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House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Report on RuSsian
Active Measures
March 22, 2018

Classified by. 5888841

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(U) Referenced Persons (cont}

Gordon Director of Nation.:,! Security of Donald Trump's 2.016 presidentia l

campaign _____________ __;______
Grnham j undsay - United States Senator from South C~rolina (2003 -present}; former
member of the United States House of Representatives from So uth

IL Chucl<
. C~_rolina_(~9~3·2.~0]_ ... - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1
United Stateg Senator from Iowa {:1981-present}; former member of
the United States House of Represe ntatives from Iowa (1973-1981)
- - · ·- - -
II Hicks !Hope White House Director of Communications (201 1-present}; former
White House Director of Strategic Co mrnu nicc)tion!I (J;muary 201'·

.I September 2017); National Press Secretarv of th e Presidential Tra n-

5ltlon Team; Communications Director of Donald Tl'u mp's 201G

prr:sldcn~i a! cnmpaign; former employee of the Trump Organi1.atlo n
f.ormr.r Sccrntory of Homc1land Scc1J rlty {2013·201,)

j Kellogg Keith E1<eculive S~m:itary and Chief of Sto Ho'i'thoNat1onal .5ecurity CoL1n-
cll (February 2017-pre, e11t); Aeling Ntitional SecuriL-y Advisor
(February 2017); foreign policy .1dviso1· of Donald Trump's 201Gpres-
fd c ntial camp air,n 1
Kemp Brian Secretary of State of the Stat e of Georgla (2010-pr e5P.nt)
- ·-ralli--
-- - - -!-·-·-
Kushner Jared

-- - - -- --1---------L:= ============ ===---- --- - -
Senio r Advisor to the Preside nt; s.on•in-l~w of the Presfdent (m.:mied
I. lvanka Trump in 2009); real-est ate developer

- ·

- -- - · -

·- Sergey

-·· - ~-

- - --·~--- - - -----~
... -·
I Miinnfort j"i>~ul IChuim)Un of~ naldTrump's 201G pr~Gldentii ~ilmpolr,n (June • -
Augu!:t 2016)
- - -- JJ~ n - co : led, \;;-i th Senator ·sessions.
thef orelgopolicy advisory panei..o f .
_ _ _ __ __ _D_o_r_1a_ld_Trump'.s 2016 presidential camp aigfl

McCabe · Andrew Former Deputy Director ol th e Federal 13ureau of lnvostigatio11 (2016



(U) Referenced Persons (cont}
- - ---·- - ·-
---,..· .Sena
- te- Majority
---· . --- -----------~
Leader (2015,present); UnHed Stales Senator from
l Kentuc:l(y ( 1985-prcsent)
M cCord M ary I Former /\cling As~istant At1orney Genr.ra l of the U1)ited.Statcs {2016
1-2017); former Principal Deput'f Assistant Attorney Genr.ra r for r<Ja·
lional Security (2014-2016 )
McGahn ! Do~ \ ~'hit~ Hou.-;e Counsel (Jan~ary 2017- prnsent); General Counsel of
the Presidenti.ll Transition Team {November 2016-Januarv 201 7);
Counsel to the Trump campaign during Donald 1rump's 2016 presi-
dential C:lmpaign

-- ---
·- ·

[ MuellC!r
l Angela

I Robert
Chancell or of Germany {2005-p resent)

Special Counsel for the United States Deportment of Justice (May

! 2017-present); farmer Dlrnctor oi the Federnl Bureau of lnvestii1a-

tion {2001-2013)
l Obairm

. __ _ 5


_.. _ .. ....
Bilfi"lCk f ormr.r Prcr.ldr.n ~ of thr. Ullitfid St.itc!s {200B·20l 7}

'Gr.-;,-gc- --1To,;;;;:~bo(oitho foroi npclity;id\lisory ·panc:l to Donald

I Trump' s·201G proslcfontial camp,1ign
. .

- - - - -- - - - - -
i Nancy
- -Leader of the United Stales House of Representatives
(201l·presant); former Spe.ikcr of the Unitr.d St<ltes House of Rep-
resentatives (2007 °2011); member of the United St ates House of
Roprescnmtives from Cr1lifornia (1987-pres cnti
Pence - ·- ·,_. Mike
Vice President of the United St at~ {2017-prc."nnt}; former Governor
rI of tncliana (2013-2017); forrner member of the Un1ted Stc1res House
of Representatives from Indiana {2001- 2013)
i- . . - - - - ~- - ~

h- -
P odast.i
John -- ' Chul~n-;;;--ot Mi'll~ry Clinton;s 2016 prosi<lentinl ciln"lpc.)lgn: form cir
I White Ho1,sa Chief of Staff; former Coun selor to t he l>resldtmt
-- ·- --- ·-

-Pompeo "
_ _ _ _....:._M
_l_k__ __
S~ct~a-s yof Stcite no~lne; (M ~rch 2018); oiract;r of the Centra l
lr'lt~lllgt:nce Ag1.mcy (Janu arv 2017·prC5Cl'lt ); former member of t he
,..___ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ __ _,~d SE1.?S Mouse of Representatives from Kan9a, (2011-2017)


(U} Referenced Persons (cont}

~P-L1~n - - -· -- - ..,._-~-'i'a-d-rn-,1-r·--·~ ~----'T"=PresldOfll of the Russian Federollon (7.012,-prr.s(m·t)- - -·· I

Reid Harry - · I Forrne/ Mfnofity Leader of the United Srntr..~ Sennto (2015 ·2017); ·- 1
fom1er United Stat.es Senator froo1 N1:vadc1 (1987-2017)
Rice St1~<ln IFormef National Security Ad visor {20l3-2.0:1.7}; former United · ·\
Statr.s Arnbnss,1dor to the United Nations {2009-2013]
Romney Mitt Former Rcp-~blican.no'niineefor President {2012); former Gov ernor
of Massachusetts (2.003-2007)
! - - - - - - -- -~ - - - - - - + - - - - - -- -- - - --···- - - --
Ryan Paul Spe;iker of the United Scatcis House of Rr.prescnt<Jtive.~ (2015·
present}; rnember of the United States. House of Representatives

I_ - -- from Wisconsin (19!}9-presen t)

Schiller Former Deputy Assistant to the Pre~ident ,md Directo r of 011al

Office Opercttions (January 20:L7-Septeinber 2017); former Director
of Security for the Trump Organization (2004-2017}

Schmitz 1
Former forejgn policy advisor to Donald Trump; fo rmr.r tnspcctor
I General of the United Stale~ Departn~ ent of ~-~fe1m_i~902-~ . _

Sosslans - - - -- ·Jr.ff . Attorney General of the United St<ltes {2017-prese i,t); momber of

J the 2016 Prnslr.hmtlal 1r.1nnll1on Tnam ;ind Don-ild Trump's 2016

prosldcntlol campalgr); form<Jt United Stnt~s Senator from Alabama

,___ ... _____ --- · - - ·· ·-··· - - ·- - · \
•Christopher Founder of Britfsh research firm Ofbls Rusiness Intelligence; former

I ~-stone- · 1Roger
British intelligence p rofe~sion al
- - - -- ---- - -··-- --- -
Former advisor of Donafd Trump's 2016 presidential camp.1ign
·- -

Sulllvan I Jake Senior Policy Advisor of Hfllary Clinton's 2016 presidential cam-
paign; former National Security Advisor to t he Vice President (2013 ·



Tr ... mp, Jr.

Don;ild J.

D~ 'llo_ _ __ _ l
I President of the United Stclces (2017-present); career real estate
developer .ind t elevision hast and producer
- - -·- - -- - --- -- -~
_ ~esident Trtimp' s son; Trum p Organization execu\ive


(U) Referenced Persons (cont)
- - -- - ··
I Y,mulcovlch Vlktor
. ... .,. ..
rormcr President of Ulm1ine (2010-2014)
- - -- ·
I Yates - - l S.il,ly It=ormcr Acting Attorney Gr.ncrill of thr. United States (J ~~Oi7};
J forn1 e, Depllty P,nornr.y Gener.ii of ,hr. United Statc~5 (201S-2017}
. - - · - - - -- ·- - ~-- -· -· - - -- ·


(U) Preface

(U} In 2015, Russia began engaging in a our democratic processes and Institutions in
covert influence campaign aimed at the U.S. the future.
presidential election. The Russlan govern· {U) From the investigation's inception,
ment, at the direction of President Vladimir we were determined to follow the facts
Putin, sought to sow discord in American
w herever they might lead within the agreed
society and undermine our faith In the dem- -upon scope and refer any criminality (if
ocratic process. Now, more than a year found) to the appropriate authorities. Dur-
after the election, the American people ing the investigation we identified numer-
rightfully want to know what the Russians
ous shortcomings, including counterintelli-
did; how they did it; with whose suppo1t, if gence concerns, classified leaks, puzz ling
anyone's; and what can be done to counter legal processes, and inappropriate or ques-
any election tampering by foreign adver- tionable behavio r. All of these are enumer-
saries in the future. ated in this report through findings, recon,-
(U) With this charge 1 the House Pem1a- mendations, and conclusions.
nent Select Committee on Intelligence (the
(U) we reviewed every piece of rele-
Committee) initiated an investigation in Jan-
vant evidence provided to lJS and inter-
uary 201 7 with t he mandate to examine (1)
viewed ·every witness we assessed wou Id
what Russian cyber activity and other active substantively contribute to the agreed-upon
measures (covert influence activities run by
bipartisan scope of the investigation. We
the Russian lntelltgence services) were di· acknowledge that Investigations by other
rected against the United States and its al-
committees, the Special Counsel, the media,
llcs; (2) whether the Russian active
or interest groups will continue and may
measures include links between Russia and
find facts that were not readily accessible to
individuals associated with presidentia I
the Committee or outside the scope of our
campaigns; {3} what was the U.S. govern ..
investigalion . We will ensme any new dis-
ment response to these Russian active coveries are considered in the due course of
measures and what do we need to do to the Committee's continuing oversight re-·
protect ourselves and our allies in the fu-
ture; and (4) what posslble leaks of classi-
(U) We.would like to recognize the tire-
fied information took place related to the
Intelligence Community's assessment of
less work of the Committee's staff, which
rema ined professional and dedica_ted
these matters. Our goal was to provide, to
throughout this inquiry. They deserve our
the greatest extent practicable, a full ac-
counting of what happened, how it hap- nation's gratitude. We would also like to
pened, and recommendations for protecting thank the thousands of men and women
who serve in the IC. They will wal<e up to-

PROPE;ffl'Y (W 'l'i'll: U.S. HOUSE 01! ~1:.r>1~1~SUM l'AI tVGB viii

morrow and continue their watch to protect
the American people against further threats
from Russia and other adversaries.

(U) Nevertheless, the Committee re-

mains concerned that Russia will continue
to undermine western democracies by stok-
ing social strife, political unrest, and divi-
sion. As a country, it is time for us to re-
flect, understand what happened, fix the
discovered problems, and unify around the
common purpose of countering any future
influence campaigns by Russia or any other


(U) Introduction and Overview

(U) Russia's interference in the 2016 during the 2016 U.S. presidential election
U.S. presidential election was nothing novel triggered the Committee to announce a spe-
for the Kremlin. The Kremlin aspires to sow cific inquiry into Russia's campaign (see Ap-
chaos and discord and advance its agenda in pendix B). The bipartisan parameters fo-
targeted nations, particularly in Europe and cused the investigation and this report-this
former Soviet republics such as the Baltics Committee examined: (1) Russian cyber ac-
and Ukraine. To do this, Russia effectively tivity and other active measures that were
combines decades of experience in propa- directed against the United States and its
ganda and psychological warfare techniques allies; (2) whether the Russian active
with its vast media apparatus, a strata of measures include links between Russia and
well-educated and proficient technicians, individuals associated with presidential
and a robust intelligence and security corps. campaigns; (3) the U.S. government re-
sponse to these Russian active measures
(U} In the United States, Russian
and what we need to do to protect our-
cyberattacks related to the 2016 elections
selves and our allies in the future; and (4)
starkly highlighted technical vulnerabilities
what possible leaks of classified information
in U.S. digital infrastructure and bureau-
took place related to the Intelligence Com-
cratic shortcomings that were exploited by
munity's assessment of these matters. 1 The
the Kremlin. Russia's active measures cam-
paign achieved its primary goal of inciting Committee interviewed 73 witnesses, con-
ducted 9 hearings and briefings, reviewed
division and discord among Americans. For
approximately 307,900 documents, and is-
more than a year, U.S. politics have been
sued 20 subpoenas. This allowed the Com-
consumed by bitter recriminations, charges,
mittee to find answers crucial for identifying
and counter-charges about the attacks. The
and addressing institutional weaknesses to
reliability of the democratic vote-the bed-
assist the United States with identifying and
rock of the U.S. republic-was widely and
repeatedly questioned. responding to inevitable hostile acts in the
(U) At the time of the 2016 U.S. presi-
(U) While the 2016 U.S. presidential
dential election cycle, the Committee was
election helped focus American attention on
already concerned with Russian malfea-
sance and aggression in levels that had not Russian cyber and information operations,
the Russian government has conducted ac-
been seen since the Cold War. In fact, the
tive measure campaigns in Europe for years.
IAA for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 included
Believing it is engaged in an information war
multiple provisions to improve the United
with the West, Russia's influence activities
States' ability to counter Russian aggression.
employ an array of tactics-usually tailored
However, the Kremlin's malicious activities

to the target country's population and envi- threat and defend their syst ems. State and
ronment-in an effort to accomplish t he local governments were slow to grasp the
Kremlin's goals. These goals generally in- seriousness of the threat and when notified
clude influencing an opponent's leadership of breaches continued to resist any action
and population, advancing a narrative, or that implied federal direction or con-
inducing a behavior change. The factors trol. Some states opted not to cooperate
that make these campaigns successful also with important defensive measures offered
make them hard to counter. However, gov- by the DHS. While no tabulation systems, or
ernments, non-governmental organizations, systems that count votes, were impacted,
and media organizations in Europe have be- the overall security posture of the U.S. fed-
gun taking actions to address and mitigate eral, state, and local governments was
the threat that Russian influence campaigns demonstrated to be inadequate and vulner-
pose. able.

{U) The Russian active measures cam- (U} The Committee' s investigation also
paign against the United States was multi- reviewed the opening, in summer 2016, of a
faceted. It leveraged cyberattacks, covert FBI enterprise counterintelligence investiga-
platforms, social media, third-party interme- tion into-Trump campaign associ-
diaries, and state-run media. Hacked mate- ates:
rial was disseminated through this myriad
network of actors with the objective of un- - Because of "the sensitivity of the
dermining the effectiveness of the future matter," the FBI did not notify congressional
administration . This dissemination worked leadership about this investigation during
in conjunction with derisive messages post- the FBl's regular counterintelligence
ed on social media to undermine confidence briefings. Three of-original sub-
in the election and sow fear and division in jects of the FBI investigation have been
American society. charged with crimes and the Committee's

(U) The U.S. government's subsequent review of these cases covers the period pri-
or to the appointment of Special Counsel in
response to the Russian active measures
May 2017.
campaign during the 2016 election was slow
{U) While the Committee found no evi-
dence that the Trump campaign colluded,
coordinated, or conspired with the Russian
government, the investigation did find poor
evolved, the FBl's notification to victims and judgment and ill-considered actions by the
oversight committees was inconsistent in Trump and Clinton campaigns. For exam-
timeliness and quality, which contributed to ple, the June 2016 meeting at Trump Tower
the victims' failure to both recognize the between members of the Trump campaign

and a Russian lawyer who falsely purported
to have damaging information on the Clin-
ton campaign demonstrated poor judge-
ment. The Committee also found the
Trump campaign's periodic praise for and
communications with Wikileaks-a hostile
foreign organization-to be highly objec-
tionable and inconsistent with U.S. national
security interests. The Committee also
found that the Clinton campaign and the
DNC, using a series of cutouts and interme-
diaries to obscure their roles, paid for oppo-
sition research on Trump obtained from
Russian sources, including a litany of claims
by high- ranking current and former Russian
government officials. Some of this opposi-
tion research was used to produce sixteen
memos, which comprise what has become
known as the Steele dossier.

(U) The effectiveness and relatively low

cost of information operations, such as the
dissemination of propaganda, make it an
attractive tool for foreign adversaries. Un-
less the cost-benefit equation of such oper-
ations changes significantly, the Putin re-
gime and other hostile governments will
continue to pursue these attacks against the
United States and its allies. Based on the
investigation, the Committee recommends
several solutions to help safeguard U.S. and
allies' political processes from nefarious ac-
tors, such as the Russians.

1. HPSCI Press Re lease , Intelligence Committee Chairman, Ranking M ember Establish Parameters for Russia Investigation,
Mar. 1, 2017.
2. HPSCI, "Russian Active Me asures Investigation Open He aring," Mar. 20, 2017.

(U} Summary Table of Findings

(U) Finding #1: The Kremlin exploits free or independent media spaces and open democra-
cies to conduct active measures in Europe.
(U) Finding #2: Russia supports fringe political parties and non-governmental organizations
in Europe to further the Kremlin's agenda while also disparaging or discrediting politicians
and groups seen as hostile to Moscow.

(U) Finding #3: Russia conducts increasingly aggressive cyber operations against European
governments; a tactic that will continue to present a profound threat.

(U) Finding #4: Russia targets disaffected European populations and exploits social, politi-
cal, and racial divisions in an effort to sow discord, encourage unrest, and incite protests.

(U) Finding #5: Russia leverages business and economic ties in Europe to achieve the Krem-
lin's goals, message displeasure, or inflict punishment.
(U) Finding #6: European governments and media outlets are conducting a variety of activi-
ties to combat Russian influence campaigns.

(U) Finding #7: Russia conducted cyberattacks on U.S. political institutions in 2015-2016.

(U) Finding #8: Russian-state actors and third-party intermediaries were responsible for the
dissemination of documents and communications stolen from U.S. political organizations.

(U) Finding #9: The Russian government used RT to advance its malign influence campaign
during the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

(U) Finding #10: Russian intelligence leveraged social media in an attempt to sow social dis-
cord and to undermine the·u.s. electoral process.

(U) Finding #11: The Federal Bureau of Investigation' s notification to numerous Russian
hacking victims was largely inadequate. ·

(U) Finding #12: Communication between the Department of Homeland Security and state
election officials was impeded by state officials' mistrust of federal government overreach
coupled with a unprecedented level of Russian cyber intrusions.

(U) Summary Table of Findings (cont)


(U) Finding #13: The joint Office of the Director of National Intelligence and Department of
Homeland Security public statement attributing election interference to Russia was ineffec-

(U) Finding #14: The Executive Branch's post-election response was insufficient.

(U) Finding #15: The majority of the Intelligence Community Assessment judgments on
Russia's election activities employed proper analytic tradecraft.

(U) Finding #16: The Intelligence Community Assessment judgments on Putin's strategic
intentions did not employ proper analytic tradecraft.

(U) Finding #17: The Federal Bureau of Investigation opened an enterprise counterintelli-
gence investigation into the Trump campaign after receiving information related to Trump

(U) Finding #18: As part of the enterprise counterintelligence investigation into the Trump
campaign, the Federal Bureau of Investigation opened an individual counterintelligence
investigation into Carter Page.

(U) Finding #19: The dossier compiled by Christopher Steele formed an essential part of an
application to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to obtain electronic surveillance
on Carter Page.

(U) Finding #20: Special Counsel Robert Mueller indicted Paul Manafort on several charges,
none of which relate to allegations of collusion, coordination, or conspiracy between the
Trump campaign and the Russian government.

(U) Finding #22: General Flynn pleaded guilty to making a false statement to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation regarding his December 2016 conversations with Ambassador Kis-
lyak, even though the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents did not detect any deception
during Flynn's interview.

(U) Finding #23: Executive Branch officials did not notify the Trump campaign that mem-
bers of the campaign were assessed to be potential counterintelligence concerns.

(U) Finding #24: The February 2018 indictment of the Internet Research Agency and Rus-
sian nationals exposes Russian actors and their intent to spread distrust towards the candi-
dates and the political system in general.


(U) Summary Table of Findings (cont.)


(U) Finding #25: When asked directly, none of the interviewed witnesses provided evi-
dence of collusion, coordination, or conspiracy between the Trump campaign and the Rus-
sian government.

(U) Finding #26: The Committee found no evidence that President Trump's pre-campaign
business dealings formed the basis for collusion during the campaign.

(U) Finding #27: The Republican national security establishment's opposition to candidate
Trump created opportunities for two less-experienced individuals with pro-Russia views to
serve as campaign advisors: George Papadopoulos and Carter Page.

{U) Finding #28: The change in the Republican Party platform regarding Ukraine resulted in
a stronger position against Russia, not a weaker one, and there is no evidence that Paul
Manafort was involved.

(U) Finding #29: There is no evidence that Trump associates were involved in the theft or
publication of Clinton campaign-related emails, although Trump associates had numerous
ill-advised contacts with Wikileaks.

(U) Finding #30: Carter Page did not travel to Moscow in July 2016 on behalf of the Trump
campaign, but the Committee is concerned about his seemingly incomplete accounts of his
activity in Moscow.

(U) Finding #31: George Papadopoulos' attempts to leverage his Russian contacts to facili-
tate meetings between the Trump campaign and Russians was unsuccessful.

(U) Finding #32: Donald Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, and Paul Manafort attended a June 9,
2016, meeting at Trump Tower where they expected to receive-but did not ultimately ob-
tain-derogatory information on candidate Clinton from Russian sources.

(U) Finding #33: Donald Trump Jr. briefly met with a Russian government official at the
2016 National Rifle Association annual meeting, but the Committee found no evidence that
the two discussed the U.S. presidential election.

(U) Finding #34: The Committee found no evidence that meetings between Trump associ-
ates-including Jeff Sessions-and official representatives of the Russian government-
including Ambassador Kislyak-reflected collusion, coordination, or conspiracy with the
Russian government.


(U) Summary Table of Findings (cont.)
. -
.cH.~·~~E~.'A:.€AM PAIGNi· tl N1<s w1t~(RIJss,14 'f~oJ·i t}

(U) Finding .f#35: Possible Russian efforts to set up a 11 back channelu with Trump associates
after the election suggest the absence of collusion during the campaign, since the commu-
nication associated with collusion would have rendered such a "bacl<channel" unneces-

(U) Finding #36: Prior to conducting opposition research targeting candidate Trump's busi-
ness dealings, Fusion GPS conducted research benefitting Russian interests.

!U) Finding #37; The law firm Perkins Coie hired Fusion GPS on behalf of the Clinton cam-
paign and the Democratic National Committee to research candidate Trump's Russia ties.

IU) Finding #38: Christopher Steele claims to have obtained his dossier information second-
and third-hand from purported high-p laced Russian sources, such as government officials
w ith links to the Kremlin and intelligence services.

(U} Finding #39; Christopher Steele's information from Russian sources was provided di-
rectly to Fusion GPS and Perkins Coie c1nd indirectly to the Clinton campaign.

.;.. ·e.)ijl\PT-.ER§S'
. .l . ..
.. . #.
f I• ' •• , ,, , ,....., I • ·,,

(U) Finding #40: Leaks of classified information regarding Russian intentions to sow discord
in the U.S. presidential election began prior to the election day-November 8, 2016.

(U) Finding #41; Leaks of classified information alleging Russian intentions to hetp elect
candidate Trump increased dramatically after the election day- November 8, 2016.

(U) Finding 1#42: The leaks prior to the classified Intelligence Community Assessment's pub-
lication, particularly leal<s occurring after the U.S. presidentia I election, correlate to specific
language found in the Intelligence Community Assessment.

(U) Finding #43: Continued leaks of classified information have damaged national security
and potentially endangered lives.

(U} Finding #44: Former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, now a CNN nation-
al security analyst, provided inconsistent testimony to the Committee about his contacts
with the media, jncluding CNN.

{U) Summary Table of Recommendations
·- . -·
. .. . . l~frfhfPliiR,t~ RWSS AN·©AMP.AIGNS1IN EUROP.E
- ~
- - . .
(U). Recommendation #1: European governments, non-governmental organizations, busi-
nesses, think tanks, and academia should strengthen legal and regulatory environments,
promote media pluralism, build professional media associations, and improve the financial
sustai11ability of legitimate news outlets.

(U) Recommendation #2: European governments, non-governmental organizations, busi-

nesses, think tanks, and academia should implement and encourage multi-pronged, coun-
try-wide efforts by both public and private entities to combat Russian propaganda, tech-
nical, and cyber operations.

(U) Recommendation #3: European governments, non-governmental organizations, busi-

nesses, think tanks, and academia should implement more stringent cyber security practic·
es, such as multifactor authentication a nd encryption of sensitive da1a, as well as educating
workforces on basic cyber security topics and best practices.

(U) Recommendation 114: European.governments shou ld look to long-term solutions to

lessen economic dependence on Russia .
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{U) Recommendation #5: Congress should identify options available to the private sector
and federal government that would address the social media vulnerabilities exploited by
the Russian government.

(U) Recommendation #6; Congress should consider updating the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act to cover maliciou s international cyber actors.

{U) Recommendation tt7: The Federal Bureau of Investigation should improve cyberattack
victim notification.

(U)Hecommendation #8: Threats identified by the Intelligence Community to state and lo-
cal elections infr'1structure should be immediately briefed to .ippropriate state and local
officials. When threats are Identified, the federal government shou ld conduct an expedit-
ed declasslfication review to ensure that the threat information can reach all necessary
state and local officials In a tfmely manner.

(U} Recommendation ti9: The Secretary of Homeland Security should provide certain desig-
nated state and local election officials ;;ipprop ri.ate security clearances to enable those offi-
cials to respond to election-related threats.

(U) Summary Table of Recommendations (cont.}
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(U) Recommendation #10: Significant threats to U.S. electio ns Identified by the Intelligence
Community, including cyberatta cl<s directed at politicill organizations, should be immedi-
ately reported to the Congressional intelligence committees.

(U ) Recommendation #11: Congress should encourage the adoption of National Institute of

Standards and Technology cyber security stendards, such as those adopted by the Elections
Assistance Commission, by providing federal resources to state and local governments to
facilitate such adoption. Funds should be ti~d to the adoption and certification of elections
systems to appropriate standards.

(U} Recommendation #12: Congress should consider additional fu nding for the National
Institute of Standa rds and Technology to enable better outreach to state and local govern-

{U) Recommendation #13: Congress should consider a one-time grant to state and local
election agencies to conduct a risk assessment of those agencies' computer systems.

(U)-Recommendation #i4: Congress should consider strengthening the Help Americn Vote
Act of 2002. to ensure that both stiltewide voter registration and tabula tion systems are
better protected from foreign cyber threats.

(U} Recommendation ff 15: The Deportment of Homelilnd Security should provide the own-
e r or operator of any electronic election infrasttucture affected by a ny significant foreign
cyber intrusion with a briefing and include steps that may be taken to mitigate such intru-
(U) Recommendation #16: State .ind local governments should be encouraged to establish
redundancies that are not dependent on current elections infrastructure, such as a mecha-
nism that retains individual vote records, ensuring the integrity of the vote In the event of
a compromi se of voting infrastructure due to a foreign cyberattack. An example of such a
redundancy is a contemporaneously created paper record reflecting the voter's selections.

(U} Recommendation #17: While it is important t o implement lessons learned from the Ex·
ecutive Branch's response, Congress should not hamper the Executive Branch's ability to
use discretion in responding t o a particular forei gn threat.

{U) Recommendation #18: Congress should consider repealing the Logan Act.

PROl'l:l~TY OF THE U.S. HQUSt, OF Rl.:Pl'{l':8E:M rATIV l:.S

{U) Summary Table of Recommendations (cont.)
.., -
.- -
Cltl'~ PiflER-:r~.& 3: Rl!JS'Sl'A:A1ifA€l(S'1iHE'llfNITEm SifAT-ES,AN1!> ~MERlt'!.I,\ RE~€lS
1 1

- _, .
~ .!
(U) Recommendation #19: All U.S. presidential campaigns should receive unclassified coun-
terintelfigence briefings at an appropriate time prior to a nomination convention.

(U) Recommendation #20: When consistent with national security, the Intelligence Com-
munity should immediately inform U.S. presidential candidates when it discovers a legiti-
mate counterintelligence threat to the campaign, and promptly notify Congress.

(U) Recommendation #21: Both houses of Congress should consider requiring all staff to
receive an annual counterintelligence awareness briefing.
- "'·-··- . I ..., ·
- T
. .• ~
- - -~- .- -- = h h ~--

(U) Recommendation #22: Political campaigns and law enforce me nt should ensure th at
their counte rintelligen ce defens es a pproprlately account for the role of cut-outs and Inter-

(U) Recommendation #23: Congress should conside r amending curre nt ca mpaign finance
laws to furthe r increase transparency rega rding services provided by fore ign persons or
e ntities.
GH~p:;fLE~ S.:il ~fu~lfULG~Elil GE:(tQr,11'1\itUNl1F'f,'~SS ESS tylE Nl .ti~~r(S
- . ~
"'- ·--
(U) Recommendation #24: Each component of t he Intelligence Community should update
its guidance regarding media contacts to ensure the guidance applies to every employee,
including senior officials.

(U) Recommendation #25 : Congress should consider legislation to increase the pe nalties
f~r unauthoriz~d disclosures of classified information.

(U) Recommendation #26: 'rhe Executive Branch should consider instituting manda tory pol-
ygra phs for all non-confirmed polltlcal a ppointees that have top secret d earances.
·-- . ... . ·- --·-· --·-~··· ·- -···- -- -··-


{U) Chapter 1-Russian Influence Campaigns in Europe
Key Question #1: What Russian cyber activity and other a~tive measures were directed
against the United States and its allies?

(U) While Americans became ncutely

aware of Russian cyber and information op-
erations a-fter the 2016 U.S. presidential
election, these activities were not new to
{U) l~ussla conducts information war-
fare in an effort to manipulate the populace
and leadership of the nations lt targets. To

these ends, Russia employs on am:iy of tac-
tics for its influence activities in an effort to
advance the Russian government's inter-
UNCLASSIFIED ests. When successful, these aclivities can

SOVIET PROPAGANDA TARGETING THE influence an opponent's leadership and

WE;ST AFTER WORLD WAR II population to advance a narrative and in-
duce a b'ehavior change, concurrently serv-
ing multiple Russian objectives.

(U) Russia's goals for: these campaigns

include: to advance the Krernlin's intereslSi
discredit the West ; confuse or distort events
that threaten Russia's image; break Western
political cohesion; and defend Russia's role ·
as a vital global power. More specific and
country-tailored goats also include to: weak·
en, divide, and halt further expansion of
consensus-driven institutions like NATO and
Tj~•<}.J('.,... S..1 ':l\:IHt'(I! /\h(,~....,,,f\f'Q'I•'

!'.u.,1,,.1 Ui'lit,"'-4( f:l;t,ft., ,l.,l,«Ju the EU; sow confusion and amplify divisions
UNCLASSfFIED among segments of Western populations;
challenge establishment politics; damage
U.S. foreign policy goals; advance Russia's
version of world events; distract from con-
troversial Russian policies and activities; re-
verse perceived anti-Russian policies; im-
prove bilnteral relations; and strengtt1en
economic ties.

(U) Aiding in Ru ssia' s influence aclivi- spaces and open democracies through a
tives, the modern world's widespread use of network of Russian state-owned news out·
lhe Internet and socia I media for news and lets and media p la tfo rm s, such as Sputnik
communications has allowed Russia to: and RT, whld1 promote Russia's image
quickly and easily weapon;ze data stolen In abroad and show foreigners world events
cyber breaches; disseminate propaganda, from a Russian perspective (see Appendix
misinformation, and disinformation; and C}.
aggravate social, racial, and political divi-
(U} The Kremlin 's active measures, or
Information warfare, strategy includl':!S sev- ·
eral tactics:

(U) Finding fll: The Kremlin exploits free or

Independent media spaces ancf open de-

mocracies to conduct active mea sures in

• (U) After alleged Russian interfer-

ence in the Brexit vote, in October
2013, the U.I<. Electoral Commission
announced a probe into this activity.
According to open source reporting,
Russian-based Twitter accounts post-
ed more than 45,000 messages
about Brexit in 48 hours during the
2016 referendum vote. 7

{~) Russia also exploils free media

to Moscow.

(U) Plant and propagate false news sto-

ries: Russia uses "troW' armies to set up fake
soc ial media accounts and biogs, Including
through an organization l<nown as the Inter- UNCLASSIFIED
net Research Agency {IHA} .ti A study by the
European Endowment for Democracy de -
scribed larp,c numbers of paid Russian
"troll s" on socia l media . -

(U) Finding #2: Russia supports fringe po- UNCLASSIFIED

litical parties and non-governmental organ-
izations in Europe to further the Kremlin's
agenda while also disparaging or discred-
iting politicians and groups seen as hostile

pugn the target's character or reputation .



(U} In ano ther examp le during the re-

cent French Presidential elections, Russian-
controlled media l1igl1Ughted defamatorv
stories ;)bout the private li fe and campaign
funding of the more RwisJa.skepLic cancli-
date Emmanuel Macron . Two days before
(U) In a tactic dating back to the Soviet
the final presidential election, data hacked
era, Moscow also denigrcites and discredits
from Macron's En Marche party was posted
people and groups seen as hostile to its in-
on a data sha ring website. Cybersecurity
researchers attributed t he hack to the same

GRU group that hncked the DNC.u

(U) Finding #3: Russia conducts increasing-

ly aggressive cyber operations against Eu-
(U) Kremlin-lin ked journalists and media
ropean governments; a tactic that will con-
outlets also will engage In misinformation:
tinue to present a profound threat.
weaving truth and falsehoods together to
create misleading reports intended to im-

,•,- . - .. C"\ I ' . ,.''' "•• l.k r:+ 1 f • .. ·, - t . '


(U) Finding #4: Russia targets disaffected

European populations and exploits social,
political, and racial divisions in an effort to
sow discord, encourage unrest, and incite


--··- ' I
. -- --- ~-

(U) Finding #5: Russia leverages business

and economic ties in Europe to achieve the
Kremlin's goals, mes.:.-age displeasure, or
inflict punishment .

{U} Russia is adept at utif!zing economic

ties to its advantage. Mo scow ai ms to
deepen busin ess ties v:1ith indiv idua Is that


can be used as agents of influence, and pa lgns.
countries whose depende nce on tr~dc with
(U) According to a 2016 study by the
Ru ssia create vulnerabHltic s to Russian influ-
RAND Corporalion, Ru ssia' s various tactic s
ence. Economic vulnerability -such as reli-
for conducting information operations,
ance on Ru ssia for trade or energy-can be
combined with its lack of a consisten t, ideo-
leveraged to change behavior, message dis-
logical goal, make countering thes e activi-
pleasure, or Inflict punishment. For exam-
ties difficult. This study found that the fa c-
ple, Germanv imports about 40 percent o f
tors that make Ru ssian disinformalion effec-
its natural gas from Russia. Because of this,
tive-the high volume of stories, its rapid,
,11any business leaders are lobbying for the
continuous nature, and lack of consisten-
removal of sanctiqns against Russia_:P
cy-are the same factors that make it diffi-
cult to counter..:li.


... t
{U) Many Eu ropean governments are
taking proactive steps to counter Ru ssian
propaganda and disinformation efforts.
NATO has prioritized efforts to counter
"hybrid threats" by developing a strategy
that includes strengthened coordination

with the European Union, a s well as training
and exercises t hrough its new Intelligence
Division . The Strategic Communications
Center of Excellence in Riga, Latvia and the
(U) Finding #6: European governments and
Cooperalive Cyber Defense Center of Excel-
media outlets are conducting a va(lety of
lence in Tallinn, Estonia also contribute to
activities to combat Russian influence cam-
these efforts. In addition, several NATO al-

PROPl,RW () j! Tt-11: U.S. HOUSE OF m : l'RFSr'NTATIVl:::S
lies and European Union members signed a
M emorandum of Understanding to estab-
lish a European Center of Excellence for
Countering Hybrid Threats in April 2017.43

(U} In 2017, Ukraine banned Russian

social media platforms, as well as RT and
Sputnik-though the latter two c_an still be
accessed online . Additionally, media
platforms such as StopFake are used to
identify false news stories. 50

(U} In November 2016, the European

Parliament adopted a resolution to counter-
act-anti-EU propaganda by third parties.5 1

(U) In France, the French newspaper Le

Monde launched a web platform to allow
readers to check the reliability of French
and interr:iational websites with an Internet
browser extension that will alert readers
when they come across false or unverified

.., ··- · -· 18
rnittee to Counter' Active Me·asures
by l:he Rllssian Federation to Exert
Covert Influence Over Peo pies and

• (U) FY 2017 lAA, Section 502. Travel

of Accredited Diplomatic and Consu-
lar Personnel of the Russian Federa-
tion in the United States.

• (U) FY 2017 fAA, Section 503. Study

and Report on Enhanced lntelfigence
and Information Sharing with Open
Sides Treaty Member States.

(U) Russia's active measures campaign
In Europe is nothing new, but the growing
frequency and intensity of Russian influence I
efforts pose an increasingly significant
threat to the United States and its allies.
The Comn,ittee has taken significant
measures to hlchlieht this growing threat to
(U) Additionally, in 2016 the Committee
the American peopll) since at least 201.5.
held two hearings and seven br!efings for
Specificatiy, the Intelligence Authorizat1on
Committee Members on Russia and related
Act (IAA) for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 in-
issues. and the Chairman and Members of
cluded multiple provisions to improve the
the Committee sent six fC!lters to the Adm in-
United States' ability to counter Russian ag-
istration urging stronger action against Rus -
sia. For example, Committee Members
• (U) FY 20'16 IAA, Section 502. As- urged the Obama administration to hold
sessment on funding of political par- Russia accountable for multiple violations of
ties and nongovernmental organi2a- the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
tions by the Russian Federation. Treaty, and expressed concern over likely
4 (U} FY 2016 IAA, Section 503. As- Russian attempts to utili2e the Open Skies.
sessment on the use of political as- Treaty for intelligence collection purposes.
sassinations as a form of statecraft Additionally, in spring 2016, Chairman
by the Russian Federation. Nunes declared the i nability to predict the
plans and intentions of the Putin regime
• (U} FY 2017 IAA, Section 501. Com-
''the biggest intelligence failure since


::I x.,~ u ...,.,. ,· .. ..... . "' ... ~ ...


7. Alexi Mostrous, Mark Bridge , Katie Gibbons, "Russia Used Twitter Bots and Trolls "To Disrupt" Brexit Vote," The Times
UK, Nov. 15, 2017.
11. Sonam Sheth, "Our Task Was to Set Americans Against Their Own Government": New Det ails Emerge About Russia's
Trolling Operation, Business Insider, Oct. 17, 2017.
12. European Endowment for Democracy, Bringing Plurality ond Balance to the Russian Language M edia Space, June 25,
14. HP5CI, HPSCI Staff Delegation to Tallinn, Estonia, Sept. 15, 2017.
15. HPSCI, HPSCI Staff Dele gation to Tallinn, Estonia, Sept. 15, 2017; XE Currency Converter, EUR t o USO, ::Jww.xe.coml
curr e ncyconverter/convert/?Amou,1t- ~.&FrnnrEUR& To=U5D.
16. HPSCI, HPSCI Staff Delegation to Berlin, Germany, Sept. 16, 2017.


22. TrendMicro, "From Espionage to Cyber Propaganda: Pawn Storm's Activities ove r the Past Two Years," Apr. 25, 2017.



27. HPSCI, HPSCI Staff Delegation to Berlin, Germany, Sept. 16, 2017; LexisNexis, Discovery Services Fact Sheet: "How Ma ny
Pages in a Gigabyte?," Dec. 23, 2017.


34. HPSCI, HPSCI Staff Delegation to Chisinau, Moldova, Sept. 19, 2017.


43. NATO, "NATO Welcomes Opening of European Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats," Apr. 11, 2017.
49. HPSCI, HPSCl Staff Delegation to Tallinn, Estonia, Sept. 15, 2017.
50. HPSCI, HPSCI Staff Delegation to Kiev, Ukraine, Sept. 21, 2017.
51. European Parliament, "European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2016 on EU strategic communications to coun-
teract propaganda against it by third parties," Nov. 23, 20:1.6.
54. GAO, Russia: U.S. Government Tokes o Country-Specific Approach to Addressing Disinformation Overseas, May 2017.
56. Bridget Johnson, "Chairman: Biggest Post 9/11 Intelligence Failure was Misreading Putin," Pl Media, Apr. 13, 2016; Saa-
gar Enjeti, "US Response to Rusian Spying is 'Biggest Intelligence Failure Since 9/11," Sept. 15, 2016; Susan Jones, "Rep.
Devin Nunes: We've Been Warning Administration About Russian Hacking 'And They Did Nothing,"' CNS News, Jan. 9,


(U) Chapter 2 - Russia Attacks the United States
Key Question #1: What Russian cyber activity and other active measures were directed
against the United States and its allies?

(U) The Russian government's multifac- Russian respons ibility to be based on com-
eted malign influence campaign was the pelling facts and well-reasoned analysis . .
subject of extensive public reporting in the
months before the January 5, 2017, publica-
tion of the classified ICA titled Assessing
.Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent
US Elections. While ma.ny of the facts con-
cerning the attack have been widely dissem-
inated, there are important elements of the
Russian campaign that remain classified.

(U) The purpose of the Committee's re-

view of the Russian information operations
was to establish the facts, as well as the fed-
era I government's understanding of those
facts. This chapter specifically examines (1)
the cyberattacks that targeted U.S. political
organizations (including the method of the
attack and its attribution); (2) the dissemina-
tion of hacked material; and (3) the role of
Russian state media and social media in
Russia's malign influence campaign.

(U) Finding #7: Russia conducted

cyberattacks on U.S. political institutions in

(U) The Committee agrees with this

statement and finds the ICA assessment of


SPEAR PHIS HING is a cyber;ittack that uses email

to !ure ,, vjct;in, into opening at..ichn1e nts, following
llnks or dlscfostng their credenti.lls. The.se mess;ig.
cs ;ire highly specific ,1nd soo'l1 ,1uthen tic to the

CREDENTIAL HARVESTING rs the procc.~, of ldC!llti ·

fying the uscirmimcs, p,1sswords, ;ind hnshes of t;ir·
r::ots which can thon bn usocl to (:ilin un,1 L1thoriz~d

I i 1 ·- - -
uc:cess to ci user'~ syslti'Tl.


i _ __ __ __ _ J

PROPcRW or, TH !! U.S. HO US(: or Rt::PRt::SENTJ\TIVCS
, ·:,,,:.

(U) Attribution is a Bear



·- 26
lective dissemination of information from
hacked U.S. political systems. This repre-
sents a "significant escalation in directnes s,
I level of activity, and scope of G!ffort" In Rus-
sia's "longstanding desire to undermine the
US-led liberal democratic order." It is there-
fore likely that high-level Russian govern-
ment approval was required in both plan-

ning and execution of the operation. 10

{U} Russian-state Actors

I (U} Guccifer 2..0 and DC Leaks

(U) While the intelligence case for
attribution to Russia is significant, alterna-
tive scenarios have been examined to in~
dude an insider threat o r another cyber ac-
tor. No credible evidence was found sup-
porting either alternative, including a review
of information contained in classified intelli-
gence reports.

{U) Finding #8: Russian-state actors and

third-party intermediaries were responsi-
ble for the dlssemination·of documents
and communications stolen from U.S. po-
litical organizations.
(U} Russlan-stc1te actors and third party
Sour,~: WouJpress.com (guec1re,2 .wordpresuom)
intermediaries were responslble for the se- UN~LASSIFIED


• (U) Both Guccifer 2 .0 and DC Leaks
worked to conceal their true Iden ti ..
ties, physical locations, and motiva-
(U) From their fl,st appearances, both •
Guccifer 2.0 and DC Leaks sought to conceal
the[r identities. During a media interv[ew
on June 21, 2017, Guccifer 2.0 identified
himself as a Romanian "hacker, manager,
philosqpher, women lover," and a "freedom

fighter." He.further explained in broken
English hls desire to follow in Marcel Lazar's
(the original Guccifer) footsteps to "fight for
freedom of minds-and for a world without
illuminati."l 9 • {U) Guccifer 2,0's first appearance
online and claim of responsibility for
{U) Meanwhile, DC Leaks identified it-
the DNC hack occurred within 24
self as a group of American hacktivists en-
hours of the public announcement
gaged in "a new level project aimed to ana-
b y - that the DNC had
lyze and publish a large amount of emails
been hacked by actors affiliated w[th
from top-ranking officials and their lnnu - 2'l
the Russian gov~rnment;
ence agents all over th e world ." The self-
described prem ise of the OC Leaks effort •
was that "politicians have forgotten that in a
democracy the people are the highest form
of political authority."~u

(U) The global r each of Wikileaks and
its established ties to the media makes it an

• (U) Multiple cybersecurlty firm s attractive outlet for the dissemination of

have evaluated Gucclfer 2.0's activi- stoten documents intended to undermine

ty and have published evidence that the United States and fts electoral process.

the online persona used a Russian - In addition, Wikileaks' historic actions,

based VPN service to transmit files whlch have undermined U.S. interests and

and communicate. Additionally, been beneficial to Russia, make the organi-

posted documents were processed zation an ideal intermediary for Russian in-
on a computer using Russian lan-
guage settings; 2..i
• {U} During interactions with the me- GUCCIFER 2.0 & WIKILEAKS
dia, Gucdfer 2 .0 denied any relation- ~ ~tl.NbO ;-~ ., - .;.,. · ~ CV
·~ rf$, ~ i;,..<;£: r1>oP<>.-1<.,.1:,,...,,...,,1
ship with the Russian government
and claimed to be Romanian . How-
THE .;:~~
ever, when pressed to explain how
he hacked into the DNC in his n ative ·p
.A, ..
Romanian language, he failed to MA~ ;;;\ 9,
demonstrate fluency. Gucclfer 2.0 "1 .
terminated the Interview when chal-
lenged on thi s point;b Sourca: T~!cr

(-U-) Wll<ILeaks renes on hackers, leak-
ers, and othfa!r criminal ngents to acquire
personal, confidentia l, and classified ma teri-
al for publication.

{U) Wikiteaks As part of that

dissemination, Wikileaks sent 118 tweets
(U) Wikileaks played a key role in Rus-
promoting the hacked material. Wikileaks
sia's malign influence campaign and served
messaging was then magnified by 426,000
as a third party intermediary for Russian in-
other users' tweet s. According to Twitter,
t elligence during the period leading up to
as much as 25% of these tvveets could have
the 2016 U.s.· presidential election.


' ""'

been the result of automated activity asso- {U) The Committee finds ample evi-
ciated with Russia's malign influence cam- dence that RT is not only a state-enterprise,
paign. 28 but is subject to the editorial control of the
Russian government. This control allowed
the Kremlin to use RT to advance its malign
influence efforts during t he 2016 U.S. presi-
dential election.

(U) RT, formerly Russia Today, became

an international news channel in 2005 .. lt is
available in more than 100 countries and
has its largest viewer base in Europe. fU's
stated goal is to "create news with an edge
for viewers who want to question more"
and produces content which appeals to ·
skeptics of both the mainstream media and
the e-stablishrnent. 3{)

(U) RT is subject to t he control of the

Russian government. The State Department
describes it as a "State-own ed international
satellite news network broadcasting in mul~
tiple languages," which "'spreads Russian.
propaganda tailored to international mar-
kets.'' The IC has identified RT as nthe Krem-
lin1s principal international propaganda out-
f ~ 'i·._.
,;.- • • ., I .
Podesta. .
(:\ ...~ =.
~~.._....,.o ,a:..::- ...,~
~ .... uw~·....-yeo......-~

~ u;-:e.: \'foo1..eats "1~-L!e

~~~·=~==o~~Nt"ti- :t
~ ~M ~ t ""ll.l!O"I.. W


Finding #9: The Russian government used

RT to advance its malign influence cam-
paign during the 2016 U.S. presidential


(U) During the 2016 U.S. presidential UNCLASSIFIED
erections, RT ran stories consistent with its
past editorial bias against the West and sug-
gested that tl1e U.S. electoral proces~ had @ ATO
been con·upted. RT was critical of presiden-
S times whe11 th'? Ciintons escaped foderal
tial candidates from both major parties but charg~
was consistently cfitical of candidate Cllnton
through the election.
{U) RT's attacks against candidate C1in-
to~ ·were wide-ranging, Including the Insinu-
ation that the Clinton family were crfmlnals.
RT also used advertising to promote materi-
al leaked by Russian intelligence, which tar--
geted candidate Clinton and the Democratic
Party.32 .

(Ul finding #10: Russian intellfgence lever-

aged social media ln an attempt to sow so-
cial discol'd and to undermine the U.S. elec- 11PoJ~~t<1B: Wikileak~ refc,u1is l.il~t hi>tch
of emails from Clinton campaign <.h3lr
toral process. ~ ! ~ l . t c + Mtfo'l.~ ~ , ; , / 1 ~ ~ .
~ .o.., ~ ~ 1 1 ;U:w,l"'"1-11lll ~-t".2!M"'-
h••.W ftt -tvf
ti...,.,~~,'--'*""~C.... r'N'\ ll"Y\

Source: Twitter

(U) The Internet Research Agency (IRA), (U) The 2016 Russian Twitter operatio n
a Russra-based ''troll farm" with ties to the of other socia l
was coordin ated with the use
Kremlln, was ,·e.sponsible for placing ads and m~dia platforms to undermine the U~S. po-
maintaining both human operated and au- litical process :and divide Americans. Both
. to mated social media accounts for the ma- presidentia I candidates (@Hilla ryClinton
lign influence campa[gn/'11 and @realOonaldTrump) were directly en-
. (UJ Twitter gaged through "retweets" :a nd "likes," as
were various p·olitically active and divisive .

factions of American society. Wikileak~.
(U) In total, Twitter identified 36,746
{U) Facebook
automated Russian accounts which were
responsible for producing 1.4 milllon unique (U) Russian operators also used Face-
tw~ets. In addition, Twilter identified 2,752 book Pages and advertising to advance their
human-operated accounts. Some of these malign Influence campaign. The company' s
accounts masqueraded as the news media, internal revtew found the creation and ·pro-
activists, and political organizations. One motion 9f 120 ~nique Facebook Pages by
Russian accolint, @TEN_GOP, successfully the IRA. These pages 13enerated approxi-
Impersonated the Tennessee Republican mately 80,000 posts over the two year peri-
Party and grew.to have significantly more od preceding the election. These posts ap-
followers than the legitimate Twitter ac~ peared ln 29 million users' Facebook ''News
colmt. After tweeting "We Love You, Mr. Feeds." When Facebook calculated the cu-
President" to Donald Trump, @TEN_GOP mulative lmpact of "Shares" " Likes" and
received a thank you from the preside'n tial "Follows,'' the company estimated.that 129
candidate. 35 million people may have been served Rus-
sia's malign Influence content.JG
(U) @TEN GOP and other Russian-
{U} According to Facebook, much of the
linked accounts incited racial divisions, anti-
Russian activity was-designed to promote
Musrim, and anti-immigrant messages.
divisive soclal and political me~sages across
They also promoted the dissemination of
the ideological spectrum and that advertis-
material stolen from U.S. political organiza-
ing was intended to drive f611owership of
tions by the GRU. The Russian cyber per-
divisive Pages. Four of the top lrnpression-
sonas DC Leaks and Guccifer 2.0 used
generating (or number of times an ad was
Twitter to promote stolen material, as did
on screen) advertisernents\1o1ere from ficti-
UMCLASSIFIED tious personas claiming to represent organi-
RUSSIAN TWEETS USING zations lncll1dln3 "B.ick the Badge,"
@HlllaryClinton and "Bfacktivist," "Being Patriotic," and "Woke
@realDonaldTrump 37
32,:?5,, ((1
Tw<:Oll. /4
l•) 1_- ro1,~ •
(U) Russian malign influence activiti es
1' 1,326 480,3-16 on Facebook were significant but they were
l.,i(es l ~ea
not well-funded or large-scale operations

T\1Jlt1e, relative to the overall scope of election-
related .:ictivlty on these platforms:
T~fGC!lng @Hill~l')'Clinton TBrgortina@<2alOonnldTrump
follower.. fonowen; • Prior to the election, Russian opera-
tors used paid advertising on Face-
book to reach s million Americans


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, . , • "-""' f l"IJ-.0. ""41 '"'l"'"=

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Mi6,4 "4 fcniJA 1,1, PW ~ ."
.......... """"'
t ei: • • , Ofl.'\li:I .... ' "· • U••"'-

- . l ~ · ~ r.t V"ffl l<.·~ lffl C1
l• I ( ~

~ r~ fct a i l ~ r,~ , ; , i l G8 t' ro,rr-~ o,;rir.,, ll"o -

w , 1v C.. !i' ~ z . ,_ .
lOU Vflf!dd
.,. , ._ t] r-....... :-4, N"3,i),,,~ ... t"I.I

~ ~-........
-W.9'MY.t!_-,_,,_,M_ ~IJQIINl-ot

t ~,~!l.) ~At.:!, ~ --
Source: Facebook


{based on Impressions). At the same (U) The Committee's Investigation
time, 33 trillion stories were served found that. Twitter, Facebook, Google, and
on Facebook Pages and ust~rs aver- other social .media platforms face slgoificant
aeed 220 per day; challenges In tt1eir effort to identify and act
• 56% of the 11.4 million impressions on malign influence campaigns. Some of

associated with Russian Facebook those challenges include:

advertisfng occurred after the elec- • Sophisticated actors adapt to auto·
tion; mated defenses;

• 99% of Russian Facebook ads were • Social media does not requlre true
funded with less than $1,000 and name usage;
25% were never seen .
• Users can easily conceal thef r physi-
{U) Google cal location wrth virtual pr.ivate net-

{U} Google also was used as a media work connections;

platform for Russia's malign influence cam- • Social media seeks authentic ex-
paign. The company's investigation re- changes and does not want to cen-
vealed that $4,700 was spent promoting 18 sor speech; and
channels and 1,100 YoliTUbe videos (43
• Social media platforms do not have
hours of content).
access to intelligence reporting.
{U) Google describes this as a limited
investment compared to overall election-
related spe nding on Google. In total,
0.0002 percent of 2016 U.S. election adver-
tising was found to be associated w ith Rl1S-
sian malign actors. In addition, Google not-
ed that this Russian-funded media had very
low view counts with onty 3% reaching
views of 5,000 or mo~e.

(U) However, it sl)ould be noted that

Google and its services have been and con-
tinue to be used by Russia for the dissemi-
nation of propaganda through RT. This is
partly evidenced by RT' s 2 .2 million sub-
scribers on You Tube, but also by the fact
that RT propaganda is served to Americans
by Google in the same manner as legitimate
news sources.


....... _,_


4. -






13. HP.SO, Full Ccmmitte.! Briefing cm Russia Cyber .Al:tivhy (Oosed Session), Sept 6, 201~: HPSO, f ull C=mitto!e Brwmr.gon
Russia Cyber Acti\'ity {Close-d Se~n), Jan_ 10, 2016; Hj,.so, fun Commiuee Bri~ng oo Russia CV~r Act1Ylty {Closed Ses-
SicnL Dec. S, 2016; -DroftJnd!Jent i fl'Jestiga:jon Reportfer the De,'?UJ0vi::c Nationof Ccmmittee, Aug. 24,
Wl6; , Droft tn::Ident lnr.1esO{;(Jt1"on Report f or tile OeJtlocrG!ic Congcesslor.a! C!I«:f!Glgn Committee, 1\ug. 8,
l<l, I)rajt !.'lcident investig(]rion Repoafcrthe ~100'!1:ic NationoJ Committee, Aug. 24, 2016;
Draft fncident lm,e:s:tgation Report jot #r~ D,;mcaaffr:. G;mgres;s.jorr1,I (;Dmpr;ig:: Committee, J..»g. 3, 2016.
15. Draft Jnddent Jqv=ti!!Off,m P.eporrfar the Demrr.:rco,;;nationc! Commi!t.:e, A11:s, 24, Wl5;
Droft faddent lnvesr>9aticm Repor.fer the Demomror; Cangresslcnaf Compqign Camr_rnttee, Au!;. 8, 2016; Lexis Nexis, D1s-
cover.fSer,f.res FJ:le! S.°iie.et: MJ.Jow Mani' P<19es i n a G,gal:ryte}" 0..-"<. :W, 2017 _


16. ODNI, Intelligence Community Assessment: Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections, Jan. 5,
2017; HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Russian Cyber Activities (Closed Session), Dec. 5, 2016; HPSCI, Full Committee
Briefing on Russia Cyber Activity (Closed), Jan. 10, 2016;
; ODNI, Intelligence Community Assessment: Cyber Threats ta the 2016 US Presi-
dential Election (/CA 2016-37HC), Sept. 12, 2016.
18. HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Russian Cyber Activities (Closed), Dec. 5, 2016; HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Rus-
sia Cyber Activity (Closed Session), Jan. 10, 2016; , "The definitive Trump-Russia Timeline of Events,"
Politico, Dec. l, 2017; , "Hacking Democracy: The Post's new
findings in Russia's bold campaign to influence the U.S. election," Washington Post, July 11, 2017;

owing Risk of Strategic Sur-

prise in Cyberspace Operations (NICM 2017-06), Jan. 30, 2017.
19. , "Interview with Gucci/er 2.0," VICE, June 21, 2017.
20. Twitter, @DCLeaks_

22. "Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee," Crowd Strike Blog, June 15,

, Inside Story: How Russians Hacked the Democrats' Emails, Associated
Press, Nov. 4, 2017; "All Signs Point ta Russia Being Behind the DNC Hack," VICE, July 25, 2016;
"Interview with Gucci/er 2.0," VICE, June 21, 2017.

24. "Two Years of Pawn Storm," Trend Micro, Apr. 25, 2017; ThreatConnect, "Gucci/er 2.0: All Roads Lead
Back to Russia," July 26, 2016;

25. , "Interview with Guccifer 2.0," VICE, June 21, 2017.

26. ThreatConnect, "Does a BEAR Leak in the Woods? ThreatConnect Identifies DCleaks as Another Russian-Backed Influ-
ence Outlet," Aug. 12, 2016
D. ~
Becker, Steven Erlanger, and Eric Schmitt, "How Russia Often Benefits When Julian Assange Reveals the West's Secrets,"
The New York Times, Aug. 31, 2016.
28. Wikileaks.org, About Wik/Leaks (www.wlkileaks.org), Dec. 22, 2017; Felke Hacquebord, "Two Years of Pawn Storm,"
Trend Micro, Apr. 25, 2017; ThreatConnect, "Guccifer 2.0: All Roads Lead Back to Russia," July 26, 2016;
; HPSCJ, Full
Committee Briefing on Russia Cyber Activity (Closed Session), Jan. 10, 2016.
29. HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Russian Cyber Activity (Closed Session), Dec. 5, 2016; HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on
Russia Cyber Activity (Closed Session), Jan. 10, 2016; Matthew Nussbaum, "The definitive Trump-Russia Timeline of
Events," Politico, Dec. 1, 2017; , "Hacking Democracy: The Post's
new findings in Russia's bold campaign to influence the U.S. election," Washington Past, July 11, 2017;

30. RT.com, About, Dec. 23, 2017;

31. U.S. Department of State, Media organizations controlled and funded by the Government of the Russia Federation
(Report 002580), Nov. 7, 2017.

34. Written testimony o Acting General Counsel of Twitter, Inc., Nov. 1, 2017; HPSCI, "Russia Investigation
Task Force Hearing on Social Media," Nov. l, 2017.
35. Written testimony of , Acting General Counsel of Twitter, Inc., Nov. 1, 2017.
36. Written testimony of , General Counsel, Facebook, Nov. 1, 2017.
37. HPSCI, "Russia Investigation Task Force Hearing on Social Media," Nov. l, 2017.


(U) Chapter 3 -America Reacts
Key Question 113: What was the U.S. government response to these Russian active measures
and what do we need to do to protect ourselves and our allies in the future?

(U) As disct1ssecl in Chapter 2, the IC are under no obllg;ltion to cooperate w ith

w<Js at the tip of the spear of the U.S. gov- federal officials, nor are political or3cm iza-
ernment's response to Russia's nefarious tions that operate their own networks. In
cyber activities. While the NSA focused on short, the developing intelligence on Rus-
detection and attribution, the FBI took the sian active measures throt1ghout 2.016, the
lead on victim notification, and the OHS was complexity of the political situation, and the
the primary agency responsible for provid- lack of federal authority to act limited the
ing assistance to victims and coordinating options for aggressive pre-election actions.
with state and local election officials. The Executive Branch t ook some actio ns, to

(U} The federal government's ability to include a Joint OHS and ODNI public state-
effectively respond to cyber threats de- ment issued on October 7, 2016.
pends on the IC's ability to pc;1ss information ( i J - , the CIA created a fu-
efficiently to the FBI at the lowest classifica- sion cell on Russian election interference,
tion level possible. It is also dependent on which was comprised of analysts from the
the sufficiency of the lnteractions between CIA, FBI, and NSA. This fusion cell produced
t he federal government and victim, whether a series of papers for the White House, di-
that victim Is a private organizalion such as rectors or each of the thre e agencies, and
tlie DNC, or a state or local government en- the DNI. The cell operated through the
tity. Given the respons e to Russia's malign election, standinc down in mid-November.
influence campalgn,-the Committee believes
(U) On December 6, 2016, President
that FBI and OHS need to Improve the pro-
Obama directed CIA Director Jo hn Brennan
cesses used to engage with victims and
to conduct a review of all Intelligence re-
stakeholders, who independently control
lating to Russian involvement in the 2016
their respective systems.
elections, and produce a single, comprehen-
(U) The Executive Branch's policy re- sive c;1ssessment. The result, an ICA titled
sponse to Russia's active measures cam- Assessing Russian Actjvities and Intentions
paign induded extensive deliberation, but in Recent US Elections, was drafted by.
not significant pre-election action. This is
explained by two factors. First, the Execu- and was coordinated with
tive Branch was jt1stifiably concerned about the NSAand the FBI. While most of the
raising an alarm so close to the election. analysis contained in the ICA held up to
Second, elections are not run by the federal scrutiny, the Committee investigation found
government. State and local governments that ICA judgments on Putin's strategic ob-

Jectives failed to meet most of the analytic
standards set forth In th<:! primary guiding
document for IC analysis, Intelligence Corn,
munity Directive (ICD) 203, Analytic Stand~

{U) Another component of the Execu-

tive Branch's response to the Russian gov,
ernment's efforts to interfere in the 2016
presidential campaign was FBl's opening of
a counterintelHgence investigation into "the
nature of any links betw9en individuals as-
sociated with the Trump campaign and the
Russlc:in government and whether there was
any coordination between the campaign
and Russia's efforts." 1

{U) The Committee collected facts relat-

ed to the FB1's investigation through May
2017, until the appointment of Special
Counsel Robert Mueller. The Committee
dld not exa mine events that occurred th ere-
after in order to avoid interfering with Spe-
cial Counsel Mueller's ongoing investigation.
While this chapter addresses the FBl's inves-
tigation, facts identified by the Committee
relating to Russia contacts with Trump cam-
paign associates, including the individuals
under FBI investigation, are addressed in
Chapter 4.
-· (U) The Commlttee is also concerned
that many, perhaps even a majority, of Ru s-
sia's known victims were never contacted
{U) finding #11: The Federi!I Bureau of In- by the r-01. In November 2017, the Associat-
vestigation's notification to numerous Rus~ ed Press (AP) r eported that it contacted ap-

sian hacking victims was largely inade- proximately 80 people out of a 11st of ap-

quate. proximately SOD victims. Only two w ho

were contacted by the AP "learned of the
hacking attempts of their personal Gmall
accounts from th e FBl ." 8 Although the Com-


mittee cannot verify t he accuracy of the 1n August 2016, Secretarv Johnson hosted a
AP's r~porting, Clinion campaign senior pol- confere.nce call with the National Associa-
icy advisor Jake Sullivan testified to the tion of Secretaries of State (NASS} and other
Committee that, consistent with the AP's Chief Election Officials. This call was fol-
analysis, his personal Gmail account" was the lowed in September and October 2016 by
subject of numerous hacking attempts, but four statements encouraging state and local
tha t he never received any sort of notifica- elections officials to request DHS's cyberse-
tion from FBL~ curity assistance.

(U) tnteraction with the DNC illustrated (U} During the August 2016 phone call,
that even when the FBI expeditiously made Secretary Johnson offered assistance to
contact with a victim, and conveyed rela- state officials in managing risks to voting
tive!\, detailed information, the engagement systems in each state's jurisdiction. He also
failed to elicit the desired response- encouraged state officials to implement rec-
namely, t he DNC's swift and serious atten- ommendations from the Department of
tion. Director Corney testified that, in retro- Commerce's NIST and the U.S. EAC on se-
spect, "[w}e w ould have sent up a much curing election infrastructure. At that time,
large r flar e. Yeah, we would have just kept DHS was "not aware of any specific or credi-
banging and banging on the door, kno1.ving ble cybersecurity t hreats relating to the up-
what I know now. We made extensive coming general election systems," and, on
efforts to notify. I might have walked over the CQll with state officials, uSecretary John-
there myself, knowing wha~ I know now." son reiterated that OHS, the Election Assis-
Similarly, former DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson tance Commission, NIST, and DOJ are availa-
r eflected that, ''You know, in retrospect, it ble to offer support and assistance in pro-
would be easy for me to say that I should tecting against cyber attacks." 13
have brought a sleeping bag and camped
(U) On August 18, 2016, the FBI Cyber
out in front of the DNC in lat_e summer, with
Division, in an effort to aid cyber security
the benefit of hindsight."
professionals and system administ rators to
(U) Anding #12: Communication between guard against the persistent malicious ac-
the Department of Homeland Security and tions of cyber crirpinals, issued an alert to
state election officials was impeded by states entitled, "Targeting Activity Against
state officials' mistrust of federal govern- State Board of Election Systems.n2'1 The bul-
ment overreach coupled with an unprece- letin warned that in rate June 2016, an
dented level of Russian cyber intrusions. "unknown actor scanned a state's Board of

(U} QHS was the first agency to raise Election website for vulnerabilities." 15 The
awareness to state election officials and the FBI recommended t hat all states search ac-
general public regarding cybersecurlty con- tivity logs for any escalation attempts and

cerns with the 2016 election infrastructure. suggested three recommendations as pre-


cautionary measures.16 cyber inciden ts, threats, and vulner-
abllity rnforrnation;
• Best practices fo r securing voter reg-
MALICIOUS CYBER ATTEMPTS istration databases and addressing
potential thre ats; and
• Field-based cybersecurity advisors to
assist with planning and incident
rw)nagement. 1~

{U) Also on September 28, 2016, Speak-

er Ryan and Leaders McConnell, Pelosi, and
Reid sent a letter to the National Associa-
tion of State Election Dfrectors, "urg [ing)
states to take full advantage of the robust
public and private seC'tor resou rces available
(U) In a Septembe, 161 2016 statement, to them ..." and informing thern that "[iJn
Secretary Johnson announced "we have addition, the Department of Homeland Se-
seen cyber intrusions involving political in- curit y stands ready to provide cybersecurity
stitutions and personal communications. assistance to those states t hat choose to
We have also seen some efforts at cyber request it." I.!>
intrusions of voter registrntion data main-
(U) On OGtober 1, 2016, Secretary John-
tained in state election systems."" Secre-
son e:<pressed gratitude for the letter from
tary Johnso,, encouraged election ofiictals
congressional leadership, and noted that
to reach out to OHS and also offered a varie-
there were a few cases in which malicious
ty of cybersecurity services to state and
actors gained acces~ to state voting-related
election officials, Including;
systems. He also encouraged state and lo-
• Scans on internet~facing systems, cal election officials to seek OHS' cybersecu-
including reporting of vulnerabilities rity assistance. "So far, 21 states have con-
and mitigation recommendations; tacted us about our services. We l1ope to
• Risk and vu lnerabiiity assessments; see mor~,'".Johnson said at the time.;,0

• Support from the National Cyberse- (U} DHS and ODNI released a joint pub-
cu1·1ty ,md Comn1lr'nications Integra- lic statement on October 7, 201~. DHS con-
tion Center {NCCIC) to provide on- tinued to urge state and local election offi~
site assistance In identifying and re- ciats to remain vigilant and seek its assis-
mediating a cyber Incident; tance with cybersecurity.n On October 10,
2016, Secretary Johnson provided an up-
• Information sharing of relevant
date on DHS election cybersecurity s.ef'\lices
. .

that "to date, 33 states . , . election agen· (U) Challenges encountered by OHS in-
cies have approached the Department of cluded the unprecedented slze <:lnd sco pe of
Homeland Sec1;rlty about our Cybersecurity Russian active rneasures, lack of public
services." Johnson stressed that time was attention, and m istrust from state and local
an important factor, with only 29 days until election officials-many of whom lacked
election; it cou Id take up to two weeks for access to classified information. Ultimately,
OHS to run scans and identify vulnerabili- 36 states took advantage of DHS's assis-
ties, and an additional week for elect;ion tance, but many election officials were re-
o ffi cials to mitigate any vulnerabilities. This sistant to the idea of designating election
was the Secretary's final public attempt to infrastructure as c·ritical infrastructure. 23 As
encourage state and local election officials former Secretary Johnson explained to the
to reach out to OHS for assistance. Committee, "one thing I discovered in this
conversation, State election officials are
UNCLASSIFIED very sensitive about what they perceived to
be Federal intrusion into their process. I
6:nnu«r.~ :>I lt111111llrir iMolt11 heard that firsthand over and over: This is
UJ~... nn :nDLl
our process. It's ou,· sovereign responslbll-
lty. We're not Interested in the Federal
Jh l ,h"-"S \'IM ,.. 24
1"!11~tl ta keove r." A clear exampl e of mistrust was
~rlJIM.l ,\ocr~..ntl:U.Ati~,~ ,rNo1oi1i.o
'2Jl) t'.,,t.,•• ~b':"U rt-t-t.C..l~ rltllf
\:J':J,1 :Xi1HI a letter sent from Georgia's Secreta1y of
State Brian Kemp to Secretary Johnson on
thc.1 3 t\c>()u~n1l'IJ\1th1,,mc~'( ,.-,.,,..,~·:.-,.·frf,'-•,1~ u, 1~ n'l1.thfw o.rta;:.., rtJU1
,:, u;-c~lkf11\lc<..:1\'n,1.uC\.1 t'i'Vn;t~il:.%t
December 8, 2016, w hich accused DHS of
lt bt,V'•Sil l ,c.:,1.. \J IT1*'1 1b t\'l 1 V'I h " " ~ 1\:1l11-n1 ltln-,:-a,nl? f1,• -(E.,.t'(
N•i1b'Td:-,1.-Jc...h;;, ,._....-w":w:lf .'1;.lic',11c.i&'1'w.1,•bi. ,\,.,11,,u.,, L-... <_.,1,~
~111 :,,~AnJf)C(IJ~ ~~r , 1.tlii;T.f:c'lt-.-J t?' "· n\ 1r... ,,,r:~.,n..., Jr:.,-r.ilif,; \,
attempting to breach the Georgia Secretary
1U'.,;.$,blu• ..J::n: .1 ..&.,..~h; : 11 ~ ) -1.t ,11 1.. c,jiC1,•.,, t1i i,"'' ~ 1...,.,•1l n, u~.ru.lJ :
t.r.~,r,l~,i l,~:J.1(<rl""91,, lr1A.ui1lh :,a 1~ ~1luf'(fr',;ur1~Y~l:J°Y"« i\\: at1
t, tr.ir,.u,",.,·~,~1nill '"t''"'~
1:m t.tlcu.1li..'C'J';.J.1:1:.~ i,,J i.f,:t:(11.;nulb. fa.rt& lo:i.-a.5,n.: ":.:lflted1\
of Stat e's firewall. "I am writing to ask you
.Nthtali.."\l:"b JAN,.(~I ~:or~ ih p.:!!D t :11"' l1twl'
},.':,-; ••1h. '1,y.a,..,"»'J It 1-=J.J .,.,~,t·U:. T~Swl :r,-U..,i&~ ..1e>~.1'~1""""""Ni:ya"r"u whether OHS was aware of t his attempt
1:... a·,h~,.,...l(,1'( 1ttl't(;:~~ ~ ,~ ~ 4tJ,ti.l1Ju~'\l«:1c.t1,-.1u~ i ~,~,.d·~
and, if so, why DHS was attempting to
7t"4'- ~f J:.'"t-! r...'t, •t ~ fl(IJ~.,halW't:l:~ta:.:r. :,:,U\:!"» .;.,.:<>l.:c::L'lilh3'J·.. ,~ ~
~ , ...~ ,t.ao: ...·.11 Ul,'!...'.1, 11_ 1.l'f UL
l l t ~ ~ 1..'C J1 J!l{l~, ;{b::oh.;lr~•P:..,• :C."\.IU,V.f4,

:., ddr,;:1N:"1,1c:.=r~i'E:'~A11.-.J:1.•, ~('( ,\(W '(;'rl'(l~\.u 111.'JU,11,.I\~·~

:! breach our firewall," Mr. Kemp stated.i.s
il:X.:'.&,,d!::wJ 1!":ai:.~'1:l,t ) l.,t•C"ls.l:,')~,N,,{'t.f oll"J..y\," t l,,it.hJ: lt:::..JfLt {'; .,,,"(t:L:A:tcliL:l.6
,.=~:n..~ U.:,,.1r1.Ca'ufN~ rt.:PtJ:.. u rCt •!'~ rii•+:-Tu r+(w~l,!\A, : r : 'Jr i....:\U Cf1"'t"I, cCh1 1~
Nevertheless, oh January 6, 2017, OHS des-
11.: fl.l,ntrr~r.-r.(t \ C'U..
•r1l:TL1 :a., ml~ i U\,A'r.,,.a.;•
~u,~1i:'1-r:.te;c..-~l t"11,, lkr.,:, a1..tr:ciw, r,d J1.:..1~,,.lr f.~pc-4 n~

1-X t '-tf ~o: r~ :to: W );1 f11~N,n A.1t1C"'47~l ~ t, · """'1 h:, "'I Cfl fn.1"\0rl,...r.,)'.fN"l\y 1,•,
ignated election infrastructure as a subsec-
1"'11~4 )'~·.1.Jln.l( \\tJA:r,u;«f~,'l'l) ~ l"f ~d4\i!fJ~i.11': J!"~ J l') ~C,J~t)N,J ','.if'J,t,
•JO,fH r.r:i,J.111){)..-,..wh tor of the existing Governmen t Facilities
critic~I Infrastruct ure sector?•

(U) Finding 1113: The Joint Office of the Di·

rector of National 1ntelligence and Depart-
m ent of Homeland Security public state-
ment attributing election Interference to
_ ··-· ) Russia was ineffective.
UNCLASSIFIED (U) No major public actions were taken


between October 7, 2016 and election day.
It is unclear exactly when policymakers be-
gan focusing on Russian efforts to influence
· the election . As further dlscl1ssed below, While Dl1S was providing assistance to
Attorney General Loretta Lynch recalls being states to conduct cyber reviews of their
briefed by Fl31 senior leadershi~ electoral mechanisms, the Prlnclpals Com-
that mittee was awaiting "with urgency whatev-
the Counterintelligence Division had essen- er the lntellrgence Community could pro-
tially uncovered some information or re- vide" that "would illumrnate !their] under-
ceived information involving Russian intelli- standing of {Russian interest in the elec-
gence operatives." 27 tion]."i3
(U) On May 18, 2016, speaking at the
Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington,
D.C., DNI Clapper stated, "we've [the IC] al- lC CONFIDENT OF RUSSIAN PRE-
ready had some indications of that ELECT!ON HACKING
[attempts of cyberattacks on presidential Joint Statement from the Department O( .
Hom£1land Sccuri('! an~ Office! of th~ Dlrector of
campaign websites] and the combination of National lntelllgencc on Election Securlly
DHS and FBI a re doing what they can to ed-
ucate both campaigns against potential
cyber threats." 28
.,. __
l)"l..._, tw,...,
C..,U,1<1 W.il)

(U) By summer 2016, CIA Director Bren• "'-\oj_ ~ · C . ~t lAO•U-..•,.,h ~ l ( ~ - . . -- ~.....,_y

~--""""\4·-•- 1-.--....rn.-.,,..,,.\ t ...... ~ T ' - . - t - - a . l t\..,...~ .....,.
._.. _ ... .._.,,. CCl-• ... ,.-J..w.-•,,.,'t••~••...,_~,,.,_.._.,.,.-
nan had l:>ecorne aware of information .. .-...~ .._.,,..,._..w"- .. - .a.,o t._.,._,,.... - ._,....,u,.,..... ... ,,.
"'~ ....,..,.....,.~-,·-\)~,-.'--,._.~,_.....,,."-""~~
l>.'"w tAN. V•..- • •....,__. ~¥_,.._..,..~-.,,,,.t..-'",,,,..__..,'1.,
aboul " specific Russian efforts to Influence
the election," 7~ and the National Security
Council (NSC) Principals Committee began UNCLASSIFIED
discussing actions to take In response to
what the Russians had been doing. 30 As Di- {U) On August 4, 2016, Director Bren-

rector Brennan continued to brief the Prin· nan, in a scheduled call with Alexander Bort-

clpals Committee on Russia, the CIA-:-as nikov, the head of Russia's Federal Security

discussed previously in this report- "pulled Bureau (FSB), became the first U.S. official
together experts rrom the Central Intelli- to raise the Issue of Moscow's meddling::~

gence Agency (CIA}, NSA, and F B - Brennan told Bortnikov that a campaign
against the United States would certainly
- to focus on the issue, drawing in mul-
ti pte perspectives and subject matter ex· "backfire" and that all Americans "cherished

perts with broad experti~e to assess Russian their ability to elect their own leaders with-
attempts to interfere iri the U.S. Presidential out outside interference or disruption."35
election." 3 Additionally, former Attorney General

Loretta Lynch testified that the decision was tion-lt was dealing with extremely sensi~
made to have "the President of the United live intelligence and had to consider the im-
States speak directly to President Putin, pacts of jeopardizing sources and methods
confront him with knowledge that we were when declassifying intelligence.~ 1 Further -
aware of his efforts on a variety of fronts more, In the midst of an ongoing campaign,
and that it was unacceptable, and that that it had to carefully consider any public state-
discussion took place during a pu II-aside ... ments or actions, as it did not want to be
at one of the G- either 7 or 20 meetings in perceived as taking sides and politicizing the.
the ea rly fall. Former National Security election-or, according to former Secretary
Advisor Susan Rice corroborated in testimo- Johnson fueling claims that the election was
ny before the Committee that President "rigged ." 4 :1
Obama and President Putin discussed Rus-
{U) Finding #14: The Executive Branch's
sian meddling in the 2016 election at the
post-election response was insufficient.
end of bilateral discussions during the G20
Summit in China in early September 2016.37 (U) In the weeks following candidate
Trump's victory over candidate Clinton.in
(U) The most significant pre·election
the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Execu-
public action was the October 7, 2016, joint
.t ive Branch officials began brainstorming
OHS and ODNI statement, indicating In part
options for punitive actions against Russian
that the IC "is confident that the Russian
activities. On December 6, 2016, President
Government directed the recent compro-
Obama ordered D1rector Brennan to con-
mises of e-mails from us persons and insti- duct a review of all Intelligence relating to
tutions, lncludf ng from the US political or-
Russia and the 2016 elections, i1,ctudfng a
ganizations. "38 The IC assessed that the dis-
comprehensive assessment that would
closures of alleged hacks on websites such 43
eventually be mad~ public.
as DCLeaks.com, Wikileaks, and by Guccffer
2.0 were consistent with Russian methods (U) On December 29, 2016, among oth-
and motivations. According to Secretary er measures, President Obama announced
Johnson, the statement "did not get the the expulsion of 35 Russian intelligence op-
public attention. that it should have, franRly, eratives under diplomatic cover, the closure

because the same day the press was fo- of Russian compounds in Maryland and New
cused on the release of the 'Access Holly- York, sanctions against nine entities and in-
wood' video . That's what made ou r news dividuals associated with Russian intelli-
39 gence services, and the Treasury Qepart-
below-the-fold news that day." Addition-
ally, the public dissemi nation of Podesta's ment's designation of two Russian individu~
emails commenced on October7.40 als for "using· cyber-enabled means to cause
misappropriation of funds and personal
(U} In considering a public response, 41
identifying information." ' Also on Decem-
the Executive Branch was in a unique posi~
ber 291 the FBI and DHS released a Joint


Analysis Report of declassified technical fn- tions-employed appropriate caveats on
form~tion on Hussian cyber activity to help sources and Identified assumptions. Some
notwork defenders identify and disrupt Rus- of the key ICA judaments that the Com-
sian malicious cyber activity. mittee found credible because they were
(U) On January G, 201.7, DHS designated based on proper anarytic tradecra~ are

election infrastructure as a subsector of the summarized below:

existing government f~cillties critical Infra- • (U) Russian efforts to influence the
structure sector. ~ The same day, a declassi- 2016 U.S. presidential election rep-
fied version of the ICA was released to the resent the most recent expression of
public.4 & Moscow's longstanding desire to un-
(U) Finding #15: The majority of the Intelli- dermine the U.S.-led liberal demo-

gence Community Assessment judgments cratic order.

on Russia's election activities employed • (U} Russian intelligenc~ services,

proper analytic trade craft. acting on the orders of Russian Presi-
(U) The IC produced three versions of dent Vladimir Putin, launched cyber

the ICA: (1~ a highly compartrnented docu- and conventional influence opera-

ment, which Included all sources and refer- tions-notably by leaking politically

ences to the underlying intellrgence, (2) a sensitive emalls obtained from com-
Top Secret version that omitted details from puter intru sions-during the 2016

compartmented reports, irnd (3) an unclas- election.

sffied version . The fu II ICA w as briefed to

Pr'csldent Obama on Jam1ary 5, 2017 and
President-elect Trump on fonu ary 6, 2017.
The unclasslfied version of the ICA was also
reteased to th e public on January 6, 2017.
{U) Finding #16: The lntelllgence Communi·
While the level of detall varies greatly
tv Assessment judgments on Putin's strate-
among the three versions, the fim:il conclu -
gic intentions did not employ proper ana·
sions and key judgments of each are the
lytic tradecraft.
(U) While the Committee found that
(U) The Committee determined that the
most ICA analysis held-up to scrutiny, the
majority of the ICA judgments on Russla's
investigation also identified significant intel-
eleclion activities employed proper analytic
ligence tradecra ft failings that undermine
tradecraft. The~e were m~stly well rea-
confidence in the JCA judgments regarding
soned, con sistent with observed Russian
Russian President Vladimir Putin's strategic
actions, properly do~umente d, and-
objectives for disr upting the U.S. election.
particularly on the cyber intrusion sec-
Those judgments failed to meet longs~and-


ing standards set forth in the primary guid- 101 The Committee's find.i ngs on lCA
ing document for IC analysis, ICD 203, Ana- tradecraft focused on t he use of sensitive ,
lytic Standards including: • intelligence - cited by the 1CA.
This presented a significant challenge for
• {U) ''Properly describe quality and
credibilit:y of underlying sources." dassifa:ation downgrade. The Committee
worked with int eltigence officers from the
• {U) "Properly express and explain
agencies who own the raw reporting cited
uncertainties associated with major
in the ICA t o downgrade the classification of
analytic judgments."
compartmented findings -
. (Ut ".I ncorporate analysis of altema-

tives ·- [particularly] when major
judgments must contend w ith sig-
nificant uncertainties or ... high-
impact results."

(U} Base confide-nee assessments on

- (U} The Committee is planning addition-
al action regarding this information in early
spring 2018.
"the quantity and quality of source
{U) Finding #17: lhe Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation opened an enterprise counter-
• (U) "Be informed by all relevant in- intelligence investigation into the Trump
formation available." campaign after receiving information relat-
ed to Trump campaign foreign policy advi-
e (U) "Be independent of political
41 sor George Papadopoulos.
considerations ."

{U) The Committee emphasizes that the (U) !n addition to tile other Executive
Branch responses described above, in late
tradecraft failures identifie<l in this investi-
July 2016, the FBI opened an enterprise Cl
gation should not be broadly ascribed to
investigation into the Trump campalgn fol~
ClA, NSA or FBI analysis, as the shortcom-
lowing the receipt of derogatory infor-
ings were confined to select judgments-
specifically, a key assessment on Putin1 s mation .a bout f9reign policy advisor George

strategic intentions-and not to the entire

Papadopoulos. Tne purpose of an enter;
prise Cl investigation is to obtain infor-
ICA product. Moreover, the ICA was
mation of intelligence value, umost times ..
w r i t t e ~ CIA analysts and their
. not with any kinci of intent or objective of
draft was subjected to an unusual_ly con-
reaching a criminal charge."~ FBl's enter-
strained review and coordination process,
prise C1 investigation Into the Trump cam-
which devcated from established QA prac-
paign wss ied by a small team a~ FBI head-
tice. The Committee is not aware of these
problems being prevalent In o'""Jler CIA, FBI,
quarters.49> The timeline of t his investiga-
o r NSA products.
tion can be found on the next page.

flRQPS'(TY OF THE U.S. H-OUSE or- ~6PR~6JITATl',f"t::S 47

(U) The derogatory inforn1ation result- the·Russian government and campaign offi-
~d from th e relationship between Papado- clals.57

(U) On April 26, 2016, over brea kfast at

a London hotel, - told Papado pou los
"that he had Just returned from a tr ip to
anonymized In Papadopoulos' charging doc-
~o Based on the Moscow where he had met with high-level
ument as "the Professor"}.
Russian government officlals."ss - fur-
charging documents, the two firsL met in
ther indicated he had learned that the Rus-
Italy on or about March 14, 2016, and
sians had obtained 'dirt' on candidate Clin-
"P~padopoulos was interested in -
ton. Specrfically that '"the Russians had
because . . . fhe] claimed to have substantia l
emails of Clinton,' 'they have thousands of
connections with Russian government offi- 59
emaits.w Howeve r, t he Committee was
cials, which Papadopoulos thought could
unable to discern if the referenced emails
increase his tmportance as a poiicy advisor.
1 were the missing emails from candidate
• •" ~ - was interested in Papadopou-
Clinton's server while sh e was Secretary of
los because of his r~le in the Trump cam-
State or the emails that w ere stolen from
paign.52 The first meeting withlailllloc-
the DNC . .
curred approximately on e week pri'or to
candidate Trump publicly naming Papado-
poulos as a forergn policy advlsor.!:,3

late March, Papadopoulos had a

(U) In
follow-on meeting w i t h - London,
where-ntroduced Papadopoulos to
a woman who claim ed to be a relative of
President Putin "with conn ections to senior
Russian government officials."s,i Papado-
poulo!? inform ed the campaign about this
meeting, with a campaign supervisor pro-
claiming that Papadopoulos conducted
" great work. Papadopoulos coi:1tinued to
correspond w i t h - who connected
Papadopoulos with an .individual-
1111 claiming to.have connections with the
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.56 Papa-
dopoulos communicated with this Russian
con tact throughout the summer of 2016,
attempting to arrange meetings between


P~OPERTf OF THE U.S. !slOUeE OF Rl:.-PRt::Sc--:NT/\TIVcS
counterintelligence investigation into the
Trump campaign, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation opened an lndlvidu;:il coun-
terintelllgence Investigation Into Ca~er

(U} By the time Page was announced as

a Trump campaign foreign ·policy advisor on
March 21 1 2016, he was already a subject of
interest for the FBI. Page previously lived
and worked rn Russra and maintained con-
tact with known Russian intelligence offic-
ers, including -who was
described in a 2015 court filing as an SVR
officer posted to the Russian Mission to the
United Nations. Page previously worked
with the FBI in the prosecution o f -
and other Russian intelligence officiais. 68 ·

{U) finding #18: As part of the enterprise


tions of collusion, coordination, or conspir-
acy between the Trump campaign and the
(U} finding #19: The dossier compifed by _Russian government.
Christopher Steele formed an essential part (U) Paul Manafort joined the Trump
of an application to the Foreign Intelligence campaign on March 29, 2016, and was ete-
Surveillance Court t6 obtain electronic sur- vated to _campaign chairman on May 19,
veillance on carter Page. 2016. Manafort became campaign manager
(U) In late October 2016, DOJ sought after the campaign removed

from the Foreign Intelligence SurveiUance - on June 20, 2016. The Committee
Court (FIS(} an order authorizin- agreed to avoid, to the greatest e;..1:ent prac-
tical, any potential interference with Special
Counsel Mueller's investigation. Given the
ongoing litigation concerns associated with
Manafort, the Committee.will only discuss
information in this report t hat has been

mittee did not find-any evidence of any publicly disseminated by the Special Coun-

cooperation or conspiracy between Page sel' s office. Although the Committee would

and Papadopoulos. Additionally, the so- have appreciated the opportunity to inter-

called "dossier" complied by Christopher view Manafort regarding his role on the

Steele formed a substantial and essential Trump campaign, the Committee is fimited
in this regard due to Special Counsel
(For ad-
ditional information about the St eele dossi- M1:1eller's investigation and indictments .

er, see Chapter 4.) {U} On Oct ober 27, 2017, a gran·d jury
indicted Manafort and his associate, fellow
lobbyist and deputy Trump campaign man-
ager Rick Gates, for various financial crimes,
as well as making false statements. All of
the financial crimes took place prior to Man-
afort serving as Trump campaign manager,
and nothing in the indictment relates to any
potential collusion, conspiracy, or conspif"Q-

cy between the Trump campaign and the
Russian government.

(U) finding #20: Special Counsel Robert {U} On February 22, 2017, a grand jury
Mueller indicted Paul Manafort on several issued a superseding indictment for Mana-

charges, none of which relate to aUega- fort and Rick Gates, which included addi-
tional allegations of financial crimes, indud-

ing bank fraud. Sfmilar to the October 27, Corney, General Flynn's resignation oc-
2017, indictment, the superseding Indict- curred after it came to light that he hacl mis-
ment does not include any reference to the led Vice President-Elect Pence about his
Trump campaign, Including no mention of contacts with Russian Ambassador Sergey
collusion, coordination, or conspiracy be- l<lslyak during t he tronsltion period. 's
tween the Trump campaign and the Russian

(U) While the Committee will not go

Into further detail on the charges against
Manafort due to ongoing litigation con-
cerns, Special Counsel Mueller's indictment
of Manafort illustrates the necessity for U.S.
presidential campaigns to better investigate
individuals who serve in sen for positions
within the campaign. If the accusations
against Manafort are true, he should have
never served as a senior official wfth a cam-
paign for the U.S. presidency, much tess
campaign chairman or manager.

{U) Prior to his trip to Moscow, Genera l

Flynn and his son met with Russian Ambas-
sador Kislyak at the ambassador's private
residence in Wa shington, D.C. on December
2, 2015. The r.neeting was later described
(U) G~neral Flynn b~gan advising the
by General's Flynn's son In an email to the
Russian embassy as "very productive."
Trump campalgn on or before february
The email indicates that the meeting was
2016 and subsequently became a central
arranged at the request of General Flynn or
figure on the campaign trail. He was the
former Director of DIA and was one of can-
his son.80 The Committee was unable to in·
terview General Flynn and his son because
didate Trump's closest advisors on national
of their written intent to assert t heir Fifth
security issues. Following the election, and
Amendll)ent rights against self-
during the transition period, he was desig-
incrimination .
nated as the future National Security Advi-
sor to the President. General Flynn served
as President Trump's National Security Advi-
sor for less than a month, resigning on Feb-
ruary 13, 2017. According to FBI Director

vote against or delay the resolution."80 The
next day, Ambassado r Kislyak informed
General Flynn t hat Russia wou ld not comply
with the request.87

(U) On December 29, 2016, President

Obama "authorized a number of actions'' -
including new sanctions-"in response to
the Russian government's aggressive har-
assment of U.S. officials and cyber opera-
tions aimed at the U.S. election in 2016."85
Following this announcement, the charging
documents state that General Flynn dis- ·
cussed "what, if anything, to communicate
to the Russian Ambassador about the U.S.
sanctions," with a senior PTT official.as

I {U) Finding #22: General Flynn pleaded

guilty to making a false statement to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding
his December 2016 conversations with Am-
bassador Kislyak, even though the federal
Bureau of Investigation agents dld not de-
tect any deception during Flynn's inter-
(U) According to the charging docu-
ments, on or about December 22, 2016, "a
very senior member of the Presidential
Transition Team" {PTI) directed General
Flynn to contact representatives of foreign
governments. This request concerned a
resolution about Israel[ settlements sub-
mitted by Egypt to the U.N. Security Councii
around Decemb er 21, 2016.ss Later, on De-
cember 22, General Flynn contacted Ambas-
sador Kislyak and "requested that Russia

L. l/
{U) Finding #23: Executive Branen officials
did not notify the Trump campaign tha1
members of the campaign were assessed
to be potential counterintelligence con-

(U} The Committee fou nd that the

Trump campaign was not notified that
members of the campaign were potential
counterintelligence concerns. This lack of
notification meant t hat the campaign was
unable to address the problems with each
campaign member and was ignorant about
the potential national security concerns. AG·
Lynell recalled that, during her fi rst meeting
with Director Corney and McCabe about
Page, "one of t he possibllltles the three of
us discussed was wheth~r or not to provide
what is called a defensive briefing to the
campaign, wherein there would be o
m eeting wlth a senior person with the
Trump campaign to alert th em to the fact
that .. . there may be efforts to compromise
someone with their campaign." 102
(U) Such a defensive briefing would not
have been unusual. According to Lynch, _
"[i]t is not an uncommon thing t o do . . . in
rntelligence matters." However, the FBI
did not provide any such warning about
Page, although it was again discussed b.y the
administration's most senior policymakers
after Director Corney briefed t he National
Security Council Principals about the Page
information in "!ate springn 2016.m


(U) The Trump campaign did not re- the indictment that any American was a
ceive a general co unterintelligence briefing knowing participant in the alleged unlawful
until August 2016, and even then, it was activity. There is no allegation in the indict-
never specifically notified about Papado- ment that the charged conduct altered t he
poulos, Page, Ma nafort, or General Flynn's outcome of t h~ 2016 election.'' 107
Russia ties. o.; Further, the counterintelli-
gence briefing provided to Trump and his
top advisors did not identify any individuals
by name, but rather focused on the general
threat posed by adversaries, including Rus-
sia and China.

(U) Finding #24: The February 2018 indict-

ment ·o f the Internet Resee1rch Agency and
Russian nationals exposes Russian actors
and their intent to spread distrust towards
the candidates and the political system in

(U) In mid-February 2018, the Depart-

ment of Justice charged 12 Russians and the
Russia-based Internet Research Agency LLC
with interference operations targeting the
United States political and electoral process·
es. The lndictment claims that th~ stated
goal of the Russian actors was to " spread
distrust towards the candidates and the po-
litical system in general" and provides in-
sight into the metl10ds used by the IRA,
such as the use of stolen identities, travel to
the U.S. for the purpose of collecting intelli-
gence, and the procurement of computer
infrastructure to hide t he Russian origin of
activities. ~ The indictment by Special
Counsel Mueller contains assertions that are
· consistent with information examined by
the Committee during its investigation. Spe-
cifically, according to an accompanying DOJ
announcement, "There ls no allegation in



l. Hr SCI, "RuS$la1l /\clive Mca~ure~lnve5ti;:otion", Mar. 20, 201,,

7.. HPSCf, ''Russla11 Actlvn Moasuw~ lnvc~tlgot1on", M.:ir. 20, 2017,


9. HrSCI, Executive Session Interview oUake Sullivan, Dec. 21, 2.017,

10. I-IPSCJ, "Russian Active rvteasurns investigation», Mar. 20, 2017.
11. HPSCI, "RUS5ia Investigative Task Force Heating with former Secretaf'/ of Homeland Setu rity Jeh Johnson," June .21,
12. HPSCI, "Russia Investigative Task Force HearinB with Former Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh JohnsQn/ June 21,
13. DHS, Reodovt of Secretary Johnso11's Cali Wit/1 State Election Officials About Cybersecurity, !J!t.eWwww.dhs.eov/
news/2016/08/15/[e<1dout·~ecret<lry-iohnsgns-calr-$\ii\e-elec.lfQD:.officials-£Ybersecu ri 1·,•. Aug.15, 2016.
1c1. F01, FBI Flos/J: Targeting ActMry Against Stat~ Boord of Election Systems, Aue. 18, 2016.
l S . Flll, FB/1-"lash: TorgetingAclivity Agajnsc Srate Board ofElection Syscems, Aug. lll, 2016.
'16. Fil l, FDI F!os/1: Toryetfog Activity Ayoin~t Stote Boarcl of[lection Systems, Avg. 18, 2016.
17. or~s. Stotemenr /Jy Secrera.ry Joh11son Concemlng the Cybersecurliy of rlle Nation's Election Sy:,cems, hltu;LL
www .d h~.ll,o v/11ow1:/7.Q11:./~/ 16/.i,t;i tom" n1 ·MtWH~Q!· ttlhnr.on•r.onr..,ml nrt-cy br:(!.<'CllrIty-na!inn·~-e:cc1ion ·S'll!m,
SopL 16, 2016.
18. DHS, Statement [)y Sccrc101y Jat1nson Concr:rn/11y tlt1.• Cyb,ll'.11:cuflly of lhe Na.lion's E(ecttun Sym ims, b.\Sn.:LL
v~~,cih<.&2_,•/ nf!.filJ2,016/0'iW,6/;,!1)lCmr. n.1:[,n111.r.:t~11v•)Qhl1HlJ)•Ci)l\r,gmln~,lCmrtl!>Y•llt1tirm';· r:l1!~1tP.t)~
Sopl. 16, 1016.
19. Puul O. Rynn, Nancy 1>01osl, Mitch McConnull, Harry Rold, Li:11,1r to Toud Vulci1t/11a, Sept. 281 2016.
20. DHS, Statement by Sacretory Johnson About EICGtton Systems' C}'IJC!rsccurlty, ~ !!d.lli!Y.l:.~.l?-OJ.6ll..QL!11.L
~li>kpir.nt·secr<~lilrY- 1ohn;o1\.,,~0lrt•sl,1c11oq-&YW\ (JI S•c;:r:b N ~ Oct. l, 2016.
21. DH~. Joint Stotemunr from the Deportment of liomeland Secut/1)' otld 0,(Jice of tile Director of Noo·onal lntelllat:nce on
Election Security, Z!Jt1l~Jb·1ww,t1hu:cw/"Q~ 01 C,/10/07llnl Qt;llilteme~ P..a!.!mJl 111-lrotM ln nd•security·il nd-office ·
dlrector-na1fonaJ, Oct. 7, 2016.
22. DHS, Update Dy Secretcrry Johnson On OHS Election Cybersecurlty Services, btt1?$://wv,w.d l!J!.4.Qy/t1ewsn.01G/lO/lO/
Jtl2f!.itiP,·5PC{P,tary· loh nson,d lls,eJectlon-cybe rs<lcurity-servlce.~. Oct. 10, 2016.
23. HPSCI, "Ru~lll lnYestiR'aiive Task force Hearing with Fomier S(melar,, of Homeland S-ecur\ty Jeh Johnsont June 21,
24. HPSCI, "Russia Investigative Task Force Hearing with Former Secretary oi Hamel.ind Securit>1 Jeh Johnson.'' Jtme 21,
25. The Office of Secretary of State of G eorgla, Letter to Secretary Jeh lohnsor\ Dec. 8, 2016.
26. DHS, Statement by ~ecretary Jeh Johnson on the Designation of Election Infrastructure as a Critical Infrastructure Subsec-
Lor, .l:!StmJb:.VV-'W.d hs.gov/ncws/2017l01/0&/~totament-~?.cret:irv•loimson-6oslgnallon-election-lnf;astructure crirtc.al,
Jan. 6, 2017. ·
27. HPSCI, Executive Session lntarvlew of Loretta Lynch, Oct. 20, 2Q1/.
28. '"The Global DlglLaJ Challenge Initiative - Xey11ote Address,'' .llil)arl:isan Policy Center video, 38:2S, http://br.ove.me/
zff9r41)q, May 18, 2016.
29. HPSCI, E:<ecutiva Ses~lon lnterYit~w of Loretta Lynr.h, Oct. 20, 2017.
30. HPSCI, hecutivc Scs~lon lnterYlew of LOrutta Lynd,, Oct. 20, 2017; llw Prl11r.lpols Committee, con von~d nnd chaired by
tl1c Not1onol S.r.curlly /\dvisor, l~ a Cnl>lne1 level h1teragc11c~· forum for r.o nsldcrln r, pollc11 l$~u os that MftH:t the national
u:curlty lntcro~ts of the United Stutes. Regular attendees of tho Prlnd p.ils Commlttc<e Include : the SccretJry of Stntc, t he
SocroLorv of the Trc~surv. tho SocroLory of l>ofori~f.', tho At\ornuv Goncrol, thu Sor.retary ol l:norgy, tho C:hfaf of Staff to
the Pro~ldcnt. tho Director of Notion ul rntclllgtmr.o, the CJiurrmon of the Joint Chlo#$ oi Stnlf, the Director of th~ Centro I
lntolll11oncv Ai;oncy. the Nat1onol Soc~ulty Advisor, tho Homeland Security A<Msor, Md tho Ropr<:5r."1miva or tho Un1totl
Stot11~ to the Unlted Nol1ons.
31. HPSCI, "Russian AcL~v11 Measura s Dunne the 2016 Election Campalen,N Mo\' 23, 2017.
32. The Gang of 8 is comprised of the Speaker of the House of Represr.otiltlvc-s, the Minority I.ender of the Mouse of Repre-
sentatives, the Chairman and Rankine Member of the Permanont Select Con1mittce on lnt~lliRllnce of t hP. House o r Rep.

56 .
,esemati~s. the Majcf.ty .,rui Minority lead= of the U..S. Senate, 3J:td the Chai!mrll\ and V:~ Chairman of !:he Sc!Ed
Com mitt~ on ln.effigC11ce of tr£ U.S. ~ate.
33. >-IPSO, Ex!:cutive 52S1icn lnteNle:.v of Susan Riro, Sap. 8, 2017.
34. l-ll'SCT, "Russian Aclive Measures Ou ring the 2016 Election Cam~ai!;O.~ May 23, 2017.
35. HFSO, ·Russi,:m Aai'-'e r·Jl.!asurcs Duri:,g 'the 2016 Election Ca."n~;;ign." May 23, 2017.
36. H?SC!, Ell!!<uti\'-e Session lnter.ri::w of Lorena tynci1, Oct. 20, W17.
37. 1-if'SO, fxe.:um•e Session loter>f,...,., ofS!tSa n Rke,Sep. 8, 2011.
38. Dl"iS,Joinr Statemellt from the OeporrmeflC of Hame/cr.d Secvrizy and Ojficeof the Ui:ecto, of Nutionof lntelfig.:m:e on
Eleaion Secority, N ~ps, f / ww,.-.,.dt-s.go·,./ r'l;!w.!}201 G/10/07 Ao<nt-stiltt2.-ner,t-deoa rt-nent-homaland-secu rit'{•a:1d-uifice-
din~g:cr-rc1tio ni!I, Oct. 1, 201E.
3!t. HPSCI, "Russia ?1westigai;,;e Task Force Hearing wi,h R;rmerSecreu,ry of Homeland ~curity Jeh lohn5on, Ju ne 2.l. 2 0'.i.7.

40. H~I, &.2cuti-1e Session lntel\liew of John !locksra, Jun€! 27, 201'1.
41. Hl>.:-Ct, uRussia Investigative T~5k Force Hearing wflh Fomter Secretary of Hoimiland ~curity leh Johmon,° June 21, 20l7.
42. HPSCI, "'Russia lm.·~tigative Task Force Hearing wi,h Fe<mer Secretary of llcmel.ir,d Security Jah Jofmson,.. June 2i. 2017.
-13 .

in Septenbet 2 0 1 5 - Shari!d similar information in a or.2-on-one meeting

with nt G2r.eral COvns~ James Baker. KPSO, Executi-.'e Sessicn cf , Oec. 18, 2017. il.rcund the same
time as ms meeting with f B I , - shared tfle information with jcurnatiru, lttclodir. of Slate, who pub-
lished an 2rticle at the e.nd of October. r!PSO, E.~ecut:v2 S~ion of Dec. :!13, 2017; "'W a5
a Trump ~fceCcmmunicating With Russia?," Slate, Oct. 3!, 2016. Candidate Ointon promoted tile: - artidetv lier
soti;;! media follCT,.,crs ,f-,e same day it wc1s p ublished. Twitt:er, @Hil~iClintoo. Oct. 31, 2.016, 4:32 PM.
44. White House. Stotemenr by Che PreslrteJlt on A.ccrons in RespMSe to R!!ssi'an Mclidous Cyb.?1 Ac:clllicy am; Harcssmer.t,
D~ 29, 201.6.
45. DP.S, Sta~emenc !rt Secretory Jen Johnson on the Des:gnotfoa of Election lnfrost.wcwr:! as a C!ictcol fflfrc;;r:-ucture Subsec-
tor, ntt!ls: l l·,•N Lw.dhs. ec,·/news/2017 i Ol/06/5t-.!remen t-se c:,Hary- jchr.son-d~sie nati!: r,-elcctiun--irr<3~t="= re--:rit! ca I,
46. OONI, Assessing Russian Activ:cies and i'ntenr:ions ln R~enl US cfeettons. Ian. 6, 2017.
47. OONJ, ,'nte/fr9eme Comrn11nity Directive 203: Analytic Stonr!o;d5, Ja". 2, 2015.
48. HP5CI, EXc:cutr,e Se,slon lllteivlew of Mary McCord, No.... 1, 2017.
49. HPSCI, E:r.crotiva So...sslol'l lntuMew of A.nprew McC,1be, Dec. 19, 2017.
so. U.S. v. Ge:irge ?opadciµoulos {3:17-cr-182, District of Columbia).
51. U.S. v . Gecrge ?ap,.d-0~oufos (!:17-cr,182, Distrli:t ofCclumbe}.
52. U.S. v. GEC'ge Papad Dpi;,ulos (l:l 7-cr-UR District of•Col umhe}.
53. Post Opimons Staff, "A crans.crlpl of Deana!d Trump'!. meeting with The Wilsh,n~o,~ Post e i:frtoriai board/ ;•/mh,r.gtan
Fort. Mar.21, 2016.

t!>- -
54. U.S.·;. Ge-:lfge Pa~;iopoutos (1:17~-1S2, District: of Cohani'.!1,iJ.
55. U.S. v. Geotgc P~dopou:os (l:l?-c.-1&2, District of Cof11ml;;;1); Email from George Fapadop<,ulos to
#Re: Me~ti.."lg ·,,•il:r. Russi-am leaderst-,ip - indud'ifll; P(itin," Ma~. 14, 2016.[DJTFP00010i1ll.
U.S.~·- Gecrge ~dcp0".1fo5 (1:.17-cr-182,-District of Columbia}; Email from Georg•:? f'.;ipado;;oulos
Fwd: (R1mian Outreadl)t May 4, 2016 {OJ1FFO()!}U40S}.
S7. U.S.•:. George Popcdopo,..ifos (l:17-cr-182, Distric:: of Colu~t.iJ).
58. U.S. v. G2org~ !>~padopc•.Jlos (1:11-cr-1S2, Dislrict ofColum~}.






68. U.S. v. Evgeny Buryakov, a/k/a "Zhenya," ·, and U.S. Southern District of New York, Janu-
ary 23, 2015; "Russian Spies Tried to Recruit Carter Page Before He Advised Trump," The New York
Times, Apr. 4, 2017; DOJ, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Application, Oct. 21, 2016, which was made available for
review by HPSCI members and staff on.March 17, October 31, November 2, December 14, December 15, and December
18 2017.



74. U.S. v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr. and Richard W. Gates ill (l:17-cr-201, District of Columbia).
75. HPSCI, "FBI Counterintelligence Investigations," Mar. 2, 2017.

79. Michoel G. Flynn, Email messages !o Russian Embassy in United States, Flynt) Intel Group Production,
80. Michael G. Flynn, Email message to Russian Embassy in United States, Flynn Intel Group Production,
FlYN N_H PSCl_00000.500, 00007542 .

84. U.S. v. Michael T. Flynn (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia).
85. U.S. v. Michael T. Flynn (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia).
86. U.S. v . Michael T. Flynn (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia).
87. U.S. v. Michael T. Flynn (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia).
88. Barack Obama, "FACT SHEET: Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment," The White
House, Dec. 29, 2016.
89. U.S. v. Michael T. Fiyr,n (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia).



102. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Loretta Lynch, Oct. 20, 2017.
103. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of toretta Lynch, Oct. 20, ·2017.
104. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Loretta Lynch, Oct, 20, 2017.
105. HPSCI, Staff meeting with Bill Pries tap, FBI Assistant Director, Head of the Counterintelligence Division, Oct 31, 2017.
106. U.S. v. Internet Research Agency, et al. (1:18-cr-32, District of Columbia). ·
107. DOJ, "Grand Jury Indicts Thirteen Russian Individuals and Three Russian Companies for Scheme to Interfere in the United
States Politi ca I System," Feb. 16, 2018.


(U) Chapter 4 - Campaign Links to Russia
Key Question 112: Did the Jlussian active measures ;nclude links between Russia and individ-
uals associated with political campa;gns or any other U.S. persons?

(U) A key focus of the Committee's therefore an ambiguous tenn, not a precise
investigation was whether Russian active legal one.
measures directed at the 2016 U.S. election
Trump Campaign
(see Chapter 3) ''include[d) links between
Russia and individuals associated with (U) The Committee cast a wide net,
political campaigns or any other U.S. generally asking each witnesses whether
persons." The first part of this chapter they had evidence of any "collusion,"
reflects the Committee's answer to that "coordination," or ''conspiracy" between
question w ith respect to the Trurnp Russia and candidate Trump or any of his
campaign. The second part of this chapter associates. The Committee also
addresses the Clinton campaign. investigated potential Trump campa;gn links
with Russia, focusing on credible af legations
(U} The ''llnl<s" between individuals
within the scope of the anreed-upon
associated with u,e campaigns and Russra parameters. Matters investigated by the
have often been publicly described as
Committee Include allegations pertaining to:
inqulril':!s Into whether them was "collu.sion"
between individuals associated with either • candidate Trump's business
ca.n didate Trump or Clinton and the Russian dealings;
government. One challenge with describing , the campaign's policy positions and
potential "links wrth the Russian personnel;
government as "collusion 11 is that the term
• involvement in or knowledge about
"collusion" may mean different things to
the publication of stolen emails; and
d ifferent people, as exemplified in witness
testimony before the Committee. • meetings with Russians.
Particularly in light of Special Counsel {U) In the course of witness interviews,
Robert Mueller's continuing criminal reviews of document productions, and
investigation-which has a different focus investigative efforts extending well over a
and the Committee agreed not to impt::!dr.- year, the Committee did not find any
it is important to note that the term evidence of collusion, conspiracy, or
"c:oUusion" does not, by itself, describe a coordination between the Trump campaf3n
criminal offense. Unlike the closely-ref atcd and the Russ ians. While the Committee
concept of "conspiracy," there is no
found that several of the contacts between
a pplicable statute that sets out the Trump assoc;ates and Russians- or their
elements of " colluslon." " Collusion" is proxies, including Wiklleak s- .w ere ill-


advised, the Committee did not determine Kushner stated categorically that the Trump
that Trump or anyone associated wjth him campaign "'did not collude, cooperate,
assisted Russia's active measures campc,lign. whatever other 'C' words you used, with
• ,.,5
anyfore,gn governments.
CONSPIRACY, OR COORDINATlON {U) Several fo rm er government officials
testified that, even though there w as no
{U} Finding #25: When asked directty, none
evidence of collusion between Trump
of the interviewed witnesses provjded
campaign associates and the Russian
evidence of collusion, coordination, or
government, they were aware of contacts
conspiracy between the Trump campaign
and interactions of potential concern. For
and the Russian government.
example, former CIA Director John Brennan
{U) The Committee interviewed high- stated in open session, "I encountered and
ranking current and former government am aware of information and intelligence
officials, along with numerous Trump
that·reveated contacts and interactions
campaign members, Trump administration
between Russian officials and U.S. persons
officials, and other Trump associates. None involved in the Trump cam-paign that .I was
of the witnesses testified they had evidence
conc~rn·e d about because of k nown Russian
of collusion between the campaign and
efforts to suborn such individuals, and it
anyone affiliated with the Russian
raised questions in my mind.. . whether or
government. In most of the Committee's not the Russians were able to gain the
witness interviews, the w itness was asked 0
coo~ration of those indi•Jiduals." Brennan
directly for any evidence of "collusion,
continued, however, "'l don't know whether
coordination or conspiracy" with any 7
or not such collusion . .. existed."
element of the Russian government to
{U) Similarly, forme r ON! James Clapper
influence the outcome of the 2016 U.S.
stated that he was aware of the same
presidential election. This question was
asked wfth respect to the w itness' own information to which Brennan referred,
"that my dashboard warning lights were on
actions; the actions of candidate Trump; the
just because of that." 5 However,
actions of anyone officially affiliated with
reaffirming his prior public statements, he
t he campaign; or the actions of anyone
tol d the Committee that, "I didn't have a~y
unofficially affiliated with the campaign,
2 evidence-l don't care how you want to
defined as including '.'v.rannabes," "hangers-
on,"3 and upeople who represented caveat it-of collusion ."

themselves as being part of the campaign." 4 BUSINESS DEALINGS

Each witness was given wide latitude in
{U) Finding #26: The Committee found no
answering these questions, but none
evidence that President Trump's pre--
produced any evidence. For example,
campaign business dealings formed the
Trump's son-in-law and senior advisor Jared


basis for collusion durinB the campaign. unsuccessful efforts to build a Trump Tower

{U) As a politic.ii outsider who had fn Moscow in late 2015 and ear ly 2016; and
other assorted claims of Russian financia l
never ru_n for office, Donafd Trump did not
ties to the Trump family . The Committee
have a polftical record to analyze, criticize,
did not uncover any evidence tha t any of
or rely upon during the 2016 campaign.
those matters formed the basis for
Therefore, his long and varied business
collusion, coordination, or conspiracy
career garnered significant attention from
between Trump or his associates and the
supporters, opponents, and opposition
Russian government during the 2016 U.S.
researchers alike. Eventually, as described
presidential election.
in the second half of this chapter, candidate
Trui:np's pre-campaign business dealings (U) Miss Universe 2013: Before he was
with Russians became a subject of a political candidate, Trump owned the Miss
significant opposition research. Universe Organization. The decision to hold
the 2013 Miss Universe annual pageant in
(U) As noted above, the Committee's
Moscow was a unanimous one made by
investigation was focused on the tirne
representatives of the Trump Organization
period of the 2016 election. Trump's pre~
and NBC-the event' s broadca ster-with
campaign dealings were within scope only
approval of the president of the Miss
to the extent they formed the basis for , or
were otherwise llnked to, Improper conduct
Un lverse organization. u Mich ael Cohen, an

during the elections. As one of the

attorney and former Executive Vice
President of the Trump Organlzation, told
Committee Members said during an
the Committee 50 percent of the fees
interview, the key question was if any
earned for the pageant went to NBC. "[01
business "relationships, whether directly or
indirectly or just by some other means, had f the $12.2 million in foreign income that
the effect that there was a preexisting
lthe Miss· Universe pageant] earned [in
relationship with Russia, and that that
2013), a substantial portion of it was
attributable to the Moscow event." 13
preexisting relationship may have in some
way inspired the Trump campa.ign to have a (U} The 2013 pageant's hosts were Aras
contact with the Russian Government to and Emin Agalarov, father and son of a
coordinate, collude, or conspire to help wealthy Azerbaijani-Russian family in
them win the election over HIiiary Moscow. The Agalarovs' company, Crocus
Clinton. Group, owned the venue where the pageant
(U) The Committee focused only on any
was held. ~ The Agalarovs and Crocus
Group wanted to host the event in Moscow
potential financial improprieties relating to
the eteclion. In particular, the Committee because tl1ey wanted to have the pageant ln
their company's bu ilding, Crocus City Hall,
examined the Miss Universe pageant in
arid It was a way to promote Emin's music
Moscow in 201.3; the Trump Organization's

career, who performed atthe pageant.~; become my new best friend?"v
The Agalarovs have connections with senfor
(U) Leading up to the Miss Universe
individuals and elements of the Russian
page,int, the issue of President Putin
government/ and Aras received the Order
possibly attending came "up a number of
of Honor from Vladimir Putin. The
times" among those planning the pageant. 23
decision to hold the pageant in Moscow
Emin's manager Robert Goldstone and the
originated from an "off-the-cuff" discussion
head of the pageant organization had
between Emin Agalarov, his manager, and a
"casual'' conversations w·ith one another,
representative from the Miss Universe
but every time Goldstone asked Emin about
it, En1in replied the pageant would have had
UNCLASSIFIED to go through "official channels" to make
EMIN AOALAROVATTHE 2013 MISS the request, indicating that the event was
UNlVERSE PAGEANT IN MOSCOW not officially related to the Russian
government. At the time, according to
Goldstone, Emin cast doubt on whether
President Putin would attend, stating "if this
was in America, would Barack Obama
attend? Probably not. It's a beauty
pageant. But there is a chance, maybe, of
some kind of meeting." 25 Before the
pageant, however, President Putin' s press
UNCLASSIFIED secretary called and told Trump and others
that President Putin would not attend the
(U) The Agalarovs first met Trump in pageant, and he did not.
person in 2013 in connection with the Miss
{U} While in Moscow, Trump, along .
USA pageant in l.as Vegas. The Agalarovs
with his head of seturity, attended the
and Trump signe-d the contract to hotd the
pageant and several pageant -related
pageant in Mosc.oi.v during the weekend of 27
events. for example, Trump attended an
the Miss USA pageant In January 2013. At
event hosted by the Agalarovs at a well-
the conclusion of the 2013 M iss USA 28
known restaurant with local businessmen.
pageant, Trump and the Agalarovs
announced on stage that the Miss Universe (U) Although there were allegations in

pageant that year \"Jould be held in the Steele dossier that Trump engaged in
In a June 18, 2013 tweet, Trump illicit activities wit h prostitutes in the

publicly asked, "Do you think Putin will be presidential suite at the Ritz-Carfton hotel,
going to The Miss Universe Pageant in the .Committee found no evidence to
November in Moscow-if so, will he support these allegations. Trump' s former
head of secu r i t y , - · testified that

although somebody during a meeting fn has a unique and colorful background, and
Moscow-did not rrnow who- described for the Committee his path from
''mentioned sendfng women to ITrunw's] Wall Street banker to white-collar crim in al
r o o m , ' - responded "absolute ly not, to governmen~ Informant.
we don't do that." - told the (U) After signing a letter of intent with
Committee he advised Trump of the
a local developer in October 2015, 36 Cohen
comment, and they both laughed about it.
andlllll exchanged a number of emails
- also festified he walked Trump to
and text messages in late 2015 detailing
his room that nlght, remained for a few
their attempts to move the project forward.
nilnutes, and did not observe anybody enter
30 For instance, in December 2015,lllllltried
the roorn.
to get Cohen and candidate Trump to travel
(U) Trump Tower Moscow: While in to Russia to work on the projecLn
Russia for the Miss Universe pageant,
(U) Several o f - communications
Trump met with the Agalarovs and
with Cohen lnvolved an attempt to broker a
discussed a possible joint real estate
meeting or other ties between candidate
development in Moscow.:.u The proposed
Trump and President Putin, and purported
project was a Trump Tower in Moscow
to convey Russian government interest in
adjacent to the Agalarov-owned Crocus City
the project.;s Perhaps most notably, . .
Hall; according to Donald Trump Jr., "it
told Cohen in a November 3, 2015, emaif,
fizz led out" after a few months. 32
"[b)uddy our boy can l)ecome President of
(U] Trump Organization lawyer Mlc:hael the USA and w e can engineer it." 39 -
Cohen was not Involved In those orlglnal continued that if "Putin g~ts on stage with
di scussions regardin g Trump Tower Donald for a ribbon cutting for Trump
Mc.)scow. In c1pproximately September Mo scow, . .. Donald owns the republican
2015, he re ceived a separnte prnpos.il for nomination." This asserlion apparently
Trump Tow er Moscow from a businessman ;;irose f r o m - rather grandiose theory
n a m e d - >1~ According to Cohen, that cementing a dea l with a hostile U.S.
the concept of the project was that "[t]he adversary would Increase candidate
Trump Organ ization would lend its name Trump's foreign policy bona fides.
and management skills, but It was not going
(U}. . testified that his
to borrow any money and it would not have
communications with Cohen regarding
any resulting debt for the purchase of the
President Putin were ''mere puffery,"
land and th e building of the facility.";~
designed to elicit a respo nse from the
Cohen worked on this idea wlth 1111111 and
· Trump Organjzation to move the project
his company, the Bayrock Group, a real
estate consultancy that had previously
along. 42 1111
explained that " (u]ntil the
bank wrftes the check, it's all salesmanship
worked with the Trump Organization. 111111 and promotion to try to get many, many,


many parties towards the center to try to Russian government.
get the deal done.,,.: Cohen similarly
{ U ) - testimony likewise made
characterized. . as "a salesman" who
clear that neither Presldent Putin nor any
"uses ver1 colorful language." 4 ~
element of the Russian government was
{U) When the project started actually directly involved in the project. For
proceeding too slov..r[y for the Trump in~ance, in one exchange,~ testified he
Organlzation,4 Cohen and . . began to was offering the Trump Organization access
exchange acrimonious text messages. As to one o f - acquaintances. This
part of those text messages- told acquaintance was an acquaintance of
Cohen that President Putin's people were someone else who is "partners on a real
backing the deal, including "this is thru estate development with a friend of
Putins [sicJ administration, and nothing gets Putin1s."52 . . testified that he was
done there without approval from the top," unaware of "any direct meetings with any
as well as meetings in Russia with [Russian) government officials" in
" Ministers" and "Putins (sic] top connection with the Trump Tower Moscov.:
administration people.":] 1111111 also 5
proj ect. > In addition, neither candidate
mentioned Dmitry Peskov (President Putin's Trump nor Cohen traveled to Russia in
spokesman) would "most likely" be support of the deal.54
(U). . . was unequivocal in his
{U} Cohen thus attempted to reach out testimony that none of the Russians
to members of the Russian government in affiliated with the Trump Tower Moscow.
an attempt to make the project proceed, project had any communications with him
but apparently did not have any direct uin which {heJ w{as] asked to do something
points of contact. for example, Cohen sent on behalf of the Russian government that
an email to a general press mailbox at the [he] knew was on behalf of the Russian
Kremlin in an effort to reach Peskov.4n Government1' with respect to the U.S.
Cohen's message notes that he has been election.S!, None of those communications
working with a local partner to build a "were intended for - to take action to
Trump Tower in Moscow and that have a ccmmunic:ation w ith or take some
communications have stalled with the local action to influence the 2016 Presidential
50 6
partner. The email further seel'-s contact election."":. The Committee t herefore
._•.,ith Peskov so they may " discuss the assesses tha. . . was attempting to
specifics as well as arrang{e] meetings with leverage polttical contacts for business
the appropriate individuals."!,1 Based on the purposes, rather than the othe-r way
documents produced to the Committee, it around.
does not appear Cohen ever received a
{U} It appears the Trump Tower
response from anyone affiliated with the
Mo~cow project failed in January 2016.57

Trump Jr. testified that, as of early June March 8, 2017 letter from Trump's lawyers
2016. he beffevecl the Trump Tower regarding his Russia-related fina1)cfal
Moscow project was dormant. 53 The dealings over the previous ten years. 67
project failed because "[t]he due dfligence
did not come through 11 and the Trump
Organization's representative "lost (U) During the campaign, candidate
confidence in the licen.see, and {he] Trump and several of his campaign advisors
abandoned the project." In fact, the expressed policy views towards Russia quite
Trump Organization did not have a different than those espoused by much of
confirmed site, so the deal never reached the Republfcan foreign policy establishment,
the point where the company was including previous Republican nominee Mitt
dlscussins financing arrangements for the Romney, wt;io labeled Russia "our number
project.uo The Committee determined that <.me geopolltkal foe" durrng the 2012
the Trump Tower Moscow proj~ct did not election, In factJ a significant nu niber of
progress beyond an early developmental Republican foreign policy experts made
phase, and that this potenli"al licensing dear statements d~irh,g the campaign that they
was not related to the Trump campaign. 61 would not work for the Trump campaign.
As a result, the c;;m1palgn relied on many
(U) Other Alleged Financial Dealings: In
lesser-k11own-or in some cases unknown-
addition to the Miss Unlvl:!l'S<:l and Trump
advisors on foreign policy issues.
Tower- Moscow projects, a number of
witnesses were asked about Trump family {U) Additionally, a plank of the 2016
financial dealings, sometimes stretching Republican pl~tform pertaining to the
6~ Ukraine has been the subject of substantial
back decades. For example, Trump Jr. was
asked about Russians: ·buying units in controversy. The question for the
Trump Tower in 1984 (wh~n he was seven Committee was whether candidate Trump's
3 pollcy positions-and the campaign's
years old)/ btJylng properties in soutf,ern
Florida for which the Trump brand was a involvement fn the debate over the Ukraine
!icensor;6'' being involvQd in the Trump platform plank-reflected legitimate policy
lntern~tional Hotel in Toronto for which the positions, or somuthing more nefarious.
Trump Organization was the brand and not The Committee found no evidence that the
65 policy positions of the Trump campaign
the developer; and having unspecified
Involvement in a licensing project for the were the reslAlt of collusion, coordination,
66 or conspiracy with the Russians. In the
Trump Ocean Club in Pariama. The
Committee does not have any evidence that words of Trump campaign
there is a nexus between these activities policy offici~I involved in the platform issue,
and the 2016 <:.impaign, or information that "lt]here was no coordination or tt,ought for
contradicts representations made in a coordination. The idea to have better
relations with Russia was a Mr. Trump idea


0 63
that I thought was reasonable to support Trump. There is no evidence that anyone
on t he Trump campaign was aware of
{U} Finding #27: The Republican national
Page's past ties to Russian intelligence
security e.stablishment's opposition to
services-or Papadopoulos' more r.ecent
candidate Trump created opportunities for
contact s with a Russian-connected
two less-experienced indi\liduals with pro-
professor-when these two individuals
Russia views to serve as campaign
were included among the advlsors that
advisors: George Papadopoulos and Cart~r
wt:!re publicly announced on March 21. In
fact, as Kushner candidly put it, "we put
(U) The Republican foreign policy together that list because we vi1ere getting a
establishment was critical of candidate Jot of pressure from the rr.edia to put out a
Trump, w~o had to turn elsewhere for list of foreign policy advisers.''

support. On March 2, 2016, 122 self.

de.'icribed "GOP National Security Leaders" UNGLASSIFtED
signed an uopen Letter to Donald Trump" GOP National Security Leaders
refusing to support then-candidate Trump.;S'
Open Letter to Donald Trump
The next day, Trump announced Senator
5().1To).l~r.r UY f O!tr.ll:R :>tA"flllNAl ill 'l,JRnY i:ffll1ALS
Jeff Sessions as chairman of his National
foe o,,jHt"~ 11¥:1t1.:!~1, l:.:,,c :JI ..,m-J "'.«<'I"" ~ -ul ,...,...,11y
Security Advisory C9mmittee {NSAC}. A few .i:1~ ·oc f'1ra~ pol).y ~ itic~ lo Atpl)::0.!ltl.'.) ~~irour-~U'\1. (r~ l
Rttlwd N<>= to !'lcrrrp: Yi.' llLNt \\~ b r" mal ~ ,_,,,
we_e ks lat er, following continuing media r,;:; ,oncl ~ """""'-'','ll!ll!-.,...lt<f"~ P.<'l~clnrLY ir
~ ')( ~ t;.;'>~ d= s ...-ar.xn..e l>l\..l <,;:):1 11"",od~or==, l~.=.:cl>
criticism of his failure to publicly name a w..•.,..,cs:::,; t'..tillK... W~b,w 11': ~ ~ it.n ~ ;;im ..f-a
t2 1'.':1.'r.len1 o!'(!)( , •n :i: J S1&".o
foreign policy team, candidate Trump
named five foreign policy advisors i n a
March 21, 2016 meeting with The
Washington Post editoria l board: Wa[Jd
Phares, Carter Page, George Papadopoulos, {U) These five advisors were
71 subsequently incorporated into the NSAC,
.1oe Schmitz, and Keith Kellogg.
which was part of the campaign's O.C.-
(U) The opposition to Trump's 73
based policy shop. · The NSAC was chaired
candidacy by the ,.,ast majority of the
by Senator Sessions and directed by J.O.
conservative national securitv
Gordon, a retired Navy officer and former
establishment paved the way for lesser-
Department of Oefense spo!<esman. ' ~ Some
known individuals, such as the then 28 -year-
members of the NSAC met with candidate
old Papadopoulos, t o join the Trump
Trump in Washington, D.C. on March 31,
campaign. Page was another unknown
2016. Page did not attend. Each advisor in
. brought into the periphery of the Trump
attendance, including Papadopoulos,
campaign to fill the vacuum left by more
briefed the group on a topic of their choice.
experienced national ~erurity specialists
Papcidopoulos spoke about Russia.
who were unwilling to acivise candidate


However, in lhe opinion of one advisor, the actual campaign or in'fluence they had
wafid Ph,ues, the primary purpose of the ·o n anything that happened in the campaign
meetina was about optics rather than was virtually nonexIstent. 1179 Gor don
substance: tl1e meeting was about the testified to the Committee that he agreed
picture and to send the rnes/jage that: I ha:ve with the ass~rtior, that the NSAC was
· po II cy tearn." 75
a f ore,gn minimally Influential In the context of the
• /l{l
UNCLASSIFIED broader campaign.

NSAC MEETING WITH (U} Finding #28: The change in the

CANDIATE TRUMP Republlca·n Party platform regarding
Ukraine resulted in a stronger position ·
-'-'" .... . .....-...
~ ~ _ . . .........,"' .. . ,•a.,:;.,1

~, ........"t u..
against Russia, not a weaker one, and
--•-,;-1.1"'<1•'" • ••-
there is no evid~nce that Paul Manafort
- _ : .. . . . . , . _ - U/1#- , • • _,,. .....~~C.T.
1, \- .C.."'10':il ·~.) was involved.
"'"''' ...
W\.""''lo'... ""'"'"~,.-.,,, ...... , . ~...
~ e . . .. - - · · - - - -
- ' v J l,.la - r . . i...-
{':J} It has been widely reported that the
2.016 Republican Party plotform was
. ,, .....
weakened with respect to Ukraine, perhaps
as a favor to Russia or some other nefarious

UNCLASSIFIED reason. Arter reviewing th e Republican

Party platform amendment process,
(U) Page was, according to NSAC
Interviewing tho se involved, and revfewing
director Gordon, "very loosely affiliated
document productions, the Committee
with the campaign and had really no roles
determined that the original plank was
or responsibillties." 76 The Committee
strengthened, rather than weakened-and
assesses that Page played no major role rn
there is no evidence that language
the campnign, and had no meaningful
advocating for th e provisions of "lethal
access to senior leadership.
defensive weapons'' was Improperly
{U) Pag·e did not attend the March 31, removed.
2.016, NSAC meeting with then-candidate
(U) on July 11, 2016, the Republican
Trump, and has never met him.n Although
National Committee Platform Committee
members of the NSAC occasionally gathered
met to discuss and debate amendments to
for meals in the Washington, D.C. area, they
the platform. As drafted, the platform
never again met as a group with candidate
78 referenced "a resurgent Russia occupying
Trump. Kushner provided a blunt
parts of Ukraine/ but incfudep no langu.age
assessment of the role, qr lack thereof,
played by the individuals on t~e initial Ii.st of
about support to Kiev.{see inset}. 11111
of Texas, a member of the National
·publicly-announced foreign policy advisors:
Security/Military Platform Subcommittee,
"[Tihe amount of Interaction they had with
offered an ~mendment that would "support


maintaining {and, if warranted, increasing) all but three v.iords o -
sanctions against Russia until Ukraine's amendment.s.1
sovereignty and territory integrity are fully
restored."3 l ~ r o p o s e d UNCLASSIFIED
amendment further called on the United Final RNC Plank
States to provide "lethal defensive weapons
(U) Wr:;. support maintaining and, ff warranted,
to Ukraine's armed forces and greater increasi ng sanctions, togcthff with our allies,
coordination wjth NATO [North Atlantic against RllSSia unless and until Ukraine's sover-
Treaty Organization] on defense ei.gnw and territorial integ_rity are :u'.ly re~t.ored .
We also support provldi:'lg approprla~ assistance.
to the armcci forces of Ukraine and great& coordi-
U NCLASSIFll:D nation with NATO defense planning.

Original RNC !)tank UNCLASSlF1ED

(U) In the int~mational arena. weakness invites
(U} The Committee also investigated
aggression. The results of the (Obama} Administra-
tion's unilateral approach to disarmament are ,...,hat role, if any, Paul Manafort played in
already clear: An emboldened China in ti\e South the Trump campaign's response to
China Sea, a resurgent Ru:.s!a occupying parts of 0€nman's amendment. Manafort, a
Ukraine and tnreatening neighbo:s from the Baltic
veteran of numerous Republican
to the Caucasus, an aggressive lstamist terrorist
camp.algns, 85 had long represented the
networ.~ !n Middle East. All our adversaries heard
th~ message in the {Obama] Arlminlstratio"n's cut- government of Ukraine, the pro-Russian
bac!G: Americil is weak~ arid retreating: former presid~nt of Ukraine Viktor

UNCLASSIRED Yanukovich, and Yanukovich's Party of

Regions.86 In late March 2016, candidate
(U} Much o f - amendment was Trump hired Manaforno-lead "delegate-
sdopted, but-foll owing debate among the corralling efforts at the Republican National
delegates-the final version called for the Convention."s Then--campaign manager
United States to provide "appropriate testified that, when
assistance" rather than "lethal defensive Manafort was hired, ~ a d e no
weapons." The Committee assesses that attempt to vet him and was entirely
aappropriate assistance" provided flexibility, unaware of Manafort's past work in
and could encompass lethal defensive Ukra.ine.85 In May 2016, Manafort was
weapons as well as humanitarian aid, promoted to campaign chaim,an and, after
medical supplies, and meals-ready-to eat. ~ a s fired the next month,
In any event, even without the words aevolve[d}" into the role of de facto
"lethal defensive weapons," t he final draft campaign manager.69
of the platform UV".las tougher against
{U) Manafort left the campaign in
Russia than the orlginal after incorporating
August 2016 following news reports that he

,, !M
had rece_ived $12. 7 million In secret hlrn to resign.
payments for his work on behrilf of
(U) Given Mana fort's past work in
Yanukovlch's Party of Region s; news
Ukraine, If the Ukraine plank change was
reporling also alleged that Manafort and hls
made as a favor to the Russian government,
aide Rici< Gates had "dirnctly orchestrated a
it seems likely that then-campaign chairman
covert Washington lobbying operation" on
Manafort would have known about it.
behalf of the partv-:-while failrng to register
However, campaign records produced to
as foreign agents. 90 Campa1gn
. press
the Commlltee show that Manafort had no
secretary Hope Hicks recalled that, after
role in, or contemporaneous knowledge of,
receiving press inquiries about Manafort's
the platform change. On July 30, 2016,
"professional history," a major story broke
. 91 Manafort sent an emall, copying Gates, to
on the evening of August 14, 2016.
Rick Dearborn, then a senior campaign
According to Hicks, "Trump had made a
policy official and Sessions' chief of staff: "I
decision to make a change ln lendership on
gather that there was a change In the
the campaign outside of Paul's ;ssues that
platform that ren,oved arming Ukraine. I
were being publicly reported," but those
don1 t know anythlnc about this change.
issues "certainly contributed to expedllinn
Who pushed for it and wIw was It done.?11 fl!I
and Intensifying the way in whfch his roJe
changed, and then ultimately he was fi red (U} In response, Dearborn generated a
at the end of thnt weck.''92 Trump directed memorandllm, dated August 1, 20:l.6,

his son-in-law Jared Kushner to ensure outlining a detailed sequence of events th<lt
Manafort departed the campaign on August occurred between July 10 and 12, 2016.
19, which he did.'
As Kushner put it, ''[tf As part of that memo, J.D. Gordon created a

here was a lot of news that was out there1 tlmeline that noted candidate Trump's
and the decision was tflat lt was time for poticy statements-including at a March 31,
2016, national security meeting-served as
the basis for the modification of Den man's
amendrnent. ' Gordon's timeline made it
clear that the change was initiated by
c<1mpaign staffers at the ·convention-not
by Manafort or senior o_
fficials. Although
Page expressed support after the fact, the
Committee did not find any evidence that
he actively parliclpat:ed in the modificati on
•rtt ~t0, • .-t :A Tt.,"tftt~~,f'\l ~ri.1 ,..-... ~ n11.0.. li'• U fV'lrt UU:, Wlt'I o-f Denr.nan's "red line ~mendment
tft .. l'\,J IO ''
providing lethal assistance to UIm1 Ine.



(U} Finding #29: Thel'e is no evidence that material in campaign statements was the
Trump associates were involved in the product of deliberation: "And so, I
theft or publication of Clfoton campaign- remember making a decision that it [a trove
related emails, although Trump associates of hacked emails) was in the public domain,
had numerous ill-advised contacts wlth and it wouJd be silty not to use it. So I used
Wikileaks. it, although I could understand somebody
else not wanting to." 101 For campaign press
{U} There is no evidence that Trump or
secretary Hope Hicks, use of emails
anyone associated with him played a role in
published by Wikileaks was uncontroversial
the hacking of emails from the DNC and
because such information was available in
Clinton campaign chairman John Podesta,
the public domain.102
among other entities and individuals,
detailed in Chapter 2. A5 a lso discussed in
Chapter 2, the Committee concurs with the
IC's assessment that Wikileaks was one of
the vehicles for the public dissemination of .__._..,,.._
emails stolen by Russians. As noted in ·~-..-
- · 1:· - 0. 11 .-

Chapter 3, on October 7, 2016, the

.,.,. ....,,.I:). ----· . . .. .--,~~~.. ... -- ·,""'·-Qr·'":.'---..!.•
Department of Homeland Security and .., __ ""' '-'•' ~ ~

Office of tt,e Director of National - - '-.....:i,..-»,.,

,.- ~--0,--
" - . - · · r.:11" 11 <: . ...

Intelligence releas.ed a public statement

that "[t]he U.S. Intelligence Community is
·- - ,--_
r _ ._, ..,,I..._ . . ___ , _ ~ ~

, _
.,.,.,~ ....
' - _ , _ ...... ~ •11-.... · · -

confident that the Russian Government

directed the recent compromises of e-mails ,..,,._._,..... - - - - - : ; - - : - . ' ; :...... . -... -·
from US persons and institutions, including :. -,o..----··!K., .:...-
' - - - - - ··- -- ·~ - ye.,
,- ·
US political organizations."1!' The statement
also specifically tfed Wikileaks to the UNCLASS1FIED
Russian-directed disclosures. (U ) Similarly, candidate Trump stated at

(U} Trump campaign communications a rally on October 10, 2016-three days

after the release of Podesta's emails began
made ample use of the publicly available
and the IC publicly tied Wikileaks'
emails, which were reported by virtually aU
dissemination to " Russia's senior-most
major media outlets. Regarding W ikileaks,
officials" -that "I love Wikileaks." 10 ?. Trump
Trump Jr. testified that "[aJt the time, I
had earli~r encouraged the Russians to "find
looked at them as essentially a media
outlet" and an "opportunistic organization" ~e 30,000 emails that are missing" from
Hillary Clinton's privateserver. 10' {These
that would have also put out negative
emaHs. which were the frequent subject of
information on Trump if it had it. 10 ° For
campaign talking points, should not oe
Senator Sessions, reference to Wikileaks


conflnted with the DNC emails. The stolen data . Nor did any witness shed llght on
Committee did not receive evidence that the the provenance of the emails, or clarify that
emails from Clinton's private server were Mifsud was reforrlng to emails actually stolen
stolen by the Russians-or anyone elsel by the Russians (as opposed to, for example,
(U} Particularly in light of candidate emails missing from Clinton's private server.)
Trump's expressed enthusiasm for Wikileaks, The Committee also found no evidence that
the Committee examined the relationship Papadopoulos told anyone affiliated with the
between his associates and the stolen emails. Trump campaign about M ifsud's claims that
The Committee did not find any evidence that . th_e Russians had "dirt" on candidate Clinton.
Trump associates .w ere involved in the (U) Michael Flynn: On Jul~ 15, 2016,
publication of emails by Wikileaks and other retired Lieutenant General and Trump
outlets-or had access to such emails or other national security advisor Michael Flynn
stolen Information prior to their becoming forwarded an email to communications
publicly available. a d v i s o r - in an attempt to connect
.i friend from the military with tl,e campaign's
(U} The Committee did find that multiple
social media operation. Flynn included the
Trump associates went beyond mere praise
following edltorlal comment: "There are a
and established ·uncs of communication with
number of things happening (and wlll happen}
W ikileal<s during th e campaign. Such contacts
this election via cyb er operatio11s (by both
were Imprudent in light of Wlkileaks' role In 109
hacl<tivists, nation-states and the DNC) ."
disseminating stolen emails in line wlth
This stateme.nt does not nece.ssarily indicate
R1.1ssian interests-and CIA Director Mil<e
non-public knowledge, and could have instead
Pompeo's post-election characterization of
reflected commentary on .then-current public
Wikileaks as a hostile non-state interllgence
events-including the mid-June attributi on of
service that " overwhelmingly focuses on the
the DNC hack to Russia by the security firm
United States, while seeking support from anti
CrowdStrike, and the subsequent claim of
-democratic countries and organizations" such
credi t by the t hen-unkn own persona "Guccifer
as the Russian military intell igence service
(GRU).l07 2.0." (See Chapter 2.)
(U} Donal~ Trump Jr.: During the course
(U) George Papadopoulos: Foreign policy
of-the Committee's interview with Trump Jr., a
advisor Papadopoulos was told by Russian-
news report from CNN appeared onllne
linked academic Joseph Mifsud in April 2016
clalmine he was given a pre-release
that the Russ1am; had "dirt'' on Clinton In the
1 notification of a Wlkileal<s release ofPodesta
form of "emails of Clinton.'' ~ However, the
emails.Ho The article appeared clt 1:01 p.m.,
Committee found no cvldenc;e that
Papadopoulos obtained these emails or that
while Trurnp Jr. was still being interviewed by
the Committee behind clo sed doors, which
the Trump campaign had a role in facllltating
concluded at 5:51 p.m.111 CNN' s Initial report
the Russian government's dissemination of ·

claimed Trump Jr. received an email on testified that he was not aware of the
September 4, 2016, alerting him to an reasons why Wikileaks decided to reach out
upcoming release of hacked emails. to him directly, but hypothesized that such

(U) The email in question was from an direct messaging was likely due to the fact

individual named , who that he "was retweeting a bunch of their

sent a lengthy email to a number of stuff. . ." and that he has "a relatively

individuals associated with the Trump formidable social media platform." 120

Organization, including Trump Jr., providing (U) In the first exchange, on September
access to hacked DNC emails. The email . 20, 2016, Wikileaks sent a direct message
was actually dated September 14, 2016, the to Trump Jr. to alert him to a "PAC run anti-
day after Wikileaks published a tranche of Trump site" that was about to launch.
Podesta emails, and thus did not Wikileaks "guessed the password" and sent
substantiate allegations of prior knowledge it to Trump Jr. and asked for comments .121
of the release . CNN subsequently issued Trump Jr. responded the next day, "[o]ff the
a correction, noting the error. record I don't know who that is but I'll ask
(U) When asked about the email by the around." Trump Jr. subsequently logged

Committee, Trump Jr. testified that he did into the site using the Wikileaks-supplied

not have any recollection of the email, password, which had also been made
publicly available .123
stating that he "get[s] stuff from people that
-you know, people put my email address (U) Following that exchange, Trump Jr.
online every few months, and I get a bunch emailed some Trump campaign officials, to
of people that do the same thing and then include Kellyanne Conway, Steve Bannon,
they start bombarding you with stuff."rn and Jared Kushner to advise them of the
Trump Jr. went further to state that while contact and seek their advice. In a follow
he may have met a at -up email, Trump Jr. noted the Wikileaks
some point in time, he was not sure of the message intimated "some connection we
identity of this individual. [the Trump campaign] should be aware
(U) At the outset, Trump Jr. told the of." The Committee did not receive any

Committee that, although he was not aware documents or information that reflected a

of any coordination " between the Trump response to Trump Jr.'s email, although

campaign and Wikileaks to disseminate Hope Hicks recalled that-after being

information acquired from the Podesta forwarded the email by Kushner-she

email or the DNC server," 117 he did "might have expressed concern to

exchange Twitter direct messages with somebody about putting passwords in

WikileakS' beginning on September 20, unknown websites, just as a general
2016, and October 3, 2016. 118
Wikileaks practice, not specific to Wikileaks." 126
initiated both exchanges. Trump Jr. {U) On October 3, Wikileaks passed


along a story reporting Clinton's comments • forward what appears to be a video
about Julian Assange and noted "{i)t'd be w ith the cap\i on "Fake N~w s"; G and

Breat If you guys could comment on/push

1 7 • on the date the news of the June 9,
th is story." J· Trump Jr. responded about
2016, Trump Tower meeting broke,
90 minutes later: ''Already did that earlier , • n·,
seek copies of Trump Jr. s em a11s.
today. It's amazing what she can get away
W ith resp ect to the latter, Trump Jr.
with." 'a Trump Jr. then wrote: " What's
published those emails himself on
behind this Wednesday leak I keep reading
his Twitter accou nt.
about?"n 9 Trump Jr. was seeking
Information on what was purported to be, {U) Trump Jr. testified that he did not

another future leak of Podesta-related reply to any of these messages, nor did he

There was no response. have any communications with Wikfleaks
before September 20 or aft~r October 3,
{U} After October 3, 2016, Trump Jr. 138
2016. He testified that the direct
received numerous messages from
message exchanges discussed above "is a
WiklLeaks that:
complete record of any communications
• suggest a website llf'.lk to use if the [he] had with Wikileaks."
campaign refers to Wikileaks In a
(U) Cambridge Analytica: In add ition to
tweet and suggests having Trump Jr.'s communlcations w ith Wikileaks,
supporters search through the
Cambridge Analytica, a British firm the
leaked Podesta emails, noting
Trump campaign used for data analytics,
WikfLeaks " just released" "Part 4" of
reached out to Julian Assange in an effort to
those cmails; l
confirm whether Wlklleaks possessed the
• seek then-candidate Trump's ta x ,;missing" ema!ls deleted from Clinton's
returns <1nd suggests leaking them to private server.140 That contact occu rred In
" improve t he pe rception of approximately June 2016,1~1 between an
[Wlkileaks'] impartiality'';m employee of Cambridge Analytica and the
speaker's bu reau (a separate thi rd party)
• suggest challenging the results
representing Assange. 142 Wikileaks replied
should Trump lose the election;m
through the bureau that " they did not wish
• describe an election-night message
to take a telephone earl or othe rwise ..
of " (w]ow" and noting Obama . A I . )
engage with us [ Cambridge na ytica . :s ,,1..

administration witl delete records as

they leave;-
1 ~d {U} Trump campaign digital director
- testified that he did not
• suggest the President-elect push participate in, nor' was he aware o f,
Australia to make Julian Assange Cambridge Analytica' s attempted outreach
that country's ambassador to the 144
to Assange. The Chief Executive Officer
United States;


{CEO} of Cambridge Analytica confirmed in his business activities in Ukraine. I thought
his testimony that he "did not share this it manifestly unfair that John Podesta not be
with anyone on the Trump campaign.uHs In held to the same standard" regarding his
fact, the C:EO testified that the outreach alleged business activities. In Octob.er
occurred before the company was even 2017, John Podesta's brother Tony resigned
retained by the Trump campaign.w; from the lobbying firm the brothers co-
founded am id revelations about the
(L!} Roger Stone: Roger Stone has had a
Podesta Group's role in pro-Ukraine
series of business relationships with Donald
lobbying efforts that also involved Manafort
Trump dating back to at least 1981, and
and his associate Rick Gates.:..: ..
served as a paid campargn advisor for
several months in 2015. During (U} Stone also addressed his August
testimony to the Committee, Stone 2016 public statement that "l've a'ctually
addressed three public statements communicated with Julian Assange. I
suggesting he might have important believe the next tranche of his documents
information about, and potentially advance pertain to the Clinton Foundation, but
knowle_dge of, disclosures during the 2016 there's no telling what the October surprise
campaign: (1) an August 2016 Twitter may be."m In his testimony to t he
message regarding Clinton campaign Cornmittee, Stone sought to "darify that by
chairman John Podesta, {2} an August 2016 saying the communication I refer to is
public speech about purported contacts through a journalist who I ask {sic) to
with Julian Assange, and (3) the March 2017 confirm what Assange has tweeted, himself,
acknowledgement of pre-election direct on July 21st, that he has the Clinton emails
communications with Guccifer 2.0. and that he will publish them." He
subsequent ly identified the interm ediary,
{U) Stone denied that he "knew in
but denied any access to non-public
advance about and predicted the hackin$
information. t 54 Stone fu rther disputed,
of .. . Podesta's email," notwithstanding his
under oath, that he "had advance
cryptic statement in an August 21, 2016,
knowl edge of the source or actual content
Twitter message-''Trust me, it will soon be
of the W ikileaks disdosures."
Podesta's time in the barrel"-that
predated by several weeks the initial public (U)·ln his testimony, Stone described a
release of Podesta' s hacked emails. s series of direct messages exchanged with
Stone noted that his Tweet makes no Guccifer 2.0 in August and September
mention whatsoever of Mr. Podesta's 2016-which he first publicly disclo sed in
email.,,149 Furthermore, it was posted " at a March 2017-as " innocuous," and denied
time that my boyhood friend and colreague, taking action in response to G uccifer 2.0' s
Paul 1"~'1anafort, had just resigned from tile messages.156 He subsequently provided
Trnmp campaign over allegations rega rding additio nal messages with Wikileaks

u .. I
extending from October 2016 to August speech at the New Economic Scl1ool-the
2017. 157 first American to do so since then -President

(U} Despit e these multiple contacts, the Barack Obama in 2009. At the time, -
served as a foreign policy advisor for the
Committee did not find any evidence
Trump campaign. The Trump campaign
contradicting Stone' s claim that "(a ]ny
made it clear to - that the trip was not
information ... disseminated via social
on behalf of the Trump campaign,.a poi nt
media regarding the timing of the release of
the DNC data or others was from publicly - acknowledged In his testimony to the
Committee.15"' J.D. Gordon, the NSAC
available sources" and "he In no way
director, strongly advised against the trip,
conspired, colluded, or coordinated with
calling it "a bad idea." 1€0 However, Trump
any agent of the Russian state." 152
campaign manager
MEETINGS WITH RUSSIANS authorized lllto make the trip "out side
(U) The Committee examined meetings of [his] role with the DJT {Dona ld J. Trump I
between Trump campaign associates and for President campaign.'' L -
Russians, to include both official and mentioned the upcoming trip to Sessions at
unof1iclol representatives. The Russlan5 one of the occasional NSAC meals,
found wllllng interlocutors in foreign policy although Sessions did not recall the
advisors llllllland Papadopoulos. These interaction. 11>3
advisors, however, were peripheral figures, (U) On July 9, 2016, while In Russia,
and neither was in a position to influence - sent an "executive summary" of
Trump o r his campaign. The Russians " Feedback From Russia" that stated in part
engaged Trump associates via official ''Russian Deputy Prime Minister and NES
channe[s and-niore notably-used [New Economic School} Board Member
apparent cut-outs and intermediaries to Arkady Dvorkovich also spoke before the
make contact with senior officials. event. In a private conversation,
However, questionable contacts like the Dvorkovich expressed strong support for
Trump Tower meeting resulted in collusion, Mr. Trump and a desire to work together
conspiracy, or coordination with the Russian toward devising better solutions in response
government. to the vast range of current international
(U} Finding # 3 0 : - did not travel problems. Based on feedback from a
to Moscow in July 2016 on behalf of the diverse array of other sources close to the
Trump campaign, but the Committee is Hussian Presidential Administmtion, It was
concerned abo ut his seemingly incomplete readily apparent that this sentiment is
accounts of his activity in Moscow. widely held at c1ll levels of government." 1(',11
a l f ldmltted to briefly greeting
(U)-traveled to Moscow in early
Dvorkovlch before or after one of their
July 2016 to deliver a conimencement

I V ,J

speeches, but minimized the interaction in repeatedly and consistently denied meeting
testimony before the Committee. either Sechin or Diveykin, including under
oath in testimony to the Committee.!e9 The
(U) Ultimately, - failed to clearly
Corn mittee has no information that
explain whom he meant when he referred
confirms the Steele dossier's assertions
to sources close to Russian government in
rega rding the purported meetings in
his executive summary. He denied having
Moscow, much less an offer by Sechin to
any private meetings w ith any senior
- for such a role in a potentially lucrative
Russian officials during his July 2016 trip,
transaction. After ret urning from Moscov:,
and stated that he mostly met w ith
- took a " leave of absence" from the
"scholars." 1 c-E The Steele dossier, a
Trump campaign, and played no role in the
document compiled by former British
transition or administration. 170
intelligence officer Christopher St eele,
alleges that while in Moscow in July 2016, (U} Finding #31: George Papadopoulos'
Page secretly met with Igor Sechin, CEO of attempts to leverage his Russian contacts
Russian state oil comp~my Rosneft, and Igor to facilitate meetings between the Trump
Diveykin, a senior Russian Intelligence campaign and Russians ,,yas unsuccessful .
official. :QJ Further, t he Steele dossier claims
{U} Papadopoulos made minor
that Sechin offered Page a brokerage fee in contributions to the Trump campaign as a
connection with the sale of 19 percent of
foreign policy advisor. He briefly served as a
Rosneft in exchange for the lifting of
Trump campaign surrogate, a role cut short
sanctions. i6!!
in May 201 6 when he publicly insulted UK
UNCLASSIFIED Prime Minister David C3meron. He also-
in an apparent effort to increase his
standing within the Trump campaign- tried
to insert himself into any· number of
international engagements. As described
below, his particular focus was t rying to
broker meetings \fJith foreign officials, but
he often acted on his ovm w ithout the
official backing of t he Trump campaign.

(U) On March 24, 2016, Papadopoulos

sent an email to several members of the
UNCLASSIFIED policy team pitching a " [m]eeting with
Russian leadership-including Putin" -and
(U) Since the allegation of meeting w ith also volunteered to travel to meet the " next
Sechin and Diveykin was first w idely
prime minister of Vietnam,,- alongside
reported in September 2016, - has
Mifsud (whom he had first met just ten days

before but nonetheless described as a negotiations. So I pushed back pretty
"good friend of mine"). i"' Campaign co- sharply on t hat.''
Sessions' account of his
chair and chief polfcy a d v i s o r - response has been corroborated by another
responded that "we probably should not go a t t e n d e e , - . l/'j- also
forward with any meetings with the attended and similarly recalled that when
Russians until we have had occasion to sit Papadopoulos raised the issue of obtaining
with our NATO allies, especially France, contacts with the Russian government on
Germany and Great Britain." :, In the same behalf of the campafgn, Senator Sessions
exchange, Papadopoulos then Immediately Interrupted and began "talking about the
switched gears, indicating that "[i)f we need Logan Act," which criminalizes unauthorized
any assista nce with setting up meetings negotiations with foreign governments.
here in London or Paris, I have some good
(U) Although the Committee has no
contacts that can open doors immediately
information to indicate that Papadopoulos
to the leadership."
was successful in setting up any meetings
(UJ Durh1e the NSAC meeting with b~tween the Tl'urnp campaien and the
Trump on March 31, 2016-the only time Russian government, he worked with
Papadopoulos is known to have engaged campaign chief executive Steve Bannon to
directly with the candidate- Senator broker a September 2016 meeting between
Sessions told the team that they were not candidate Trump and Egyptian president
~uthorized to speak for the campaign . 175
In Abdel Fatah el-Sisi. 181 Trump was
his words "[t]hls committee was not . . . a apparently pleased with the meeting, which
croup of people ~uthorized to speak for he described In an Interview as "very
[candidate) Trump, and they absolutely productive," describing el-Sisi as "a fantastic
weren't authorized to go around the world guy."1s2
pretending to represent him." That
(U) While on a trip to Athens, Greece in
sentiment was, according to Sessions, ''a
May 2016, Papadopoulos sent an email to
good statement to make quite clear." 177
Manafort stating that he expected to soon
(U) When Papadopoulos offered that he receive "an official invltijtion for Mr. Trump
could engage, and possibly travel to, Russia to visit Greece sometime this summer
on behalf of the campaign, his suggestion should his schedule allow." ~ In the same
was swiftly rebuffed by Sessions, who email to Manafort, Papadopoulos also
testified that "I felt like·-and I'm the forwarded a meeting Invitation from rvan
chairman of this group-I should not do Timofeev, Director or Programs for the
anything that indicated to Mr. Russian International Affairs Council, and
Papadopoulos that he was authorized to go claimed that "Russia has been eager to
to Russia or anyplace else to represent the meet Mr. Trump for quite sometime and
Trump campaign and do some sort of have been reach ing out to me to discuss.

thought it would be prudent to send to expense without asking permission first."ts
you." 1e4 - replied t o - with one
word : "agreed.''l!>~
(U} As of May 2016, Manafort had not
yet been elevated to campaign chairman, (U}~espondedto
but had a long track record of wor'f( abroad. Papadopoulos that he could take the
Manafort forwarded Papadopoulos' email me~ting, but he "should do that as a private
to his business and campaign deputy. citizen.''® Making the point explicit,
- noting that a(wJe need someone to - wrote: "You' re not authorized to
communicate that D[onald} T(rump] fs not meet with him by {sic] the campaign, nor
doing the.se trips." Manafort a n d - can you reflect the views of the campaign
agreed to assign a response of a "general on security issues in that meeting."
letter" to "our correspondence
{U} finding #32: Donald Trump Jr., Jared
coordinator.'' the person responsible for
Kushner, and Paul Manafort attended a
" responding to all mall of non-
June 9, 2016, meeting at Trump Tower
where they expected to r&-eive-but did
{U) In June 2016, Papadopoulos sought not ultimately obtain-derogatory
a paid position and reimbursement for information on candidate Clinton from
expenses from -a sessions Russian sources.
aide, who along with , ran
(U) tn July 2017, the Committee became
the Trump campaign's D.C. policy shop-for aware of a June 9, 2016, meeting in Trump
an upcoming trip "to DC for a high level
Tower, which became a key focus of the
meeting (with) the director of the Israel
investigation. The Committee's findings
National Security Counciin and past trips to
were informed by interviews with six of the
" the UK, Israel and Greece over the past
eight participants in the meeting.
month engaging in some senior level
meetings .. . .
-forwarded the {U} Although they did not attend the

message to Gordon a n d _ meeting, the Agalarovs w ere the driving

Mashburn then replied as follows: "He cost force to arrange it. ru previously noted, _the
us a lot more in having to deal with what he ~aalarovs and Gof~tone had gotten to

said about [then-UK prime m inister David) know businessman Donald Trump when the

Cameron 2 months ago ... he got no Agalarovs worked with Trump to host the
approval for the travel and did it on his own .Miss Universe pageant at the Agalarovs'
in[i]tiative .. .. Let him eat the cost and building, the Crocus City HaU, in Moscow in
maybe he will learn to play nice with the 2013. The Agalarovs also had discussions
with Donald Trump in 2013 to facilitate the
team, not go off on his m.vn. ·-
would never have approved possible development of a Trump Tower in

his going off on world travels at campaign Moscow.m The 2013 M iss Universe


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pageant formed the basis of a casual {U) Events. leading to th e meeting were
friendship between t he Trumps and the set in motion by a June 3, 2016, email from
Agalarovs.1.!H Trump appeared in one of Goldstone to Tru·m p Jr,, stating: "Emin just
Ernln Agala rovs's music videos with the called and asked me to contact you with
2013 pageant winner,1 and Trump something very interesting . The Crown
maintained a frfen dly correspondence with prosecutor of RllSSia [possibly referri"g to
Aras 1:i.gala rov- includlng during the busy Ru ssi an Prosecutor General Yuri Chatka)
2016 carnpaign. 196 met with his father Aras this morning and in
t heir meeting offered to provide the Trump

campaign with some official documents and of the meeting. - e x plained that
infor.mation that would incriminate Hillary he believed the scheduled m eeting at
and her dealings with Russia and would be Trump Tower was about providing negative
very useful to your father. This is obviously information on candidate Clinton to the
• 201
very high level and senslti\le information but Trump campaign.
is part of Rus·sia and its government's
(U) Based on Trump Jr.'s testimony and
support for Mr. Trump - helped along by
the documentary evii;lence received by the
Aras and Emin.'' Trump Jr. replied to
Committee, there is no evidence ~o support
Gold.stone' s June 3 request by indicating "if
that there were any prior communications
rt's what you say I love ft especially in the
between the Trump campaign and the other
summer." 1~
attendees: - ; Russian lawyer
(U) This exchange indicates that Trump Natalia Veselnitskaya; Russian-Amer<can
Jr . was open to discussing derogatory, lobbyist and former Soviet intelligence
information from Russian government officer ; or Russian-
sources that could be useful to candidate who served
Trump. Goldstone proposed to deliver as a Russian interpreter. furthennore, the
information concerning Hillary Clinton via a Committee found no evidence that Trum p
Russian government attorney. t~ Trump Jr. Jr. knew the identities of these individuals
indicated that he had invited Kushner and before the meeting,202 or that he discussed
Manafort,2!iO underscoring his belief in the rt with candidate Trump beforehand.203
importance of the information.
(U) The Committee interviewed all
attendees other than Manafort, due to the
- with connections to the
Special Counsel's ongoing investigation, and
Agalarov family, was one of the individuals
Vese!nitskaya, who is a Russian national
who attended the June 9 meeting at Trump
located overseas without a valid visa to
Tower. The Committee discovered that the
enter the United States. Despite the pretext
participants.of the June 9 meeting did not
for the meeting, every person with direct
all have the same understanding as to the
knowledge of what occurred confirmed that
re~sons for the meeting, w ith -
· there was no m~ntion of derogatory or
testifying that he thought it was odd that al!
incriminating information directly relatir:ig to
three senior Trump campaign officials would
Hillan.., Clinton during t he June 9 meeting.
be taking a meeting on the Magnitsky Act, a
Goldstone testified that he had no ~vidence
U.S. human rights law that imposes certain
that the Russian government supported or
sanctions on Russian interests. Accordingly,
favored Donald Trump, and admitted to
- called , a close embellishing the contents of the email
associate o f Emin .4.galarov based in the
solely for the purpose of gaining a response
United States, t o inquire about the purpose
from Trump Jr., namely by using inaccurate

s J
?HO?ERlY OF T;;E U.S. XOUS:: Of RE.." R!;S£NTATl\r
information. 204 visibly uninterested In the Ma3nltsky Act
{U) Ve sclnitskayc1, Samochornov, briefing provided by Veselnitskaya.2H

Kavcdadze, and Akhmetshin met for lunch Manafort, according to Goldstone, "never

before the Trump Tower rneeting. 205

During looked up from his cell phone from the

lunch, there was a discussion regarding the moment we began the meeting until the
Trump Tower meeting. Vesel'nitskaya moment we ended."' 15 Manafort and
sha red an approximate ly 10-page document Kushner complained to one another via text
in Russian to provide the lunch attendees message during the meeting that the

with a synopsis of what would be discussed meeting was a "waste of time." 21G Kushner
at the meeting, a summary that contained asked his assistants to call and give him and

much of the same information as a similar excuse to leave, which one of them did

document reportedly shared with Russian shortly after the text.m At the end of the

prosecutor gener~I Yuri Chaika. 10

b Based on meeting, Goldstone apologized to Trump Jr.
this discussion, the lunch attendees for the "bait-and-switch ta!k abou t

believed the Trump Tower meeting was something which we !mew nothfng about,
about tl1e Magnltsl<y Act.
The lunch which was, acain, Russian adoption and the

attendees then met Goldstone at Trump rvtagnitsky Act." 218

Tower shortly beforf! the meeting. 208 They (U) t<aveladze testified thut he received
proceeded to the 25th Floor where they two calls from Aras Agalarov aft er the
me1 Trump Jr., and he led the group to a meeting. Durir:ig the second call, l<aveladze
conforence room. 200 explained that the meeting was a "complete

(U) The June 9 meeting lasted as little loss of time and about nothing. 1121~ Aras
. no Agalarov and Kaveladze d id not discuss t he
as 20 minutes. Kaveladze testified that
he believed Trump Jr. started the meeting "dirt" on Hillary Clinton.
° Kaveladze also
and then turned it over to Veselnitskaya.211 sent an email to his daughter after the
Interviewed meeting attendees agreed that meeting indicating that the "meeting was
Veselnitskaya presented information boring. The Russians did not have any bad
concerning -the Magnitsky Act and the Ziff info [o] n Hillary" -a reference back to his
Brothers, including their alleged role in conversation with Beniaminov, which he
evading taxes in Hussia and political had apparently relayed to his daughter. Th e
contributions to the DNC and/or Clinton Committee received no testimony or
campa Ign.
2 12
Seve,·al attendees also documentary evidence indicating that the
recalled discussion of Russian adoptions, purpose of the meeting was to discuss
which the Russian government suspended Wlkileal<s, J1.1lian Assange, the hackin.e of
in retaliation for the Magnitsky Act. 213 DNC servers, and/or the John Podesta
emails. 222
(U) Goldstone further testified that
Kushner, Manafort, and Trun1p Jr. seemed (U) No witness, including the attendees,

testified that candidate Trump was aware of the emails' rhetoric about setting up a "back
the meeting prior to fts public exposure in channel'' between the United States and
June 2017. Steve Bannon, who had been Russian governments, the relevant
previously quoted as saying ''{t]he chances testimony obtained in the Committee' s
that Don Jr. did not walk [the meeting interv[ews showed these email inquiries
participants] up to his fathers office is resulted in a brief meeting between Trump
zero," conceded under oath that he had no Jr. and a Russian government official that
evidence to support that ciaim. The centered on shooting and hunting. It did
Committee also investigated a public not focus on the U.S. presidential election.
statement made by candidate Trump during
(U) from May 19-22, 2016, the NRA held
a speech after the final Republican primary
its annual meeting and exhibits in Lou isville,
contests on June 7, 2016, the same day as 226
Kentucky. In an intervie\'.' w ith t he.
Trump Jr. exchanged emails with Goldstone
Committee, TrumpJr.'testified he received
regarding meeting attendees and
an invitation from "[v]arious people at the
logistics.224 According to campaign press
NRA" to attend the 2016 meeting.-~v In
secretary Hope Hicks, Trump's publicly
addition to Trump Jr.'s invitation, there
st(lted intent "to give a major speech .. .
were several emails sent to _
next week . . . discussing all of the things
seeking to establish a connection at the NRA
that h~ve taken place with the Clintpns" did
meeting between an emissary of the
not reflect knowledge about t he upcoming
Russian government and candidate Trump.
meeting; instead, it referred to a planned
speech uthat w.as an outline of the book (U} In the first email, dated May 16,

Clinton Cash," and was ultimately derivered 2016, a business executive emailed
approximately two weeks later after being ~ it h the po~sibilit':( of candidate
delayed by a domestic terrorist attack.us Trump meeting with Alexander Torshin, the
Deputy Governor of the Bank of Russia, the
(U) Finding #33: Donald Trump Jr. bri~fly 228
country's central bank. The email
met with a Russian government official at
mentions an " overture t o Mr. Trump from
the 2016 National Rifle Association a nnual 29
President Putin." ] - responds he
meeting, but the Committee found no
will be "[\·1}orking on this first thing in the
evidence that the two discussed the U.S. am.":!30
presidential election.
(U} - forwarded the email to
{U}Jn the weeks leading up to the
Manafort, Gates, and Kushner, noting the
r,.iational Rifle Associa tion's (NRA) 2016 1
"interesting request." B - email
annual meeting, there were a series ~f
highlighted the entrepreneur's re quest t hat
emails sent to-a member of the campaign
Torshln "meet with a high level official in
discussing Russian interest in the campaign
our campaign'' during the NRA meeting t o
a5 it related to the NRA meeting. Despite
di~cuss "an offer he {Torshin] claims to be

., 83
carryln{l from President Putin to meet with email in his Jntervlew before the
DJT." In response to that email, Kushner Committee, Attorney General Sessions
wrote: "Pass on this. A lot of people come testlried he was not c1ware of this email..B9
claiming to carry messages. Very few we - testified that he may have met
are able to verify. For now I think we - o n c e , and did not remember
decline such meetings," as well as "(b]e replying to hrs email.7,1{)
careful." ' - replied to the (U) Atthough the campaign declined to
executive seeking the meeting: "I've asked
hord a meeting, Trum·p Jr. was introduced to
about a mtg but we are not able to
Torshin, at the request of an acquaintance,
accommodate it at that event in KY."' 33
at a restaurant where they were dining
(U) In addition to the emails d iscussing separately . Dur ing their brief
a possible meeting with Torshln, on May 10, introduction, they spoke about "stuff as it
201.6, - ' who had previously related to shooting and hunting . ..
approathecalllllllllll about advising .a . exchanged casual hellos" but did not
prospective Trump transition,234 sent exchange contact information.2-1z In his
- an e1T1ail about meeting with brief exchange with Torshin and a
NRA event. 735 The email
Russians at the subsequent exchange wrth Torshln's
discusses- purported "back- assistant, Marla Batina, Trump Jr. testified
channel to President Putin's Kremlin," that he ·dld not recall any discussion of the
"Russia is quietly but actively seeking a upcoming U.S. presidential e!ection. 20 No
dialogue with the U.S. that isn't forthcoming other witn~ss provided a contrary
under the current administration," and.that recollection to the Committee.
"the Kremlin believes that the only
(U) The Committee reviewed several
possibility of a true re-set in this
emails discussing a meeting with Russians at
relationship·would be with a new
the NRA meeting, an attempt to establish a
Republican Whit~ House."7.36
back channel of communication betw~en
{U) The email goes on to note that the U.S. and Russian governments, and a
"Presidenf Putin's emissary 11 wFII be at the possible meeting between candidate Trunip
NRA convention and hopes to make contact and President Putin. However, the
with candidate Trump and present Mrs. Committee found that all of those email
Tm mp with a gift.'~-, The email discussed exchanges resulted in just one, brief
Putin' s desire to build a relationship with meeting between Mr. Torshin a'nd the
candidate Trun,p, to Include e)(tending an candidate's son that did not include any
invitation to the l<remlin. The email also discussio1, related to the U.S. election.2~d
a s k e d - to "talk through what has (U} Finding #34: The Committee found no
transpired and Sen. Sessions' advice on how
238 evidence that meetings between Trump
to proceed.'' When asked about this
associates-including Jeff Sessions-and


official representatives of the Russian the Mayflower. 249
government-including Ambassador
(U) Republican National Convention: In
Kislyak-reflected collusion, coordination,
July 2016, then-Senator Sessions attended
or conspiracy with the Russian
the Republican National Convention in
Cleveland, Ohio. Because he used his
(U) Meetings between U.S. senators campaign funds to pay for his travel and
and foreign government officials are lodging while in Ohio, his schedu le focused
considered a routine part of the job . primarily on his Senate campaign-related
However, there have been multiple media events.
° For the five days that Sessions
articles raising concerns about contacts with was in Cleveland, he attended numerous
former Russian Ambassador to the United Trump campaign-related events. 251
States Sergey l(islyak, particularly those
(U) Over 50 ambassadors to the United
involving then-Senator Sessions.
States also attended a reception associated
(U) Mayflower Hotel Speech: In April with the 2016 Republican Convention. 252
2016, Senator Sessions, an early endorser of Sessions addressed th is group of
Trump and later a key figure during the ambassadors, as the keynote speaker, at the
transition, attended a foreign policy speech Heritage Foundation's Embassy Row
by Trump at the Mayflower Hotel in Ambassador's Buffett Lunch. 253 Accord ing
Washington, D.C. l<ushner also attended to Sessions, his interaction with
and recalled meeting 20 to 25 guests, Ambassador Kislyak following that speech
including Ambassador Kislyak for the first was brief, unexpected, and occurred in the
time. Kushner stated that the presence of several other people. 254
conversation between him and Ambassador
(U) J. D. Gordon testified about briefly
Kislyak mainly consisted of pleasantries, and
encountering Kislya k twice at convention
concluded with an offer for Kushner to visit
events in Ju ly 2016, including a brief
the Russian Embassy for lunch, which
conversation that occurred during a
Kushner never attended.
networking event that was also attended by
{U) Attorney General Sessions similarly 1111.255 . . .recalled seeing Gordon and
described a pre-speech reception of maybe chatting casually with Kislyak at the same
24 people; immediately following the event. The Committee found no evidence
speech, he went to a media stakeout to that these brief public interactions related
answer questions about the speech. 248 to the hacking of emails or collusion,
Attorney General Sessions re ca lled "no ... coordination~ or conspiracy between the
discussions with the [Russian] Ambassador Trump campaign and Russia.
or any other representative from the
(U) Senate Office Meeting: On
Russian Government or their surrogate" at
September 8, 2016, Senator Sessions met


Ah1bc1ssc1dor Kislyak In his Senate office: 2!)t relationship" between Russia and the
As a Senator, such meetings In his Capitol United States. bl l(ushner testified that the
Hill office are common. Notes of the meeting primarily entailed Gorkov telling
meeting taken by Sessions' staff, and Kushner about VEB, w ith which Kushner was
provided to the Committee, verified that the entirely unfamiliar, and "that was really the
approximately 30-minute meeting was extent of it." i Gorkov gave Kushner two
official in nature and not related to any role gifts, which l<ushner registered with the
that Senator Sessions held with the Trump transition.
campaign. Sessions testified that the
(U) In January 2017, businessman and
conversation mainly revolved around
former Navy o f f i c e r - was
Ukraine, and the two "had a little testy
introduced through Emirati associates to
conversalion" about Ukraine given Sessions'
Russian investor Kirill Dmitriev in the
support for the urm1inian cause.259 The 24
Seychelles. c - had no official or
Committee's investigalion did not uncover
unofficial role in the transition, btJt had met
anything improper about Senator Sessions'
twice wlth Bannon at Trump Tower.2G5
meetin~s with the Russian ambassador.
- testified that his meeting with
Finding #35: Possible Russian efforts to set Dmitriev lasted 20-30 minutes and focused
up a "back channel" with Trump associates on "trade matters," and "how the United
after the election suggest the absence of StatC!s and Russia should be working
collusion during the campaign, since the together to defeat Islamic terrorism." 2~
communication associated with collusion - stated that he and Dmitriev did not
would have rendered such a "back discuss sanctions, the Russian governm ent' s
channel" unnecessary. "desire to have a relationship with the

JU) The Committee investigated Trump admin istration," or "any channel of

meetings during the post-election transition communications between the United States
period betv-Jeen Trump associates and and Russia.'' -furthE:r stated that he
Russians-with a focus on individuals who had had "no communications or dealings

may have been acting as unofficial with {Dmitriev] or any of his colleagues
representatives of Moscow. In December before or after that encounter last
2016, l<ushner met with the head of Russian
bank VEB, Sergei Gorkov, at the urging of (U} The Committee did not find
Russian Ambassador Serr,ei Kislyak, with evidence that Kushner o r - did
whom J<ushner and Flynn had met earlier in ,mything Inappropriate during or following
the month.2 Kushner took the meeting their meetings with Gorkov and Dmitriev.
partly because he hQd been told Gorkov To the extent that one or both meetings
could provide "Insight into what Putin' s reflected an unsuccessf ul attempt by
thoughts were on a potential new intermediaries of the Russian government


to set up a "back channel" to the incoming reporter and Fusion co-foundeiallll
Trump administration, that purpose was not - Fusion "specialize[s] in finding
shared with or accepted by Kushner or records and reading things and digesting
- - a n d potentially reflected an large volumes of information." Fusion's
absence of such channels during the general practice is to "do engagements on a
campaign. Kushner, who was connected 30-day basis, and at the end of the 30 days
to Gorkov by Kislyak, asserted that "the fact we write a report about what we found ....
that we [we]re going through the normal And if you think what we told you was
channels during the transition hopefully interesting and you want more, we can sign
serves to show that there were no existing up again.'' Founded and led by former
channels through the campaign." Similarly, journalists, Fusion maintains relationships
- noted his meeting with Dmitriev with numerous reporters, and provides
"didn't happen until ... more than 2 information to ne·ws outlets on behalf of
months after the election. So if there was all clients that include law firms, media
this collusion [before the election], why organizations, and lobbying
would there even need to be any other organizations. 275
followup meetings?"
{U) As described below, Fusion was
Clinton Campaign hired in spring 2016 by

(U) Using a series of intermediaries, the

Democratic National Committee (DNC) and - · who represented the DNC and the
Hillary for America (Clinto·n campaign) paid Clinton campaign. Fusion was paid to

a research firm to conduct opposition conduct opposition research on candidate

research on candidate Trump and his ties Trump. Fusion subsequently hired

with Russia. As part of this effort, research Christopher Stee le as a sub-contractor to

from n_
u merous purported Russian sources obtain information from sources purported

was obtained and provided to the Clinton to be current and former Russian

campaign, thereby constituting indirect, but government officials. The information

substantial, links "between Russia and Steele collected was reported back to the
individuals associated with political Clinton campaign via Fusion and- 276

campaigns" relevant to the 2016 U.S. {U) Finding #36: Prior to conducting
election. opposition research targeting candidate

{U) Fusion GPS (Fusion) is the trade Trump's business dealings, Fusion GPS

name of a Washington, D.C.-based conducted research benefitting Russian

company, Bean LLC, that conducts research interests.

primarily on behalf of corporate clients. 271 {U) Prior to conducting opposition

According to longtime Wall Street Journal research targeting candidate Trump's


business dealings, Fusion conducted discussing the Trump Tower rTi eeling w ith
research benefil1.ing Russian Interests. i n her before or after it occurred, and claimed
Specifically, in 2013, Fusion was retained by not to have learned about it until 2017. 281·•
a law firm to assist w ith representation of a
(U) Finding #37: The
Russian defendant in a civil forfeiture case
hired Fusion GPS on behalf of the Clinton
arising out of alleged money laundering
campaign and the Democratic _National
activities uncovered by the late Sergei
Committee to research candidate Trump's
Magnitsky {whose name was subsequently
Russia ties.
given to the U.S. human rights law, the
IV1agnitsky Act).
-acknowledged {U}
that the Kremlin's interests in the case were . , is longtime counsel to the DNC.n °

aligned with his client and against the U.S. -.alllatso represented the Clinton
government. 279 campaign, from which it received $5.6
million in 2015 and 2016.287 Pursuant to
(U) Russian lawyer Natalia
that representation, d~ring the 2016
Veselnitskaya hired the law firm for which
campaign, "[tJhere w as an expectation that
Simpson was workfng, and that fjrm
- would hire the consultants,
retained the services of Russian-Amerkan
including rese<Jrch consultants, necessary to
lobbyist Rinat Akhmetshln, both of whom
e11able us to provide services to the
attended a meeting at Trump Tower on June
campaign." 288
9, 2016, described in the first part of this
280 {U} In approximately March or April
chapter. During the litigation,
Veselnitskaya receive~, via the law firm, 2016, Fusion p r i n c i p a l s - and
memoranda summarizing- - approachecal " and indicated
research:m Certain topics-including the that they might be a good fit for doing wo rk
Ziff Brothers (a venture capital firm to support the legal efforts" o i a l
specializing in capital investment)-were clients. llllllltestffied that Fusion "had
the-subject of both {1) memoranda been retained ... by a wealthy Republican ,

Veselnitskaya received from - and .. to do research on t hen candidate Trump .

{2} the presentation Veselnitskaya made to . . and thought that if I was going to be

Trump campaign officials.

2 2
R -
looking to hire a consultant to help me

acknowledged being with Veselnitskaya at a advise the cam i>aign on issues relating to
court hearing in New York on the morning Trump, that they wot1ld be a good fit."m

of June 9, 2016, prior to her meeting at lllwas looking fo r a consultant to, among
283 other things, sort tf1rouuh the multitude of
Trump Towef. He fu rther recalled having
drinks and dinner with her and others, public records perta ining to Trump's
including Akhmetshfn, in W(lshlngton, D,C, a business dealings.<92 Although he had not
day or two later. m However, he denied previously worked with Fusio n, he chose to

hire the company based on its familiarity were passed on to - , and
with Trump's dealings, including "his ultimately to the Clinton campaign and
business holdings, his financial holdings, and DNC. 301 In total, Fusion paid Steele (and
the kinds of litigation he had been involved c h a r g e d - ) approximately
in." • · further testified that "[t]hey $160,000; Steele's efforts were part of a
were recommended ... [and} thought larger opposition research project for which
294 302
highly of in the community." - · paid Fusion over $1 million.
(U) The Committee determined the { U ) - testified that Fusion bega n
"wealthy Republican" who funded Fusion's its opposition research work by "review{ing]
what we had learned over the previous
months," presumably including
"information about candidate Trump's
the Beacon retained Fusion to conduct business ties in Russia," although - had
opposition research on Trump. 295 not been aware of Russia-specific research
leadership have publicly stated they "had no at the time he engaged Fusion. 303 Fusion
knowledge .of or connection to the Steele "began to develop more specific lines of
dossier, did not pay for the dossier, and inquiry," and eventually hired Steele, whom
never had contact with, knowledge of, or - had known since approximately
provided payment for any work performed 2009.
by Steele." 296 signed off on the decision to hire Steele as a
- testified that-based on a careful sub-contractor in June 2016-around the
review of the relevant documents-he had same time he learned that Fusion was
identified "zero overlap in the work beginning to focus its opposition research
product" between the dossier and what on Trump's ties to Russia-but was not
297 305
Fusion providecl aware of Steele's identity until Ju ly 2016.

(U) lllllsought and received "budget {U) Finding #38: Christopher Steele claims
approval to be able to spend money in to have obtained his dossier information
order for me to retain consultants," from second- and third-hand from purported
Clinton campaign m a n a g e r - high-placed Russian sources, such as
but did not specifically identify Fusion to government officials with links to the
- .• Fusion's Simpson was "definitely Kremlin and intelligence services.
aware t h a t -· represented the
(U) Between June a·nd Novembe r 2016,
DNC and that they were the client in this
Steele produced sixteen reports for Fusion,
matter" based on a general understanding
which comprise what has become known as
t h a t -· represents the DNC.
the Steele dossier, "concerning Russian
Fusion's expenses, including the hiring of
efforts to influence the US Presidential
Christopher Steele as a sub-contractor,

/ l\l
election and Hnks betwC?en Russia and (U) Finding #39: Christopher Steele's
Donald Trump." G Steele did not travel to information from Russian sources was
Russia to con~plle these reports.io, Instead, provided directly to fusion GPS and
Simpson stated that "!Steele] hire(d) people - and indirectly to the Clinton
who can travel and talk to people and find campaign.
out what's going on.1130R
(U) Fusion began receiving written
(U) Of the separate claims the reports from Steele in June 2016. At the
Committee identified within the dossier, same time, Fusion provided updates-
almost all are attributable to Russian or approximatety weekly and usually orally- to
Russia-based sources, such as: a "senior • 1A - recalled
Russian governn,ent figure," a "senior receiving some of the information later
Russian leadership figure," an "official close included ln the dossier ' 1maybe late June,
to [the] Russian Presidential early July. ". - exchanges with Fusion
Administration," a "Kremlin insider," a were not one-way communications: he
"former top Russla1"1 officer," a "senior specifically recalled directing follow-up
Russian financial official," a "senior Russian work on lnformalion eathered by Steele.a.1r;
Foreign Mil\istry figure," a 1'Kremlin official Elias recalkid persont1lly bl:tlng briefed by
involved In U.S. relntions," cind a "former Steele on his findinf.ls d~iring a late
top level Russian Intelligence officer still September or early October meeting at
active inside the l<remlin." 31w office and
(U) The Committee is concerned with formed the impression that ''the Fusion

the degree to which the Kremlin may have foll<s thou~ht jt was important t hat Mr.

sought to influence information that was Steele hear from me directly that I was

ultimately provided to Steele-through the aware of his work and was appreciative." 3n

.Potential provision of disinformation or The Committee requested

otherwise-consistent with its ongoing records related to this meeting1 but the firm

efforts "to undermine public faith in the US wc1s not able- to locate any. 315

democratic process ... .11310 In addition, the ( U ) . led regular briefings that
vast majority of witnesses the Committee contained Steele's Information for senior
interviewed, includinEIII, did not know Clinton campaign staff, which included
the Identity of Steele's sources:" Steele Clinton campaign m a n a g ~ r - and
declined to testify before the Committee, 9
campaign chairman John Podesta .31 -
and the two witnesses who cialmed to 1
also began ' relaying ... information
know some of Steele's sources-Simpson received from Fusion GPS to the DNC . ..
a n d - , a former U.S. around . .. conven tion time."
Depvrtment of State offic.lal-decllned to
identify them:m


1. HPSCI, · 1nrelligenve Committ$!; Chairman, Ranking Me moor Establish Parameters for Russia lmre:otigot.on,~ httru:/l
!J.m:.li'icl:!'lce.hou!e.eov /nev;sicoc..rm•"'ntsinglea:s!li?DOClimen;:1~767, Mar. 1.1, ::>.l)l.7.
2. HP-SCI, Ex2cuti1ie Session lnterif.sw of Jefferson 8. Sessicns, Nov. 30, 2017.
3. HPSCI, executf,,e $eS,s!on lnt~-iew of Don ~rd f n:m p, Jr•• !)~::.. 6, 2017; HPSCI. Executr,re $e$slon fnterviev, cf Jeffe.rson B.
Sessions. Nov. 30, 2017.
4. H!K.,CI, Execufi,,e Ses.sian ln1i:l'~ w oflefferson B. Ses-.slcr.s. Nov. 30, 2017.
5. HPSCI, E>?-cutive: Session !nt.<:Pliew of !ared Kusimer, July 7.5, 201?.
6. HPSCI, · 1wssi.1n Aclfve Measu t~ During the 2016 Election Campaign," May 23. 2017.
7. HPSCi, .,,... I\Ussian Active Meawres Ounng the 20!6 Election Campaign;" Mav 2.3, 2017.
8. HPSC!, &.ecutiVe Session fntetvie\'1 afJames Clapp,;r, July 17, 2017.
9. HPSC!, Executive Session rnter\'iew cf James Clapper, Ju~'( 17, 2017.
10. HPSCI, E.-.:ecutive Session Int~ ~ ... of Donald Trump,.:!,., Dec. 6, 2017.
11. HPSCI, o:ecutlve: Session lnteIViE't/ of Michael uihen, Get. 24, 2017.
li'~ HPSO, ~cutlve Session !ntenne,., of Michael Cohen, Oc.t.14, 2017.
13. Morgan, lewis & Bockius UP, Letter fro m Sheri A. Dillor. ~mi Williom !'. Nelsof\ to President Don<1ld J. Trump. Mat. 8,
14. HJ>SO, fxecudlli? Ses1ion lnteNicwof !\•1!chael Cohen, Ocr. 24, 2017.
15. H!7S.CT. Executive Se~sion lnte.-view cf Ike Kaveladze, lfov. 2, 2017.
16. I-IPSO. Execudve Sessron ln!el'VH!w~f lite KaYel;;d:ze, l-lD'1. 2, 2017.
!7. HPS.O, Executive Session lnter\'iewof Rob Goldstone Dec- 18, 2017.
18.. HPSO, ExecuUYe Session Lnter>Aew cf Rab Goldstone. Dec. 18, 1017.
1.9. HPSO, Executive Session lnter.iew of Rob Golc!stone, Oec.18, 2017; HPSCI, uecutw.: Session Interview of 1-1:lidiaef c~
hen, Oct. 24, ion.
20. H·Psa, ~utive S:asslon lntennewof I ke Kavcf.idz11, Nov. 2, 2017.
2..!.. HPSO. f:xecutive Session Interview of Rob GoJdsrone, Dec.18, 2.017.
2)_ Twitrer.@re.al DonaJdr,ump, .fune 18, 2013, 8 :17 PM.
2.3. BPSO, W!uttve Session ln,e1viawcf Rob Goldstone,Dec.. 1S, 20!7.
24. HPSO, EY.ecutfveSession lnter.Jiewof Rob Goldstone, Oec. 18, 2017.
2.5. HPSO, b.;;cutive Ses~lon lnt~vaf Rob Goldstone, Oec. 18, 2017.
26. HPSCJ, EY.ecutive Session lrm:rJiew of Rob Goldstone, Dec. 18, 2017.
27. H?sa, E.xecut:•1e Ses~lon lntecrviewof Keith Sdiiller, Nov. 7, 2017; HPSCI, £xe-cunve ~on Inte rview of Roll Go!dstone,
Dec.18, 2017.
2$. H!K...O, Executive Session lnt eiview of Rob Goldstone, Dcc. lS. 2017.
29. HPSCJ, &.ecut1•1e Session Interview of Keith Schiller, Nov. 7, 2017.
30. HPSO, becutive Sessicn ln~nf.e...,- af Y.eitk Schiller, Nc-1. 7, 2017.
31. HPSO. Executive 5'>....ssion lnt2n-ie'.v o~ Rob Goldstone, Oec. !8, 2Cl17.
~2. HP5Cl, Executive Session ln~e-.v af Oonalc! Trump, 1r., De~ 6, 2017.
33. !IPSO, &.ccucive Session lm:e.-vie-A' of Michaef Cohen, Oc-.. 24, 2017.
34. HP50, o:ecutive Session Inti::\~ "' at Micbae! Cohen. Oct. 24, 2017.
35. Hl'SCl, Execuctve ~e!.sian lnterv'~w of , Oec. 20, 2017.
36. HPSO, E.'<eeutive Session lntenr.ew of Michael Cohi:m, oa. 24, 2017.
37. HPSO. Executive S~~io!i lnteJ¥..ew of felix ~,er, Oec. 20, ::2017.
38. Text ME:SSaee: Exchange SetWcen Mtch<!el Cohen anci ~ Satar, De-:. 29-31, 2015. [FSHR001!2.-30)
39. .Email ftom f.elix Sater to Midael Colten, "fb1 :Puti11/Trump,~ No,,. 3, 2.01.5. [MOC-H-0©6921
40. Email from Felix Sater to Mii:hael Coho!!n, "Re:Putin/Trump,• Nov. 3, 2015. [MO.C-H-O!ID592]
41. HPSO, Executr,e Session lnterlievt of Dec. 20,·2.017.
42.. HPSO, E.xecutivo!! Session lntavlew of !)ec. 20, 2.017.
43. I-IPSO, Executive Session ln,eiviewof ,Dec. 2.0, 2017.
44. HPSO, &acutive S~sion lntan,i ewofMichael Cohe n, Cd. 24, 2017.
45. HPSCI, aecume Session lmsvlewof Mlchael Cohen, Oct. 24, l.017 .
46. Text M=age E."<diange Betw;....cn M~el Cohen ,md f ~ Sater,~. 3G-31, 2015. [fSHR00112-30] 1-l?SO, ~~u.ti•1e
Session !nte!"Vlew of Felix Saer, De-.;. 20, 20!7.
47. Text M=ge from F~lix Sater to Mi;:;hael Cohen, Oec. ~ . 2015. [FSHR00ll4·7.5J
48. Text Messaee from Felix Sate:< wMicllael Cohen, Doc. 30, 20:15. [FSHR00125]
49. €mall fea.m M ichael Cahen to imo@p.;:,res..s.i;ov..n,, QTnm1p TcweHvlos~ow,» Jan.14, 2016. {MC:H:- t-'r-0005!:-J}
so. Email from Michael Cohen to lnfo@prpre.ss.gov.t1.1. "Trump Tcwar-Moscow," Jan. 14, 2016. {MtlC-H-OIX\f.Su]
51. Err.all frcm Mkhae\ Cohen to info@p,press.i::ov.ru, 'Tn...'ITip Taw-er·Mo5cow," .lan.14, 2.016. (MDC· H·000690J
52 HIX.1J. Executive Session IntcN'.e.'./ of felix Sater, De~ .20, 2017.


53. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Felix Sater, Dec. 20, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen,
Oct. 24, 2017. .
54. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, Oct. 24, 2017.
55. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Felix Sater, Dec. 20, 2017.
56. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Felix Sater, Dec. 20, 2017.
57. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, Oct. 24, 2017.
58. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017.
59. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, Oct. 24, 2017.
60. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, Oct. 24, 2017.
61. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, Oct. 24, 2017.
62. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017.
63. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017.
64. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017.
65. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017.
66. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017.
67. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Letter from Sheri A. Dillon and William F. Nelson to President Donald J. Trum p, Mar. 8,
68. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017.
69. Eliot Cohen, Bryan McGrath, et al., "Open Letter On Donald Trump from GOP National Security Leaders," War an the
Racks, Mar. 2, 2016.
70. Daniel W. Drezner, "Why can't Donald Trump close the deal with any foreign policy advise rs?," Washin gt on Post, Mar. 9,
71. Missy Ryan and Steven Mufson, "One ofTrump's foreign policy advisers is a 2009 college grad who lists Model UN as a
credential," Washington Post, Mar. 22, 2016.
72. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jared Kushner, July 25, 2017.
73. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017.
74. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017.
75. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Walid Phares, Dec. 8, 2017.
76. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017.
77. HPSCI, Testimony of Carter Page, Nov. 2, 2017.
78. HPSCI, Testimony of Carter Page, Nov. 2, 2017.
79. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jared Kushner, July 25, 2017.
80. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017.
81. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of , Dec. S, 2017; - RNC National Security/ Military
Platform Sub Committee Proposed Plank on the Ukraine, Undated. [DENMAN 000012]
82. - RNC National Security/MIiitary Platform Sub Committee Proposed Plank on the Ukraine, Undated.
83. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017.
84. HPSCI , Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017 .
85. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of , Jan. 17, 2018.
86. U.S. v. Paul J. M anafort, Jr., and Richard W. Gates Ill, "Superseding Indictment" (1:18-cr-83, East ern District o f Virginia),
Feb. 22, 2018.
87. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of , Jan. 17, 2018; Alexand er Burns and Maggie Haberman,
" Donald Trump Hires Paul Manafort to Lead Delegate Effort," The New York Times, Mar. 28, 2016. ·
88. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of , Jan. 17, 2018.
89. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of , Jan. 17, 2018; HPSCI, Executive Session Int erview of Hop e
Hicks, Feb. 27, 2018.
90. Andrew E. Kramer, Mike McIntire, and Barry Meier; "Secret Ledger in Ukraine Lists Cash for Donald Trum p's Cam paign
Chief," The New Yark Times, Aug. 14, 2016; Jeff Horowitz and Chad Day, " Trump advisers waged covert influence cam-
paign," Associated Press, Aug. 19, 2016. ·
91. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Hope Hicks, Feb. 27, 2018.
92. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Hope Hicks, Feb. 27, 2018.
93. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Hope Hicks, Feb. 27, 2018.
94. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jared Kushner, July 25, 2017.
95. Email from Paul M anafort to , "Arming Ukraine," July 30, 2016. [Sessions production: 2016-07-30- Arming
96. Email from to Brian Jack, "Fwd: ukraine," Aug. 1, 2016. [Sessions production: 2016-08--01- Fwd: ukraine] ;
Memorandum from , "GOP Platform: National Security, Ukraine Amendment-Sequence of Events,'' Au g.

1, 2016. [Ses:sivns production: 2016-08--01- fw-d: Ukraine-ATIACHMEIIT MEi>.50-Ul:raine Arnendme::tt (l}.pdf]
97. M emo from J.D. Gordon,. ''GOP Pl~tfo,m: National ~rlty, Ur.r<ll ne Ame:~dment-Sc:quimce of Events,"' Aug. 1, 2016.
[DJTF1'00004693] !:ma:i from John Hemen--.·,,ay roJatre\• 0 . Gordon, "Ukrair:,e-~llised F(lfl'l't~t,MAug_ l, 2016.
98. HPSCI, Testimony of Car.er Page, Nov. 2, 2017.
99. DH.S and OOtJI, Jo;n r Src.tement from the Dep!1!!.-nen, off/t1me/01i d Sew.'TI'f mid Office of the DIre aor afNotionai lntr:lli-
gence on Eleetii:m .Security, t::tto.;;://yjww.drn..;zm·fns~·:s i20i~/lQ/Q7 /joint::StiiRrae:rt-4l eo;;rtm-ent- homei::o~~a •rip.,-and-
cff:,ce- director-nation::l, Oct. 7, 20.16. ·
100. HPSCl, Executive S=ion Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017.
lOL H?SCJ, Executive SBsron Interview of Jeffersan !l. S.."'55ion~. Nov. 30, 2017.
!.02.. Hf'SCl, Executive Session lntervf= of Hope Hicks, Feb. 27, 2018.
103. Mark Hencn, "'Trnmp; 'llOlle Wifdl.eak;.'" Tr.e Hili, Oct.10, 2016.
1.04. Ashl;iy Parkru- anc Da-.-id E. Sanger, "Dena.Id Trump Calls on Russia to Find ..!illary CEnton'.s Messing E~ils; The 1V2·;>/ York
Time5, July 27, 2016.
105. HPSG, Execut:iye S~:on lnteN~v,' of Matlh£!w F. Tait, 0 Li. 6, 2017.
106. HPSCI, Ei,;ec1:ti" e ScS>ion Interview of Hope Hid:s., f€!:J. 'l7, 2018; HPSCI, Ex=Jti>.,e Session Interview of Dorn,1Jd Trump, Jr.,
Dec. 6, 2017; H~Cf. Execudve '.!<?S$IC.1 rntel"..ri!lwof letf~rson 8. Session~, Nov. 30, 1017.
107. CIA, "Director Pompeo De!i•,ers Rem~rks c t CSIS,' hrt.::d/www.oa.gnv/~w:;;4lfo;m;;t;onhp;;edies-1esrmonvn 0l , -
saceches·te;timonv/c.omoco-<leilvers·r~mzrks-at-csis/ htn1I, Apr. 13, 2017.
108. U.S. v. George Papadcpoulos. "Stcternent of ihe Offc...nse" (1:17-cr-182, Oistr:ctof C!!lum!iia), Oct. 5, 20l7.
109. f m.iil from Michael ffyim to - July 15, 2016. (FlYNN HPSCI 00002980-8:!j.
110. Manu Raju a n d Jerer.r, Herb, ME:mall poln~ 1rump .:ampaign to Wikile.t.l:s dactJ~nts," CNN, Oec. S, 2-017.
ill. h.'!:>SCI, Eicec mve Se~o.~ I rview of Donald Tn..'llliJ, Jr., Dec. G, 20i7.
112. Em aU from ~o Donald J. Trump, e:t2!., ''Trump : AnotllerWll:il..eaks DNC Upload,NSept.14, 2.016.
113. Email from o IJooald J. Trump, et al., "Trump: Another \'!ikileaks DNC Uplo a d." Se;,t. 14, 2016.
[TRUMP _ORG_ l3_0...fit,Q1]
114. O!ive r D~rcy, aC NN corrects story on email w Trumps about W1kilea~.s.N CNN, De<. 8, 2017.
115. HPSCI; Execufa·e Sess!ot1 fn~n1iew of Dona!d Trnrnp, ;,., D~c. 6, 2D17.
116. HFSCI, Executive Ses:slan ln~entiew of Donald Trurni;, ir., Dec. 6, 2017.
117. H?-SC!, E~ecu tive Session !nteNiew of Donald Trurnp,ir.• Dec. 6.2017. .
ill. Direct Message from l.'Tii.'.ileaks to Donald Trump 1f., Sept. 20, 1016, 11:59 PM; Direct Message from Dcn?ld Trump Jr. to
Wckileaks, Sept. 21, 2016, l l:50 AM; Direct Messar;e from Wikileaks to Do.,a!dTrump Jr., Oct. 3, 2015, 1:25 PM; Direct
Mes.sage from Do9ald Trump Jr. to Wikileaks, Oct. 3, 20l6, 3 :0! PM.; O:rei:tMessagc from Donald Trump Jr. to Wik-·
il£aks, Oct. 3, 2016, 3:03 PM. [Dm R01265-65.j
1.19. Ok ed Message from V.'ikil.eaks to Donald Tromp Jr., Sept. 2.0, 2016, 11:59 i'M; Oilcct Me ssage from 'Niki!.cal-s to Ooneltl
Trump Jr., Oct. 3, 2015, 1:25 PM.
12<}. HFSCI, Executi~·e S~on lnh!r,ie:w of Donald Trump, Jr., Oec. 6, 2017, p. 101.
:l2'i. Direct Message from l!J'ib1.eaks to Oonald Trump fr., Sept. 20, 2016, 11:59 PM. [OITJR01265]
122. Direct Message from Dooald Trump Ir. to INikileaks.. 5'.!pt. 21, 2016, 11:50 AM.. [DJTJR0126~j
i23_ KPSCJ, Executive Ses,ii!)n lntenliew of Dona!c Trump, Jr., Dec-. 6, 20l'l'.
1£4. Email from Conald Trump Jr. to Keflyanne Conw.1y, ct al., "Wil<i!!!aks," Sept. 21, 2016. [TRUMPORG_11_0000007J
125. Email horn Dona ld Trump Jr. to Ke:llyannc: Conway, et al., ~Wikl!eaks," Sefrt. 21, 20l6, [TRUMPORG_l i_OOC'(JOO?j
126. !-;?SCI, Executive Ss5i:>n tnterliew of Hope Hlcks, ~ . 27, 2018.
127. Direc t Me!>sage from 't .ftkileak.s to Donald Trump Jr., Oct. 3, 2016, l:25 P~- {OJTJR D1265-66J
128. Direct Mern,ga.frvm C-or.ald Trump Jr. to \Vikit.eaks, Oct. 3, 2016, 3:01 PM. !OJTJR01266]
H 9. Dr:ect M~ssage from Donaid -Trump Jr, to \"d'iidlea!::s, Ott. 3, 2016, 3:03 PM. {DJTJR01266]
13u. HPSCI, fxa:lltivc Session lnte.Niew of Donald irump,lt., Dec. 6, 2017.
131. Direct Message from Wi'.~il.eaksto Donald Trump Jr., Oct.12, .20!6, 8:31 Al•t {DJTJRO:i267]
132. Orrecr Message from w r,<lteai<s to Donald Trump J(., Oct. 21, 2Dl6, 9:46-9:5?AM. [OJTJRD1267-69]
133. Direct Message from Wikil.eaks to Don;ild Trurr.p Jrv ,J,'.)v, 8, 2016, 6;35 FM. [D1TJROU6i:'-7 0] ·
134. Direct Message from Wi"ollleaks to D0n;1ld Trump 1rv Nov. 9, 2016, 12:49-12:51AM. !DJTJR01270]
:135. Direct Mess2g12 from >M~ileaks lo Donald Trump k, 02c. 16, 2016, 12:38 i'M. [0JrJR01271]
13ii. Di;-.;ct M ~ssage from l;'.Jiklte.:ks to Don;1ld T; ump Jr.,.Apr. 26, 2017, 12:0 l AM. {DJTJR0!272J
B7. Direct Message from \,V'oole.1ks to Donald Trump~., .lu:y 11, 2017; 9:2.9 A.I\~. {DJTJR0121S-74j
~ HPSCJ, Exs!cul:i·,•e Sess,on lntet·.<i;;;w of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017.
i39. H!}5(l, Exectrtiye Session lntet'\'iew of Donald Trump, Jr.• Dec. 6, 2017 .
140. n1'5Ct faf!CUtive SeSQo:1 fn terviaw of Ale,ramle~ tux, tl,;c. 14, 20!7.

I'. - -·-- .,,

?.41. fmail from Alexander NI.~ to F~:er Sciwn!lz.er, et al.. "ne: Rernernh-er m e? I h;1•1e ari idea !:O v/in; t.ug. 26, 2016.
142. HPSCI, Eltec;:uthc.e Session Interview of Alexander Nr,;, !;;c. 14, 20,-7.
143 . HPSCl, EltecutiV-2 Se!>sio..-1 lnten:iew oi-Ale>:~nrlet Nil: Ci:c. 14, 2017.
144. HPSCl, f~cuti,,e Sessicn Inte rview of ct. 24, 2017.
1115 . ~.PSCI, E:oc1:cutvc: Session lntervt<:w cf Alex~nder Nb:, O~c. 1-4, 2017.
146. ~iPSCI, E:tecuti~"e Sets1cm Interview cl A'e>!2rn:ler Nix, De.c. 14, 2017.
147 .1-i."SCI, !::xecu~ Sei.s:on lntervi~w Rci3er Stone, Sept. 26, 2017.
148. HP$CI, l:xer;ut'...-~ Se!.Sicn Interview cf !!oiler ~ one, 5-ept. 26, 2017.
149·. ..tP:SCl, ~cut',>,e Se55lon lnte.Niew o f Reger Stone,~pt. 25, 2.0l7.
l~G. HPSO, Executive Session lnte-rview cf Roger Stone, S2pL 26, 2017.
151. Ke nn 11th P. Vogel. "'Under Mueller Sc:1..-tiny, Cemocrath; O<inot Tony Pc-desta Restf;FIS from Lobb')--:n~ Firm,= Thl! Ue.w York
7imas, Oct. 30, 20l7; HPSCI, E:r..erunVc&:ssions lntet'#ie-,.v i;f :ohn ?Qd.,sta, fone 27, 2D17; U.S. v. Paul.J. Mc1nafor.. Jr., am:
liicr.arci W. G3<CS Ill, '"1.1:dJctme:nt" (!:!7-cr-201, District of Columbla), Oct. 30, 2017 (descrihing role of "Ccmparrv A" and
&CornpallY il·'}.
152. HPSC!, l:r.:-cut=<,te Session !nte rview !lf Roger Stone, ~pt. 26, 2017.
1.53. H?SC!, E.'<e cu I:!\'{: S~sion lntervi~w of !roger Stone, Sepi. 2 6, 2017.
154. Letter ftam R~rt C. !wschel to The Honor.. ble K. Michael Coo3L'Ja"t/, "'Re; Follqv, Up to Appearanc.e of P.cger Stone on
~p~eml;e-r 26, 2017, and Supp!em~l 10 May 9. 2017 ReQL:e.st to ~oduce {)('Cum:nts"' 04 1.3, Wi7.
155. i-li'SG, Exe-cut'...-<? Se.s.sio.-. Interview of Roger ~ne, 5<?pt. 26, 2017.
1SI>. Andrew Shike. ~~oger Stene, Tr.imp comldant, ackr.owledge:s 'in=ous' Twitter con•,er.;at:ion wi:th DNC hack~,,·
Wo,hirrgmn Tur.es, C\far.10, 2Gl"/; Hl'SO, Eicecutiva S=lon !., te,v:ew cf R.n ger St00<:, Sei:;t. 26, 2017.
157. Letter f:°<? m RO!!~rt C. Busche! to The Ho.,orat-!e K. ri.i"ocnael Coo,avr.,y "Ri!: Fcl!ow Ur, to A;i;,:ear.ir,,;;~ or Rogar Stfrne on
·Sep,em!lE-r 26, 2il17, and Supp!ement to May 9, 2017 ReqUo..st to Pl"oduce Documents~ Oct. J.3, 2017.
158. lette:- frcm Ro!:i-ert C. 6'..:schel to The Honor;;ble K. M"icr-aeJ Coo<1way"lle: rd low Up to ,!ip~atalla! of P..oger Stone on
S3pternt.er 26. 2017, and Sup~~ment to May 9, 2017 Reque5c to Prod~ 0...""'Cu=r:o" Oct:. 13, 1vl7.
159. 1-:PSCi, fo;;"tfrneny crf ov. 2, 20li.
iGO. .-!?SCI, Exccuti1.'c Sc~s:Jc11 lnte!'.i ew ot Jl;ifre~ Gordan, Juh• 26, 2017.
l6l. E'mail fmin Caner Page to Je!'f~ D. Gordon et 21., ·Re: Commencerrientfuidress, Oass of lOl&, rtew !;CDil()mic School
{NES.}. Ju;y 7, 2016. i:OJlFP000038921 H?SCI, .uecui:Wi: 5es.srcn fr.te:view m' .Jeffrey Gotrlon, July 26, 2017.
162. HPSO, Te~mo., 'f o f - N o v. 2,. 1017.
163. i-'.i'Su, &.ecum.'2 Session ir;ten..;ew o; .reffer:son B, SQ>ions, Nr;-v, 30, -!017.
164. E.m;iil fr-0m Caner Pa~e to Jeff:"ev D. Gordon, Ter.:i Dal1I. and Walld Ph;ires, "Feedb-ad< from Rllssi::- Executive Surruna:y,:
July 8, 2016. [Dfl FPOOC'<l4023-24]
165. HPSCI, Testimany of Car.:er Page, Nc'V. 2, 2017; Jos.'I Rogi11, "Trumi::;'s Russia acMs~ speaks out e2lls = ~ t ions
'canmJetc gar~ge.''' Wo,h/ng!on Pasr. Sept. 26, 20!6.
166. HPSO, Testima,ly of Car~r Pag~. Nov. 7~ 2017.
167._HPSQ, RU$sla A..rtive Measur~ l.mest!gadon, /.1.ar. 20, 2017; HPSC!, Te.stimo:iy of Camu Page, NC'1. 2, 2017.
_168. HPSO, ·Russia P.ctive Me,m.rres lnlle5tigation,M Mar. 20, 20.17.
16~. HPSQ, Testimony O! Car.er Pase, Nov. 2, 2017; Josh Ragin, "frump's Rus.sia acMse.r speaks out, calls a cc~ations
'wmp!et: g~ rh;:ge; Wa..hi1Jgt1:1n Past. Sep. 25, 20:i.6.
!."ID. P.PSCI, Testirr,o:r>' of Caner Page, Nov. 2, 2017.
17'.l. Sha rOll larra nl€.re, Mark Mau£ttf, and Matt Apuz20, gi-low the Rus:sfa lnqu'u-y Beg,m: A Cam!)a ign Aide, Drinks a nd ialk of
Pclltical Olrt,» V.!ashingtr:;n Post, Dec. 30, 2D17; Err.3i! frcm Jah11 tvlashburn to Rick Dearb:::rn and Jeffrey 0 . Gordon, »?.e:
Tra'lel re:imbursce rllent ~ceived emai1 from Michael G:aSSllcr],"" J1..r:i:e 24, W:iG. [ DJTFPD002i91<lJ
172. E!nail from Gecrge Paµacopaulos ! t ai., ~Re: Meedng vilth Russian le.adershi]:o-induding
Putin/' Ma~ !)JTfPOOOlOill-12] .
!"!3. Email frornllllllllllll!lo Geotg~ Paparlnpm.:los ~t a l, "Re: ME-etlng with Russian ieadersl-tij)-lnduding Putin,· Mar. 24,
2016. {DJTFPO,Jill.01B]
1.74. Entail from Ge;:,1ge Pap.:dopo~'.os t c - t al. ~Re: M ~ting with Rcssian Rade~.shi;l-in.duding !'-Jtin,": ~-~ar. 24,
2015. ~D:TfPG-J.OlOlilj
l 75. HPSCJ. Executi.-:! Session Interview of JEffersc-11 5. Session~, Nov. 30, 20l7.
l"IG. HPSO, f;,:ecuti\.'e s~ssjon lntenr~w cf .leJfers1J11 B. Se£Ian>, ~~ov. 2tl, 2017.
i77. HPSC, C!:CLJtive S~ssian lntentiew ;:,fJe.-'fers:;;n B. Sessions., Nov. :W,- Z0.17.
17S. }-:il$CI, B,.;wti-.•e Session l ritt"!f'Jt~W oi J«fersot1 B.. Ses$!oni, Nov. .JO. 2017.
!79'. i-!PSCJ, Elrecutive Se~iM lnter..<ie•N o , DE-C. 8, 2017.
!80. HPSCI, 5.ecutl\<.:! Session lnter.-iew of Jr., D.;c. 12, 2017.
181. Sharon taFraniere, Mar'.: !J,a.rzctti, a nd Man Apuzzo. "1-f.owthe Russia !oqu[T'f .Sega11: A Camp;;ig11 Aide, Drinks an(! Ti!U: of

Political Dirt," Washington Post, Dec. 30, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session lnter•~iew of - e c. S, 2017, ,:ip. 79-
80; E1nall from Goarr,e Popadopoulos 101 l"Tr.:insltton," Nov. ll, 2.016 {"I made the lntroduct1oo between l~r
Trump [a)l,d presitlcnt 5!sl bu5ed pr!morlly on the trvvt the ronior, h~i M rHY wo,'$: otc." ) [DJTFP0002117Si1]
182. Lou Dobbi, Interview with Oon,Jld Tr11rnp.Fc,x 811s,·11ess, Sept. 22, 2016.
183. Email from Georse PijpijOOJ>OUlos to Paul ManijfOrt, "Fwd," May. 21, 2016. [GAT-HPSCl-0000025B]
184. Email from George P;ipadopou1osto Paul Mar,afort. "Fwd,'' May. 21, 2016, [GAT-HPSC1·000002S8·SgJ
l8S. E:m.:ill from Paul Manaiort t 'Fwd," May. 21, 2016. [GAHiPSC:1·00000:!SB)
186. En,all frt>1'r1 P~ul MoMfort to 'll a:H M.i~·. 21, 2016: (GAT·MPSCl·OC0002SSJ
167. Email from George Papadopou os o re Dtrnrbom, "Trtwel reimbursement {received emiill from Mld,~el Gl3s5ner),"
June 24, 7.016 [OJTf P00022915-16}
1SS. Email fro nd Jeffrey D. ~ordon, "r-WD: Tra'lel reimbursemem (received email from
Michael Glassner)," June 24, 2016. [DJTFP00022915]
189. Emilll from ind Jelfroy D. Gordon, NIie: Tr.wol reimbur~ormint {rc,1,1lvod urnnil fcom
Michat!I C31.is~n,u)," JuM :.!4, 2016. [OJTFP00022~1S]
190. Emallfronj o George Papadopoulos, "Re: Travel reimbursement (received email from Michael Glassner),"
June 24, 2016. [DJTfP0002291BJ
191. Email f r o m ~ Georgl! Papa<;lopoufos, "Re: Trave!I reimburS!!lll4'rlt (reci,iv!!d l!ffiail from Micha!!I Glasrnl!r),"
June 24, 20 ~29181
192. HPSCI, Executive Se~slori Interview of Rob Gold~tone, Dec. 18, 2017; Executive Session lritervlewof Donald Trnmp, Jr.,
Dec. 6, 2017, Email from to Rob Goldstone, "FW-Message-from '26-Cople r·E>:ec,'" Apr. 25, 2016 (p;;s5ing
along haodwritten response from candidate Trump to email from Aras Agalarov) [RG000033i
193. HPSCI, Erncutivl! S1,s,sion lnt!!rview of Rob Goldstone, Dec. 18, 2017.
194. HPSCI, E~etutive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. G, 2017,
l9~. rll'SCl, l!J<ocv ti•;<r ~stlon lnt"rvluw of Roll GoldslOnu, Due. 18, 2017.
l96.'Emall 1rorralllllllllllao [REDACTED], 11 ~rom the otriceof DoMldJ . Tru mp,"' Mn.-, 18, 2016 (passing a long ha nd·
w ritten r e s ~ t e Trump to typewritten note from Aras Agalarov) (DJTJR00408·09l; Email from Rhona
Groff to Rob Goldstone, NFV1,i-Mesx1ge-from '26·Copler·E.:<e1:,"' Apr. 25, 2016 (po.ssing along handwritten re5ponse from
p,ntiicfott: Tr\1mt1 to em.iii from AriJ$ Ag~laro11J [RG000033)
197. Email irom Rob Gold~tono to DcrniJld Trurnp Jr.; ~Ro: no : Rus5ia - Clinton - prlv,1tc and crmAdemial," Ju ne 3, 2016.
[DJTJR00464} .
l'il8. Email from Donald Trump Jr to Rob Gold~tone, " Re: Russia - Ointon- private and confidential, 0 fone 3, 2016.
199. Em.i ll from _Rob Gold1tone to Oon;Jfd Trunii, Jr., "Re: Russia - Clintorr - privati, and co nfidenti<JI," June 7, 2016.
200. l:mofl from Donofd Trump Jr to Rob Goldstone!, "Re: Russt.i -Cl Into~ - private and conft<fo11tfo l," June 7, 2016.
201. HPSCI, l::xe!culivE! S-=5s1on lntervil!v,• of Ike l<ave ladze, Nov. 2, 2017.
202. HPSCI, E~ecutive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr,, Dei;, 6, 2017.
2.03. HPSCI, Excic1.1tive Se~5lo11 lntcr•,lcw of Dorinld Trnmp, ,Ir,, Ocr,. 6, 2017,
204. HPSCI, ExuculiVI.! SC!~SIOrl lnl1Jr•Jl1Jw l)f Rab Goldslono, O~c. lR, 2017.
20S. HPSCI, E~!!CLHiv~ Si,s.sion lntE!rvlew of Rinat Akhrlll!tshin, Nov. 13, 2017; HPSCI E:tecutive Se:;.slon Int erview of Anatoli
Sam ochornov. Nov. 28, 2017. ·
206. HPSCI, Executive Session lnter'lie•!v of Ike Kaveladze, Nov. 2, 2017; Sharon la r-ranieri! and And rew E. Kramer, "Talking
Po!r,ts Brought to Trurnp Tower M(!1.t11,,g Wt!rn Sha cl!d With l<r1irnlir)," Tl) (! Now Yorr. Times, Oct. 27, 2017. 8ns<.id on pub-
lie reporting. Vc~lolt~knyn prcvlomty shurcd n version c,f the memo or t alklni,: points with Yuri Chnll<a.
207. HPSCI, h~cutive Stt5sion Interview of Ike Kavel.iclze, Nov. 2, 2017; HPSCI, Executive 5e5sio n Interview of Rlnat Akhmet-
stJjn, Nov.131 2017; HPSC I, E.xecutlve Ses~lon lntE!l''i'l!!W of Anatoll 5nmoehornov, Nov. 28, 2017. ·
208. HPSCJ, E.xecutive Session lntel'View of lke Kavl!Jadze, Nov. 2, 2017.
209. HPSCI, Executive Ses~ion Jriterview of Oona Id Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017.
210, HPS<:I, l:1«m1t1vo Session lntel'1lcw of Analoli S3moc1X>rnov, Nov. 2~, 2017.
21i. HPSCI, E:tl.!Cutive Session lnlel'1lew of Ike Kijveladze, l~ov. 2, 2017.
212, HPSCf, Executive Se.5sion Jntel'V[e•.v of Ike Kavcladz!?, Nov. 2, 2017; HPSCI, EKE!Cutive S!!!>Sion lnt1<r•Jiew of Donald Trump,
Jr., Dec. 6, 2017; HPSCI, l:xecutive Session Interview of Anatoli Samochorno11, Nov. 2B, 2017; HPSCI, Exe~utive Session
lnteiview of Rlnat Akhmetshin, Nov. 13, 2017; HPSCI, Ex!!C1,1!ive S,m ion lnl.l!rvi!!w of Rob Goldstor,11, OE!c.' 18, 2017
213. HPSC I, E>:ccl11ive Sc~~lon Interview of Ike Kaveladze, Nov. 2, 2017; lir-SCI, Execunvo Sa~lon lntorvl ~w oi Oon~ld Tr-urn1l,
Jr., Dr,c. 6, 2017; Hl'SCI, Executive 5cS$IOn Interview of Amrtoll S..~rnochornov, Nov. 28, 2017; HPSCI, Execl1tivc Session
lnteN lew of J<1red Kushner, July 2S, 2017.
214. HPSCJ, l:x!!cutfve Sesslon lntervl!!w of Rob Goldstor,..,, Dec.18, 2017.


. ..., - ,-,,,
21S. HPSO, e")(ecutive Ses.slo1,.lr.te.n:few of Roh Goldstone, flec.18. 2017.
216. Text r..,1es.sage Exchange Betv.een lar~ Kushne:-,;nd 1'4ul ;".1an.;;.furt, June 9, Wl5. (!'lHPSCTOOD0014Sj
i17. 1-iPSO, E,cec utive S-essiol) lntr:tvlew of Jared Kushne.r, July 25, 2017.
218. !IPSO, &.ec1Jtfve S£ss,on ln:enii-ew of Donald Trump,Jr., Oec. G, 2017.
:?J .S'. HPSQ, E;icee:.itive Session lnt.etvl'i'!w of r.~e Kavaradze, ND'.'. 2, 2017.
220. HPSCI, &.ecutive ~IM lnt=..:Niew of L\:e l~vefadz.e, NQv. ?, 2017.
221. Email from Ike Kavelaoze to A. Ka~!adte, llRe: how are yo:i=," June 14, Z016. [K:C-i<AV_00-0201
222. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview o{ Ro h Goldstone, Dec. la, 2017.
223. HPSCI, Executive Se:sr~n tn~ew of Stephen &mncm, Ja:t. 26, 2 018.
224. Ryan Teague Beckwith, ~Read Dona ld Trump's Suhdued Victory Speech After \\finning Ne.w J2rsey,r. TIM£, !1;ne S, 2017;
CITl3il from Donald Trump l r to R!>l:t.Goklsto1,e, ~"Re: Rll:iSia- 0 1nton - pr,vate :mtl CCl'\fidential,~ Ju:ie 7, 2016.
225. HP.SCI, Executive Session lotcn<iew of Hope ~jicks, f-eb. 27. 2.018~ "full ;:rariscri;n: O=!d Trump NYC.speech on stakes ~f
.he election," POUTlCO, June 12. 2018.
225. lJRA, " 2016 NRA Ann\Jo l Meetings &Exhibits Fvll .EventSv..:oule." httos://v,•ww.-uaam.cn/rricdia{l641/dalJ·.r-e,eflt-
s,hedule.odf. undated.
227. HPSC:!, Execlltive S e . s s i o ~ o n o ld Trump, Jr., Cec. 6, 20l7.
228. email fm-m o - -'Russian b-;;;ckc!oor overture and dinner inwre;" May 16, ].016.(Sessior.s pt"Qduc-
.ion: 2016~ l } ~ r overture and dinn:r imite (35)]
229. ~al fro~ o . . . . . . ."Russlan hackdoorovertureanci dinner rn#te,• Ma)· 16, 2016. !Sessions iuoduc-
.icn: 2 0 1 ~ Ru~!.!an bacl'<door overtura .md dfrut.2r inYlte (:!6)]
23;1: Email fro~ ~ Russion b.ad:.door G',-erture and dinn.er irr,m,• May 16, 2016_ [sP..ssi= produc-
tion: :m.!.6-05-16--Re ~ r Olferrure and diMQf ln·~ltc (3.6)!
231. i:maif from ~ Paul Manafort, e t ~I., Rf'.\lrl; Russian backdror 01.reo~-re an.I di11ner invite/ May 17, 2016.
[Se~io.;, production: 2016-uS-l.7--twd Russian b~:doot o\·ertute and dlnr,er invite (28)]
232. Email from Jared Kirshner ~ "Re: Russian b.;;d:door avei:ture ar;d dinner mvi~e, u f\•lay 17, 2016.
233. ·EmaH!ro~ o- Ra: KY R~uecst,~ M~y 18, 2016. [Scs.slcm ?roducticn: 2015-05:18-~ KY Re-
-n. 17, 2018.
"Kr2mtin u;.-mEction;• May 10, 2016. [RD 000.078]
236. Email from '·'Kremfin Ccnnection,~ May 10, 2015. 1RD000078]
237. Email rrom "Krem!in~n..-wction;'' May 10, 2016. [ RD000078]
238. ~au fro:n "Kremfin Conneaion," Ma•/ 10, 2015. (RD OW078]
239. HPSQ, c.""<ecutive S<!Ss.fon lntetvi':.•,v o ~ Nm·. 30, 2017.
240. HPSCI, £:c~tSve Sassion lntel'.r.e·,v ~ ao. 17, 2018.
241. H?SQ, Exe-cutive Session lnter.icw of Oona Id Trump, Jr., Oec. 61 2017.
242. iiPSCI. &e,1Jti•,e So...,,fon lnte.rview of Donald Trump, Jr., o~ 6, 2017.
243. HPSCI, Exec-.itive Session lnre.-view of Donald Trump, J_r,, Oec. 6, 2017.
244. HPSCI, E.xecutwe S5.>Ssion int:2rvr'2w of Donald Trump, Jr., occi 6, 2017.
24S. HPSCI, a.~utiYe Sessi on lntciview of Jefferson B. SBslOlli. Nov.30.2017.
246. h"P50, executive Sess1on lnt.:n.·i:w of Jared Kllshner, J:ity 25, 2017.
247. HPSCI, EY.ecu Hve SP..5$ion Interview of Jarad Kushner, Ju~· 25, 2017.
248. HPSO, i:xe.:utive Session lnte'"'oliew of Jefferson B. Y-"-.$Sicns, Nov. 30, 2.017.
249. HPSCJ, &.erutive Y..5.Sion !nte.-view of Jeffecson B. S2S...eu>rts, Nov. 30 :io11.
250. F~e!1il Election Commission, "HiUart for America Disbursan<!nts t ~ o m 2.0!5-2016, w.,w,.fui'...§0'."; · JBS
Sthedule," July 16, 2016. i201 6-07-!6-Unlitled (15}- ATIACHMEN~ ~nSchedulewith Drop By (Saessior.s
Prod uctlon))
251. ·JBSSdledule," Jul,; lti, 2016.. (~ssJons Production: 2016-07-16--Uotitled (15)-ATIACH~~eNT JBS Conventbn Sc.h-edulc
"'ith Orop Byi
252. HPSCJ, Executive Session lnte;.,i !:111 of Jeffrey Gorcon, July 26, 2017; Courtney Omi>;.. DU5. Senator 8!)b Cor!:er S;:i-eaks at
Global Cleveland's Global Parmers in Oiplomacv Event." Grc,!Jalclevefa r.d.org, Jan. 31, 2017.
253. !6S Schaoule," Juty 16, 2016. [Sessions Production: 20!6-07-16-Untitled ( 15)-ATiACH~ ..ENT JBS Ccnve-nl!on Sdiedulc
·,•mh Drop B~·}
23ol. HPSCI, Exerutive Sasslon ln!~ -,.-,,;w of Jeffer,;on. l:L Sessions, l'Jov. 30, 2017, p. S6 i~l met '>'ilth him, as i recall. twice. rnere
w-i!S an ~cOLJn1er af.er I m;eccie a sp~ech at the Repubt~n Conventfon. .1 didn't-d":d.n't know he W2S golr.g to be ;;1ere.
~kE to .i nulll ber of ;;.mba»a<lors and other peep!~ and was standing in front en the poclum and h~ and l cilatted a


255. HP50. ExeC\JtiveSes io11 lrr.enri voi Jeffrey Gordon.July :25, 2DJ7. .
255. H?SO, T2:stimony of Nov. 2, 2017.
257. "JBS Schedule," July 16, 20iQ.. Sessi-ons Produaion: 2•Jla-07-15-Untitled (15)----ATTACHMENT JBS Conyen t;i;m Sdtaiule
\\rtth Drop Byl calendar ir"w it~ · Meeting with Russl~n Ambas.sado, Kislyak;" $£pt. s . 2016. [2016-09-0!!-."ieEtlng w lth
Russran AmbasEdc,r Kisl-,.ak]
2.58. Senator Sessions' Staff Noto, iID.ssian Ambassador," 5....~. 8, 2016 (Sessiom Suµpleniernal Protfuctiol\]; Caler,dar flwite,
«Meethg with Russian Ami:ass.,d.-;il iGsh•ak," Sept, 8, l016. [Ses.sii;;ns prO<;luciion: 201G-09-08- Me.,ting with Rllssicn
Ambas.sador Kistvakl,
25S. H?SO, loXecutive Session ln~-viewof J2ffetson B. Se.s.sic-.-.s, Nov. 30, 2017.
260. H?SO, Executive Session rntervie•Nof Jared Kusliner, Ju~ 25, 2017.
26L HPSO, £,cecutive Ses.s ion lnt!!r.iew of Jared Kushni!r, JL:t-; 25, 2017.
262.. HP5Cl. Executive Session lnten'iEv1 of Jared Kushner, ! u.'y ~5, 2017.
263. HPSO, 'Executive Session lr.renliew of Jared Kushner, July 25, 20l 7.
2.64. HPSO, Executi'Je S1a?Sslon lnteNlew of Nov. 30, 2017.
265. HFSO, 81:ecutive Session lr.tcr.iiew of t\10'1. 30, 2017.
265. HP5Q, Executive s~ssfon lnt~rvlew of Nov. 30, 2017.
267. I-IPSO, firecutive Session lnt-cl\.-ie'o of Nov. 30, 2017.
268. HPSCI, E>:.ecuti'le Session lnreNiewof Nov. 30, 2017.
269. HPSO, ExE,cutive Sessiori l~ewof Jared Kushner, July 25, 20!7.
270. HPSO, T~-timony of l:.rik P(inc;'!, N!?~. 30 2017.
271. HPSO, Executive Sesslori ln!c1viewo. Jo,.,_ 14, 2.017.
272. 1-lPSCI, Execuw,e Session tm.,vie,•ro, Jvv.14, W17.
273. HPSO. Executive Sesslori ln~rvie1u o 'ov.14, 2017.
274. HPSO. Ex~cuti1Je Session lnta"~ , l.:n. 14, 2017.
275. HPSG, Executive Se.sslon lntel'llie>N o , 1c-\.'. 14, 2.0.17.
2.76. HPSCl, Executive Ses~ion lnterv',ew of .lake Sut!ivan, Dec. 21, 2017~ntral rot1:: In the dossfer was first re-.-ealed in a

of of-
pros a rticle. Adam Entous. D.:~lil Barrett, and Rosalind S. Helderm an, NCllnton camp;;ign, DrK paid for re.seorm tf-..;it led
to RU£Sia dossier.~ Woshll,gton Po:;;t, Oct. 2.4, 2017. Pn o;-to its pub!i.c.itk;n, £rras elected to reprcsent thre2 witn~es -
induc1ne form2r Clil\ton campaign ,chairman 1ohl) Podesta-before, the Committee In CO!ll'H!ction with this im'!!.;tiiration.
HPSO, :.,te~t!= Se~lon lrl!e......;ew John Pooeste, Jur.e 27, 20l7; HPSCf, Exea.,.iv<,S2Ssro11 lnte rvili!w
Aug. JD, 2017; HPS01 Execi.lti\R ~ sion lnterv~w ofYarlHi Tamene Wolcle-Yohann~. A ug. 30, 2017. Th.a!: decision was
q ~onable, since Eli,1~w as h.imselfin possession of facts relevant to. the Comm itice's inve.tig.ation. HPSCI, ~ecutive
Sessl:m Interview of Marc Ellas. Dec.. 13 2017.
277. HPSO, Executr,e Session lnteiview , 4ov. 14, 2017.
278. liPSO, Executive Session Interview or lo-1. 14, 2017: HPSCI, £.xewtive Session Interview crf ffinat Akmet·
sJ'jr~ !'.ov. 13; Jcel Schectman and Na " .S. sattles Russian money laundanng case," Reuters, May 13, 2017.
279. HPSO, Executive S~ssio n Interview tlov. 14, 2017.
280. HPSCI, &:ecutive Session lntcl"\/i~w o Nov. i4, 2017; HPSCI, E.xecuti...-~ Session lntel\llew o; Rit\at AI<met-
shin, r;cv. 13, 2017 .
2.81. H?SO, Executive Sessiol\ lm:l!!Me-.•1 of lov.14, 2017.
282. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of ~0'~.14, 2017; HPSCI, Exerotive Session l11terview of Rin.,""t Akhmet-
shin, Nov. 131 2.017; HPSCI, mcutive ,, oflke Kaveladze, Nov. 2, 2017.
2.83. HPSQ, Exect.'tive Ses~ion lnteNiew of
284. HPill, fxecuti11e 5.!ssion lnter...1&,,.1 o f
285. HPSCl, ~tive Session ,mervrew or
2.86. HPSO, ~ii-cutive Sesslon tnt&"'l.oie•,.,- cl 1
/;l'J . 14, 2017.
2fi7. fece-ral Election Commissloa, "'Hillary ·o c Dlshurs-=ments to P.erklns Cole from 2D15 to 2016", •M·.,.-J.!e<.:;:o,·;
H!X..CJ, El(ecuti',e Session irrtaview of e-c. 13, 2017.
288. HPSCI, &.a:cutive Session lm;,rvie-.-1 cf ec. 13, 2017.
289. HPSCl, Executive Session ln.t.En.1ew 11,t:.13, 1017.
2SO. HPSO, =x;Cuti'I~ Session lrrterview o: ec. 13, 2 017.
291. HPSCI, Execvtive Se.ssion trtteNiew of ~c..13, 2017.
2S2. HPSO, ExecutiVeSllssiOll l~ nria:wof et. E , 2017.
293. HPSQ, Executive Session lrlEMewaf c. !3. 2017.
294. HPSO. ~ cutiue S~ssion lcrtentmw ., 13 2017.
295. H?Sa, E.'Cecutive Session lritetvlew ec.12, 2017.
29'5. Miitth-ew Continetti and Midtoel Go! l':i and the Washington f ree Beacon.'' Washington Fri!e Beacon, Oct.


297. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of
298. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of
299. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of
300. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Nov. 14, 2017.
301. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview o f - e c . 13, 2017.
302. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of . Nov. 14, 2017; Mark Hosenba ll, "Ex-British spy $168,000 for Trump
dossier, U.S. firm discloses," Reuters, Nov.1, 2017.
303. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview o - Nov. 14, 2017.
304. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview o . Nov. 14, 2017.
305. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of ec. 13, 2017.
306. Guba rev et al. v. Orbis et al., Defense, (Claim No. HQ17D0413, Queen's Bench Division), Apr. 3, 2017.
307 . HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Nov.14, 2017 (stating that, as a known ''former undercover British
Intelligence officer who worked In Moscow," Steele would not have been able to travel to Russia safely).
308. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Nov. 14, 2017.
309. Ken Bensinger, Miriam Elder, Mark Schoofs, "These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia," BuzzFeed News, Jan.
10, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of David J. Kramer," Dec. 19, 2017.
310. ODNI, Assessing Russian Activities In Recent U.S. Elections, Jan. 6, 2017.
311. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Dec. 13, 2017.
312. letter from Robert M. Weinberg to K. Michael Conaway and Adam Schiff, Aug. 21, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session Inte r-
view of Glenn Simpson, Nov. 14, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of David J. Kramer, Dec. 19, 2017. The Com-
mittee issued a subpoena to Kramer, but Kramer still refused to Identify Steele's sources. HPSCI, Executive Session Inter-
view of David J. Kramer, Jan. 10, 2018; letter from Lawrence S. Robbins to Representative Devin Nunes and Representa-
tive Adam Schiff, " Re: December 27, 2017, Subpoena Issued to David Kramer," Jan. 10, 2018.
313. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Glenn Simpson," Nov. 14, 2017.
314. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Marc Elias, Dec. 13, 2017.
315. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Marc Elias, Dec. 13, 2017.
316. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Marc Elias, Dec. 13, 2017.
317. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Marc Elias, Dec. 13, 2017.
318. Email for Katherine Ruemmler to HPSCI Staff, "RE: Production," Jan. 24, 2018.
319. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jake Sullivan, Dec. 21, 2017.
320. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Marc Elias, Dec. 13, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jake Sullivan, Dec.
21, 2017; Jennifer Palmieri, "The Clinton campaign warned you about Russia. But nobody listened to us," Washington
Past, Mar. 24, 2017.

I • •....., • ....., • ,,
(U) Chapter 5 - lnteUigence Communfty Assessment Leaks
l(ey Question 114: What possible leaks of cfas!;if/ed ;nformation took place re/c1ted to the In-
telligence Community's assessment of these matters?

(U) Leaks of classified information are chapter, leaks related to the Russian active
criminal acts, and have the potential to measures were already happening in 2.015
damage U.S. national security interests, at and 2016. For example, there were press
horne and abroad. Even more concerning reports regarding the hack of the DNC, as
is that the lives of IC employees or assets well as the potential hacks of pro-Trump
may be placed in danger due to unauthor- and Republican groups.~ Du ring this time,
ized disclosures of classified information. the Committee carried out a healthy dia-
Finally, when leaks of classified information logue, whlch included briefings, with the IC
come from congressional sources, such related to these matters as part of its over-
leaks jeopardize the effective oversight ro le sight responsibilities.~
Congress plays over the IC. Therefore, as
{U} In addition, this chapter covers
part of the Committee's Investigation, the
leaks of information about IC assessments
Committee reviewed lenl<s related to the
that were likely classified at the time this
classified ICA on the Ru ssli!n active
Information found its w ay into the press,
measures campaign targeting the 2016 U.S . espedally In light of the fact that the reaks
presidential election, focusing primarily on
reportedly came from government sources.
leaks that occurred between the IC's estab-
This chapter does not make any determina-
lishment of the CIA Director's. fusion cell I tion as to the accuracy or analytic integrity
and the publication of the JCA
of the information leaked to the press and
in January 2017. · subsequently produced in the ICA.
{U) On January 6, 2017, the DNI re-
(U} Finding #4-0: Leaks of classified infor-
leased the unclassified ICA. The ICA states
mation regarding Russian intentions to sow
that Russia conducted lts active measures
discord in the U.S. presidential election be~
campaign for the dual purposes of (1) sow·
gan prior to the election day-November 8,
ing discord in and undermin ing the U.S.
presldential election process, and (2} help-
(U} The leaks rel ated to Ru ssian inten-
ing elect Donald J. Trump by denigrating
tions to sow discord in the U.S. preside ntia l
Secretuy Hillary Clinton.' Unfortunately,
election took place prior to the November 8,
the publfc release of the unclassified version
2016 election, and notably, after the IC's
of the ICA w as not the first time that the
public had seen the IC's various assessments
establishment of the fu sion c e l l -
re lated to th e Russian aclive measures cam-
paign. Although outside the scope of this

Almost a week
later on October 7, 2016, the U.S. govern-
ment formally accused Russia of hacking
politi~I institutions, but did not attribute a
specific hack to the Russians. 11

(U) At the time of these lea ks, the infor-

mation contained within them was still clas-
sified. These leaks of classified information
endangered U.S. national security by reveal-
ing key information about U.S. Intelligence
capabilities to its adversaries, including as-
sessmen~s on adversary intentio ns. The
Committee finds the timing of these leaks
particularly concerning. These leaks hap-
pened during the early stages of the iC' s on-
going assessm~nt of Russian active
measures, thus permitting adversaries to
not only potentially di scover U.S. intelli-
gence capabilities, but also provided adver-

saries, including the Russians, the oppor-
tunity to thwart or manipulate the IC's on-
going assessment.

(U} Finding #41: Leaks of classified infor-

mation alleging Russian intentions to help
elect candidate Trump increased dramati-
caUy after the election day-November 8 1

5, 2016, the administration had not

acknowledged any attem pt by Moscow to
influence the election in favor of candidate

('I'S/NF) ~ However, four days later on Decem-

ber 9, Adam Entous, Ellen Nakashima, and
Greg MIiier of The Washington Post report-
ed that the CIA concluded a new assess-
ment that Russia intervened in the 2016
U.S. presidential election to help candidate

,. - r -. - Trump wrn the presidency, rather than for
the sole purpose of undermining confidence
in the U.S. e lectoral system.

(C/NF) (U) ln addition, on December 10, 2016,
fahn Walcott of Reuters reported that a U.S.
UNCLASSIFIED official familiar with the !C's findings stated
SECRET CIA ASSESSMENT SAYS _that as the 2016 U.S. pres[dential campaign
RUSSIA WAS TRYING TO HELP progressed, Russian government officials
TRUMP WIN WHITE HOUSE devoted increasing attention to assisting
candidate Trump's efforts to win the eiec-

~ r; ;,. ":J ....:!'lc~""('~ ~ ~ . , . . . , ~ ~ ~~~







Intelligence Community Assessment..

(U} During t his review, the Committee

found that leaks of potentially classified in-
formation permeated thro.u ghout t he media
(U) It is irnporta1:it to note that Evan Pe- both before and after the November 8,
rez, Jim Sciutto, Jake Tapper, and Carl Bern- 2016, U.S. presidential election. -
stein of CNN reported on January 12, 2016,
that President-elect Trump was briefed on
classified information indicating that the
Russians have compromising personal or
financia l information that the Russians
could use against President-elect Trump.39
The Committee's investigation revealed that
President-elect Trump was indeed briefed
on the contents of the Steele dossier and
when q uestioned by the Committee, former
Director of National Intelligence James Clap-
per admitted that he confirmed the exFst-
ence of the dossier to the media..:o

(TS/NF) ·-(1:f; In reviewing the various lea!<s both

before and after November 8, 2016, a trend
becomes e'~ident-prior to the election,
teaks of potentially classified information
focused on Russia's attempts to sow discord
with the U.S. presidential e~ection. -

(U} Finding #42: The leaks prior to the clas-

sified Intelligence Community Assess-
ment's publication, particularly leaks ot-
curring after the U.S. presidential election,
correlate to specific language found in the

I. JP 11,-.~ -· ---:-- ..., . . ' .. . - .. •. -~ ~!'"-...'\

lro@~tillfl1:mtfutn1Ll©1:fl:&~.wll:r£r.il~Mt~ .d
Artide Quotes in Article that Mirror ICA Final ICA Findings
"Secret CrA ;issessmrmt says Russia was trying to : "The CIA has concluded In s secret assessment that Pase 1; "We further asses~ Putin and the Russian Govern-
help Trump win White House" i Russia intervened in the 2016 election to help Don-. ment developed a clear preference for Preslclent-Elect
• Date: Doccmbor 9, 20l6 aid ~romp win thl? 11residcncy, rot her th.in Just to Trump."
• Outlet: me Washington Post I undermine confidence in the U.S. electoral system,
laccording to officl.lls brkifed on the mmer."
I . -·· - - -- - ---, - - - - - - -··-----·---
·:·it Is Lhe a5sessmcnt.or the Intelligence community ,· &>age 1: "Nonetheless, Putin publicly lndlct1ted "preference

that RllSSla's BO.ii hero was to fnvor one ,::nndldate
over the other, to help l'rump get elected,' sald a
for Presfdent-cJoct Trump's stated poJJcy to work with Rus-
$ia, and pro-r<remlin figu res spolcc highly about what they
' .
senior U.S. ofllclal briefed on an intelll{lence presen- saw as his Russici-frlendly positions on Syria and Ukraine.

f:= tation m;ide to U.S. senators. 'That's the con~ensus Putin publicly concrrssted tfle Presldent-eJect's r,pproac{110
~ view.'" ; Russia with Secretory Clinton's 'aggres~lve rhetoric."'
::i: l

-- - I .
''Ru~sian Hackers Acted to Aid Trump in 1:lection. , '"We now·have hi~h con Viuence .that they hacked the I P.ige 3: "Russia collected on some Republlcar,-afflllate d
U.S, SilYS~ ; D. N.C. and the R.N.C., and conspicuously released no : taq~ets but did not conduct o comparable disclosure cam•
en • Date: Dewmber 9, 2016 ' documents' from the Repubf/can organfzation, one I pa/gn."
• Outlet: The New York Times senior administrc,tion officiitl said, referring to the
:::l Russi;ins."

Page 2: "We <"lSsess with high confidence thanh

;- ,r 'A.P.'r. 28,' Is believed to have creat- DCLuaks.com, and WJIOLl:a
ed two outletr. on rhe internet, Guccirer 2.0 orad ~ I I J P t£1lried lr1cyber operotf ons public·

DCLcaks. to make Democratic documents public. ! ly and in exclusives t o medi,i outlets.

Many of th!:! documents w ~re also provlcJud to Wik· 1

lleal~s, which releasecl them over many weeks be·

, fore the Nov. 8 election."

~ -- ,,r.:·.. -· - ~
. ..- · ==-1
·~ ·.
•- .f i t .'f.» . . - Pi . 4111!> .:p~! -~ ·v .. ;T;\--vll , -- . - ''4-·, ' - , • . J -_ J ' f!.ff:,t,.,...r,,==.,. , . 1 _..f L~ .:...':':' ""'.. ·-" •

. . .~.,
-...:, •...... m,c4::_w'..,illt~ml
. """
...-... ~ • •...
~!l(., . . • . . ' . .~-~J~iffl,. - .... ll ,_. ;~_,:, ··j{1"; . . .. .:

_. ________________ ____________
Article ,n ........,,... ;,. r.~.....
.. ··- - ·- - ____

1.... +-h~t, M:Y~n~ lf"I\ c· .. •:I• - 1-"3 I 1-1\
I frl-lrlfflr' !

"U.S. Officlnls: Putin Personally Involved ir'I U.S. Electior, ''Two seniot officials with direct access to the Page 1: "We assess with high confidence thot Hussian Pl'es-
Hack" information say new fntell(gence :shows tl,at ldcmt Vladimir P11tin. ordared an lnfluenco campolg 111ti
• Datu: Oocernl.>er 15, 2016 P11tin ,,ersonal/y dlrectad how hflclted moterlt:ll 2016 aimed :it lhe US prc~ldr.nti.'ll clr.ction ...''
• Outlet: NOC News I from Democrats was leaked and otherwise used.
iThe intellige~r,r. cam e from diplomatic sources
Iand spies working for U.S. allies, the officials
i said." 1
fl "Pul1n'~ obj~ellv.es were mul tlfDr.eted, u hleh· r;igc 1: ~Pul1n most like ly wnnted to discredit Socrut.iry

level lntelllsenc0 source told NHC News. What Clinton because he lw.v publ/cly blamed her since 2011 for
began as a 'vendettc1 1 against H{l/ory Clinton inc1iin(! moss pro,cst~egalnst hi$ regime ln l,He 2011 and
Imorphed into an effort to show corrupHon in I early 2012, and because he holds a grudge for co mments
m j American poHtfcs and to 'split oft ke\' American j' he almost certainly saw as disparaging him." ·
fl} I i!llles by creating the lmi'lge th.:it !other coun,
::t l tries] couldn't depend on the U.S. to be a credi- i Page 1: "In t ryir'lg to inftuence th e US election, we assess
; bl~ globi.ll ltii'lder unymort:,' th e offlclill said," : the J<rcmlin soucht t o i:!dv.irw: Its longstondlnr, dcslro t o
0 . undermine the US-lerl liberal democratic order, the pro·
;ll motion of which Putin and other sen i or Ru~sian leaders
view as a threat to Russia and Putin's regime."
z 1-- - - - ·- --- ·- - - - - - - - - - - - -- ·- - - -
lntel 11naly!ll sshows Putin il?proved election hacking" "'The intelliBCnce community hns a~scsscd that Pa~c 2: "We .issess that lnf:luenw carnpc1lgns m ~ approved
;;,; • Data: December 15, 20l,G , In ord er for this opera ti on to hove been execut· at the hi!}hest levels of the Russian Gavernme11t-
rn • Outlet: CNN ,.ad, It could not h,Ml L1een done without tM p(lrtic11l t1l'ly lhoso LhElt would be polillcoll11 sensitlv~."
J highest levels of the go11emment, lncl1Jdfn9 the
i President himsetf."' - - ___,____. --------···-·-····-· ---·--·
"Repqrt: Putin, Ru~sia Tri ed to Help Trump By "The un classified report doe~ not Identify who ; Page 3: "We assess wi th high confidence tha
'Discrediting' Clinton" transmitted the information or how. A senior layed mott?rial it acquired from the DNC ;ind senior Demo-
• DaLe:J :muory G, 2017 o1Acl.il with direct knowledge, however, told r.rntlc officlols to Wi!(Jloaks."
• Out lGt: NfJC News NOC News Thl11·sdny th at the U.S. has lde11tlftcd
the ftusslcm actors who turn ed over stolen Dem·
. ocratic rmiterial to Wikll..cal<s."
(U) Finding #43: Continued leaks of classi-
fied information have damaged national
security and potentially endangered lives.

(U) Finding #44: Former Director of Nation-

al Intelligence James Clapper. now a CNN
national security analyst, provided incon-
sistent testimony to the Committee about
his contacts with the media, including CNN.

(U) When initially asked about leaks

rel~ted to the ICA in July 2017, former ONI
Clapper flatly denied "discuss ling] the dossi-
er [compiled by SteeleJ or any other intelli-
gence related to Russia hacking of the 2016
eledion with joumalists."~5 Clapper subse-
quently acknowledged discussing the
"dossier with CNN j ournalist Jake Tapper,"
and admitted that he might have spoken
with other journalists about the same top-
ic.45 Clapper's discussion with Tapper took
place in early January 2017, around t he time
IC leaders briefed President Obama and
President-elect Trump, on "the Christophe r
Steele information,'' a two-page summary
of which was " enclosed in" the highly-
classified version of the ICA."

(U) On January 10, 2017, CNN published

an article by Tapper and others, which

claimed that "classified documents present- ty analyst:''
ed last week to President Obama and Presi-
dent-elect Trump included aHegations . ..
about Mr. Trump'' that were (1} "1?r1:=sented
in a two-page synopsis ... appended to a
report on Russian interference in the 2016
e lection" and (2} derived from " memos
compiled by a former British intelligence
operative.'" 8 Those claims were sourced to
"multiple U.S. officials with direct
knowledge of the briefi ngs."49 The next day,
Clapper issued a statement describing a call
with President-elect Trump in which Clapper
" expressed my profound-dismay at the leaks
t hat have been appearing the in press" and
" emphasized . . . that I do nof believe the
leaks came from w [thin the lC." 30

(U) The Committee assesses that leaks

to CNN about t he dossier were especially
significant, since CNN's report "that~ t wo-
page synopsis of the report was given to
President Obama and Trump" w as the prox-
imate cause of BuzzFeed News' decision to
p ublish the dossier for the first time just a
few hours later. Until that point, the dos-
sier had been "circulating among elected
official, intelligence agents, and journalists,"
but remained unpublished.52 As the accom-
panying article explained, " [n]ow BuzzFeed
News rs publishing the full document so that
Americans can make up their own minds
about allegations about the president -elect
that have circulated at the highest levels of
government." 5;
{U} In approximately early August 2017,
shortly after his t estimony to the commit-
tee, Clapper joined CNN as a n~tional securi-

1. Espionc.ga Act of 1917 {codr.:~ as amended at !8 U.S.C. §§ 793-7gSJ.
2. ODNI, Assessing Russ,·oo Activities mtd lntentior1s i"n Recen t US fledions, Jar\. 6, 2.017.
3. Ellen Nak-oShima, ~Ru:.sian Go~,;,..-nment Hackers Penetrat,;rl DI-IC, Stole Oppo-sition ~arch on Trump," Wa.hittgrot.
Post, June 14, 201.6; Joseph Menn, Mark f losenbal.1, and ; ohtl Walcott, "H ac!(ers Targettd Trump Ca mp,iig11, Re~uh!i::an
Party Groups: Sources,'' .'?e!.erers.. Au& 19, 2016.
'1.. HP-~, Staff Briefing on Cyb<?r Targ-en.ng of PolitiuJJ Parties, !une 14, 2016; HP.SO, Swfi' Briefing on Wi}.il;;a k5,ma
of Camp:2ig11 Systems, Aug. 3, 20!6; 1-!rSCI, Mernb~ Bri1=f.rig on Hussian C•1b;,r AcL,~ti~. Sept. 6, 2016; Gais of S
Briefing, "Russian 0 1•ber Acfu:ities, Sep;. 8, 2016.






11. DliS and ODNl,.'"Joint Stiltemem from the Department of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of Nanor.ai inte!-
lignncc oo Election Socurlty,"' Oct. 7, 2016.

15. -
16. Adam Entous, .Ellen Nakashlma, and Greg Mlller. wSecretOAA5s~ment Says Russia W,as Trting to Help Trump Win
White House;" Wczshlt1yton Pas!, oer:.. 9, 2016.



2!. John \-'Jal oott, "Russia inter,e ned t o help Trump-win .election: inte!lfgence officials;" R~urers, Dec. 10, 2016.












39. Evan Perez, Jim Sciutto, Jake Tapper, and Carl Bernstein, "Intel chiefs presented Trump with claims of Russian efforts to
compromise him," CNN News, Jan. 12, 2016.
40. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of James Clapper, July 17, 2017.


45. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of James Clapper, July 17, 2017.
46. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of James Clapper, July 17, 2017. Regarding his communication with Tapper about the
dossier, Cla.pper stated: "I don't know exactly the sequence there, but It was pretty close to when we bri~fed it and when
It was out all over the place. The media had it by the way. We were kind of behind the power curve, because the media,
many media outlets that I understood had that, had the dossier for some time, as did people on the Hill."
47. liPSCI, Executive Session Interview of James Clapper, July 17, 2017. Former CIA Director Brennan testified publicly that
the dossier was "not In any way used as a basis for the lntelll(lence Communit y Assessment." HPSCI, Russian Active
Measu res During the 2016 Election Campaign, May 23, 2017. However, NSA Director Rogers clarified that, In late Decem-
ber 2016, a two-page summary of the Steele dossier was "added" as an "Appendix to the ICA draft," and that his consid-
eration of the Appendix was "part of the overall !CA review/approval Process." Letter from Michael S. Rogers to the Hon·
orable Devin Nunes, Mar. 5, 2018. See also Evan Perez, "Blden confirms Obama, VP were briefed o_n unsubstantiated
claims against Trump," CNN, Jan. 12, 2018.
48. Evan Perez, Jim Sciutto, Jake Tapper, and Carl Bernstein, "Intel chiefs p resented Trump with claims of Russian efforts to
compromise him," CNN, Jan. 12, 2017; Twitter, @cnnbrk, Jan. 10, 2017, 2:13 PM (reflecting the story's initial pub lication
49. Evan Perez, Jim Sciutto, Jake Tapper, and Carl Bernstein, "Intel chiefs presented Trump with claims of Russian efforts to
compromise him," CNN, Jan. 12, 2017.
50. ODN I, " DNI Clapper Statement on Conversation with President-elect Trump," Jan. 11, 2017.
51. Ken Bensinger, Miriam Elder, Mark Schoofs, "These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia," BuzzFeed News, Jan.
10,2017. .
52. Miriam Elder, Mark Schoofs, "These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia," BuzzFeed News, Jan. 10, 2017
("originally posted ... at 6:20 p.m.).
53. Ken Bensinger, Miriam Elder, Mark Schoofs, "These Repo, ts Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia," BuzzFeed News, Jan.
10, 2017.
54. Transcript, "President Trump Takes Working Vacation; Analysts Examine President's Recent Poll Numbers," CNN, Aug. 7,
2017 ("Joining us now to talk more about this is CNN's new nationa l security analyst, James Clapper.").

-· - - ·--·11

(U} Chapter 6 - Summary of Related Committee Oversight Efforts

(U) During the course of the Com- change in policy w as necessary for the IC to
mittee's investigation into Russian active protect U.S. person privacy 13nd the sanctity
measures targeting the 2016 U.S. presiden- of t he peacefu l transition of presidential ad-
tial election, the Committee identified sev- ministrations, all ._•.,hile resulting in no oper-
eral issues within its jurisdiction t hat re- ational impact. As part of negotia tions of
quired additional attention and oversight the FISA Amendments Act of 2017, DNI
outside of the broader investigation. Coats and the White House agreed to devef-
Sufficiency of "Unmasking'-' Procedures op a new IC-wide policy for handling
" unmasking" requests. Therefore, on Janu-
(U) In March 2017, the Committee be-
ary 11, 2018, DNI Coats signed lnte!ligence
came aware of senior Obama Administra-
Community Policy Guidance 107.1 (see Ap-
tion officials' requests for U.S. person identi-
pendix 0), which includes requirements for:
ties related to President-elect Trump's tran-
sition team. These U.S. person identities • IC element heads or designee approval
were previously redacted in IC reporting. for requests for U.S. person identity in-
The Committee initiated its investigation of formation;
the ptoce.ss for requesting identities, collo- • Documentation for names or titles of
quially referred to as "unmasking," to deter- individuals who will receive the U.S. per-
mine the sufficiency of existing policies and son identify information;
procedures related to the release of U.S.
.• A fact-based justification for each U.S.
person identities. As a result, the Com-
person identity request; and
mittee recognized gaps in the "unmasking"
processes, including the lack of IC-wide • IC element General Counser concurrence
standards related to the justification for re- for U.S. person identity requests that

questing U.S. person identity information. relate to Presidential transition team

Therefore, the Committee's findings related members prior to those identities being

to these processes necessitated an immedi- approved for release.
ate change in policy.

(U} The Committee believed that the JC {U) Using a series of intermediaries, the
should use specific procedures related to DNC and Hillary for America {Clinton cam-
the "unmasking" of U.S. person identities in paign} pald a research firm to conduct op-
IC r~porting, including additional review re- position research on candidate Trump and
quirements for "unmasking" presidential his ties with Russia. Fusion GPS (fusion) is
transition team officia1s during a presiden- the trade name of a Washington, D.C.-based
tial transition. The Committee felt that a company that conducts research primarily

on behalf of corporate clie nts.2 Ma rc Elias,
chair of Perkins Coie's election law practice
w ho represented the DNC and the Clinton
campaign, hired Fusion in spring 2016 and
paid Fusion $1 million to conduct opposition
research on candidate Trump. Fusion sub-
sequently hired former British Secret Intelli-
(U) After uncovering this information,
gence Service officer Christopher Steeie for
the Committee voted to publicly release two
$160,000 to obtain information on candi·
memos, one written by the Majority on Jan-
date Trump via a Russia-based primary sub-
uary 18, 2018 (see Appendh( E) and another
sou rce and numerous sub-sub-sources net-
written by the Minority on January 29, 2018
work who were purported to be cunent and
(see Appendix f}. In additi'?-n to the.Com-
former Russian government officials. The
mittee's oversight of this matter, the Senate
information Steele collected was reported
Judidary Committee identified the same
back through a series of memos to Fusion
issues in a criminal referral sent by Chair-
and Perkins Coie. Steele produced sixteen
man Grassley and Senator Graham to the
memos, which comprise what has become
DOJ on January 4, 2018, describing Christo-
known as the Stee.Je dossier.
pher Steele's exploits in detail (see Appen-
(U) By the end of September 2016-in dix G}.
addition to Fusion and Perkins Coie-Steele
(U) Ongoing lines of effort include (1)
provided the information in the Steele doy
continued oversight of DOJ and FBI (see Ap-
sier to the DOJ, Department of State, nu-
pendix H for.relevant correspondence}; (2}
me;ous press outlets, and the FBI. -
inquiries into the State Department's han-
dling of information from Steele, including
the dossier;4 and (3} post-election anti-
Trump research by Steele and/or Fusion

1. ~-P- J:::78, § l.07, 115''' Cong.

2. HPSC1, "~.:utive Session Interview ofG!.:-nn Slrnp.son,n Nov. 14, 2017. . .
3. ,ne dossier; however, has ru:, fixed ccmpasltion. The version pubUshed by BuzzFeed doe; not net:essanly enr.rely corre-
spond with documents provfC:eli to oll'~ pattil!S.

4. !=crmer S..a,e Department cff.aal has stated pub!id\• that, over a pen..--o of approximate}; t,•ro years, he
providi:d ever 100 of Steele's teycrts with the Rus!:ia experts at the State D;;;:iartme..t,' i nc!u ding ;\ssistant &;cretary of

S12t~ V:ctoria Noland. In Se~"":'ll:)er 2016, Winer was personaUv briefed by Staele on the dossi~r, 2nd shared a two-pag;;
summar-., with r-£uland, Y.'ho en..cured th:a t Secret2iy of State John Kerry was m3:le aware of Steele's information. Addi-
"3onally.- -eceivetl from C!inmn associate nformatioo collecterl l:y an indi\'iciual named-
Shearenvhid, "alleged the RU3sians had compromisinR infurmationon Trump of a sexual and financial nature.· Winer
shared ,..;th r iriform.ition with Steele, wh;;i provided it to t he FBI. , c~..<in Nune:;
is lrr~stic.,ating me. H~re's the truth.," Washington PDSl, Feb. 8, 2018; Susart 6. Gia=, "Victoria Nu land: The Fu!J Tran-
scripr.• POUT/CO, Feb. 5, 20J8; A;:,per.dix G. Tne Committ~ believe, that additional State Deparrment offi~ were
.;1ware of Steele's efforts In 2016..
S. •,ho currentiy leads ~a research and inve-sttgatory ad>1isory" called the ?enn Quarter Group {PQG). ls a
former a:ipJoyee cf The Dasdlle G:-cup, U.S. Senate Select Committee on lntcltigence (SSO). and FBJ; while a~ SSO, he
serv~ ~ the "chief author" of "The Ccrnmitte-e Studi' of the Central lntefligence At;ffiqs Detention and lr,tef"Ogatt,111
P1oyan"_~ The Pclln Quarter GrOVJ), aour t.eade~hip, th~:1..:cq,/te,am/leaciershJO; Linlcedln,
N httns:i/
w\w1.h11<.:din .c.:itr1/in/danie!if~~s. tn late _March 2017, Jones met ,•Jlth FBI reg.anilna PUG, which M descr~ as
~exposil\3. forei8J1 influence in Woti:m elcctions.1111111 mkt, FBI that PQ.G was being funded by 7 t o 10 we:il!hy dortors
located prcmarily in New Vork and California, who provided appro:<imately $50 mil~on. - further stated tiet PQG had
s:cured th~ services of Steele, hi!. aucciatf! and Fus.ion Gi'S to roritinue exposins lwssian interforarice in
,he 201S U.S. !'residential election. -planned to sharalhe lnformalio,, he obtained ,.,.,i~h polieymalters 0:'1 Capitol Hitl
and with the press, and c1lso ofkred .:o provide PQG's e ntfre holdings to the F'31. f!B!. FD-302, Mar. 28, 2017.

{U} Chapter 7 - Conclusions and Recommendations

Russian Influence Campaigns in Europe (U} Russia exploits free media spaces

(U) For at least the la.st decade, Russia and open democracies through a neti.-vork of

has aggressively engaged in an information Russian state-owned news o.utlets and me-

war against the West. The Kremlin takes dia platforms. Those platfon-ns amplify pro-

advant age of the openness, freedom of ex- Russian views in Russian-funded and local

pression, and respect fo r legal norms en- media, provoke doubt and disagreement,

joyed in Western democracies by con- and propagate false news stories. In many

ducting targeted, multi-faceted influence Eastern European and Baltic countries, local,

operations against its adversaries. Each in- i ndependent media outlets often operate

fluence c2mpaign is unique to the populace, with extremely limited resources, limiting
media environment, and internal dynamic their ability to acquire and produce high-
of the country being targeted. quality con.t ent. In contrast, the high pro-
duction value of Russia-owned content pre-
{U} The factors that make Russian oper-
sents an attractiw alternative. Russian in-
ations effective also make them difficult to
telligence services or their agents of influ-
counter. Nonetheless, countries through-
ence also purchase, invest in, or partner
out the West are taking a variety of actions
with exlsting TV and radio channels, provid-
to impede, counter, and where possible,
ing editorialized content for redistribution.
eliminate Russian influence operations.
Furthermore, Russian p~opaganda is occa-
(U) The vast majority of Russian tactics sionally re-broadcast by legitimate news
share a common denominator: proliferation outlets.
through mass media. Therefore, thls chap-
(U) Strengthening legal .and regulatory
ter's recommendations primarily focus on
environments, promoting media pluralism,
ways to degrade the impact of nefarious
building professional media associationsJ
media activities and make them more diffi-
and improving the financia l sustainability of
cult to conduct.
legitimate news outlets will help to: in-
{U} Recommendation #1: European govern- crease access t-0 legitimate news reporting,
ments, non•governmental organizations, improve production quality and financial
businesses, think tanks, and academia sustainability of-local media, and prnfes--
should strengthen legal and regulatory en- sionalize journalists_
vironments, ·promote media pluralism,
(U) Countries that contain sizable ~us-
build professional media associations, and
sian-speaking populations are more vulnera-
impn:>ve the financial sustainamlity of le-
bte to the effec-t.S of media-enabled Russian
gitimate news outlets.
rnformation operations. As described

,..._ •JI
above, for many of these populations, Rus- bat Russian information, technica l,. and
sian media saturates local markets, provid- cyber operations.
ing few alternatives for news and entertain-
(U} Re<:ommendation #3; European govern-
ment and non-Russian editorial viewpoints
ments, non-governmental organizations,
{U} For countries with large Russian- businesses, think tanks, and academia
speaking populations, strengthening legiti- should jmplement more stringent cyber
mate Russian-language broadcasters and security practices., such as multifactor au-
independent media outfets that disseminate thentication and encryption of sensmve
fact-based content would provide both bal- data, as well as educating workforces on
ance to the media space and more viewing basic cyber s&urity topics and best practic-
options for r esidents of those countries. es.
(U} Recommendation #2.: European govern- (U) In the last decade, Russian cyber
ments, non-governmental organizations, operations have targeted governments, mil-
businesses, think tanksr and a.cademia itaries, industrial control systems, business-
should implement and encourage multi- es, think tanks, and universities worldwide.
pronged, country-wide efforts by both pub- Whjle Russian intelligence services can em-
lic and private entities to combat Russian ploy extremely sophisticated means for
propaganda, technical, and cyber opera- gaining access to sensitive data, often sim-
tions. ple tacti~s such as spear phisiling can prove

(U) Russia utilizes a \l'.'hole-of- just a$ effective.

government approach in its information op- (U) Given that cyber operations are rel-
erations, mobilizing a variety of tools to atively low risk/high reward, difficult to
achieve its goals. From hacking of govern- attribute, and even harder to consistently
ment nen•.:orks, think tanks, and universities combat, it is likely that Russia will continue
to spreading propaganda via social media, to utili2e this t actic in its influence C3m-
Russia 's tentacles are many and far reach- paigns. Network defenses have to b e right
ing. 1_0 0% of the time; a cyber intruder. o nly has

{U) It is therefore imperative that West- to be right once. Therefore, it is imperative

ern n ations implement country-\•Jide efforts that governments, NGOs, businesses, think

to educate its populations and inoculate tanks, ~nd academia invest more r-e.sources

their governments, media outlets, and other in cyber security-defenses, imp1ement more
organizations from Russian influence cam~ stringent cyher security practices, and con~

paigns. To do this, Western nations should duct regular workforce education and train-

encourage increased partnership between ing on these topjcs.

public and private entities in order to com- (U) Recommendation #4: European govern~


ments should look to long-term solutions
to lessen economic dependence on Russia .

.(U} Russia utilizes economic ties to its

advantage. Economic vulnerability - such as
reliance on Russia for trade or energy- can
be leveraged to change behavi-0r, send a
message of displeasure, or inflict punish-
ment. This is especially true for smaller
countries within Russia's periphery, such as
Moldova, where Russia is among their larg-
est trading partners. Yet even large, eco-
nomically secure countries like Germany
depend on Russia for a large percentage of
its energy needs.

'{U) The United States should look for

opportunities to lessen European countries'
eco·n omic dependen-ce on Russia. Exploring
alternative sources of energy and diversify-
ing trade relationships would diminish one
of Russia's tools for imposing influence on
its neighbors.

Russia Attacks the United States & America


(U} The Committee's findings contern-

ing the Russian government's malign lnflu-
ence campaign during the 2016 U.S. presi-
dential election are largely consistent with
the facts outlined in the IC~. The Russian

effort was multifaceted, persistent, and
effecnve in sowing division. The effort in-
cluded cyber operations (hacking}, the use
of social media, the creation of automated (U) Evidence reviewed by the Com-

accounts and fake cyber p_ersonas, the use mittee also shows that the Russcan govern-

o f third party intermediaries, and state-run ment and its proxies used social media to
media. advance Russia's malign interests. While


these efforts were limited - some even vulnerability. The- response of social media
came after Election Day-they were effec- platforms to this threat should be examined
tive at SO\.'!ing divisions within American so- closely and evaluated against ongoing
ciety and promoting false information. threats. Furthermore, social media

(U} America's reaction t o the Russian platforms should consider implementing

active measures campaign consisted of a m~thods to help counter malign foreign ac-
whole of government response, with vari-
ous activities conducted by the IC, law en- (U} Recommendation #6: Congress should
forcement, and policy ma kers. Despite ar- consider updating the foreign lntetligenc~
guably the best of intentions in addressing Surveillance Act to cover malicious interna-
the Russian cyber menace before and dur- tional cyber actors.
ing the 2016 election cycle, the Execu_tive
{U) As part of the Committee's initial
Branch's response fell short of deterring the
FISA Amendments .C\.ct reauthorization dis-
Russians from conducting such activity in
cussions in 2017,·the Committee sought to
the future.
address the changing threat environment as
(U) After analyzi.ng the Executive it relates to malicious cyber activitv
Branch' s responses to the active measure threi;iting the U.S. national security. Given
campaign, the Committee identified various the difficulty in attributing a specific cyber
gaps in current lai.v and policy that must be actor, the lines betv,een independent hack-
addressed in order to help protect U.S. elec- er and government cyber operator are often
tion systems and increase the efficacy of blurred. U.S. ad,Jersaries are consistently
victim notifications in the future. In addi- attempting to obfuscate their i~entity and
tion, the Executive Branch must diligently location in order to evade detection. Unfor-
inform U.S. presidentiaf campaigns in the tunately, current national security authori-
future of counterintelligence threats, to the ties are inadequate to counter the growing
extent consistent w ith national security and cyber threat.
law enforcement equities.

(U) Recommendation #5; Congress should

identify options aiJailable to the private
sector and federal government that would
address the social media vulnerabilities ex.-
plaited by the Russian government.

{U} The exploitation of social media

platforms by the Russian government for
malign purposes demonstrated asignificant



needed flexibility and will help keep the

United States ahead of its adversaries.

(U) Recommendation #7: The Federal Bu-

reau of Investigation shoufd improve
cyberatlack victim notification.

(U) When a state-sponsored cyberattack

is dire.cted against U.S. critical infrastructure
or systems rela ted to _n ational elections, i~ is
essential for the appropriate federal officials
(U) Unfortunately, the proposed addi-
to work quickly to both understand the na-
tion to the FISA "foreign power'' definition
t ure of the threat and aid the vi~m's de-
did not make it into the final version of the
FJSA Amendments Act of 2017 given con-
cerns that such a designation would dHute
the ·key distinction between two djfferent
legal purposes: intelligence collection and
law enforcement. This concern, while un-
derstandable! fails to take into account the
changing th reat environment, as evidenced
by Russian cyber actors, such as the Internet
Research Agency, that attempted to meddle
in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections.

{U} The-Commfttee renews its call for

Congress to update the definition of (U) Although the FBI maintained an on-
"foreign power" and agent of foreign pow- going dialogue with t he DNC related to the

er' in FISA to account for entities engaged Russian intrusions, the engagement re-

in international malicious cy'o er activity that mained at the-working level. These interac-

threatens the national defense or security tions continued for m onths, despite no signs

of the United States. Adding this n ew entity of effective mediation to the problem. In

to the definition of "foreign power' would

permit the IC to ta met intemational cyber
groups without having to connect that
group to a foreign government or terrorist
organization, so long as the C'{ber entity is • Director Corney testified that, had he
threating US. national security or defense. known at the time the seriousness o f the

Such an addition provides the IC with much - problem, he wouid have "walked over


there" himself. eL

{U) One way to implement these proce-

dures is to p rovide specific guidance to FBI
agents conducting victim notifications as to
the circumstao,es under which t he agent
should elevate the situation. Additionally, if
the cyber intrusion is attributed to a foreign
government entity and the victim is a politi-

{U) On the other side of the notification cal party or campaign, FBI senior manage-
ment should be responstble for victim en-
process, the Committee found that
gagement immediately.
cyberattack victim organizations did not a!- ·
ways grasp the information conveyed by the {U) The Committee therefore recom-
FBr, even when that information was rea- mends that notifications associated with
sonably dear. As a result of both govern- state-sponsored cyherattacks should be
ment- and private-sector failures, Russian conducted as soon as possible, and at the
Intelligence agencies were afforded critical highest levels of the victim organization. If
time on breached systems. During this intelligence sources and methods are
time, extensive amounts of data were sto- threatened by dissemination of information,
len for later use as part of Russia' s malign the IC should work with the Department ·of
influence campaign. Homeland Security (DHS) to p~ovide specific
recommendations on what actions can be
{U) While the DNC failed to handle the
taken by system owners to defend their net-
intrusions with the level of seriousness it
works from the state-actor. The DHS and IC
deserved-given the severity and national
should designate personnel and resources
security implications of the particular intru-
to carry out this task and should establish a
sets-the FBI should have engaged
triage system to prioritize tasking during
more vigorously at the senior management
periods of high demand.
level. The FBI cannot, and should not, force
a victim of a malicious cyber event to take (U) Recommendation #8: Threats identified
specific remedial measures. However,. the by the Intelligence Community to state and
FBI should update its internal processes to lo~al elections infrastructure should be im-
make it clear that if a victim is neither will- mediately briefed to appropriate state and
ing nor able to take remedial measures in local officials. When threats are identified,
the event of a significant national security the federal government ~hould conduct an
cyber event, FBI leadership should contact expedited decJassification review to ensure
the victim and engage at the leadership lev- that the threat information can reach all


necessary state and local officials in a time- those officials to respond to election-
ly manner. related threats .. ·

(U} The Committee fou nd insufficient (U) Even if all parti es recognize the in-
information sharing between the federal terest in sharing information, the classifica-
government and state election officials ln tion-or even the knowledge of the exist~
2016 regarding cybersecurity t hreats to fed- ence-of a threat may impair timely sharing
eral elections. The Committee has attempt- wi th state and local election officials. Con-
ed to address this deficien cy in the FY 2018 sistent with the need to protect sources and
Intelligence Authorization Act {IAA}. methods, the Secretary of Homeland Securi-

(U) Section 502 of the House-passed tAA ty should provide certain state and local
would require the Director of National Intel- election officials w ith necessary security

ligence {DNI}, jn coordination with the Un- dearances in order to share information.
dersecretary of Homeland Security for Intel- (U) The Senate Select Committee on
ligence and Analysis and the FBI Director, to lntelligence~passed FY 2018 IM also
post on the internet an advisory report on attempted to address this issue. Specifical-
foreign counterintelligence and cybersecuri- ly, Section 402 of the IAA would require the
ty threats to election campaigns for federal DN! to support the Under Secretary of
offices. Homeland Security for intelligence and

(U) The provision also allows the FBI Analysis and any other DHS officfal in spon-

and DHS to make available additional infor- soring a security clearance up to the top se-

mation to appropr[ate representatives of cret level for each eligible chief election offi-

any ca mpaign for federal office if those cial of a state. In addition, the DN I may is-

agencies determine that such campaign is sue interim clearances to a chief election
subject to a heightened foreign counterin- official for the purposes of receiving appro-

telligence or cybersecurity threat. priate classified information regarding cy-

bersecurity threats to election systems.
(U) The Committee has seen some re-
cent improvement in this area on a general (U) Recommendation #10: Significant

level. In February 2018, the Office of the threats to U.S. elections identified by the
Director of Nati~nal Intelligence, FBI, and Intelligence Community, including
DHS held a classified briefing for election cyberattacks directed at political organiza~
officials of all 50 states. tions, should be immediately reported to
the congressional intelligence committees.
(U} Recommendation #9: The Secretary of
Homeland Security should provide certain (U) The House and Senate Intelligence
designated state and local election officials Committees should be informed whenever

appropriate security.clearances to enable the IC dete,mines with medium confide,:ice


- ··- 3

that a significant cyber intrusion or active aging systems. To encourage adoption and
measures campaign by foreign actors is in- in recognition of the federal government's
tended to influence an upcoming election responsibility to protect the nation against
for any federal office. Accordingl'I, the foreign threats, the Congress .shou ld consid-
Committee recommends that the FBl Direc:- er providing significantly more resources to
tor, the DN!, and the Secretary of Homeland state and local governments. These invest-
Security jointly provide a briefing to the ments could be tied to appropriate en-
Congressional intelligence committees no hancements in election system security.
later than 14 days after a determination of a
(U) Recommendation #12: Congress sho~ld
significant cyber intrusion.
consider additional funding for the Nation-
{U) Recommendation #11: Congress should al Institute of Standards and Technology to
encourage the adoption of National Insti- enable better outreach to state and local
tute of Standards and Technology tyber governments.
security standa~ds, such as those adopted
{U} With additional resources, NIST
by the Elections Assistance Commission, by
could host more frequent engagements
providing federal resources to state and
around the United States to promote the
local governments to facilitate such adop·
adoption of new standards and to provide
tion. Funds should be tied to the adoption
more technical support to state and local
and certification of elections svstems to
officials. Furtherm ore, separately identify-
appropriate standards.
ing the budget for this activity within the
(U) Election systems are owned and op- NIST would further convey the importance
erated by state and local governments. of this effort and allow Congre.ss to more
Their acquisition and installation is costly closely track progress.
and recapitalization is infrequent.
{U) Recommendation #13: Congress should
(U) The federal government largely op- consider a one-time grant to state and local
erates within the limits of establishing vol· election agencies to conduct a risk assess-
untary standards through NrST, providing ment of those agencies' computer systems.
technical assistance and sharing threat in-
{U} Because voting is admrnistered at
the state and local level , even for federal
(U) NIST is working with state and local candidate elections, there is a patchwork of
election officials to develop further en- electronic voting systems: In addition,
hancements to election agencies' system those varied systems are not subject to con-
security. sistent maintenance and replac~ment re-
(U} The adoption of new standards may
involve system replacement, particularly for (U) Congress should consider allocating

- - - - -~
funds to be transferred to state and local
election agencies to conduct a risk assess~
ment of their systems. Doing this would,
(U) As noted above, OHS Secretary Jeh
the Committee believes, further demon-
Johnson designated U.S. election systems as
strate the need for the implementation of
critical infrastructure on January 6, 2017,
the NIST cyber security standards for elec-
which was one day after the ref ease of the
tion agencies.
classified ICA and the same day as the re-
(U) Recommendation #14: Congress should lease of the uncla~-sified version. By labeling
consider strengthening the Help America election systems as critical infrastructure,
Vote Act of 2002 to ensure that both state- DHS can "prioritize cybersecurity assis-
wide voter registration and tabulation sys- tance11 for those who request it, as well as
tems are better protected from foreign provide election systems the same interna-
cyber threats. tional legal protections afforded to other
critical infrastructur e. Implementation of
such a designation takes time. As of Sep-
tember 1, 2017, the U.S. Election f!..s.sistanc.e
Commission reported that th e election criti-
cal infrastructure subsector plans v,rere pro-
gressing, in hopes of finalization in time for
the 2018 elections. The Committee ap-
plauds this designation because it helps ad-
dress the threats to the nation's voting in-

(U) However, as articulated in recent

news.reports, even with election systems
designated as critical infrastructure, the DHS
"risk and vulnerabiiity" assessments take
time and resources, and there appears to be
a lengthy wait list. Therefore, in preparing
for the 2018 m idterm elections, OHS should
continue to work with the states on priori-
tizing these assessments for election sys-
tems - and other stakeholders must do

{U) Recommendation #15; The Department

., 122
of Homeland Security should provide the dancy is a contemporaneously created pa-
owner or operator- of any electronic elec- per record reflecting the voter's selections.
tion infrastructure affected by any signifi-
{U} The vulnerabilfty of state and local
cant foreign cy.ber intrusion with a briefing
erection infrastructure has been well docu-
and include steps that may~ taken to
mented. These systems, which are not fre-
mitigate such intrusions.
quently updated or replaced, are not devel-
{U) The Committee found that commer- oped to defend against state-sponsored
cial providers of electronic election infra- cyber threats. The fact that voting ma-
structure were not informed of foreign chines themselves, as well as tabulation sys-
cyber intrusions to their systems. While the tems, are not directly connected to the in-
IC and federal government may be aware of ternet does not offer adequate security.
malicious cyber activity targeting election Rather, it can create a false sense of securi-
systems, the information is of little value if ty.
appropriate threat information cannot be
(U) To help p-rntect the integrity of t he
shared with the owners and operators of
process, state and local election au thor ities
affected systems. Accordingly, the Com-
should consider building in additional re-
mittee recommends that OHS provide a
dundancies to ensure an audit trail in the
briefing and mitigation steps to the owner
event of a compromise of the electronic
or operator of election infrastructure sys-
voting systems. An example of this is a con-
tems targeting by a foreign cyber intrusion.
temporaneously printed record of votes
{U) In addition, DHS has offered state that is securely stored at the polling place
and local governments a network monitor- and transported to the relevant election
ing tool t hat alerts election system opera- office at the end of Election Day. The Com -
tors about known forejgn threats using in- mittee is mindful of the reason most juris-
formation obtained by the IC. Not all states dictions replaced the paper ballot, but
have adopted this tool. building [n a redundancy using a paper rec-

(U} Recommendation #16: State and locaf ord of a vote will help guard ag~inst the po-
governments should be encouraged to es- tential for manipulation of voting results in
tablish redundancies that are not depend- the event of a breach of the electronic

ent on current elections ~nfrastructure, voting machines.

such as a mechanism that re~ins individu- {U} Recommendation #17: While it is im-
al vote records, ensuring the Integrity of portant to implement iessons learned from
the vote in the event of a compromise of the Executive Branch's response$ Congress
voting infrastructure due to a foreign should not hampet the Executive Branch's
cyberattack. An example of such a redun- . ability to use discretion in responding to a


particular foreign threat. U.S. military forces. These are variables that

{U) The Executive Branch's response to the Congress cannot possibly anticipate in
the 2016 Russian active measures campaign drafting potential legislation. Therefore,
was neither timely nor effective. As dis- despite potential calls from both Democrats

cussed above, the Execulive Branch did not and RepubHcans to legislate the threshold

publicly attribute Russian attempts to hack necessary to ttigger attribution or reaction

into various political institutions or compro- by the President in the wake of foreign hos-

mise emails of U.S. people until October 7, tilities, the Committee urges Congress not

2016-roughly one month before the 2016 t o hamper the Executive Branch's role in

U.S. presidential election. The Executive r esponding to foreign threats.

Branch also waited to issue sanctions {U) Recommendation #18: Congress should
aga(nst Russia, expel Russian diplomats, and consider repealing the Logan Act.
close Russian diplomatic facilities until De-
(U) Congress passed the Logan Act and
cember 29, 2016. Further, DHS did not des-
President Adams signed it into law on Janu-
ignate US election systems as critical infra-
ary 30, 1799. Broadly stated, the Logan Act
structure until January 6, 2017, which was
prohibits U.S. dtizens to influence any for-
two months after the 2016 U.S. presidential
eign government vis-a-vis any disputes that
election. While the previous administration
government may have with the United
made attempts in diplomatic channels to
States. It provides a punishment of a fine
dissuade Russia from its ongoing activities,
and three years' imprison ment.
such attempts apparently feil on deaf ears.
{U} Qver the course o f the Act's more-
(U} However, despite the fact that the
th an-200-year history, there has never been
Executive Branch's remedial actions were
a conviction for its v iolation, and there have
arguably too little too late, any efforts by
only been a handful of indictments that nev-
Congress. to introduce certain legislative
er reached trial.
"solutions" are misguided. The President is
the primary recipient of the intelligence (U) Oe..,;pite its demonstrated disuse,

produced by the IC, as well as the individual the law has gained occasioO?l congressional

constitutionally empowered to command interest. In 1978, Senator Ted Kennedy un-

the armed forces of the United States. As successfully sought to remove the Logan

such, if a foreign government conducts ac- Act. In 1980, Congressman and former

tive measures targeting U.S. elections in the House Intelligence Committee Chairman,

fut ure, the Executive Branch should have Anthony Beilenson, introduced legislation to

the abilrtyto craft a response based on the repeal the Logan Act, stating that the prima-
inte rngence known at the time of the inter- ry use of the Logan Act was to prpvide for
ference and, if necessary, the readiness of " periodic calls for prosecution motivated by



opposition to the cause b2ing expressed in- such campaigns in the hopes of influencing
stead of actual concern about treason." In U.S. po licy and discourse. Therefore, it is
1994, Congress updated-the log,m Act by critical that the IC educate presidential cam-
changing the $5,000 fine to "shall be fined paigns on counterintelligence issues as an
under this title." important protection measure for campaign
{U) Due to the lack of prosecutions un-
der t he Logan Act and despite the various (U) For example, at an appropriate
apparent violations since its passage, Con- time, the lC could host unclassified counter-
gress should evaluate the la1.-v's utility and intelligence tt'clining sessions for each cam-
consider re pealing it. paign. Such training would assist the candi-
dates and campaign leadership in under-
(U) Recommendation #19: All U.S. presi-
standing the severity of this issue, and
dential campaigns should receive unclassi-
should cover a range of topics, including:
fied counterintelligence briefings at an ap-
propriate time prior to a nomination con· • (U) The intelligence collection pro-
vention. cess;

(U) During the 2016 U.S. presidential • (U) Reasons why fore ign intelli-
election campaign, candidate Trump and gence services, generally, would
candidate Clinton did not receive a classified want to penetrate a U.S. presidential
intelligence briefing until after their respec- campaign;
tive nomination conventions. Since 1952,
• (U} How to better secure campaign
the sitting President typically offers the U.S.
communications and practice good
presidential candidates classified briefings
cyber operational sec~rity; and
as a matter of courtesy, but only after the
• (U) Hypothetical examples of suspi-
nomination conventions. However, the
cious behavior that ma y warrant
Committee's investigation found that a
questioning or t he dismissal of cam-
coun terintelligence briefing before the
pafgn staff.
nomination convention, even at t he unclas-
sified lev~I. would be a significant benefit to (U) Recommendation #20: When con-
the candidates and enhance the integr ity of sistent with national security, the Intelli-
the campaign. gence Community should jmmedlately In-

{U) U.S. presidential campaigns are a

form U.S. presidential candidat es when rt
significant target of interest to America's
discovers a legitimate counterintelligence

foreign adversaries. It should be expected threat to the campaign, and promptly noti-
that various foreign intelligence services wil l
fy Congress.

conduct offensive operations to penetrate {U} The Committee is not aw3re of any


f:P.O?ERf'I' OF THE U.S. HCUS£ 0 ~ RE.PRE$EtITA"llV£$
noti-fication to candidate Trump that the pending on the sensitivity, such notifications
U.S. government conducted counterintelli- can be made to the leadership of the House
gence investigations of people associated and Senate, as well as the chair and ranking
directly or indirectfy with the campaign. Members of the House and Senate intelli-
While the Committee understands and ap- gence committees - known as the Gang of
preciates the !C's reasons for not disdosing 8.
such information to protect classified
(U) Recommendation #21: Both houses of
sources and methods, the FBI should have
Congress should tons.ider requiring aU staff
provided candidate Trump some s-o rt of no-
to receive an annuat counterintelligence
tification, even if it is general and at the un-
awareness briefing.
classified level, that th ~ IC is concerned that
a potential counterintelligence threat exists (U) As with.presidential campaigns,

to the campaign. corigressional staff members are targets for

foreign intelligence collection. The IC
{U) The DNI should issue an ICD to pro-
should coordinate, and Congress should
vide guidance on how and when the IC
consider requiring, an annual counterintelli-
should notify a U.S. presidential campaign
gence briefing for staff.
of a legitimate counterintelligence threat.
Similar to victim notifications in the cyber (U) The briefing should be unclassifie d,

context, 1ivhen the re has an individual under cover both physical and cyber threa t aware-

an active counterintelligence investigation ness, and should emphasize that all staff are

and the JC becomes aware of that individu- targets fo r foreign intelligence services. The

af' s affil iation with a U.S. presidential ca m- Committee's investigation of the 2016 elec-
paign, the IC should have a responsibility t o tion demonstrated that many campaign

notify the candidate, when consistent with staff members were unaware of t he-ir status

nationa l secu rity. There may be instances as a potential target for foreign intelligence

w here such notifications are not consistent services. Congressional staff m ay also be

with nationai security, such as jf the candi- unaware of the counterintelligence risks as-

date himself or herself is under a counterin- sociated with their positions. Increasing the
t elligence investigation. awareness of staff-even in an unclassified
Setting-that they are potential targets
(U} Further, given the sensitivities asso-
would enable them to take precautionary
ciat~d with counterintelligence investiga-
m easures and be better prepared to coun-
tions, if the IC decides that campaign notifi-
ter the threat.
cation is required, the IC should promptly
notify Congress of the campaign notifica- Campaign links to Russia

tio n, induding the classified details under~ (U) Recommendation #22: Political cam-
pinning the counterintelligence threat. De- paigns and law enforcement should ensure


that their counterintelligence defenses ap- sufficiently transparent. For example, the
propriately account for the role of cut-outs DNC and Hillary for America used Perk.ins
and intermediaries. Coie, which they billed as "legal services" or
"legal and compliance consulting," to fi-
{U} Russian attempts to influen<;e the
nance opposition research by Fusion GPS,
American political process, including via in-
which In turn utilized Christopher Steele, a
termediaries and cut-outs, did not end on
foreign person, t o comprle the dossier that
Election Day. The universe o f pre- and post-
he created for use against candidate
election contacts between Russjan interme-
diaries and Trump associates described in·
Chapter 4 sugg·e st a sophisticated effort to {U) Under current federa l election law,
target unwitting Americans by leveraging foreigners are prohibited from ma king con-
existing relationships, interests, and oppor- tributions or donations in connection with
tunities.3 Therefore, both U.S. government any campaign in the United States.. Howev-
entities and campaigns in particular must er, it is not iflegal to contract with a foreign
strengthen their defenses against such sub- person or foreign entity for services, includ-
versive tactics, beginning \:nth expanding ing conducting opposition research on a U.S.
counterintelligence education and training. campaign, so long as the service was pa id

(U) The IC ~hould work to provide as

for at the market rate.
much infonnation to campaigns and law (U) ln light of the use of fo reign people
enforcement agencies about foreign intelli~ and foreign companies for services by the
gence agencies' efforts to target them. _The 2016 U.S. presidential election campaigns,
Committee is mindful that sensitive coun- the Committee encourages Congress, in
terintelligence issues often involve some of consultation with the Federal El~ction Com-
the most highly classified secrets t he U.S. mission (FEC), to consider whether Congress
government has, but the IC should work to should amend campaign finance laws to re-
provide some basic training at the unclassi- quire gr~ater transparency when U.S. cam-
fied level about foreign adversaries' use of paigns obtain services from fo reign persons
intermediaries. or entities. Congress should consider
whether U.S. campaigns that contract with a
(U} Recommendation #23: Congress
foreign person or entity for services should
should consider amending current cam-
immediately disclose to the FEC a contract
paign finance laws to further increase·
with a foreign person or fore ign entity, a?
transparency regarding services pro~ded
well as a lengthy summary of the types of
by foreign persons or entiti~s.
services provided by the foreign person or
{U} The Committee is concerned that
current campaign finance reporting Is in-

Intelligence Community Assessment Leaks out disclosures made under the Freedom of
Information Act, in litigation or administra-
{U) Based on the extraordinary number
tive proceedings, under executive orders, or
of leaks of classified information over the
to any federal employee with an active se-
pa.st year, it is apparent th~t government
curity clearance and a need to kno•N.
officials are not afraid of the criminal penal-
ties for such unauthorized and illegal con- · (U) Recommendation #25: Congress
duct. should-consider legistation to increase the
penalties for unauthorized disclosures of
(U) This leaves the Committee with an
classified information.
impression that criminal statutes related t o
leaks of classified informatiqn are not strong (U) To date, based on pubUcly av ailable
enough to deter potenti al criminal acts of information, there have not been an y prose-.
leaking classified information . cutions of leaks p~rtaining to. the Russian
active measures campaign. ~s evidenced by
{U) Recommer:idation #24: ~ach compo-
the lack of leak prosecutions, d ifficulties
nent of the Intelligence Community should
often arise in finding a culprit behind leaks
update its guidance regarding media con-
of classified information. However, when
tacts to ensure the guidance applies to eve-
the Executive Branch is successful in identi-
ry employee, indudrng senior officiaJs.
fying an alleged leaker, there should be no
{U) Th e Committee found significant bar to prosecuting that ,ndivid ual. While
leaks of classified information around the prosecutors may utilize multiple ~riminal
time of the ICA. The Committee believes statutes to prosecute individuals who leak
many o f those leaks were likely frol)1 senior or mishandle national def ense information,
officials w ithin the IC. This recommendation the construct of the Espio nage Act does no t
is similar to a provision of the FY 2013. Intel- lend itself in favor of prosecu tion and as a
ligence Authorization Act tl_1at expired in sufficient deterrent from individuals break-
early 2014. That provision required a notifi- ing the law for their own political purposes.
cation to the congressional intelligence Therefo re, Congress shou ld consider legisla-
committees in the event of an authorized tion to c learly articulate stronger penalties
disclosure of classified information to the for those individuals who make unauthor·
media or anybody else who had the intent ized disclosures of classified information to
to make the information public. The pur-
the media.
pose of the law was to ensure that congres-
(U) For example, enactment of Con-
sion al int elligence committees were in-
gressman Chris Stewart' s bill - HJL 3448,
formed on a timely oasis when there w as a
t he Classified lnform.;tio n Protection Act -
disclosure of classified information to the
would strengthen the Espionage Act. Unlike
media, and the stat ute specifically carved

1) 8
current unauthorized disclosure statutes curity procedures for handling classified in-
which, by virtue of their complexity, create formation.
difficulties in building cases, H.R. 3448 d ear-
{U} Recommendation #26: The Executive
ly prohibits any current or former individual
Branch should consider institu~ng.manda-
who had lawful access to classified infor-
tory polygraphs for all non-confirmed po-
mation from knowingly providing such infor-
litical appointees that have top secret
mation to a person who is not authorized to
access the information. If someone is found
guilty under this proposal, the leaker will be (U) Despite employees in the Executive

fined, imprisoned for up to three years, or Branch having extraordinary access to a sig-

bod-.. This legislation originally passed both nificant amount of highly classified infor-

chambers of Congress in 2000, but Presi- mation, there are very few processes in

dent Clinton vetoed-the bill. Given the pro- place to ensure that these individuals han-

liferation of leaks, it is essential for Congress dle such information appropriately.

to examine amending the Esp ionage Act to (U) The DNI is responsible for policies
strengthen our laws needed to protect das- and procedures governing "eligibility for ac-
s[fied information . cess to classified information or eligibility t~

(U) Furthermore, given the significant hold a sensitive position made by any agen-
number of leaks and instances of mishan- cy_." However, pursuant to ICD 704, the DNI

d ling classified information coming from detegated the authority to grant .access to

within the JC in the past several years, Con- an IC element's Sensitive Compartmented
gress should consider ways to strengthen Information (SCI} and other controlled ac-
the protection of dassified information. cess program information to the heads of

·This legislation·could include requirlng the such element. As it relaies to the admin-

head or a federal agency to suspend the se- istration of polygraphs during personnel se-
curity clearance of an individual vJho inten- curity vetting, the DNI issued lntel!igenc~

tionally or recklessly fai ls to comply with Community Policy Guidance {ICPG) 704.6.

security procedures for handling classified {U} ICPG 704.6 provides basic instruc-
information. The legislation could also pro- tion as to the types of polygraphs and cir-
vide fur the ability of an agency's Inspector cumstances by which polygraphs should be
General to make recommendations to the administered. While IC elements should
President related to potential violations of have ~iscretion in terms of the timing and
seq.Jrity procedures by senior agency offi- circumstances by which to conduct S!Ps,
cials. Finally, the legislation should consider every employee not subject to Senate-
mandating annual training for an individuals confirmation that is granted access to TOP
with access to classified information on se- SECRET classified information should be

- ._ I
--~·- .,

subject to at least a counterintelligence

scope polygraph (CSP). As a result, the DNI
should revise ICD 704 and ICPG 704.6 to
specifically reflect this requirement.

1. so u.s.c. § 1804.
2. so u.s.c. § 1801.
3. HPSCI, "Russian Active Measures During the 2016.Election Campaign," May 23, 2017, pp. 31-32.
4. Campaign Legal Center and Catherine Hinckley Kelley v. Democratic National Committee and HIiiary for America,
"Complaint," Federal Election Commission, www.campaignlegalc1:nter.org/document/fec-complaint-hillary-america-dnc-
failure-disclose. Oct. 25, 2017.
5. 52 U.S.C. § 30121; 11 CFR 110.20.
6. Pub. L No. 112-277, § 504 (2013).

---- --- 130

(U} Appendix A - Scope and Methodology

(U} On January 25, 2017, Chairman following up on leads acquired from fo rmal
Nu nes and Ranking Member Schiff released transcribed interviews with current and for-
a joint statement detailing the Committee's mer administration officials, as well as vol-
inquiry into the Russian active measures unteers who offered pertinent testimony or
campaign targeting the 2016 U.S. presiden- documents to the Committee. In some in-
tial election. The final parameters of the stances, prospective witnesses were unre-
Russia investigation were ~greed to by sponsive or unwilling to be interviewed.
Chairman Nunes and Ranking Member When appropriate, Congressman K. Michael
Schiff on l'v1arch 1, 2017. 2 The review's key Conaway, in consultation with the Ranking
questions were: {1) what Russian cyber ac- Member, made a recommendation to the
tivity cJnd other active measures were di- Committee Chairman Devin Nunes in ac-
rected against the Unite~ States and its al- cordance with Rules of Procedure for the
lies; (2} did the Russian active measures in- Permanent Select Committee on intelligence
clude links between Russia and individuals to issue a subpoena:~ Subpoenas were used
associated with political campaigns or any to compel witnesses to appear as well as t o
other U.S. persons; (3 } what 1.-vas the U.S. compel the production of pertinent docu-
government response to t hese Russian ac- ments in compliance with the Committee's
tive meas.ures and what do we need to do lal<'.rful authority. Six of the witnesses the
to protect ourserves and our allies in the Committee requested to inteNie\•.., invoked
future; and (4} what possible lea!<s of classi- their 5th amendment protections from self-
fied information took place related to the incrimination, which resulted in the Com-
Intelligence Community's assessment of mittee not being able to obtain pertinent
these matters?The Committee remained information from those particular individu-
focused on investigating the answers to als.
these four questions and designed the in-
(U) During the interviews, the Com-
vestigation's methodofogv around them.
mittee Members and staff questioned the
(U) Tne Committee interviewed and/or witnesses about activities that generally
transcrib ed testimony from 73 witnesses, took place bet\veen April 2015 and January
conducted 9 open and closed hearings and 2017. lf the Committee discovered anything
briefings, and issued 20 subpoenas. The that arose before April 2015 or after January
Committee identified witnesses to interview 2017, the Committee made a determination
by reviewing open source material, includ- of its relevancy. If it was identified to have
ing news reports; official U.S. government an impact on the campaign or e lection, the
documents, including classified lntellrgence Committee defined it as relevant and includ-
IC source material; IC agency briefings; and ed it within the scope. However, none of


the witnesses interviewed indicated poten- services about the Russ;an active measures
tial collusion that would have led the Com- against their governments.
mittee to adapt a broader scope. The Com-
(U} Did the Russian active measures in-
mittee also collected over 307,900 docu-
clude links between Russia and individuals
ments and 230 hours of witness testimony.
associated with political campaigns or any
{U} What Russian cyber activity and other other U.S. persons?
active measures were directed against the
{U) The Committee investigated facts
Unim<l States and its allies?
r~!ated to the FBl's investigation through
(C//NF) tts, The Committee collected and ana- May 20171 until the appointment of Special
lyzed IC products on Russian influence oper- Counsel Robert Mueller. The Committee
ations and activities from the period begin- avoided examining events thereafter to
ning with the summer of 2015 and ending in avoid interfering with the Special Counsel's
January 2011:~ The Committee did not ex- investigation. The Committee also exam-
amine the motivation of the Russian actors, ined allegations of collusion by investigating
but instead focused on w ilat it found about the interaction between the political cam-
the Russian' s activities. The Committee also paigns and Russian agents of influence dur-
spent approximately 1,200 hours reviewtng ing the 2016 election cycle. The election
the classified Intelligence Com_m unity As- cycle was defined as April 12, 2015, when
sessment on Russian Activities and Inten- Hillary Clinton launched her campaign fo_r
tions in Recent Elections {ICA), - President through November 8, 2016, or
election day. To answer this question, the
Committee met \Mith the head of Counter-in-
telligence for the DOJ to understand the
context ;;u;d events surrounding the investi-
- In addition, the Committee inter- gation into the Trump campaign. The Com-
viewed the Chief of the CIA Director's fusion mittee afso interviewed several officials
cell, which was an interagency analytic from the FBI and DOJ to collect official testi-
group run by the CIA that \.~s stood u'9 mony about the investigation. In addition,
- to produce products focused on the. Committee collected and reviewed per-
Russian cf ber and other influence activities tinent FBI and DOJ documentsaboutth_e
targeting the United Stat es. The Committee counterintelligence investigation. The Com-
also interviewed the FBl's Section Chief for mittee also coordinated do~ely with the
the Bureau's Count~rintelHgence Analysis Office of Special Counsel. For example, the
Section. rn addition, the Committee traveled Committee shared the list of witnesses that
to Buigari3, Cypress, Estonia, Germany, f\."IOI· the Committee interviewed and kept the
dova, Ukraine,_andthe Unite~ K1ngdom to Special Counsel's omce apprised of any
intervie\v these nation' s foreign inteliigence changes or developments on a monthly ba-


sis. ligence Community's assessment of these
(U) What was the U.S. government re-
sponse to these Russian active measures {U} The Committee collected, reviewed,
and what do we need to do to protect our- and analyzed open source articles contain-
selves and our allies in the future? ing leaks that occurred between the IC's es-
tablishment of the OA Director'.s fusion cell
The Committee interviewed current and
and the publication of the
former officials at the NSA, FBI, and CIA. The
classified and declassified version of the ICA
Committee interviewed these witnesses
in January 2017. In addition, the Committee
about Russia's active measures, the 1mpact
collected and analyzed laws and policies
these active measures had on U.S. intelli-
pertaining to the release or publication of
gence relationships and alliances, as well as
classified information. Fi nalty, the Com-
the agencies' response to these attacks. In
mittee also compared the leaks found in the
addition, the Committee t raveled to seven
identified articles to the classified and u n-
countries in Europe and met with IC, De-
classified Intelligence Community Assess-
partment of State, and foreign intelligence
ment to determine any similarities.
service representatives to obtain other na-
tions' perspectives about the Russian active
measures, the pot@ntial impacts of these
measures, and the U.S. government and its
allies' response.

(U) What possible leaks of classified

information took place related to the Intel-

1. HPSQ, NJ;;int Statement on Progress of Bipartisan HPSO lnc;uiry Into Russian Activa M e;isuras," Press Relea!.eS_ intelli·
,!€£lce..h;:;=.eov,J~n- 2 5, 10::.7.
2. HPSO, "l rr.ellieence Commtcee Chairman, R:rnkiog.Member fstabli.;h Parame:ters for Russia ln'Jestigation/ in,elft-
l!Ence.i:c.~.!~.gov, MM. l , 101'7.
3. HPSC1, Rl:!e.S of Procedure f or ,lre Pcrmcnent Sc.'eer Commirrec on llllel!lger.ce, United Statas House of Repte_=_ntativ<:S,
4. The IC comprtses n dlfforent o:-gani?ot:ons, or IC e lemo,ts, to include the Offu;e of~ Director of Nation.ii !n-re:ligenre,
the Ce.,!ra I Intelligence /\gency, Federal Bureau of Jn-.odgation, ttie Office of lnteillgence and Count~nte3fge nce at
the Department of EMrgy, !he! Office of National Security Intelligence a t the Di!partrnent of Justke's Drug Enforcerr.eot
Adm,r-.istration, the Office of !.T.elfjgenc.e and Analysi5 at the Department of Hcmeland Securtw, the Bureau oi lnt!:111·
ger.ce ar.rl Research <1t tl\e Oepamnen, of S~ate, the Olr.ce of IJ'lte!Ugenc.e and Analysis the Department ofT~ury, Air
force fmefligence, Arm\' lntelrigence, Coast Guard lnt<!lligC?Jltc, Defense Intelligence .~gency, r•Aaritle Corps 1n!efiigence,
National Goospatial-!ntelligance Jl.gency, N.itional Reconnai:.sance Office, !{ational Sea..crity Agency, and Navy tmelli-
gente. For the pu,pose5 of this review, tho Commlttoe re-.rie,...oed lntenigence products fro.n the Central ln~ence Agen-
C'i, Federal Bureau of lnYestiifcjtion, and National security ~ ncy berousl? ttlllSe aeencieswere the IC pan:neu for com-
munity-v.'id~ assess,net\t of I t ~ " a~tiva l\'l~asur~.

{U} Appendix B - Russia lnvestig_ation Parameters

- - - -. - - - --··- · ---... - -- - - ---- ----




An examination imo Russia., cyber activity 3.1d mher active measures o1rccred· at 1hc 2016 l J.S.
election. ·


Whal probl= are you frytr:g if1 s11lo,e?

One ofHPSCI's highest priorities is oversighi oftk Intelligence Community"., aclivilic:; to
c.ounter Rus:-i<L"l aggn:s:;ion, including th:: cyucr-a1tacks directed 9.gain,--:t the United Seate;: in the
last year. As pl!rt ofttiis ovi:r.,ight respv,;~bility, lht.: Comrailtee isnnd~ga bi-parJsan
invcstigi:tion imo these activitie~ direeled at the 20! 6 election and tt,c imdcr!ykg intclligc:1cc
used to draftlhefurelligel'..ce Conwuruty 1~eu~ ~aussiru\ Actr~irn:sand lntcnfoms m
. RQCcnl us Ele-.-t:ans." The investigation will ~p lli Octtenmde;staw.Russi..P.n acti,,e mcasun:S
agcirn,i the United States and our allies and infonn efforu co prcv~ simlk cpisod~ in lhe
future, bolh bcrc arid abroad.

1J'f10 is>-OW' fntende;J ii~rJienur_ .

Tnc inteudcd imciCilcc is tlre Members oi BPSC! and- to the extent jl:mJiUt:c by classification
and .~ecurily ruks-thc b.rwocr House ofR~tativcs itml th: An:~ pceople. ·

What (JTe tilt! key qu.1?Stio11s y<1ll l·e:ek to answer?_

• \','hat R.;ssfan cyber activity all:d other active measmes ,\'C!"C di,cctcd i,ga)n:it the·tJniled
Slllles mid lts anic:s?
• \'lhai: co.m:e..•inrelligc:1ice conee.-ns eXist related to Russia and.the 20l6 U.S. election);.
including any intelligence regarding lin.1<5 ~ctwccn Russia a."'!!! intff\.'itl!!l!l~ a;;sociated v.1th
!)Oliticul =npaign3?
• What was tlk USG respot1~e IO !hes;: Rns:;ian active mea;;ur,;s an:d t>,11a! impact, if any,
did the Ri.s.,i:m activity have oo intellig=e relationships li!iO u~ditfom,l ul!iances?
• ·V..ilJat po5:>:.b1e ieaks of classified info!m:iti.o.:i took place rc1Rted lo th: lnlcllig~t1ce
Community·s z..,~essmCflt of th= maue.s?

WltaJ is your inrerutd olltcomeprot!ud(s)? .

The Con1mi1tce i:niends to C<\mplelc a FepOrt al the highest c]asi;i lic:ition net.-e.ssat;' to ans~cr the
key qu~-tions ~ where possio!e, rcpo.t(s) at !ewer clas.~iicntlon );;Vcls rel~--ai:ile to the House
ofRcprescntati,;cs a:id d1e public, as ;apjl!Oy-i-at::.


· Wltat i11te11ded impact will tltere be/or budget, legislatio11, or press?
The inquiry and report may uncover vulnerabilities within the Intelligence Community and/or
USG agencies or institutions. If so, the Committee may identify avenues of improvement that
would be reflected in IAA provisions, stand-alone legislation, IC budget adjustments, and/or
further areas to focus HP.SCI's oversight efforts.

The Committee also expects that there will be significant interest from the press, given the
delicate poli~ical issues surrounding the topic. Staff will remain bi-partisan and focus solely on
the facts u.ncovered in our investigation.

What i11te11ded effect do yo11111a11t those products to have? How does that fit i11to the
Committee's overl·lgllt p/a11?
The objective is lo better understand Russian active mcusures directed at the 2016 U.S. election,
and to better position the re and the broader USO to respond to and defend against the threat.


What are the boundaries of your review? Please co11sider time, s11bsta11ce, 11ge11cy, and ra11ge
ofactivities. . ·

The Committee.will focus primarily on Russian active measures deployed during the 2015-2017
timeframe,·but may pursue activities germane to the investigation that took place outside this
window. ·

• What: The Committee will investigate Russian activities airried at USG agencies, political
parties, NGOs, individuals, and private industry, .as appropriate.

The investigation will also assess whether there is any

intelligence that identifies insider threat or CI concerns, including whether Russian
activity involved any USPs, including those on or associated with campaigns.
o · The investigati<>n will also consider what USG officials believe to be the impact
. to U.S. intelljgence of both Russian active measures related to the election·and the
associated recent disclosures.
• How: The Committee will investigate the methods by which Russia -targeted the
aforementioned groups.
• Why: The investigation will consider Russian leadership plans and intentions, including
whether and in what ways Russia intended to influence U.S. policy or undermine U.S.
political systems and democratic institutions.
• USG response: The Committee will examine how the U.S. government responded to
Russian active measures.
It will also·include an assessment of the process used to generate the !C's
report and any deviations from standard practices in the !C's report.

and an accounting of whether a person or persons in the IC or
the.White House leaked information on the report prior to its dissemination to the Gang
of Eight, Congress, or the public.
o The report willalso assess whether intelligence relating to U.S. persons was
collected and disseminated in accordance with applicable laws and policies.
• Recommendations: Several recommendations are likely to come out of this investigation.
• The Committee expects to be in contact with CIA, NSA, DHS, FBI, DTA, and ODN!.
However, The Committee will pursue all avenues of inquiry, which may include agencies
not listed here,
• The Committee will also engage current and former JC and USG personnel, private
industry, and any other parties with knowledge relevant to the investigati9n.
• The Committee will examine the process by which the Intelligence Community
Assessment, "Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections." was created and
the intelligence underlying tbe assessment to determine whether the JC comported with
all relevant Intelligence (:ommunity Directives and security precautions when
researching, writing, analyzing, and releasing their product, and whether the assessments
meet a reasonable stand~rd of credibility as determined by the investigatory team. The
Committee will focus on evaluating the IC's work on the Asse~sment with regard to IC
rules and procedun:s, but not create a new or separate assessment of Russian activities.

Given the above, a11d competing priorities, whe11 do you expect to complete the project?
The Committee expects the investigation to take several months, at least, and the drafting of a
report and any declassification review to ·takc additional time thereafter. Above all, the
investigation will prioritize comprehensiveness over completion by a particular date, while still
· seeking to move as quickly as possible to ensure the report is timely and useful.

What if!a11y political or jurisdictio11al issues exist?

The inquiry's subject matter carries political sensitivities. ~everthelcss, staff will proceed in a bi-
partisan and objective manner, both in conducting the inquiry and in drafting the report.
• The CommitteJ's investigation will not interfere with any ongoing criminal or
counterintelligence investigations. Staff wiil, however, seek relevant law enforcement or
coun\erintelligence information consistent with the Committee's oversight jurisdiction
and investigative responsibilities. The objective of seeking such information will be to
assess whether any collusion occurred between Russians and USPs, and the leaks of
classified information.
• The investigation could implicate the work of the agencies within the jurisdiction of
Homeland Security, Judiciary, Oversight, and Forcigry Affairs Committees. However,
because the investigation will focus on an active measures campaign by a foreign
adversary, the investigation clearly lies within the jurisdiction ofHPSCI. Additionally,
House Rule IO provides that HP SCI shall study the sources and methods of the IC on an
"exclusive basis."


Wllat if/a11}' c.ampa.ro11entJJ.tio11 l.'in4:s aist?
Staff ::nd l\·1embcrs conductinft the invo.;6.gflliun \viii nee,j access to G:img of Eigln: mat,;rial. This .
:iecessi1atei; a sn\llll, nimble group, w,.<l will rc;;quire special nmmgeu::cnts for proper storage of
· compartmented 1nfonnation al TlPSCl: .

Wi/I it b2 bipartisan? Wlw will be involved?
This in,-estlgation is bi-JJaIB-'1!1. Gang, of~r access will be: requirci for~ invcstigzrory team.
• Lead· (),fajority)' (Miuo~)
• Counsel: 0,..hljority): ~1inority)
• and {Majorily}
• {Minorilyj
{Bi--p"-l"iisan Fellow) ·

What iliformatiotz do ]'(JU anticipate will be Jt~ary to ac/Ileve J,YJW p;uposd

• Access to and cusroriy of all underlying imelligence used to c=e ti1eintclli~-tn1:e
Conununity Assessment, "Russia(! Acti,rues and ln(cntions i n ~ US Elections.''
This ii.tcludcs P..porting cturently only ss.--ailabtc fo the Gang ofEight and lhcir Staff
Directors. .
• Access to im:I cu:stc,dy of o(hcr relevant -~orting on R.ussfon acti~ mi;a5ure:; 25 ii relates
co !he timcfiami;o and tupi e:1 described ia th; Scoi:i-e of Investigation, as r_-=ted.
• In.tcrvie"'-;; i.mh. lJSG and non-USG individmls with lmowkdg1: ofRussi!lll active
measures. i!icluding those in the fotellig_enee Commwiity, pm ':lll: i.'l!fustry, NGOs,
pofi1ical ·.:s, and.for niher groups.

• The

Committee may aL~ wish to engage cyb:cr cxpc;ns fulm oi.:r NaGorr.11L.<lbs, both resident
at HPSCI and out:ri.dc the comm.itt~c.

• Access to d~ and infonnatiotl reg;'.ltdi.ng law enforcement aid <:0U1itcritttelligence

investigmons, COOS!S!cnt with the Committee"s ovcrsightj urisdi_cti.<lll and invcst.igat.h':
rcsµousibilli:ies, s fwthcr described ~ho..c. -

Whal roles wl/1 :'l.femf;ers play? At what poir.1$ will they be brought in !o pruviik fec;.aback or
guide tire project? Whar Committee evl!l1ts ma)' be necesstuJ•?
• 'fhe investigation is ofhighc$t interest co HPSCT Membi:,-s. The-7 will ne::d to l~ updated
on the sla!u:s of ire invc:~tigu1icn at rcguhr mletVals, likely lhrougb bi-partisan
investigabl;:y t = m~us :ind 11..fajorily- ~,d :,..1inorily-spt:ciijc coon~els, as necessary_
• Members mar also re inter~Ced in joinhJ.s interviews if lhc:y are of high intere&.
• As nccdod, the Comrnitt_cc will hold hcaing:;, both open aoo closed, on clements llfthc


How will yo11 go.tlur infonttatfoo (what types of4oo.uht!n1 reqll!!sts do you plan. to suim:it; w!,o
do yo:u plan t o inJ.en.•few; wha2 do J'OU iniimtI IQ tra~{)? ·
• Thi: Comrulttc,;: lms.a!r~d}' r equested froni tlreODNlaci;:ess to and cusrody of all
i,:tel [isence reporting included in the i.ntdlig=.--c Comml.Ulity ;1ss.:ssm;:nt, "Rt1~1111
Acti\·ittes and hllentions in Recent US Elcc!i<ms.''
• ·The Co,:rucitc~ vrill submit forthcr rcquc.st5 fo:r documents. am:! for in1cPticws. as the
inquiry proc=k
• The Committee wi!l intee.view CUITCI+t and former USG j)e:-:,0ru,~J, indUS'lsy pi:~mmel,
those wlio work or worked in NGOs n.mlinr pDlitic~I p..-.tie5, wit! milers as the Committee
<lo.:ms app_..-opriate. ·
• The Cornmirtec will al...o00 seek ex.i..'<ling lC in.fomJ.atlon on Russian actr,;ity agam..""t U.S.
~llit:s during their clecoons.

llow will yau fde, organiu, mrct retain all oflhe infonI1f11it)11 ~eci.-ed? Hm:e you/(,ctottti in
su.fficiurt timefor dttl<usfjlt'<ltion rt!,'l'e-,9, ifr..itcessa.-yl flow will !flat ocaul
• The CommiltQc: will o~ to 11oo:lllllll0datc document l'C\'i.ew and storage lit HPSC!-
. particularly as it relu!.es to (;(Jrn~meriti:d infomiatiori. Tot Commiue:: will also ~ to
fuctor in th:c time it may take ~g,:n~ to rt:spond to d<JCUl'l".cnt access requests,
da:lassiflc~ion reviews, au.d/or ma.lcin~ av.tilcl-ile individutls for interY~Ws wiih me
investigatory team or l!PSC[ Mei:11),o..rs. .
• The CommiU=e sl.lffha~~ alrt w.ly s,;t-r..i, <.UgiW fo[decs on the: fiPSC! clo.~ified system .
t<> bold all ~evant non-(r.iog ofEight planninsand scoping documcrms, wlth the propt:r
p,.."DJl.issious ba:ied on re!pOnsihilitie,; and hfajority!'.Ylinori.Iy st~rus.


Prol•ide specific intended deadlines for e!lt:ft phase ofyow revi;w (drita gmlur/11g, amil,sis..
writifzg. Ct1m·di.Jiation/editb1g,publis/Jing.-)
Tr.e Committee will pim;\fe ii ~ed. bialdiog-biocks c1:pproncl1II) the inves!igmion, \.,.hlle
prio.itizing compreh1!nsiveness zbove completion by a fixed end <l.:!.te.. The stri.cluring of the
im,csngation imo PiY.!..-;es, end the cnnseqw..n!. p;ioritizntion of sp,:qfically identified in~gativc
acti viti~ or research, will nor re coc1strued to iimit s1affs ability <O gather or analyze n:krnmt

The Co:runittc:e ::;qr~ ca,;h prn;sc will take weeks t" monlht- 1o complet.c.
• Ph.!s,; l 1,111 focus on initial, g1:11crnl knowledge a1:quis:lhm ~boul lhe Russ[a c!Cti\"E
measures ~pai!!;l'I, tlJ.c·u.s. ~ e , e-01:ntmntelligeneeconcerns, 2nd tlie othar key
~t!estions id~tified .:.bo\--e.
o Phas; l will im:l~e rcadin,g ur.tl analy7ing intd ligai~ ~~ relevrint to the
R.u..~a cyb<::r ~ t , inclurJingcll underlying intetligenee usecf:o product th~
Intelligence Communhy Asse;s:inent, ~Russian Activities and ktcntions in Ro:.:ent
US Elections:=
o Phase ! also \\ill iuclude meetings with USG a1id h:.-dustry pcr:-oo.ncl g~nerally
knowledgeable abm.r.: the lhrcar; m~io.gs 'hitb USG perso,,n~ koowled~ ~
~boUl th¢ IC"s.malytic proc,:..<s;,and mcctings with furm~-r USG ~trtS
i ·



lrnowlc:dBc;1blc; about tJSG posture against the Rus~in 1.3.IBct, to include

o Ph«~c 1 also will include witness testimony, following investigative leads, and
docwnem pro~uction relative co the IC As.~essrnent, counteri1ltelli3ence concerns,
the USG res ponst:, nnd lellk nllr;g.~(ltw;.
o Throughout rh~ l , the Commi ttet will pun;ue tlocumi:nt ACc1uisition and
schedule ioterYiews neces..~Qt)' to conduct l'h,ise 2.

,, Phase 2 wjll build on tlie baseline knowledge acquired ill Pha.;e 1 through a focused and
spcci.fic'invcstigation. ·
o Phase 2 will include a detailed analysis of the intelligence producti~n process and
oonclu~ions in the .Intelligence Community Asscssme..llt, "Russian Acti,,.[ties and
Intentions in Recent US ElectioilS" to assess whcilier the IC componcd wifo all
re.Jevnnt Intcl!igenc:c Community Dh~ctives and sccur:ity pri:cuutions wh~n
~~rching., w,iting, iurnl:1?:ing, 11ml rclca~i:n~ 1hcir n~~m1.mt.
·o Phase 2 will include inten•icws wi!h ~pecil.ic; USG uml industry personnel
knowledgeclile obout rhc specilic !opics discusml in Uie !C's ~port ;mJ tl1e
·process u~d 10 ~rn\pile, ~ view, 110\l 1lissr:minlltc \he IC's reporl.
o Phnw 2 may inclu1lc dclllilctl inlcr..·icws nm1 unuly~is regarding the Russhm nctivc
owm,urc:s cumpaign i the U.S. rcspon.sc; countorintclllicncc con\lcm:;; lhe impuct
or H,,~~i ~n acth 0 m~,i, urc~ on U.$, ;,Illes; mid whether 1ho IC or the \~~1itc Hou~c

lont<ed lnfonnullon oo rhc report prlor 10 i~ 11i~~cmln11tion 10· ll1e Gnng or night,
C.:ongrcss, or t11~ public. ·

• Phui;e 3 wlll loco:i oa wr1tinu. ooordlnnt Ing, cdi11n{l, u:onsmltlinfl fol' doclossilication
review (if nc~ssary), imd rclonslug tho Commlltr.c's reports ot appropriutc clnSlli!lcaiicm

• TI1ru111>hout nil three phases; the Committee. will engage Members for ru1y fc\'.:db~s:k imd
incolJlorn\~ thnt f~back lnlo our proccsii'. ·

Pursuant to Rule 9 of the Com:mittee' s Ruh:s of Pro~un:., I 15th c:ong~s. we hereby jointly
agree to the scope of investigation descnoed above.

- t;i?J!6_
<lnm Schiff

Date: Fcbruruy 2?, 2017


(U) Appendix C- Russia's Media Propaganda Apparatus

{U} Rossiya Segodn ya thing they see in Western media and from
its leaders.
{U} Created by Putin in 2013, Rossiya
Segodnya is Russia' s overarching state me- (U) Sputnik
dia company. Rossiya Sogodnya acts as an
(U) A l:\ussian state-owned network o f
umbrella fur outlets like RT and Sputnik.
media platforms producing radio, social me-
· ''Rossiya Segodnya" is translated as "Russia_
dia, and news content, Sputnik was created
Today,~ but it is different from t he television
[n 2014 to act as Russia's multimedia hub.
channel with the same name. According to
Sputnik is based in 28 countries and o per-
Russian press reporting, in September 2014,
ates in 3 3 differen~ languages, broadcasting
Moscow tripled Rossiya Segodoya's budget
pro-Russian messaging and disinformation .
to 6.4S billion rubles and increased RT's
A recent GAO study found that Sputnik·pro-
2015 budget by 41 percent to 15.38 billion
motes anti-West narr~tives and undermines
rubles, which is equivalent to roughly $600

(U) Russia Today (RT}

{U) This 24-hour worldwide television
(iV) and online network was created in (U) Russia Beyond the Headlines
2005 to promote Russia's image abroad and
(U} Less ideologically hosti le than RT
to show foreigners world events from a Rus-
and Sputnik, Russia Beyond the Headlines
sian perspective. Nominally independent
(RBTH) pays for printed inserts in many
. but Kremlin-controlled and funded, Ru ssia
leading European newspapers and targets
Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Germany, Greece,
[taly, Macedonia, Portugal, Serbia, Spain,
and the UK. Comparatively less anti-
Ame rican in tone, RBTH provides another
. . . . . To deemphasize its Russian origin,
avenue for Russian propaganda to reach
Russia Today was rebranded RT in 200S: .
wide audiences in these European coun-
{Uj RT employs 2,000 staff to ~rovide
coverage in Russian, English, Arabic, French,
· German, and Spanish in 100 countries and
on the Internet from its studios in Moscow
and \Vashington DC. Rrs central slogan,
"Question More," is indicative of its over-
arching goal to urge viewers to do·ubt every-

2. GAO, Russia: U.S. Government Takes a Country-Specific Approach to Addressing Disinformati'on Overseas; May 2017.


(U) Appendix E - HPSCI Majority Memo about FISA Abuses


Junuart; rs, io 18
To: Hl'SCl M.1jority Members


Subject: f-'reign m1.dlir;:m..~ Survci\lw= Act Abl!!;eS 01 the nej)1Utm=11r &f:Jus1ice and 1he
Fcd,ml1 Bur~u oflllwstig:uion

Thil. mi::rrll.)t~t!<:lnm pr0vi~~ ::'i.iember. llil update ao ~ignifi~ fact!'. r.:laring to t~

~mmittee's 1rngoin~ i;wc,"'ti~atiCM1 i11ro rr.e De;,2t1mem .s·.iuruce (OOJ} and F~ral Bu~ of
ln•.vslig:u-fon ('iBl) 3!ld thi3ir use oflh,: i:'01ei~ .!ntt'llli~ Sut,·cill~ A~ (.f!SA) durio~th:::
"2016 pr~dc:itbl <Jlection cyck Our findings. which ~<l.;t~]cd !,;low, I) rn.is:;c.:,nuems 1;1:1!.h
lhc kgitin~scy and leg:ility of ~anru:i OOJ and FBT intcrwio;;s wi!h the for.:isn !ntellig~~
S!!r1eill.mcc c~urt (FffiC), :i:ncl 2) r.:pu:~i!lli 11 ~ling bn:cl.do1, n one~ p ~ s est~bii:sll.«I

to prote~'1 Qie Amcn~.!ll p,:,Jple lhnu abuse; tclato:il to cm F!SA pro=.

ln"estlgqtio11 l '~fate

On 0...-i:ob.rr 21, 2016, DO.I=.! l;BI ..ougl-tt ant! received .i r'!SA prol>tb-lc c-au~c ord.:r
(!:!fi uud~r Tille VII) oi.."tilori1_iilg : fectrorlic sur\-c:1llnn~ ,'!l ~~ P~g.; fa:,m tb.~ P1SC. t>ag;;, is ~
U.S. citizeil vmo serve..! flS a vo!t~r adv~no th~ Tromp p1esid~ial ~ip:ugn. C.On.-ir.'--ot
witll_r.:quircm~c..~ und~FISA, tl1~applic:uio11 l-~~ t., he fi_r,;tcc:tjfi=d oy the Director or Drput1
Di!tctor orth.: FBT. It lh~"'ll !\.'l{uir.;,d ihc appro•~ ol'th:: Attorm:y G::neml, D~p~• Attom:y
~eml (??AG}, 01· the S=nn!s!-ccmfrrmcd - ~ ~ t Att~~~ (i~:ieral for the ~a:tioro\ Sec;n:ity

'!be E'Br rid OOJ o'ht.rirn:d on.c :niti!il FJSA wammt .argeting c.:rt.:r l'as<! imd mree r!S~\
r~wals fam ih<! FISC. As ret{Uired by~Wtu!c(50 li.S.C. §180:i{di{l)), n FISAord;;r on .m
-~meric:m citiz.::n must be =~wed :i.y 1he rll>C every 9(1 day;; ,incl ;..-:!!cl) r.:T>Ct\•111 £>aqw.res a
1"~t)'.1I"<1te finding orprubab!..: cause. Th~n-Dir.::.:ior Jamc:s Corney sig..ed tbrc:e FISA app!icatiom
u.1 qnestion :.'.!11. b.!lwf oft11'! FBl, and Deputy Dir¢C1or .-\!u:hew Mewl>:: signed Oll<}. Tncn-DAG

Silly Y~. th~-Acting DAG !>meBoe:ne, ana DAG Rod Rommcin c~h !-igw.d orw or rr<Q,-:o
FISA np plicdiun~ on ru:lulfofOOJ.

nu~ tot~ sensitive nature of fu:ciei., imcl.Li5cncc n ~·. FJSA S?1b1nis.~ions (including
.rcnev. :ils) bcfon:: the FiSC arc dassifi-::d. A.-, such, !11:> public•; a.:cnfid~uce in !he wt~grity ofth~
fiSa\ proc~ <.!~pends on me court's llbtlityto hold the ~ovi:rn.·nan IQ the hlghes!,;,mndl'Jd -
p.'.ll!icu[ruiy ~ ii rc)nt::s to "tl:('vciil=.cc of Amcri~.!n ci ~ How.:..-cr. the FI'SC's 1isor hi
prot.:~1i:l~ 1he righls of Amcric:cns, wbich i~ remfurc::d b:.g.Q.J::y reG:::WillS of=cillar=
ilrd!:n;, is n=sarily d~dent on the s o v =t' ~ production to tfle court of al! m:\t,ri.:tl :iad
~-v.:u1l fa~. ,o
•• 11rls shocld inoh1de in.formation potentially fuvornbl~ th,e !Mgd. of the FJSA


application that is known by the goven.uuent. In the case of Carter Page, the government had at
least four independent opportunities before the FISC to accurately provide an accounting of the
relevant facts. However, our findings indicate that, as described below, material and rel evant
info nnation was omitted.

1) l11e ..dossier" compiled by Christopher Steele (Steele dossier) on behalf of the

Democratic National Committee (DNC) a nd the Hillary Clinton campaign fom1ed an
essential part of the Carter Page FISA application. Steele was u longtime FBI source wh9
was paid over SI 60,000 by the DNC a nd C linton campaign, via the law finn Perkins Coie
and r esearch firm Fusion GPS, to obtain derogatory infonuation on Donald Tnimp's ti es
to Russia.

a) Neitl1cr the initial application in October 20 t6, nor any of the r enewals, disclose or
reference the role of the DNC, Clinton campaign, or any party/campaign in funding
Steele's effo11S, even though the political origins of the Steele dossier were then ·
known to senior DOJ and FBI officials.

b) l11e initial FISA application notes Steele was worlcing for a muned U.S. person, but
docs not name Fusion GPS and principal Glenn Simpson, who was paid' by a U.S. law
finn (Perkins Coie) representing the DNC (even though it was known b y DOJ at the
time t hat political actors were involved with the St.::ele dossier). application does
not meution Steo:le was u!timati:ly working on behalf of-and paid by-the DNC mid
Clinton campaign, or that the FBI had separately B\lthorized payment to Steele for the
same inJ:onnation.

2) The Carter Page FISA application also cited c>."tensively n September 23, 20 l6, Yahoo
News article by Michael Isikofl: which foc uses 0 11 Page's July 2016 trip to Moscow.
·111is article docs not corroborate the Steele dossier because it is derived from infonnation
leaked ~v Steele himself to Yahoo News. 111e Page PISA application incorrectly usscsses
that Steele did not directly provide information to Yahoo News. Steele has admitted in
British court filings that he met with Yahoo News- and se\leral other outlets- in
September 2016 at the direction of Fusion GPS. Perkins Coie was aware of Steele's
initial media contacts because they hosted at least one meeting in Washington D.C. in
2016 with Skele a nd Fusion GPS where this matter was discussed.

a) Steele was suspended and then tem1inated as an FBI source for what the FBI defines
as Ilic most serious of violations-an una uthorized disclosure to the media of his
relationship with the FB[ in an Octobe r 30, 2016,Mmher Jones article by David
Corn. Steele should have been terminated for his previous undisclosed contacts with
Yahoo and otlJ.eroutlets in September- before !lie Page application was submitted to




the FISC in October- but Steele improperly concealed from and lied to the FBI about
those contacts.

b) Steele's numerous encounters with the media violated the cardinal rnle of source
handling-maintainingconiidentiality- and demonstrated that Steele had become a
less than reliable source for the FBI.

3) Before and after Steele was terminated as a source, he maintained contact with DOJ via
then-Associate Deputy Attorney General l:lmce Ohr, a senior DOJ ollicial who w~rked
c losely with Deputy Attorneys Gen eral Yates and later Rosenstein. Shortly after the
election, the FBJ began interviewing Ohr, documenting his communications with Steele.
For example, in September 2016, Steele admitted to Ohr his feelings against then-
candidate Tntmp when Steele said he "was desperate tlmt Donald Trump not get
elected and was passionate about him not being president." TI1is clear evidence of
Steele's bias was recorded by Ohr at the lime and subsequently in official FBI fil es-but
not reflected in any of the Page FISA applications.

a) During this same time period, Ohr's wife was employed by Fusion GPS to assist in
the cultivation of opposition research on Tmmp. Ohr later provided th e FBl with all
of his wifo's opposition reseal'ch, paid for by the DNC and Clinton campaign via
Fusion GPS. The Ohrs' relationship with Steele and Fusion GPS was inexplicably
concealed from the rise.
4) According to the head of the FBl's counterintelligence division, Assistant Director Bill
Priestap, corroboration of the Steele dossier wns in its "infancy" at the time ofthe initial
Page F[SA application. After Steele was tem1inatcd, a source validation roport conducted
by an independent u nit within f:BI assessed Steele's reporting as only minimally
corroborated. Yet, in early January 2017, Director Corney briefod President-elect Trnmp
on a summary of the Steele dossier, even though it was- accordiug to his Ju11e 2017
testimony-"salacious and unv,:ri!ied." While the FISA application relied on St.:ele's
past record of credible reporting on other unrelated matters, it ignored or concealed his
anti-Tmmp fmancin! and ideological motiva\ions.· Furthennore, Deputy Director
McCabe testified before the Committee in December 2017 that no surveillance warrnnt
would have been sought from the FISC without the S1c:ele dossier information.



5) TI1e Page FISA application also mentions i.nfonnation regarding fellow Tmmp campaign
advisor George Papadopoulos, but there is no evidence ol' any cooperation or conspiracy
b.itwecn Page and Papadopoulos. ]11e Papadopoulos infom1ation triggcrcd the opening
ofan FBI counterintelligence investigation in late July 2016 by rm agent Pete Strzok.
Slrwk was reassigned by tbc Special Counsel's Office to fBI Hurnnn Resources for
improper tell.1 mess.ages with his mistress, FBI Attomey Lisa Page (110 !mown relntion to
Carter Page), ,vherc they bolh demonstrated a clear bias against Trump and in favor of
Clinton, whom Strzok had also investigated. TI1c Strzok/Lisa Page texts also reflect
e:1.1e11sive discussions about the investigation, orchestrating leaks to the m edia, and
include a meeting with Deputy Director McCabe to discuss an "insurance'' policy agaiiist
Presidf!nt Trump's election.



Redactions match
{U) Appendix F --HPSCI Minority Memo about FISA Abuses previously released
redactions taken
TO! AH Mcmbc:Ts of\hc Hollo~ qf R~prucntotivcs
FROM: HPSCl Mi110rity
DATE: J11nuary29.2018
RE: Corcectiiig tuQ RctOTd :-T.hl! [tlisji:t Jn,'c-stigation"

Tile HPSCI Majori(y's m:>ve to rclc= tot~ House cf Rcp~..itivcs its llllcs:3tioo.:s agair.st lhc
Federal Burent1 ofinv1mis;itio~ (Fnl) end the Di:~rmmt of Ju.siicc (DOJ) is a rrans~cnt effort
to und.?rmin~ those agcncks, the Special Cou,1!CI, a.'lrl. Congress' in\-cstig.itions. II 11lso risk!
publ:c C.'<pOSUTC of scnsiti\·c sou= am:'I methods (OT no tcgitim!!c p1U'\JO&

FBI and DOJ officials did w "nbuse" 1h:: Forcign ln1cllf~c:t1er.: Sun•cillancc Ac1 {FISA) ~ess.
omit moterlnl infoIJTl.'ltion. or sub\lcrt this vital tool to spy on the Trump camp;i;ign.
ln foct, DOJ and the FBI would hawi teen nmiss in thecr ciucy to p:ote-.."'1 the C'O'JnUy !rad mC}' not
soug,u ct FISA wzrrnnt and ~cd n:n.cmi!>. to wr.du.ct lcmporccy sur,..cilhl=: of uutcr ~..~c.
someone tlte f.BI asse.'i$1:d to be an 11gcru oflhc RUSS'".an go\'rmumnL DOJ met the .!imrs
lransi,arenc.:, ~ud C\i£i.!J~i bmis ·11~ to nteet FlSA ;s prooob!e i:.iuse rTaquiremen(. by
o contampor:uteolli evirlenc~ of ~!.Si.o's ek-..tion interf=~;
o concerning Ru~an link:, nnd o~ac-h Ir> Trwnp co.m~in c>niciJi.ls;
o Paie's history wilhRussian int.cllf-sencc; nnrl
o P.age's su::plcious nctMtlcs io 2016, including in Mi&Ow.

·rt:i.e Committee's Minority 1!53 thcrefore Jm!parcd !his memorandum to corrc:1 the record:

• Cb'r.tslophcr Steele•, raw iotclligm~ rcpo rli.Dg did not lnforn1 the rn.rs decision ,a
initle1c !a counf~rinlcUigcnce im·estig•tion in lste July 1016. In fuct. ~ rBl'si:loscly-
!leld inV1:S1ipth~ team only received Steele' s ·rqioning in mid-Scp1tml;,,;r- more lnmt S-e\'tn
weeks le1er. TI:e FBI - 8ml, subscqmntly, the SpccfaJ Coun~I 's - i nvesti~tion in!o links
between I.he R~inn GOVC!iJ,"r11:nl ll.n.d Trump cMOp..1ign '1Ssoi:btcs bas be.en based l>ll
troublins law enfortr:mrnt and intcllig_cm:c inform:?tlon t1nn:1'ltcd lo the ...dossier."'

• DOJ's Octo~rll, 2016 FISA 01>plii:.,Hloa..11.11d tflr~c suln-cqu_ent renm-nls cru-~fully

outlinetl f()r the Cnurt ~ multi-pronged mtlonnlc !o:- sitl"\·eilling Page, who, at me tirne of
d~c fir.it npplicatiot1, v.ns oo longer ~ith the Trump CArn))llig~ DOI detrukd Pege's past
rebt!onslilps \\ith Russi!ln S!Res nnd imcrnctfo:, with Russinn officie.ls during the 2016
campaign • DOJ cited multiple soonxs to support lhc; c~c for
s!!::vcil!ing Pnge-buI ~de only narrow ll!lo ofinfonnatlon fr~m Srccle's source:;i !!bout
Psge's specific acfo'i1il:s in 20 l 6, chiefly his s~<red July 2.016 meeti.r..gs in M~oow \\i th
R~iu., officiirls. la f&el.
tbc FBl i.nlen•kwcd P(l:ge io Murch 2016 nbout hi; conta.:r.,ith Russian iatclligeocc. lh-: \'cry
m;:>nlh ~ndidale Don'1d Trump n ~ bim a fordgn policy &.,·iso,.

As OOJ informed tlic Com in suhseqneru rene,~-a!s,

Ste.cl~·., reporting 11b~I11 Page's MC5cow nte~tia~ • DQj's
appliea1ions did not o!h=n..ce rely on Steele's rcpotlin2. incl"Jding any "si!oi:iou:s" nlle~:itio11!;

' 1/ 146
nbout Trump, 11mJ 1h1: F8l n1:var pttld Stcuh: fo1this reporting. Whllc: t;(pln[ninB why Iha FBI
vlcwed $tC(tk's roporting ond ~ources ~ relir1hh: ant\ m·dibh:, DOJ ruso dl~loscd:
o St~le'$ J1rior rclntionsltip with lhci Fl31:
o tho foot of ond rcfuion for his termlnotlon ns n :s.ou~; nnd
o 1h1a1 uss~sstd polilh:al motiva\ion of thos~ who hln:tl him,

• TIJ.t Co111mlll1:c MnjoriJy'~ xur:.111onind1.11111 which druw, .,c1~1lvrtr on highly llrn~ltlw

('l11JsffietJ 1nrorm11tJon, tr1clude~ orhcr Lllslorrlons on<l mlsrcprc.scbllltlons lho111re
contradicted by. lfle underlyins ~!a:ssi!ied clouumenlS, which the vast rruijority ofM~mbers of
the Commltte~ and the House hnvc not h1l.~ the; oppol1uni1.:, to l""vicW-· and whi;h Choirmun
Nunes chose not lo read hini;c:Jf, 1


Ou Jwumrr J8, 20\8, the Committee Mojority, during nn unrelated busincs~ meeting, forced c.
surpriat: vote 10 ~h:111111 to the (ull Hause lil profpundl)" mis!C11ding,memonmdum alleging s~rious
ob1iscs by lhe FBI and DOJ. Mnjority slafl'drulkd !ho docwtli:nl iri secrcl rm bdialforCh.iirmM
Devin NUC\es (w,d rcpo11tdl)> v.ilh gu!tfon~e und inpul from R~p. Trey Oowdy), 11od lheo ru.:slw.J
1111any-ti.ru: volo \~hhout pripr noti~c.

Thi.s was by dc-!ign, The oYcrwhelntlng nmJorI1y or Commillco Mornbtrs oovcr rccckro DOJ
nuU1orlin1lon 10 ncc~ss the: uoderlyhli ~liu,lfied lnform111\01'1, Md th~~rorc could 110-t judgo lh~
vomc'tty of Chrurm1m Nuoc~' clni~. Due to son~Wve souroC:1 nod 111ctbod.~, DOJ providt;d m:cess
only 10 Ul1l Commilll!ll1$ Chnir nod Ttmud11s Mcmb\lr (orrespeciive d~~is.um} 1 l:\nd limitcc! :;to.ff,
to fllcllltntc thu Com111lh~':1 itwc~li!!otion Into Rus,ln's coven cumpnisn lo lnnucnce the '201 G
U.S. cleciions? M DOJ ILi!, cauf1m1~ publicly, it did nol t1ulhorize tho bron~~r relt.Uc ofrh).$
informuUon within Congress or to lhtl' public, nnd ChlllJJDll[I Nwic., r~u.s«i to nUow OOJ mid lhc
FBI lo review his tlocumen1 lllllil lie p<:rmiw:d lhe F61 Director 10 sec it for \he first time lo
HJlSCl's secure spnccs late on S11ndny, Janu11ry 28 - 10 dayi; nncr diS(:losurc 10 \he J:lou~.'

ln its Oclober 20 J6 FISA opplicBHon aod sub~µenl ri!IlewaT!!, DOJ ll(curntely fnfo.nncd the
Court t)lat 1h.e FB[ initiated its collntcrin1elligc_n~c investiga1ion on Juiy 31, ~0·10, nfl~r r~~ving
i n f o r m a t i o n - - - .. OcoJllc P1ipadopolllos re~ealetl _ _ _
- t h p l ~ l l . who,t~oklntcrest ioP11pad~ulo~mp
=Jia.ign foreign- polic 1uMser, infilJ"lll~ him in lute April 20l61.ha1 Russitt

. Papadopoulos's disclosure,
mo:n:over, ~cllm:d 11s11irin Jhc: b11~kdrop o( ijiw;iit's os.grei:th·C) c:9vcrt 1:1nnpalgn fo I nffucn tt•
our c:Jc:dions, which th~ FDJ WM 11tre11dy monitoring.. \Vo W(l\l]d J:11cr lcwa in Pnpadop,.11ilos'1,
pliai th~tlh~l t~I) infonnat!ort th-c Rtt<tSlnos co!,1111 n~ist b)'llflC1J1yntously relea.~ing were 1hou.!m11ds
9fHlllory Clint<m1~ cmo.ils.3

DOJ 1otd the Court the lruth.11.s rC'J>resm1aH011 WtJS consisleol wilh the fBl's undcrl,Ying ,
inve.stlgutivc rccor~, wlJich curm1111ml fonncr:rcnior officiuls IMei· corruoonw~i.J In extensive

Committee testimony. Christopher S!eete's Rp,;rting, wlrlgi he beg;m to sh~ ,\ilh ru:i Alf Ggtnt
thro!J&b the end of October 1016, planed no rnlc in launching tho
FBl's c:ounterint.elligence investigation into RtiSSian in!erferencc ~rid lin;:s to thr! Trump
campaign. ln f5ct, Steele's rcponing did no1rcru:h the counieri~tellig~nc:c; tcam_invc:stiS'ling
R=ia_ at FBi headqu:mers until mid-Septcmbcr2016, more tbll!l seven Weeks: nfter the fBI
Q?ened its um:sti'gatfaa, ~!lu~ 1.he prore's existence ,,m; so cl0£e!y held wilhin \he FBf.6By
tr~n. the FBl had ~dy opened rub-inquiries into U)divldll,11$ linked to th, TrumP

As Committee tcslimo:iy bea.ra <>ill, tM FBI WQuld h.wc conlinucd iu investignticn, incluiµng
::gain intlividu:ils, c:i;e..,. ifit h;ui :,e\-er received in(ormation from Stcefa, ncve: :ipplied
for a FISA warmn[ lJe!!ll!! Pu..~. or if the FISC hnd rej:ctcd tho a~l~tion.'

DOJ's FJSA Aru,ILC!ltion !lnd.R£newal5

The initial w-arrnnl ~pplica1ion :md sul>seq11cnt rC'llCWills ctt<:lved indcpemle.n1 sautiny m:d
llJ)prova! by fullt' different federal judges, three ofwhom were appoin_1cd by l?=it!enl G~rp:; W.
8~h ilnd oi::e liy Pr~i<l1:nl Roiald Rengsi. DOJ ftrst ~plied to the FISC on October 21, 2016
for a warnmt to pcnrrit ibe FBI to inittale clmn:mic su.rvcillancc imd physkel ~arch ofPage for
90 dayS: con..~s1ent with RSA reqcit~ena The Couit 31>-p..-o,id tr.tee renewids- in cariy
January 2017, early April 2017. a.-id Jot~ Juae 2!H7 -'-'ill'cl1 authcnizi:d the FBI to mafoiain
~ ,\'eiUane¢ on Page until !Ille: Scptem~r101?. Seni<1rD0J m,d FBl offid.als spp<1int~ by lte
Obama end Tr.llTI pA~nisunlions, including accing Atton-.~y Gero...rol Dan.. B-0ente and Deputy
Attorney General Rod Rd5enstcin, certified th:: applic:ntions with the Court,

FlSA wns not used le spy on Trump or ho carn1111ign. Af the Trump c.-.mpai~ and Pa~ ®''C
1aclmowtcdg.cd, Pn£e: :ndcd his £omni 11ffilk!ti~:; wilb lh:=paign months~ OOJ spplied
for a \v:rmint. DOJ, moreo\-cr, ,;ubmitted the initial applica~o l~than lh.ree ....ui:s be(ore !bi:
. clcctlon. e,·crr ilioug!t the FBJ's im·estlg.ntioo had bcc:n ongoing sin:a lbc c:nd ofJuly 2016.

DOJ's v ~ t requ::s1 wos based on cornpellin5 e\idcm:eand prob.:bl<: caus~ to bcUc\·c Page was
knowingly i=isting ciandcstinc Russi/In i.nlcUiicr.cc o~livitles in l.l:e U.S.;

• Page's Connections ro Russi::in Go\·~rnm~nt 11.ml tnlcllig.cncc Officla~ TI,e FBI h:!d on
indep;.'lrlent basis for investieotjng Pose's mo1ivnfio11s and actions durin2 the cnmpajm
lrnnsition. and followinl! the irul'Jgµration. As DOJ d=ribcd in detail to r!::c Court, ~l!l? had
nn c.xtl!DSi\·e recmd es -
•>i prior te> jornin~ th~ Tnunp crunpsis,,. He ~d~ in Mcw...ow from '2004-
2007 and pursued husin.:5.'i dcaJs with Ruma's sUtC-il\"llcd tnel'g.y comp.my O~.oro-

Redactions match previously released version-no additional redactions taken

Page rcmsiotd on (h~ rndllr oJ Ruisi11n in lelligen~c nnd the F8l. ln 20)3, prosecutor..
indicted thr~ omu 1qissian spies, two of whom 1;lfgetetl llESg-e for re....uitmenL The FBI also
intc.viewcd Pagi:; mcl.tiple times ai>D11t hi! Rw.siun. intelllgr:ncc con~. ir.tluding in Marth
2016.u The FBI's can~ about and kno\dedgi;:- of Pag,e's cc:1iYi1~ tlrerc:forc long predate
the FBI's 1ccei5=t ofS!~tl:'s 1nrorm!l.llon.

• Page's StJSpiciom Ac.ri-Yity Do.ring the 2016 C:impnign: The FJSA .app!;c;,lions also detail
Pl!gc·s 5USpic:om nctivity nl'\l?r joining the Trump ccmpaign io March 2016. I
Pose oaw:Ied ra Y...o:scow u; July 20!6; during
wliich he gev~ e uniYCJStt"J comm~e<meal e:!;;h,:ss -an honor 1.L9'eJJy RServeiJ for ·wcll-
kno..n luminaries.

o 3t 4 ln [b~ $'.ll~ifi~ ,ult-s~lillll C)f 1be application$ rh11 I OOJ 1'1!fe~ to ~tceJc's
nporting on P.1:,:; 4nd hb alk,g~d coonlin11tilln wltl1 'Runirul aI&fab. Ste~Je's
infonnetionnlxnn Page \YnS consisteru. ,.;lb~ fB1's ~ e n t ofRussl!ln
intelligem:: effora to ffl:ruit him nnd 1'.i.s-connections to Russmn _r.r-...0113 oflntere~.
o ln p:uticuia;, Stec!e·s soum3 rqioited UIB\ Page met s~aratcly wt:Ue ia Russia wilh
Igor. ~run, a clDseess1fola1C t'lfVlsaimir Put.in end ei<ecuti'!c c~i:ma:n of Rosneft,
RlWicl.'s .51:l1c;-omrcd oil comp;mj•, mid igor Di\'}"<;kJn, .a s.eitlor Kmnlin official. Scdun
al legC'dly disi:us5ed die prospect offutu.-e U.S.-Russfo. i:OCfEY ~-peraticm and "an
ossocinted mm-e tD l.ifl Uknii:at·rclat~d v.es.tem ~ctions ascinst Rus!i.l." Divyckln
al legcdly <fuclo.."61 ro Pa.gc llml ihe Kremlin J_)l)S?..ssed comproIPJ~mg info~iion o:i
Clintan ("kamproma1") 8Ild not~d ><the possibilily of its bdng rcle=i;i to Candidate
# \ '$ campaign." 12 [No1e ! "Cnndkla.<e #l" rerers to candid:1.tc Trump.] This c!O:Scl v
1rack3 what o!hs RnssillJl conhlci, ~-e infomiin& anotb~ To.mp !~tgo policy
advisor, Geer};:. ~daponlo;;,

• Tn subsequenl FJSA renewals, DOJ JH"Ovld.cd llddilion;d inform"lion obtiunrd thro!lgb

multiple: ~udcpcndcnt sourc~ lhnt c11rrabor:1r~d Stc~Jt', rrpor tlng..

This information ccntrod.~ :Pa_ge's No\·mb:r 2, 2017 tcsJimonyto the Conirnittee, ln which
he i.niliu.lly cic:nfod.any ~ incetings~d tb:;i \~ forced to ·Ddmi1 spea'<fag w~lh

IU ~I:.
DvorF.ovich !lilt! fl'll!'<:tln& wilh Rosncfi's S~hln..-ttcd im-cslor rcl;.tfu.'JS'. cchi;f, Andrey
Bmanov. ·

• Th~ Court-:ippro-.,ed sun·cillancc: orl':.J!e illlowed Fm: to rollc-ct \'lllm1b!c in li:lligcn~

The F1SA 1\."'tlewals cfcrr..onstrorc WI lhD f'BJ .:olk><:lcd hnpcu1o.nf iri~·~igat:\>t= in{armotfon
and !tads by cc·nducring Court-nppro\'ed sun-ei!lancc. FOf insta.ricc.

Pllge's c.ffoits to
sworn testimony to our Comn,jtl.ec.

DO.l't Tr.a.nspnr~ncY about Chri.~1onhC!r Stvtlli!

FAr (rom ..omitti.Dg" m~tc~nl fucu nhcut St~Ye. ,u thi:: Majority da.lm,,~ DO.I rcptatcdly
lnformccl the Court 11boutSt~c?c'll bnt1,gro1md, ~rcdlbllity, 11nd porenti:il bills. DOJ
explained in dellli._l Stecl~s p,-for ri;lntionsl1ip ~ithu.1d compcllSlltion from lru: FEH; hrs
credibility, reporting hi:slory, illld source m:lwnrk; tl'l!! fact ofand n:-~ fil'r his h:rminlllcon as fl
sourc¢ in late October20I6; ruid the likely pmi~ motivn1ion."I of lt.ose who i>Jred Sleele.

• DOJ w~t tmrupnrcnrwlth Coutt2hootSt~lc's.$0Urdng: Tl'le Committe~Mnjori:y,

which hcd ea.ii.ie-r att1.tScd ObllJlU\ A<imia.istmion officials of improp:r '"unmasldng.•r f!tults
DOJ for not r.ev~ling the ru\l'lt~ of specific U.S. ~r.;ons ~ ·entiti~ in the FISA npplkation
ond subsequec1 renewa~- ln. re.ct, OOJ .lpJ!!'OJlrilllely upheld its i9ngsraudiog. prnctic.e of
protc,:ting U.S. ~tizcn infomiation Ir; p~fully r.cl "unnui.,king'' U.S. pc-rson and entlty
names, unless they we~ thcm:;eh-es lM subjc::t of I\ cowiten'ntcllig~tie in.-.·es1ign1ion. ·nru
1nstead uscl g:nerlc identifiers t1m! pro'i'ided lh.e Court with mere than sufficient info,-mitti<: n
to undl:TSt!lnd I~~ politic:al conle:ct ofStttk's ~seatch. In an ~leJ\Sl~-c cxplanution·to ~
Court, DOJ dlsdoS::?5 that Steel~

"i,tLS" flpprcached by (;11 fdan1{/ied U;S.. P~~n/ 1 wlro fr.diCll/M (0 S:J=~ :Jl{S!eeleJ11 t1Mt a
U.S.-based f= jlritr'1 r.ad hlwilr<E irkn.tifi~d U.S, Pl!r.ton ((1 r!or.thta re~!J!'Ch regarding
Candidate ;;1 •~'I 1it.s to R1wfa. {Ir.;: JdrrJiffecl U.S. fer.fjm and &iI1r&t !1i have o !1mg•
stcmdlJtg b!lli<;-s:! r~fotlo,uhtp.) T~ i:.lmcijt1J U.S, perum hf~d ~ J.S J Jo ~onduct fh~
res~nrr:h. 71>-: /dcnl{jled U.S. Pt:rwn n!!,'eJ' IUNf.red St,111'~ JI.I as !o tl!i! l!:J)!im/!an bchir,,J lite
re.march m:c Candldaro -fl] '.r ties 10 Jlus:r:D... 11r,1. FBf s~CJrm/es ll-,a; ,Fr,, filirr;1i((ed U.S. Pcr,roq
w<1s li~/y lookfrr~ {or fnformt1tion ,r.m °rou!,J be user! lo ,(isr::rr;dil Cgr.:Nefarc IiI 's f(lf12J?(~n. ""

Co!ltr.>..ry tc> th.: Majority's osscrtiort tltill DOI falls to mentlo:-i ~ Steele' s r~c-h {\'2.$
commissi'1ned by "P:Olit:cCal w::tors" ,o "obmrn derogatory informa.ioo on Donald Tn.1mp's
lies to Rusn11,~ DOJ t, fnct lnfomird Ott Court e~urnhily th::it S!ccle WA! blrctl by


polilic:tlly-moth--:itcd U.S. per.sons .11.nd c,nl!tks nod th:it bi! r ~~rth np~nrtd"inrN1tkd
for use "lo disercdil" Tnimp 1s ,:ump11lgn.

• DOJ CXJ)llliocd lhc flll', rca~onnbk bllsb for findin Stcdi: credible: The npplicalions
correctly dcscn~-"d Stecle os
. The 2ppltc11ions also ~ S'jen~d Stcclc:'11 rimIll-yea;
hi.story of cro:iible .eponins on RU$sia and oll:tr msttcrs, includins..info.rra:itioli OQJ us~ in
criminal pro~c:-cdings. 27 Senior FBI and DOJ ollicirilis lia~·c r.:~rolly affirmed tot~
Committee the reliab:@y and credibility ofSt~le·s ~porting, nn ~ ; i i \ also rdle1;,cd in
!lie FOl' s ur.der}y;ng sawce documcnlS.21 The FB! Jms uml~na1:cn li rigomos proc~ 10 vet
allesolions fro:n Steele's reporting, includir.g wilh regard to Pcge.'1

• The FDI propErly uodficif thi f'ISC i:ifttr II rennf11.2..ltd Sttck .U"ll s~lln:t for n1aklog
un{lothol"l:ted disdosu«:S to tlii mtdill.. 1hc MajoriLy dt~s no ~ ·ider.~ fr..il \he FB I, prior
10 filing in; initial 0 ~ 21, 2016 oppli~i~n, ~loolly knew or should bave kriovm of nny
nUesedly iru1pp~oprie1c mediCL contacts l>y St.e:I~. Nor do they ei~ niden::e tlult S1cele
disclosed 19 Yill-.DD! d~111Us iru:luded 511 lhe FlS!, wm'ront, since the.British Couit filings to
wbich they refer rlo ilDl edtlrcss. wont Steele may have said to Yahoo!.
DOJ informed the Coun in iis rencwD}s lhat the FBI ~I~ promptly to t ~innlc Steele afu:r
l"1tning f(om hlm {afle; DOJ fili:d tht·first ~ t application) tr.at he mrl discus..~ his
work with a media outkl in [ate lxtom. Tu Januuy 2018 r~wt1\ f11rt.~r e~plaincd to 1he
Coun that Slccle I.Old 1.he FBI lhVJ he made his unauthorized mC'd.io disclosure betouse of his
fMlralion 111 D ~ Camey's public rmacunccment ,hwtly before the e!c~tion lira! the ffil
rcopc~ its investigation in((} cnttdidate Clin:on'.s email use•.

• OOJ·n~nr p,-.hJ S~e !or the "dossier": The Majority assms that 1l1s FBl had "separately
outho~ pn>menr !a-St~ele fer his n:~rclt on 'Tnnnp but ne_gl«tS to ffi!mtion Ui:it
payment wns ~~~l!ed ond never Uittde. As the FBl's records m-:1 Commiltee tcsti,mllll)I
confum.s, althoogh the fBI inilialfy considered c:omp:nsntlon
St~clo ullho~lcly ncv~r rccclvctl p:iymcnt from the FBI tor
nny "dosilcr"-rcbkd iDfonnntlo11•.ll DOJ acaimtely infon:ocd the Coi:rt th111 Steele hntl
been o.n FBI. c ~ human source ~irice• • for which he •,\';li ...cmnpensatcd
by I.he FB1" - payms for pre\;ow;!y,th:u-cd information of \·sl u.e
Wlt'l!lated tQ 1be FBI'~ R:nssui invc-stigotion.:;,

,-\ dd itional Omission!.. Error.1 1 11nd Dislortions in the l',1Ajoritv•5 Memorandum

~ -
- . - .. .
• DOJ :lppropriaid)" provided lfo: Court wilh .Q cor:nprcb~11slv~ CXJllll:Il:lllon of Russi.n's
election interfcrcn~. rocludi.llg c~·itlcnce th:11 R11UI11 courr.-d :in.o!bcrTrump c:nmpoign
~tlt·uor, Pap~ct\l!X'"ulOJ, .\IHI nrnt Ruuilln ~sen~ p rcYiC\Ytil tbtir hnck rui(I
d~semfo11tion ohtokn cmP ib, In cfaimiog 1J-~ there is "no cvi~ t}f any coop~ro1ion or
conspiracy bct\\,:en Fagc aml PapadopoulllS,.-.).1 lhe ~iajori1y milii.ates t1E ffl!Son wiiy DOJ
spmfa:ally expl~td Russia's ~ounfag of Papadopoulos. Popadopoufo.s's imerattion _\.,ith
~!l!.11 agents, COllpkd ·with real-time cvidzn;,; ofRltSSian d~i~n i nte.fere!JCC, provided
th1: Ccurt withe bro* ~1."Xt in whicll 1t> 1:l~luatc RI.ISSia's c!antfeitir.-e octMlies PDd
P:lge's- hi~ory and alleged con~ct ,,ith RUS$t.""lll offic:iols. Mori:o'rtt, ~ only i'iigc-

I no cvldtnec ofll..so~tc co~piracy lieiwc:cn him and _
Pepadopou'los was required. DO.f ,'l"(Ju!tl hnv1: bun utgligi:nt in omillcng ~-lh•l in{'ormalion
:1bouC Pupmlopoufos nnd Ruulo'5 conc.erutl efforts.
• In it, Court filingi, DOJ made prop~ use of n~,·s con rage. The l!.tijcrity fals:ly claims
rhet thi:. f"ISA materials '"'relied hea\'jly" on B Scp!cm_licr23. 2016 Yahoo( News .micle by
Mkh:ic:l Tsikoff :uid th.at thi~ artick ''docs not conoboratc lho Stcctc Dossi~ becQusc·ii is
derived from infonn~tioo leaked by S(Cck: hlllL"Clf." lS In fuc!, DOI fl:fcreo~cd 1sikofi's
4'.lticle, nlongside onothc:r article th¢ Majoril)' fruts lo menlion. not to provide sc~te
co:-roboration for Steel:'s repqning. but instenct 10 inform the Court of Page's public da.1it1l
ofhi3 ~uspected meetings in MoS(:()w, which Ps" 11lso ecr.o...e.,1 i1111 Septeml:>ct 25, 2016 letter
to FBI Direc.torConiey.
• Tbc Majority' 5 n~rcncc'to Bruce Ohr ii mislell<ling. The Majority mischnmclcl'lZ\?S
!}ru-cc Ohr's role, ove~ lbe ~ignific;mce ofh.i3 tnren:icticms with Stcclc, lil!d misl~::s
ab-Jut the timefrome ofOh:'s con.,mUJlkntion .,.,,th
the FBI. In fol~ Novm1bcr 2016, Ohr
info:-mel the FOi of his p.•-ior pn:>iemoaa.I rdotionship with Srecle and information tillt
S~ele sl1ared \\ith him (i!'tiuding S-teele.'s ccncezc: a~t Jruinp bci11g ~mpromisrd by
Russia), He nlso described hill wife's con!rac~ wt1rk with Fusio~ GPS, th: Hnn th~t him!
St~?e separate!)'. This oCCWl'ed ween after U1e ele..-tion mid more than a month ~ tho
Cau."1 ;ipprovcd ~ initin\ F!SA DP?1i~ion. The M11jo:ity des~n"bes Bruce Ohr as a g n.for
DOI officfot wl:-0 "\\~rl:cd cfoscfy ,,.;th lhc: Dcpul;- AUom~i' Otncrel~ YGtts 11nd lnter
Rosenstein," io order to imJ)!y tht11 Ohr \\,1lS somehow involved in.1he FfSA process, b!!l there
is no indication this is the e2..ce.

Bru~e Ohr is o well-respected career professional whose ponful io rs drugs and orgmized
~rimi:, not counterln1ellig~u. There i! rro ~\'idence t.1i!lt he woa[d ba\·ct!cnown o.bou! tfa::.
Pag~ F(SA niiplicntions and their c:onter.ts. The Y..sjo:ity'iii;ssmicms, mo~ver, Qr1!
izTo..kv:mt in detcrm1:iing lb: '\'l:rw:iiy ofSlee[e's reporting, By 1he: time O_hr.debri.efs \'rich the
FBl, i1 had nll'¢ilci)' termic~ Steele as a sow-c:e Q.r\d ,vns iridependcntl;• corroborating
Steele's ~n.ini about P.ng~·~ oc1hities..13ruc1l Ohr rook the initiative!o inform tra: FBI of
whs.t he krew~ mid the Majo:ity do:::s hi1112. gr.n,~ diss:e..-i.1re by suggcslin! he is part ofsom~
malign ccnspir2C.y.
• Finalty,1'eterS.tn.okan~ Lba Pc.gels h:~t messages arc im:levant'to ~e FISA .
upplkation. The f\.fajority gratJJitD'.J.S!y includ1$ rc~nce to Strzok 1µ1d P.ige ot the end of
theh· memoran-dum, in mi effort 10 imply that pclitie,.l ~ias infec:ed the f81'5 lii=tig_ation
orA DOJ's FISA applications. J11 ract, neither Strz.ok nor P0&e se:-\'fd as cllil).lits en lh-:-
opp!ic::ations, wnkh \\'ere the prodl.lCl ofe.xtensh·c! and senior DOJ and FBI m•il:'lv.37 !n
dcmonizir:g both cam:i ptefc:ssionllls. th.: Majority ac~ thtm o·r~otclf:=5trnlin:g tc-aks to
the media." -:nscriou:; charge, omits ir.convcniect !ei,:im,:5.~~. in which they critiqtr!:d ;i
wide :range ofother officicls a11d candidates from bolh parties; docs nql disclo.sc !hat FBI
Deput}' Din:c:or McCibe te!\if!cd to the Committee toot ~ had n-0 idea wlut P:i.ga ml:1
Stnok were referring to in their l'insurencc policy.. tcxtsr1 emi ignores Strzok's
11r:tnowl~dged ro!e in prep:.1rins Cl public.declnrallon, b)' 1hen Director Corney, about forme r
So=wy Clinton's ·•e.~: careJeSSlle3S'' h-:.'ld!1og clasiitied inform.alien-which greatly
~a.'1la~ed Clmion' s·puolic ~11\ti~n in lhednysjust prior to the presider;lbl el~1ioo.

1~ t r 111 HPSC I Ch1dmllln Dcvln N11n~. Awlrwll Auomcy Gcm~I Su:pl1en 80yd, ~pnrunc1u of Juui,t,
Jll!lunry 2•1, 2013.

Cholrmlln 0.:'l'in Nune;s, AMnllll\t J\,HPm~y O~rul Sttplicn 8Qy,I, Dcpnnmcr,1 of 11.t$1it~.
, l.ctti!i to IIPSCI
Jomr.uy24, 2018. OOJ ~lie ccnflJlTll!d In \\'rillns l.O Ml"Of!lY ~ffDOJ ~ml FDl's c,erm~orrtv[c1.1;

the D:p111tmt~t h,-u ntcO!)lmodU1ttl HPSCI'~ 01'C·~iSht rcqun-1 b'y ~Uuwms ttpa:llei;f Jn ,;,i,rr,;<ll re~ltw, or
'Ille rr.!lerfal in ~n npprojlriJLl~~c~ facility u_odc:r Ilic g. nm 1l s•ipµllllions ll·..a: ( IJ 1)111 Chiilr (or hb
d~l~I~) rwd tht RJ1:11k1Dc Member (or h~ dr{~qJt} a11d tv.·o 1131T r:.d!, '1ill1 arproprbt, .ii.:urlty
dCVTIID~~ bf ellDYtd lo "'d;I)' OD li-rbulr Uf \11~ Con:,l'Jlllt«, (2) \hat 1/):-revfew ~ Fl:i;e in~ readlijg
room SC'! up lll lhe !xf.1,tmc.111, eM (3} lh::!t the documctJcs not le-;iwe1lu! p!lY5knl control or tho DGj,p(tl11en1,
and (S) th!,l Ilic re~lcw oppM\lllitic:i ~ bl~~ilnn in rto~. 1liougb weori.gi!tJllly l'llqJJ'l=$!c:d lhll\ no l!D1~
~ \:lr.cn, ln 111'.:lowwkd:smt'n~ of o ~~, b)' 1l1e CPmrnit1t-e.1md 11:WJITJ.zlnl! lh~t Ill¢ YOlianc ofd~nu
hl!!f fom-ui:d whh ti111c, \hc Dcpai(mcn, cvrnnu1ily allttwtd no1~ 10 b:! u\cn 10 rll'CJlitnlc Hl'SCI', rc\·Icw.
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In (On!e.\H.lld lo prov-ido somC' addit~.al informalioa..

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Jflrwnry 24.2018.

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'l'Ul>5equcn1 n:ncw~I Dpplft11lloru

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~~OOiMi. O~ r n l ci"JU5t[::&, F=i.!,i, T.nfclligcrcc Survcllbc;,:: Court Apps~ioo, Jun; :?9, lO [7. r;i. Ji!.:? I.

u Dt~rln::nl c{.fuslitc, Fc.-rig;i Tn:e.l!i:,acc S:.n-~e Cmirt Aj!fliutior.-, l = 29, 2Dl 7, ll?- 36, 46, 4S.

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-::i ~ , or J~!c:e, Fll<'e~ lmellig=c: Sl:f'--eI!tc.,:,: Co1111 A;r,,,'il:a1ioo, Ocl.obcr 21, '.2016, pp. 15-1?, n. 8.
~~d !n s-.:Jm,;jucot·rrc-tmll wlionlo;r;.

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~ Ncll¢n::} ScC1/rl[)I)., Ho~ P6maacot Sck,t CQrnmi:Jrt on !R:cllig?t:~. l ufy, Wl7, p. 35.
<1 tn!miewofA:.dtcw Y~c {fBf Depucy !)~=:}, Hen= P ~ t Select Committee= lntcl!i~
D=mbcr 19, 2617, p. lOC'-101,: 15.

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Repeated hi ~ e n c :e-~,.,,I aP£1l1c::ii~.s.

;c t!PSCI .Mi:y.my Men~uro, Fore!'gr. lnt<lf~ cr.w S;,,wili= Act .ibiues u1. 1Jre lkpt:.roT.FJ efJi:rJ~ t!F..d
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re;i~l~s (elk= l'rurnp ='i"lfp, n,i.-i~r GcQ('!<: P~p<)11los, l,,..:t t.'tm is r.o :ville= or w./ coo~~ or
ro.-upirncy W."= P;,gc .;r..i P.19,>:l.opm.,.'cs..")

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!b.: FIS/I. M:itcricl~. in ke"ep~ "lil.'l 1he fBJ's g~mif i;octicc of .:M 1~:isit)'bl U.S. pc=

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ci lt:11!ce, F ~ lnl~lliru=..S,.;;v~flm.~ Col..'i /\pp!'?:aion.1"1=r"f Ii. 201;, p. JI~ C~TJ;;r ?a~ Lsu (l) FBl
mt ~=
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Oe.-emlxr 19, 2017, f , JS7.


{U) Appendix G-Senate Judiciary Memo about Steele Referral

(UNCIASSIFraDwhcn ~rated from atmchmen1}

J=:sry 4. 2C l8


Th? HOOCl'nlble Rod J. Rosmrui.n. Toe Hoconblc Chm~ A. Wray
Deputy Attorney C-=al Dirtd.ct
U.S. Otpc:<.mart of I~cc Fcdml!B~ofm~
950 ~mmylvm!aA~ NW 9'35 Pecnsyh-anm A ~ NW
Washington, DC 2053-0 W~on, DC20S35
DCl!t 0epazy Atnr!M)' G=al Roscnstcin ilad ~ Wra'j:

AtlXbcd p ~ fil)d I i:u.t:11.ficd mcm~ releicd. to email!. comcurua:tiom ~tween

Chrimpbcr Stccle aod multipk U.S. ncwsOIIL.lct! reprding the ~led "'Trump~~ ~ Mr.
S~le tOnlptled Oil behili offmfon OPS {qr Ebe Clinron Ca,np.-dga Md the Dem~ NNtioiw
Com.m.itte: amt iblo prmi<b! ~ the FRI
8-=:d on !he mt'Dffll3lkln cwu:aino:I. thcmB. Wll an: r:1pectlully ref:mng Mr. ·st«le ll) )'IN fir.
investig,ttfon of po!a!tW viol.$tkins of t8 U.S.C. § 100!, fur mtmii:nb ti» Cammittee has re-om to
bdlm Mr, S>.ecle-~ n:ga.diog l.u:i ~!:xmon cf i.nfonnatlon t£1rusir'.! d l!\ l~ ~~.

11:itnk. yoa fw ;-our prompt are:mion In 1h:h nflPQrtl!!nt matter. If}"OU. h.we =.ny qµatlom.
p l = ~ Patridt Dam c:rr DcLis3. L:.J ofChlinnan Ormley·• rtalT il{l02) 224-S225.

S:ikomminec an Cril=~T~
Comm.!~ on die Judiciuy

{UN'Cl..~PIED ~separated fn:im a t ~ t J

~ All~ Oolltrll R.on m11in M:I Olrc<;ot Wr&y
hnuuy o!, 'lOUI
cc: The HonQroblc Di~oc f'cinltcln
Hllnkina Member
Committee on the JudkllU)I

The Ho.'lOTa.bhi Rlchatd Burr

Senate Se!«! Committ(I; oil In1clligcne<:

The ll~Mf*blc Mmk W~r

S=te Scl«t Cooimi~ Oil l!Uelli~

1be Honomblc Devi.SJ Nunai

House Pcrmnruml Scled Conunitt.ce on ~Ulgt'.nu

The Honornblc Acwn Schiff

R1mking Mcmbct
Jlouse Pcrinlllle'.III Selca Commin« on IMcllig~

f I
s...... .... e.... a... ,;· •I.~ o t ,s:
• . . . ,1• rc......o.a 1:: JC...... .c,r:...... : ..... .ta,·•r.sn


(tf) FROM: Cb!!rks 2. Gr-J.!.Slcy, Chainr.n, U.S. S«:nr.te Commiu~ 011 the J::diciuy
Li~y 0. Gnilurn, Chaimwi. Su~mmitl~ un Crim:: and Tcirerism,
U.S. Semie CoUUil!u« on Irie JuiditilU')'

TO: Th.e Honorable Rod J. R~nstein, Ixputy Attorney <ii."'!l.erol. U.S.


~ HoJl!)mb[c Christopher A. Wray, Diro:1or. federal Bureau of

fa\ 'rS!ig"..!iO n
RE: Rem-nu o.f~pbcr S~!e ((){' Po1colisl Violation of J& U.S.C. § l 00 l

(U} As you know. iortna Orhh.'l Intclli~~ Officx:r Chruto~-r Skclc was hircl by(~
privste furn Fmion -OPS in JU!".e 2016 10 ~ r infurm:nion obo-,n "links be.n"ffl! R~llaod
fthi:o-pri:£i<icmial caooidBle] Donald Trump... 1 Pltr.ruanl to that l-mir= arrangcmcnl., ~.r. Sr~le
prepared e series of docum,?Dts. s.-J!ed iii itltelligenre repom. some of which i,wre kn~ cmiplled
into a "'tlos5i.er·• !!nd p11bliwd by Bi=F~tdill Jan~·y 20l 7.2 On tM foce orthe ~er, it
a:ppe:?6 th.at Mr. S~e gru.heccl much of his informwou from Riwien go\'e.rnn-.enr !¢1.ll'ttS
inside Russia.1 A!wrding to lhc 111w furn Pclil'I!! Coic. Mr. Sleck'sdossfcr-n:latro efforts wc:rc
runded tfo,:iugh Fmion GPS by Ula! li!,w fum on ~ 1:clf oflfo: Ixma.;rauc: N.tL'OIW.I Committee:
and the Clinton C~!!ll-~

(1.J} ln rcspo~ to rq,orting by the WC?1hi11i1cm f>osJ obotn Mr. Steele·~ relotkmship v..ith
the FBI rcluling 10 uri, p:inis..m douitt 9t0ject. lhe JU(i~ilU)' Coi'?'IMictee began taf.s.ing :i seri.?s of
questioll!l to the FBI and thl!' Jn.ruce ~ l abcut ~ mane.IS ns part o!the Committee'9
c:onstitutioncl. o,-enisht respcJJSibiliCies.s
(U} The .FBI has~ providd th: C«nmillr:1: Jiec~ ~ c:~jlic;d documents re!e<rant lo
the FBr, relationship v.ilh Mr. Steele :md -.hctl,cr &.c ffiI relied on hi, dossier wori:..
apJain::d in grcmi:r dcmrl below, wt.en W'onnalion in l1u:lse classilicd docWit::flts is ev.1h.,J?.ted m
light ofsvmm stlW'n.ents by Mr: S1~le ~ Brit~h liligation, i t ~ tha ei!1ler Mr. Steele lied
to tm FBI or lhe· Brlti5h tt>Wl. or 1hot w.: cl.a.s$ilicd d..~umcn,5 m ·icw«J by ~ Commiuee
coninin mnteru!ly false statements.

I (U) ~ . Vzlxva Cl. ,IJ ,-, Orru B ~ la!l~ U J citr..,J cUd O..mffJb;,hu Stttlz.. Crum )la.
11Q1mooo3.Qll(e:a·, &nsb(Apr. 4. 2(111}, p:= 9{Hcn:i:o~·~-,:1c S!Jl:m.ccn 1~ n ,.i
'(ll) tit ;,: pan.. 10: Kffl B ~. ~rlam Eti."f, l!lxi M11..1. ~ ~~ .'~~s ,r[{c,g,, .-p /i4$ r.... o.....,., nu

ta lil<Ui:T- Bl•zzFE:m{h::i. 10. ?017).
't'U) 1.!
• {U) Adz.'!! Enl :!D, Dc.lm &m5t i1:d it.<MJ!D,:I~ !Id,~~~. Glri.,:;,, C~..,,, DNC f>atf/11" R=-k tbat L4:J
u, Jam..' o lJn:.Iitf', T:r.; WA.'<1~ rt'IST(O:t. 2..t,1i:l17)..
'\ U) Y-cm Hamb~ cd Rol.ll1r~ S. lkldtm=. FBI Orrct i'!~ ,a P.zy Ft!ff/Jf!'I BrJrW. ~· >tlto A ~l:.£tttl
('<lJUraWTrla! 1'nmlp 0<=1#, Th"E W~GTOSl'c:sT {f'cb. 2t . l0!7).

., 158
(U) ln mpom'C co lhr: CommilC«'s inqu.lrics, lh,: Chainnnn nnu Rwlkinu Member
reecived o tnknnu on Mitrctl 15, 2017. from lhl."n-Dln:ctc,r Jrunr:3 B. Corney. Jr.
- n l l l l briefing 1uldre.S$ed the Ru:.~lo in\'~\ifllllion, the rDI ':i n:latioruhlp will1 Mr.
Steele, nnd thi: FBl's reliance on M.r. Steele', d@iCf in two opp)i~tioll.! it filed for survcitlwicc
under lhc Foreign Jntcllig~cc: Surveillance Act (FlSA}. Then, on MNch \ 7, 2017. the Chuinnan
an<l Run}dng Member were pro\lided copie$ ofth~ cwo relevnut flSA applicntions, Y.bi~h
requostcd aulhorit)• IO coodntl sqrveil~ ofCar1cr F2g~. Doth relied heavily on Mr. S1oelc':1
dotsie.r cle.imi, Md bo!h ll?Plienlif)ns Wt1" glUillcd by the Fcmigo lw:lligcncc Surveillance
Court (FJSC). In Dcccmbcr of2(JJ7, lhc Chairmnu, Rankin; Membe1, nnd S1Jbcommittee
Chnirman Grabs.DI were clJowed to review a totol offo1U' f'ISA applicatioons relying oo 1he
dossier to seek :;W\•elllance of Mr. Caner P11gc, f\S well cs mimcro\1$ otn:r FBI doetunc:nts
rcla1fos 10 Mr. Srecle.

(U) SimUurly. in Jw,e 2017, fomt« FBl OlrcctO!' C01My testified publioly before the
Sc-111,.10 Select Commlttcc on 1t11elllgcn~c 1]1Al lie hod bticrcJ PN:dilcnt•Elc:-ct Trump on 1hc
tlw.,si~r ollcgations In JanlW)' 2011, whith Mr. Comcy described us ·'sQlnclous·· o.nd
)lheo ~ lll lhr: M111ch 2017 briefing why Hl<l FBI n:llad on lhc d003ict in the

FISA 4119 1c.>ns 11bs.m1 mcanlui;rul c11nohor11Llon-Md in lliil1l oftl~ h!ghly politicnl ,.n od~
rurrour.dint! iU cn.-.illoll-\l1en-Dirci:ior Cnmcy s1111~ tl\ll \ho FBI inclu~ llJc dossia
l\lleJ?Blions about Cl'.ll1t:t ~ lo lhc F1SA upplic.\tfon~ ~use: Mr. St1:elc hims<:lf was
(Oll!icltffl.l reliable du.c to hu pns1 worl; wilh 1he Uurc4111.

-[ndocd, th!: doc=lll.! we hiwe revie)\~ sbow lhn1 the FBI ~ool< impQtt:ml
iJm:st.ignth-e steps wgely oos«t on M.r. Steele's. infonr.o.tlon-onr.l ~lyiTJll h:JWily Qn his
credlbillly. Spei:iJkally, on Cktobt, l J. 20l6, Ille FBI filod iu first · ~1applic:uion untie•
flS/\ for Cener .Pnge. This iniLi&l appliCLJtion relks in Pift on cllc:gc:d past ~ am.~mpt:!i lo
recroit ~e )'ellJ'S aso. That portion is lc.5:i llwl five JP..J;C$. llie bulk of Im: L1PW01.1ion con~
of!)llcgruions o.g4m51 Pngc lllll-t l.\~re di~lD~cJ !o the FBI by Mt. Sx~!e 11nd aro 111~ outline<! in
the- S1ecleoo53ic:r. ~ application appears IO cont111n l30 :u.kl.ilional information tO~bQsaflns
\ho: dossier allcg11tions ~ainst Mr. Page. although it does cite-10 a news B11!1:hnbn1 appear~ 10 be
solUWd to Mr, S(cdc's dos.,itt 11., w~l1.

G (U) SllllCmetil o! J~ta1 U. Conicy, Jr.• Hcurills or lhc l.J .S. Sm. Sclric:t C'cr.:rJo. on lnteUlgrnN (l une 11, 20 17).



-11'.e fBl di~u.ssed lhc ttlitlbilir: of tlti!I um·CTi[i~ iubmuliim pn:widd hy Mr.
St~lc in fooUlO(c:s 8 aruf 18 ofll:li; flSA wam::nt !!pplianioa Fim. lhc FB! noted to a vaguely
limi!rd extent the politioil ori~ns of th~domer. fu f ~ e 8 lile FBI~iai rf:11.t 1he dos..ier
lnformetlon wnsc:o;npiledpllJSlJllnt lo thedi=<i.onQf a Taw ffiro wht!~ tr.m:g .i.n 'id;entilied
U.S. pa-son"--nowt.nowa as Glc:nn S"nnpsoa ofFusi<tn GPS-"ia to.5ia:t =,i,"Ch.rcgiurling
[Tnunp' sl tii:s .o Russie. .. The FBI funhcr-spccui311:[drtha1 Mr. Sir.ipson °'Q1!.5 likely Jooking
ror information lh&t cou1d ~ used to diseredil lTl:UmP'S} campaigp." The SWlioli<m. railed Co
<fuel~ ~ l !he fdc:ntitks or Mr. Simp.wn' s ultimalc: c£ienls 1n-en= th;; Clintm:J campnign XU'ld Im

~ fBt ~ w lh; r1SC th:il. "'wscd on [Steele's) ~'ious rc~ing hislo;y

with l ~ ~ y [St«k} provided n:liw'.<:: i:tformnJicn to \he FB-L tr.a FOi belifl",I~
[Steclc:'s} rtporti.ngto be cmfiblc." Ir, :sher., itappc:mi me FGI relied c;nadmin-'"<lly
LmWrrobotn1ed infom1.a.uoo1 funded by md ~cd fbr S«:rctaiy Cllirlfil\'s p=idc11~al
~fflj>W$0, in orde; to G<lOOUel 5-urvtillo.ntt of Qt :lSSOCinte of the opposing jires?denlinl candidate.
It did s o ~ on Mr. Stei:lc".s pcm>nnl cre.ficility mw:I presumably haling fl!ith in ~ls ~ of

obl.un.ing the mfcrmlilim.
(U) But ti,ae is YJbsun1ial ~i:kooe suggc:ning lhst Mr. Stedc mntc.ricl[y misled~ FBJ
!lbolll a~ t of hi$ dossic:r effons.. one which b:llr.l on hiHrc:<lib,1ily.
lhc ()cfgb.;r 2016 FISA ~i-;Qtion,aod in ca,-cn cft.'>e three l'C.1141wals, ai\er
relaying S\i:c:Jc·s dorner o.llcgsrions agaimt C!neT Page, lhe Fl:31 suircs: '"!Stttlfi told the FBJ
tb1t he/she on.Iv prgyidNI this iftlorntttioo ta the bu~ln~ MJ2t\S'1 Jfu.sf913 GPSI !]Id Uic

fil!!."7 (c:mplwis added>. tndm thi: fJS/\ iw.ewa! appfie:tlion fa lanu:.r, 2017 fl()lf:S 1hZ1t
Steele had received· a
the PISA 4t>plialio.ru not-e the- aistence of4 ne,,s .:rticle d:!!cd Septeltbcr
23, 20 t 6, whM1 in pmicu!az containod some of lhc .wne d~iei: infonn:l!iDn eboul Mr. ~
oompikd by Mr. S1e11le and on which li:e FBI re.lied in iu 4pplica1ioo.. Whllc rc0t c.wlicitfy
slated. !his is ~3bcy lht! micle by Miclt;;d f.s:ikoff of Yah~ N~.e.:., fiU:d .. U.S. In•cl
Offic h1ls .[>ro~ Tics &IWrtll Tl'Ualµ A.cvisc:r ~ KmnliD, /\flc:T mning thzu }.'tr, S~lc hsJ

cll!.imed to the F.B.l he lu!d. only provide<.f lhls informatlon ICI lhe FBI and M.. Simpson. ~
applicatian . a t ~ to explain uway It~ ir.c{lnsis.mcy betw~"n Mr. Sttel.e'i ~ion lo the FBI
and lh~ c:~ce cftr.c mi.cl~ DpPl)rcr.ily to shidd Mr. S:..eclc'l i;red.ibJ1ity o.nv.i1kh it roU .
relied for !he im='Sl mt!le$1. The applic:atian to the l:1SC .!:.lid: " ~ that t~ infoml!tion
conlainod in th: Sq,!rmber 23rd n.}\l,'S a-tlefe ~ml!y ~tehe, lhe infurmatiuu about '11~ !hat
{Steele J discovert"d coing histher re~h.,

17re FBI dJHS no/ trli= that fSteelc} dmctly provided this
inform111ion to lhc yICSS" {miphnsi, tl<lckd).
1111111» f«M()tc 9 ofiisJ:wllW)' 2017 eppliC4Woo 10 n:new ,re%: f!S.I\
&,gi:., the FBI~ add..11:SS:d Mr. Stm.e's CRdibility. AI that Ii.me, the Fm t:0ltd that it had
wlmUll! for Mr.

~dc:,1 iu ~letiomhlp with Mr. S1eel: in Ocwbe" 2016 ~use of~·~ ·'unmnhori'Zi\d
rlis1:losnre of informllilim co 11-.e presiJ.,. The FBI relayed d)ar. Sceele hM be1:r? bc,!lien>d oy the
FRJ 's notifies!] cm to C('l'".gre!S in October 2016 ebo\21 tlM: rcoJ=m& of~ Ciinl~ invcstigm.ion,
i.nd as aresull "{Sk:eicJ ind:pmdrnUy e n d ~ the prior admonishment from ilie rBl lO
~ only wilh th.i: F.!ll on thiJ ll14tlef, ~lwi:d tiN rcpcnu,g dlSCU$SCO hmm {do$.'lier
cllegarloos £1.sninst ~ ) Ill s:n ilknlified oor.-s ~-mi1.alioa." HOWt:\'CS', \he FBI coatinutd 10
cite to Mr. Sit.tie'!!.~ wrk l!5 i:vi~c.c ofhi3 rclinbility, e:rid st111etl t.~t "l;hc iilcidenl thzt led
to the FDJ ~ i n g iU in:ti.omhip .,.,;lh [Mr. ~e.elcJ uccum:d after [Mr. Sttclcl pro\i<li;d" ti¥.:
fel mlh t h e ~ infonnation dt3ml>«I in the i5JlPlicalion. The FBI furthc- a;scrtal in
fuotoote 19 t1mt it d_,;d rot bclh:\"t: tha1 Steele dm!c1ly ga'Je informE!lion lo Yaht>o Ntw~ thst
"p-.ibli~~ du; Scpc.cmbcr 23 Ne\'15 Article."
lallllo.. !!.$ documc:nt.¢d in the FlSA R:DC\va.!:;, th 1: Fm &rjll ~ to bc:I ic\~ Mr.
S t e e ' J e ~ tba1 be had only provided~~ ioform.Eilion to the FBI and Fuson-
,;m nol to \be ~ 0 7 lD bis ~ med:11 C'01UBc.t !hid resulted in me FBI suspemii123 the
mlitiOllS'jp. Accordingly, cl,;: FBI still d«mi.>d die information he p.>nvided prior to th¢ October
dlS':lQ!JU!C LO bo ~li.Bhk. Aim all. the FB1 all\'Zdy believed Mr. Steclt Wi!S mirdlle, he had
previo~y ioJd the fBl he ~ not shattd the mfonnatlon v.i 1h the press - rad l)ina to the Fm is
, crime. 1n dd1?odio& Mr. Slce[e's credihility lOlhe F'lSC. l1P! FBI h:srl po-~ an ii,n~us
cxplaoafum for 1he Sept2mber 23 emcle, based on the nsromptlon Jr.Ol Mc. St.oelc hfl.d tt,Jd lhc
FBI the trUfh abou1hB}'.tt:SS con\ru:l.&. The FBI 1heiJ ..~ ior him twia: mo~. U$Ulg lbo ~c
rationnte, in s11bscq=t l'eDe'.\'3.1 npplieatiom fil.~ \.\-il.b. llx P-0mgn Jn~m,~ Sur.·dltmcc
Coll:11. in Aprll llJ)(} l= 2011.
(U) How~'l!f. ?"J.bii; rcpor1s, COlct ~ l!l1d infonnlll:ion obiainai O}' the Commitlee
duriDg wunc:ss iDkr.:ic:ns in the coune ofi~ ongo1:tS io-.~i;rst~n i.ndi~ thtl Mr. Strcle oo1
cnly pro11ideddo.s:sier infomration 10 lhe F.BI. bUI also to n.u:m~rOU3 media orgimiz.etioD.3 prior to
U-.f end of his relation.ship with the Fm in Oclobcr 2016.s
(t,') Jn Steele's m-om cou.-t filingsm lilip.tion in.London, bt"lldmi!ierl!hat be ugaveoff
lhc ~ord briefings 10.t 9.Ill'lll number of journalists itbout tbr.! prc-ct,eclion 0H:moram.L1 [i.e.• !be
ei'.IS5kr] in lat,; ~ v·au~ 2016.'~ 1n Zlliltht:r sworn filing in nw case. ~tr. Sl~le further

: (l.l} Sn Su:el~ SW=c."'J:l J; O.:r~· lte$pom,: 5o ~ I~ ' 11.:q.x:,I Cw fur..'!tf ~ f ~ , Pun~ so CPR
P2n. t &, Gdxzr.?v ft, Al 'I'. o.-b-~ l ! ~ 1 l111dhg-..., 1.!!,;:Ud arxl Ckilrt;pf,rr SUrk. 0.l:i:l Na. HQ 17WD413.
~ D'$ 8ei:Y.h {M~y la.;.'017), ~ "Slcdl? ~.atlml.2'11~~ 131'; Ttllll fu:&..~v imd·Roulilld
.S. Hcldennan. FBJ Or,= Pll'Jf!l,.-zl to Pt1J1 ForYt>r. Braim Sn ,rle:; ..fwhr,mlC ~ Tr2!f1.Dw.rfu , "OE
W ASJIINOTO.~ l'OST (f!b-2!, l011); ~ T ~ eJ filo .,.itf. Sc,i. C'M!l!l.. a; ur.> k<:Jcmy.
~ {U) Steele St..mmtnt I ?! µa J2.

staled th.sl jourMfu.13 from "'1.,ic N!:W YOlk Timo, lhe \Vashlrie,ton ~ . Y:aboo New11, the New
Yorker, and CNN-were -brl~feQ 1c tbecll.11 or SeptcDlb~r- 2016 by {Strot!} and r1.1&ion nt
Fuslon' s instruttic~" 10 The filing futlrer Slates that Mt, St:eefe "subs!<i_uer.tly p:i.rtifi?,lltcd in
funlier ~n~ m Fusion's wt=1t<>n ~ith F<Gion mid lhe Nr;w Yort; T'tTID:S. the Wa..<t.ingtcn
Po.st, Md Y11.bro N;ws. wh.i~ took ~cmid-Ott-0ber 2016.->.1 1 AcrotifJtlS to these cowt filings,
~itlhc briefing$ in;-uh-ed the disclosure of limi!ed inti:l!i~e rl.!1:Jlt'ding, imfia,.tions of Russinft
interf~ in tht: US dc,;fion process md tht; p:;,s;sil>k co-otdirumon of mcmb:rs orTni.mp's
• rn
campaign teM\Md Rlmim .govemm~toffidals.~r. his intcnitw ·.iri.th tlu: Comminee,
Glenn Simpson of Fmion GPS confinnNi this lh.'l:Ount by Mr. S!eele and l"d! c:.otnpM}' as filed in
the Brifuh COOl't. 11

~ fir!% of tl>.ts~ tilings WilS pooiidy reported in the U.S_ m~ia in April of
2017, re did 110( subsequcn1ly di~lo~ t<i Lh~ rlSC lhb evldenre SUJ:&C!llf1S 1ha1 Mr.
Steele 111:d lied to !:be FBI. inste.ad !he appik.llio!I still tefied prnmrily en his c:redibHh}' prior to
!he October mroia inci~at.
fl::U n:ccis::d simi12r infom,:ition from a lmili:! .D:pamneaJ
offici • ruce • '-''at! maintuinol ~PU!cl:5 v.ith Mr. Si1I1JOOD l!IDd Y.r- Sl:clc a.bout •~r
dcsi.i1:r wi;m. .er.d whose wife 11150 1vork.¢d for F\lsion GPS on the Russi! projcc,. ln ill1 interview
with the: FBI ·oa Na\.'cmbc:r 2Z1 20l 6, Mr. Ohr~ tlul Mr. Simpson gave the

same intetvic:w Iha! Mr. :Steele v.-as "rkspcr~tc" 10 see th.ct }r'flo, Trump v.-ns not cl!!c1ed
presidrn1. ' None oflh~ infonnmion prcvJd«t by Mr. Ohr !n bis ititem&S wifu the fB[ wns
indudcd in the FISA renc:wal l!pplicaI!o:u, dt:!pi~ rts relcvmc.e ro \\ie1het ML Steele hm! lied to
lhe fBl sbout his c:onta~U wi:th the ~ M well as its bro~c:r ~lc-..uitc to hll ro:dibollity and
his stated poUtl~ mati\'1:.

.. 0n tue tritb lbc Sea C-=!l:..

• 3"~ {NC>Y: l:l, ~Cll 5)•
r.i ~ Jlidii:~ 11120s...o;.

I F0-.302 {u«.. 12,. 20 (6;
FD-l-07{Ncw_ 22, 201si


- h ~ · t h e t Mr. Sleek lied to 1bc FBI ubout hi$ rnedii1 eon\.lri:l) i~o:lcvunl ror 111
Jca,i \v.t> rct\!Ul'"· f'irsl, hi~ rc:lc:\'Ulll lo hiJs crc<liblllly IL" 11 souroe, putlcula.rly W"cn 1hc hick of
corrobom1iu11 for his clnlm,, u1 lc.ut :11 \hQ limo lhcy were iru:Juded ia the FlSA. applicdotlOf\ll.
Scoond. it is ~l~VMI to the 1cli1)1lillly of hi, infonnation-glll.htrlng tffor1.1.
(U) Mr. S1cclc condum:d his wort for Fu,ion OPS compiling lhc "Jlrt... olection
lllL'CllOrnilda~ ''(b]t't\\WII Jwie Md enrly Novcmbi!r io 16.~n lo the Brilish litigmlan. Mr. S1celu
ncktlowJ~dgcd brieftngjoumnli~ ntx>u1 thct do9sie: /Tlffl1Cln:lndll "io lnh! summer/muumn
20l6. " 18 Uusw-ptisingly, durills Im: summa- of2016, n:port.'I of111 lemt some oflhc: ~c:r
allegations bcf:l!UI cimilllling amQll3 rcponcrs and people invclved io Ru.s.siim i~cs. 19 Mr.
Steele oJsn admi11cd in the llri1i!ih li1igruion ro t,riefing joumnlisis.from 1hc WaJJt/11gran Pc.v,
Y'1MO New~. tlie New iar*-u, IS1\d CNN m Scpttmbcr of Wl6.:w Simply put. tlte mo~ p:opl~
who contcmpOranco!J!ly .k.miiv tluit Mr. Steele: W8.'l. ~mpilins his do:isia, the more 1ikdy it \\Ill:\
vul11erable 10 ro.nnipQlo1ion. 1n· fact, in I.be British litigaiioo, whicb ID\'O.h"t'.S s J'IO!l<kc:ticm
do.55ia mmiorandllID. Mr. S!celc: oomitted lhnl he received lllld. indudcd in it unsoficlt::f--ilnrl
unvcrified-nllcgatiom.lJ That fitiog ~plies lhat hs! siotilarly :recd1,Gd UilSOlidted ir.tcl.ligence
on these moners prior to the election a, Y.--eil. Slitting that Mr. Steele.Mcorrtfnutd 10 ,~ull'e
UMOl/dJed }IJ/tlllgtnu on the ms~ covered by d1e pre-elci!lioo mcm.Pram.b rillc!r ~ tJS
Prcsiden'!iCl.l cl~tion."12 ·

. (U) Olk! memomndum b Mr. St~lt lli:u WM not ublishL-d by Bu=(cl!d is dnl.ed October
19 2016. Thuttponnllegc.5tl Cl.'lweil~
Mt. Stetlo' s memonu wn ~llltcs I us complln}' "ru«ivcd lhls JeJJ()lt f'r<>m Jon
S SUlli! Dc:p.1rtmcn1," Jluu the repott won the StCQntl In u $t'Ji,c ti I n
t c ,e from o forcl2l) sub,,s(lUY(:e who ·~.~in 101.1
frl~ ot' th~ Clioiom, who ~13od h 11 11 i~ troubling cnoull,h
thul c Ch111011 Com1):)18Jl ful'\dcil Mr. Stet:le'~ work. btlt 1hu1 thQ~ Cliruon A:Uo~ln.tc! were
c:-0ntcmpo™1towly feeding M,. Stttle alltSolions roi~ oddilioMl concmu nbout hi5

(U) SUolt Suuomcnt I Cl p:,t'I, ii.
i. (lJ) St~k s~1cmm1 r at JlC1L. )l
tt (U) hhknlP~hiri Tl'IIO~ On fi~ whb 11'.: Sat. Cc,otru. Cfl 1hr 1\ldlcW')' (Mt. ~ bfn IJ\r~rn,cd 1hr,
Comrnliltt fh~I flt!~ hwt~ l\'oin J!Nmdilu IIOOll1 thl: \10$.Jlll' bet~ It 'II'~ p,_blbhod, DiKI 1/ioos&,'IJ h Y'11S lll~
·5 \IJlllllCf af:?ll 16).
"'{IJ)Stcck swemem 2 a1 ~ 111 tcurpba.lu lldd1:d).
1, {IJ) ~ l , S1t1mocn1 I 111 ~ I~ Md 20C. .
u (U} Id; -s~1c S~til!lttll 2 ~t 4 rStM:b lne~IH"1)C.C . - M>I e,.;ti\Tly iOUgb\. i\ \l"t.! rncnly ~ !"o:d." )

~ - Steele Ihm apparently p=ec.i lhls repo:t to the FBi.

-.S:mply put, Mr. Steele to.Id the fBI he ood oo1 roi..~ ~ Cmn- PAgl? doss-ier
i n f o ~ d his clit:m imd the Fl3l Th: Dfpamnra repc:!led Iha! dnim to u~ FISC. Yet
Mr. St~Je ad.:nowla:lgai in =m fili~ thaJ he-did bnt?f Yahoo Nn,,~ and other.media
Ol't]animtions nbom die d<mier-around. the timi! of the [1Ublicar.ion of the rahoo Ne1r$ rutiele llat
seems to b e ~ en the ~ r .

(U) On Sej>tetnber 23, 2016, >".koo Nfm pubtls.hal Hs ortlek entiikd "'tl.S. in tel
Official$ Frobe "Tie$ &tween Tromp AdYise:r and Kii:mlia.»ll That Ql'ti~e ~Dt'rl cl!lllI15
about meetings bc-t\,ttn C.mer J>uge md Russians, includ.ing rgor ~ n . Mc. Si:cnin is
described in tlR: article a5 <>a longtime Putin aS!OCfate nnd form~ Russian d~..1ty pri.mc rrunJncr-
undl:1' ~ r u i by~ Treasury Departm..."llt in respon:si:. ID Rusm's e,ai_cuis in lhc Ukrainc.2 i ~
article ouribittc:i (he lniormaticn lo ''ll \\"elt-ttlaad WC$C~l intelligence sour.;e," who repotto.ily
said tool "'[~rt their =Ileged ~tins, Seehin r:w=i lhe issi:re o f!he lining of~ tiol'ls wilh
Page:.z, Ta:is infurm-ation also appears in or~ltip!c "'m<!mornrtds'" [}";it ~ up the dossir:r. ~

(l;1 in $UlD. erouoo lire 5llmC lim c af.;c,o- Neir.s publisfu:'d its sru..-u:
co nlafoing doss.icr
infonnnt:ion l0JUl est~ Page., Mr. Siu!~ ll!fd F-,l!.ioo GPS had brle~ Yal!oo i\~;1' 111:1d O'(het
oi:w.. outlets them infrunlMion conl.ained in the dassler.

~ fai::ts app,ear to direc!iy ccntradkl the fBl ·.s ass..-rticns ill iis inili.sl
sppli~~-~e PISA w11rr11m.as "7i'::llas subsequent renev.al 1.pplic:aiom. Toe FBI
repear~dly ~ c d to lhe court thlll Mr. Sttcli:: !Did Iha FBI he dkl ,rotm.'t'l! ur.mi\horizcl
contacts wilh !ht: p r,:s:, ~boui the dos.1itt prior ~o Ocl.1'.ll:wWl6. Tbe FISA !!.pplic.il1ions mllke
!.htse cl.e.itm spec:ifitl!lly in ~ context of.the 5.e?1ember Ult ti l ~ l..'&-setide. Bw Mr.
Stt:dc ha, ~ - p u blicly before a cou:t of ra-truu he till hA\-e ~ CQl:W:~ with·il'.e
pr=~ this time, i>!'.<I his lb.-mer busl~S$ ~ Mr. Simpson ~ COllfrrmed it to toe
Committee. TI.ro5. ~ RSAcppllca1kmsar¢ci1Mrnwaially fslse in daimingths\ Mr. Steele
said he did not pl'(ni de doss!~ iD.form~ to~ p=s prior l o ~ .WI 6, OJ Mr. S~h;
made materially i~ S1a1emcal9 to lbe FBl ,vhm he claim~ h<: only ~idcd the do$$i.er
inft1rmation to hiJ bu!i=u prutna- !Uld lhe F9f.
this ~c. Mr. Sta:!e•s <1pp.trsn deception !!Cem.5 io ~-ve ~ significanL..
m.st~riat ~u~tts on the FBt's in\~th-c decisions wxl reprcscntlllions lO 1hc ~Wt. Mr.
Steele's !!lfoJT!lDtion.fqrmei;l s $igJJifi~.t portion arl.hll fl31'll w~t ::ippli~Ii~a. and lb:: FIS.A
.:ipplicotioa rt:li<.-d rogre fu:a.~'i.ly on Stecte•s cn:dihUiiy tl'!lln on any wdtpcndc:n vcrific;.wion or
oormboranon £'or his dsims.. ThllS lile ~ fo;- ~ we.mu1l l'Wthori_zmg wr.-cilhmce 011 a U.S.
citi7.tn rtsts l.argcly oo Mr. Steele's crc-dibiliiy. Tho O.:~t l~~ I= l'C$pomi.hility to a
:u (U) fl.I ~ l lsillC.{[ U.S. fmd Of!l<"1/s f?o.."'« Tic e ~ Tra:tl\p Mrti'lf' or.d K!'ecfl::i. YMl'"...O N1:.11;s ~cpt. i..;,
"(U} Id.
., (Up.:/.
?> (U) &o.,m&tt ~- :::i, lit.:Tfte:o.


1kto?rmins? wh!!thcr 1'.lr. Steele proviucd falsi: informu1iu11 lu tl:t: FBI u11u \ ' hcthcr !he FBi's
rcprcsematkms 10 ll1e eourt \\<!re in c.m,r.
(U) Accordingly. we are ,cfor rins Christopher S1edc to the lkp:irtmcn1 of Justice for
invo:s1igotion ofpot,mlial ..-iolaiion(s) of 18 ll.S.C. ~ J(){)J.

I 165


- ~ APR 2BV ·
{1) Al.EKSEJ GUBAR.!f1< - ~.::,0 Q.l....;
(2) WEBZIUA B.V. '<,,- >,·-N n<cY
m w~~tJ,.A l-JMm:o ~:..-~1:...~ .P·
{4) xaT HOLDINGS 5.A.





~ ., t!i~ veffin~ ....-e !o pw.,gr-~ in lhs P ~ al Oain wte.1e olhetY;ll!O


1. Sa\se 1h51 R Is admltted lhal lr.!t Sece9d a.id Thlro O;ilm3re. 1;1ra tM;.11liog
lnlm:!!rucM'e =npanle: t;es.ed in e-~ NeQ)ertands and ~rm !8!.pe~. no
!l<!rnlsl~ ~ tr.ede 0$ lo persorsphs 1 f!od 2.

~- Th9 Se:oM Oe!enaanl es'.d CM:;!opoor B;.urC'\'4 ""9l'O ~ Ae~ end

eipe~ Cii;znn .satWl'ltl: In !h~ ~~n ltnd ~mmo~'?h ~

5. ~ .Atdtr1N Wood G"CMG ~ ina 8'1tkn . A m ~ r lo M~..al'tl ~ 1995 a!JJ

2000. He ta an ~ le i=e!bw C>f k'li& Ru!J!a mil Eurasia Programme at the RQYal
11'1:!llillJI& !or lnlemafiCl1lll Aftainl el Chca'il'.sm Ho~ He ~ oho on A;sociale ol Oro!~

6. FUJi:)(; GPS {'FU3/,cn'}l$ a alffli.1£sl1C'j l::i85ad In Wastihglcn DC p r o ' ~ fll$(M!TCl1.
11fro:eitci n \ ~ arxt tlL11;1 ::!~'tee SCfV!ce~ ro cllM\l$.

7. Pnc:v to 1,) 6 O't'OO~ In 1$Sw I n ~ =~ Ifie Oefendanls ,'la'tl <iewloped 8 l'iOJ1LTJlg

roiator:st.fp ~th Rlslon OV!!t a n.srnhEr of}'88ft;.

8. Al cB .T~lWl! U.'11M F\1~1-0l'I w.3~ ~~ to a11 ObligaUon rtil t~ ~ - th.."11 !O

pertle.s confide~ l n t e ~ mo!~m!! p.rovldcd ~ ii by ~.!I nerend2nts tn tlii,
CCtl1SQ of tl'la! ~~no rolal~ ~'W..i! a,s ssraemern or iff.l DE!Sld.imi.

e. Bo~= J1.'nll am eiar1y Nov-emt« 1016 Obis Wi'J';!, (Jnnai;-eo ~ F ~ to prepara :i

&()(Jes°' ~~v:1531 1'11~-.da ~ I);') 11\~I~ a . i r ~ Rici:sien effocta to
Inf!~ ::ha US Froo/dr.nlial ~cGci.'I ~ .!l'ld llMll bal',Y2!l:'l ~ ~~ 0Q(\31d

10. The De~s.;dsn1~ produced ~ lhJctl marnorar.da. ThwJ '1£J be re'..elTBd to for
i;oo\~Jer<C8 as '"Iha pra.e~n ~ ·. l'l.a\,rag b$81\ prop.a;.!d ~oro C'>O
2018 us Prc~a1 erect!a.'l. TI"dS iatt ooc ~ ~ in aie tauar p,srt or
Cc»~ rote. Nc:1D won, p;od~ h N e \ ~ 2018. Noc» a1 tl'le p<lHlleruoo
memM:rida. C011ts!r4d 8ttf ~ }o_ or ln~lll;«ic::& about. L"ie ~

11. A!i .en Asscciato er ~ ~ MCrrM.Wood wu tvrure or in'3 s ~ oereridar:t's

ln!e2lga.~ gsthef.r;g f« tl)ci ~*"-n

12. ~!Cl J-,iu, McCflin I! jhe Chmr ci !.fl8 us Sllnia'.O Armed S!~~s ~ltt(IO Md
:s me.m::.er of~ US $aroiile ~ on Hemo!anc! ~ Vl<I G<Mltnn1an~l

1:t 03-41 Kramer )a a !ocmer us ~-e ~ ( ! f l l cl','!I sa1w:rt ano ~ ·us AiSi1.tani.
s ~ of S"1la ~ Desrn:icn,q, Hun-an Right!!, and ub.:ic fro:'r. ~ to 2000.. H5
ls ~ Senb" Dir"-~cr tcf Hum.so RJs1t15 SJ'ld Human fnasr:loa;q si Sat'abr LtcCatn's
lr.sli!W!tcr !fitem~tonol Lez~Jp.

1od... Meir ~J) O:loclfon of Oot'ulld Trul'l'lp 8 ! t!Je 45" Pc.isidonl d 6"' Un:"lcd S1altm Oil a
No...::r..tm Zil1 e. Sir M!Jrtn/ WOC4 r.:et l.!t" Krnnrs1 e.no ~ ~- A> it R.&\iit
of the:r (f~fOris S1r Arl:!.rew anM.,g,!!d for the Sacood ~ &ri meet Mr
Knsmer, as Iha ~resootatlw of ~ « McO.ln, In ~ to 6hc:?H him the p~
ill9clioo msmcranda on a conf.<ler.tia! ~


15. The rn&.:±)g t:..a:Jl9e!I tM Seco.nd Os&ndMI end Mt 1(.'E;Tl'B( t::.x p\OC8 Oil 2B
N!M!rnber 2P18 !."I &"ffey. Mt l<ror~ ~the S=ul Oefondo.ll! lha1 :he ln~~e
oo had gaihelrl r,ijS6(j ~ of ¢.es?s l na~I ~ ~ -

,6. An arrangancnl w::s IOOsT m200 upc:1Mr Kramslis teUJm ~ Wash;.T,.tlOn lo, Fu...
to ,:wt.!l_s Sm. Mt"Caln ~:I\ tl'W ~ of the P'JHll~ r:;-emnranda QO ~
0 0 / l ~ ~ V:>3 +k Ktmnsr.

17. On b1!11',a.'f of Son ! l ~n, Mr l<rermr requo:iled lO bo pro,."l~ ...-:th oriy hL"ther
lnfEIUl!Js.-r;e g a ~ by It\!! D e f ~ ~u:11llegod ~ n ~ e.S11cs In Iha US
Prll'!lde.'"l!i~ e-ac:Uon.

18. Toe Defer~ c:i.'ltlnued t o ~ ~.ell&.1 lMeUlci&nca or, h tr.aEar.i CO'rara<S

by th& p r e ~ memonmd11 ~ 8'~ US Presdenllal ~ , l!1l:i the condl.!S.00
cl Ula assigrtme:11 f0t Fuakln..

19. Aller r=.'Y.ng ~me wtll Weill~ the Second Defc,x!;m\ J:tepen!d !he
COrlfiOGn~ t:loeomw ~ refe~ 10 et ~ p h c:n h~ own a,.
!nllla1hiie en 111" el"Q'.io;i 13 Dewmbet 20ta.

anu collSldored, ~ ,. lhi?lt Cho iaw lni.Glfqence in tl'"' Decernbor

20. The De!~

lL w:ea of c:.nsid~ lmPol'lllnoe in relf.\lio1l LO all!Jge.-J ~ rruerrorer,ce m

tro US P<oskJi;q-itlal a.lac6oo;

i,. ~ ir,;,;,ica!.kull; ror·1.lJ!l naSOnai sec:.,.'k,. of !ho US a~ fh:, UK; .,111';1

c. rir.«!c<i IO be anaiylsed a n t i ~ ITTV!;3.ti;zaledlvanfi~.

21. Acz:ordinQ~1 lh8 ~ OclendDl\t .r,.-ot ~ & ro-r,y d t h e ~ ~orarullrn

1. a. A!~r UK ~ er.t nafon?J 10:::u't.'Y offlcl&J a ~ in tis ~cial ~ f y .
l o., o ~n!.c!antiDl rir..is 1n ti&rn w:;,-; rem,: a.rad

b. FUliO:t, ~ ettQPhattd emu!! ~ ~11 IO!lruefion to Fusion !O pmwle a ~

1 ~ ll) ~ - McCthl '<UI ~ ~:st.

Uabrnty for the publication comp!!llned ct

22. Snw 1.'13! !t is edmlt1ed Ula! ~ ffilfC~ com~ of Md ~l!l oo.rt !llOmf1 1,1,<:?HI
con\2illed in ~ eonfldanfral Dac8mber memara~. ptHagmph 61! ~ -

23. 11 Is denied ihf,i In ~ r n&t!.r.l! e.od ~ roea.rimg, i:': lherr ~er tantiro. ~
wt,rtls wmpilltnoo of bore oc Wl!fo i;spaNei of beef.;-ig ttie .meenng pk!aasd s1
pcragrn~ 7.

24. Rea.I in conraxs !he nawrnl Ml! ocrl!ruuy mminirlQ ot Iha YKl(CS ~ o o o( -
~ t m9m 'ffl!rn ~n:,ur.:l:a !o lm.1'S'.l;rB1e ~ the O~lltll ~ bG6cl coe,n::ect hy
R.uwa ln!O t i s ~ .be cc:nputu'!: ~ tly 1.11!3 US ~traSc ~ ~~­
IJansnittlng ¥fro-.;. P8~ b<~-;g. s1es11og da-ta entl i : c a - ~ llltal:"ITTl OpEScl~

25. S9YS iJ:...<s0lar as a Is aclmltl~ etove paregl'!-PII S.1 19 t*l'~.

2$. Tl',s, flm sentor~ QI ·parag-:oj:h 8.2 13 notDt3. Thh Is uooo.-sraod3blo. lM 00tl1Cl)3j Of
ths O!;-QJm~r mo..w.orancrwn 'W'ln? h'igr.!y sen~itr.ia aoo ~.a Ce'fe~ rr:i.'y
alssem!.iatod ~P~ ce uIn st:ia eonn~co Be alO!IKak:I.

26. Sub~raptis 8..2., . 8.Z.2 ~ 6.2.4 im, cdmltte<I.

29. A$ to s u b - ~ a.2.3:

L The Int gel'l{mc:o is «,o w;ue for Iha OefeMarts to plesd to rn £nY
tn!ar/..~l way.

t Thll &"Et ~llntenr;a ~ again IQO ~ fa; :J)Q Ocl'~:a ID plcx! IO t.'\
any mea~ way. T h e ~ mr;mo,~ndum ~ pto~ed (:)
(t",e r e c _ ~ I ~ ebcr.-e SC Uu!t !hal lho !mon;-. atoo Ill ll was
known to (ha Uniliid Slat~ 6r,d Uniled ~ go<;'QITlffliv.is el a
higll l!n~ b y ~ wltfl ~tiiltY fo; iwU!x'ral s ~

30. To.:t Rrs1 sc;nts=ci $l!>~h 8.2.S!s noted.~ Defendants did no\. ltG'_,.'!f,
prov!t1a .n)' ot l~ p.-la~ r . ' . 8 ~ b:) !Ueda Olg"'...Jl~~ or p.ime.li5ls. far
orl lhby ilUtho,.rt?o an,'Me to oo ao. ~ did l?i§y prowlo u-11i l;Otl!ide.?°..:al Dece.-n'ixif
mF-roorenc!tim fl) medb o ~ n s or Jo~. Nor di! !hey auihorizll am.,-one to
do 60.

32. Sl!Vtl lhltt it b 41<1mitt«l U'lcrt Iha SQQan(I Ool00!1Dnt (Jt1vo off IIIQ r~etm.l IA!lingi; to ll
ll!niili · m11111>0t of Joumnl~ riboul !hi, pr0-0IC1Clion mnmornndo r, llltl'!I
:iurnmor/® h.rnn 201e, AUl).~rogn.ipll o.2e 13 <knlod.

35. Parngrnph B..5 i9 O!!:ll!Gd. The Del~ \s ara oot·Tiebta for ptt~liOrl by 8 ~.

Quatlfktd prlvUeg-~

:ie. Further o, in Ula nltsmeGv", the <XK1/idonUel 090Bmbor men:.0111ndum Yfil!i ptmfi~hltu
by Wi Dofond3nts. as !HB!lrmd 111 pa.mo
raph 21 above, In good tallh, QO un QC:CllSlol1
of qulllllied pi1.,,.3eoe.

37. In the cltf.lJrnetanCl(Jll or,t cul cbDll'ft Iha OD!l)O(l.,11111 woro t.JWr,r p l,l\rty lo puCI.$ tho
fniormollori fn U1u 0 11com"81 m~ n i le ~ nor,trJ1 VK QO','(lrnmont nllUonnl
i.,cullty officio! 11.nd &n. Jkenln co th.11 It ~ 1 koown to the Llnl~d KJngekJm M d
Ul\llod Stotoa govomrnonlt Ill i:t hloh klvul by PoriOII& wi.h rMfl(lni,Jblllly IOI nnUoMI·
t.OCUIII)', ~ mcl;,l«lnl!I had O C:Of,OJ jmlllllnlJ duty (Jf ll'llc!,ost Ill t1)01'llvo It Ill !Mir
c.ipoc,l11>u WI Ur«>t ~ nllllMl:.ot lh«lo uovommonta ~ •vcll rnnpoooiblrillu.!l.

SO. The fncldc,nt.et f)vbllcolloNI v.i F ~ ulld Mt Kmmor WCl«l rcosol\(1blo Oft a moann of
bnnl)kl{) U1hs uDMUVft d()aumon1, '10\mll)' to lho • Uon.Uon o( S&n. MoCul11.

39. Tho Dofernhmll) old ·"ot publr.h tho DtlCC1mb01 momo~ to any of !ho wxl
rociplenlo wRh mo lnt"1l)on II ~k1 bo ropubil~hod lo tho world at 1D:rzy, not" r:Sld tt,(ry
n!Jc llMY ol them to ropub~!!h lhfl Ou<>ernb?:r 1nemorv11dum to o\l'IOJ'S. It any or loo
rociplonla dill '°with lhlJ roa\JI lhAt It ~ s pubfi~l1od ~ tho world al laly11 Iha
Oofondon w, In tho clrwtn~ llCell.. rl!mln I.lie pro'..!)Ct!cn of qi.ziuC'lll:d pi'filege.

40. L, J1;1lation to parzigrapn 9, It ~ @t!mltti;d ihet publ[callon Qf .l>i& '>\'Oros comp'~ oo of

by 8uzzfood ("' EJJY 51.Jbs&qu~I ft>ltm'lill repubflcalion ~ tl'IOOO IIIO«hl by U,..ird
parties) WBS likely !ti ca"<lSll S!!rlrus ha(m to Iha rer,umtion ol lho Flrol Claim:anL Save
as nfomsoid, po1tlg(Clph 9 hs no; !ldmlllod. In parlli::ul.11, II ~ riot adrnifsd that the
publication or 1m words ~ ! H I o/ by BuzzFeed (or an~ 11uch S~LICnt
ropublloo\ion) h~ o.mm1d 8000llS fiflllndal lollll w any of Ito CtalrnaA\3 the< it b °'
tik91y to do r.o In future. The Cm mmls il!t(I roqvll9CI Ill prow ttl9 nXl1lUtnoo and ~tent
of or,y ~ i r!OM()IOI IO?is ci.ndlor eny ·1111.ry rwo 'flnunckit toe,.,. llllO!led hy th6
pvbllc.it/,Qn of tiw. W()rdn r.o/llp!tllood 1;1f,


-41. Pa~ra;h 10 is rot:c. It~ r.ocr.dlrottod~i lh1:> ~wor sadtQf too ~ .sd"~ic(o.s it! ~>
Eur~'\ Uni= in Y.°h!i;l'l lhe ;wrtis c.om~ ol wen, rx,ibll&hed ~ iir.d IS, ~ fe:
as m1t:9dal, \hs S£1lle as Ole ia.,, r:J England ard W.ile5.

42. /n7tlilal!On t o ~ f1:

t>. Sub-porag;e;>'I n2 l3 ednulled bul it is ~1'ia:I l!tru ~ Qe(e~·.a ~ llshll:l

or CG~od ft;:i '11)b!icnfo:a of Iha wo,'d:; OOi!lp.:.linod ofeoan:mefyw;dely.

44. !fl re>.all:>n 1!l tllO secoo1 Snnlllfl::& of ~ t; 12. II is ~>ad !Bll lt\15 C!L,."Tialn
are ~ ~Jeo to ~ ®meg~. w ~r aggr.r.~led or Q ~. agatzw. !!l8
Oa~6f'ldalts ll~ o ~ lo Bu27.Fe8d.

45. I n ~ t o ~ ~ 1i,1 ana 12.2. u"' adrntUl!lG !!lat !he D ~ dld not
contac! the Ctai;411l"i$ p.rklr ?D 11",e l)l.lbbl!® of Ire 'fflmls ~ined of by
Bu::zFaed. In f:::Jltl of :he mal!el'S p!aa.delS aboYa ih8 0~111 h:::d n) ~ to
con~ lt\11 Oei:m~ I'll rclaS~, ta Iha p1.-b..";callon oflho Deoomber tr..:~trm I:?/

'6. P a ~ 1'2.3 l a ~- The Fil!t. Sl?C.)l1d ar.d Thkd C',a:msr,'!s mr.ta IQUer blita
IH:!JDI\ lo !M 0e1~rlda,:r,~
. Oi1 ;l3 J!JU..l!t'/ .2017. fhe i)efeodanls A<:k/JaMedgad ~ I
of '111 !«tor bofn u ~ lhrouQbl! letiet fran !hair fomietllofTci'.Qte. ~ a . en :m
JMua.rJ 2017. Tho Oo!enda....,.3 !tEn J)tQ'Vlded a d ~ response 10 the let\er beflx8
aeljon fO'Jt day& ~ on 3 F ~ 20T7. Jha Defendani$ t,Oln~ o:Jt tl'ISl t?lD
Ctalmsr.ts' 1au,1b!l!orl, action ifxl not me..: the mqlin!manls ca:itei.-:ed the ~ rn
A.cl.lo!\ Prot~ toe Ol:!£amt1tlon. tn ~ a ilar rJte liUe.r M!att ;ietion;

a. stst&d tl'lal t~(JOO;l Y/Q) 3, en«Y ~l'& ~..ictcd tr'/ •e_ff ilfire~ ot ~
~lld and Thirtl Ov~ts.. bU1 ca not pro'lidA! Iha ~ or Mr/ d019!'~ t;f
:i'loi!:o 'ell:~ . Nor (ijcf ft 5La1$ ~ r M~!l1\0tt Wil & Ems,y ~
r.struct9d by ea Fau.~ Cta~nl;

b. @ not !~n(f'/ Liie ~ r ~i.on{e) lt!Sl ~ I.ho ~J~ o£ lllB

~pe~ om, c;:oo!la:ry to p:irag;-aph 3.2 of illo l':,t-Acc&:t» Prot~ool fo.-

c. c.id net ~ffy L'18 ~ t.10l Iha F'iB! !o Thi:d Cfa~b !db'tlul&d ta ~
'l!ffllS co.'T!p!2i;:-ad of, cx:otmry IO ~ra;,.'l 3.3 eJ lhG ~,oaoo ~ ti:"
The Def enc'an.!q lhe!oCoro n : q ~ l!l6 ~ n r s to proi.ic5e Ula r i ~
:otomiatGn In c:der IO ieuab:e tll<;J Defffldar!l5 to prov.oo.
a rl.lll ~ io ir~


proposed cln•m Notwithstond,ng thP- l:1cl thi\l the Oefondants provl dad a tJolcl1lcd
response lo ll'ie C!alm11nls' lelter belo10 action wllhm 11 clay:i of ti1nt teller being ser.l,
end nolwil.'lstancllng the r,umorous dr.llclenc1cs 1n tno lotte:r oefore aaion, on J
Febni.iry 2017 lh9 Claimants Issued nnd served proccedi1Y;JS on tho Defendants. In
the circurnstanccs. tho Oaim.inls' decisi on to ,ssue procoedings less than rNo wooks
anor the !cUer before oclion was 11recipitous, i ncompa:ib)e .,. ,,ti
the ove,,1e11r.g
ol>jcct1vc In lho Civ,I Proccduro Rul!ls, ond b,e.,chod tllo roqu1rllrncn;!; of tho Pm,
ac!ion Pro:urol /or Dc:lwnullon.

4 '( 11,s <1F.riP.<I thill the ClalmR'llS R•e t:nlllled lo ;in 1n;unc1ron agai nsl ltl!l Oe(el"\1.11:I~ ::is
pl~~dCXJ ·n parngropll 13 ol tr,e Particulars (t/ Clo:m or m <111.



I ho Dotondonts t:ollavo tnat lhe facts set out ,n these Port>culors of Claim ore hue.

Chrtstopt,er Steele
Po~1tion: Director, Orbls Business lntcllig1Jn::o L1r1
Dille: 03 Apill 2017



(2) WEB21L.1.A B.V.





---------- ----- ·- -- --------

(Jndo, p.11rngr•ph, ? ond ll

Of: 'Al IJII mmonnt tlmoc F111'JM ~ :wl>}tlcr 10 ar, oOJ/gation ntX 10 ~Q(JO 10 //lY'tJ
(/0/lilN• r:or1/if.fq,,,//(II lntonlgcmo ,rwsorr.,1 prol'idacl 10 tt by /ht, O(r{DJldar:ni ltl tho 0011{111>
ol /fhtl WOffllnr, l ~ ~ p \VIIIIOI.~ tllo oOMCllllM/ o//JIO Dllfflfldi1J1/~ •

I. Wtinlhetr Iha o,ooed <Si>\)' of CClt1Jldontio11ty is smd 10 flt!~ by eon1roe1 or in
2. !I by coolmcl. sum, \lthelhot too duly llf0$0 under (P) n gooorru coocroct ol
rotuln171; o< (b) '$pCCir11. coolnlQa relt,llno lo Ute ~oflc wot~
3. In eIDler e,'!N'll ~la\D lllhe\her ony C1)1l!r~~) ie!oo on were wr11~ Ot ~ II
Of'lll, sb1firl$ ~ $nil betv..e<in v.tiam IN)y W@ffi made.

The duty 11= both by i;onlract end ln ~ . A l'lrllliln non--Olsclcxwle
agm9ment was eonciuded between 1he F'!ta1 Oefe!idan\ and e rep~lr"9 of
Fusion In JeJ'lUltY 2010 In ra!lll\on to ld(lJ'1( condudim 11y Ftl~ for \hQ ~ t
Oafendsnt. S:!ath!Rmon1, Fus!O., wM !r'lliere of \ha eo111ldenllalily oSl n l . e ~
t'Df)Olit, throuQ.h tllCI course of t>ulllll= \llitn Uis DefElll(Janl& and, ln miatlon to
~ di,clo.sure cf !ho memo..inda le ftlt t<ra:ru?t, 1h11 ~ Oe/erdellt ani:s
Fl.1£loo hM oac, s ~ ~ O G Jn "rrtch ll'ltl con11conlilt~ty or the
memornncla had boon ernptau;IS&d ll ncl Fur.'On v,as ln:iU-. .<CJed IO lntonn Mr·
l<IBmer al their conTIOeollB!l',y.


., .


4. S!!l!e 'ttflelhe< 11\e a.."eged d,cy ~ w dl&dQ:.e s~ 1n1e,.,genca ID l ~ ~ -
Vli(ho::t tho pi'.!lf a;J"CKm9nl er fl'I.; D e f ~ 'II lhe coull!D ~ U-,9 w ~
reJatk),-.ship e.$!1Cfci:! ~ <II~ ~ 'by FWCII to :Mir o.irn i;;fl(JrJs (ic Ola clkl<,~
v.i\o hacl com..'?lisslooed u» in~cllC8 m11lcrieJ: s!IS pa~J]h 5 of !he

1n sastion to tl\8 ;iro-e!ection m.werooort thr: dtty f"IOl b d':~l.w.i !r.!e;.i~ tc
thifcS patties "':thwl ll\il prior agreenlEUll. -Of Ina D e f ~ did not extllOO to
d l ~ ~ by ~ Co II); t!;en:{lt), olthough l!le 01:r~.ots ~ l e n d ~111
~ s ct !he rr:e.."Tln."'3.IGa ·:.-e:."B tt.it m ~ bY F\@Cn to ::s cfierll{s}.
(n.ra.'n)ion !() the Oecen'lo!lllr rr.ert<ll'B!ldurn, ttrls was r.OI ~ c l p.;,~lll,;t'll to
ar,y CC!ll!llCI DI W!!l.d Ill ii3rag.-.iph 1a cC !!\a Oe{sn;a Tl'.e 0\/?Y ~ '.a ~lc-S9
~ ~ ' l C 8 rip!l't to thi:d ~ ;,,ilhout lh9 ';)dot ~ : " i l of lhs
Cefemia:ita 1.1-.e.1'&'= dlli er.sod !o e f . ~ b:, Fu,lcn to it.. c!;ef$).

REQ JA::."1:
5. Slalt> ~tullh<l, OIC Oafclld:m:s GQed any rocip'ocai duly cl ~ Ill f'usioo
an~ FU:;.io(l's t:;e."'l.~ in ro~i::,c\ ~ !l'>ll lr,!cffigorGQ lh8y pro•,fdoo.

S:'.nt:e i4 vra.G not p ~a ~ t t o Iha enguQerrrent wi!h FuS>Qn ~ ' b ~ l!-l

~ p h SI c4 tho Oorenco. Ibo '0$fcll<!al"..la did not o:-,oo ony c~!lllon o/
~nllden:o lo FUilen ondl'or F~'11 d!i!,t\1(111 .1:1 r~llon to lr4 ::uJrtgenoe
eonl:a.ln$d kl ~ Oe(:e-:nb,,r rr~n<lum.

6. Slal9 ¥r!Y.lther Fu*JI·.$ ~11e'1:i. it'COfat 8$ tfscrosure to lt~m \'fa$~~~ {~it

Ri)ql1¢Sl 4). were ~erciry (Mylo lr1'1 O~ffld•,i nb 11n:S:oc Fue.'Qn r.at to (a) ~i?
nndlor {l>} d~ Ifie ln\'Olligana;• .m;j, ii ..o, eiva lilm ~ n as b h£Nf ll'lal
<My ~ aleQ8d to~-

"Th& ra;pon~ to qoos.lkfl 4 ®~ ~ repeated. The De!~e;;nts u-nde.~d ll',at

!lie arrangement ~ $ 1 ~ ~ ~ di:W(t.) wu 1tra1 lntc!5geme would
ool be a~ed. As eipt~ ~ IJle December m~ \llt!IS ooi
~ooed ~~ to ll'le c.'l",,a~elll r e ~ to at paregtaprt 9 of Ul9
Otll'e~ and C'knl~ore I l l . . ~ of lt.e oecen:oor memot2M!!r1 to u-.w
clia!'l'!{S}Vfflll Mt ~1ted.

Undor p.anrgr•¢18 9 and to

O! ·s ~ ~'l.llfJ eno iH!-'fy Ncwr.:~ 2G16 01i!5 wzs eng.ll~ 1:/i' Fw..e, io ~ e
o ~.'os ol coo5dcnt1ai memanmrfs ba~ or, ~ n r o C1:JtlCem&lfi Rus:ief; effc;rt: to
frJNience the US PresiiG.~I ~ trCXlO!;!J ll!'/d llnlrs bo~"l?M RussJa ;;.-i<:t ~ ' d

. ,_

7. f>l.oii,oo 1dal\01y (r.oe pornornpn 6 ot tl'lrJ Dn/ol'\CI)) Fu~l\'o Glioro{n) ,n rt11t11ion to thlt
pa11i<:tl!ll1 {l~on'(lnl.

111.6 roquosi IS /leithor rGOsooab!y net1>1>SB,y nor 1>1opo,lion~1e lQ enab!;e \ho

Cffl~iwn1~ to propore 1h0lr own.c.uo nos 10 iR'Hlmlana tho case \llo)' l'IBW 10 moot

OI ·11re Otlfend.inls fTO(SuCf!d sixleiin ~di memoroflda. Thew ~ bf> lllfem:d IO fa:
come~ es ~ h a ~ memr:rrutdt1~ l)BVinp been prepe,-ed bolot6 Ille 2016
US Pr.zsfdonllal e#eclfon. T1't9 ~sf l)f)O 'or.ls prodllCe{J in lrie 1$(18( ~ o/ Oclobar 201ti
NDna = producoo .it) NfJVM?l),:.< WtCl. /'l<Jt10 al lh8 j:,r~lon memomMa
COl!ItJ.'11~ any r o ~ to, or k1toNgcn,» ~ . tho ClolmlJllts·.

8. In \'lew qf lho =«tlon 1,.>uu no rnEJT!Omnda - e pl'Ddul;oo 10 Novembat 2010,
p:el'it:a 111111t1 !rt& nature CJf 111e ol"l!lll9omOl'll rn oart,. UO'tl9'1\txlr 2018 on 1"8/erred
lei In j}Mlgraph 9, ontt wt)Gthflr t.llls ongngement Wl!.!I porfoJmcd end what
intollkJcmcc ll roolod lo.

nm nllluro o! tno Dolondnnt&' OJ1g11gernont by Fu.skin dl<l not GtulnlJ<I dunr4 too
polled txJIWoon lhu pro1Wrnl\oo of kltt1 lonl pco--01<i1(llliJn mr,mornndum ori 20
OC\Dbttr 2016 MO ttia <Into ol UV., OS Pt1111dantllll i:,6eellon liOWl'tl/1lt r~noo th&
OolondllnlJ> dld nol rlM'lClivo eny r~l&Vllnl lrttollgoooo c<111~mlng flu,ah111 otlOftll
ID lnlNllJICO tht US PruklMlint olt.llllloo pt(.)C4>M 11nd llnka btllwvnn Rui1la ond
Donnld Trump tl~ng lhlo pe(.rxl, oo mt11no1111lda we,o p,oduCQd p111t1J~I to
tho Ofl!)l)(JOl'llOOI rinC)( 20 OClobor 21) 1O.

Un~r l)l)1111Jfl'.1Ph, 12 ond 13

OI ·s~nr1Ior John Ml:Caln Js I/to Cl'laJt Qf thlr us SOrniU, Nfnr,q Serviwo Ccmmiltoe
Q/ld a mombor ol //IQ Us Sonll.la Commiltoo on HomoJIJnd 5ocl.uftr ar,d Gl)Yt!(1Ut'l(N'Js1
A(fahv anti '~vi,J ~ k, O fomvl,r US Sffllr;r Psps,frrlDl'I( r::MI tllmrMl tlncl WM US
A!d:sltdll $(1(:ttilety 6( Stitto !tr ~ . Huil>M RJQhw. arid Lr.W from iooo lo
~009. Ho f!J tho Serr:« ~ fCI ffuman Rights and HU71JfN1 Ftwr!Qw.l 1;11 ~enalt:Y
McC£Jfn·s fnst/Ulra fer tnJemollonaJ t.DfJtkJrohJp".

9. Pfeesa confl,m (as l)!IJ'9Qroph 29b{ij of \Jla O.ifoocs ~ I S ) ~t S:JNlor
McCain and ti< Kremor a~ il\leg(ld (a) lo hsva bo.M e.cons In ~11 offic;L,I
capaclUe~; a.,o (b) Mly In · relation to ~ C8')0d~ In tn,: ccurse or the
mntlorn ploo<IOO ln paragraphs 14 lo 17 end 21b; .ood, i! not, Lcfenllly anyo\h~r
cap~clly In vm!ch tmy wero 8Ciliig ord whorl and forwh."lt pc,1poe.<l{a).


The Oefendar:15 b<'..iifM!d Iha[ S!maror M::Qlui am! Mr KR.mer ""-sri: ~":9 «:fy
il'l their cffic;;!i ca.Decitie!. sna ~ ,.i« nt:xmei:l of ~ other Cl!?!clly er
~upose L"I ;,,tJ.::h ~ were &;511!;1. There weto no gro\.roo$ that led !Tie
Dofoooorns t o ~ lhnf ~<o, ~k;Caln and Mr Kramer ;a."6re not a:t'!.9 lri
ll'lofr otrJCW c a ~ at eriy ,l!ma ~;> ~ i:md S'ldudklg llle !1'Jll!icaoon af lhe
Ol?cernt,,,;; m=o-nmsndwl IQ Mr l<ra!M!.

Undar paragraph 1•

or •.4s a = l d 0-=:1: a:'¢"~ssfotls s~ .Ar!rit.:-N ~ for the Se,:;a,d D:e~.tf.6nf to

niaot J.Jr K'mtroe!, ~ !~ ro,nt:1/'llallv~ CJ{ S9rH!Dr McCain. j1) Otdsr lo :;t;:;-1( r.im /hD
~ i o n m<Jm:r.m<I;; oo a ~loon!i&J be.sis'.


10. S!Slo whot .a mearJ by 'on a ccnrld~bssii;', ~ g preasat;-..t-.al 11Sa or

usaa ~ o r Mte.oo wB.Ylllen; penn;tled 10 m~lla of 1:1\8 pre-e!6t1lor;
mamOfatld~ and Ylttether ~ ~~, e.pedn.d \0 ~ l w McQirl and Mr

The Oe~o!a ~<006 lhst th& ~811~ of l,t,o memo.-and3 v ..ul;f be
trenllld i.'l ll".a ~!l$1 ttinllde,r.co ttlld ~ onl~ be used Ir! Sa,.,,.1~ Mc:CmrT In
hl<i offlc!at ~ (Qt the $0<& puJ3X?$8 c! ~ng. { I \ ~ ~ ,anr;i ~!'IQ
their ~ lo ensble 51Jch t.~lon te be takll!t 3$ n11~,. for &.e ~
of proted:r~ us natSoool ~rfty. The Secood Oe!el"ldant ~ lnCcrmoa
Mr Km= ti:81 ~ ?l'e,-e!edlon ~ n ! l a were only ~ be tJ5ed far !ht&
axclLIS"t'9 ~ e boforo he shM,&(5 t.!r Ktamer any cf CM m1 ; ~. M,
Krsrner was ~ $l t11le llm11 praMad v&h a,pr~ of ~ ~ tmn h$d
been i : i r ~ n ~ ti.n data, b~ w a , ~ ~-

Uncle-r p_aragtaph 1!!

OI "Th& Del!:nda!".ls cor.(!.."tlJtd to ~Ive llf"~Q"tc,J itlio,'figence M lfu l;ll!Uar~

ccvr:rt1d by the ~ momorailda at:er me US PresidCMfie! oiocBc,, 0/ttJ /tie
,;or,c;J-.1~ ol !f>e as...•<nenl kJr FIJ.$kxl•.

11. Pte.a&& st1:ate v.ft5lne( SlJCtl nle:9'9er.ca "'/&$ a ~ =.-ghl tiy !ha- ~ d
acroOG?ru or rr.e."ely ttteeNe<i (ss pre!,!.,U-/ pleruie-.!J.

Sucf) I~~ wu rlOI acL'vely s:o~t;:; Ji w:lS manslv re~w.

Un!fM paragraph 'i9

. j.

01 'Altur rnco,•,ing OOffl<I r.uch lnfo/llgu11eo 11w, Sor,orrcJ DotcntJonl PfOIWfC<I (fl{)
~ nlidomlnl Oocomboi mom<l('1f>cfwn, t(l{t/ft()(l lo hi PMJWtl/.)11 8.1. OIi hi8 own Inll/11Uvo
°" or (l!Olllltl 13 Doco~, :io1a·.

12. Plllntilt c.1,110 whlltoor tho ~ 'on hl:i =lnlllallvu' moan tnat tho [)(Jcember
memororuhsm ""1fl not (fl) C!&Hltw; or (t>) pro,.ided lo Fuoion r,umun11t lo eny
r..:,ntmcl. II 001, plimae vpoe1fy \ho CQnlrool in que:iUon.
Tho Dllcember memorandum wa~ not created 01 ~1/Jdoo to Fus.on p,x&uanl In
any cootta ct

uni:ier pnrooreph 20
Of "The Del'ornto..ts considered, COITTlGl,ly. 1/'ull tho rlJVI inloll/g!Jnc& in !ho Dilccmbpr
m.imortmd~m: e. was of crmsi,;!erab!e im~onct)· ln m/Mlon to ~ Ru:;st;Jn
mltll181'0t1Cf> In Illa US f>ros/dsn~·lil ~ ; b. (1£Jd ~km~ [Qr nw nE16onat sec,.sify
a! lJw US 8ltd thtt UK; Md o. r,seded IQ l,e or.~/ysw end Tc.trl:tr&r inv&sti:}s!edlv~rifleo'.

13. Ptoo&ll 6\ale wt-.e!Nlr 1M Sbooro De(oodant only r!!rl'lehod thla eonciuSliOn on
bohell or n-.a Flfs\ Dafc,ndB.il <II' '*'1cther Chri&topht'lr Burrow& Mi11o1 Sat Ar.dtew
were parly to his aliSassrnenl

Tho Ocfood1Lnlo' 11~110:wnonl that t/10 pttM>lodl.On momoomdo ontJ ;ny .
r.ubr,oq110l'II rolcuwt tnlOU!oor,eo wtrlch lho~ ~C>d MOIJl.'J bo ~ lo the
lndMdu11I) ntlom,d lo a l pffllOmph 21 of !hi> .Oofa~ wno roochod lolJc\Mp
ooi,~rcito l!bcu,ulo~ botwoon lho Sowfl"d OOfoO<Jnn\ unO. ll) Cl11l~Nflho:
Oun=• of 1h11 Firul ooronoont; (f1} !llr h-tdJtM Wood ~ h04 ~\\011 wltl'l
~11n.110( ~ ) ; (QI 011v'd Knimcr (,tho WO\\ ocllno on t>Qlu.\W of S0l)Clto1
Mr.Com) oncJ (IV) Ulo lJI< n&tbnal 11acun1y ost~illl ,ctfuntld to ul poruvruph i llbl
ot tho C)orcncu. Mr Burrow, e.htlro~ tno Suceo<r ()U(oll(l,:11'11'0 u~soum11nt 1:11 tho
l'lllavoo1 Omo. 11'<1 Oofor.ot1n1, oonokJ016d thllt lho ,~1111:i v.1110 oo:t,-0Y1"onuy
n:,JO"'t)l"I! ~ lhO oolioll(II r.oc:urlly ot \lln US, UK Md 1~ 11 o\Sea 11.!1d !mil
nul>Do:iuonc 11\lbllil)onco rallbng to thOMi mauttG oul))n 10 be dlsdo(md lo lho
lndlvk11.lllb rolonoo 10 01 p011>i]rnph 21 of 1ho Doloncu. Eoch OI Iha tndMdlJlll&
\IIIU1 miom \fin 80<:0lld OctondMI ol&CIJWJd Ulo lllOve Nll"llod &ill vlS¥J 11t rho
IIMo and, 10 lhcl Soc:oocl Deiond!Ull'a lulov/edtra Md ool'81. contiouo to ilo!d
lh:81 "4cw.



14. ~se elote ~!~ !he O..accrr.t>er memoran~um ,~ ~llY~ kl (sl 1Jl8 UK
~!loriru 5et.~ clfrot?t and,!c,r to) F!ISlon: aM/C!l' (tj Mt Kra.,na( ili'ld Sonil!o"
~ i n wiih the 30'.Hl:.e or
;,,a e ~ ew;imt Ire r.&u1man1s racacrooC<

,r.torma!ion ~ ! I l g b tho 2bl11JS ol Lit!! ~ce{s} n! !he ~t~~,ce to:nl:<liOOd

'4'!iron tne O~bef mamOfli!Xfum WI:~ no! r ~ted whon ~ wa,
prov~ :o
e:1her !.">a UK ~1)31 ~ cit~ ,mdlnr F ~ aridl01 M( Kra-t:lor ~
59nator ~ - Tos 1n l ~ n contained wntun ctl!l 1n . ~1co mix,ru
i,;ertalC!~ le tl'le stl!tus of U,e soun:e{sl v,zs coll$Wlt ~ith lhe Oe{u,65,.1!5'
COT\G~ eff~ !O ~c:! tha rcerilly d O ! B ~s}. .

1 ~ P.aaso sl.a!a whslhel l!,s !Afl...ru;;!'.M to rutaon co!ltclned any e~s:s: l'Sf«~
to eodld8!'.lialily {cootr.tst para,grapn 21.> ~ a ~ ri!fcrs to 'c,11 11
c o r , ~ ~·}.

!n Ole Seo:,od Dere.-.dan\'5 ::cmmu~ wrtli F ~ ,;tino<,mn9 U'!9.
pro>tl6ion of tne ~ tiy ~nerea en-~ f( ~~a~~ 1110.t !.'1~
4lemoranda ~-e oo.'y ID be r,,~:,oad 10 Mr -K~ fa:- 100 ~ ¢ pa~'-lg
L1'.im oo !o s~~ f ~ . ~~ ~ -werssi ~ ~ lll9 ~
Oefenaant arr:s Fusitn na:,J;a~ Eo lti5 ma\.~ wera !:alduded us!r.,g .!:l!al.'B
teleptic;:ie c:cmar..r-l0"j;n$. ~ o-~ =re- com:nu n t ~ ~ Sna:-n:I
Oefrm!1ant ~,.l'GSSly e.r~~c.a ~ l fOO Da-~"er IJ=ll'.012ldi.1m ~s stil;f~
\0 Uie ~a ~ tew1ctlon:s.o n ~ to iliird ~ a& -..aro eoo.!all>.e!'S In
IJ")e wri2n 8g=na~ de$cr.~ ~ ltut l'IMl)O("Ga ~ /~~ 1 !O l abO\le.

U.nd-ttr p::in11mph 21a Md b

Of 'J.!;l;q1Jinfly the S=;n.rt Def~/Tlhr,t PTJomed 8C®'r <;;( ll1e D o ~ ~
10: a ;1 sen/cY we~ r n rt.J l/ar/21 ~ t oJf/Ciei acfintJ f.'l hl:s ( J . ~ ~ . ca
3 CQt1r'l!kul1;.'I/ ~~ ,n lwo .;;cyy fwn: eJlrJ b. F=m, by sn-::lpllemd cma!/ ~th l1'!l
1:J~h'JC!iat to ~ n ;<:>rr.wftfr, 11 h;r.J copy r.o SM. ~ \/kl 1...'r Kra:rot ".

16.. R eag~ state ~.her !nt&~ pn:::':id8d t,y l!',ii Olt~i1at1~ to ~ n W'3S
g3,~r~::, pro-.i~ in ~ e r e ! ~

-e -


lotllllll)onoo pro·,lela.d by 100 OotQr.<11Jot8 to Fv,lon w11ri provl<k!d socv,oly.iM
\1-hwo J>ro«od oloct101'1alll'/ ii w11~ p,0\-ttled li'I on<:lpllllrod (crm.

Unaar pMonmptu 23 nttd 24

Of '1l IS donilld tllor In lhDfr f)(l(l,lf'O/ Md QlrPrrtJfy mr:ottlfll'/, In tholt f)IOpor 0011/eJd. Uio
words complo!nod of lxYD at !I/Em (;{1l,l/tlJh1 d ooarmg the meanmg pie.oded at
pera!J(t}Ph 7" and ·Re.act In GOMm tho rA<1tuts/ er.cf crdinwy me&J!ng of th<t war1S
comf))DJt>IJa of was lnl!l l!We weu, grO\Jflda lo trwo:ffgat& whether too Clsim8llf3 fi-0!1
mn ~ by RU3Sia info lulclri/'lf/ tho compulo,.s USBd by Jh(> us DortlWll/&: PaJty
lon(J~fp, lrtlm.millirrrJ wu~on, {X(IIllft~ bull$, s!oallf'l/1 ""'" ooo

17, Please kfBnlify the context Ol!iO!l on and Iha 1'1l8118,<1.1) !O ~ n wa:a o!leli,led!;•

Tile reaclers ~:.cm.I ID sre lhe roadors of ti'ID O~bet rt'l8mornndU1'r1 Yltio
acx:eue<i and r""8d the v.c~ complalne6 of via ~ Bfllt!o Iha! waa ptiblistxla
on !ho auuFOOd ~toon ,o Jlffiuury 2017.

Tho Docombor memOl!.)1)(fvn, WM o. ,ow l/lto~nw ~ r \ ""111d'I oontalfl«l

inJom1ot!on gnlh1Jrcc from a c:onfldor1tto.1 GQurc:e(.IJ) l!ll)Ov\ ~r'.au, notkll,01
Mlellrily '3.:sue$ lh11~~ rurth!JI' invm;ligntlon.

Fur1l'n!lr, 1h11 wtw'Cls ~ -or were pub!ishC!d by BtJru:sed as p;irt at an

Ml® ~ " I ~os~ad 8VJI lhb OMlbll!o of tho dl1Mit>· ('nfl-lcil lnflludod !he
Oar.oml>8r mornorori<lum) W'lll'O "JJt'l'larillod., ·unco()f1rm11d' and OO!'ll1llnod
'11t1W1tf(i~, o.ncJ fX)lo.ntl{J{ty ,mverlfloblr, DIIOO(ll/oo.~·. Tho .euttclo nc;tc!G<J I.hot

Rliogcd 18cl~ In {he rkwi9r but hmlll vri1«J OF,~

'Buwoad Nmva ropatl~ Kl tlra. VS and C:wvpr, huvo l:it>On /nvostJaorlrrg IM
"°' lhDlfl.' Tho w1!du
rtlportad thal lhei Pr~1-c1ec1'11 01tome1. P.!lctiee! Cohs.'l, hll11 !!(lid ~at
oHegattom In th~ ll~ler · ~ ~ false·.

111 lhOAO cifcumulll11~0. fll.i'-dO[l) of thu word3 complDlnod of 1w10 lhorororn

1nvim.1 OIOJ (I) U>c! i::onkinto d ll'lo Ovetlmbe< momomOdum dll1 nol roprn&<mt
loml cJld not pwpo1t lo raproMlfll} lj(lriliod fact£. bul YMro raw illto,.'!Jgooco .which
had Jdenutied a nltlDB cf alk!gation:i thaJ \,;,airanw.d lnve:.tigaljon .11l~n lt.eir
Pote111illl natlomll aeevfily i11~1lons; Oi} pem>/lS men!!onoe(l in Iha o«itlmb<::t
rl\tmlOl'Mdum WGl'O ~:y to hOIIO been 11ppmachod IOI CtJnliTlOO!,. rutd
ttmmfom mony or ttio.~o PQr&Qns \11$~ lilloly lo dony 1tio·t1U<tgotlon, oonlziinccf tn
\I~ rnw lntoJHl)onco: and (81) whll6 lho 004ombtlr rnomomn<lum w111 pni;innid In
goOd lolth, I~ oontont ~ , bo .criliclllly lliowoo In Uuht of tho ptll'ptll:o fot n.nd
cltcumelnn<:~ In wh~ ll'oe inlomiotlon wa:s c;.o!laclsd

., .

Under pu.igroph·'li

or·s.iwi !hBf ll 1:s l!dmJi1Cd cr.ar.ne> &cJoo ()..lf'!md2r,r fl3'.f9 o.7 rt.e recad or~, la s
!Jrn-~ nu.r,-.w /JI jc,.Jmafisls a.."v.;,.Jt Uia p!l>-;te:tlon rr.oot,;r~ !it1 la!~ svmmf;:f&:ttmtn
20t~. S®-pstllgr;;p/1. IJ.2.6ilrcferwd".

tB. P1~ l!!enliJy !he Jc...~(,&t& t;ri$!8'1 by ! I l e ~ Deter.6ant and ata:a wr-l
a,,d her"' t!1:e ~!"!!lg ~ don,e in eaai CMa 111-..d m glsl 'Jf wtml ~ co;;yeyed.

ni... lol,l!llll~~ illi!laffy l:.ooroo at l:"ll et1t1 cl Se\:lrembJ>..r 2018 b1 t.')e se.tona
Dnl'e{!di.:i:er.o Fu~lcm l!l F®,:-,cr's i.- .21T1Jciioo W'l!!'O Crtirn 11'.G, ~ Y«,; Tlmos,
l2'l'l W~!on Post. YaJ\oo News. t!'..o ~ YGl"1.er tir~ CNN. To; Sacctid
D.?:!onder,t so~u~1 p:µtcpaled in ru~r n-.e(;1.~9s el F\J~'s tr..\'-'Uctt.lr>
~ FIJS!en l>.~ !he New YO!'!( Tim!!!. 1/\e W~w\Oll Pou BOO Yoh::ic ~ ' 6,
whlch fe>:l( ~ ln rrJ~-Ocl®'lr 2016. In ~h Q( 0'.0$6 C2i6:i ltia or'~ ~ Yl'i!S
=idueied \erc:a,ty !fl !)Ot"'..on. rr; ~ . a:tt:I SIJa)'i al Fusion'~ w!r..don. in
iel!e ~ r 10 f6 the Second Da!®danl br'oe!od a jootnalist Crom MoU. ~looOeS
l:J,J ~ . 1..o ~ ol the p:s~~loll memor.1r.da ~re e\'el' s;.)'ll'J1 or
p.'Olllded !o any joumef:Jb tiv. o, ~ \t'>8 ll~\lon oJ, !rl(I Do~~ n, n
b<ie!ino~ ~.cl'lla!I tho ~=ra oi t,(tljbJd: lr.!el%er.cG ~ i n s !n~ cl
RuslYlltl l:1~ert'.:won~!!l me tJS ~ ~ soo tM poa!ibl&co,c,-cI,~n
al mi:tmbe13 of Ttump'I campal2fl IDa'll ond R\d&~~ gowm.'T>0Rl eHlc:R..~

1S. P'~a e!st!! l'lt'.et '5 rn=I ~ 'off In~ reot!,"ti' !Ult!, ln psrtlcu\Sr ~ i!
(a) Tho i~ Coo ptt:,i.~ was rot to be p u ~ {butm~I be vae:l~

te) Tho 1rJ~ ~ J 011 QIJbf:s.'Je~ tM ~~ i;m-d:JutS<J ,o the e>&r~"dY!ta tr,


{~> AFi (bl, tJ;i;t Liu! Daa:mnts tt:hM t~ ~flGl'1>:3Jly ~ctUYA, tll.rl tio1 IJ'i nam&.

~ S.."="rd D!lftt!IWlt u n o ~ ltat lb1I imoona-.i(m pro\1/(fed ffiiihl re used for lhe
pUfPDSC cf f\Jcther rel!e!!mh, b<Ji woolj not t;e pubf.sheo or &llrib~: T~ DErfflc!a.l1ts
ta~al Illat no c!f the n!O;>l'tl brt&f,-,g ~ (OOK pi.."1:$ COOOiMin,g IM Oecsrnbo:
tneff'.orandum, llnti M ~ cf any oi ti» ) ! t ~ o r , mgrnotaDM er-Oi8 C«el'!l!!et
me~dum wero e-.~ pn:;\'ded le l~~ b),. t'if v.Wt U'l9 euthcr'cu&.a cl, !h.o


20. ~ SGt& ...mstr.8t ll".ese le.tm:i ~ agru,d IO~ mo ~ i : d . ~ t : l ~ -


Tho Stlcond l)cll)rufonl W1l4 totd by fu 5'oll llloll U10 lt1rm11 htld boon uxpl/J1noc.l l0
tho tOloVMI }oumu~I& In OOvt}t\C() by ~l)Jl'I llnd UIO Socond Dofcndonl
rf>JoforCG<I !ho bi»itl on wnlc:h ho wan opoaJdng lo .a~h o# Ole joLIITlllll.11tc ho mm
In potaan. Nono or tho Jou1Mll~8 mlsl!(J any ob)odioii.

Under pnrogr.ap~ 36 lQ 39

2, . Prasso slate whllth_er tho 00191\CD or quarirti.x, prlvi~o 13 rillied oo by tt,fj

DeCO(lcl&11ts If tticy um held lo be liable to, pub!icaUon ta lh9 wolld el Iorgo oe
"dlslnct from tt,e admitl.'Jd pot,acallon lo lh& 1/\divld~s ldMtif"ied by IJle
Dafemlants In Ula DefBf1cs.



The Defendonlo beli8'\/8 that lhe fatts !!tllod In lhlt Ro~Pon10 111m truo.


Nic:.cla Cnln
L~ot J}lroctor. RPC; 00Pond11nb' klgol 101)1'1).cunwtivc

D.llo: 18 fAay2017

- ,.

Cl:1lm No. HQ17000413










Tav.,er 8ridoo HaJS<J
Sr l(a\Mrir,c', W"Y
T: 020 3000 C-00-J

Re!ere-:1oe. ORSA.!
Solicitors for thu 0ter~11:Janls

Trtt'fi.\Tnl'n- •• 1

(U) Appendix H - Committee Corres(?ondence about FISA Abuses

Appendix H Table of Contents

{U) letter to Acting Deputy Attorney General Dana Boente (March 8, 2017) 187

(U) letter from Acting Assistant Attorney General Samuel R. Ramer {March 17, 2017} 188

(U) letter to FBI Director James Corney et al. {March 15, 2017) 189

(U) Letter from FBI Assistant Director Gregory A. Brower {Aprll 4, 2017) 191

(U) letter to Attorney General Jeff Sessions {May 9, 2017) 192

(U) letter to Acting Attorney General Marv McCord (May 9, 2017) 194

(U) letter from Acting Assistant Attorney General Samuel R. Ramer (July 7, 2017) 196

(U) Letter .to FBI Acting Director Andrew McCabe (May 161 2.017) 197

(U) Letter from Acting Assistant Attorney General Samuel R. Ramer (July 27, 2017) 199

(U) Lette.r to Special Counsel Mueller and FBI Acting Director McCabe (May 17, 2017) 200

{U) Letter from FBI Acting Director Gregory A. Brower (July 26, 2017) 202

{U) Letter to Attorney General Jeff Sessions (Sept. 1, 2017) 204

(U) letter to FBI Director Christopher Wray {Sept. 1, 2017) 206

(U) letter to Attorney General Jeff Sessions (Sept. s, 2017) 208

(U) Letter to FBI .Director Christopher Wray (Sept. 5, 2017) 209

(U} letter to Attorney _G eneral Sessions and FBI Director Wray (Sept. 15., 2017} 210

(U) Letter from Deputy Attorney Genera1 Rod J. Rosenstein (Sept. 22, 2017) 212

(U} Letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein {Sept. 26, 2017) 213

(U) Letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein {Nov. 2, 2017) 215

(U) letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein (Dec. 28, 2017) 216

(U) letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein (Jan. 4, 2018} 218
(U) Letter to Former FBI Director James Corney (Nov. 8, 2.017) 220

(U) Letter from former FBI Director James Comev {Feb. 1, 201~) 222
(U) Letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein (Dec. 6, 2017) 223

. (U) Appendix H (Cont.}

{U) Letter from Assistant Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd (March 14, 2018) 225

(U) Letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein (Dec. 12, 2017) 227

(U} letter from Assistant Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd (Dec. 12, 2017} 228

(U) Letter from Assistant Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd (Jan . 19, 2018) 230

{U) letter to Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein and FBI Director Wray (Jan. 25, 2018} 233

{U) letter from FBI Assistant Director Gregory A. Brower (Feb. 2, 2018) 235

(U) Letter to Assista1Jt Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd (Feb.16, 2018} . 236

{U) letter from Assistant Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd {March 7, 2018) 237
(U) letter to Former t:Bl Director James Corney {Feb. 20, 2018) 238

(U} Letter to FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe (Feb. 20, 2018) 240

{U} letter to Attorney General Jeff sessions {March 1, 2018} 242

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M=h 8, 2017

The Honor:ibJe Dana &ente

Actir.g Depur;r A:tomey General
United S:a..es Depamnem ofJ1Jsticc
9SO Pmnsyh"$Ilia Ave, NW
WashiOJIOD, D.C. 2{)530
D~ Acting Deputy ;\nomcy Gcnaal Boentc,

The Ho~ Pcmianrnt Se!~ Committee on Inte1liil!nfe (the C=ittee) is av.we o(

T"..tP...nt media reports iodie:lting ih.c possi'blc wsteri:¢e of Foreign
rnteili~ Sun-eifla::u:e A~ .
(F!SA) appli;a.uons subm:ued '] the 0.:pPrtltLO~ ofJustice {DoJ) in 2016, and'm- r<lrelgn
ln1¢11igcnoc SUN:etllencc Court F1SCJ orders o-r criminal warrants ~ t to T'uk mof 11te
Omoi"bus Crim! Cont.o! 2::!d Sa e Slrccts Act of 196B !hill msy h1W¢ iwthori~ ~ .:atleciicn ;;ii'
communkatlons and/or infonnarlon ~~ins Presidei1tii;t tandid8.lf: D=1d J. T=iy OT hl5
;w..Q~i:;ites in 2016. ~

Porth: pwposes oithis lellf:t', -associ~Ies' includes =IJY Trump cam])8tgn SUITOSJ!!C!>,
er.)v.isors, or e:mP.loy::es; U."f TTWnp Org_4nization si.-m,gn1es. sdvfaor5, or employees; a.>til fe.rnily.
friends, 1111d business ~ates ot Mr.Trump.
Acoo::dingly, (bi: Committee m:.=ts ~ fo!lo,\fog ln~orm::ti<m. i fil exis:is:
1. Any·11.nd 11n r;apies of er.y FrS,upPfie.ni ons subwiC'.ed to tt.e FISC by ~ DoJ in
20r6 regilltfiog then Presidential arndidate Don-el.d J, Trump or bis as:-.cci:I:~ .
2. A,,y lUld cl1 ca~<if any orders issued b1 lb.e FISC in 20l!> regarding then
Pr--..sid~lial c:indidnle Dmla!d J. Trump or his s=fates.
3. kl.y and .;11coplesof ~ we:mnt is!l.1Cd by a Fdcni.l Judge or MllgiS!l""...!e ~.muan1 to
Tit!~ UI of the Omn.ibt.ls ~rime- Ceontrol a..-,d Safe Street:. Act of 1968 in :W f6
~ding then Prcs.idai:i:11e£ndtd:itx: Donald J. Trump or his a,.socfarcs.
We seek coi:,:~ of the for~ins do=umenis, iith,:y c:ds1, r.o la!¢r than Merch 13, 20 i7.

Copy to: Tne Ho:iorcl)lc 1AmfS Co~. Ditedca-, Fcd.:~l l3= of lrwi:s.tig:ition

_ ___________ _ j
[__ - - - --- -- - - - - -- - - - - -- - -- -

------- - - - -

(I .'
U.S. D~:irtmt<trt<lf Justice

omce oftegi5lll!ive ./IJfairs

OffiL-e of the Assis•.11nt Attorney Gcncntl Washington. D_C 20530

March 1i, 20i7

The Honorable ~vi:i Nunes

P1:r.mmcnt Scle(:t Committc: on lnt,:IIig~
U.S. House ofRepreSi!ll[:i.rive:s
Washing~n, OC 20515
Tii~ Hom)mhlc Adam B. Schiff
Ronking Mcmb.:r
Pcimam:m Scle.-::t Committee: on lntcllig=
U.S. Bouse of R.ep.resenlfili ves
Washington. DC 20.515

Dear Chatrm2n Nwles and Congresmian Schiff.

Endo.Scd p!eas.e find ctessifiro documenls re!ponsi\'e to your ~ which w:: a.re
providing for te\iew only by each of )~u an1 fur ri:turn 10 us !CX!ny. q1 !!i.!dilion, pun.mm! to 01-'T
asreernen1, one s~mcmb::r for e.ndi of yo.u, who lru the rcguisi~_~ra:ru:cs, also ~ ny review
lhe matc:rials. ln the cvcr.t that either cfyau is not available today ro mi.aw these mareriols, you
may designare one staff mcm~rwim the rcqmsitc clearan~s to review ~min you. sc~d- A;-i
attomey from :his office will r<:m11in with lhe: docu.rt1cn1s at ol! times and R:tt.'nl with lhcm to tile
D1.:parun¢t1I today.

We hope chat Chis intbnnruio.n :s ~"lfut P!~e do not ::esit;Ue to ~niact tnis oflic~ if
we mny pn11:idc additioaal ;;,ssjst~iK-.: regimling this or any other rm.tn::r.

_ ____j
' ·""''.;a..l~(""""'\· -:,...., UNCLASSIFIED
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ilf\, , tJ,.,•,dlA·4. l~\ ,.1-:"" PERMANENT SELECT COMMITIEE D• U"i,, N,1'51UJ
t,1,y <io-Nd'), ~4'h t.w, .1•.,111 !i•~r0 Hl"t~
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March 15,2017

The Honorable Admiral Michael Rogers

Director, National Security Agency
Fort Meade, MD 20755

The 1Ionorablc James Corney

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535

The Honorable Mike Pompeo

Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20SOS

Dear Directors Rogers, Corney, and Pompeo:

As you know, the Committee bas been very concerned regarding the purported
unauthorized disclosures of classified information, po.rticularly when they pertain to intelligence
collection on, or related to, U.S. persons (USP). To take a prominent example, a January 12,
2017 article in a mojor newspaper was the first to claim that "Retired Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn,
[then President-Elect] Trump's choice for national security adviser ... . phoned Russian
Ambassador Sergcy Kislyak several times on Dec. 29."
Such stories would appear to contain the unauthorized disclosure of USP identities. This
potential misuse is a key reason why the Intelligence Corrununity (IC) has developed robust
''minimization procedures" for the protection of USP information, including requiring the
"masking" of USP identities in most circumstances.
However, as recent news stories seem 10 illustrate, individuals talking 10 the media would
appear to have wantonly disregarded these procedures. The Commillec is concerned that USP
identifiable information may have been mishandled in violation of approved minimization and
dissemination procedures pursuant to statulc and/or Executive Order 12333, as amended.
Therefore. no later than Friday, March 17, 2017, each of your agencies should provide the
Committee with the following:


- ·----~- - - .. ~--- ----,


I. All spt<i(ic l)()ticlcs Md/or proi.:cdures c11ch ag;mcy employs to make II dc1~rmin111ion It>
un~kand disseminate 1hc i1kmi1y ofa USI'; ~ifically, the Commluee rtqueru the
:ipprovnl process requirt'd co autll-Orizc such a di.s£eminalion within a11d outside the:
llflcn,;y, mchidi11g lhc nU111bt.-r ofimlh•idWt(g who cen uw,ove an unmu:t!<ing in ci:ch
, 1111,cncy:

2. The.toral number of d~in.itions of ruiy unmu~ked USP id<:nlitics between June 2016
and January 2017, it'lheJ' e.xist;

3. lfthi::y e.xist, the names of any unrnas.lu;:d USPs. whose identitf.es were dlsscmi~<:d in
TCSJl<lllSe to requests from IC agencies, ww cnfurcemcnl, or senior Executive Branch
officlals betv.>een June 2016 and Janiwy 2017, and thet n.:lntc to Prc:si\31:ntinl candidntcs
Donald J. '!'.!'ump w.rl HillBJ}' Rodho.m Clinton a11d their C$0cillles in 2016; 1

4. lflh~y oxist, tl1c rumics ofiiny lC ngcnciC81 law er:uorccmcm agencies, nnd/or senior
Executive Brunch ofl1ciD.ls 1lwt r1:qucstcd nnd/or nu1hori1.ed the w,rm1sllins nnd
dl&.'!t'lttinutlon of USP infomintion n:la1ins to too specific [ndlviduals and entities
11pcctfkd in request t,J abov~. AS well II$ the 11~,:~ ofull ~pcclftc retlpient.s oflhat
11nmiukcl LISP informnllon; m\<l

5. 1fit exists, th~ s1mcd reason, pursu.im \O the ri:lcvant m1t,lml.1.n1lon pruc~dur;;u, for
unm'a.,il<ing crn:h USP idcmJty rclntinc 10 request IIJ ~bovc.
We Opprt¢io1c your prom pr mtcntJon 10 tl1is request.• If you han: any questions rcg:irdln&
the forcaolr,S, please COTIIOCI 11~ Commill~o ~\ (21>2) ?.2S•412 I,


Devin Nunes Ad4m F3. Schiff

Chainnnn Rooking J't,kmber

Cupy to:
~ Honorable Michael Dcm!l!lcy, Aeling Director of-:-Jatiunal lmclligeIB:r:

' For 1bc 11~1j)0.1Q or this )011~,, ··iu,orlJ>1•'1• lndu<k o..,ry c.111n;111f!!)l ~w1ogo1C$, advhON., er cmplo)'ilc:31M)' iNmp
~&11!rA!l~1n cir Clinlll~ Poµn <C..ll1.1:i wrroi:,>IG~. 11dvi~. «· cn,pto~~"ct; "2id fo111llr, frl~As. lllld bu~lru.'11~ 11.!MlClacc,
of Mr. Tnimp lllld Mn, CUncorL


- -- -- --- ·- -- ---- -- -- - -- ·- ,- --._ . _J


,--- ---
-- --

I 1

I April 4. 20! 7

I HoMriL.Ole Devin l\'tu1i:s


l'=ent So:Jec; Cvmmiu~ 011 Jntcllie =
U.S. Home of Rcprescnt~th-es
WE.tillglO:l, DC 105!5

H="l!.hlc: Adam B. Sc..l1iff

l{Jm);ing Member
r ~ Stlecc Comrni!lfc en !:nti:mb=c:
U.S. llouse:ofR.~tati-,.-cs
W:ciiing1t1n. DC 10S13


I Thls re.spor.ds toy= le~d~tcd March iS, 2017 to Admiral Rog-ers, National S=ily
A~~J; Director ?o~pco, Ccntra.l lntcllig~me Agency. :..'ld Di,relor Come:y, Fcc!en:l Bure~ of
Jn\·~~tio;i {FBI), ,:=qt.:cstlns. ir.:orm:.1ion con~"11ing ~ci> ~ncy's po!iciese.rid pra.."'\'.ldUr=!

cdz.1.ms lo the di~=unawm of U.S. :;;,erson infor.nsticn.

J\s 'l\'l: ha\-e dlscu~ with your s1s.ffa on :s¢,'eraJ oc:::asioos, vn: .ve?co= :au oppoctllliliy
to hr.ff lb~ Commi1rec <:0.nceming !he F'Bl's poric:icsMJ! procc-!ur,;s motd~r t.J identify
inf=.ni<>n h~lc.l by me- FBI th..·u is of in~;:;;t co the Committee.

'},le 2;)i)rccutc )'OU::-.:orttinued supp,on for the FBl aiKI ill llliS£Dn. P ~ <:anact this
oiikc is we c:2.0 be of furtha nssis'.a!ire. II

~\ -~---- I

Gregory A. Bro=
A ~ t i)i~ctor
' Off.ce of v.ing.r=ro,1:al .A..mir.s 1


I• I

jI '

- - - - -- -- - -- - - ----- --- I




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YIAmt:N0.101'1, 0C 20$i0
(202f 22!>* 1121

P"Jl,081N1.Sfu.c.1ct f•IHor'.I May9.20l7


The Honorable Jeff Sessions

U.S. Artorocy Gcoeral ·
U.S, Department of JUSlice
950 Pennsylvania Avenu,: N.W.
Washingwn, D .C. 20530

Denr General Sessions:

Ju part ofits bipartisan investigation into R\1$UU1 nclh·e m~surcs directed at the 2016 U.S,
election, the House Permanent SeleQt Commit!~ on lntelligence requests that you prodUGC
certain documents nnd 01her matcrla.ls 10 the Commlttet: nnd nmmgc for your partictpation in o
voluntnry, transcribed Interview at cho Committee's ofrtces.

First we respectfully ask that you produce lo the Committee, 1,y L10 later tha.11 the olo~c of
business on M!ill, the following;:

Any documents, rccor&, elce(ronlcally stored inform.1tlon 111cludiog <:•mo.ii,

communic111iou. rccordingo, dotn nnd tnnglblo Lhlngs (tncluding, b'Jt OQt limlt\XI to,
grnf)hs, clu:u1:J, photogruph.s, images and other documents) rlll£tlrdlc:is of form, other thnn
tho:.e widely ovnilnblc (e.g., nowspnpcr nrtlcles) that reasonably could lund to U1e
discovery ofuny fucts within lh.c iovesUgntion's publlcly..unr1oun~d pnrnmct~.

In complying with this rcqu.cst, we nsk th:.t }'OU furnish to the Committee, in Ulll'1!dacted form,
:my OJ\d o.11 resix>nsive materi11l in youacrual or constntctive possei.sion, custody, or control or
otherwise available to you. including rcsJ>Onslve material possessed by any ~ party to be
transferred to your possession and shaced whh the CQmmin~. This ~uesl ;s also made on an
ongoing b-.!sis: If after making an initial production to the: Committee you find addltional
responsive material. you should produce that material to the Committee.

To the extent not encompassed by the above requesi. this leuer also ri::quests ~ervatio.n of all
docuine.nts, rcccmis, electronically stored infonnation, recc.rdings, data and 1angible things
(including, but not limited to, graphs, cfwts, photographs, images .and other documents)
regan:lless offonn, other than those widely availaole: (e.g.• n~wspapcr llI1icle3), ralateQ to the
Cornmittee"s investigation, your interview, and any anclllmy mauers.




Shoufo ft hcromc nec:tssery t~ do m, ti:~ <:9mmi1~ m::n, suppl£mcnt the rlo"im~nt reot1est
ronl:iincd in tyis lcttcc::it :mv tim£:

Cornmilli:>.: staff will work wiih you 10 m:\uge }'O\lf illt.:'.rview, at a t irnem111 <fu,e S!lbsettU>.:m to ·
The m£i:..1::w m11y co~·cr miy hlpic within the
)'0\1.f prcduc:Lion of do-..-;::n~n\s tO tll~ Commi:!.i!~.
Ett.blic:ly•:wiou."'JCC'd paramc:<crs oftht: Comcni1~c·i; im.estigziion, iccluding Rl.!ssiw cy~r
::etM,ies diCl!C~ ~ 1 lh~ 2')16 U.S. ek~tion, po11:n1izil li.n:."<s betW<cn Rt!S'Siu ~~ indiv;d113Js
assi:>: i.l~ ·wilh p,ol!ti~ I cam~sns. lh~ U.S. g.ovemmcnt•s ~n.se 10 these Ru.ssfan ict!\•c
m~o..u=, aod relared leclcs of classified it1fi:rn.,a1ion.

Shollld }'GLL !1:..-,'<! any q=Liot1:s at l!ny tii"D<?, p~se contru:t C-Qn-,mitt~ sufT a.t (202) 225-4 i 21. Jr
:,-ou = r,:pn:~tcd by !!n attorney, pl=r forward thl.., lc.ncrto your anomcy. tmd i!.a\·e h.iiu or
!-.tt con=t the Committee o::i your bdclf.

Sincerel;: :.o-· -:- · -

- • f· · .

!':,fembeJ- of Congn:.ss Tt:.n!dr.g Mcmb;r

.iUradunrot: l'or2roeters for Rl!Ssia !n\'estigorion

I._ _________ I
. _ __J


u,..tnH-.,, 0,1~.ata_ CH.•J •"IAN

; ~~ : : : : ~ Joo UNCLAS$1Fl80//COMM1TT£E SENSlTIVi;.

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U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES W.•!.i111toro11, CC 20~16
f:02l 21S-4121
'11r\Ql'lll"'.. tl.lllU9'U Pl:flMANENT SE.Lr.er Cor.,wrree
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Ms. Macy McCord

Actillg Assismnt Auomey Genera!
U.S. Departmmi of Justice
National Security Division
950 Pcmmylvania Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Ms. McCord:

As part or its bipllctisan invcslig:itlon lnto Russilm nctlvc imnsurcs directed et the 2016 U.S.
election, 1ho House Pmtnnncnt Se.lcct CQmmittco on Intelligence requests thAl you produce
ccrt!lln dOC\.lnlcnlS nnd 0U1er m11tc.rials to the Conunittcc and pnrtlclpotc in a voluntnry,
1ronscribcd il){crvicw nt the Committee's offi~s.

First we r~ccUi.dly nsk ltwt you produce to the Commi«ec, by no Inter 1hru1 lhc close of
businosson~. the following:

Any documcnlll, records, olectronJ~lly scored itifonnntlon including o•mllil,

communlcutior1, 1ecordinge, data ru1d tansiblo lhing.s (hwludlng, but not limited n:i,
nroph:,, chnru, photographs, imas~ and ·other documrnts)' regnrdless of fom11 other 1han
those widely o.vn.Unble (c.g., lle\V5papcr LUticloo) tbatzeasonably oould lead to the
discovery of uny facts within the invcstisntfon's publicly-announced p[IJ'8fflclers.

hi complying v.ith this request, we ask lb.at you fumi~h to the Committee, In an.redacted form,
any and all rcspon.5ive material in your actual or c·onstmctlve possession, custody, or control or
oUierwise available to you, including responsive mnteri1d possessed by any third party co be
tnulSfurTed to your possession·and shat~d with the Committee. Th[s r~est is also made on an
ongoing basis! ifiuler making an lnilia! production to the Committee you find additional
responsive material, you should produce ttiat material to the Commltt~

To the extent not encompassed by the above request, this letter also requests preservation of all
documents, records. eteetronically stored informalian, recordings, d!rta and tangible things
(ineludlng, but oot limited to, graphs, char!s, photographs, imnges and other documents)

L __


r - - - - - ----

regardless of fonn, cli;er th.ar; rhllSe widcly lf'tailable {e.g., n::-,v:;p:3per n,1icks). related 10th.:
Commi~'s im'l-srigation, your ittll!!",i ew, :ind any 2r.!:.l1!ary martct'!I.

Sboutll it hccom.e n~e.rv to do so, the Committc~ m!lv .su~plem~nt tbe document n:~rui:-.st
co11taint!I In chis letter at am,- time,

Ccmminee suff 11;ill work wi1 h yon h) nrra.~ y.:iur interview, at :i time ::md d~e subsequent to
y:,;,ur r,mrlw:rion of rl..~wn:nls to !he 0.:imntitt~- Tl?t! imer.-icw may ccve. any topic ·\,ithln tlie
pub! i c;ly-mwcunced ~m meters of lh¢ C-On::mit1«'s inv,;stigaiion, i.~cl uding l{ussian cyb;:r
ac:livili~ directed against the 2016 U.S. elceti-Or., potaitinl links between Russia and indi\'idml3
assocfarc,d v.;111 politiea.1 ~mpaig.'lS, lhe U$. go,•emment's respcmse to thi:sc Russian a.-ti,-e
measures. end refaterl leaks of cl,'>S3ified cnfumi2.tion.

Shoufd you have ar,yquestions m any lime, pk::ii~ i;on~-ct Commiuee staff at {202) 2254121- ff
you ~ ~resented by an attorney, ph:asc for\,.'an.l lhis le.·t:!T 10 yo,,.ir uttomey, and tia-.•e bic:. or
her contact tfo:- Commi!itt on your l:cl,alf.



U.S. l>cpnnooont of Juslicd
Office ofLcf,i:1l~tivc Affuir.i

Wa$hin.r:ton. D.C. ,10S50

JUL O·7 2017

Tho Hon.orablc K. Mlcliacl Conaway

· Pcrrr.llncnt Select Committee o:i lnt.:lllgencc
U.S. Efo= ofll~entntiv~
w~~bi.ogton, DC 20515

11ic Honor&1le Ad~m Sc.hiff

Ra..~J.:w.g Member
P=~~t Select COJllll\illee 011 lntclligcnt.o
CJ.S. House ofRcp1-u.."C®tives
WllShington, DC 2Q5l5

near Congressman Coruiway and CongmmI'.an Schiff:

Thi, rc::pouds l.o youz lcttlll's to the Attowoy Gooorol and to 1hllll•Actin,e Assfot:1111
Ar.lnniey Cicnmil l'>'llll'Y McCord ofthe N111ionnl Sc;,cmity Division, both dated f\{Jly 9, 2017,
will.oh. requested do~umeots in oonuecUon with \fa~ C:ommiUc:e'N 1m·1:Nlig11\ion int.o Rll!lslmt acrivc
moos rues directed 111 tho 20 16 U.$. eleotlrm.

A:i )'OU )mow, on Moy 17, 2017, 'Ille Dcpartmoot of Juutico (O.iplll'tmcnl) announced the
ni1pol11.trr11:nt of Robert S. Mudlcr mto sc:we 11~ S11cclol COWLSel to ovorsc;Q too ;rrovh)tL'!ly- .
oon11nnod FBI invosllgat!on of R~i~n !)O\'t:mmcnl offor(IJ to infl~1011ca the 20 L6 prc.?idcntiot 1 •
election nnd rolntml numerJ. We o.ro odvlSlld Ihat tho 8pcci:tl Cow1sol ho, ~sun to lnke r.tep~ tn I .
l\1JJill U1cse rospcmm'bilitics. Under these c!rcwnstanoc~ ruid co1wistcnt with the IJ<:plll'll.Ue.ul's :I I
hmg-~t~ndiog polity rcgnrdlng thu '°nfitlcntiwily uncl scn1iliYity oflnforrnntion rc:ioting to
J)Olldh1g n1.1ltCTS, the Depnrunen( is not p ~ t W rc:&ponJ furthor to yo11r rcquosts ut Uus time.

We nppreci.nte the Commiltee's luterests in Ulis ut.11tcr ond hope that tb4; infonnetion !R
helpful. Plc&e do not hesitnto to oontn.ct this office Jf we may provide a:fditioual :is~ist:Ulce
11bout nny otbc-r m.1tter.

& sm~.~
uel R. Rnmer
g Ass.stant Attorney (!Cll~al


r..w.t:n11t,~· - - iJNCI.AS SlFIEO/IL"()MMlTIEE SENSITiVE

:"IIUl:.UJ.•ra~~ Ii\~·- T\.a; C.P.=t.
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htJ!:l..rt,•l\~.!:f. ..... ~
:'-.fay 16, 2017
~ N.f l10 . ~ e c t ~


Aaing Di.rwor Andrew McCal:e

FBI Hf:a.dqU211.erS
9<..S Pe11.1lsylv~ AVet°t'.!C, NW
W3Shingtoa. D.C. 20535-000t

t.~ Act.ioi Di~ r Mcl:abc:

. As part oi'its bipmis~n investigation ic..10 Rus:san ~Clive me~s ci~cted at the 2.\1]6 U.S.
ekction, tr.e HCU3e Petmf!lCll.t Si:ltx.t Commine= on. ~er.ce req~ ~ you prod=
ce:tlBin doclJIJ'lea?s .!lld ot!::er meieri.als to I.he Comminee !l.!ld 2rnmge fo:- YQ1.1r pe:rticip:.Ui® in a
•,olwlwy. trans::n.1>od inll:n'icw at~ Ccmmittce's (If.ice:;,

Fi~ we respectfully cl that you prorlu.-:e to tf'l..e Committee, by no tarer i.,an \.he; close of
I r ~ on Jl.!av 23. the following:

Any d0¢s.!l:.!Ct1lS, :i:cotds, elcdr~i:.nlly st¢rcd infcrmE!icm including e-mail.

ccn:muni~oo. t1:corclir,gs.. dau. and t.ogiblc lrungi {incl~ but Mt lil:ruted to,
~ . clw1s, pruitograpru, umacs and ocl1er documr:n.~) ~~ ofform. oth<:r lhwt
those widely a-.'.llW>le (e.g., De'>\'S;>al)U .!..4:ic!es) that i:ea.ou~bly eould !e9d to the
di;oovery of any ucts witliin the bvestigatio:J's publicli'· llnC~ Faram.e:cnt.

fn complj'ing with lhi:1 ~ul;St. we Ask tct yo;i furaisb to the Committee, in ~edat'.ed fOffll,.
=y arui an ~'l~"e nweri4l in your ect\l8I ar~ons(nlCti \"<: possession, cc.s:tody, or control i)r
olh:::wisc ~"~ to )'Ou, inclumoi rcsptmsi;·c ma!:ml possi:ssod by .any u:ircl paey to be
~ca to y<Wr pcs:::es,ion end shsred with the Comznircee. nus requ~t is alS<> ma& ca im
orsoing leis: if ~tter mtki og a.'I illitial i:;roduc:tion ~o Ille Committee rou finrl additi=al
re;sponsive roaterial, you ~ u!d _produc:: tha.t m~~tW to the Commi~

To the no:cnt not encompasso:!

by tlte shove request. thjs ltUJ:ralso TI:1,.u:sts ~ent:tion cf al[
d1:a1rncotS. r~ords, c!cc:tr.lni<:al:y stored information, n:cordmgs, da~ and l:l.ngible c..'lings
(mcludinE, but Mt lil-...ited to, ~s. charts. photographs, im1:ges ar.i.ct.'ler6'.lcume.ltS}
regardless of fuim, O<he! thllll tfa:ise widely available {e.g.. ne.WSP'!P!l' anides}, rel21:d to ~
Ccmmilte:'s i.'!,:CS!igatlon, yoU? in!et\'iew, !lllli ~y znciJ:!wy :n.attei:s.

L__ - - - - - --- __.



SJtuLLld ii l)CC,ODll) IIC~.'lslln' to d() ~n, thc Con\ntltMS! nil)]' sunnlollut~Ul t{le ~ocum~nl regugt
sonlllipcd In lill11 ldtcr 1't 11ny func,
C<1mmittoc ~taff will work with you to ammgc yo\tr intcrvfow, at a. time and date: ~ubseqlJ<:[ll 16
yout production ofdocumco\S to tho Comauttee, T11e lntcn-iew 10.~ <:over o.ny topic within the
publicly•an:nounccd pua:ne:er.; oftl1e Cammitt~'s investiga.lion, including Rl.l.~an cybor
wivltle:.c; dicected age.inst the 2011? U.S. eh,ction, J>Olcntial links b~eeo Russia nnd lndivldunls
llll!ociated with politlcal ~J.'Vgns, 11\e U.S. go\'trna1cnt's rcsponoo to th~ Russian active
me11surcs, and reh1tcd leaks ofclassified infomu1tlon.

ShO\l.lcl. you irnvc 11n:r q~~ns ~t .any time, ple8Se contact Committee stoff at (202) 225-4)21. If
you~ represented by an anomey, please fol'WlUd this lette? to your attorney, and lun•e him or
her i:.on~t the Committee on your bob!!lf.


Member ofCMgtc:!i'S
Mam Schiff
Ronkins Membct

AWichmcnt: Parameters ror Russl11 lnvcstisation

) 2

·l I

U.S. DepQrtm:nt of J.ustlce

• Ofiloe of Legis!ative A.ffiim

Washlr.grc,n, D_C. 20530

JUL 2 7 2017

The Hm:orab'.~ l<. ~ l Cmlll.way

! ' ~ s~J:e,::t Col:Il71itt~ on Int=lligca.o:.
U.S. H'omie ofR.er,!r&l:ffitiv~
Washiog(oo. DC 20515

The &itoral>!: .tui= Schiff

R:.r~lci~ M,:;;rnbc:-
Peml2!!-'....at Se~"f Committee ;:in brelligoooo
V-S. H= of~,.,:s
\V;;shin_giO!!., DC 20515

~ Congrcssirum COil3W'f:Y arid Congr~ Sclilii:

Thli responds lo your .cttcr to Fcd..-zal Burcm of f u . ~ {FBI} Ac~g Oiteen

kl:lr~'t McCuic, dJ;red Mr.y I~ 2017. ,-.-hit::l ceqvtiled doe:uIUenIS i.n ~ o n ..ith tk
Qir.lnlith=c:'s imi=stigatfon into Rus..qan activ:ro~-urcs diroe:l.o:,l iuihe 2016 U.S. cie¢il>n.

As )'Oil ~w. 11:0.:Moy 17, 2Dl7 !lle Di:panment of JllS1lce tD:pattm!!Ilt) :m;)Qtlet~ tile
,'JfJ>Oizmm:nt cfRJ)b=t S. Mveller JlI to &.."IW ~ Sp--~ Cmmscl.to O\iasee oc prcvi=ly-
c o ~ FBI i.o.,~.,aiion of~gm'<::C!lmelll elmru to .influ.~~ tbc 2016 F=1l~
electicc mid rilit.ed ~ . ~- We en::i::hrii;cil thut t::.e Sp,;:;;.id Co~fh~-: bcgoa b tak.c ;teps to
fu?fiU fu.;sc ~onsibilities. Unrler mes~ c i r ~ ~ eoo C-Ollsimo.t with l!?e ~!:llt's
long-~flg po1ic-t ~ I l g 1!1e ~fidcn!Wity ~ .scnsithity oiinfo:rmoc,n rclatittg 10
pcndin&matte=s, the Depa.rttniem is not prepared to r,espond funh.t:r Yt>UI t1:qu~~t ct this om e.

We tipprec;iate the Ccr.I,miue's illt.ere."!9 io ibis mQtlft aud irope ~ this inf=zfum is
n~pful. Please <!o no,i:e.iliae to colllact thl.s-0ffioe-if we !Itl.Ypro\.'id~ ::dditfon.al esst!f'<:11.CC
ebou, ecy ott matter_


t(l/~j!.. ~~/
I. :
S!twiel R- Rttm!:r
Acru:i.g Assiscan. Auomey ~

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Thl--r.v.J~.. At'l'tiai
f.UPCM~,;..Jbr'1 HI/ C-:J~ n-.s C...."rnX.
D&ti "'-. Y• ..-.nt.a.OUa
P.'"c:t.~~, •• , · PE~MliENT Sft.S::TCoMMnTEE
J:.U'Jw(. lt,;_.
ON l~Ell.lt?!:NCC:: ~,l)qv;,.

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T~~ •


Mr. Robcrt.M\t.eller
Special Cou.osel
U.S. ~aitmcnt ofJUSl!te
Washington, D.C. 20530

Mr. Andrew McCebe

Acting Director
Federal Bureau ofTm-cstigt:!i~
WasbingtOll, D.C. 20S3S