as Annexes (sic) "C".
E. That respondent Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., on the basis of Annexes A, B, C,
D, inclusive of submarkings knowingly subverted and perverted the truth
when he falsify certified (sic) and verified under oath in the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping, that:
He has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same
issues in any court, including the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or
any other Tribunal or agency." Where verification-certification was placed
under oath and was conveniently notarized by the wife of the counsel of
respondent in both cases at Branch 159 of the RTC in Pasig and at the NBI,
an agency within the ambis (sic) and purview of the circulus (sic) of the
Supreme Court prohibiting forum shopping.
F. That Jose Antonio Bernas, the counsel on record of the respondents in
Civil Case No. 65646 is the same lawyer who instigated a criminal complaint
at the NBI for forgery and respondents themselves conspired and
confabulated with each other in facilitating and insuring the open, blatant and
deliberate violation of Art. 172 of the Revised Penal Code which states:
Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. —
The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and
a fine of not more than P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications
enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official document or
letter of exchanged (sic) or any other kind of commercial document; and
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause
such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.

Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial
proceeding or to the damage of another or who, with the intent to cause
such damage, shall use any of the false documents embraced in the next
preceding article, or in any of the foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall
be punished by the penalty next lower in degree.
G. That Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas should be disbarred for having instigated,
abetted and facilitated the perversion and subversion of truth in the said
verification and certification of non-forum shopping. Contrary to Canon 1,
Rule 1.01, 1.02, Canon 3, 3.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for Lawyers, the pertinent provisions of which are herein
below quoted and a copy of said code is hereto attached and marked as
Annex "E";
CANON 1. A. LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
decietful (sic) conduct.
Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities simed (sic) at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 3. A. LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES
SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE
INFORMATION OF (sic) STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Rule 3.01 — A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualified (sic) or legal services.
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH
TO THE COURT.
In his Comment, 2 respondent Jose Antonio Bernas avers that he has not
committed forum shopping because the criminal action is not an action that
involves the same issue as those in a civil action and both suits can exist
without constituting forum shopping so long as the civil aspect has not been
prosecuted in the criminal case. He emphasized that forum shopping only
exists when identical reliefs are issued by the same parties in multiple fora.
In his Supplemental Comment, 3 respondent further contends that neither he
or his client Pascual has commenced any criminal action. Pascual merely
75
requested the NBI to assist in the investigation or prosecution, and left it to
the NBI to determine whether the filing of an endorsement to the prosecutor,
who would determine probable cause, would be appropriate. It was only
upon request of the NBI that he assisted Ramon Pascual in drafting an
affidavit-complaint for falsification of public documents against complainant.
Likewise, respondent by counsel reiterates that the letter transmitted to the
NBI cannot constitute an action or proceeding because the NBI's functions
are merely investigatory and informational in nature. NBI has no
prosecutorial functions or quasi-judical powers and is incapable of granting
relief or remedy. The NBI cannot be an agency contemplated by the circular.
The core issue to be resolved here is whether respondent Atty. Bernas
transgressed Circular No. 28-91, Revised Circular No. 28-91, and
Administrative Circular No. 04 - 94 on forum shopping.
After a careful scrutiny of the records, we find the administrative complaint
bereft of merit and should be dismissed.
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one
forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari)
in another. Therefore, a party to a case resorts to forum shopping because
"by filing another petition involving the same essential facts and
circumstances, . . . , respondents approached two different fora in order to
increase their chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action. 4 In this
case, there is no forum shopping to speak of. Atty. Bernas, as counsel of Mr.
Pascual, Jr., merely requested the assistance of the NBI to investigate the
alleged fraud and forgery committed by Mr. Jesus Cabarrus. 5 The filing of a
civil case for reconveyance and damages before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City does not preclude respondent to institute a criminal action. The
rule allows the filing of a civil case independently with the criminal case
without violating the circulars on forum shopping. It is scarcely necessary to
add that Circular No. 28-91 must be so interpreted and applied as to achieve
the purposes projected by the Supreme Court when it promulgated that
Circular. Circular No. 28-91 was designed to serve as an instrument to
promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure — which is to
achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. 6
Adjunct to this, Act No. 157 7, specifically section 1 hereof provides, viz:
Sec. 1. There is hereby created a Bureau of Investigation under the
Department of Justice which shall have the following functions:
(a) To undertake investigation of crimes and other offenses against the laws
of the Philippines, upon its initiative and as public interest may require; binding orders or judgments. As succinctly put it by R.A. 157, the NBI is not
performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The NBI cannot therefore be
(b) To render assistance, whenever properly requested in the investigation among those forums contemplated by the Circular that can entertain an
or detection of crimes and other offenses; action or proceeding, or even grant any relief, declaratory or otherwise.

(c) To act as a national clearing house of criminal and other informations for WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby
the benefit and use of all prosecuting and law-enforcement entities of the DISMISSED.
Philippines, identification records of all persons without criminal convictions,
records of identifying marks, characteristics, and ownership or possession of SO ORDERED.
all firearms as well as of test bullets fired therefrom;
Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.
(d) To give technical aid to all prosecuting and law-enforcement officers and
entities of the Government as well as the courts that may request its Mendoza, J., is on leave.
services;

(e) To extend its services, whenever properly requested in the investigation

of cases of administrative or civil nature in which the Government is
interested;

(f) To undertake the instruction and training of representative number of city

and municipal peace officers at the request of their respective superiors
along effective methods of crime investigation and detection in order to
insure greater efficiency in the discharge of their duties;

(g) To establish and maintain an up-to-date scientific crime laboratory and to

conduct researches in furtherance of scientific knowledge in criminal
investigation;

(h) To perform such other related functions as the Secretary of Justice may
assign from time to time.

Explicitly, the functions of the National Bureau of Investigations are merely

investigatory and informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial
powers and is incapable of granting any relief to a party. It cannot even
determine probable cause. It is an investigative agency whose findings are
merely recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own
initiative and as public welfare may require. It renders assistance when
requested in the investigation or detection of crimes which precisely what
Atty. Bernas sought in order to prosecute those persons responsible for
defrauding his client.

The courts, tribunals and agencies referred to under Circular No. 28-91,
Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94 are those
vested with judicial powers or quasi-judicial powers and those who not only
hear and determine controversies between adverse parties, but to make

76
G.R. No. 148579 February 5, 2007
GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD,
Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Subject of this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
June 18, 2001 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the January
7, 2000 order2 of respondent Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB) which read:
In view thereof, the BOARD, by the undersigned, hereby imposes the
administrative penalty of SUSPENSION FROM AIRING/BROADCASTING
any program on EMC Channel 27 for a period of seven (7) days which
period shall commence immediately upon receipt of this Order. Your failure
to comply with this ORDER shall be construed by the BOARD as defiance
on your part of a lawful order of the BOARD.
The facts follow.
Petitioner GMA Network, Inc. operates and manages the UHF television
station, EMC Channel 27. On January 7, 2000, respondent MTRCB issued
an order of suspension against petitioner for airing "Muro Ami: The Making"
without first securing a permit from it as provided in Section 7 of PD 1986.3
The penalty of suspension was based on Memorandum Circular 98-17 dated
December 15, 19984 which provided for the penalties for exhibiting a
program without a valid permit from the MTRCB.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the suspension order and, at the
same time, informed MTRCB that Channel 27 had complied with the
suspension order by going off the air since midnight of January 11, 2000. It
also filed a letter-protest which was merely "noted" by the MTRCB thereby,
in effect, denying both the motion for reconsideration and letter-protest.
Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari which was dismissed
in the now assailed June 18, 2001 decision. The January 7, 2000
suspension order issued by MTRCB was affirmed in toto.
Hence, this recourse.
77
The pivotal issues for our resolution are:
(1) whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the show "Muro
Ami: The Making" prior to its broadcast by television and
(2) whether Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was enforceable and binding
on petitioner.
First, Section 3 of PD 19865 empowers the MTRCB to screen, review and
examine all motion pictures, television programs including publicity
materials. This power of prior review is highlighted in its Rules and
Regulations, particularly Section 7 thereof, which reads:
SECTION 7. REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR REVIEW. -- No motion picture,
television program or related publicity material shall be imported, exported,
produced, copied, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited or broadcasted by
television without prior permit issued by the BOARD after review of the
motion picture, television program or publicity material.
The only exemptions from the MTRCB’s power of review are those expressly
mentioned in Section 7,6 such as (1) television programs imprinted or
exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or departments and agencies,
and (2) newsreels.
According to the CA, the subject program was a publicity for the movie,
"Muro Ami." In adopting this finding, we hold that "Muro Ami: The Making,"
did not fall under any of the exemptions and was therefore within the power
of review of MTRCB.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that "Muro Ami: The Making" was a
public affairs program.7 Even if that were so, our resolution of this issue
would not change. This Court has already ruled that a public affairs program
-- described as a variety of news treatment; a cross between pure television
news and news-related commentaries, analysis and/or exchange of opinions
-- is within the MTRCB’s power of review.8 Clearly, "Muro Ami: The Making"
(which petitioner claims to be a public affairs program) was well within the
purview of MTRCB’s power of prior review.1awphi1.net
However, while MTRCB had jurisdiction over the subject program,
Memorandum Circular 98-17, which was the basis of the suspension order,
was not binding on petitioner. The Administrative Code of 1987, particularly
Section 3 thereof, expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of
the National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the
Philippines Law Center three certified copies of every rule adopted by it.
Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the ONAR are
ineffective and may not be enforced.9

Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, which provides for the penalties for the
first, second and third offenses for exhibiting programs without valid permit
to exhibit, has not been registered with the ONAR as of January 27, 2000.10
Hence, the same is yet to be effective.11 It is thus unenforceable since it has
not been filed in the ONAR.12 Consequently, petitioner was not bound by
said circular and should not have been meted the sanction provided
thereunder.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision

of the Court of Appeals dated June 18, 2001, insofar as it affirmed the public
respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification Board’s
jurisdiction over "Muro Ami: The Making," is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the suspension order issued against petitioner GMA
Network, Inc. pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 is hereby
declared null and void.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

78