THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant vs. HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN CFI, Sta.

Cruz, Laguna, JOSE BUENAVENTURA, GODOFREDO REYES, BENJAMIN REYES, NAZARIO

AQUINO and CARLO DEL ROSARIO, accused-appellees.
G.R. No. L-32166 October 18, 1977

FACTS:

This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries,
promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old
Fisheries Law.

On March 7, 1969, the five accused were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna for violating the Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused
resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz. Upon motion of the accused, the
municipal court quashed the complaint. The prosecution appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the
order of dismissal. The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an
obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in Section 11 of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at
all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances. Further held that, since the law does not clearly
prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful. It is noteworthy that the
Fisheries Law does not expressly punish electro fishing.

Notwithstanding the silence of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation
of the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84, prohibiting electro fishing in
all Philippine waters. On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation
of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative
Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries.

Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their
authority in issuing the Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1.

HELD:

The Court ruled in the affirmative.

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in
issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries
Commission, Republic Act No. 3512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing.
As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in
penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis. That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous
substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deep-sea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca,
(4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6)
other violations.

Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in punishing electro fishing,
does not contemplate that such an offense fails within the category of "other violations" because, as already shown,
the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous
substances, fixed in section 76, and is not the same as the penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations
fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law.
The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an
offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself.

AUGUSTO TOLEDO, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, respondents.
G.R. No. 92646-47 October 4, 1991

FACTS:

Petitioner Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed by then Comelec Chairman Ramon Felipe as Manager of the Education
and Information Department of the Comelec, on May 21, 1986. At the time of his appointment, petitioner, was already
more than fifty-seven (57) years old. It was the first-time petitioner joined the government service as he was then
engaged in active private practice prior to said appointment.

Petitioner's appointment papers, particularly Civil Service Form No. 333 and his oath of office were endorsed by the
Comelec to the Civil Service Commission for approval and attestation. However, no prior request for exemption from
the provisions of Section 22, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP) was
secured. Said provision prohibits the appointment of persons 57 years old or above into the government service without
prior approval by the Civil Service Commission (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1983).

Petitioner officially reported for work and assumed the functions of his office on June 16, 1986.

On January 29, 1989, public respondent Comelec, upon discovery of the lack of authority required under Section 22,
Rule III of the CSRPAP, and CSC Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1983 issued Resolution No. 2066 declaring
void from the beginning the appointment of Atty. Augusto Toledo in violation of law and pursuant to Section 7, Rule
III of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action as Manager of the Education and Information Department of the
Commission.

According to the Comelec it was necessary that not only must prior authority from the Civil Service Commission be
obtained considering that he was more than fifty-seven (57) years old at the time, it must as well be shown that (a) the
exigencies of the service so required, (b) Atty. Toledo possesses special qualification not possessed by other officers
or employees in the Commission, and (c) the vacancy cannot be filled by promotion of qualified officers or employees
in the Commission;

Petitioner appealed, however, public respondent CSC promulgated Resolution No. 89-468 which disposed of the
appeal, the Commission resolved to declare, the appointment of Augusto V. Toledo as Manager, Information and
Education Department, Commission on Elections, merely voidable and not void ab initio. Hence, Atty. Toledo is
considered a de facto officer from the time he assumed office on June 16, 1986, until and up to the promulgation of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2066 on January 29, 1989.

Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CSC Resolution No. 89-468 is without legal basis because the CSRAP is invalid and unenforceable
for not having been published in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation.

HELD:

The Court ruled in the negative.

The petitioner argues that the requirement of prior CSC authority to appoint persons 57 years or older under Section
22, Rule III of the CSRPAP has not "become effective" and cannot be invoked against him.
The Civil Service Act of 1959 (Republic Act No. 2260) established a Civil Service Commission one of the functions
of which was, "with the approval by the President, to prescribe, amend, and enforce suitable rules and regulations for
carrying into effect the provisions of ... the Civil Service Law," said rules "to become effective thirty days after
publication in the Official Gazette".

The Revised Civil Service Rules, published in the supplement to Vol. 58, No. 49 of the Official Gazette, dated
December 3, 1962.

Section 5, Rule VI of those Revised Civil Service Rules provided that:

SEC. 5. No person shall be appointed or reinstated in the service if he is already 57 years old, unless the
President of the Philippines, President of the Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives, or the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, as the case may be, determines that he possesses special qualifications and his
services are needed.

RA 2260 contained no provision prohibiting appointment or reinstatement in the Government service of any person
who was already 57 years old, or otherwise requiring that some limitation as regards to age be placed on employment
in the Government service. This prohibition was purely a creation of the Civil Service Commission.

Pursuant to the 1973 Constitution, Presidential Decree No. 807 was issued by President Marcos, establishing "an
independent Civil Service Commission.", known as the "Civil Service Decree of the Philippines," repealed or
accordingly modified all laws, rules, and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent" with its provisions (Sec. 59),
although it declared that "the former Civil Service Commission created under Republic Act No. 2260, as amended,
and as organized under the Integrated Reorganization Plan may serve as the nucleus of the Civil Service Commission".
Like RA 2260 which it superseded, PD 807 empowered the Commission to "prescribe, amend, and enforce suitable
rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Decree," and also provided that said "rules and
regulations shall become effective thirty (30) days after publication in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of
general circulation."

The new Civil Service Commission adopted "rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions" of the Civil
Service Decree. The rules were named, "Civil Service Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies" (CSRPAP). Section
22, Rule III of the CSRPAP is substantially the same as Section 5, Rule VI of the quondam "Revised Civil Service
Rules" and it reads as follows:

SEC. 22. No person shall be appointed, reinstated, or re-employed in the service if he is already 57 years old,
unless the President, or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in the case of employees in the judiciary,
determines that he possesses special qualifications urgently needed by the hiring agency.

There is no provision at all in PD 807 dealing in any manner with the appointment, reinstatement or re-employment
in the Government service of any person already 57 years or any particular age, for that matter. Again, the provision
regarding persons 57 years of age was purely a creation of the Commission, having no reference to any provision in
the decree intended to be implemented.

It was this provision of the CSRPAP (Sec. 22, Rule III) which was applied to Toledo. According to the CSC, since
prior authority for Toledo's appointment had never been obtained — indeed, it would appear that the appointment
papers were not transmitted by the COMELEC to the CSC until February, 1989 at which time Toledo's appointment
was "approved as permanent" by the Executive Director of said CSC—the appointment had to be struck down.

These rules and regulations (CSRPAP) were never published either in the Official Gazette or any newspaper of general
circulation, at least as of the time that Section 22, Rule III thereof was applied to Toledo to the latter's prejudice. This
was admitted by the Chairman of the Commission, Hon. Patricia A. Sto. Tomas in a letter written by her to Toledo
stating that (a) the Commission had "no record of the publication of said Rules ("Rules on Personnel Actions and
Policies") in newspapers of general circulation" although said Rules were "published and distributed by the National
Media Production Center in 1975," and that (b) only "the Rule on Promotion embodied in CSC Resolution No. 83-
343 repealing Rule V of the said Rules was published on August 15, 1983 in Volume 79 No. 33 of the Official Gazette.

The Revised Civil Service Rules implementing R.A. No. 2260 cannot be considered valid and effective after RA 2260
was repealed and superseded by PD 807. PD 807 was obviously intended to take the place of RA 2260. In all matters
dealt with by both laws, the provisions of PD 807 were obviously intended to be controlling. So, also, the rules
promulgated by the Civil Service Commission to carry the provisions of PD 807 into effect were meant to supersede
or take the place of the rules implementing RA 2260. In other words, PD 807 and the CSRPAP were intended to make
RA 2260 and its implementing rules functus officio, render them without force and effect except only as regards any
provision, if at all, not dealt with by PD 807 or the CSRPAP.

The President, was aware of the provision on 57-year old persons in the Revised Civil Service Rules promulgated
under RA 2260. Yet when he promulgated PD 807 the President did not see fit to incorporate therein any provision
regarding 57-year old persons or for that matter, to prescribe any age beyond which persons could become ineligible
for appointment, reinstatement or re-employment. This surely is an indication of an intention not to continue the
provision in effect.

In any event, the provision on 57-year old persons in the Revised Civil Service Rules (under said RA 2260) cannot be
accorded validity. As already pointed out, it is entirely a creation of the Civil Service Commission, having no basis in
the law itself which it was meant to implement. It cannot be related to or connected with any specific provision of the
law which it is meant to carry into effect, such as a requirement, for instance, that age should be reckoned as a factor
in the employment or reinstatement of an individual, or a direction that there be a determination of some point in a
person's life at which he becomes unemployable, or employable only under specific conditions. It was therefore an
unauthorized act of legislation on the part of the Civil Service Commission. It cannot be justified as a valid exercise
of its function of promulgating rules and regulations for that function, to repeat, may legitimately be exercised only
for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect; and since there is no prohibition or restriction on the
employment of 57-year old persons in the statute—or any provision respecting age as a factor in employment—there
was nothing to carry into effect through an implementing rule on the matter.

The power vested in the Civil Service Commission was to implement the law or put it into effect, not to add to it; to
carry the law into effect or execution, not to supply perceived omissions in it. "By its administrative regulations, of
course, the law itself cannot be extended; said regulations 'cannot amend an act of Congress.

Apart from this, the CSRPAP cannot be considered effective as of the time of the application to Toledo of a provision
thereof, for the reason that said rules were never published, as is admitted on all sides.

The fact that he was already more than 57 years old when he was invited to work in the COMELEC appear to have
been satisfied. There is no question that it was not Toledo's fault that his papers were tardily submitted to the Civil
Service Commission.

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. (As Employer) and FRANCISCO TONG (As Assistant
General Manager) and Attorney-in-Fact of SUSUMO SONODA, SENJI TANAKA, TAKASHIKO
KUMAMOTO, HITOSHI NAKAMURA, TETSUO KODU, (Employees), petitioners and appellants,
vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, respondent and appellee.
G.R. No. L-21223 August 31, 1966

FACTS:

The Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., a domestic corporation, has been employing Japanese technicians under a
pre-arranged contract of employment, the minimum period of which employment is 6 months and the maximum is 24
months.

From April 28, 1957, to October 26, 1958, the corporation had in its employ 6 Japanese technicians. In connection
with the employment of these aliens, it sent an inquiry to the Social Security System (SSS) whether these employees
are subject to compulsory coverage under the System, which inquiry was answered by the First Deputy Administrator
of the SSS, under date of August 29, 1957, as follows:

Aliens employed in the Philippines:

Aliens who are employed in the Philippines shall also be compulsorily covered. But aliens who are employed
temporarily shall, upon their departure from the Philippines, be entitled to a rebate of a proportionate amount of their
contributions; their employers shall be entitled to the same proportionate rebate of their contributions in behalf of said
aliens employed by them. (Rule I, Sec. 3[d], Rules and Regulations.)

Starting September, 1957, and until the aforementioned Japanese employees left the Philippines on October 26, 1958,
the corresponding premium contributions of the employer and the employees on the latter's memberships in the SSS.

On October 7, 1958, the Assistant General Manager of the corporation, on its behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the
Japanese technicians, filed a claim with the SSS for the refund of the premiums paid to the System, on the ground of
termination of the members' employment. As this claim was denied, they filed a petition with the Social Security
Commission for the return or refund of the premiums, in the total sum of P2,520.00, paid by the employer corporation
and the 6 Japanese employees, plus attorneys' fees. This claim was controverted by the SSS, alleging that Rule IX of
the Rules and Regulations of the System, as amended, requires membership in the System for at least 2 years before
a separated or resigned employee may be allowed a return of his personal contributions. Under the same rule, the
employer is not also entitled to a refund of the premium contributions it had paid.

After hearing, the Commission denied the petition for the reason that, although under the original provisions of Section
3 (d) of Rule I of the Rules and Regulations of the SSS, alien-employees (who are employed temporarily) and their
employers are entitled to a rebate of a proportionate amount of their respective contributions upon the employees'
departure from the Philippines, said rule was amended by eliminating that portion granting a return of the premium
contributions. This amendment became effective on January 14, 1958, or before the employment of the subject aliens
terminated. The rights of covered employees who are separated from employment, under the present Rules, are
covered by Rule IX which allows a return of the premiums only if they have been members for at least 2 years.

Hence, the appeal contending that when appellants-employees became members in September, 1957, and paid the
corresponding premiums to the System, it1 is subject to the condition that upon their departure from the Philippines,
these employees, as well as their employer, are entitled to a rebate of a proportionate amount of their respective
contributions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the amendment of the Rules and Regulations of the SSS, insofar as it eliminates the provision on the
return of premium contributions, originally embodied in Section 3(d) of Rule I, constituted an impairment of
obligations of contract.

Whether or not in implementing the SSS law and denying appellants' claim for refund of their premium contributions,
due process was observed.

HELD:

Petition Denied.

The contention cannot be sustained. Appellants' argument is based on the theory that the employees' membership in
the System established contractual relationship between the members and the System, in the sense contemplated and
protected by the constitutional prohibition against its impairment by law. But, membership in this institution is not the
result of a bilateral, consensual agreement where the rights and obligations of the parties are defined by and subject to
their will. Republic Act 1161 requires compulsory coverage of employers and employees under the System. It is
actually a legal imposition, on said employers and employees, designed to provide social security to the workingmen.
Membership in the SSS is, therefore, in compliance with a lawful exercise of the police power of the State, to which
the principle of non-impairment of the obligation of contract is not a proper defense.

The Rules and Regulations promulgated by the SSS, pursuant to the rule-making authority granted in Section 4(a) of
Republic Act 1161, was duly approved by the President on July 18, 1957, and published in the Official Gazette on
September 15, 1957.2 These rules and regulations, provide:

3. The determination of whether an employer or an employee shall be compulsorily covered shall be vested in the
Commission. The following general principles shall guide the Commission in deciding each case:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) Aliens who are employed in the Philippines shall also be compulsorily covered. But aliens who ate employed
temporarily and whose visas are only for fixed terms shall, upon their departure from the Philippines, be entitled to a
rebate of a proportionate amount of their contributions; their employers shall be entitled to the same proportionate
rebate of their contributions in behalf of said aliens employed by them.

XI

AMENDMENTS AND EFFECTIVITY

1. xxx amendment and/or additional rule, however, shall not take effect until and after the corresponding
resolution of the Commission has been submitted to and approved by the President of the Philippines.

Rule I Section 3 (d) and Rule IX, however, were later amended, which amendment was approved by the President on
January 14, 1958, to read as follows:

(d) Aliens who are employed in the Philippines shall also be compulsorily covered (Sec. 3, Rule I)

EFFECT OF SEPARATION FROM EMPLOYMENT

When an employee under compulsory coverage is separated from employment, his employer's contribution
on his account shall cease at the end of the month of separation; but such employee may continue his
membership in the System and receive the benefits of the Act, as amended, in accordance with these rules. If
he continues paying the 6 per cent monthly premiums representing his as well as the employer's contribution,
based on his monthly salary at the time of his separation; but if at the time of his separation the covered
employee has been a member of the System for at least two years, he shall have the option to choose any one
of the following adjustments of his membership in the System:

1. A refund of an amount equivalent to his total contributions of two and one-half per centum plus interests
at the rate of three per centum per annum, compounded annually;

The question pertinent to this case now is whether or not appellants are bound by the amended Rules requiring
membership for two years before refund of the premium contributions may be allowed.

These rules and regulations were promulgated to provide guidelines to be observed in the enforcement of the law. As
a matter of fact, Section 3 of Rule I is merely an enumeration of the "general principles to (shall) guide the
Commission" in the determination of the extent or scope of the compulsory coverage of the law.

It may be argued, however, that while the amendment to the Rules may have been lawfully made by the Commission
and duly approved by the President on January 14, 1958, such amendment was only published in the November 1958
issue of the Official Gazette, and after appellants' employment had already ceased. Suffice it to say, in this regard, that
under Article 2 of the Civil Code,5 the date of publication of laws in the Official Gazette is material for the purpose of
determining their effectivity, only if the statutes themselves do not so provide.

In the present case, the original Rules and Regulations of the SSS specifically provide that any amendment thereto
subsequently adopted by the Commission, shall take effect on the date of its approval by the President. Consequently,
the delayed publication of the amended rules in the Official Gazette did not affect the date of their effectivity, which
is January 14, 1958, when they were approved by the President. It follows that when the Japanese technicians were
separated from employment in October, 1958, the rule governing refund of premiums is Rule IX of the amended Rules
and Regulations, which requires membership for 2 years before such refund of premiums may be allowed.

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN C.
TUVERA. in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as
Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., Respondents.
G.R. No. L-63915. December 29, 1986

FACTS:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure or a number of presidential decrees which
they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided,".

The Court hereby orders respondents to publish to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which
are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. irtua1aw library

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides:

"ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication."

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties the Court hold, that the clause "unless it is
otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in
any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day
period shall be shortened or extended.

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that
such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed
to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its
approval notwithstanding the lack of publication, it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced
as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of
its existence. This is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed.

The law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to
remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the
government.

"Laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to
the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. The subject of such law is a matter of
public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party,
even in the courts of justice. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be
directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
HELD:

The Court held therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as
a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature.

Presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the
national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published,
including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain
prohibitions or requirements.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case
studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the
assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms.

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of
the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the
presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not
even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY
1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos
administration. 7 The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it
impractical. Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period
provided by the legislature.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said
Article 2.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep
secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.