AN APPROACH TO A THEORY OF BUREAUCRACY
PHILIP SELZNICK
Fellow of the Social Science Research Council
HIS ANALYSIS will Consider bureauc-
T racy as a special case of the general
theory of purposive organization. Re-
cent sociological research has made explicit
several conceptions which must serve as es-
sential background for any analysis such as
that to follow. Based upon that research,
three hypotheses may be introduced here:
A. Every organization creates an infor-
mal structure.
B. In every organization, the goals of the
organization are modified (abandoned,
deflected, or elaborated) by proces-
ses within it.
C. The process of modification is effected
through the informal structure.
Three recent sociological studies have eluci-
dated these hypotheses.
(i) In an intensive examination of a shop
department, Roethlisberger and Dickson found
clear evidences of an informal structure. This
structure consisted of a set of procedures (bing-
ing. sarcasm, ridicule) by means of which con-
trol over members of the group was exercised,
the formation of cliques which functioned as
instruments of control, and the establishment of
informal leadership. "The men had elaborated,
spontaneously and quite unconsciously, an in-
tricate social organization around their collective
beliefs and sentiments."^
The informal structure of the worker group
grew up out of the day-to-day practices of the
nien as they groped for ways of taking care of
their own felt needs. There was no series of
conscious acts by which these procedures were
instituted, but they were no less binding on that
account. These needs largely arose from the
way in which the men defined their situation
v,iihin the organization. The informal organiza-
'.: tion served a triple function: (a) it served to
control the behavior of the members of the
'F. J. Roethlisberger, and W. J. Dickson, Man-
Hement and the Worker, Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1941, p. 524.
worker group; (b) within the context of the
larger organization (the plant), it was an at-
tempt on the part of the particular group to
control the conditions of its existence; (c) it
acted as a mechanism for the expression of
personal relationships for which the formal or-
ganization did not provide. Thus the informal
structure provided those avenues of aggression,
solidarity, and prestige-construction required by
individual members.
The consequence of the activity of the men
through the informal organization was a del-
eterious effect upon the professed goal of the
organization as a whole: it resulted in the restric-
tion of output. In asserting its control over the
conditions of the job, the group wanted above
all to protect itself from outside interference,
exhibiting a strong resistance to change.
Thus the facts in this em.pirical investigation
illustrate the hypotheses noted above: the crea-
tion of an informal organization, the modifica-
tion of the professed goal (maximum output),
and the effectuation of this modification through
the informal structure. In addition, three impor-
tant characteristics of the informal structure
were observed in the study: (a) it arises spon-
taneously; (b) the bases of the relationships are
personal, involving factors of prestige, accept-
ance within the group, friendship ties, etc.; and
(c) the relationships are power relationships,
oriented toward techniques of control. These
characteristics are general, and they are impor-
tant for conceiving of the theory of bureaucratic
behavior as a special case of the general theory
of organization.
(2) C. I. Barnard, in his theoretical analysis
of organizational structure, concemed mainly
with the problems of the executive, discusses
explicitly the character and function of informal
structures which arise out of the attempts to
solve those problems. By informal structures he
means "the aggregate of the personal contacts
and interactions and the associated groupings of
people" which do not have common or joint
purposes, and which are, in fact, "indefinite and
rather structureless."^ He says, further, that
* C. I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940, p. iiS-
47
 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
'•though common or joint purposes arc excluded
by definition, common or joint results of an
important character nevertheless come from such
organization."^
Barnard lists three functions of informal struc-
tures as they operate in formal organizations:
(a) as a means of communication, establishing
norms of conduct between superordinates and
subordinates; (b) "maintenance of cohesiveness
in formal organizations through regulating the
willingness to serve and the stability of objective
authority"; (c) "the maintenance of the feeling
of personal integrity, of self-respect, of inde-
pendent choice."'* The last mentioned function
means simply that the individual's "integrity"
is protected by the appearance of choice, at the
same time that subtle group pressures guaran-
tee control of his actions. Barnard's view of the
functions of the informal structure is primarily
in terms of the needs of the executive (control
through friendship ties, personal authority, a
"grape-vine" system, etc.). but it is clear that
his analysis agrees with the h\'pothesis that the
informal organization is oriented essentially to-
ward the techniques of control. In the Roeth-
lisberger and Dickson study, it was the worker
group which was attempting to control the con-
ditions of its existence; in this case, it is the
executive who is doing the same thing.
(3) A discussion by Waller and Henderson^'*
based on the study of institutions of segregative
care, gives further evidence for the theses pre-
sented here. The general hypotheses about or-
ganizational processes are confirmed by the
examination of such structures as private
schools, transient camps, prisons, flop-houses,
reformatories and military organizations. The
authors set the problem in this way:
Each of our institutions has an idea or pur-
pose—most of them have several purposes
more or less compatible with one another—
and this idea or purpose gives rise to an in-
stitutional structure. The institutional struc-
ture consists of a system of organized groups.
The interaction of these elements is a prin-
cipal clue to the understanding of institutions
of segregative care. Without a structure, the
purpose of an institution would be an empty
form of words, and yet the process of trans-
lating the purpose into an institutional struc-
' Ibid.
* Loc. cit., pp. 122-123,
*W. Waller and W. Henderson, "Institutions of
Segregative Care and the Organized Group" (unpub-
lished manuscript), 1941.
ture always somehow deflects and distorts it.
It is thus the iron necessity of an organizational
structure for the achievement of group goals
which creates the paradox to which we have
referred. The ideals of those who construct the
organization are one thing: the "facts of life"
operating independently of and often against
those ideals are something else again.
Professed and Operational Goals. Run-
ning an organization, as a specialized and
essential activity, generates problems which
have no necessary (and often an opposed)
relationship to the professed or "original"
goals of the organization. The day-to-day
behavior of the group becomes centered
around specific problems and proximate
goals which have primarily an intemal rel-
evance. Then, since these activities come to
consume an increasing proportion of the
time and thoughts of the participants, they
are—from the point of view of actual be-
havior—substituted for the professed goals.
The day-to-day activity of men is ordered
by those specific problems which have a
direct relevcLnce to the materials with which
they have to deal. "Ultimate" issues and
highly abstract ideas which do not specify
any concrete behavior have therefore little
direct infiuence on the bulk of human activi-
ties. (The general ideas, of course, may
influence action by setting its context and,
often, defining its limits.) This is true not
because men are evil or unintelligent, but
because the "ultimate" formulations are not
helpful in the constant effort to achieve that
series of equilibria which represent behav-
ioral solutions to the specific problems which
day-to-day living poses. Besides those pro-
fessed goals which do not specify any con-
crete behavior, which are analogous to non-
procedural formulations in science, there
are other professed goals which require ac-
tions which confiict with what must be done
in the daily business of running an organi-
zation. In that confiict the professed goals
will tend to go dow'n in defeat, usually
through the process of being extensively
ignored. This phenomenon may be intro-
duced as a fourth hypothesis in the general
theory of organization:
 AN APPROACH TO A THEORY OF BUREAUCRACY
D. The actual procedures of every or-
ganization tend to be molded by action
toward those goals which provide op-
erationally relevant solutions for the
daily problems of the organization as
such.
This hypothesis does not deny that opera-
tional goals may be, and very often are,
specified in the formulation of the professed
goals of the organization. But in any case
it is the operational goals which must be
looked to for an understanding of the con-
duct of the organization.
What is meant by the "daily problems"?
Consider a boys' reformatory.^ The institu-
tion is organized on the basis of progressive
ideals as specified in social work literature.
But the processes of constructing and oper-
ating the organization create problems and
demands, effective daily, to which the gen-
eral ideals give no adequate answer. Since,
however, the existence of the organization
depends upon such answers, and since the
way of life of everyone concerned depends
on the continued existence of the organiza-
tion, a set of procedural rules is worked out
which is helpful in solving these problems.
These rules are, in practice, substituted for
the professed ideals. 'The social work ideals
are fine, but how can we do otherwise than
use techniques of discipline, regimentation,
spying, etc.?" This is the cry of those who
must meet daily crises in the institutions of
segregative care. "Holiday speech," "lip-
sen-ice," "we've got to be practical" are
expressions which confirm from ordinary ex-
perience, repeated over and over again, the
validity of this hypothesis.
The "Tragedy of Organization." Beyond
such specific sociological investigations as
have been mentioned, it is necessary only to
point to the fact of organizational frustra-
tion as a persistent characteristic of the age
of relative democracy. The tragedy of or-
ganization is evident precisely in the fact
and in the consequences of increased par-
ticipation in associational endeavour.
There have been many critics of democ-
racy, but relatively few have ventured to
* From a description by Mr. F. E. Robin.
49
support the sweeping judgment of Robert
Michels that democracy leads inevitably to
oligarchy.'' It must be admitted, however,
that in this discussion the thesis of Michels
finds much comfort. For his theory (taken
in its sociological rather than in its psy-
chological context) stands or falls, in terms
of its lasting significance, with the possi-
bility of establishing that there are processes
inherent in and internal to organization as
such which tend to frustrate action toward
professed goals. The burden of research, on
the plane of organizations in general, indi-
cates quite clearly that such is the case.
Bearing in mind the hypotheses stated
above, and the specified character of the
informal structure (spontaneity, network of
personal relationships, orientation toward
control), we may tum to the problem of
bureaucracy itself.
The Term Bureaucracy. If the ideas de-
veloped above have been clear, it will be
readily evident that the approach which
identifies bureaucracy with any administra-
tive system based on professionalization and
on hierarchical subordination is not accepted
here. Such a point of view is maintained in
the work of Friedrich and Cole^ on the
Swiss Civil Service; the interest of the au-
thors is clearly in the formal structure of
the administrative apparatus as a mechan-
ism of, in this case, popular government.
The structure is related to the asserted, pro-
fessed purposes of the administration; and
bureaucratization is conceived of as the
tendency toward the complete achievement
of the formal system.
The same point of view is evident in Max
Weber's long and careful essay on bu-
reaucracy—the outstanding work in the
literature we have at present:^ The main
burden of Weber's work is devoted to an
examination of the roots, conditions, and
dominant features of the formal organiza-
^ Political Parties, Hearst's International Library
Co., New York, 1915.
*C. J. Friedrich, and T. Cole, Responsible
Bureaucracy, Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1932, p. 84.
* Max Weber, "Burokratie," Ch. 7, Pt. 3 of Wirt-
schaft und GeseUschaft.
 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
tion of an administrative hierarchy. The
development of this structure with its
dominant features of authoritative jurisdic-
tion, hierarchy of office, specialized train-
ing and general abstract rules of procedure,
is a process of the depersonalization of ad-
ministrative relationships. Weber's main in-
terest was in the development of rational
bureaucratic behaviour as a break from the
ties of seignorial leadership set up under
the feudal system. The development of
centralized hierarchical administration did
in fact involve a tendency to vitiate that
particular kind of personal infiuence. But
what Weber seems to have only partly un-
derstood is that the dynamics of the ad-
ministrative apparatus itself created new
personal influences—those of the adminis-
trators themselves seeking their own ends
and engaging, as newly powerful partici-
pants, in power relationships. That Weber
did not overlook the facts of the case is
clear from his final pages, in which he dis-
cusses the power-role of the bureaucracy.
Although recognizing them, he seems to
have neglected their theoretical importance.
The use of the term bureaucracy, not as
designating an administrative organization
as such, but rather some special character-
istics of that organization, is common in
the literature. Thus Laski's"^" definition of
bureaucracy emphasizes the de facto power
relationships and their consequences. Again,
although Dimock and Hyde" define bu-
reacracy in terms of the subdivision of
jurisdiction, hierarchy and professionaliza-
tion of personnel, their use of the term in-
dicates an interest in such phenomena as
"organizational resistance," with the formal
structure operating as simply the environ-
ment of the bureaucratic tendencies.
The idea of bureaucracy proposed here is
consonant although not identical with the
usage of Laski and Dimock-Hyde. It will
be considered in terms of the hypotheses
suggested above. "Bureaucratic behaviour"
" H . J. Laski, "Bureaucracy" in Encyclopedia
oj the Social Sciences, v. 3, p. 70.
" M. E. Dimock, and H. Hyde, Bureaucracy and
Trusteeship in Large Corporations, TNEC Mono-
graph #11, p. 31.
will designate that behavior of agents in
social action which:
(1) tends to create the organization-
paradox, that is, the modification of the
professed aims of the organization—aims
toward which the agent is formally supposed
to strive; this process obtains
(2) through such behavior pattems in
the informal organization as are centered
primarily around the ties of influence among
the functionaries, and as tend to concentrate
the locus of power in the hands of the offi-
cials; and
(3) through such pattems as develop
through the displacement of the function-
aries' motives on the habit level, e.g.,
routinization.
This does not mean that every situation
in which the organization-paradox is found
is a bureaucratic one. Bureaucracy is con-
cerned with the behavior of officials, while
the action of, say, worker groups, may also
lead to deflection of an organization. It is
clear from this definition that the emphasis
is on the informal structure as the mechan-
ism or manifestation of bureaucratic pat-
tems; it does not follow, of course, that
those pattems are uninfluenced by the char-
acter of the formal organization.
A final point is the question of size. For
the most part, the existence of bureaucracy
in any sense is associated with large or-
ganizations. For Dimock and Hyde, for ex-
ample, "The broadest stmctural cause of
bureaucracy, whether in business or in gov-
emment, is the tremendous size of the or-
ganization."" Indeed, there seems to be
little doubt that the factor of sheer size is a
very important element in concrete bureau-
cratic structures. However, because of the
patterns exhibited in the behavior of agents
in small organized groups and because of the
implications for greater generality, the
formulation used here does not make the
factor of size crucial for the existence of
bureaucratic behavior pattems.
Bureaucratization: A General Formula-
tion. A brief analytical formula stating the
general character of the process of bureau-
cratization may here be introduced:
"^Ibid., p. 36.
 AN APPROACH TO A THEORY OF BUREAUCRACY
(1) Co-operative effort, under the con-
ditions of increasing number and complexity
of functions, requires the delegation of
junctions. Thus action which seeks more
than limited, individual results becomes ac-
tion through agents. It is the activity of
)fficials acting as agents with which the dis-
:u5sion of bureaucracy is concemed.
(2) The use of intermediaries creates a
:endency toward a bifurcation of interest
Detween the initiator of the action and the
igent employed. This is due to the creation
di two sets of problems: for the initiator,
the achievement of the goal which spurred
him to action, and for the intermediary,
problems which are concerned chiefly with
his social position as agent. The character
of the agent's new values are such as to gen-
erate actions whose objective consequences
undermine the professed aims of the or-
ganization. This conflict need not be be-
tween the employer as a person or a group
and the agent, for the latter may be able
to manipulate the ideas of the former, but
between the actual course of the organiza-
tion and those aims formally asserted,
whether the employer recognizes the confiict
or not.
(3) This bifurcation of interest makes
dominant, for initiator and agent alike, the
issue of control. What is at stake for each is
the control of the conditions (the organiza-
tional mechanism) which each group will
want to manipulate (not necessarily con-
sciously) toward solving its special prob-
lems. In this struggle for control, an in-
jormal structure is created, based largely
on relationships involving personal influ-
ences rather than formal rules.
(4) Because of the concentration of skill
and the control of the organizational me-
chanism in the hands of the intermediaries,
it becomes possible for the problems of the
offiicals as such to become those which oper-
ate for the organization. The action of the
officials tends to have an increasingly in-
ternal relevance, which may result in the
deflection of the organization from its origi-
nal path, which, however, usually remains
as the formally professed aim of the or-
ganization.
The Bureaucratic Leader vs. the Rank
and File Which Employs Him. Utilizing the
scheme outlined above, let us examine a
concrete type of bureaucratic situation, that
which opposes a bureaucratic leader to the
rank and file for which he is formally an
agent. This situation tends to arise whenever
a group of people organize for the attain-
ment of shared objectives, with the addi-
tional aim of conducting their organization
along democratic lines. Common examples
are political parties, trade unions, a national
political democracy.
(1) The need for the delegation of functions
to a leader arises from the pressure of the wide
range of problems, with which every individual
must deal in his social existence, against strictly
limited time and ability as well as against the
social pressures which limit the exercise of cer-
tain functions to only some personality types
and to members of only some classes. Even in a
small group, individual differences in terms of
aptitude for the various functions of organized
effort (speaker, writer, record-keeper, etc.) play
an important role in creating a leader-ranks
relationship.
(2) Another bifurcation of problems arises
from the fact that the problems and interests
which impel men to organization are of a quite
different kind from those which occur in running
the organization. Whenever the ranks are needed
to carry out the work of the organization, this
gap becomes of real importance. Spurts in or-
ganizational effort on the part of the members
occur when a direct connection can be seen be-
tween this organizational work and the reason
for allegiance to the organization. Thus a po-
litical party can get "activity" when it carries
on direct political propaganda—but the day-to-
day task of keeping the party together, shaping
its character, and strengthening its roots in vari-
ous centers of power are tasks too far divorced
from the original problems to stir most people
from their ordinary way of living. In a political
democracy, too, only heated contests over broad
issues can really "bring out the vote," while the
day-to-day changes which in the long run are
decisive remain uninfluenced by the mass.
(3) There is a hierarchy of values attached to
kinds of work. Thus even equality between a
worker in a unionized plant and the union or-
ganizer, in terms of money, does not alter the
situation. It is the kind of work involved which
is valued above the work of the ordinary mem-
 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
bers. Not only is there the fact of being well- of the leadership are diminished. The existence
known (the presiige of bare celebrity), but the of the organization itself becomes dependent on
facts of having certain powers, however small, of the continued functioning of the incumbent
being associated with the incumbent leadership leadership. And so long as this is true, and the
and of being acquainted with the ''mysteries" ranks still require the organization (or think
of organization are important. There are always they require it), their dependence upon the
men who ivant to be officials. leaders become firmly established. This has
(4) Positive valuation of the office as such nothing to do with the existence of formal {e.g.
raises new problems for the bureaucrat. His in- constitutional) procedures for replacing leaders;
terest in the ultimate purpose of the organiza- these may continue to exist, but they are rela-
tion, or in the "common good," becomes tively harmless to the intrenched leaders (be-
subordinate to his preoccupation with the prob- cause functionless) so long as the ranks fear the
lems involved in the maintenance of his post. consequences of using them.
This is not the same thing as the attempt to (6) In order to be secure in his position, the
hold on to an official sinecure; for in this case, leader-bureaucrat must strive to make himself
the post is primarily a source of social prestige as independent as possible from the ranks. He
and power. In many cases, the leaders could must seek a power-base which is not controlled
obtain better positions financially in another by them. He may attempt to derive his strength
field. The leader of a women's club who, because from an electorate more general than the party
she has a jollowing, is treated with respect by or union membership. Thus he will be able to
political or other socially important forces, has follow independent policies by claiming that he
more than a merely well-paid position. A, J. has a responsibility to a broader base than the
Muste, in his discussion of factional fights in party ranks; and the ranks cannot do without
trades unions^'^ deals with the problem of why his influence on outside groups. In a nation, an
a leadership seeks to maintain its status. He independent politician tends to cultivate those
points to reasons such as those already men- forces, such as a ruling economic group, which
tioned: the positions are pleasant, the return control the instruments which shape mass opin-
to the shop is humiliating, the official tends to ion as well as the electoral machinery, but which
become less efficient in his old trade. In addi- are not themselves controlled by the mass. It is
tion there are motives connected with what they a well-established political principle that a politi-
honestly consider to be the good of the union. cian reacts most sensitively to those forces to
They feel that they are better (more competent, which he owes the maintenance of his position;
have a better policy) than the opposition and to the extent that forces can be developed apart
that they have given more to the union and from the electorate, he can—and often must,
deserve to be left in power. This is often quite because he becomes dependent upon the new
sincere and even objectively a correct appraisal. force—assert his independence from his formal
For our purposes that changes nothing: whether constituency.
honest or corrupt, the tendency is for leaders, (7) The leader-bureaucrat must seek a per-
to use the same general procedures for the main- sonal base within the group itself: some mecha-
tenance of their power. This ought not to be nism directly dependent on, devoted to, or in
surprising: if the question of organizational alliance with him which can be used to maintain
dominance as such becomes directive in action, his organizational fences. A class base in a na-
and the available means are limited, it is to be tion, a political faction in a trade union, paid
expected that the characters of their procedures gangsters, an elite guard, a secret police force,
would converge toward a common t\TDe. regard- proteges and confidants—these are the weapons
less of their ultimate reasons for desiring domi- which he must use in order to be independent of
nance. the shifting sands of public favor.
(5) The delegation of functions introduces a (8) Because of this series of problems which
relation of dependence. This is enforced by and the bureaucrat must face, his action in the name
perhaps directly dependent upon the projession- of the group, that is, that activity carried on to
alization of the work of the officialdom. To the further its professed purposes, comes to have
extent that the necessary knowledge and skill more and more a chiefly internal relevance. Ac-
are increased, the possibilities for replacement tions are taken, policies adopted, with an eye
^^ "Factional Fights in Trade Unions," American more to the effect of the action or policy on the
Labor Dynamics, ed. hy J. B, S. Hardman, New power-relations inside the organization than to
York, Harcourt Brace, 1928. the achievement of its professed goals. An or-
 AN APPROACH TO A THEORY OF BUREAUCRACY
ganization drive in a trade union, party activity,
legislative action, even the "activities program"
of a club—all come to be oriented toward the
problem of self-maintenance before possible on-
slaughts from the membership. Factors of
"morale"—the condition wherein the ranks sup-
port the incumbent leadership—become domi-
nant. Biircaucratizatiofi is in a sense the process
oj transforming this set of procedures from a
minor aspect of organization into a leading con-
sideration in the behavior of the leadership.
(g) Struggles within a group tend to become
exclusively struggles between leaders. The
masses (rank and file) play the role of manipu-
lable weapons in the conflict between the con-
trolling groups. The struggle for control between
the initiators and the agent-officials is a very
complex problem. The rank and file as a group
(and in an important sense the leader, too, be-
cause he has to build an apparatus which creates
new problems for him) cannot exercise direct
control. Even a struggle against an incumbent
leadership must be carried on through inter-
mediaries. When a faction is formed, it being
an organization too, the relations which operated
lor the organization as a whole come to be effec-
tive within the faction. The faction leaders assert
their dominance over their groups and come to
grips with one another as leaders whose strength
is measured by the forces they can deploy.
There are, however, three ways in which the
influence of the rank and file is felt in a demo-
cratic organization: (a) the threat of spon-
taneous rank and file action and of a consequent
internal revolt makes the construction of bu-
reaucratic power-relationships necessary as a
pveventive measure; (b) opposing faction lead-
er? tend to champion the professed aim of the
organization against the leaders who abandoned
iJ. thus expressing, if temporarily, the desires
of the rank and file; and (c) pressure groups,
often spontaneous, which do not seek the seizure
of the organizational reins, may influence the
course of the leadership in directions desired by
the mass. This last, however, has usually a lim-
ited measure of success precisely because no
direct threat to the power of the leadership is
offered. It is significant that tolerance of these
sroup? is a function of the extent to which they
are interested in "new leadership."
(io) The bureaucrats, like every other social
type with a power-position to maintain, con-
S'lriict an ideology peculiar to their social posi-
tion. The following general characteristics may
be noted,
(a) By the identification of the particular ad-
53
ministration with the group as a whole: playing
upon the known desire of the ranks for the
maintenance of the organization (national state,
party, union, etc.), the leadership attempts to
spread the idea that any opposition immediately
places the very existence of the organization in
jeopardy. In defending itself from attack, it
tends to identify its opposition with enemies of
the group as such. Thus opponents are "dis-
rupters," "foreign agents," "agents of an alien
class," etc.
(b) An incumbent leadership tends to adopt
the ideology of centralization, while those out
of office call for autonomy. The opposition wants
to retain its dominance over the local groups or
factions which it controls and in general desires
to avoid increasing the power of the central
authority; the concentration of the control of
the organizational mechanism (jobs, equipment,
finances) is especially to be avoided, although
the minority may not object to that within its
own domain. For the ruling group, on the other
hand, it is convenient that its power, especially
over the organizational mechanism, be increased;
it is also desirable that the central powers have
the right to step into the affairs of a local group
dominated by the opposition, in order to be
able to take the offensive against it within the
center of its own power. Each side attempts to
defend its view by appealing to the professed
aims of the group as a whole. In an action or-
ganization, the leadership will stress the military
aspect and the importance of centralization for
disciplined action; the opposition will stress the
importance of democracy. Although this rule is
often broken, there is a tendency for neither
side to discuss the matter on the basis of the
power-motives involved, either in defense of
their O\MI view or in criticism of their oppo-
nents. This is not surprising, for that would
create the danger of exposing the irrelevance of
the struggle to the overt aims of the group,
which would inevitably result in alienating some
of the ranks from both. They therefore some-
times form a pact of silence on these matters,
carrying the discussion forward on the level of
general principles, at the same time waging
furious battle in the shadow-land of informal
maneuver.
(c) The leadership creates the ideology of the
"collective submission to the collective will."^*
The obvious necessity for the delegation of cer-
tain functions is generalized, and democracy is
" See Robert Michels' excellent chapter on
'Bonapartist Ideology'' in his Political Parties.
54 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
interpreted sufficiently broadly to include the such as dependence on tradition, depreciation
notion thai the group has the democratic right of youth, and rigidity in organizational proce-
to abdicate its power. The leader, it is pro- dure may go hand in hand with a thoroughly
claimed, represents the "general will," and every revolutionary program with respect to outside
action that he takes is justifiable on the ground political events. Needless to say, the internal
that he is merely exercising the desires of the character of such an organization plays an im-
collective. Thus the symbol of democracy itself portant role if that organization achieves any
becomes an ideological bulwark of autocracy great social infiuence.
within the group.
The above discussion emphasizes certain
(d) An existing leadership tends to don the characteristic tendencies in the organiza-
mantle of conservatism, with its many variant
expressions justifying the maintenance of exist-
tional process. These tendencies are, how-
ing conditions. Since, having the power they are ever, analytical: they represent abstractions
responsible for the exercise of the basic func- from concrete organizational pattems. To
tions of the group or state, they must abandon state these tendencies is merely to set a
slogans which are characteristic of irresponsible problem, for although they ascribe to or-
minorities. The latter need not be considered ganizations in general an initial presump-
merely a term of opprobrium; the fact is that a tion oj bureaucratic consequence, it always
minority can be irresponsible because its func- remains to be determined to what degree the
tion as an opposition is radically different from bureaucratic tendencies have become domi-
its function as an administrative leadership, nant. It may be said, indeed, that this is
manning and responsible for the conduct of the
chief posts of a party or a state. In small
the way organizations will develop if they
groups too, the function of the critic may are permitted to follow the line of least
change, and with that his ideas as well, when he resistance. That is what does happen, often
is faced with the new problem of carrying out enough. But in the real world of living
a program,^-^ It is also important to note that organizations there is always the possibility
a party can be deeply conservative in some as- of counter-pressure, of devising techniques
pects and revolutionar\' in others: thus in the for blocking the bureaucratic drift. The
Marxist parties, factors in consen-ative ideology study of these techniques, which must be
based on a clear understanding of the gen-
^'' For material on the metamorphosis of leaders eral nature of the problem involved, is one of
see Michels, op. cit., and J, B, S. Hardman, "Prob- the most pressing intellectual tasks of our
lems of a Labor Union Somewhere in the U.S.,"
pp. 163-6, in his American Labor Dynamics. time.