Arising Out/In the Course of Employment

The widow led a claim for death bene ts with GSIS which denied the claim on the ground that at the time
Hinoguin vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 8430, April 17,1989 —

of his death, Alegre was performing a personal activity which was not work-connected. The Employees’
Facts: Sgt. Hinoguin was a detachment non-commissioned officer at Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. On
Compensation Commission (ECC) af rmed the ruling of the GSIS.
August 1, 1985, he and two members of his detachment sought permission from the Company
Commander to go on overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya “to settle an important matter thereat.” The
Company Commander orally granted them permission and allowed them to take their rearms with them But the Court of Appeals reversed the ECC’s decision and ruled that Alegre’s death was work-connected,
because Aritao was a “critical place.” In Aritao Poblacion, one of Hinoguin’s companions dismounted,
walked towards and in front of the tricycle cab, holding his M-16 rifle in his right hand, not noticing that hence, compensable. Citing Nitura vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission and Employees’
the ri e’s safety lever was on “semi-automatic” (and not on “safety”). He accidentally touched the trigger, Compensation Commission vs. Court of Appeals, the appellate court explained its conclusion, thus:
ring a singleshot in the process and hitting Sgt. Hinoguin, causing the latter’s death. The shooting was
purely accidental. The Line of Duty Board declared Sgt. Hinoguin’s death to have been “in line of duty,”
and recommended that all benefits due Sgt. Hinoguin’s dependents be given. “[T]he Supreme Court held that the concept of a ‘workplace’ cannot always be literally applied to a person
Sgt. Hinoguin’s claim for compensation bene ts under P.D. No. 626 (as amended) was denied by the
GSIS because the former was not at his workplace nor performing his duty as a soldier of the Philippine in active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in an assembly line in a factory or a
Army when he died. clerk in a particular xed of ce.
Issue: Is the death of Sgt. Hinoguin compensable under the applicable statute and regulations?
Ruling: The death of Sgt. Hinoguin that resulted from his being hit by an accidental discharge of his
companion’s ri e arose out of and in the course of his employment as a soldier on active duty status in It is our considered view that, as applied to a peace of cer, his work place is not con ned to the police
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and, hence, compensable.
precinct or station but to any place where his services, as lawman, to maintain peace and security, are
The concept of a “workplace” cannot always be literally applied to a soldier on active duty status. A soldier
must go where his company is stationed. Sgt. Hinoguin and his companions had permission to proceed required.
to Aritao. A place which soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different from a
place where they are required to go by their commanding officer. Hinoguin and his companions were not
on vacation leave. They are authorized to carry their rearms with which they were to defend themselves At the time of his death, Alegre was driving a tricycle at the northeastern part of the Imelda Commercial
if NPA elements happen to attack them. Complex where the police assistance center is located. There can be dispute therefore that he met his
The Line of Duty Board of Officers had already determined that Hinoguin’s death occurred “in line of
duty.” A soldier on active duty status is really on duty 24 hours a day. He is subject to call and to orders death literally in his place of work.
of his superior at all times, except when he is on vacation leave status (which Hinoguin was not). The
work-connected character of his injury and death was not precluded by the simple circumstance that he
was on an overnight pass. He did not effectively cease performing “official functions” because he was It is true that the deceased was driving his tricycle, with passengers aboard, when he was accosted by
granted a pass. While going to a fellow soldier’s home for a few hours for a meal and some drinks was another police of cer. This would lend some semblance of viability to the argument that he was not in the
not a specific military duty, he was, nonetheless, in the course of performance of official functions.
A soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and unequivocally performance of of cial duty at the time.
put aside that status or condition temporarily by, e.g., going on an approved vacation leave. Even vacation
leave may be preterminated by superior officers.
A soldier in the Armed Forces must accept certain risks, e.g., that he will be red upon by forces hostile to However, the argument, though initially plausible, overlooks the fact that policemen, by the nature of their
the State or the Government. That is not, of course, the only risk that he is compelled to accept by the function, are deemed to be on a round-the-clock duty.”
GSIS goes to the SC on petition for review on
very nature of his occupation or profession as a soldier. Most of the persons around him are necessarily
also members of the Armed Forces who carry rearms, too. A soldier must also assume the risk of being certiorari reiterating its position
accidentally red upon by his fellow soldiers. This is reasonably regarded as a hazard inherent in his
employment as a soldier.
that SPO2 Alegre’s death lacks the requisite element of compensability which is, that the activity being
The 24-Hour Duty Doctrine and Its Qualifications; Moonlighting Policemen performed at the time of death must be work-connected.

GSIS vs. CA and F. Alegre, G.R. No. 128524, April 20, 1999 — Ruling: We grant the petition.

Facts: SPO2 Alegre, a police officer was driving his tricycle and ferrying passengers within the vicinity of
a commercial Complex when SPO4 A. Tenorio, Jr., Team/Desk Of cer, confronted him regarding his tour
of duty. Alegre allegedly snubbed Tenorio and even directed curse words upon the latter. A verbal tussle
ensued between the two which led to the fatal shooting of SPO2 Alegre.
Under the pertinent guidelines of the ECC on compensability, for the injury and the resulting disability or
death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the
following conditions:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be;
 (2) The employee must have been performing his of cial functions; and 
 leave. Moreover, they were required or authorized to carry their rearms with which presumably they were
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been 
executing an order for the
employer. 
 soldiers had in fact encountered NPAs while on their way to or from Aritao and been red upon by them
Owing to the similarity of functions, that is, to keep peace and order, and the
risks assumed, the Court has treated police of cers similar to members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines with regard to the compensability of their deaths. Thus, echoing Hinoguin vs. Employees’
Compensation Commission, a case involving a soldier who was accidentally red at by a fellow soldier,
we held in Employees’ Compensation Commission vs. Court of Appeals, that “members of the national
police are by the nature of their functions technically on duty 24 hours a day” because “policemen are
subject to call at any time and may be asked by their superiors or by any distressed citizen to assist in
maintaining the peace and security of the community.”
Upon examination of the Court of Appeals’ reasoning, we believe that the appellate court committed
reversible error in applying the precepts enunciated in the cited cases. While we agree that policemen,
like soldiers, are at the beck and call of public duty as peace of cers and technically on duty round-the-
clock, the same does not justify the grant of compensation bene ts for the death of SPO2 Alegre based
on the facts disclosed by the records. For clarity, a review of the cases relevant to the matter at hand is
in order.
In Hinoguin, the deceased Philippine Army soldier, Sgt. Limec Hinoguin, together with two other members
of his detachment, sought and were orally granted permission by the commanding of cer of their company
to leave their station in Carranglan, Nueva Ecija to go on overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya. As
they were returning to their headquarters, one of his companions, not knowing that his M-16 ri e was on
“semi-automatic” mode, accidentally pulled the trigger and shot Sgt. Hinoguin who then died as a result
thereof. Ruling for the grant of death compensation bene ts this Court held:
“The concept of a ‘workplace’ referred to in Ground 1, for instance, cannot always be literally applied to
a soldier on active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in assembly line in a factory
or a clerk in a particular xed of ce. Obviously, a soldier must go where his company is stationed. In the
instant case, Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya was not of course, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, Aritao, being
approximately 1-1/2 hours away from the latter by public transportation. But Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo
and Dft. Alibuyog had permission from their Commanding Of cer to proceed to Aritao, and it appears to
us that a place which soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different, legally
speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding of cer. We note that the three
(3) soldiers were on an overnight pass which, notably, they did not utilize in full. They were not on vacation
to defend themselves if NPA elements happened to attack them while en route to and from Aritao or with
which to attack and seek to capture such NPA elements as they might encounter. Indeed, if the three (3)
and if Sgt. Hinoguin had been killed by an NPA bullet, we do not believe that respondent GSIS would
have had any dif culty in holding the death a compensable one.” Then came the case of Nitura, likewise
involving a member of the Philippine
Army, Pfc. R.S. Nitura, who was assigned at Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte. At the time he
met his death, he was instructed by his battalion commander to check on several personnel of his
command post who were then attending a dance party in Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City. But on his
way back to the camp, he passed, crossed and fell from a hanging wooden bridge which accident caused
his death. Reversing the ECC which earlier denied death bene ts to the deceased’s widow, the Court
ruled:
“A soldier must go where his company is stationed. In the case at bar, Pfc. Nitura’s station was at
Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte. But then his presence at the site of the accident was with
the permission of his superior of cer...
As to the question of whether or not he was performing an of cial function at the time of the incident, it
has been held that a soldier on active duty status is really on a 24 hours a day of cial duty status and is
subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his
superior of cers at all times, seven (7) days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave
status...”
The more recent case which was cited by the appellate court in support of its
decision is Employees’ Compensation Commission vs. Court of Appeals. This time, the claim for death
compensation bene ts was made in behalf of a deceased police of cer, P/Sgt. W. Alvaran, who, at the
time of his death, was a member of the Mandaluyong Police Station but assigned to the Pasig Provincial
Jail. Findings showed that the deceased brought his son to the Mandaluyong Police Station for interview
because the latter was involved in a stabbing incident. While in front of the said station, the deceased
was approached by another policeman [who] shot him to death. Both the GSIS and the ECC denied the
claim by the deceased’s widow on the ground that Sgt. Alvaran was plainly acting as a father to his son
and that he was in a place where he was not required to be. The Court of Appeals reversed said denial
which decision was af rmed by this Court, declaring that:
“But for clarity’s sake and as a guide for future cases, we hereby hold that members of the national police,
like P/Sgt. Alvaran, are by the nature of their functions technically on duty 24 hours a day. Except when
they are on vacation leave, policemen are subject to call all anytime and may be asked by their superiors
or by any distressed citizen to assist in maintaining the peace and security of the community.
xxx xxx xxx
We hold that by analogy and for purposes of granting compensation under P.D. No. 626, as amended,
policemen should be treated in the same manner as soldiers.
While it is true that, “geographically” speaking, P/Sgt. Alvaran was not actually at his assigned post at the
Pasig Provincial Jail when he was attacked and killed, it could not also be denied that in bringing his son
— as a suspect in a case — to the police station for questioning to shed light on a stabbing incident, he
was not merely acting as father but as a peace of cer.”
From the foregoing cases, it can be gleaned that
the Court did not justify its
grant of death bene ts merely on account of the rule that soldiers or policemen, as the case may be, are
virtually working round-the-clock. Note that the Court likewise attempted in each case to nd a reasonable
nexus between the absence of the deceased from his assigned place of work and the incident that led to
his death.
Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC, with respect to claims for death
bene ts, namely (a) that the employee must be at the place where his work requires him to be; (b) that
the employee must have been performing his of cial functions; and (c) that if the injury is sustained
elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer, it is not dif cult to
understand then why SPO2 Alegre’s widow should be denied the claims otherwise due her. Obviously,
the matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met his death, that of ferrying passengers for a
fee, was intrinsically private and unof cial in nature proceeding as it did from no particular directive or
permission of his superior of cer. In the absence of such prior authority as in the cases of Hinoguin and
Nitura, or peacekeeping nature of the act attended to by the policeman at the time he died even without
the explicit permission or directive of a superior of cer, as in the case of P/Sgt. Alvaran, there is no justi
cation for holding that SPO2 Alegre met the requisites set forth in the ECC guidelines. That he may be
called upon at any time to render police work as he is considered to be on a round-the-clock duty and
was not on an approved vacation leave will not change the conclusion arrived at considering that he was
not placed in a situation where he was required to exercise his authority and duty as a policeman. In fact,
he was refusing to render one, pointing out that he already complied with duty detail. At any rate, the 24-
hour duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact validation of
their acts to place them within the scope of the guidelines rather than a blanket license to bene t them in
all situations that may give rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24-hour duty doctrine should not be
sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police of cer but only to those
which, although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless, basically police service in character.
The “24-Hour Duty” Doctrine Requires Work-Connection; “Police Service” Activities
Valeriano vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission and Government Service Insurance
System, G.R. No. 136200, June 8, 2000 —
Facts: C.S. Valeriano was employed as a re truck driver
assigned at the San
Juan Fire Station. On the evening of July 3, 1985, he was standing along Santolan Road, Quezon City,
when he met a friend. They decided to proceed to Bonanza Restaurant in EDSA, Quezon City, for dinner.
On their way home at around 9:30 PM, the owner-type jeepney they were riding in gured in a head-on
collision with another vehicle at the intersection of N. Domingo and Broadway streets in Quezon City.
Valeriano, thrown out of the vehicle, was severely injured. Pursuing his EC claim, Valeriano argued that
the exigency of his job as a reman requires a constant observance of his duties as such; thus, he should
be considered to have been “on call” when he met the accident. He underscored the applicability of
Hinoguin vs. ECC and Nitura vs. ECC to his case.
Ruling: Petitioner Valeriano was not able to demonstrate solidly how his job as a retruck driver was
related to the injuries he had suffered. That he sustained the injuries after pursuing a purely personal and
social function — having dinner with some friends — is clear from the records of the case. His injuries
were not acquired at his work place; nor were they sustained while he was performing an act within the
scope of his employment or in pursuit of an order of his superior. Thus his injuries and consequent
disability were not work-connected and thus not compensable.
The circumstances in the present case do not call for the application of Hinoguin and Nitura. Following
the rationalization in GSIS vs. Alegre the 24-hour-duty doctrine cannot be applied to petitioner’s case,
because he was neither at his assigned work place nor in pursuit of the orders of his superiors when he
met an accident. But the more important justi cation for the Court’s stance is that he was not doing an act
within his duty and authority as a retruck driver, or any other act of such nature, at the time he sustained
his injuries. There is no any reasonable connection between his injuries and his work as a retruck driver.
______________
Similarly, the Supreme Court failed to nd connection between the work and the death of SPO1 Tancinco
who was shot dead by ve unidenti ed men while he was repairing a private vehicle in front of his house
in Lemery, Batangas. SPO1 Tancinco was a member of the NCR Security Protection Group of the PNP
and assigned as part of the close-in security detail of the Vice-President. At the time of his death he was
off-duty as the Vice-President was in the US for medical treatment. Applying GSIS vs. Alegre, the Court
reiterated that:
...[T]he 24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing the
death of a police of cer but only to those which, although not on of cial line of duty, are nonetheless
basically police service in character. In this case, SPO1 Tancinco was not performing acts that are
“basically police service in character.” (Tancinco vs. Government Service Insurance System and
Employees’ Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 132916, November 16, 2001)
INGRESS-EGRESS/PROXIMITY RULE
Iloilo Dock & Eng’g. Co. vs. WCC, et al., L-26341, November
27, 1978 —
Facts: At about 5:02 in the afternoon of January 29, 1960, Pablo, who was
employed as a mechanic of the IDECO, while walking on his way home, was shot to death in front of,
and about 20 meters away from, the main IDECO gate, on a private road commonly called the IDECO
road. The slayer, Martin Cordero, was not heard to say anything before or after the killing. The motive for
the crime was and still is unknown as Cordero was himself killed before he could be tried for Pablo’s
death. At the time of the killing, Pablo’s companion was Rodolfo Galopez, another employee, who, like
Pablo, had nished overtime work at 5:00 p.m. and was going home. From the main IDECO gate to the
spot where Pablo was killed, there were four “carinderias” on the left side of the road and two “carinderias”
and a residential house on the right side. The entire length of the road is nowhere stated in the record.
The principal issue is whether Pablo’s death comes within the meaning and intendment of that
“deceptively simple and litigiously proli c” phrase “arising out of and in the course of employment.”
Ruling: The general rule in workmen’s compensation law known as the “going and coming rule,” simply
stated, is that “in the absence of special circumstances, an employee injured in, going to, or coming from,
his place of work is excluded from the bene ts of workmen’s compensation acts.” This rule, however,
admits four well- recognized exceptions, to wit: (1) where the employee is proceeding to or from his work
on the premises of his employer; (2) where the employee is about to enter or about to leave the premises
of his employer by way of the exclusive or customary means of ingress and egress; (3) where the
employee is charged, while on his way to or from his place of employment or at his home, or during his
employment, with some duty or special errand connected with his employment; and (4) where the
employer, as an incident of the employment, provides the means of transportation to and from the place
of employment.
We address ourselves particularly to an examination and consideration of the second exception, i.e.,
injuries sustained off the premises of the employer, but while using a customary means of ingress and
egress.
This exception, known as the “proximity rule,” was applied in Philippine Fiber Processing Co., Inc. vs.
Ampil. There, the employee, at about 5:15 a.m., while proceeding to his place of work and running to
avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a ditch fronting the main gate of employer’s factory, as a result of
which he died the next day. The sole question was whether or not the accident which caused the
employee’s death arose out of and in the course of his employment. The Court ruled in favor of the
claimant.
The point where Pablo was shot was barely twenty meters away from the main IDECO gate, certainly
nearer than a stone’s throw therefrom. The spot is immediately proximate to the IDECO’s premises.
Considering this fact, and the further facts that Pablo has just nished overtime work at the time, and was
killed barely two minutes after dismissal from work, the Ampil case is squarely applicable here. We may
say, as we did in Ampil, that the place where the employee was injured being “immediately proximate to
his place of work, the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his
employment and therefore arose out of and in the course thereof.” Our principal question is whether the
injury was sustained in the course of employment. We nd that it was, and so conclude that the assault
arose out of the employment, even though the said assault is unexplained.
American jurisprudence supports this view.
In Bountiful Brick Company vs. Giles, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled:
Employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space
necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be
injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way
over the employer’s premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical
effect a part of the employer’s premises, the injury is one arising out and in the course of the employment
as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its
performance. In other words, the employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon
and in point of space before the place where the work is to be done is reached. Probably, as a general
rule, employment may be said to begin when the employee reaches the entrance to the employer’s
premises where the work is to be done; but it is clear that in some cases the rule extends to include
adjacent premises used by the employee as a means of ingress and egress with the express or implied
consent of the employer.
“GOING TO OR COMING FROM WORK” RULE
Accident on the Way to Work
Alano vs. ECC, G.R. No. L-48594, March 16, 1988 —
Facts:
Dedication was a school principal whose tour of duty was from 7:30 a.m.
to 5:30 p.m. While waiting for a ride at a public plaza on her way to school, she was bumped and run
over by a speeding bus which caused her death. The Employees’ Compensation Commission denied the
claim led by her heirs on the ground that the injury was not an employment accident satisfying all the
conditions prescribed by law.
Ruling: The deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where her job
necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private
or personal about her being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required
her to be there. The GSIS, as the ultimate implementing agency of the Employees’ Compensation
Commission, is ordered to pay the claimants.1
Accident on the Way Home
Lazo vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 78617,
June 18, 1990 — Facts: Lazo is a security guard of the Central Bank assigned to its main of ce.
His regular tour of duty is from 2 o’clock in the afternoon to 10 o’clock in the evening. On June 18, 1986,
he rendered duty from 2 o’clock in the afternoon to 10 o’clock in the evening. But as the security guard
who was to relieve him failed to arrive, he rendered overtime duty up to 5 o’clock in the morning of June
19. On his way home, at about 6 o’clock that morning, the passenger jeepney the petitioner was riding
on turned turtle due to slippery road. As a result, he sustained injuries and was taken to the hospital for
treatment.
Ruling: The claim is compensable. Here, Lazo left his station at the Central Bank several hours after his
regular time off, because the reliever did not arrive, and so he was asked to go on overtime. After
permission to leave was given, he went home. There is no evidence that he deviated from his usual,
regular homeward route or that interruptions occurred in the journey.
Employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space
necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be
injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way
over the employer’s premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical
effect a part of the employer’s premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the
employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the
place of its performance.
“ACCIDENT” AND “INJURY”
NFD International Manning Agents, Inc./Barber Ship Management Ltd. vs. Illescas,
G.R. No. 183054, September 29, 2010 —
Facts: Illescas was employed as Third Of cer of M/V Shinrei through a POEA- approved employment
contract for nine months with US$854.00 monthly salary. On May 16, 2003, in the seventh month of
Illescas’ employment, the vessel of cers ordered Illescas to carry 25 re hydrant caps from the deck to the
engine workshop. The next day, while doing the same kind of work, he felt a sudden snap on his back,
with pain that radiated down to the left side of his hips. Repatriated to the Philippines, he underwent
operations, but his condition did not improve, causing an orthopedic specialist to declare him “un t to work
at sea in any capacity as seaman.” He claimed disability bene t under the contract that grants as much
as US$90,000.00 to the seafarer who suffers permanent disability “as a result of an accident.” The
employer denied the claim, insisting that the disability was not due to an “accident.”
Ruling: Black’s Law Dictionary de nes “accident” as “[a]n unintended and unforeseen injurious
occurrence; something that does not occur in the usual course of events or that could not be reasonably
anticipated, x x x [a]n unforeseen and injurious occurrence not attributable to mistake, negligence, neglect
or misconduct.”
The Philippine Law Dictionary de nes the word “accident” as “[t]hat which happens by chance or
fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen.”
“Accident,” in its commonly accepted meaning, or in its ordinary sense, has been de ned as:
[A] fortuitous circumstance, event, or happening, an event happening without any human agency, or if
happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual
and unexpected by the person to whom it happens x x x.
The word may be employed as denoting a calamity, casualty, catastrophe, disaster, an undesirable or
unfortunate happening; any unexpected personal injury resulting from any unlooked for mishap or
occurrence; any unpleasant or unfortunate occurrence, that causes injury, loss, suffering or death; some
untoward occurrence aside from the usual course of events.
The Court holds that the snap on the back
of respondent was not an accident, but an injury sustained by respondent from carrying the heavy
basketful of re hydrant caps, which injury resulted in his disability. The injury cannot be said to be the
result of an accident, that is, an unlooked for mishap, occurrence, or fortuitous event, because the injury
resulted from the performance of a duty. Although respondent may not have expected the injury, yet, it is
common knowledge that carrying heavy objects can cause back injury, as what happened in this case.
Hence, the injury cannot be viewed as unusual under the circumstances, and is not synonymous with the
term “accident” as denied above.
Although the disability of respondent was not caused by an accident, his disability is still compensable
under Article 13 of the CBA under the following provision:
A seafarer/officer who is disabled as a result of any injury, and who is assessed as less than 50%
permanently disabled, but permanently un t for further service at sea in any capacity, shall also be entitled
to a 100% compensation.
Respondent [Illescas] is, therefore, entitled to disability bene t in the amount US$90,000.00 under the
CBA.
Occupational Disease
 emotional strains and stresses, dealing as they do with intractable teenagers, especially young boys, and
Meñez vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission, et al., G.R. No. L-48488, April 25, 1980 —
 lesson plans until late at night, if they are not badgered by very demanding superiors.
Facts: Petitioner, G.D. Meñez, was employed by the Department (now Ministry)
of Education and Culture as a school teacher. She retired on August 31, 1975 under the disability
retirement plan at the age of 54 after 32 years of teaching, due to rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis.
Before her retirement, she was assigned at Raja Soliman High School in Tondo-Binondo, Manila, near a
dirty creek.
On October 21, 1976, petitioner led a claim for disability bene ts under P.D. No. 626, as amended, with
respondent Government Service Insurance System which denied the claim on October 25, 1976 on the
ground that petitioner’s ailments were not occupational diseases, taking into consideration the nature of
her particular work. Requests for reconsideration were also denied by the System; hence, the case was
elevated to the Employees’ Compensation Commission for review. On March 1, 1978, the Commission
en banc af rmed the decision of respondent GSIS.
In her petition for review on certiorari, petitioner claims that she contracted pneumonitis and/or
bronchiectasis with hemoptysis and rheumatoid arthritis on January 27, 1975 after wetting and chilling
during the course of employment. She claimed these diseases are permanent and recurring in nature
and work-connected.
Ruling: An occupational disease is one ‘which results from the nature of the employment, and by nature
is meant conditions to which all employees of a class are subject and which produce the disease as a
natural incident of a particular occupation, and attach to that occupation a hazard which distinguishes it
from the usual run of occupations and is in excess of the hazard attending the employment in general.’1
To be occupational, the disease must be one due wholly to causes and conditions which are normal and
constantly present and characteristic of the particular occupation; that is, those things which science and
industry have not yet learned how to eliminate. Every worker in every plant of the same industry is alike
constantly exposed to the danger of contracting a particular occupational disease. 2
An occupational disease is one which develops as a result of hazards peculiar to certain occupations,
due to toxic substances (as in the organic solvents industry), radiation (as in television repairment),
repeated mechanical injury, emotional strain, etc.3
From the foregoing de nitions of occupational disease of ailments, rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis
can be considered as such occupational diseases. All public high school teachers, like herein petitioner,
admittedly are the most underpaid but overworked employees of the government, and are subject to
harassed as they are by various extra-curricular or nonacademic assignments, aside from preparing
In the case of the petitioner, her emotional tension is heightened by the fact that the high school in which
she teaches is situated in a tough area — Binondo District, which is inhabited by thugs and other criminal
elements and further aggravated by the heavy pollution and congestion therein as well as the stinking
smell of the dirty Estero de la Reina nearby. Women, like herein petitioner, are most vulnerable to such
unhealthy conditions. The pitiful situation of all public school teachers is further accentuated by poor diet,
for they can ill-afford nutritious food.
But even if rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are not occupational diseases, there is ample proof that
petitioner contracted such ailments by reason of her occupation as a public high school teacher due to
her exposure to the adverse working conditions above-mentioned.
Indisputably, petitioner contracted pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with hemoptysis and rheumatoid
arthritis on January 27, 1975 after being drenched and the consequent ‘chilling during the course of
employment which are permanent and recurring in nature and work-connected.’ Undoubtedly, petitioner’s
ailments thus become compensable under the New Labor Code since under Rule III, Section 1(c) of its
Implementing Rules, ‘only sickness or injury which occurred on or after January 1975 and the resulting
disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules.’
The ECC’s decision was set aside and the Ministry of Education and Culture is ordered (1) to pay
petitioner the sum of P6,000.00 as disability income bene ts and (2) to reimburse petitioner’s medical and
hospital expenses duly supported by receipts.1
Increased Risk Shown
 P.D. 626; however, his claim was denied on the ground that his illness had no causal relationship to his
Narazo vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 80157, February 6, 1990 —
Facts:
The death of petitioner’s husband was caused by “Uremia due to
obstructive nephropathy and benign prostatic hypertrophy,” which is admittedly not among those listed
as occupational diseases. As per nding of the ECC, “Uremia is a toxic clinical condition characterized by
restlessness, muscular twitching, mental disturbance, nausea, and vomiting associated with utenal insuf
ciency brought about by the retention in blood of nitrogenous urinary waste products.” One of its causes
is the obstruction in the ow of urinary waste products.
The nature of the work of the deceased as Budget Examiner in the Of ce of the Governor dealt with the
detailed preparation of the budget, nancial reports and review and/or examination of the budget of other
provincial and municipal offices. Full concentration and thorough study of the entries of accounts in the
budget and/or financial reports were necessary, such that the deceased had to sit for hours, and more
often than not, delay and even forego urination in order not to interrupt the ow of concentration. In
addition, tension and pressure must have aggravated the situation.
Ruling: Under the foregoing circumstances, the cause of death of petitioner’s husband is work-
connected, i.e., the risk of contracting the illness was aggravated by the nature of the work, so much so
that petitioner is entitled to receive compensation bene ts for the death of her husband.
From human experience, prolonged sitting down and putting off urination result in stagnation of the urine.
This encourages the growth of bacteria in the urine, and affects the delicate balance between bacterial
multiplication rates and the host defense mechanisms. Delayed excretion may permit the retention and
survival of microorganisms which multiply rapidly, and infect the urinary tract. These are predisposing
factors to pylonephritis and uremia. Thus, while we may concede that these illnesses are not directly
caused by the nature of the duties of a teacher, the risk of contracting the same is aggravated by their
working habits necessitated by demands of job efficiency.
Increased Risk Not Shown
Limbo vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission and Social Security System, G.R. No. 146891,
July 30, 2002 —
Facts: Petitioner R. Limbo was employed at Nestle Philippines since 1966 as
a salesman and was later promoted as Areas Sales Supervisor in 1977. In December 1994, he was con
ned for one week at the Philippine General Hospital for joint pains. It was revealed that he had elevated
BUN, creatinine and anemia, and that he had chronic renal disease. He underwent a renal transplant and
was discharged on January 13, 1995. He claimed compensation bene ts under the SSS-ECC invoking
job as Area Sales Supervisor. He appealed to the Employees’ Compensation Commission which af rmed
the decision of the SSS. The Court of Appeals likewise dismissed his petition.
Issue: Whether or not “end-stage renal disease secondary to uric acid nephropathy” is compensable
under P.D. 626 as amended.
Ruling: The Court considered the workload and areas of responsibility of petitioner and found that it was
not unlikely for him to develop hypertension leading to uremia. In determining whether a disease is
compensable, it is enough that there exists a reasonable work connection as the workmen’s claim is
based on probability and not certainty.
Under the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, “(f)or the sickness and the resulting disability
to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex “A” of
these Rules with the conditions set therein satis ed; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.” Concededly, “end-stage renal disease
secondary to uric acid nephropathy” is not among the Occupational Diseases under Annex “A” of the
Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation. This, however, would not automatically bar petitioner’s
claim for as long as he could prove that the risk of contracting the illness was increased by his working
conditions.
Petitioner’s job description showed that he was responsible for the following:
(1) Territory’s collection, merchandising, market hygiene and promotion goals;
(2) Nestle’s principal satisfaction provider to the company’s customers and business partners,
government and other signi cant entities;
(3) Principal Liason of the territory with the National Sales Manager, Areas Sales Manager and other
Nestle units;
(4) Leads and manages territory sales force and 3rd party support.
Considering the workload and areas of responsibility of petitioner in this case, it is not unlikely for him to
develop hypertension, which in turn led to uremia. It should be stressed that in determining whether a
disease is compensable, it is enough that there exists a reasonable work connection. It is suf cient that
the hypothesis on which the workmen’s claim is based is probable since probability, not certainty, is the
touchstone.
CANCER: NEW DOCTRINE: PROOF IS REQUIRED
 Supreme Court in Raro vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 58445, April 27, 1989, en
Raro vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 58445, April 27, 1989 — Cancer is a
disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a person’s
employment appears to have no relevance. Cancer can strike a lowly paid laborer or a highly paid
executive or one who works on land, in water, or in the bowels of the earth. It makes no difference whether
the victim is employed or unemployed, a white collar employee or a blue collar worker, a housekeeper,
an urban dweller or a resident of a rural area.
Jurisprudence on the compensability of cancer ailments has of late become a source of confusion among
the claimants and the government agencies enforcing the employees’ compensation law. The strongly
lingering in uence of the principles of “presumption of compensability” and “aggravation” found in the
defunct Workmen’s Compensation Act but expressly discarded under the present compensation scheme
has led to con ict and inconsistency in employees’ compensation decisions.
The problem is attributable to the inherent dif culty in applying the new principle of “proof of increased
risk.” There are two approaches to a solution in cases where it cannot be proved that the risk of
contracting an illness not listed as an occupational disease was increased by the claimant’s working
conditions. One approach is that if a claimant cannot prove the necessary work connection because the
causes of the disease are still unknown, it must be presumed that working conditions increased the risk
of contracting the ailment. The other approach is that if there is no proof of the required work connection,
the disease is not compensable because the law says so.
It is not correct to say that all cancers are not compensable. The list of occupational diseases prepared
by the Employees’ Compensation Commission includes some cancers as compensable. There is no
arbitrariness in the Commission’s allowing vinyl chloride workers or plastic workers to be compensated
for brain cancer. There are certain cancers which are reasonably considered as strongly induced by speci
c causes. Heavy doses of radiation as in Chernobyl, USSR, cigarette smoke over a long period for lung
cancer, certain chemicals for speci c cancers, and asbestos dust, among others, are generally accepted
as increasing the risks of contracting speci c cancers. What the law requires for others is proof.
Cancer is a disease of still unknown origin which strikes people in all walks of life, employed or
unemployed. Unless it be shown that a particular form of cancer is caused by speci c working conditions
(e.g., chemical fumes, nuclear radiation, asbestos dust, etc.), the Court cannot conclude that it was the
employment which increased the risk of contracting the disease.
For the guidance of the administrative agencies and practicing lawyers concerned, the decision of the
banc, Gutierrez, Jr., J. supersedes the decisions in Panotes vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission
(128 SCRA 473 [1984]); Mercado vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission (127 SCRA 664 [1984]);
Ovenson vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission (156 SCRA 2 [1987]); Nemaria vs. Employees’
Compensation Commission (155 SCRA 166 [1987]) and other cases with conclusions different from those
stated in Raro vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission.
Suicide, When Compensable

NAESS Shipping Phil. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 73441, September 4, 1987 —
Facts: While plying the seas
from Brazil to Egypt, the vessel’s chief steward,
named Dublin, fatally stabbed Fernandez, the second cook, during a quarrel. Dublin then ran to the deck
from which he jumped or fell overboard. The body was never recovered.
For the death of Dublin, his widow Zenaida collected the amount of P75,000 under the ITF Collective
Bargaining Agreement. She also led with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) a
complaint against NAESS for payment of death bene ts totalling US$74,512, under both the Special
Agreement and what she claimed to be also the applicable Singapore Workmen’s Compensation
Ordinance. Under the special agreement, a crewman of the vessel is entitled to compensation for “loss
of life.” The POEA rendered judgment for complainant, holding Dublin’s death compensable under the
Special Agreement.
NAESS went to the Supreme Court charging grave abuse of discretion by POEA and raised the issue
whether “death caused by suicide” (jumping overboard) is compensable.
Ruling: No law or rule would make it illegal for an employer to assume the obligation to pay death bene
ts in favor of his employee in their contract of employment. Since NAESS freely bound itself to a contract
which on its face makes it unquali edly liable to pay compensation bene ts for Dublin’s death while in its
service, regardless of whether or not it intended to make itself the insurer, in the legal sense, of Dublin’s
life, NAESS cannot escape liability.
Contracts which are the private laws of the contracting parties should be ful lled according to the literal For his death, his father led a claim for compensation bene ts but the GSIS denied it because the
sense of their stipulation, if their terms are clear and leave no room for doubt as to the intention of the deceased at the time of accident was not performing his duties aside from being notoriously negligent.
contracting parties, for contracts are obligatory, no matter what their form may be, whenever the essential
requisites for their validity are present. Appellant sought a reconsideration of the ruling. He averred that his son belonged to the Ranger Training
Group whose primary mission is to develop selected soldiers in the eld of specialized small unit tactics,
The argument — that to compel payment of death bene ts would amount not only to rewarding the act of
particularly on weapons, explosives, and hand-to-hand combat, among others. Thus, testing a dynamite
murder or homicide, but also inequitably places on NAESS the twin burdens of compensating both the
was part of the deceased’s training as a ranger. “In fact,” appellant said, “no less than the Minister of
killer and his victim, who allegedly had also been employed under a contract with a similar death bene ts
National Defense through his legal chief, Brig. Gen. Samuel Soriano, supported the line of duty status of
clause — confuses the legal implications and effects of two distinct and independent agreements. It
his son’s death.”
carries within itself the seeds of its own refutation. Entitlement of Dublin to death bene ts resulted from
his death while serving out his contract of employment. It was not a consequence of his killing of
“Moreover,” appellant added, “it was not the commanding of cer of the deceased as alleged in
Fernandez. If the latter’s death is also compensable, that is due to the solitary fact of his death while
respondent’s adverse decision who advised him not to test the dynamite, but merely a colleague of the
covered by a similar contract, not precisely to the fact that he met death at the hands of Dublin. That both
same rank as the deceased.”
deaths may be related by abuse and effect and NAESS is the single obligor liable for compensation in
both cases must, insofar as factual and legal basis of such liability is concerned, be regarded as purely
Ruling: We [the ECC] believe that there was indeed negligence on the part of the deceased soldier.
accidental circumstances.
However, his negligence was not notorious as perceived by the respondent. Notorious negligence is
something more than simple or contributory negligence. It signi es a deliberate act of the employee to
According to American authorities, suicide is compensable in the following cases:
disregard his own personal safety. Disobedience to rules does not in itself constitute notorious

(a) When it results from insanity resulting from compensable work injury 
or disease; 
 negligence, if no intention can be attributed to the injured to end his life.

(b) When it occurs during a delirium resulting from compensable disease. 1 
 Thus, in line with the principle of liberally construing compensation law, to attain its purpose for which it
was enacted, the correct view to be followed is that no man in his right senses would deliberately court
Self-destruction is not presumed. In cases where compensation is sought for a violent death due to death. The presumption then to be adopted is that any person by his instinct of self-preservation wants
accident, our courts have refused so far to impute to the victim an intention to end his life. The laborer is to avoid such danger unless an intention is attributed to him to end his life.
presumed to take the necessary precautions to avoid injury to himself, unless an intention is attributed to
him to end his life. That presumption is based on the instinct of self-preservation.2 Considering the soldier’s training on explosives as a ranger, his desire to test the con scated dynamite is
but a natural reaction on his part to the extent that he even ignored the advice of his colleague against
Not Notorious Negligence
Quizon vs. GSIS, ECC Case No. 3015, promulgated on October 26, 1987 his plan. Unfortunately, the dynamite exploded prematurely causing his instant death.

— Facts: A Philippine Army soldier died in December 1980 due to dynamite blast
Conversion from Permanent Partial Disability to Permanent Total Disability

at Tumalutab detachment in Ipil, Zamboanga City.
Investigation showed that after lunch that day, he
GSIS vs. Court of Appeals and R. Balais, G.R. No. 117572, January 29, 1998 —
asked permission from his unit to

Facts: In December 1989, the employee claimant was diagnosed to be suffering from Ruptured
test the dynamite they had earlier con scated. He took a civilian pumpboat and proceeded towards nearby
Aneurysm. She underwent craniotomy.
Sinonog Island. Along the way, however, he accidentally ignited the fuse of the dynamite, causing it to
explode prematurely. The soldier died on the spot.
But despite her operation, she could not perform her duties as cashier in the NHA as ef ciently as she did
before her illness. This forced her to retire on March 1, 1990 at the age of sixty-two (62). She led a claim
for disability bene ts.
The GSIS granted her temporary total disability (TTD) benefits and, subsequently, permanent partial
disability (PPD) bene ts for nine months.
In November 1992, she requested the GSIS to convert the classi cation of her disability bene ts from
permanent partial disability (PPD) to permanent total disability (PTD).
GSIS denied the request and informed her that her condition did not satisfy the criteria for permanent
total disability. She asked for reconsideration. GSIS denied it, and ECC af rmed the denial. But on a
petition for review, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision favorable to her. GSIS petitions the
Supreme Court to reverse the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Is private respondent entitled to conversion of her bene ts from permanent partial disability to
permanent total disability?
Ruling: The Supreme Court, through Justice Romero, refused to reverse the Court of Appeals.
While it is true that the degree of private respondent’s physical condition at the time of her retirement was
not considered as permanent total disability, yet, it cannot be denied that her condition subsequently
worsened after her head operation and consequent retirement. In fact, she suffered afterwards from some
ailments like headaches, dizziness, weakness, inability to sleep properly, inability to walk without support
and failure to regain her memory. All these circumstances ineluctably demonstrate the seriousness of
her condition, contrary to the claim of petitioner. More than that, it was also undisputed that private
respondent was made to take her medication for life.
“A person’s disability may not manifest fully at one precise moment in time but rather over a period of
time. It is possible that an injury which at rst was considered to be temporary may later on become
permanent or one who suffers a partial disability becomes totally and permanently disabled from the
same cause.”1
In the same vein, this Court has ruled that “disability should not be understood more on its medical signi
cance but on the loss of earning capacity.”2 Private respondent’s persistent illness indeed forced her to
retire early which, in turn, resulted in her unemployment, and loss of earning capacity.
Judicial precedents likewise show that disability is intimately related to one’s earning capacity. It has been
a consistent pronouncement of this Court that “permanent total disability means disablement of an
employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of a similar nature that she was trained for or
accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of her mentality and attainment could do.” 1
“It does not mean state of absolute helplessness, but inability to do substantially all material acts
necessary to prosecution of an occupation for remuneration or pro t in substantially customary and usual
manner.2
The Court construed permanent total disability as the “lack of ability to follow continuously some
substantially gainful occupation without serious discomfort or pain and without material injury or danger
to life.”3 It is, therefore, clear from established jurisprudence that the loss of one’s earning capacity
determines the disability compensation one is entitled to.
It is also important to note that private respondent was constrained to retire at the age of 62 years because
of her impaired physical condition. This, again, is another indication that her disability is permanent and
total.
IS EARNING CAPACITY “IMPAIRED” IF EARNING IS HIGHER AFTER THE INJURY?
Central Azucarera Don Pedro vs. C. de Leon, in his capacity as Workmen’s Compensation
Commissioner and L. Alla, No. L-10036, December 28, 1957 — The claimant laborer was granted
bene t for temporary total disability. When
the disability ceased, he found a new employment at a higher salary. Meantime, he led a claim for
permanent partial disability but the ECC denied the claim because in fact his salary was higher than
before.
Ruling: The alleged new employment does not appear to have been duly established and, indeed, even
supposing it to be true, that fact would not in itself necessarily affect the laborer’s claim for compensation
for a permanent partial disability. An injured laborer’s
incapacity for work is not to be measured solely by the wages he receives, or his earning, after the injury,
since the amount of such wages or earnings may be affected by various extraneous matters or factors. 1
As noted in the American Law Reports, “there are a number of possible explanations of the fact that an
employee who receives higher wages after an injury than what he earned before may still have suffered
an impairment of earning capacity. Thus, it may indicate: (1) that the employee is the bene ciary of a
mere gratuity and does not actually ‘earn’ his wages; (2) that the employee, by education and training,
has tted himself for more remunerative employment; (3) that the employee works longer hours than he
did before his injury, his hourly remuneration having increased; (4) that a general change in wage scales
has taken place for the type of work or in the industry; (5) that the new wages are intended as an
inducement to him to refrain from pursuing a claim; (6) that the employee, before his injury, was younger
or a minor; (7) that the employment in which the employee was employed after the injury was of uncertain
duration.”2