Ars Disputandi

Volume 9 (2009)
: 1566–5399

Mark Siderits Indian Philosophy and the

  ,
 Consequences of Knowledge
By Cakravarthi Ram-Prasad

Subtitle: Themes in Ethics, Metaphysics and Soteriology; Aldershot,

UK: Ashgate, 2007; xiv + 176 pp.; hb. £ 55.00; : 978–0–7546–5456–8.

This work consists of five chapters each of which explores a particular facet
of a larger theme, that of the place of knowledge in Indian theories of liberation.
Classical Indian philosophy is distinctive for the widespread (though not univer-
sal) acceptance one finds there of the notion that the highest end – liberation from
the wheel of rebirth and the suffering that attends such sam . sāric existence – is
attained through cognition of some sort. We even find the claim in the Bhagavad
Gı̄tā that devotion to God leads to liberation by producing the requisite liberating
knowledge in the devotee. An investigation of the soteriological significance of
knowledge in Indian philosophy may prove worthwhile for those seeking a way
out of the impasse generated by the faith-reason dichotomy in modern Western
thought.
The first chapter concerns the epistemology and semantics that stem from
what Ram-Prasad calls Jainism’s ‘multiplist metaphysics’, the view that reality
is such as to warrant true contradictions. It is widely held that this position
represents an expression of the Jain commitment to non-violence (the practice of
which is central to attaining liberation on their view). The idea is that refuting
the position of one’s opponent is itself an unjustifiable form of violence, since it
rests on the false assumption that two contradictory views cannot both be true.
The difficulty lies in articulating this in a way that avoids the trap of relativism
about truth. Ram-Prasad has interesting things to say about how Jain efforts to
accomplish this lead to the higher-order difficulty of avoiding relativism about
the nature of the truth-predicate: what can Jaina philosophers say when their
opponent insists that contradictions cannot be true? Ram-Prasad concedes that
the resolution he has in mind goes beyond anything that Jainas say or even might
want to say. It is nonetheless a suggestive and significant response to Jain thought.
The second chapter explores the variety of views Indian philosophers held
on the question how we come to be aware of our own cognitions. Some held
that when we cognize a blue patch, we are aware only of the blue and not of
the cognition whereby we come to be aware of the blue; awareness of the fact of
cognizing comes only subsequent to the cognition. Others held that cognitions
are self-luminous–a cognition illuminates not just its object but itself as well. Ram-
Prasad discusses five distinct views on this matter. He then explores some ways

Mark Siderits, September 13, 2009. If you would like to cite this article, please do so as follows:
Mark Siderits, ‘Review of Indian Philosophy and the Consequences of Knowledge,’ Ars Disputandi [http://www.
ArsDisputandi.org] 9 (2009), 125–128.
 Mark Siderits: Review of Indian Philosophy and the Consequences of Knowledge

in which these views might impact on current discussions in the philosophy of

mind (discussions that proceed for the most part on physicalist assumptions not
shared by most classical Indian philosophers).
The third chapter concerns a debate between Advaita Vedānta and Mı̄mām . sā
over the respective roles played by knowledge and action in attaining liberation.
Both sides agree that knowledge is instrumental in attaining liberation. What is at
issue is whether it, rather than action, is liberation’s proximate cause. Advaitins
hold that liberation is consequent on knowledge of the nature of the self, while
Mı̄mām . sakas claim that since bondage results from action, liberation can only
stem from action (or rather its cessation). Ram-Prasad’s discussion of this dispute
highlights ways in which the competing views might be grounded in distinct con-
ceptions of the nature of liberation, thereby calling into question the philosophical
significance of the debate.
The fourth chapter discusses a refinement of the Mı̄mām . sā view of libera-
tion. Mı̄mām. sā agrees with Nyāya that the liberated self undergoes no experience.
The stock challenge to this view is that liberation could not then be the highest
good, since being liberated would be no better than eternally existing in the form
of a rock. One response to this objection is that the state of dreamless sleep is pro-
foundly refreshing despite the fact that the self is not conscious while in this state.
But some opponents retort that the self is indeed conscious in dreamless sleep, it
is just not conscious of any objects. One later Mı̄mām . saka sought to differentiate
the liberated state from the state of a rock by claiming that the liberated self still
possesses the power of cognition, even if it will never again exercise that power.
Ram-Prasad finds this position incoherent, in that it invokes a potency that will
never be exercised: ‘the notion of potency is no use here because there is no way of
confirming it’ (146). But this resort to verificationism (the view that unverifiable
statements cannot be true) may be out of place in the Indian context, and can also
be questioned on general philosophical grounds. It seems we can imagine a pane
of glass continuing to exist in a universe otherwise suddenly gone soft. In the
absence of anything else hard enough to shatter it, surely the glass still retains its
fragility?
The fifth chapter looks at the difficulty Yogācāra Buddhists confronted when
they claimed that the liberated person cognizes in a way that lacks the subject-
object dichotomy. This claim reflects the general Buddhist notion that liberation
involves overcoming belief in the self as subject of cognition. The difficulty for
Yogācāra stems from their further claim that all conceptualization involves super-
imposition of an illusory subject-object dichotomy. In that case it would appear
that the liberated person cannot employ concepts, and is thus unable to com-
municate with others. But the liberated person is presumably obligated to help
others overcome suffering, and it is difficult to see how that might be achieved if
communication is impossible. Ram-Prasad investigates the approach to this prob-
lem found in the work of Śāntaraks.ita and his commentator Kamalaśı̄la. Their
resolution essentially has it that the liberated person may safely employ concepts
in their efforts to help others, in that the liberated person is cognizant of the ways
in which all conceptualization distorts reality.

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 Mark Siderits: Review of Indian Philosophy and the Consequences of Knowledge

Much of the material in this book was published previously in a variety of

venues. It is nice to have these studies collected together, but one might wish
that more effort had been made to integrate and consolidate them. For instance,
a different arrangement of the chapters might have led to greater coherence.
The chapter on the debate between Advaita and Mı̄mām . sā (Chapter 3), which
highlights the question of the role of knowledge in liberation, might have served
as a good introduction to themes in other chapters. And the chapter on Jaina
multiplism (Chapter 1) is a good candidate for the role of capstone, since it has as
background the fact that different schools propound competing claims concerning
those facts that make liberation possible.
There is much to admire in this work. But there are also some discussions
that are not as clear as they might be, and it is the responsibility of a reviewer
to point these out. The discussion of how cognition comes to itself be cognized
(Chapter 2) contains a good bit of useful exposition but also some troubling
unclarity. For instance, it is not clear whether Ram-Prasad distinguishes between
the two ways in which a mental state might be said to be ‘representational’:
(1) its representing its object as being thus-and-so (perceptions are thought of
as representational in this sense, while itches are not); and (2) it itself serving
as the direct object of perceptual consciousness, the external object being only
indirectly cognized through its being represented by the cognition. In classical
Indian accounts of cognition, the second sense of ‘representation’ was discussed
in terms of the question whether cognitions necessarily have form (e.g., red color)
or are formless, i.e., consist in nothing more than their intending a red object. One
might agree that cognitions are representational in the first sense while denying
that they are representational in the second sense. This appears to have been
the view of Nyāya, and much of the dispute between Nyāya and Yogācāra over
luminosity and reflexivity hinges on their disagreement over whether cognitions
have form. Ram-Prasad makes use of the term ‘representational’, but it is not
clear which of the two senses he has in mind, and this leads to unclarity in his
discussion of the debate over the cognition of cognition.
Another sort of unclarity occurs in his discussion of the account of luminosity
given by Bhāt.t.a Mı̄mām . sā. This school held the seemingly sensible view that
when one cognizes an object one is not at that time aware of the cognition itself
whereby one is cognizing the object, one is aware only of the object itself. That
we can also be aware of the cognition is explained by their claim that we may
subsequently perform an act of ‘presumption’ (arthāpatti): we may become aware
that the object has the property of being cognized, and on that basis infer that
this is best explained by supposing there to have been a cognition of the object.
(As this example illustrates, ‘presumption’ is equivalent to what is now called
abduction or inference to the best explanation.) This position was dictated by the
Bhāt.t.a insistence that a cognition cannot cognize itself, just as a knife cannot cut
itself. Consequently our capacity for reflective awareness of our own cognitions
must involve some indirect mechanism. Now Ram-Prasad notices that in certain
later Bhāt.t.a texts the indirect cognition of a cognition is said to proceed by way of
inference (anumāna) and not ‘presumption’ (arthāpatti). And he thinks this leads

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 Mark Siderits: Review of Indian Philosophy and the Consequences of Knowledge

to a problem of infinite regress. But he overlooks two possibilities here. First,

the later text he cites may be using ‘inference’ loosely, in the sense in which
it applies to both inference strictly so called (anumāna) and to presumption or
abduction (arthāpatti). Second, the potential infinite regress he points to does not
actually pose a problem for the Bhāt.t.a. Suppose the Bhāt.t.as really do hold that
one cognizes one’s cognitions through inference and not through presumption.
According to their view, I become aware of my cognizing blue by first coming
to be aware of blue, then noticing that the blue is characterized by cognizedness,
then inferring that there must have occurred a cognition of blue. Now one might
go on to achieve awareness of this inference of the cognition of blue as yet another
cognitive occurrence. And one might in turn do the same to the inference whereby
one became aware of that inference, and so on. Still one need not perform any
of these subsequent inferences in order to come to be aware of the cognition of
blue. An infinite regress would be vicious here only if it somehow threatened
the justification of the original cognition. And it is far from clear that it does any
such thing. I can know that there is something blue before me without having
introspective knowledge of my perceptual cognition. And I can know that a
perceptual cognition has occurred without having introspective knowledge of
the inference (or abduction) whereby I came to cognize the perceptual cognition.
Only if one presupposes that I cannot be aware of the object of a cognition unless I
am aware of the cognition itself, does an infinite regress threaten the Bhāt.t.a view.
And to hold that presupposition is to beg the question against the Bhāt.t.a.
The last point will no doubt seem like something of a quibble to many
readers. What makes Ram-Prasad’s book so interesting and valuable is that it
helps demonstrate why Indian philosophers fought over such questions as how
one comes to cognize one’s own cognitions, and why it should matter to us
to get their various accounts right. It demonstrates some of the ways in which
deeply philosophical questions concerning the nature of knowledge can have
concrete soteriological consequences. This makes the work a useful and important
contribution to our knowledge of the classical Indian tradition.

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