ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ

Facts:
Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No.
1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among others,
are:
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among others,
from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business.

Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the
Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and
municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act,
contending that:

It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property
without due process of law.
The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.
The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue/s:
Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

Discussions:
A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in good faith. If a treaty
would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise
of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the
medium of a treaty.

Ruling/s:
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw
no conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of
the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class
and those who do not.”
GUERRERO'S TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC. vs.BLAYLOCK TRANSPORTATION SERVICES EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION-KILUSAN (BTEA-KILUSAN), LABOR ARBITER FRANCISCO M. DE LOS REYES and JOSE CRUZ

FACTS

In 1972, the US Naval Base authorities in Subic conducted a public bidding for a 5-year contract for the
right to operate and/or manage the transportation services inside the naval base. This bidding was won
by Santiago Guerrero, owner-operator of Guerrero’s Transport Services, Inc. (Guerrero), over Concepcion
Blayblock, the then incumbent concessionaire doing business under the name of Blayblock Transport
Services Blayblock. Blayblock’s 395 employees are members of the union BTEA-KILUSAN (the Union).

When Guererro commenced its operations, it refused to employ the members of the Union. Thus, the
Union filed a complaint w/ the NLRC against Guerrero to compel it to employ its members, pursuant to
Art. 1, Sec. 2 of the RP-US Base Agreement. The case was dismissed by the NLRC upon Guerrero’s MTD on
jurisdictional grounds, there being no employer-employee relationship between the parties. Upon appeal,
the Sec. of Labor remanded the case to the NLRC. The NLRC issued a Resolution ordering Guererro to
“absorb all complainants who filed their applications on or before the deadline” set by Guerrero, except
those who may have derogatory records w/ the US Naval Authorities in Subic. The Sec. of Labor affirmed.

Guerrero claims that it substantially complied w/ the decision of the Sec. of Labor affirming the NLRC
Resolution, & that any non-compliance was attributable to the individual complainants who failed to
submit themselves for processing & examination. The Labor Arbiter ordered the reinstatement of 129
individuals. The Union filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. The order wasn’t appealed so it
was declared final & executory

Subsequently, the parties arrived at a Compromise Agreement wherein they agreed to submit to the Sec.
of Labor the determination of members of the Union who shall be reinstated by Guerrero, w/c
determination shall be final. The agreement is deemed to have superseded the Resolution of the NLRC.
The Sec. of Labor ordered the absorption of 175 members of the Union subject to 2 conditions.

ISSUE

Whether or not the said members of the Union were entitled to be reinstated by Guerrero.

RULING

YES. Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Art. I of the RP-US Labor Agreement, the US Armed Forces undertook, consistent
w/ military requirements, "to provide security for employment, and, in the event certain services are
contracted out, the US Armed Forces shall require the contractor or concessioner to give priority
consideration to affected employees for employment.

A treaty has 2 aspects — as an international agreement between states, and as municipal law for the
people of each state to observe. As part of the municipal law, the aforesaid provision of the treaty enters
into and forms part of the contract between Guerrero and the US Naval Base authorities. In view of said
stipulation, the new contractor (Guerrero) is, therefore, bound to give "priority" to the employment of
the qualified employees of the previous contractor (Blaylock). It is obviously in recognition of such
obligation that Guerrero entered into the aforementioned Compromise Agreement.
 Under the Compromise Agreement, the parties agreed to submit to the Sec. of Labor the determination
as to who of the members of the Union shall be absorbed or employed by Guerrero, and that such
determination shall be considered as final. The Sec. of Labor issued an Order directing the NLRC, through
Labor Arbiter Francisco de los Reyes, to implement the absorption of the 175 members into Guerrero's
Transport Services, subject to the following conditions:

a) that they were bona fide employees of the Blaylock Transport Service at the time its concession expired;
and
b) that they should pass final screening and approval by the appropriate authorities of the U.S. Naval Base
concerned.

For this purpose, Guerrero is ordered to submit to and secure from the appropriate authorities of the U.S.
naval Base at Subic, Zambales the requisite screening and approval, the names of the members of the
Union.

Considering that the Compromise Agreement of the parties is more than a mere contract and has the
force and effect of any other judgment, it is, therefore, conclusive upon the parties and their privies. For
it is settled that a compromise has, upon the parties, the effect and authority of res judicata and is
enforceable by execution upon approval by the court.

PEOPLE vs GOZO [53 SCRA 476] (G.R. No. L-36409) Oct. 26, 1973
Principle of Sovereignty as Auto-Limitation

Facts:
Loreta Gozo seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, convicting her of a
violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit from the municipal mayor for the
construction or erection of a building, as well as any modification, alteration, repair or demolition thereof.
She questions its validity, or at the very least, its applicability to her, by invoking due process citing the
case of People v. Fajardo. She contend that her house was constructed within the naval base leased to
the American armed forces located inside the United States Naval Reservation within the territorial
jurisdiction of Olongapo City and therefore shall be exempted from the Municipal Ordinance No. 14.

Issue:
WON the property of the Appellant shall be exempted from the application of the Municipal Ordinance.

Ruling:
Yes. The appellant’s contention that because her property was located within the naval base leased to the
American armed forces located inside the United States Naval Reservation, she must be entitled of the
exemption from complying with the ordinance was given no merit. Though the property yielded within
the naval base of US, it is a clear doctrine that the Philippines still possesses the sovereignty over that
area – given the record that it is still a part of its territory. Thus, it can still enforce its administrative
jurisdiction by virtue of its government instrumetalities which the people sojourning to that territory must
always adhere and respect. Citing the case of Reagan vs CIR it states that, “By the Agreement, it should
be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction in
certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency. The Philippine
Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested
itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the
United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The
Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as
the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first proposition
is implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the second from the express provisions
of the treaty. “Thus, the Philippine jurisdictional right might be diminished but will never disappear. This
manifests the principle of Sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is
the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and
self-restriction." A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable
competence. "WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of November 11, 1969 is affirmed insofar as it found
the accused, Loreta Gozo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Municipal Ordinance No.14,
series of 1964 and sentencing her to pay a fine of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and modified insofar as she is required to demolish the house that is the subject matter of the
case, she being given a period of thirty days from the finality of this decision within which to obtain the
required permit. Only upon her failure to do so will that portion of the appealed decision requiring
demolition be enforced. Costs against the accused.

Bayan Muna vs. Romulo

Facts:
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the marginalized
sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the
period material to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive
Secretary.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal
Court (ICC) with “the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern x x x and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.” The serious
crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.

On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute
which, by its terms, is “subject to ratification, acceptance or approval” by the signatory states. As of the
filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the
ratification, approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is not among the 92.
RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement.

On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement
(Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and the RP. Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated
May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter), the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed
with and accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to and put in effect
the Agreement with the US government. In esse, the Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and
defines as “persons” of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against
them in international tribunals.8 It is reflective of the increasing pace of the strategic security and defense
partnership between the two countries. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements have been
effected by and between the US and 33 other countries.
The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:

1. For purposes of this Agreement, “persons” are current or former Government officials, employees
(including contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one Party.

2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the express consent of the
first Party,

(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international tribunal for any purpose, unless such
tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, or

(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third country, or expelled to a third
country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has
been established by the UN Security Council.

3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the Philippines to a third
country, the [US] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third country to any
international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, absent the
express consent of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines [GRP].

4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the [USA] to a third country,
the [GRP] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third country to any
international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, absent the
express consent of the Government of the [US].

5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the date on which one party notifies the other
of its intent to terminate the Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement shall continue to apply with
respect to any act occurring, or any allegation arising, before the effective date of termination.

In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the non-surrender
agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28, 2003 that the exchange of
diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding agreement under international law; and that, under US law,
the said agreement did not require the advice and consent of the US Senate.
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying
the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force
and effect.

Issue: Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for contracting obligations
that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles of international
law.

Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.

Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

Petitioner’s initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture being that E/N
BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.
Petitioners’ contention––perhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international doctrines,
practices, and jargons––is untenable. One of these is the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section
2, Article II of the Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law and international jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy
of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An exchange of notes falls “into the category of inter-
governmental agreements,” which is an internationally accepted form of international agreement. The
United Nations Treaty Collections (Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term as follows:

An “exchange of notes” is a record of a routine agreement that has many similarities with the private law
contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the
possession of the one signed by the representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting
State repeats the text of the offering State to record its assent. The signatories of the letters may be
government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The technique of exchange of notes is
frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of
legislative approval.

In another perspective, the terms “exchange of notes” and “executive agreements” have been used
interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form of executive agreement that becomes
binding through executive action. On the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the President
“sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal documents
denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols.’” As former US High Commissioner to the Philippines Francis B.
Sayre observed in his work, The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts:

The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements –
whether denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise – begin, may sometimes
be difficult of ready ascertainment. x x x It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-
03––be it viewed as the Non-Surrender Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance
thereof or as consent to be bound––is a recognized mode of concluding a legally binding international
written contract among nations.

Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance with Principles of International Law

Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations
and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of international law. The immoral
aspect proceeds from the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, “leaves criminals immune
from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; x x x it
precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to the [ICC] x x x.”

The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioner’s earlier position, which, as already discussed,
contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in the
process undermined its treaty obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international law
principles.

The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly
described by the Solicitor General, “is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes
under its national law. x x x The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the
country’s judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and
judiciously.”
Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos
and Americans committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial and punishment.
This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can
be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US, before
the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome
Statute have been met. For perspective, what the Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by
either party of individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party,
which may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With the view we take of things, there is
nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming
criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by
both Philippine laws and the Rome Statute.

Department of Budget Management Procurement Service vs. Kolonwel Trading

FACTS : This is a petition for review, with a prayer for temporary restraining order to nullify and set aside
the Order dated Dec. 04, 2006 of the Manila RTC.

In the middle of 2005, DepEd requested the services of the DBM-PS to undertake procurement project
which is to be jointly funded by the World Bank (WB), thru the Second Social Expenditure Management
Program (SEMP2) of the RP-IBRD Loan Agreement No. 7118-PH and the Asian Development Bank (ABD)
thru SEDIP Loan No. 1654-PHI. In October 2005, the DBM-PS called for a bidding for the supply of the
Makabayan textbooks and teachers manuals. Of the entities, foreign and local, only eleven (11) bidders
submitted, including private respondent Kolonwel.

Following the bid and the book content/body evaluation process, DBM committee issued a resolution
disqualifying, among others, Kolonwel for “failure in cover stock testing “. Kolonwel was informed of this
and subsequently filed with RTC Manila a special civil action for certiorari with a prayer for TRO. In support
of its TRO application, Kolonwel alleged, among other things, that the supply-awardees were rushing with
the implementation of the void supply contracts to beat the closing-date deadline. After summary
hearing, the Manila RTC issued a 20-day TRO, and later issued a decision wherein Resolution 001-2006-A
of the DBM was annulled and set aside. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign loan agreements (Loan No. 7118-PH) with international financial
institutions, partake of an executive or international agreement and shall govern the procurement of
goods necessary to implement the project.

HELD: This issue has been affirmatively answered in the case of Abaya. In that case, the court declared
that the RP-JBIC loan agreement was to be of governing application over the CP I project and that the JBIC
Procurement Guidelines, as stipulated in the loan agreement.

Under the fundamental international law principle of pacta sunt servanda, the RP, as borrower, bound
itself to perform in good faith its duties and obligation under Loan No. 7118-PH. Applying this postulate,
the IABAC was legally obliged to comply with, or accord primacy to, the WB Guidelines on the conduct
and implementation of the bidding/procurement process in question.
Commissioner of Customs & Collector of Customs vs Eastern Sea Trading
3 SCRA 351 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Treaties vs Executive Agreements
FACTS: Eastern Sea Trading (EST) was a shipping company which imports from Japan onion and garlic into
the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import
goods because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were
pursuant to Executive Order 328. On the other hand, EO 328 was the implementing law of the Trades and
Financial Agreements, an executive agreement, entered into between the Philippines and Japan. The said
executive agreement states, among others, that all import transactions between Japan and the Philippines
should be invoiced in dollar. In this case, the said items imported by EST from Japan were not invoiced in
dollar.
EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the executive agreement that the EO was
implementing was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax
Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Agreement is subject to the concurrence by the Senate.
HELD: No, Executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3
of the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are
commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government
than are the more formal instruments — treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of
exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or
‘protocols’.
The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements —
whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin, may
sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large
variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements,
other than those entered into under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign
governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the
act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant
precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the
Executive without the approval of the Senate.
They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the
admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims,
postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by
specific congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with
respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect
to the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a JUNK VFA MOVEMENT v EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA

FACTS:

The Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30,
1951, To further strengthen their defense and security relationship. Under the treaty, the
parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces,
public vessels, and aircraft.

On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of
US military bases in the Philippines.

On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed, among other things, the
possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).This resulted to a series of
conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter,
President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon
and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.

On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign

Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent
Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the
Philippines,the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners – as legislators, non-governmental

organizations, citizens and taxpayers – assail the constitutionality of the VFA and impute to
herein respondents grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.

Petitioner contends, under they provision cited, the “foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities” may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently
met: a) it must be a treaty,b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by
congress, and c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what
is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-
thirds of all the members of the senate.

ISSUES AND RULING:

1. Issue 1: Do the Petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or

legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA?

NO. Petitioners Bayan Muna, etc. have no standing. A party bringing a suit challenging the
Constitutionality of a law must show not only that the law is invalid, but that he has
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. Petitioners
have failed to show that they are in any danger of direct injury as a result of the VFA.

As taxpayers, they have failed to establish that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of
its taxing or spending powers. A taxpayer's suit refers to a case where the act complained
of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Before he
can invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will
sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract.
It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the
public. Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation are involved in this case,
and in the absence of any allegation by petitioners that public funds are being misspent or
illegally expended, petitioners, as taxpayers, have no legal standing to assail the legality of
the VFA.

Similarly, the petitioner-legislators (Tanada, Arroyo, etc.) do not possess the requisite locus
standi to sue. In the absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person or to the
institution to which they belong, they cannot sue. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) is also stripped of standing in these cases. The IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring
this suit in the absence of a board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its
National President to commence the present action.

Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional significance of

the issues raised, the Court may brush aside the procedural barrier and takes cognizance of
the petitions.

2. Issue 2: Is the VFA governed by section 21, Art. VII, or section 25, Art. XVIII of the
Constitution?

Section 25, Art XVIII, not section 21, Art. VII, applies, as the VFA involves the presence of
foreign military troops in the Philippines.

The Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties
or international agreements.

Section 21, Article VII reads: “[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.”

Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:”[a]fter the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between
the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases,
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except
under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified
by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose,
and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”

Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in general, in which
case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is
required to make the treaty valid and binding to the Philippines. This provision lays down
the general rule on treaties. All treaties, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or
particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and
effective. In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties
which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines.
Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to render
compliance with the constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding on
the Philippines. Sec 25 further requires that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities”
may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so
required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting state.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of US troops visiting
the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and
further defines the rights of the US and RP government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, import and export of equipment, materials and supplies.
Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain
extent, however, the provisions of Section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to
determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate.

It is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient
agreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of structure for the
establishment of a military base. The Constitution makes no distinction between “transient”
and “permanent”. We find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or
facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines. When no distinction is
made by law; the Court should not distinguish. We do not subscribe to the argument that
Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely foreign
troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA. The proscription covers “foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities.” Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to the entry of troops
and facilities without any foreign bases being established. The clause does not refer to
“foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” collectively but treats them as separate and
independent subjects, such that three different situations are contemplated — a military
treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c)
foreign facilities — any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of Section
25, Article XVIII.

3. Issue 3: Was Sec 25 Art XVIII's requisites satisfied to make the VFA effective?

YES

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country,
unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:
(a) it must be under a treaty;
(b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by Congress,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and
(c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The
concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the
Constitution, as there were at least 16 Senators that concurred.

As to condition (c), the Court held that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the
other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the
US to submit the VFA to the US Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to
accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in
the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language
should be understood in the sense they have in common use.

The records reveal that the US Government, through Ambassador Hubbard, has stated that
the US has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the US
accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its
treaty obligations, there is indeed compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
Worth stressing too, is that the ratification by the President of the VFA, and the concurrence
of the Senate, should be taken as a clear and unequivocal expression of our nation's
consent to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and
responsibilities embodied thereunder. Ratification is generally held to be an executive act,
undertaken by the head of the state, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is
proclaimed. A State may provide in its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a
treaty. In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as
commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or
withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.

With the ratification of the VFA it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under
principles of international law (pacta sunt servanda), to be bound by the terms of the
agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II declares that the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres
to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.

PHILIP MORRIS, INC. VS COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to seek the reversal and setting aside of
the following issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA).

Philip Morris, Inc. and two other petitioners are ascribing whimsical exercise of the faculty conferred upon
magistrates by Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court when respondent Court of Appeals lifted
the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier had issued against Fortune Tobacco Corporation, from
manufacturing and selling “MARK” cigarettes in the local market. Banking on the thesis that petitioners’
respective symbols “MARK VII”, ‘MARK TEN”, and “MARK”, also for cigarettes, must be protected against
unauthorized appropriation.

All petitioners are not doing business in the Philippines but are suing on an isolated transaction, They
Invoked provisions of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property. As
corporate nationals of member-countries of the Paris Union, they can sue before Philippine courts for
infringement of trademarks, or for unfair competition, without need of obtaining registration or a license
to do business in the Philippines, and without necessity of actually doing business in the Philippines.

Philip Morris and its subsidiaries filed the complaint for infringement and damages against Fortune
Tobacco before the Pasig Regional Trial Court (RTC) for manufacturing and selling cigarettes bearing the
trademark “Mark” which is identical and confusingly similar to Philip Morris trademarks. The said act was
dismissed. Hence, this petition at bar.

Discussions:
Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on trademarks regarding the requirement
of actual use in the Philippines must subordinate an international agreement inasmuch as the apparent
clash is being decided by a municipal tribunal. Withal, the fact that international law has been made part
of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in
the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of
international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislative enactments
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner’s mark may be afforded protection under said laws;
(2) Whether or not petitioner may be granted injunctive relief.

Ruling:
(1) NO. Yet, insofar as this discourse is concerned, there is no necessity to treat the matter with an
extensive response because adherence of the Philippines to the 1965 international covenant due to pact
sunt servanda had been acknowledged in La Chemise. Given these confluence of existing laws amidst the
cases involving trademarks, there can be no disagreement to the guiding principle in commercial law that
foreign corporations not engaged in business in the Philippines may maintain a cause of action for
infringement primarily because of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law when the legal standing to sue is
alleged, which petitioners have done in the case at hand.
Petitioners may have the capacity to sue for infringement irrespective of lack of business activity in the
Philippines on account of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law but the question whether they have an
exclusive right over their symbol as to justify issuance of the controversial writ will depend on actual use
of their trademarks in the Philippines in line with Sections 2 and 2-A of the same law. It is thus incongruous
for petitioners to claim that when a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in Philippines files a
complaint for infringement, the entity need not be actually using its trademark in commerce in the
Philippines. Such a foreign corporation may have the personality to file a suit for infringement but it may
not necessarily be entitled to protection due to absence of actual use of the emblem in the local market.

(2) NO. More telling are the allegations of petitioners in their complaint as well as in the very petition
filed with this Court indicating that they are not doing business in the Philippines, for these frank
representations are inconsistent and incongruent with any pretense of a right which can breached.
Indeed, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioner must show that there exists a right to be protected
and that the facts against which injunction is directed are violative of said right. On the economic
repercussion of this case, we are extremely bothered by the thought of having to participate in throwing
into the streets Filipino workers engaged in the manufacture and sale of private respondent’s “MARK”
cigarettes who might be retrenched and forced to join the ranks of the many unemployed and
unproductive as a result of the issuance of a simple writ of preliminary injunction and this, during the
pendency of the case before the trial court, not to mention the diminution of tax revenues represented
to be close to a quarter million pesos annually. On the other hand, if the status quo is maintained, there
will be no damage that would be suffered by petitioners inasmuch as they are not doing business in the
Philippines. In view of the explicit representation of petitioners in the complaint that they are not engaged
in business in the Philippines, it inevitably follows that no conceivable damage can be suffered by them
not to mention the foremost consideration heretofore discussed on the absence of their “right” to be
protected.

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS PEACE PANEL ON ANSCESTRAL DOMAIN

Facts:
Subject of this case is the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) which is
scheduled to be signed by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the MILF in August 05,
2008. Five cases bearing the same subject matter were consolidated by this court namely:-

 GR 183591 by the Province of Cotabato and Vice Governor Pinol on its prayer to declare
unconstitutional and to have the MOA-AD disclosed to the public and be open for public
consultation.
  GR 183752 by the City of Zamboanga et al on its prayer to declare null and void said MOA-AD and
to exclude the city to the BJE.
 GR 183893 by the City of Iligan enjoining the respondents from signing the MOA-AD and
additionally impleading Exec. Sec. Ermita.
 GR 183951 by the Province of Zamboanga del Norte et al, praying to declare null and void the
MOA-AD and without operative effect and those respondents enjoined from executing the MOA-
AD.
 GR 183692 by Maceda, Binay and Pimentel III, praying for a judgment prohibiting and
permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any
other agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being
unconstitutional and illegal and impleading Iqbal.

The MOA-AD is a result of various agreements entered into by and between the government
and the MILF starting in 1996; then in 1997, they signed the Agreement on General Cessation of
Hostilities; and the following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on
August 27, 1998. However, in 1999 and in the early of 2000, the MILF attacked a number of
municipalities in Central Mindanao. In March 2000, they took the hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte;
hence, then Pres. Estrada declared an all-out war-which tolled the peace negotiation. It was when
then Pres. Arroyo assumed office, when the negotiation regarding peace in Mindanao continued. MILF
was hesitant; however, this negotiation proceeded when the government of Malaysia interceded.
Formal peace talks resumed and MILF suspended all its military actions. The Tripoli Agreement in 2001
lead to the ceasefire between the parties. After the death of MILF Chairman Hashim and Iqbal took
over his position, the crafting of MOA-AD in its final form was born.

 MOA-AD Overview

This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP and the MILF. Used as reference in the birth of this MOA-
AD are the Tripoli Agreement, organic act of ARMM, IPRA Law, international laws such as ILO
Convention 169, the UN Charter etc., and the principle of Islam i.e compact right entrenchment (law of
compact, treaty and order). The body is divided into concepts and principles, territory, resources, and
governance.

Embodied in concepts and principles, is the definition of Bangsamoro as all indigenous peoples of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands. These people have the right to self- governance of their Bangsamoro
homeland to which they have exclusive ownership by virtue of their prior rights of occupation in the
land. The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First Nation' with defined
territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with
foreign nations." It then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it
grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.

As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE shall embrace the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region, involving the present ARMM, parts of which are those which voted in the inclusion to
ARMM in a plebiscite. The territory is divided into two categories, “A” which will be subject to plebiscite
not later than 12 mos. after the signing and “B” which will be subject to plebiscite 25 years from the
signing of another separate agreement. Embodied in the MOA-AD that the BJE shall have jurisdiction
over the internal waters-15kms from the coastline of the BJE territory; they shall also have "territorial
waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the
Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial
waters, the BJE and the government shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over all
natural resources. There will also be sharing of minerals in the territorial waters; but no provision on the
internal waters.

Included in the resources is the stipulation that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation
and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the option to establish trade missions in those
countries, as well as environmental cooperation agreements, but not to include aggression in the GRP.
The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the government. The BJE shall
have participation in international meetings and events" like those of the ASEAN and the specialized
agencies of the UN. They are to be entitled to participate in Philippine official missions and delegations
for the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for environmental protection and equitable
sharing of incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands
forming part of the ancestral domain. The BJE shall also have the right to explore its resources and that
the sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural
resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. And they shall have the right to cancel or modify concessions
and TLAs.

And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD claims that the relationship between the GRP and MILF is
associative i.e. characterized by shared authority and responsibility. This structure of governance shall
be further discussed in the Comprehensive Compact, a stipulation which was highly contested before
the court. The BJE shall also be given the right to build, develop and maintain its own institutions, the
details of which shall be discussed in the comprehensive compact as well.

Issues:

1. WON the petitions have complied with the procedural requirements for the exercise of judicial review

2. WON respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right
to information when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD; and

3. WON the contents of the MOA-AD violated the Constitution and the laws

Ruling:

The SC declared the MOA-AD contrary to law and the Constitution.

 On matters of international law.

The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principle of international law as part of the law of the land.
In international law, the right to self-determination has long been recognized which states that people
can freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural
development. There are the internal and external self-determination—internal, meaning the self-pursuit
of man and the external which takes the form of the assertion of the right to unilateral secession. This
principle of self-determination is viewed with respect accorded to the territorial integrity of existing
states. External self-determination is only afforded in exceptional cases when there is an actual block in
the meaningful exercise of the right to internal self-determination. International law, as a general rule,
subject only to limited and exceptional cases, recognizes that the right of disposing national territory is
essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every state.
On matters relative to indigenous people, international law states that indigenous peoples situated within
states do not have a general right to independence or secession from those states under international
law, but they do have rights amounting to what was discussed above as the right to internal self-
determination; have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and
local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions; have the right to the
lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or
acquired.

Clearly, there is nothing in the law that required the State to guarantee the indigenous people their own
police and security force; but rather, it shall be the State, through police officers, that will provide for the
protection of the people. With regards to the autonomy of the indigenous people, the law does not
obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of a state; since it would impair
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states.

 On the concept underlying the MOA-AD.

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on
the Philippines under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself,
already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective. The MOA-AD not being a
document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents' almost
consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute
grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the
Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that
Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding such
an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a
Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way
that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or
interference with that process.

Santos III vs Northwest Orient Airlines

Facts:
This case involves the proper interpretation of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention: Art. 28. (1) An
action for damage must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of
business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract has been made, or before the
court at the place of destination.

Petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in San Francisco. U.S.A., for his flight from San Francisco
to Manila via Tokyo and back. On the date of departure, he checked in at the NOA counter in the San
Francisco airport but despite a previous confirmation and re-confirmation, he was informed that he had
no reservation for his flight from Tokyo to Manila. He therefore had to be wait-listed. Petitioner sued NOA
for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction, citing Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention.

Invoking the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, the petitioner claims that the lower court erred in not ruling
that Art. 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention is inapplicable because of a fundamental change in the
circumstances that served as its basis- that the provisions in the Convention were intended to protect
airline companies under “the conditions prevailing then and which have long ceased to exist.” He argues
that in view of the significant developments in the airline industry through the years, the treaty has
become irrelevant. Hence, to the extent that it has lost its basis for approval, it has become
unconstitutional.

Issue:
Supposing that a fundamental change in the circumstances occurred in the above case, did it render Art.
28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention inapplicable?

Ruling:
No. The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus does not operate automatically to render the treaty inoperative.
The treaty has not been rejected by the Philippine government. The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus does
not operate automatically to render the treaty inoperative. There is a necessity for a formal act of
rejection, usually made by the head of State, with a statement of the reasons why compliance with the
treaty is no longer required.

In lieu thereof, the treaty may be denounced even without an expressed justification for this action. Such
denunciation is authorized under its Article 39, viz: Article 39. (1) Any one of the High Contracting Parties
may denounce this convention by a notification addressed to the Government of the Republic of Poland,
which shall at once inform the Government of each of the High Contracting Parties. (2) Denunciation shall
take effect six months after the notification of denunciation, and shall operate only as regards the party
which shall have proceeded to denunciation.

Obviously, rejection of the treaty, whether on the ground of rebus sic stantibus or pursuant to Article 39,
is not a function of the courts but of the other branches of government. This is a political act. The
conclusion and renunciation of treaties is the prerogative of the political departments and may not be
usurped by the judiciary. The courts are concerned only with the interpretation and application of laws
and treaties in force and not with their wisdom or efficacy.