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National Transmission Corporation vs.

Oroville Development Corporation

G.R No. 223366
August 1, 2017
FACTS: Alfredo Reyes and Grace Calingasan owned two parcels of land located in Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-3 and OCT No. P-13, respectively. In 1983, petitioner National
Transmission Corporation (TransCo) constructed a power transmission line on these properties, known as the
Tagoloan-Pulangi 138 kV transmission line. Reyes sold his land to Antonio Navarette, who later sold the same
property to respondent Oroville Development Corporation (Oroville), which is now covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-85121. Likewise, Calingasan sold her land to Oroville, now registered under TCT No. T-104365.
Thus, in 1995, Oroville became the registered owner of these properties with a total area of 13 ,904 square meters
traversed by the existing Tagoloan-Pulangi 138 kV transmission line. Transco offered to buy these properties from
Oroville to be used for the construction of the Abaga-Kirahon 230 kV transmission line in Mindanao. Oroville, through
its representative Antonio Tiu (Tiu), requested to reroute the Abaga-Kirahon 230 kV transmission line because the
Tagoloan-Pulangi 138 kV transmission line is already traversing its properties. Tiu also informed Transco that
Oroville has not been paid just compensation for the construction of the Tagoloan-Pulangi 138 kV transmission line in
its property. Transco, however, refused to reroute the proposed Abaga-Kirahon 230 kV transmission line because it
planned to construct the said transmission line parallel to the existing Tagoloan-Pulangi 13 8 kV transmission line. On
April 20, 2007, Oroville filed a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order against Transco, seeking to enjoin the construction of the AbagaKirahon 230 kV transmission line.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is taking of Oroville’s property for purposes of eminent domain in 1983?
HELD: YES. The Court rules that there is taking of the property for purposes of eminent domain in 1983. The
landmark case of Republic v. Vda. De Castellvi 15 provides an enlightening discourse on the requisites of taking.
First, The expropriator must enter a private property; Second, the entrance into private property must be for more
than a momentary period; Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority;
Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and
Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property.
The first and fourth requisites are present in this case. Transco took possession of Oroville's property in order to
construct transmission lines to be used in generating electricity for the benefit of the public.
The second requisite is likewise present as there can be no question that the construction of transmission lines
meant an indefinite stay in the property of Oroville. Further, Trans Co's exercise of eminent domain is pursuant to its
authority granted under Section 8 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001.
Finally, Oroville has been deprived of the beneficial enjoyment of its property. In several rulings, notably National
Power Corporation v. Spouses Zabala, 18 Republic v. Spouses Libunao, 19 and National Power Corporation v.
Tuazon20 this Court has already declared that "since the high-tension electric current passing through the
transmission lines will perpetually deprive the property owners of the nonnal use of their land, it is only just and
proper to require Napocor to recompense them for the full market value of their property."
G.R. No. 210669
August 1, 2017
FACTS: Sometime in 1978, the government, through the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways (now DPWH),
converted to a road right-of-way (RROW) a 29,690 sq. m. portion of the 89,070 sq. m. parcel of land located in
Mayapa, Calamba, Laguna, for the Manila South Expressway Extension Project. The subject property was registered
in the name of Commercial and Industrial Real Estate Corporation ( CIREC) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-40999. Later on, Philippine Polymide Industrial Corporation (PPIC) acquired the subject property, which led to
the cancellation of TCT No. T-40999 and the issuance ofTCT No. T..:120988 under its name. PPIC then mortgaged
the subject property with the De~elopment Bank of the Philippines (DBP), a government financing institution, which
later acquired the property in a foreclosure proceeding on September 6, 1985. TCT No. T-120988, under PPIC's
name, was then cancelled, and TCT No. T-151837 was issued in favor ofDBP. Despite the use of the 29,690 sq. m.
portion of the property as RROW, the government neither annotated its claim or lien on the titles of CIREC, PPIC and
DBP nor initiated expropriation proceedings, much less paid just compensation to the registered owners.
ISSUE: Whether or not HI-LON is entitled to just compensation for the 29,690 sq. m. portion of the subject property?
HELD: NO. Having determined that HI-LON or its predecessor-in-interest TGPI does not own the RROW in question,
as it has been the property of the Republic of the Philippines since its acquisition by the DBP up to the present, the
COA concluded that the proper valuation of the claim for just compensation is irrelevant as HI-LON is not entitled
thereto in the first place.
Concededly, the 29,690 sq. m. portion of the subject property is not just an ordinary asset, but is being used as a
RROW for the Manila South Expressway Extension Project, a road devoted for a public use since it was taken in
1978. Under the Philippine Highway Act of 1953, "right-of-way" is defined as the land secured and reserved to the
public for highway purposes, whereas "highway" includes rights-of-way, bridges, ferries, drainage structures, signs,
guard rails, and protective structures in connection with highways. Article 420 of the New Civil Code considers as
property of public dominion those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the state, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character.
Being of similar character as roads for public use, a road right-of-way (RROW) can be considered as a property of
public dominion, which is outside the commerce of man, and cannot be leased, donated, sold, or be the object of a
contract, except insofar as they may be the object of repairs or improvements and other incidental matters. However,
this RROW must be differentiated from the concept of easement of right of way under Article 649 of the same Code,
which merely gives the holder of the easement an incorporeal interest on the property but grants no title thereto, 20
inasmuch as the owner of the servient estate retains ownership of the portion on which the easement is established,
and may use the same in such a manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement.
Heirs of Jose Peñaflor v. Heirs of Artemio and Lydia Dela Cruz
GR No. 197797
August 09, 2017

On April 15, 1991, Nicolasa authorized her daughter, Carmelita C. Guanga, Artemio's sister, to mortgage the subject
property to Jose R. Penaflor, the predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioners, Jose Penaflor, Jr. and Virginia P. Agatep
in order to secure a loan in the amount of P 12,000.00. As Nicolasa failed to settle her loan obligation when it fell due,
Penaflor filed an application for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage before the Regional Trial Court. After the
requirements of posting, notices, and publication were complied with, the subject property was sold at a public auction,
where Penaflor emerged as the highest bidder. A Certificate of Sale was thus issued in his favor. The period of
redemption expired without the subject property being redeemed; hence, a Final Bill of Sale was issued and registered
in Penaflor's name. Thereafter, the latter executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership. This notwithstanding,
Nicolasa persisted in her occupancy of the subject property and refused to deliver possession to Penaflor.

RTC granted the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession of Penalosa. Nicolasa and Carmelita did not appeal
the decision; thus, the same lapsed into finality. However, the writ of possession was not enforced as Artemio filed a
complaint for annulment of judgment before the same trial court, claiming to be the lawful owner and possessor of the
subject property even prior to the mortgage. Artemio's complaint was eventually dismissed without prejudice on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. The CA annulled and set aside the writ of possession and notice to vacate issued by the

WON the CA erroneously set aside the Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate issued by the RTC in favor of herein

YES. It is well-settled that the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property becomes the absolute owner of
the property if no redemption is made within one [(1)] year from the registration of the certificate of sale by those entitled
to redeem. As absolute owner, he is entitled to all the rights of ownership over a property recognized in Article 428 of
the New Civil Code, not least of which is possession, or jus possidendi".

In this case, respondents, in their Comment and/or Opposition submitted before this Court, claim that "Artemio Dela
Cruz validated his ownership of the subject property, including the [two-storey] house erected thereon and other
improvements, through a deed of waiver and transfer of possessory rights executed by his mother, Nicolasa Dela Cruz
in May 3, 1989 which is attached and made [an] integral part hereof." However, it is apparent from the face of this
document that the same was not an effective mode of transferring Nicolasa's ownership to Artemio, which could have
thus given the latter an independent right over the subject property prior to its mortgage to Penaflor. By virtue thereof,
Nicolasa supposedly waived, renounced, transferred, and quitclaimed all her rights, interests, and participation over
the subject property to Artemio.
North Greenhills Association v. Atty. Narciso Morales
GR No. 222821
August 09, 2017
NGA started constructing a pavilion or kiosk occupying the side of the park adjacent to the residence of Atty. Morales.
Part of the design was a public restroom intended to serve the needs of park guests and members of NGA. Said
restroom was constructed alongside the concrete wall separating the house of Atty. Morales from the park. Objecting
to the construction of the restroom, Atty. Morales filed on July 23, 2003 a complaint before the Housing and Land
Regulatory Board.

Atty. Morales amended his complaint and additionally sought the demolition of the pavilion which was then being
built, alleging that for a period spanning 33 years, he had an open, continuous, immediate, and unhampered access
to the subdivision park through his side door, which also served as an exit door in case of any eventuality, and that
such restroom is a nuisance per se. NGA contended that as the absolute owner of the park, it had the absolute right
to fence the property and impose reasonable conditions for the use thereof by both its members and third parties;
that the construction of the restroom was for the use and benefit of all NGA members, including Atty. Morales; and
that Atty. Morales' use of a side entrance to the park for 33 years could not have ripened into any right because
easement of right of way could not be acquired by prescription. NGA likewise sought the payment of P.878,778.40
corresponding to the annual membership dues which Atty. Morales had not been paying since 1980. HLRUB favored
Morales, which was affirmed by CA.

1. WON the restroom is considered as a nuisance per accidens.
2. WON NGA had the right to block Atty. Morales’ access to the park.

1. NO. A nuisance per accidens is one which depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its
existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized
to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance. In the case, however, Atty. Morales has
no evidence to show that such restroom poses sanitary issue that may harm his family, and that such
assertions are mere speculations, which will not persist in the case.
2. YES. As per Article 429 and 430 of the New Civil Code, NGA, as owner of the park, has the right to
enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other
means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon. It also has a right to exclude others from access
to, and enjoyment of its property. NGA's legal right to block the access door is beyond doubt. Courts have
no business in securing the access of a person to another property absent any clear right on the part of the
latter. Atty. Morales never introduced any evidence that he had acquired any right by prescription or by
agreement or legal easement to access the park through his side door. Moreover, he never claimed that his
side door was his only access to the park. He has other means and, being adjacent to the park, going
through other means is not cumbersome.