LAGUNZAD vs.VDA.

DE GONZALES & CA

MANUEL LAGUNZAD, PETITIONER, VS.MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES AND THE COURT OF
APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.G.R. NO. L-32066 AUGUST 6, 1979

FACTS

Petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began the production of a movie entitled "The Moises Padilla
Story" portraying the life of Moises Padilla, a mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the
Municipality of Magallon, Negros Occidental and for whose murder, Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the
Liberal Party then in power and his men were tried and convicted. The emphasis of the movie was on the
public life of Moises Padilla, there were portions which dealt with his private and family life including
the portrayal in some scenes, of his mother, Maria Soto, private respondent herein, and of one "Auring"
as his girl friend. Padilla’s half sister, for and in behalf of her mother, Vda.de Gonzales, objected to
the "exploitation" of his life and demanded in writing for certain changes, corrections and deletions in
the movie. After some bargaining as to the amount to be paid Lagunzad and Vda. de Gonzales, executed a
"Licensing Agreement" whereby the latter as LICENSOR granted Lagunzad authority and permission to
exploit, use, and develop the life story of Moises Padilla for purposes of producing the picture for
consideration of P20,000.00.Lagunzad paid Vda. de Gonzales the amount of P5,000.00. Subsequently, the
movie was shown indifferent theaters all over the country. Because petitioner refused to pay any
additional amounts pursuant to the Agreement, Vda. de Gonzales instituted the present suit against him
praying for judgment in her favor ordering petitioner 1) to pay her the balance of P15,000.00, with
legal interest from of the Complaint; and 2) to render an accounting of the proceeds from the picture
and to pay the corresponding 2-1/2% royalty there from, among others. Petitioner contended in his Answer
that the episodes in life of Moises Padilla depicted in the movie were matters of public knowledge and
occurred at or about the same time that the deceased became and was a public figure; that private
respondent has no property right over those incidents; that the Licensing Agreement was without valid
cause or consideration and constitutes an infringement on the constitutional right of freedom of speech
and of the press; and that he paid private respondent the amount of P5,000.00 only because of the
coercion and threat employed upon him. As a counterclaim, petitioner sought for the nullification of the
Licensing Agreement, Both the trial court and the CA ruled in favor of Vda. deGonzales.

ISSUES
Whether or not the fictionalized representation of Moises Padilla is an intrusion upon his right to
privacy notwithstanding that he was a public figure.
Whether or not Vda. de Gonzales., the mother, has any property right over the life of Moises Padilla
considering that the latter was a public figure.
Whether or not the Licensing Agreement constitutes an infringement on the constitutional right of freedom
of speech and of the press.

HELD
YES, being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy.
The right to invade as person's privacy to disseminate public information does not extend to a fictional
or novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or she may be. In the case at
bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life story of Moises Padilla,
petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab
story of torture and brutality.
YES, Lagunzad cannot dispense with the need for prior consent and authority from the deceased heirs to
portray publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in that of his mother and the members of his
family. As held in Schuyler v. Curtis" a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deceased
person to protect his memory, but the privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their
feelings and to prevent a violation of their own rights in the character and memory of the deceased."
NO, Lagunzad claims that as a citizen and as a newspaperman, he had the right to express his thoughts in
film on the public life of Moises Padilla without prior restraint. The right of freedom of expression,
indeed, occupies a preferred position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties." It is not, however, without
limitations. One criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press is the
"balancing-of-interests test." The principle requires a court to take conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation."
In the case at bar, the interest’s observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and the
right of -freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of those
interests, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner,
the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of
expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern

ABUNDIO MERCED, petitioner, vs. HON. CLEMENTINO V. DIEZ. ETC. ET AL., respondents
No. L-15315. August 26, 1960

Facts:

On January 30, 1958, Abundio Merced, already married to Eufrocina Tan, filed a complaint for annulment of his second
marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar on the ground that he was threatened and intimidated into signing an affidavit that he and
Elizabeth had been living as husband and wife which was used by the Elizabeth in securing their marriage of exceptional
character, without the need for marriage license; that he was again threatened by Elizabeth and her relatives to enter into
the marriage on August 21, 1957; and that he never lived with her. Merced prays for annulment of the marriage and for
moral damages in the amount of P2,000.

In her answer to the civil case, Elizabeth Ceasar denied the allegations of the complaint and avers that neither she nor her
relatives know of plaintiff’s previous marriage. According to her, it was Merced who insisted on the marriage. As a
counterclaim she asked for P50, 000 for moral damages. She later on filed acriminal complaint for bigamy against
Merced.

Merced filed a motion to hold to trial of said criminal case in abeyance until final termination of the civil case on the
ground that the latter involves facts which if proved will determine the innocence of the accused. This motion was granted,
but upon a motion for reconsideration by the fiscal, the order for suspension was set aside and denied on the ground that
in People vs Mendoza, judicial declaration of nullity of a second and bigamous marriage is not necessary.
Issue:

Whether or not an action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question in a prosecution for bigamy.

Ruling:

The civil case presents a prejudicial question which must first be resolved before thecriminal case.

The elements of prejudicial question are the following: (1) it must be determinative of the case before the court; (2)
jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.

For the first element, in order that the Merced be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the marriage which she contracted for
the second time with Elizabeth Ceasar, must first be declared valid. But its validity has been questioned in the civil action.
This civil action must be decided before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed. In order that a person may be
held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the second and subsequent marriage must have all the essential elements of a valid
marriage, were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. One of the elements is consent, without it, a marriage would
be illegal and void. Since Merced claims that he was forced into the marriage, the validity of the second marriage is
determinative of the guilt of Merced in the crime of bigamy.

The denial of the suspension of the criminal case was based on the case of People vs. Mendoza. The same cannot be
applied in this case because of different set of facts. In this case, Mendoza was first married with Josefa, then married
Olga, and after the death of Josefa, married Carmencita. Olga filed a case of bigamy because of the third marriage.
The Court held that he is not guilty of bigamy since the marriage with Olga was void, having been contracted when Josefa
was still alive, whereas the marriage with Carmencita is valid because it was contracted when the first wife was already
dead.

For the second element, (NOTE: IN THIS CASE, THE CIVIL CASE AND THECRIMINAL CASE WERE BOTH FILED IN
THE SAME COURT) Spanish jurisprudence, requires that the essential element determinative of the criminal action must
be cognizable by another court. This requirement is due to the fact that Spanish courts jurisdictions’ are exclusively
divided into civil or criminal. In the Philippines, where our courts are vested with both civil and criminal jurisdiction, the
principle of prejudicial question is to be applied even if there is only one courtbefore which the civil action and the
criminal action are to be litigated. But in this case the court when exercising its jurisdiction over the civil action for the
annulment of marriage is considered as a court distinct and different from itself when trying the criminal action for
bigamy.

ABUNDIO MERCED, petitioner, vs. HON. CLEMENTINO V. DIEZ. ETC. ET AL., respondents
No. L-15315. August 26, 1960

Facts:

On January 30, 1958, Abundio Merced, already married to Eufrocina Tan, filed a complaint for annulment of his second
marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar on the ground that he was threatened and intimidated into signing an affidavit that he and
Elizabeth had been living as husband and wife which was used by the Elizabeth in securing their marriage of exceptional
character, without the need for marriage license; that he was again threatened by Elizabeth and her relatives to enter into
the marriage on August 21, 1957; and that he never lived with her. Merced prays for annulment of the marriage and for
moral damages in the amount of P2,000.

In her answer to the civil case, Elizabeth Ceasar denied the allegations of the complaint and avers that neither she nor her
relatives know of plaintiff’s previous marriage. According to her, it was Merced who insisted on the marriage. As a
counterclaim she asked for P50, 000 for moral damages. She later on filed acriminal complaint for bigamy against
Merced.

Merced filed a motion to hold to trial of said criminal case in abeyance until final termination of the civil case on the
ground that the latter involves facts which if proved will determine the innocence of the accused. This motion was granted,
but upon a motion for reconsideration by the fiscal, the order for suspension was set aside and denied on the ground that
in People vs Mendoza, judicial declaration of nullity of a second and bigamous marriage is not necessary.

Issue:

Whether or not an action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question in a prosecution for bigamy.

Ruling:

The civil case presents a prejudicial question which must first be resolved before thecriminal case.

The elements of prejudicial question are the following: (1) it must be determinative of the case before the court; (2)
jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.

For the first element, in order that the Merced be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the marriage which she contracted for
the second time with Elizabeth Ceasar, must first be declared valid. But its validity has been questioned in the civil action.
This civil action must be decided before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed. In order that a person may be
held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the second and subsequent marriage must have all the essential elements of a valid
marriage, were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. One of the elements is consent, without it, a marriage would
be illegal and void. Since Merced claims that he was forced into the marriage, the validity of the second marriage is
determinative of the guilt of Merced in the crime of bigamy.

The denial of the suspension of the criminal case was based on the case of People vs. Mendoza. The same cannot be
applied in this case because of different set of facts. In this case, Mendoza was first married with Josefa, then married
Olga, and after the death of Josefa, married Carmencita. Olga filed a case of bigamy because of the third marriage.
The Court held that he is not guilty of bigamy since the marriage with Olga was void, having been contracted when Josefa
was still alive, whereas the marriage with Carmencita is valid because it was contracted when the first wife was already
dead.

For the second element, (NOTE: IN THIS CASE, THE CIVIL CASE AND THECRIMINAL CASE WERE BOTH FILED IN
THE SAME COURT) Spanish jurisprudence, requires that the essential element determinative of the criminal action must
be cognizable by another court. This requirement is due to the fact that Spanish courts jurisdictions’ are exclusively
divided into civil or criminal. In the Philippines, where our courts are vested with both civil and criminal jurisdiction, the
principle of prejudicial question is to be applied even if there is only one courtbefore which the civil action and the
criminal action are to be litigated. But in this case the court when exercising its jurisdiction over the civil action for the
annulment of marriage is considered as a court distinct and different from itself when trying the criminal action for
bigamy.

LANDICHO VS RELOVA Case Digest

LANDICHO V. RELOVA

Facts:
On February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, presided over by respondent
Judge, with the offense, of bigamy. It was alleged in the information that petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which
marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe Lourdes
Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, likewise presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe
Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio because of the alleged use of force, threats and
intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character. On June 15, 1963, petitioner a s defendant in
said case, filed a third-party complaint, against the third-party defendant
Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant be declared null and void, on the ground that
by means of threats, force and intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of
Makati, Rizal.

Issue: Whether or not the civil case filed is a prejudicial question.

Ruling:
Where the first wife filed a criminal action for bigamy against the husband, and later the second wife filed a civil case for annulment of
the marriage on the ground of force and intimidation, and the husband later files a civil case for annulment of marriage agai nst the first wife, the
civil cases are not prejudicial questions in the determination of his criminal liability for bigamy, since his consent to the second marriage is not in
issue. "The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by accused in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial
questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case. In order that the case of annulment of
marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that petitioner's consent to such
marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be
involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.
The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy, the fact that two marriage
ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the petitioner who filed the ac tion for nullity
on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was only later that petitioner as defendant in the civil action, filed a third party complaint
against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation.
Assuming the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal
case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of a
competent court and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the
presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy."

Geluz vs CA
TITLE: Geluz vs CA
CITATION: 2 SCRA 801

FACTS:

Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz, the petitioner and physician, through her aunt Paula
Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950 before she and Oscar were legally married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from
her parents, she decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted again on October 1953 since she found it inconvenient
as she was employed at COMELEC. After two years, on February 21, 1955, she again became pregnant and was accompanied by her sister
Purificacion and the latter’s daughter Lucida at Geluz’ clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street. Oscar at this time was in the province of
Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He doesn’t have any idea nor given his consent on the abortion.

ISSUE: Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from the physician who caused the
same.

HELD:

The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the death of a person does not cover cases of an unborn fetus that is
not endowed with personality which trial court and Court of Appeals predicated.

Both trial court and CA wasn’t able to find any basis for an award of moral damages evidently because Oscar’s indifference to the previous
abortions of Nita clearly indicates he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental affections. Instead of filing an administrative or
criminal case against Geluz, he turned his wife’s indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of which not only he but,
including his wife would be the beneficiaries. It shows that he’s after obtaining a large money payment since he sued Geluz for P50,000
damages and P3,000 attorney’s fees that serves as indemnity claim, which under the circumstances was clearly exaggerated.

Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
CITATION: 248 SCRA 300

FACTS:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in
the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now Divine Word
University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work
with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President
Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as
Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in
Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro
Manila during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy
Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the
words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained
Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the
Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First District of
Leyte.

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of
legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following
reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them
to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of
origin should be deemed to continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in
Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not
domicilium necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres.
Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.
To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act, which
supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are
hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly
elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

Constantino vs Mendez
Constantino vs. Mendez
209 SCRA 18

FACTS:

Michael Constantino, an illegitimate child, as represented by Amelita, her mother, sought monthly support from Ivan Mendez including
Amelia’s complaint on damages. The latter and Amelita met in a restaurant in Manila where she was working as a waitress. Ivan invited him
at his hotel and through promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Amelita, afterwards, he admitted being a married
man. In spite of that, they repeated their sexual contact. Subsequently, she became pregnant and had to resign from work.

Trial court ruled in favor of Amelita providing actual and moral damages, acknowledging Michael as Ivan’s illegitimate child and giving
monthly support to the latter which was set aside by CA.

ISSUE: WON the alleged illegitimate child is entitled for the monthly support.
HELD:

Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael
Constantino. Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even
established on direct examination as she merely testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September, October and
November, 1974. More so, Amelita admitted that she was attracted to Ivan and their repeated sexual intercourse indicated that passion and
not alleged promise to marriage was the moving force to submit herself with Ivan.

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

Francisco Hermosisima vs Court of Appeals

103 Phil 629 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Breach of Promise to Marry – Moral Damages
In 1950, Soledad Cagigas, 33 years old (then a school teacher, later she became an insurance underwriter), and Francisco
Hermosisima, 23 years old (apprentice ship pilot), fell in love with each other. Since 1953, both had a refular intimate and sexual
affair with each other. In 1954, Soledad got pregnant. Francisco then promised to marry Soledad. In June 1954, Soledad gave
birth to a baby girl. The next month, Francisco got married but with a different woman named Romanita Perez.
Subsequently, Soledad filed an action against Francisco for the latter to recognize his daughter with Soledad and for damages
due to Francisco’s breach of his promise to marry Soledad. The trial court ruled in favor of Soledad. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court and even increased the award of damages. The Court of Appeals reasoned that Francisco
is liable for damages because he seduced Soledad. He exploited the love of Soledad for him in order to satisfy his sexual
desires – that being, the award of moral damages is proper.
ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to marry.
HELD: No. Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. The Court of Appeals based its award of damages on
Article 2219 of the Civil Code which says in part that “Moral damages may be recovered from… (3) Seduction, xxx…” However,
it must be noted that the “Seduction” being contemplated in the said Civil Code provision is the same “Seduction” being
contemplated in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code. Such “seduction” is not present in this case.
Further, it cannot be said that Francisco morally seduced (in lieu of criminal seduction) Soledad given the circumstances of this
case. Soledad was 10 years older than Francisco. Soledad had a better job experience and a better job overall than Francisco
who was a mere apprentice. Further still, it was admitted by Soledad herself that she surrendered herself to Francisco and that
she wanted to bind “by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.”

Pe vs Pe
TITLE: Pe vs. Pe
CITATION: 5 SCRA 200

FACTS:

Alfonso Pe, the defendant, was a married man, agent of La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory in Gasan Marinduque who was treated like a
son by Cecilio Pe, one of the petitioners. Cecilio introduced Alfonso to his children and was given access to visit their house. Alfonso got
fond of Lolita, 24 year old single, daughter of Cecilio. The defendant frequented the house of Lolita sometime in 1952 on the pretext that he
wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Eventually they fell in love with each other.

Plaintiff brought action before lower court of Manila and failed to prove Alfonso deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita’s affection.
The case on moral damages was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolita’s family on the ground of moral, good custom and public policy due to their illicit affair.
HELD:

Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy contemplated in Article 20 of
the civil code. The defendant took advantage of the trust of Cecilio and even used the praying of rosary as a reason to get close with Lolita.
The wrong caused by Alfonso is immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages
and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.

WASSMER V VELEZ G.R. NO. L-20089 DECEMBER 26, 1964

FACTS: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get
married and set Sept. 4, 1954 as the big day. On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be
saying that he wants to postpone the marriage as his mother opposes it and that he is leaving. But the
next day, Sept. 3, he sent her a telegram and told her that nothing has changed, that he is returning and
he apologizes. Thereafter, Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again. Wassmer sued him for
damages. Velez filed no answer and was declared in default.
ISSUE: Is the case at bar a mere breach of promise to marry?
RULING: Surely, this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise
to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and
publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This
is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in
damages in accordance with Art. 21 of the NCC which provides that "any person who willfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
DECISION: Affirmed.

ESTOPA VS PIANSAY, JR 1960

Facts: The plaintiff Erlinda Estopa, a beautiful girl of twenty-three, residing in Bago, Negros
Occidental, with her widowed mother, Felicidad Estopa, stated that she fell in love and submitted herself
completely to the defendant Loreta Piansay, Jr., sometime in September, 1957, after a courtship that
lasted for a couple of months during which period the defendant consistently promised and succeeded to
make her believe in him that he was going to marry her; that sometime in December, 1957, the plaintiff
was informed reliably that defendant was backing out from his promise of marriage so she demanded
defendant's compliance to his promise in order to vindicate her honor, and plaintiff went to the extent
of asking the help of defendant's parents, but all her efforts were in vain. Finally, realizing that her
efforts were futile but knowing that her cause was not completely lost, she decided to file her
complaint, not to compel defendant to marry her, but to demand from him a compensation for the damages
that she sustained. No other claims of damages was petitioned, she merely alleged "social humiliation,
mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feeling and moral shock."
This is an appeal from the decision of the Negros Occidental court of first instance awarding to
plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 by way of moral damages, P2,000.00 as exemplary damages and P1,000.00 as
attorney's fees.
Issue: Whether or not Estopa can claim damages becasue of the breach of promise to marry by Piasay.
Held: No, as plaintiff has no right to moral damages, she may not demand exemplary damages. While the
amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded. (Art. 2234, New Civil Code)
We have today decided that in this jurisdiction, under the New Civil Code, the mere breach of a promise
to marry is not actionable. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, Supra, 631); and we have reversed the Cebu
court's award for moral damages in breach of promise suit. Consistently with such ruling, Loreta Piansay,
Jr. may not be condemned to pay moral damages, in this case. Therefore, as plaintiff is not entitled to
any damages at all, there is no reason to require Piansay, Jr. to satisfy attorney's fees.
Dispo: Judgment reversed, defendant absolved from all liability. No costs.