Camilo Sabio vs Richard Gordon

November 10, 2011

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504 SCRA 704 – Political Law – Inquiry in aid of legislation – public officers

On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455
“directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the
alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.” Pursuant to this,
on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting
him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee
on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman
Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section
4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its
official cognizance.” Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG’s unhampered performance of its
task. Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he threatened
Sabio to be cited with contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.

HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and
expansive construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v.
Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials
of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation
of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and
that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate”. Subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of
all its transactions involving public interest.

Article III, Section 7

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in
the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable
them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens
can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their
effective implementation.

SCB Philippines vs Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institution and Currencies en banc
G.R. No. 167173 December 27, 2007

FACTS:
SCB Phil Branch had criminal and civil charges against them before the courts in Metro Manila
for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799).
Enrile, in his privileged speech, urged the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry in aid of
legislation, to prevent the occurrences of a similar fraudulent in the future. The respondent
Committee then set an initial hearing to investigate, in aid of legislation thereto. SCB stressed that
there were cases allegedly involving the same issues subject of legislative inquiry, thus posting a
challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent Committee to continue with the inquiry.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Committee, by aid of legislation, would encroach upon the judicial
powers vested solely in the courts who took cognizance of the foregoing cases.

RULING:
Yes. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the resolution, as initiated in
the privileged speech of Senate President Enrile, was simply "to denounce the illegal practices
committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities xxx", and at the conclusion
of the said speech "to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the
occurrence of a similar fraudulent in the future."

The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body
should not automatically bar the conduct of legislation. The exercise of sovereign legislative
authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made
subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.

The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may not be
enacted into law. Except only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt, the committees
of the Senate or the House of Representatives cannot penalize violators even there is
overwhelmingly evidence of criminal culpability. Other than proposing or initiating amendatory or
remedial legislation, respondent Committee can only recommend measures to address or remedy
whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in its
Report a recommendation for criminal indictment of persons who may appear liable. At best, the
recommendation, along with the evidence, contained in such Report would only be persuasive, but
it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies and the courts to determine the liabilities of the offender.
Republic v Judge Eugenio G.R. No. 174629, February 14, 2008
Sec. 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions whereby these bank accounts may be
examined by any person, government official, bureau or offial; namely when: (1) upon written
permission of the depositor; (2) in cases of impeachment; (3) the examination of bank accounts is
upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; and
(4) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. Section 8 of R.A. Act
No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been recognized by this Court as
constituting an additional exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality, and there have been
other similar recognitions as well.[

Facts: Under the authority granted by the Resolution, the AMLC filed an application to inquire
into or examine the deposits or investments of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong
before the RTC of Makati, Branch 138, presided by Judge (now Court of Appeals Justice) Sixto
Marella, Jr. The application was docketed as AMLC No. 05-005. The Makati RTC heard the
testimony of the Deputy Director of the AMLC, Richard David C. Funk II, and received the
documentary evidence of the AMLC.[14] Thereafter, on 4 July 2005, the Makati RTC rendered an
Order (Makati RTC bank inquiry order) granting the AMLC the authority to inquire and examine
the subject bank accounts of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong, the trial court being
satisfied that there existed p]robable cause [to] believe that the deposits in various bank accounts,
details of which appear in paragraph 1 of the Application, are related to the offense of violation of
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act now the subject of criminal prosecution before the
Sandiganbayan as attested to by the Informations, Exhibits C, D, E, F, and G Pursuant to the
Makati RTC bank inquiry order, the CIS proceeded to inquire and examine the deposits,
investments and related web accounts of the four.[16]

Meanwhile, the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, Dennis Villa-Ignacio, wrote a
letter dated 2 November 2005, requesting the AMLC to investigate the accounts of Alvarez,
PIATCO, and several other entities involved in the nullified contract. The letter adverted to
probable cause to believe that the bank accounts were used in the commission of unlawful
activities that were committed a in relation to the criminal cases then pending before the
Sandiganbayan. Attached to the letter was a memorandum on why the investigation of the
[accounts] is necessary in the prosecution of the above criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan.
In response to the letter of the Special Prosecutor, the AMLC promulgated on 9 December 2005
Resolution No. 121 Series of 2005,[19] which authorized the executive director of the AMLC to
inquire into and examine the accounts named in the letter, including one maintained by Alvarez
with DBS Bank and two other accounts in the name of Cheng Yong with Metrobank. The
Resolution characterized the memorandum attached to the Special Prosecutors letter as
extensively justif[ying] the existence of probable cause that the bank accounts of the persons and
entities mentioned in the letter are related to the unlawful activity of violation of Sections 3(g) and
3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended.

Issue: Whether or not the bank accounts of respondents can be examined.

Held: Any exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality must be specifically legislated. Section
2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions whereby these bank accounts may be
examined by any person, government official, bureau or offial; namely when: (1) upon written
permission of the depositor; (2) in cases of impeachment; (3) the examination of bank accounts is
upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; and
(4) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. Section 8 of R.A. Act
No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been recognized by this Court as
constituting an additional exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality, and there have been
other similar recognitions as well.
The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act. Under Section 11, the AMLC may
inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent court in cases of violation of the AMLA,
it having been established that there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related
to unlawful activities as defined in Section 3(i) of the law, or a money laundering offense under
Section 4 thereof. Further, in instances where there is probable cause that the deposits or
investments are related to kidnapping for ransom,[certain violations of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,hijacking and other violations under R.A. No. 6235, destructive
arson and murder, then there is no need for the AMLC to obtain a court order before it could
inquire into such accounts. It cannot be successfully argued the proceedings relating to the bank
inquiry order under Section 11 of the AMLA is a litigation encompassed in one of the exceptions
to the Bank Secrecy Act which is when money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation. The orientation of the bank inquiry order is simply to serve as a provisional relief or
remedy. As earlier stated, the application for such does not entail a full-blown trial. Nevertheless,
just because the AMLA establishes additional exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act it does not mean
that the later law has dispensed with the general principle established in the older law that all
deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines x x x are hereby
considered as of an absolutely confidential nature. Indeed, by force of statute, all bank deposits are
absolutely confidential, and that nature is unaltered even by the legislated exceptions referred to
above.

Republic v Judge Eugenio G.R. No. 174629, February 14, 2008

Sec. 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions whereby these bank accounts may be
examined by any person, government official, bureau or offial; namely when: (1) upon written
permission of the depositor; (2) in cases of impeachment; (3) the examination of bank accounts is
upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; and
(4) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. Section 8 of R.A. Act
No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been recognized by this Court as
constituting an additional exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality, and there have been
other similar recognitions as well.[

Facts: Under the authority granted by the Resolution, the AMLC filed an application to inquire
into or examine the deposits or investments of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong
before the RTC of Makati, Branch 138, presided by Judge (now Court of Appeals Justice) Sixto
Marella, Jr. The application was docketed as AMLC No. 05-005. The Makati RTC heard the
testimony of the Deputy Director of the AMLC, Richard David C. Funk II, and received the
documentary evidence of the AMLC.[14] Thereafter, on 4 July 2005, the Makati RTC rendered an
Order (Makati RTC bank inquiry order) granting the AMLC the authority to inquire and examine
the subject bank accounts of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong, the trial court being
satisfied that there existed p]robable cause [to] believe that the deposits in various bank accounts,
details of which appear in paragraph 1 of the Application, are related to the offense of violation of
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act now the subject of criminal prosecution before the
Sandiganbayan as attested to by the Informations, Exhibits C, D, E, F, and G Pursuant to the
Makati RTC bank inquiry order, the CIS proceeded to inquire and examine the deposits,
investments and related web accounts of the four.[16]

Meanwhile, the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, Dennis Villa-Ignacio, wrote a
letter dated 2 November 2005, requesting the AMLC to investigate the accounts of Alvarez,
PIATCO, and several other entities involved in the nullified contract. The letter adverted to
probable cause to believe that the bank accounts were used in the commission of unlawful
activities that were committed a in relation to the criminal cases then pending before the
Sandiganbayan. Attached to the letter was a memorandum on why the investigation of the
[accounts] is necessary in the prosecution of the above criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan.
In response to the letter of the Special Prosecutor, the AMLC promulgated on 9 December 2005
Resolution No. 121 Series of 2005,[19] which authorized the executive director of the AMLC to
inquire into and examine the accounts named in the letter, including one maintained by Alvarez
with DBS Bank and two other accounts in the name of Cheng Yong with Metrobank. The
Resolution characterized the memorandum attached to the Special Prosecutors letter as
extensively justif[ying] the existence of probable cause that the bank accounts of the persons and
entities mentioned in the letter are related to the unlawful activity of violation of Sections 3(g) and
3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended.

Issue: Whether or not the bank accounts of respondents can be examined.

Held: Any exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality must be specifically legislated. Section
2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions whereby these bank accounts may be
examined by any person, government official, bureau or offial; namely when: (1) upon written
permission of the depositor; (2) in cases of impeachment; (3) the examination of bank accounts is
upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; and
(4) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. Section 8 of R.A. Act
No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been recognized by this Court as
constituting an additional exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality, and there have been
other similar recognitions as well.
The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act. Under Section 11, the AMLC may
inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent court in cases of violation of the AMLA,
it having been established that there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related
to unlawful activities as defined in Section 3(i) of the law, or a money laundering offense under
Section 4 thereof. Further, in instances where there is probable cause that the deposits or
investments are related to kidnapping for ransom,[certain violations of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,hijacking and other violations under R.A. No. 6235, destructive
arson and murder, then there is no need for the AMLC to obtain a court order before it could
inquire into such accounts. It cannot be successfully argued the proceedings relating to the bank
inquiry order under Section 11 of the AMLA is a litigation encompassed in one of the exceptions
to the Bank Secrecy Act which is when money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation. The orientation of the bank inquiry order is simply to serve as a provisional relief or
remedy. As earlier stated, the application for such does not entail a full-blown trial. Nevertheless,
just because the AMLA establishes additional exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act it does not mean
that the later law has dispensed with the general principle established in the older law that all
deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines x x x are hereby
considered as of an absolutely confidential nature. Indeed, by force of statute, all bank deposits are
absolutely confidential, and that nature is unaltered even by the legislated exceptions referred to
above.

Nacague vs. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 172589; 8 August 2010

Facts: Jeffrey Nacague (Nacague) was “hepe de viaje” or the representative of Sulpicio Lines,Inc.
(Sulpicio) on board one its vessels (the ship). A housekeeper on the ship reported to Sulpicio that
Nacague and the chief mate made a threat on his life after he found drug paraphernalia on board
the ship. Sulpicio sent Nacague a notice of investigation informing him of the charges against him
– use of illegal drugs and threatening a co-employee. When the ship docked in the port of Manila,
crew members, including Nacague, were subjected to a random drug test at the S.M. Lazo Medical
Clinic (S.M. Lazo Clinic). Nacague tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu
and was subsequently subjected to a formal investigation. Nacague denied using illegal drugs and
on the fifth day following the random drug test, underwent a voluntary drug test at the Chong Hua
Hospital in Cebu City, which yielded a negative result. Nacague submitted this result to Sulpicio,
but Sulpicio later terminated
his services. Nacague filed a complaint for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal and
reinstatement with backwages. The Labor Arbiter declared that Nacague was illegally dismissed
and awarded him separation pay in lieu of reinstatement due to his strained relations with Sulpicio.
The Labor Arbiter gave more weight to the drug test result from Chong Hua Hospital because it
was accredited by the Dangerous Drugs Board, unlike S.M. Lazo Clinic. On Sulpicio’s appeal, the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision, holding that
there was a presumption that S.M. Lazo Clinic was an accredited drug testing center and it was
incumbent on Nacague to show otherwise. Nacague filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals which sustained the termination of his employment. Nacague brought the case to the
Supreme Court for review.

Issue: Whether or not there was just cause to terminate Nacague’s employment.

Held: Sulpicio failed to clearly show that Nacague was guilty of using illegal drugs. The lack of
accreditation of S.M. Lazo Clinic made its drug test results doubtful.
Section 36 of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) provides
that drug tests shall be performed only by any government forensic laboratories or any of the drug
testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the Department of Health, to safeguard the
quality of test results. The same provision also requires that drug testing should consist of both the
screening test and the confirmatory test. In this case, Sulpicio failed to prove that S.M. Lazo Clinic
was an accredited drug testing center. Sulpicio did not even deny Nacague’s allegation that S.M.
Lazo Clinic was not accredited. Also, only a screening test was conducted to determine if Nacague
was guilty of using illegal drugs. Sulpicio Lines did not confirm the positive result of the
screening test with a confirmatory test. Sulpicio Lines failed to clearly show that it had a valid and
legal cause for terminating Nacague’s employment. When the alleged valid cause for the
termination of employment is not clearly
proven, as in this case, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal.
As the Labor Arbiter found, Nacague’s reinstatement was no longer feasible due to the strained
relations between Nacague and Sulpicio and he should instead be granted separation pay. The
Labor Arbiter’s decision was reinstated.

Briccio “Ricky” A. Pollo v. Karina Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011
DECISION
(En Banc)
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

I. THE FACTS

[This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who was then
charged administratively and was eventually dismissed from the service. The employee’s personal
files stored in the computer were used by the government employer as evidence of his
misconduct.]

On January 3, 2007, an anonymous letter-complaint was received by the respondent Civil Service
Commission (CSC) Chairperson alleging that the “chief of the Mamamayan muna hindi mamaya
na division” of Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. IV (CSC-ROIV) has been
lawyering for public officials with pending cases in the CSC. Chairperson David immediately
formed a team with background in information technology and issued a memorandum directing
them “to back up all the files in the computers found in the [CSC-ROIV] Mamamayan Muna
(PALD) and Legal divisions.”

The team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office and backed up all files in the hard disk of
computers at the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) and the Legal Services Division.
This was witnessed by several employees. At around 10:00 p.m. of the same day, the investigating
team finished their task. The next day, all the computers in the PALD were sealed and secured.
The diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD
computers were then turned over to Chairperson David. It was found that most of the files in the
17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the
petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or letters in connection with
administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. Chairperson David thus issued a Show-Cause
Order requiring the petitioner to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from
notice.

Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-
complaint. He asserted that he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he
was on leave, citing the letter dated January 8, 2007 in which he informed Director Castillo of
CSC-ROIV that the files in his computer were his personal files and those of his sister, relatives,
friends and some associates and that he is not authorizing their sealing, copying, duplicating and
printing as these would violate his constitutional right to privacy and protection against self-
incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. He pointed out that though government
property, the temporary use and ownership of the computer issued under a Memorandum of
Receipt is ceded to the employee who may exercise all attributes of ownership, including its use
for personal purposes. In view of the illegal search, the files/documents copied from his computer
without his consent [are] thus inadmissible as evidence, being “fruits of a poisonous tree.”

The CSC found prima facie case against the petitioner and charged him with Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A. No.
6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). Petitioner then
filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal
charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal search, which is beyond the authority of
the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court. The CSC denied this omnibus
motion.

On March 14, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent Petition before the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing
both the January 11, 2007 Show-Cause Order and February 26, 2007 Resolution as having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or total absence of jurisdiction. On July
24, 2007, the CSC issued a Resolution finding petitioner GUILTY of Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of Republic Act
6713. He is meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with all its accessory
penalties. This Resolution was also brought to the CA by herein petitioner.

By a Decision dated October 11, 2007, the CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition for certiorari
after finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondents CSC officials. His motion
for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brought this appeal before the
Supreme Court.

II. THE ISSUE

Was the search conducted on petitioner’s office computer and the copying of his personal files
without his knowledge and consent – alleged as a transgression on his constitutional right to
privacy – lawful?

III. THE RULING

[The Supreme Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the CA, which in turn upheld the CSC
resolution dismissing the petitioner from service. The High Tribunal held that the search on
petitioner’s office computer and the copying of his personal files were both LAWFUL and DID
NOT VIOLATE his constitutional right to privacy.]

The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right
protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution. The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures
but only of “unreasonable” searches and seizures.

[The Supreme Court then discussed the American cases that served as jurisprudential bases for its
ruling:

That the Fourth Amendment [of the U.S. Constitution] equally applies to a government workplace
was addressed in the 1987 case of O’Connor v. Ortega. In O’Connor the [U.S. Supreme] Court
recognized that “special needs” authorize warrantless searches involving public employees for
work-related reasons. The [U.S. Supreme] Court thus laid down a balancing test under which
government interests are weighed against the employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy. This
reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant requirement, which are
related to law enforcement.

O’Connor was applied in subsequent cases raising issues on employees’ privacy rights in the
workplace. One of these cases involved a government employer’s search of an office computer,
United States v. Mark L. Simons where the defendant Simons, an employee of a division of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was convicted of receiving and possessing materials
containing child pornography. In this case, the US Supreme Court held that the search remains
valid under the O’Connor exception to the warrant requirement because evidence of the crime was
discovered in the course of an otherwise proper administrative inspection. Simons’ violation of
the agency’s Internet policy happened also to be a violation of criminal law; this does not mean
that said employer lost the capacity and interests of an employer. The warrantless entry into
Simons’ office was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment standard announced in O’Connor
because at the inception of the search, the employer had “reasonable grounds for suspecting” that
the hard drive would yield evidence of misconduct, as the employer was already aware that
Simons had misused his Internet access to download over a thousand pornographic images. The
retrieval of the hard drive was reasonably related to the objective of the search, and the search was
not excessively intrusive. Thus, while Simons had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
office, he did not have such legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to the files in his
computer.]

Applying the analysis and principles announced in O’Connor and Simons to the case at bar, we
now address the following questions: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his office and computer files?; and (2) Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair, [which
involved] the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer, reasonable in its
inception and scope?
(1) NO, the petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files.

Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his
office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege
that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was
always locked and not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used
passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files.
On the contrary, he submits that being in the public assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he
normally would have visitors in his office like friends, associates and even unknown people,
whom he even allowed to use his computer which to him seemed a trivial request. He described
his office as “full of people, his friends, unknown people” and that in the past 22 years he had
been discharging his functions at the PALD, he is “personally assisting incoming clients, receiving
documents, drafting cases on appeals, in charge of accomplishment report, Mamamayan Muna
Program, Public Sector Unionism, Correction of name, accreditation of service, and hardly had
any time for himself alone, that in fact he stays in the office as a paying customer.” Under this
scenario, it can hardly be deduced that petitioner had such expectation of privacy that society
would recognize as reasonable.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or proof of the aforementioned
factual circumstances, that petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of privacy in his
computer as he claims, such is negated by the presence of policy regulating the use of office
computers [CSC Office Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 “Computer Use Policy (CUP)”], as in
Simons. The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they
have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office
computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated
or human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the
computer resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes.

(2) YES, the search authorized by the respondent CSC Chair, which involved the copying of the
contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer, was reasonable in its inception and scope.

The search of petitioner’s computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of work-
related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David
regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya
Na division is supposedly “lawyering” for individuals with pending cases in the CSC. A search by
a government employer of an employee’s office is justified at inception when there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related
misconduct.

Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioner’s computer was justified at its
inception and scope. We quote with approval the CSC’s discussion on the reasonableness of its
actions, consistent as it were with the guidelines established by O’Connor:
Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is no doubt in the
mind of the Commission that the search of Pollo’s computer has successfully passed the test of
reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated in the above-discussed
American authorities. It bears emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in its capacity as
a government employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation involving a
work-related misconduct, one of the circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement. At
the inception of the search, a complaint was received recounting that a certain division chief in the
CSCRO No. IV was “lawyering” for parties having pending cases with the said regional office or
in the Commission. The nature of the imputation was serious, as it was grievously disturbing. If,
indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively engaged in the practice of “lawyering” for
parties with pending cases before the Commission would be a highly repugnant scenario, then
such a case would have shattering repercussions. It would undeniably cast clouds of doubt upon
the institutional integrity of the Commission as a quasi-judicial agency, and in the process, render
it less effective in fulfilling its mandate as an impartial and objective dispenser of administrative
justice. It is settled that a court or an administrative tribunal must not only be actually impartial
but must be seen to be so, otherwise the general public would not have any trust and confidence in
it.

Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to
arrest or limit any possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the
complaint was received, a search was forthwith conducted involving the computer resources in the
concerned regional office. That it was the computers that were subjected to the search was
justified since these furnished the easiest means for an employee to encode and store documents.
Indeed, the computers would be a likely starting point in ferreting out incriminating evidence.
Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer files, that is, they could easily be destroyed at a
click of a button, necessitated drastic and immediate action. Pointedly, to impose the need to
comply with the probable cause requirement would invariably defeat the purpose of the wok-
related investigation.

Thus, petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail.
His other argument invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section
3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded to
certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government workplace under the
aforecited authorities. We likewise find no merit in his contention that O’Connor and Simons are
not relevant because the present case does not involve a criminal offense like child pornography.
As already mentioned, the search of petitioner’s computer was justified there being reasonable
ground for suspecting that the files stored therein would yield incriminating evidence relevant to
the investigation being conducted by CSC as government employer of such misconduct subject of
the anonymous complaint. This situation clearly falls under the exception to the warrantless
requirement in administrative searches defined in O’Connor.

Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, 24 July 2012

FACTS
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted
a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who
keeps a Private Army Group (PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP–
Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby
causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs. Contending
that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a
Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials
of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the right to
privacy is invoked as opposed to the state’s interest in preserving the right to life, liberty or
security.

RULING

NO.

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum
to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right
to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is
being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized
that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right
to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that
her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible
to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently
explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in
which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she
failed to overcome. [T]he state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on
the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of
information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of
habeas data must be denied.

Ople v Torres G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998.

7/11/2010
0 Comments

Facts: Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of
a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional
grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it
impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the
rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.

A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and
January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents,
then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as
members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of
A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its
implementation.

Issue: Petitioner contends:

A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION
REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE
CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE
EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR
EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE
GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS
ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION."

Held: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void
for being unconstitutional. SO ORDERED.

Ratio: It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the
Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized
Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various
contending state policies — the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against
dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice
Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of thought.

Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it confers
no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a
citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people
without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card
for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a
citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the
contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.

In view of standing
Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed
of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a
usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and
the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.

The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No.
308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be
promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the
implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997,
respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the
manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card.

In view of the need for Legislative Act

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific
aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and
should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables the President to fix a uniform standard
of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in
administrative orders."

Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence,
beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of
identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen
and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of
Congress is understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the
Legislature to make laws and the power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate
balance of power and cannot be allowed.
In view of right to privacy
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental
right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No.
308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is
predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the
facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent
transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether
these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not
arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented
will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.

The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference
Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies"
through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs." A.O. No. 308
should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state whether encoding
of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor
General claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the
"generation of population data for development planning." This is an admission that the PRN will
not be used solely for identification but for the generation of other data with remote relation to the
avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the
government the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the
identification of the individual through his PRN .

His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded — whether it be in
the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may include his
transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities,
reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the
better the chance of building a huge and formidable information base through the electronic
linkage of the files. The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the
existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a
temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist.

Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information.
Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When the access code of the
control programs of the particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction
or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored
within the system. It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal
information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally
specified purposes. 60 The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere
with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his
movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and
circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by
government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated
when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID,
much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of
Rights seeks to prevent.

In Morfe v. Mutuc, we upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared that the law, in compelling a public
officer to make an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of income and
expenses, did not infringe on the individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote
morality in public administration by curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official
corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service.

In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions
into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological
advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It merely requires that the law
be narrowly focused and a compelling interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions into the right
must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional
invasions.

Kilusang Mayo Uno vs The Director-General

This case is consolidated with Consolidated with Bayan Muna vs Ermita

In 2005, Executive Order No. 420 was passed. This law sought to harmonize and streamline the
country’s id system. Kilusang Mayo Uno, Bayan Muna, and other concerned groups sought to
enjoin the Director-General from implementing the EO because they allege that the said EO is
unconstitutional for it infringes upon the right to privacy of the people and that the same is a
usurpation of legislative power by the president.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said EO is unconstitutional.

HELD: No. Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to “adopt a unified multi-
purpose ID system.” Thus, all government entities that issue IDs as part of their functions under
existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their IDs.

Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the purposes of the uniform data collection and format. The
President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the
Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Sec 17, Article 7 of the
1987 Constitution provides that the “President shall have control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices.” The same Section also mandates the President to “ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.” Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can
direct all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a
uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility,
and convenience to the public.
The President’s constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any
implementing legislation. Of course, the President’s power of control is limited to the Executive
branch of government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional
commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under
existing laws is also authorized to issue voter’s ID cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not
establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is
compulsory for all branches of government.