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Conclusions: Whither Renewable
Generation?
Boaz Moselle, Jorge Padilla, and Richard Schmalensee
T he authors of this book have assessed the cur-
rent use and future potential of renewable
energy technologies for electricity generation.
These are technologies that, as Godfrey Boyle
puts it in Chapter 2, “enable constantly replen-
ished renewable energy flows to be harnessed to
produce power in forms useful to humanity on a
sustainable basis.” In particular, the authors have
addressed the following two questions: What is
the case for promoting renewable energy? and
What are the implications for power markets and
systems of the widespread adoption of renewable
generation? In this concluding chapter, we sum
up the answers provided in preceding chapters
and discuss some possible policy implications.
The Case for Promoting
Renewable Power
Kenneth Gillingham and James Sweeney argue in
Chapter 5 that the transition from carbon-based
technologies to renewable energy is inevitable in
the very long run. As noted by Erin Mansur in
Chapter 3, we are likely to see a significant
increase in the role of renewables in meeting elec-
tricity demand in most developed countries in
coming decades. Recent experience surveyed in
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this book, notably Germany (by Hannes Weigt
and Florian Leuthold in Chapter 14) and Spain
(by Luis Agosti and Jorge Padilla in Chapter 15), is
consistent with this trend. The goal of the Euro-
pean Union is to achieve significant reduction in
carbon intensity by 2020, with renewable genera-
tion playing an important role. As explained by
Christopher Jones in Chapter 12, about 60% of
the world’s wind capacity was installed in Europe
at the end of 2007, and the EU is committed to a
20% share for renewable energy in its total energy
mix by 2020, compared with about 8.5% in 2005.
The growth in renewable generation is not—
and, for the foreseeable future, is not likely to
be—driven by market forces, but is largely the
result of government intervention. As described
by Richard Schmalensee in Chapter 11, there are
four basic kinds of support schemes targeted spe-
cifically at renewable generation: feed-in tariffs,
output subsidies, investment subsidies, and output
quotas. Feed-in tariffs guarantee a predetermined,
above-market price for power over a period of
years. They have been used widely within the EU,
notably in Germany and Spain, and have proved
to be a powerful mechanism to promote invest-
ment, minimize costs to consumers (for a given
level of output and mix of renewable technolo-
gies), and maximize production. Output subsidies
paid on top of market price, though not as widely
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328 Boaz Moselle, Jorge Padilla, and Richard Schmalensee
employed, can be shown to be as effective as, and
less distortionary than, feed-in tariffs. Investment
subsidies are less efficient than feed-in tariffs or
output subsidies yet are widely used all over the
world to promote the deployment of renewable
power plants. Finally, output quotas typically
require agents operating in power markets to gen-
erate or procure a minimum fraction of energy
from renewable sources.
Renewable generation support schemes,
whether feed-in tariffs, output subsidies and quo-
tas, or investment subsidies, are commonly justi-
fied as a means of curbing CO2 emissions and
therefore as part of the overall response to global
warming. Indeed, U.S. and especially EU energy
policies place renewables at the forefront of the
fight against climate change (see Chapters 11 and
12). Climate change is expected to adversely
affect many economic sectors and natural systems
and increase human mortality and morbidity. The
need to address this threat is beyond dispute. With
respect to renewable generation, the relevant and
difficult question from an economic perspective is
whether current and planned support schemes
represent an efficient response to the challenges
posed by climate change.
From an economic viewpoint, the starting
point for designing an efficient climate policy is a
market-based mechanism to internalize the exter-
nalities associated with emissions of greenhouse
gases, such as a carbon tax or emissions trading
(cap-and-trade) system. A properly designed car-
bon tax or cap-and-trade system can in theory
reduce emissions at least cost.
Those market-based instruments are by defi-
nition technology-neutral.1 That is, they affect
different technologies in terms of their green-
house emissions only, and therefore do not favor
one technology (e.g., renewable technologies)
over other low-carbon forms of generation (e.g.,
nuclear power or energy efficiency) on a priori
grounds. Under those mechanisms, technologies
compete on their merits and electricity is gener-
ated efficiently, using those technologies that are
more economical on the basis of both their actual
costs of production and the market cost of their
emissions. Investment in renewable energy may
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be an efficient response to those market-based
interventions, but there is no guarantee that this is
the case.
Market-based solutions would also affect all
CO2-emitting sectors in a similar way and would
not place the entire decarbonization burden on
the electricity sector. Most of the jurisdictions
analyzed in this book have committed to ambi-
tious renewable generation targets even though
they perhaps could have more easily and eco-
nomically achieved the decarbonization of their
economies through a properly designed carbon
tax.
Governments almost universally have adopted
specific policies to promote renewable generation
rather than relying on market-based solutions,
however. This is so even though alternative tech-
nologies may offer the same environmental ben-
efits at lower cost. Of course, policy choices are
the outcome of political processes that are often
complex, and it would be naive to expect that
those outcomes generally coincide with the rec-
ommendations of economics textbooks.
Existing renewables policies and future policy
proposals have been defended using both eco-
nomic and noneconomic arguments. The various
chapter authors have a range of views regarding
those justifications and the necessity or desirability
of specific support mechanisms for renewable
generation. The view of the book editors is
derived from three observations.
First, it is plausible that the true size of the
negative externality associated with CO2
emissions—the social cost of carbon—is higher
than the current price of CO2 emissions (e.g., in
the EU Emission Trading System, or ETS), and
that, as Boyle argues in Chapter 2, the difference
exceeds the incremental cost of renewable genera-
tion relative to conventional generation. This is a
necessary condition for supporting renewable
generation, though by no means sufficient (for
example, one might be able simply to raise the
price of CO2 emissions).
Second, it is also plausible that other forms of
emissions reduction—such as nuclear, carbon
capture and storage (CCS), or energy efficiency
policies2—are either more costly (at the relevant
margin) than renewables or constrained by
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Conclusions: Whither Renewable Generation?
noneconomic factors, such as the public accept-
ability issues around nuclear power.
The third observation is an empirical one, for
which Part IV of this book provides ample sup-
port: political processes do not easily deliver out-
comes that resemble the first-best outcome of
technology-neutral, market-based mechanisms to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Why this is so
raises many interesting questions of political
economy, but it is clear that governments face
great difficulty in credibly committing to a long-
term carbon price that is close to the social cost of
carbon or high enough to support significant
investments in low-carbon technologies. Even the
EU ETS, which is an impressive and unique
achievement, has to date given a level of carbon
prices that induces switching from coal to gas-
fired generation but is not high enough to support
such investments.
Drawing these three observations together,
the editors therefore recognize that the need to
respond to the challenges posed by global warm-
ing, combined with real-world constraints on
policymaking processes, may provide a valid justi-
fication for specific support mechanisms for
renewables, especially for less costly forms. How-
ever, no plausible combination of assumptions
justifies a “pay whatever it takes” approach. The
shadow value of investing in a given technology is
finite, limited, if by nothing else, at least by the
opportunity cost of investing more in lower-cost
technologies. In particular, it is hard to justify
extensive investment in deploying extremely
expensive forms of renewables, such as solar
photovoltaic in Spain, Germany, and parts of the
United States and offshore wind in the United
Kingdom.
This logic for supporting some specific meas-
ures to promote renewable generation does not
depend on the kinds of market failure arguments
that are often cited in favor of such measures.
Although it is possible in theory to identify many
such market failures (see Chapter 5), in most cases
they appear unlikely to be material enough to
justify the kind of large-scale interventions they
are used to support. In general, the claimed “non-
climate-change externality” arguments for
renewables support appear rather weak.
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329
For example, investing in renewables to create
jobs seems like poor economic policy. This is
because electricity generation is generally highly
capital-intensive, the time frame for investment is
too long to allow for a temporary boost in
employment in the short run (during a recession),
and in the long run the level of employment
depends on structural macroeconomic factors and
is unlikely to be affected by policies of this nature.
As an illustration, in Spain, the rapid growth of
renewable generation before and after the Great
Recession has had, at most, a de minimis impact on
its labor markets and has not offset in any mean-
ingful way the growth of unemployment during
the current crisis.
With regard to industrial policy, almost every
major government in the developed world seems
to believe that it will become a world leader in
new energy technologies, and that such leadership
will generate positive externalities on other com-
panies within the energy sector as well as on other
industrial and services sectors. As yet, however,
evidence is slim in support of that claim for any
nation. In particular, little evidence exists that
extensive deployment of renewables creates
learning-by-doing (or knowledge) spillovers that
cannot be captured within firms (see, e.g., Chap-
ter 5). Moreover, as in other industries, it is likely
that these positive externalities are much stronger
at the R&D level. Subsidies for wide-scale
deployment of expensive renewable technologies
are therefore unlikely to be justified on the basis
either that the cost is overestimated (because they
will bring down future costs) or that they will
stimulate an infant industry.
An alternative justification for existing and
proposed support schemes for renewables con-
cerns their impact on security of supply. In most
markets, individual participants deal effectively
and efficiently with uncertainty regarding demand
and supply through price incentives, bilateral
insurance contracts, and related devices. The con-
clusion that supply insecurity justifies government
action here must rest on the identification of one
or more specific externalities that can be cor-
rected by nonmarket intervention.
From a U.S. perspective, Gillingham and
Sweeney point out in Chapter 5 that an important
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330 Boaz Moselle, Jorge Padilla, and Richard Schmalensee
externality may relate to the costs associated with
national security, but this concerns oil and has
little relevance to renewables other than biofuels.
Looking at the EU, where security of supply is
high on the political agenda and is routinely cited
as a justification for renewables subsidies, Boaz
Moselle in Chapter 4 identifies significant exter-
nalities in the context of the key relevant security-
of-supply issue: dependence on Russia and Alge-
ria for natural gas. Although EU policymakers
often refer to generalized import dependence, few
security issues appear to exist around the use of
imported coal, given that many diverse and his-
torically friendly countries have enormous coal
reserves. Moselle discusses the extent to which
renewable generation in the EU, as opposed to
other energy sources, may replace Russian and
Algerian gas. He concludes that dependence on
imported gas gives rise to real security-of-supply
issues in the EU, especially in eastern Europe, and
that market outcomes may not provide an effi-
cient response to those risks because of “moral
hazard” types of concerns that give rise to exter-
nalities. He argues, however, that these externali-
ties do not justify the specific promotion of
renewables, because it is not clear how much
Russian or Algerian gas would be displaced by
renewable generation, and because other forms of
low-carbon generation could have similar or
greater impact on security of supply.
In summary, then, although the environmen-
tal benefits of renewable generation are clear, the
editors are skeptical of economic and geostrategic
justifications for policies specifically aimed at pro-
moting renewables. They do, however, recognize
a political rationale for existing renewable support
schemes: subsidizing renewables may be politi-
cally more acceptable than taxing firms and con-
sumers for polluting. As in many other instances,
first-best economic policy choices may not be
politically feasible. In such cases, we need to look
for second-best policy responses. Existing and
planned support schemes can be rationalized only
as second-best responses to the challenges posed
by climate change. Yet the authors widely agree
that current and anticipated policies need consid-
erable fine-tuning before they can be properly
regarded as the right policy instruments even in a
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second-best world.The editors would add that the
constraints that lead to second-best policy out-
comes can change, and as the true cost of not
using technology-neutral, market-based mecha-
nisms becomes clearer over time, the opportunity
may arise to move closer to first-best.
Renewable Generation and
Power Systems in Practice
Current policies toward greenhouse gas abate-
ment in the electricity generation sector in the
EU, in many EU member states, in some U.S.
states and regions, and under serious considera-
tion at the federal level in the United States com-
bine a technology-neutral market-based mecha-
nism (e.g., the EU ETS and similar cap-and-trade
schemes in California and the U.S. Northeast)
with technology-specific interventions for
renewables, nuclear, and CCS. This mix of poli-
cies has profound implications for wholesale
power markets.
Existing and planned policies may raise ques-
tions about the current model of liberalized
power markets. A large part of the benefits from
liberalization have come about through improved
investment decisions. In fact, dynamic efficiency
considerations underlay the move from regulated
to liberalized generation. However, current poli-
cies mean that market forces will have limited
impact on future investment decisions, as those
will be driven, to a large extent, by the environ-
mental and security-of-supply concerns of gov-
ernments. In the United Kingdom, for example,
choices for new investment are affected by a very
large number of different environmental programs
(as discussed by Michael Pollitt in Chapter 13),
whose cumulative effect is likely to be determina-
tive.3
At a more concrete level, existing and planned
policies are bound to have a significant impact on
the economics of conventional generation plants.
As shown by James Bushnell in Chapter 9, the
exploitation of wind resources will have a signifi-
cant impact on market prices. It will also affect the
net load shape, the difference between load and
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Conclusions: Whither Renewable Generation?
supply from intermittent sources. This is likely to
exhibit relatively higher spreads between peak and
average demand for thermal production. As a con-
sequence, the equilibrium investment mix of
nonwind resources will shift toward less base load
and more peaking capacity. The experiences in
Spain and Germany show that the widespread
deployment of intermittent generation (wind)
leads to increased price volatility, with very low
(on occasions even zero or negative) prices when
wind patterns make for high levels of output at
times of low load (see Chapters 14 and 15).
This combination of spot price volatility and
the need for large numbers of peaking plants with
very low utilization is likely to significantly ex-
acerbate the “missing money” problem that can
already arise in wholesale power markets, where a
combination of the lack of real-time pricing for
many consumers, transmission system operator
(TSO) behavior, explicit regulatory interventions
(price caps), and implicit regulation means that
markets do not provide the right signals to get
sufficient peaking capacity.
Essentially three approaches can be taken to
this problem. The first is to observe that markets
are quite capable of dealing with problems of this
sort via the price mechanism, including for goods
that are not storable. For example, demand for
accommodation on or near a ski slope is highly
weather related. High prices for that accommoda-
tion at times of peak demand (e.g., around Christ-
mas and during school holidays in winter) ensure
a high level of investment and the absence of lines
outside ski chalets. Similarly, if there are no price
caps and investors do not expect future govern-
ment intervention, then they should be expected
to build sufficient capacity to cope with demand,
investing in backup plants that would tend to run
infrequently, on the basis that the spot prices
when they did run would be high enough that
they could recover their fixed costs over time. At
the same time, demand should become more
responsive to short-term price signals as the
prevalence of price spikes makes it worthwhile to
devote time and make necessary capital invest-
ments so as to be able more easily to reduce or
shift demand at times of peak load.
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331
In many (probably most, and perhaps all)
jurisdictions, however, governments lack the abil-
ity to credibly commit not to intervene in energy
markets when prices are high. Indeed many liber-
alized energy markets, including several in the
United States and in a number of EU member
states, already have explicit price caps in place.
These caps in part reflect political sensitivities but
are also a reaction to well-founded concerns that
wholesale power markets are more susceptible
than many others to market abuse.
In those circumstances, the second approach
to dealing with intermittency, price spikes, and
the need for backup is to provide a subsidy to
investment in generation (and on efficiency
grounds, perhaps also to flexible load) in the form
of “capacity payments”. A number of design
issues around the capacity markets determine
these payments, which have been widely explored
(in theory and in practice) in the United States,
much less so in the EU, where few jurisdictions
currently have any form of capacity payment in
place. Getting those payments at the right level
appears to be key to ensuring that the move
toward renewable energy does not compromise
the reliability of electricity systems.
The third approach would be to conclude that
measures of this kind are ineffective, and that
competitive markets with a significant proportion
of intermittent (and low-marginal-cost) renew-
able energy are not able to deliver the necessary
rents to induce adequate investment in peaking
capacity. From the discussion above, it should be
clear that the editors do not share that conclusion.
The prospect of re-regulation of electricity aimed
at ensuring generation adequacy, while at the
same time giving governments more direct con-
trol over technology choices, is nonetheless a real
prospect,4 though in the editors’ view, it is prob-
lematic and potentially worrisome.
That the shift to renewable energy may lead to
new market distortions and regulatory challenges
does not justify giving up on markets. No doubt
regulators will have to adapt their tools to accom-
modate the environmental and security-of-supply
concerns of governments, but they should do so
without throwing off the discipline that a com-
petitive market imposes not only on firms and
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332 Boaz Moselle, Jorge Padilla, and Richard Schmalensee
consumers, but also on policymakers. Bad poli-
cies, like poorly managed firms, tend to fail the
market test quickly.
Power markets that integrate large amounts of
wind face several other policy issues. First, apart
from the investment issue discussed above,
increasing penetration of intermittent generation
gives rise to operational concerns because of the
difficulty of predicting output ahead of time.
However, significant improvements have taken
place in forecasting wind generation output over
time (see Chapter 2). Moselle argues in Chapter 4
that as a result, the operational issue can in princi-
ple be made relatively straightforward and, subject
to solving the problem of providing investment
incentives to ensure sufficient availability of peak-
ing plants, the problem becomes simply a further
cost element, albeit potentially a very material
one, rather than a security-of-supply concern.
Second, a subsidy per megawatt-hour of
renewable generation distorts price signals and
can lead to inefficiencies. For example, the mas-
sive introduction of wind generation can lead to
negative prices, reflecting an inefficient outcome
where wind generators, which could stop run-
ning at zero social cost but at the expense of losing
their feed-in tariff payments, pay others (e.g.,
nuclear generators) to incur real costs to produce
less electricity (Schmalensee reports on negative
spot prices in west Texas in Chapter 11). Other
inefficiencies may arise when the level of payment
is unrelated to the market price (e.g., the absence
of an incentive to produce at peak hours or at
peak times of the year).
A third problem concerns the potential need
for new investment in transmission, as new pat-
terns of generation, reflecting different patterns of
location for new installed capacity, lead to chan-
ging flow patterns in transmission systems. Chris-
tian von Hirschhausen explains in Chapter 10 that
the complexities of harnessing renewable energy
to generate electricity are relatively simple in
comparison to transporting that electricity over
long distances to large demand centers. He also
describes the many market and institutional prob-
lems, including regulatory and technological risks
and rent-sharing issues, which make it difficult to
overcome the transmission bottlenecks that limit
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the effective deployment of renewables. If
renewables are to play a more important role,
policymakers must address these difficult prob-
lems.
The location of large-scale renewable genera-
tion will depend on a number of factors, includ-
ing the location of appropriate resources, such as
water, wind, sunshine, and sources of biomass; the
relevant transportation costs for some of these
resources; issues around siting; and the costs of
developing the necessary distribution and trans-
mission systems. Efficient locational pricing, as
discussed by William Hogan in Chapter 7, will
help provide incentives for efficient decisions
concerning the location of generation and trans-
mission facilities, such as by ensuring higher
prices in areas where transmission bottlenecks
exist. However, it would be daunting even in
theory to attempt to fully decentralize transmis-
sion investment decisions via locational pricing, if
only because transmission investments are lumpy
and commonly eliminate the nodal price differ-
ences that justified the investments. In practice,
therefore, more extensive work is needed on
developing and implementing appropriate meth-
odologies for transmission planning.
Moreover, one effect of the need to locate
generation close to renewable resources, and far
from NIMBY-minded citizens, is likely to be a
much greater mismatch between the locations of
generation and load. New arrangements for trans-
mission planning thus need to include arrange-
ments to coordinate planning among multiple
transmission owners. U.S. experience suggests
that electricity systems operated by regional trans-
mission operators (RTOs) and independent sys-
tem operators (ISOs) are more effective in inte-
grating wind generation. Those systems leverage
their operational and transmission integration to
facilitate deployment of renewable generation (see
Chapter 11). A new approach to infrastructure
planning is foreseen in Europe. Under the third
internal market package, two new European
organizations, the Agency for the Cooperation of
Energy Regulators (ACER) and the European
Network of Transmission System Operators for
Electricity (ENTSO-E), will have to cooperate
and coordinate to put in place new infrastructure
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Conclusions: Whither Renewable Generation?
and grid access rules to ensure that the growth in
renewable energy is sustainable and the available
capacity is used efficiently (see Chapter 12).
Finally, large-scale deployment of renewable
generation raises questions as to the nature of
regulation. Richard Green maintains in Chapter 8
that energy regulation will need to adjust, for
example by recognizing the need for new regu-
lated investments (e.g., in “smart grids” to com-
plement distributed generation), but that there
should be no step change in the fundamental
scope of energy regulation. He also suggests that
regulators should continue to focus on the pro-
motion of competition, and indeed that competi-
tive models will have extra advantages in the con-
text of a transition to renewables because of their
superior performance in stimulating innovation.
Conclusion
Except possibly for nuclear terrorism, global
warming is widely regarded as the most important
challenge to our globalized society. Policymakers
are considering ways of confronting this challenge
and are also putting a substantial amount of
money on the table. A significant share of that
money is being allocated to renewable generation
support schemes. For a variety of reasons, a lot of
that money will be spent inefficiently. Because the
sums involved are very large, it is imperative that
we discuss how to move toward a decarbonized
electricity system at the least possible cost. This
requires moving away from generic and arcane
debates about policy goals and toward analyzing
the design and implementation of renewable gen-
eration support schemes, as well as the relative
merits of renewable generation policies in com-
parison with other decarbonization policies. It is
hoped that this book represents a nontrivial step
forward in that direction.
Notes
1. A “market-based instrument” is defined in this
context to refer to an instrument that puts a price
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333
on greenhouse gas emissions (or at least on CO2
emissions), either directly via a tax or indirectly via
cap-and-trade. Under this definition, therefore, an
instrument like tradable renewables certificates (or,
hypothetically, a tax on all nonrenewable genera-
tion) does not qualify as a market-based instru-
ment.
2. In industrialized countries, as explained by José
Goldemberg in Chapter 6), energy efficiency will
be an attractive, though limited, alternative to
renewable generation. In developing countries,
energy efficiency programs are less likely to substi-
tute for the promotion of carbon-free or low-
carbon technologies. In those latter countries,
energy demand is bound to grow and should be
met by deploying clean and efficient technologies
early in the process of development.
3. These programs include the EU ETS; the national
UK Emissions Trading Scheme; the Renewables
Obligation Certificates, which fund renewables
deployment differentially by technology; invest-
ment subsidies for renewables, known as capital
grants; feed-in tariffs for new microrenewables;
support for cogeneration; new support measures
currently being developed for nuclear and CCS;
obligations on suppliers to install energy efficiency
measures to meet the Carbon Emissions Reduc-
tion Target (CERT); as well as a number of other
measures.
4. Recent proposals from the British energy regula-
tor (formerly a leading advocate of liberalized
energy markets) include, at one extreme, the crea-
tion of a single central buyer responsible for pro-
curing wholesale power and contracting to pro-
cure new generation investment, which it would
secure against long-term contracts (see Ofgem
2010).
Reference
Ofgem. 2010. Project Discovery: Options for Delivering
Secure and Sustainable Energy Supplies, February 3.
London: Ofgem.
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