THIRD DIVISION the property for almost thirty (30) years; the subject lot was once tenanted by
his ancestral relatives until it was sold by Rogelio’s father, Emilio, to his
[G.R. No. 191696, April 10, 2013]
ROGELIO DANTIS, Petitioner, v. JULIO MAGHINANG, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
January 25, 2010 Decision1and the March 23, 2010 Resolution2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 85258, reversing the March 2, 2005
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Malolos, Bulacan (RTC), in
an action for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages.
The Facts
The case draws its origin from a complaint4 for quieting of title and recovery
of possession with damages filed by petitioner Rogelio Dantis (Rogelio)
against respondent Julio Maghinang, Jr. (Julio, Jr.) before the RTC, docketed
as Civil Case No. 280-M-2002. Rogelio alleged that he was the registered
owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
125918, with an area of 5,657 square meters, located in Sta. Rita, San
Miguel, Bulacan; that he acquired ownership of the property through a deed
of extrajudicial partition of the estate of his deceased father, Emilio Dantis
(Emilio), dated December 22, 1993; that he had been paying the realty taxes
on the said property; that Julio, Jr. occupied and built a house on a portion of
his property without any right at all; that demands were made upon Julio, Jr.
that he vacate the premises but the same fell on deaf ears; and that the acts
of Julio, Jr. had created a cloud of doubt over his title and right of possession
of his property. He, thus, prayed that judgment be rendered declaring him to
be the true and real owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-
125918; ordering Julio, Jr. to deliver the possession of that portion of the land
he was occupying; and directing Julio, Jr. to pay rentals from October 2000
and attorney’s fees of P100,000.00.
He added that he was constrained to institute an ejectment suit against Julio,
Jr. before the Municipal Trial Court of San Miguel, Bulacan (MTC), but the
complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action.
In his Answer,5 Julio, Jr. denied the material allegations of the complaint. By
way of an affirmative defense, he claimed that he was the actual owner of the
352 square meters (subject lot) of the land covered by TCT No. T-125918
where he was living; that he had been in open and continuous possession of
father, Julio Maghinang, Sr. (Julio, Sr.); that later, he succeeded to the
ownership of the subject lot after his father died on March 10, 1968; and that
he was entitled to a separate registration of the subject lot on the basis of the
documentary evidence of sale and his open and uninterrupted possession of
the property.
As synthesized by the RTC from the respective testimonies of the principal
witnesses, their diametrically opposed positions are as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Plaintiff Rogelio Dantis testified that he inherited 5,657 square meters of
land, identified as Lot 6-D-1 of subdivision plan Psd-031421-054315, located
at Sta. Rita, San Miguel, Bulacan, through an Extrajudicial Partition of Estate
of Emilio Dantis, executed in December 1993 which land was titled later on
under his name, Rogelio Dantis, married to Victoria Payawal, as shown by
copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-125918, issued by the Register of
Deeds of Bulacan on September 29, 1998, declared for taxation purposes as
Tax Declaration with ARP No. C20-22-043-07-046. According to him,
defendant and his predecessor-in-interest built the house located on said lot.
When he first saw it, it was only a small hut but when he was about 60 years
old, he told defendant not to build a bigger house thereon because he would
need the land and defendant would have to vacate the land. Plaintiff,
however, has not been in physical possession of the premises.
Defendant Julio Maghinang, Jr., presented by plaintiff as adverse witness,
testified that he has no title over the property he is occupying. He has not
paid realty taxes thereon. He has not paid any rental to anybody. He is
occupying about 352 square meters of the lot. He presented an affidavit
executed on September 3, 1953 by Ignacio Dantis, grandfather of Rogelio
Dantis and the father of Emilio Dantis. The latter was, in turn, the father of
Rogelio Dantis. The affidavit, according to affiant Ignacio Dantis, alleged that
Emilio Dantis agreed to sell 352 square meters of the lot to Julio Maghinang
on installment. Defendant was then 11 years old in 1952.
Defendant Julio Maghinang, Jr. likewise testified for the defendant’s case as
follows: He owns that house located at Sta. Rita, San Miguel, Bulacan, on a
352 square meter lot. He could not say that he is the owner because there is
still question about the lot. He claimed that his father, Julio Maghinang (Sr.),
bought the said lot from the parents of Rogelio Dantis. He admitted that the
affidavit was not signed by the alleged vendor, Emilio Dantis, the father of
Rogelio Dantis. The receipt he presented was admittedly a mere photocopy.
He spent P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Since 1953, he has not declared the
property as his nor paid the taxes thereon because there is a problem.6

On March 2, 2005, the RTC rendered its decision declaring Rogelio as the
true owner of the entire 5,657-square meter lot located in Sta. Rita, San
Miguel, Bulacan, as evidenced by his TCT over the same. The RTC did not
lend any probative value on the documentary evidence of sale adduced by
Julio, Jr. consisting of: 1) an affidavit allegedly executed by Ignacio Dantis
(Ignacio), Rogelio’s grandfather, whereby said affiant attested, among others,
to the sale of the subject lot made by his son, Emilio, to Julio, Sr. (Exhibit
“3”)7; and 2) an undated handwritten receipt of initial downpayment in the
amount of P100.00 supposedly issued by Emilio to Julio, Sr. in connection
with the sale of the subject lot (Exhibit “4”).8 The RTC ruled that even if
these documents were adjudged as competent evidence, still, they would
only serve as proofs that the purchase price for the subject lot had not yet
been completely paid and, hence, Rogelio was not duty-bound to deliver the
property to Julio, Jr. The RTC found Julio, Jr. to be a mere possessor by
tolerance. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. quieting the title and removing whatever cloud over the title
on the parcel of land, with area of 5,647 sq. meters, more or
less, located at Sta. Rita, San Miguel, Bulacan, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-125918 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan in the name of “Rogelio
Dantis, married to Victoria Payawal”;cralawlibrary
2. declaring that Rogelio Dantis, married to Victoria Payawal, is
the true and lawful owner of the aforementioned real
property; and
3. ordering defendant Julio Maghinang, Jr. and all persons
claiming under him to peacefully vacate the said real
property and surrender the possession thereof to plaintiff or
latter’s successors-in-interest.
No pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.9
Julio, Jr. moved for a reconsideration of the March 2, 2005 Decision, but the
motion was denied by the RTC in its May 3, 2005 Order.10 Feeling aggrieved,
Julio, Jr. appealed the decision to the CA.
On January 25, 2010, the CA rendered the assailed decision in CA-G.R. CV
NO. 85258, finding the appeal to be impressed with merit. It held that Exhibit
“4” was an indubitable proof of the sale of the 352-square meter lot between
Emilio and Julio, Sr. It also ruled that the partial payment of the purchase
price, coupled with the delivery of the res, gave efficacy to the oral sale and
brought it outside the operation of the statute of frauds. Finally, the court a
quo declared that Julio, Jr. and his predecessors-in-interest had an equitable
claim over the subject lot which imposed on Rogelio and his predecessors-in-
interest a personal duty to convey what had been sold after full payment of
the selling price. The decretal portion of the CA decision
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is reversed. The
heirs of Julio Maghinang Jr. are declared the owners of the 352-square meter
portion of the lot covered by TCT No. T-125968 where the residence of
defendant Julio Maghinang is located, and the plaintiff is ordered to reconvey
the aforesaid portion to the aforesaid heirs, subject to partition by agreement
or action to determine the exact metes and bounds and without prejudice to
any legal remedy that the plaintiff may take with respect to the unpaid
balance of the price.
SO ORDERED.11
The motion for reconsideration12 filed by Rogelio was denied by the CA in its
March 23, 2010 Resolution. Unfazed, he filed this petition for review on
certiorari before this Court.
Issues:
The fundamental question for resolution is whether there is a perfected
contract of sale between Emilio and Julio, Sr. The determination of this issue
will settle the rightful ownership of the subject lot.
Rogelio submits that Exhibit “3” and Exhibit “4” are devoid of evidentiary
value and, hence, deserve scant consideration. He stresses that Exhibit “4” is
inadmissible in evidence being a mere photocopy, and the existence and due
execution thereof had not been established. He argues that even if Exhibit
“4” would be considered as competent and admissible evidence, still, it would
not be an adequate proof of the existence of the alleged oral contract of sale
because it failed to provide a description of the subject lot, including its metes
and bounds, as well as its full price or consideration. 13cralawvllred
Rogelio argues that while reconveyance may be availed of by the owner of a
real property wrongfully included in the certificate of title of another, the
remedy is not obtainable herein since he is a transferee in good faith, having
acquired the land covered by TCT No. T-125918, through a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition of Estate.14 He asserts that he could not be considered
a trustee as he was not privy to Exhibit “4.” In any event, he theorizes that
the action for reconveyance on the ground of implied trust had already
prescribed since more than 10 years had lapsed since the execution of
Exhibit “4” in 1953. It is the petitioner’s stance that Julio, Jr. did not acquire
ownership over the subject lot by acquisitive prescription contending that
prescription does not lie against a real property covered by a Torrens title. He
opines that his certificate of title to the subject lot cannot be collaterally
attacked because a Torrens title is indefeasible and must be respected
unless challenged in a direct proceeding.15cralawvllred
The Court’s Ruling
In the case at bench, the CA and the RTC reached different conclusions on
the question of whether or not there was an oral contract of sale. The RTC
ruled that Rogelio Dantis was the sole and rightful owner of the parcel of land
covered by TCT No. T-125918 and that no oral contract of sale was entered
into between Emilio Dantis and Julio Maghinang, Sr. involving the 352-
square meter portion of the said property. The CA was of the opposite view.
The determination of whether there existed an oral contract of sale is
essentially a question of fact.
In petitions for review under Rule 45, the Court, as a general rule, does not
venture to re-examine the evidence presented by the contending parties
during the trial of the case considering that it is not a trier of facts and the
findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding upon this Court. The
rule, however, admits of several exceptions. One of which is when the
findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court.16 Considering the
incongruent factual conclusions of the CA and the RTC, this Court is
constrained to reassess the factual circumstances of the case and reevaluate
them in the interest of justice.
The petition is meritorious.
It is an age-old rule in civil cases that he who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.17 After carefully sifting
through the evidence on record, the Court finds that Rogelio was able to
establish a prima facie case in his favor tending to show his exclusive
ownership of the parcel of land under TCT No. T-125918 with an area of
5,657 square meters, which included the 352-square meter subject lot. From
the records, it appears that TCT No. T-125918 is a derivative of TCT No. T-
256228, which covered a bigger area of land measuring 30,000 square
meters registered in the name of Emilio Dantis; that Emilio died intestate on
November 13, 1952; that Emilio’s five heirs, including Rogelio, executed an
extra-judicial partition of estate on December 22, 1993 and divided among
themselves specific portions of the property covered by TCT No. T-256228,
which were already set apart by metes and bounds; that the land known as
Lot 6-D-1 of the subdivision plan Psd-031421-054315 with an area of 5,657
sq. m. went to Rogelio, the property now covered by TCT No. T-125918; and
that the property was declared for realty tax purpose in the name of Rogelio
for which a tax declaration was issued in his name; and that the same had
not been transferred to anyone else since its issuance.
In light of Rogelio’s outright denial of the oral sale together with his insistence
of ownership over the subject lot, it behooved upon Julio, Jr. to contravene
the former’s claim and convince the court that he had a valid defense. The
burden of evidence shifted to Julio, Jr. to prove that his father bought the
subject lot from Emilio Dantis. In Jison v. Court of Appeals,18 the Court
held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of
proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts.
However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima
facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant
to controvert plaintiff’s prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be
returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with
plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the defendant’s. The concept of “preponderance of evidence”
refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which
is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.19
Julio, Jr. failed to discharge this burden. His pieces of evidence, Exhibit “3”
and Exhibit “4,” cannot prevail over the array of documentary and testimonial
evidence that were adduced by Rogelio. The totality of Julio, Jr.’s evidence
leaves much to be desired.
To begin with, Exhibit “3,” the affidavit of Ignacio, is hearsay evidence and,
thus, cannot be accorded any evidentiary weight. Evidence is hearsay when
its probative force depends on the competency and credibility of some
persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to be produced. The
exclusion of hearsay evidence is anchored on three reasons: 1) absence of
cross-examination; 2) absence of demeanor evidence; and 3) absence of
oath.20cralawvllred
Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its
affiant/maker did not take the witness stand.21 The sworn statement of
Ignacio is of this kind. The affidavit was not identified and its averments were
not affirmed by affiant Ignacio. Accordingly, Exhibit “3” must be excluded
from the judicial proceedings being an inadmissible hearsay evidence. It
cannot be deemed a declaration against interest for the matter to be
considered as an exception to the hearsay rule because the declarant was
not the seller (Emilio), but his father (Ignacio).
Exhibit “4,” on the other hand, is considered secondary evidence being a
mere photocopy which, in this case, cannot be admitted to prove the
contents of the purported undated handwritten receipt. The best evidence
rule requires that the highest available degree of proof must be produced.
For documentary evidence, the contents of a document are best proved by
the production of the document itself to the exclusion of secondary or
substitutionary evidence, pursuant to Rule 130, Section 322.
A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130,
Section 5, which states that: when the original has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may
prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly,
the offeror of the secondary evidence is burdened to satisfactorily prove the
predicates thereof, namely: (1) the execution or existence of the original; (2)
the loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and (3)
the unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the
proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document and its
subsequent loss would constitute the basis for the introduction of secondary
evidence.23 In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong
Corporation,24 it was held that where the missing document is the foundation
of the action, more strictness in proof is required than where the document is
only collaterally involved.
Guided by these norms, the Court holds that Julio, Jr. failed to prove the due
execution of the original of Exhibit “4” as well as its subsequent loss. A nexus
of logically related circumstance rendered Julio, Jr.’s evidence highly
suspect. Also, his testimony was riddled with improbabilities and
contradictions which tend to erode his credibility and raise doubt on the
veracity of his evidence.
First, the claim of Julio, Jr. that Emilio affixed his signature on the original of
Exhibit “4” in 1953 is highly improbable because record shows that Emilio
died even before that year, specifically, on November 13, 1952. Excerpts
from Julio, Jr.’s testimony relative to this matter are as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Vicente Millora
(On Cross-examination)
Q: You don’t remember how old you were when this according to you you
witnessed Emilio Dantis signed this?
A: Eleven years old, Sir.
Q: So that was 1953?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And you were then…?
A: I was born October 1942, Sir.
Q: You were eleven (11) years old?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And you mean to say that you witnessed the signing allegedly of the
original of Exhibit “4” when you were eleven (11) years old?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And you remember what was signed in this receipt. From your memory
can you tell the title of this Exhibit “4”?
A: What I can say that it is a Sale, Sir.
Q: So, when you said that you witnessed an alleged sale you are referring to
Exhibit “4”?
A: Yes, Sir.25 (Emphasis supplied)
Second, Julio, Jr.’s testimony pertinent to the alleged loss of the original of
Exhibit “4” is laden with inconsistencies that detract from his credibility. His
testimony bears the earmarks of falsehood and, hence, not reliable. Julio, Jr.
testified in this wise:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Roldan Villacorta
(On Direct examination)
Q: Mr. Witness, I noticed that this document marked as Exhibit “4” is only a
photocopy, where is the original of this document?
A: The original was with the safekeeping of my parents because of the
lapse of time the original was misplaced, Sir.26
The above testimony of Julio, Jr. tends to give the impression that the
original of the document was lost while it was in the possession of his
parents. During cross-examination, however, he testified that it was lost while
it was in his possession.
Atty. Vicente Millora
(On Cross-examination)
Q: x x x Where did you keep that document?
A: I was the one keeping that document because I live in different places,
[the said] it was lost or misplaced, Sir.
Q: In other words, it was lost while the same was in your possession??
A: Yes, Sir.27 (Emphasis supplied)
Still, later, Julio, Jr. claimed that his sister was the one responsible for the
loss of the original of Exhibit “4” after borrowing the same from him.
Atty. Vicente Millora
(On Cross-examination)
Q: So, who is your sister to whom you gave the original?
A: Benedicta Laya, Sir.
Q: In other words now, you did not lost the document or the original of
Exhibit “4” but you gave it to your sister, am I correct?
A: I just lent to her the original copy, Sir.
Q: So, you lent this original of Exhibit “4” to your sister and your sister
never returned the same to you?
A: Yes, Sir, because it was lost, that was the only one left in her custody.
Interpreter:cralaw
Witness referring to the xerox copy.
Atty. Vicente Millora
Q: In other words, it was your sister who lost the original, is that correct?
A: Yes, Sir, when I lent the original.28 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court also notes the confused narration of Julio, Jr. regarding the last
time he saw the original of Exhibit “4.”
Atty. Vicente Millora
(On Cross-examination)
Q: And when did you last see the original?
A: When my mother died in 1993 that was the last time I tried to see the
original of the document after her interment, Sir.
Q: Where did you see this document?
A: From the safekeeping of my mother, Sir.29cralawvllred
xxxx
Q: When did you get this Exhibit “4” now, the photocopy from your sister?
A: When the interment of my mother in September 1993, Sir.
Q: Now, let us reform. Which one did you get after the interment of your
mother, this Exhibit “4” or the original?
A: I asked that xerox copy because I have lost the original and I could not
find the same, Sir.
Q: So, from the safe of your mother after her interment, what used you found
and got this Exhibit “4”?
A: Yes, Sir, from my sister.
Q: So, not from your mother safe?
A: The original was taken from the safe of my mother, Sir.
Q: So after your mother’s death you never saw the original?
A: I did not see it anymore because the original was lost before she died,
Sir.30(Underscoring supplied)
Third, it is quite strange that two receipts were prepared for the initial
payment of P100.00 in connection with the sale of the subject lot. The Court
notes that the contents of Exhibit “4” were similar to those of Annex “A” 31 of
Julio, Jr.’s Answer, dated June 9, 2002. Annex “A,” however, was
typewritten and the name of the recipient indicated therein was a certain
Cornelio A. Dantis, whose identity and participation in the alleged sale was
never explained.
Fourth, apart from the lone testimony of Julio, Jr., no other witness who knew
or read Exhibit “4,” much less saw it executed, was presented. In the
absence of any shred of corroborative evidence, the Court cannot help but
entertain doubts on the truthfulness of Julio, Jr.’s naked assertion.
Assuming, in gratia argumenti, that Exhibit “4” is admissible in evidence,
there will still be no valid and perfected oral contract for failure of Julio, Jr. to
prove the concurrence of the essential requisites of a contract of sale by
adequate and competent evidence.
By the contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to
transfer the ownership of, and to deliver, a determinate thing, and the other
to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.32A contract of sale
is a consensual contract and, thus, is perfected by mere consent which is
manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing
and the cause which are to constitute the contract.33 Until the contract of sale
is perfected, it cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as a
binding juridical relation between the parties.34 The essential elements of a
contract of sale are: a) consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to
transfer ownership in exchange for the price; b) determinate subject matter;
and c) price certain in money or its equivalent.35 The absence of any of the
essential elements shall negate the existence of a perfected contract of
sale.36cralawvllred
Seemingly, Julio, Jr. wanted to prove the sale by a receipt when it should be
the receipt that should further corroborate the existence of the sale. At best,
his testimony only alleges but does not prove the existence of the verbal
agreement. Julio, Jr. miserably failed to establish by preponderance of
evidence that there was a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the
subject matter and the purchase price.
The chief evidence of Julio, Jr. to substantiate the existence of the oral
contract of sale is Exhibit “4.” For a better understanding and resolution of
the issue at hand, Exhibit “4” is being reproduced
here:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Alamin ng sino mang
Makababasa
Akong si Emilio Dantis may sapat na Gulang may asawa naninirahan sa Sta
Rita San Miguel Bul. ay kusang nagsasasay ng sumosunod.
Na ako Tumanggap Kay Julio Maghinang ng P100.00 peso cuartang Pilipino,
bilang paunang bayad sa Lupa niyang nilote sa akin 400 apat na raan
mahigit na metro cudrado.
Testigo Tumangap,
Emilio a Dantis
A perusal of the above document would readily show that it does not specify
a determinate subject matter. Nowhere does it provide a description of the
property subject of the sale, including its metes and bounds, as well as its
total area. The Court notes that while Julio, Jr. testified that the land subject
of the sale consisted of 352 square meters, Exhibit “4,” however, states that
it’s more than 400 square meters. Moreover, Exhibit “4” does not
categorically declare the price certain in money. Neither does it state the
mode of payment of the purchase price and the period for its payment.
In Swedish Match, AB v. Court of Appeals,37 the Court ruled that the manner
of payment of the purchase price was an essential element before a valid
and binding contract of sale could exist. Albeit the Civil Code does not
explicitly provide that the minds of the contracting parties must also meet on
the terms or manner of payment of the price, the same is needed, otherwise,
there is no sale.38 An agreement anent the manner of payment goes into the
price so much so that a disagreement on the manner of payment is
tantamount to a failure to agree on the price.39 Further, in Velasco v. Court of
Appeals,40 where the parties already agreed on the object of sale and on the
purchase price, but not on how and when the downpayment and the
installment payments were to be paid, this Court
ruled:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Such being the situation, it cannot, therefore, be said that a definite and firm
sales agreement between the parties had been perfected over the lot in
question. Indeed, this Court has already ruled before that a definite
agreement on the manner of payment of the purchase price is an essential
element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale. The
fact, therefore, that the petitioners delivered to the respondent the sum of
P10,000.00 as part of the down-payment that they had to pay cannot be
considered as sufficient proof of the perfection of any purchase and sale
agreement between the parties herein under Art. 1482 of the new Civil Code,
as the petitioners themselves admit that some essential matter – the terms of
payment – still had to be mutually covenanted.41
The CA held that partial performance of the contract of sale – giving of a
downpayment coupled with the delivery of the res - took the oral contract out
of the scope of the Statute of Frauds. This conclusion arose from its
erroneous finding that there was a perfected contract of sale. The above
disquisition, however, shows that there was none. There is, therefore, no
basis for the application of the Statute of Frauds. The application of the
Statute of Frauds presupposes the existence of a perfected contract.42 As to
the delivery of the res, it does not appear to be a voluntary one pursuant to
the purported sale. If Julio, Jr. happened to be there, it was because his
ancestors tenanted the land. It must be noted that when Julio, Jr. built his
house, Rogelio protested.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed January 25, 2010
Decision and the March 23, 2010 Resolution of the Court Appeals, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 85258, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The March 2, 2005
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 18, in Civil
Case No. 280-M-2002, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 200055, September 10, 2014
STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC., Petitioner, v. ARNOLD CUARESMA
AND JERRY B. CUARESMA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 and
Resolution,2 dated June 22, 2011 and January 16, 2012, respectively, of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 117785.
The antecedent facts are as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On March 20, 2004, two vehicles, one driven by Jefferson Cham and insured
with petitioner Standard Insurance Co., Inc., and the other owned by
respondent Arnold Cuaresma and driven by respondent Jerry B. Cuaresma,
figured in an accident at North Avenue, Quezon City.3 Consequently, the
damage on the vehicle driven by Cham was repaired, the cost of which was
borne by petitioner. Cham then executed a Release of Claim in favor of
petitioner subrogating the latter to all his rights to recover on all claims,
demands, and rights of action on account of the loss, damage, or injury
sustained as a consequence of the accident from any person liable
thereto.4 Based on said document, petitioner, in its letter5 dated April 15,
2004 addressed to respondents, demanded the payment of the sum spent on
repairing the vehicle driven by Cham.
Meanwhile, on August 10, 2004, an Information6 was filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City charging Cham of the crime
of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property docketed as
Criminal Case No. 020256. During the pendency thereof, on March 17, 2008,
petitioner, claiming that respondents collided with Cham's vehicle in a
reckless and imprudent manner, filed a Complaint7 for Sum of Money with
the MeTC of Manila against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No.
184854, demanding payment of the sum of P256,643.26 representing the
cost of repairs on Cham's vehicle.
Respondents, however, were declared in default on December 12, 2008 for
failure to file their responsive pleading to petitioner's Complaint despite
several opportunities granted by the MeTC of Manila.8 As a result, petitioner
was allowed to present its evidence exparte.
Finding that petitioner sufficiently proved its claims by preponderance of
evidence, the MeTC ruled in favor of petitioner in its Decision 9 dated January
8, 2010, the dispositive portion of which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
IN VIEW THEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants
Arnold Cuaresma and Jerry B. Cuaresma, jointly and severally,
to:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Pay plaintiff the sum of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-SIX
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FORTY-THREE PESOS AND TWENTY-SIX
CENTAVOS (Php256,643.26) with interest at the rate of 12% per annum
from the date of the filing of the complaint;
2. Pay plaintiff the sum of Php 10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;
3. Pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC, however, reversed the ruling of the MeTC in its Decision10 dated
September 17, 2010. Contrary to the findings of the MeTC, the RTC found
that not only were there inconsistencies in the evidence presented by
petitioner as to its corporate identity as well as the amount of the supposed
cost of indemnification, but petitioner also failed to sufficiently prove that the
proximate cause of the damage incurred by Cham's vehicle was
respondents' fault or negligence. In addition, on respondents' argument that
the instant case must be consolidated with the prior criminal suit they filed
against Cham, the RTC disagreed and ruled that criminal and civil cases can
proceed independently.11cralawlawlibrary
On appeal, the CA likewise found that the evidence proffered by petitioner is
insufficient to support its averment of negligence. Consequently, it affirmed
the RTC's Decision and further denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration in its Resolution12 dated January 16, 2012.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner essentially invokes the following ground to support its
petition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONCLUSIONS
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT PETITIONER'S EVIDENCE,
SPECIFICALLY THE TESTIMONY OF ITS ASSURED, JEFFERSON CHAM
AND ITS ASSISTANT VICE-PRESIDENT FOR CLAIMS, CLETO D.
OBELLO, JR., AS WELL AS THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT REPORT, ARE
INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE ITS CLAIMS BY THE REQUIRED QUANTUM
OF EVIDENCE.
Petitioner contends that the testimonies of its witnesses Cham and Obello
sufficiently prove its claims, since the former has personal knowledge on the
events that transpired during the vehicular accident and the latter was in a
position to prove the amount incurred for the repair of the damages on
Cham's vehicle. It also argues that its failure to present SPO2 Felicisimo V.
Cuaresma, the police investigator who prepared the traffic accident report
submitted in evidence, is not fatal to its cause of action.
In their Comment,13 respondents counter that the bare allegations of Cham
on negligence cannot be deemed sufficient to prove petitioner's claim. They
also claim that in order for the traffic accident report to obtain probative
value, the police officer who prepared it must be identified in court. On a
procedural matter, respondents allege that petitioner, in failing to disclose the
pendency of the criminal suit against its assured Cham, is guilty of forum
shopping.
Prefatorily, We address the issue of forum shopping in saying that the
essence of forum shopping is the filing by a party against whom an adverse
judgment has been rendered in one forum, seeking another and possibly a
favorable opinion in another suit other than by appeal or special civil action
for certiorari.14 It is the act of filing multiple suits involving the same parties
for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively for the
purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.15 However, as the RTC already
mentioned, there exists no forum shopping herein for the filing of the instant
suit is expressly allowed to proceed independently of the criminal action filed
by respondents.
In the similar case of Casupanan v. Laroya,16 wherein as a result of a
vehicular accident, a party involved therein filed a criminal case for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property against the other party, who, in
turn, filed a civil suit against the party instituting the criminal action, We held
that the party filing the separate civil action cannot be liable for forum
shopping in the following wise:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxx However, there is no forum shopping in the instant case because
the law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action
which can proceed independently of the criminal action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property based on the Revised Penal Code, while Casupanan and Capitulo
filed the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission,
they have different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa
criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code, while the civil case is
based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil
Code. These articles on culpa aquiliana read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant."
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by
preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered damage because of
the fault or negligence of another. Either the private complainant or the
accused can file a separate civil action under these articles. There is
nothing in the law or rules that state only the private complainant in a
criminal case may invoke these articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure ("2000 Rules" for brevity) expressly requires the accused to
litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) x x x.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the
accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have
been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action."
(Italics supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file
his counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-
shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.
xxxx
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are not
the offended parties in the criminal case, can file a separate civil action
against the offended party in the criminal case. Section 3, Rule 111 of the
2000 Rules provides as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action." (Italics supplied)
xxxx
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an
independent civil action for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the
present Rule 111 expressly states that the "offended party" may bring such
an action but the "offended party" may not recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of
Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the criminal action, not to the
accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero vs.
Cantos12 where the Court held that the accused therein could validly institute
a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the
criminal case. In Cabaero, the accused in the criminal case filed his Answer
with Counterclaim for malicious prosecution. At that time, the Court noted the
"absence of clear-cut rules governing the prosecution on impliedly instituted
civil actions and the necessary consequences and implications thereof."
Thus, the Court ruled that the trial court should confine itself to the
criminal aspect of the case and disregard any counterclaim for civil
liability. The Court further ruled that the accused may file a separate
civil case against the offended party "after the criminal case is
terminated and/or in accordance with the new Rules which may be
promulgated." The Court explained that a cross-claim, counterclaim or
third-party complaint on the civil aspect will only unnecessarily
complicate the proceedings and delay the resolution of the criminal
case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in the 2000
Rules precisely to address the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero. Under this
provision, the accused is barred from filing a counterclaim, cross-claim
or third-party complaint in the criminal case. However, the same
provision states that "any cause of action which could have been the
subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint) may
be litigated in a separate civil action." The present Rule 111 mandates
the accused to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action which
shall proceed independently of the criminal action, even as the civil
action of the offended party is litigated in the criminal
action.17chanrobleslaw
On the basis of the foregoing decision, therefore, petitioner, who is
subrogated to the rights of Cham, the accused in the criminal case instituted
by respondents, cannot be guilty of forum shopping for its separate civil
action is expressly allowed to proceed independently of the criminal action
involved herein.
It must be noted, however, that notwithstanding the allowance of the instant
petition to proceed independently of the criminal action, the claims of
petitioner cannot be sustained in the absence of satisfactory evidence
proving its right thereto.
In civil cases, basic is the rule that the party making allegations has the
burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. He must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense
offered by his opponent. This principle equally holds true, even if the
defendant had not been given the opportunity to present evidence because
of a default order.18cralawlawlibrary
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the
term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible
evidence." It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of
belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.19 The reason for this is
that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to
proof. Mere allegations, therefore, cannot be deemed as
evidence.20cralawlawlibrary
To prove the allegations in its complaint, herein petitioner presented
testimonies of its assured and its Assistant Vice-President, the Traffic
Accident Investigation Report, and documents evidencing the assured's
insurance policy with petitioner as well as the payment of repair expenses.
As aptly ruled by the RTC and the CA, however, the evidence presented by
petitioner failed to preponderantly establish negligence on the part of the
respondents.
While petitioner may have proven the fact of its payment of the expenses for
the repair of Cham's vehicle through the testimony of its Assistant Vice-
President and other supporting receipts and documents, it fell short in
proving that the damage caused on said vehicle was due to the fault of the
respondents.
As correctly held by the RTC and the CA, the Traffic Accident Investigation
Report21 cannot be given probative weight. Section 44 of Rule 130
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 44. Entries in official records - Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie cannot acquire any claim, security or remedy its assured did not have.
evidence of the facts therein stated. Considering, however, the insufficiency of preponderant evidence attributing
negligence on respondents resulting in the damage sustained by the
assured's vehicle, it will be unfair to hold respondents liable for the same,
Moreover, for the Traffic Accident Investigation Report to be admissible
as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, the following requisites payment by petitioner of its costs, notwithstanding.
must be present:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The
Decision and Resolution, dated June 22, 2011 and January 16, 2012,
x x x (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person
respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 117785 are
specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in
hereby AFFIRMED.
the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of
a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other
person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have
been acquired by him personally or through official
information.22chanrobleslaw

Regrettably, in this case, petitioner failed to prove the third requisite cited
above. As correctly noted by the courts below, while the Traffic Accident
Investigation Report was exhibited as evidence, the investigating officer who
prepared the same was not presented in court to testify that he had sufficient
knowledge of the facts therein stated, and that he acquired them personally
or through official information.23 Neither was there any explanation as to why
such officer was not presented. We cannot simply assume, in the absence of
proof, that the account of the incident stated in the report was based on the
personal knowledge of the investigating officer who prepared it.

Thus, while petitioner presented its assured to testify on the events that
transpired during the vehicular collision, his lone testimony, unsupported by
other preponderant evidence, fails to sufficiently establish petitioner's claim
that respondents' negligence was, indeed, the proximate cause of the
damage sustained by Cham's vehicle.

It bears stressing, as the courts below have explained, that subrogation is

ultimately the substitution of one person in the place of another with
reference to a lawful claim or right, so that he who is substituted succeeds to
the rights of the other in relation to a debt or claim, including its remedies or
securities. The rights to which the subrogee succeeds are the same as, but
not greater than, those of the person for whom he is substituted, that is, he
cannot acquire any claim, security or remedy the subrogor did not have. In
other words, a subrogee cannot succeed to a right not possessed by the
subrogor. A subrogee, in effect, steps into the shoes of the insured and can
recover only if the insured likewise could have recovered.24cralawlawlibrary

Hence, before We can sustain petitioner's argument that its right to be

reimbursed for the repair is by operation of law upon mere proof of payment
of the insurance claim, a determination of the liability of respondents vis-a-
viz the assured in the vehicular collision must first be made, for petitioner
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 200942 June 16, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JORIE WAHIMAN y RAYOS, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Appellant Jorie Wahiman y Rayos (appellant) was charged with the crime of
murder for the death of Jose Buensuceso (Buensuceso). During his
arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.1 Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution established that on April 2, 2003, at around 10 o'clock in the
evening, Buensuceso, the manager of Stanfilco-Dole, Phils. in Malaybalay
City, was on his way back to the company staff house on board his Isuzu
pick-up after attending a despedida for one of his employees.
While he was about to enter the gate of the staff house, he was gunned
down by persons riding in tandem on a black motorcycle. The guard on duty,
David Azucena (Azucena), who was then opening the gate, identified one of
the assailants as herein appellant.
During trial, the prosecution submitted in evidence the extrajudicial
confession of appellant taken during the preliminary investigation of the case,
admitting to the killing of Buensuceso. However, when it was appellant’s turn
to testify, he narrated that at the time of the killing, he was at Landing
Casisang, Malaybalay City attending the birthday celebration of his brother-
in-law. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
On February 16, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision2 finding appellant
guilty as charged, viz.:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is issued finding the accused Jorie Wahiman y
Rayos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and imposes
upon him the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and directing him to pay the
heirs of the victim the sum of ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, ₱75,000.00 [as]
civil indemnity and actual damages as follows:
₱59,280,000.00 lost earning capacity of the deceased;
[P]25,000.00 actual damages; no receipt was presented for ₱220,000[;]
₱1,500.00 Appearance fee; and
₱50,000.00 Attorney’s fee.
He shall serve his penalty in the National Penitentiary of Davao Penal
[C]olony.
SO ORDERED.3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA)
In his appeal, appellant argued that when his supposed extrajudicial
confession was being taken, Atty. Michael Florentino Dumlao (Atty. Dumlao),
the lawyer who supposedly assisted him, was not around. He arrived only
when appellant was about to sign the extrajudicial confession.
Appellant also insisted that Azucena, the prosecution’s alleged eyewitness,
did not actually see him shooting the victim.
Appellant’s contentions were, however, disregarded by the CA.
In its Decision4 dated October 13, 2011, the CA found no reason to depart
from the trial court’s findings. It held that appellant’s contention that he lacked
legal intervention and assistance during the taking of his extrajudicial
confession was totally belied by the testimony of Atty. Dumlao that he
rendered assistance to the appellant throughout the entire proceedings and
carefully explained to the latter the consequences of his admission. Besides,
the voluntariness of the execution of the extrajudicial confession was
apparent considering that it is replete with details that only appellant would
know. The appellate court brushed aside appellant’s assertion of torture, the
same being unsupported by medical certificate or marks of physical abuse. In
any case, he never bothered to narrate how he was tortured or to identify his
alleged tormentors. Moreover, the ballistic examination proved that the slugs
used in killing Buensuceso were fired from the firearm earlier confiscated
from appellant. The CA also found no merit in appellant’s claim that Azucena
did not actually see him shoot the victim. The CA opined that although
Azucena did not see appellant actually shoot the victim, he nonetheless saw
appellant within seconds from hearing the gunshots fleeing from the
immediate vicinity of the crime scene aboard a motorcycle with a gun in
hand. Based on the foregoing, the appellate court found appellant’s denial
and alibi undeserving of credence.
The dispositive portion of the CA’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 16, [2009] decision
rendered by Branch [8], Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region,
Malaybalay City, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.5
Hence, this appeal.
Our Ruling
We totally agree with the RTC and the CA in finding that the guilt of appellant
for the crime of murder was proved beyond reasonable doubt. There is no
doubt that on April 2, 2003, at around 10 o’clock in the evening, appellant
shot Buensuceso while the latter was about to enter the gate of the staff
house of Stanfilco-Dole in Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Moreover, we agree
with the findings of the RTC and the CA that appellant’s extrajudicial
confession6 was voluntarily and duly executed and replete with details that
only appellant could supply, viz.:
x x x But before proceeding in questioning you, I am informing you that under
our new constitution, you have the right to the following:
A. You have the right to remain silent and not answer x x x my questions; it
might be that I might use your answers as evidence against you or favorable
to you.
01. QUESTION: Do you understand your right?
ANSWER: Yes[,] Sir.
02. QUESTION: Are you going to use your right?
ANSWER: I would rather not[,] sir[,] because I would tell the truth as
to what had happened.
B. You have the right to avail [of] the services of a counsel of your
choice to help you in this investigation, and if you can’t afford to hire
the services of a lawyer, the government will provide you with free
legal services of a lawyer from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP).
03. QUESTION: Do you understand your right?
ANSWER: Yes[,] sir.
04: QUESTION: Are you going to use your right?
ANSWER: I have my own lawyer, he is Atty. Michael Florentino
Dumlao III, we already had a talk and he made me understand x x x
my rights, and he also made me understand about this investigation
where I will voluntarily narrate what I x x x [know].
05. QUESTION: Did anybody give you money or promised to give
you a reward, or did anybody intimidate you in giving this affidavit?
ANSWER: Nobody[,] sir.
06. QUESTION: Did you understand your rights that I told you?
ANSWER: Yes[,] sir.7
Appellant then proceeded to narrate that he was hired by Alex Laranjo
(Laranjo) and Kid Canadilla (Canadilla), for and in behalf of a certain Alonzo
who owns a quarry in San Isidro, Valencia, to kill the victim for a fee.
According to appellant, Alonzo wanted the victim killed because the latter
withheld the release of his collectibles from Stanfilco-Dole. Appellant then
narrated how he met with Laranjo, Canadilla and Alonzo; how he received
payments and instructions; how he planned the killing; and how he executed
the plan. Appellant signed his extrajudicial confession, with the assistance of
Atty. Dumlao, and subscribed the same before Atty. Dennis B. Caayupan at
the Office of the Clerk of Court.8
Moreover, Atty. Dumlao testified that he ably provided legal assistance to
appellant all throughout the proceedings and carefully explained to him the
ramifications of his admission. He informed appellant of his rights and that
anything he says may be used in evidence against him. Notwithstanding,
appellant insisted on giving his extrajudicial confession. 9
In any event, it must be stressed that appellant’s conviction was not based
solely on his extrajudicial confession. The prosecution likewise presented the
eyewitness account of Azucena who testified that immediately after hearing
gunshots, he saw appellant about 5 meters away from the Isuzu pick-up of
the victim. Appellant was riding in tandem aboard a black motorcycle and
was holding a gun. The ballistic report also confirmed that the slugs found at
the crime scene were fired from the firearm earlier confiscated from the
appellant. Moreover, appellant was not able to establish that it was physically
impossible for him to be present at the crime scene at the time of its
commission.
The RTC and the CA thus properly found appellant guilty of murder and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. However, it must
be stated that appellant is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty
in the Philippines.
Anent the damages awarded, we find that modification is in order.1âwphi1
Regarding the award for lost earnings, the general rule is that there must be
documentary proof to support indemnity for loss of earning capacity.
Admittedly, there are exceptions to this rule, viz.:
with prevailing jurisprudence. In addition, the heirs of the victim are entitled to
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00. Finally, all damages
awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality
of this resolution until full payment. WHEREFORE, the assailed October 13,
2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 00830-MIN
finding appellant Jorie Wahiman y Rayos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that appellant is
not eligible for parole; the award for lost earnings is reduced to
₱9,878,100.00; the award of actual damages is deleted; in lieu thereof,
appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages; he is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim exemplary
damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00; and all damages awarded shall earn
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this resolution
until full payment.
SO ORDERED.

By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded

despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-
employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and
judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased’s line of work no
documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a
daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor
laws.10 Notably, this case does not fall under any of the exceptions. The
deceased victim could not be considered as a self-employed earning less
than the minimum wage; neither could he be considered employed as a daily
wage worker. However, we are inclined to award lost earnings considering
that the deceased, as testified by his widow, was the manager of Stanfilco-
Dole, Phils. in Malaybalay City and was receiving a monthly salary of
₱95,000.00. He was 54 years of age when gunned down by appellant. This
testimony was not objected to by appellant or questioned during cross-
examination or on appeal. Clearly, the existence of factual basis of the award
has been satisfactorily established. However, the amount of the award for
lost earnings must be modified following the formula [2/3 x 80 – age] x [gross
annual income - necessary expenses equivalent to 50% of the gross annual
income]. Thus: [2/3 x (80-54)] [(₱95,000 x 12) – 50% (₱95,000 x 12)] =
₱9,878,100.00.

In addition, the awards of actual damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 must

be deleted for lack of proof; in lieu thereof, temperate damages in the amount
of ₱25,000.00 is awarded. The awards of civil indemnity in the amount of
₱75,000.00, and moral damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00, are in line
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 100354 May 26, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DIONISIO TADEPA y MERIQUILLO, defendant-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
In the apprehension of illegal drug dealers, law enforcers have resorted to
entrapment or buy-bust operations where ways are devised and means
employed to ensnare and capture the malefactors in flagrante delicto while
engaged in their illicit trade. Entrapment has since received judicial sanction
as long as it is carried out with legal and constitutional circumspection. 1 It
must be distinguished from inducement or instigation where the criminal
intent originates from the mind of the instigator and the accused, in effect, is
lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him.
In instigation the instigator practically induces the would-be offender into the
commission of the offense and becomes a co-principal.2
In determining whether what took place was an entrapment or an instigation,
the manner in which the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the
alleged pusher was made is material. All the elements of the sale transaction
must be clearly and adequately shown starting from the initial contact
between the buyer and the pusher until the sale is consummated with the
delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. 3
To secure a conviction, the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean
such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. 4 Nevertheless the burden of
proof still rests on the state. The accused, if he so chooses, need not present
evidence. He merely has to raise a reasonable doubt and whittle away from
the case of the prosecution. The constitutional presumption of innocence
demands no less.
In the case at bench, to prove that accused Dionisio Tadepa sold 25 sticks of
marijuana to a peace officer, the prosecution presented two witnesses: Buy-
bust Operation Team Leader Sgt. Luis Alfiler of NARCOM, Region 8,
stationed in Ormoc City, and Forensic Chemist Capt. Liza Madeja-Sabong
who certified that the specimens submitted to her for examination were
indeed marijuana leaves.
Sgt. Alfiler testified that on 12 May 1989, acting on a tip from an informer, he
organized a three-man buy-bust team to entrap the accused. Pat. Noel Triste
was designated as the poseur-buyer. At around four-thirty in the afternoon,
the buy-bust team proceeded to the Ormoc Bus Terminal where they saw the
accused sleeping inside a passenger jeep. Accordingly, Pat. Triste
approached the accused while Team leader Sgt. Alfiler stayed behind some
seven (7) to eight (8) meters away. Sgt. Alfiler saw Pat. Triste give to the
accused two (2) P20-bills and a P10-bill although he did not hear the actual
conversation between Pat. Triste and the accused. The accused then left the
place briefly, and upon his return, handed over to Pat. Triste marijuana sticks
wrapped in an empty Marlboro pack. After finding the goods to be marijuana,
Pat. Triste executed the pre-arranged signal. Forthwith, Sgt. Alfiler together
with the third member of the team closed in and arrested the accused from
whom they recovered one (1) marked P20-bill. The 25 sticks delivered by the
accused were then sent to the PC Crime Laboratory in Palo, Leyte, where
Forensic Chemist Capt. Sabong after conducting a series of tests confirmed
them to be marijuana.
The accused, for his part, narrated that on 12 May 1989, at around four-thirty
in the afternoon, he was awakened by four (4) gun-toting men who gave him
a P50-bill and ordered him to give the money to a certain "Jojo" who was
then at the side of the city stage. He did as he was told, and in return, "Jojo"
handed him something wrapped in a stapled newspaper. After giving the
package to the group, he went back to sleep. Later he was again awakened,
this time by the sudden handcuffing of his wrists. He was brought to a hotel
where he was questioned by a certain "Alfiler" after which he was taken to
the INP Ormoc Station where he was detained for peddling marijuana.
On 10 October 1989 the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City, Br. 12, 5 found
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 4, Art. II,
R.A. 6425, as amended, and sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of
twelve (12) years, five (5) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal minimum, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum. On 21 June 1991
the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but increased the penalty
to reclusion perpetua considering that the accused was found guilty of selling
marijuana and thus cannot just be meted an indeterminate sentence.
Nevertheless the appellate court refrained from entering judgment and
certified and elevated instead the records to this Court for review pursuant to
Sec. 13, Rule 124, Rules on Criminal Procedure. But while the appellate
court correctly observed the erroneous imposition of an indeterminate
penalty, the proper imposable penalty, as provided in R.A. 6425, as
amended, is life imprisonment and not reclusion perpetua which, it has been
stressed, is distinct in duration, nature and accessory penalties.6 The trial
court does not have the discretion to change the penalty expressly mandated
by law. Its duty is simply to interpret and apply the law.
In the case at bench, we are not convinced that the state has presented
sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the
fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused. Accordingly, we reverse
his conviction on reasonable doubt. The prosecution built its case solely on
the testimony of Team Leader Sgt. Alfiler who admitted that he was some
seven (7) to eight (8) meters away from where the actual transaction took
place. As a consequence, he said that he did not hear the conversation
which transpired between Pat. Triste and the accused. We find this testimony
of Sgt. Alfiler insufficient evidence considering that the accused in effect
claimed that he was not merely lured but in fact directed under threat to buy
marijuana from the real drug pusher amounting not merely to entrapment but
to instigation. In People v. Lapatha, 7 this Court held that where there is
instigation the defendant would have to be acquitted.
Thus the failure of the prosecution to present Pat. Triste, the alleged poseur-
buyer, is fatal. In People v. Polizon 8 we said —
We agree with the appellant's contention that the non-
presentation of Boy Lim, the alleged poseur-buyer, weakens the
prosecution's evidence. Sgt. Pascua was not privy to the
conversation between Lim and the accused. He was merely
watching from a distance and he only saw the actions of the two.
As pointed out by the appellant, Sgt. Pascua had no personal
knowledge of the transaction that transpired between Lim and the
appellant. Since appellant insisted that he was forced by Lim to
buy the marijuana, it was essential that Lim should have been
presented to rebut accused's testimony.
The ruling in People v. Yabut 9 is further instructive —
Well established is the rule that when the inculpatory facts
and circumstances are capable of two (2) or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence
of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then
the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is
not sufficient to support a conviction. In the present case,
accused-appellant's version of the circumstances leading to
his apprehension constitutes a total denial of the
prosecution's allegations. In this regard this Court has ruled
that when there is such a divergence of accounts —
. . . it becomes incumbent upon the
prosecution to rebut appellant's allegation by
presenting . . . the alleged poseur-buyer.
This it failed to do giving rise to the
presumption that evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced
(Rule 131, Sec. 5 [a]). This failure
constitutes a fatal flaw in the prosecution's
evidence since the so-called (poseur-buyer)
who was never presented as a witness . . .
is the best witness for the prosecution . . . .
Both the trial court and the appellate court gave much weight to the
testimony of Sgt. Alfiler. However the prosecution did not present as witness
Pat. Triste, the alleged poseur-buyer. Such omission casts serious doubt on
appellant's guilt because without the testimony of the poseur-buyer there is
no convincing evidence to show that the accused was a marijuana peddler
and not merely a victim of instigation. Thus in People v. Fider 10 we decreed
that "[w]e have held in many cases that the testimony of the poseur-buyer
becomes material and well-nigh indispensable when the accused denies
having committed the prohibited act," and failure to present him is fatal. 11
In fine, we find the uncorroborated testimony of the state's star witness Sgt.
Alfiler, even if coming from a police officer who enjoys the presumption of
regularity, insufficient to induce moral certainty. For, the presumption of
regularity of performance of duty of a peace officer cannot prevail over the
constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused. The public
prosecutor should have been so minded that corroborating evidence was
necessary to complete the testimony of Sgt. Alfiler; but no corroborative
evidence was submitted.
We thus hark back to the constitutional doctrine that the state carries the
burden of proof in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, and it is not incumbent upon him to disprove his guilt. If the state fails
in its burden the accused must be discharged.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the
conviction of the accused by the trial court is REVERSED and accused
DIONISIO TADEPA y MERIQUILLO is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt
and for insufficiency of evidence. His immediate release from custody is
ordered unless he is held for another lawful cause. SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 157943 September 4, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
vs.
GILBERT REYES WAGAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of an accused to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. In order to overcome the presumption of
innocence, the Prosecution is required to adduce against him nothing less
than proof beyond reasonable doubt. Such proof is not only in relation to the
elements of the offense, but also in relation to the identity of the offender. If
the Prosecution fails to discharge its heavy burden, then it is not only the
right of the accused to be freed, it becomes the Court’s constitutional duty to
acquit him.
The Case
Gilbert R. Wagas appeals his conviction for estafa under the decision
rendered on July 11, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, in Cebu
City (RTC), meting on him the indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 30 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum.
Antecedents
Wagas was charged with estafa under the information that reads:
That on or about the 30th day of April, 1997, and for sometime prior and
subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent,
with intent to gain and by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, to wit:
knowing that he did not have sufficient funds deposited with the Bank of
Philippine Islands, and without informing Alberto Ligaray of that
circumstance, with intent to defraud the latter, did then and there issue Bank
of the Philippine Islands Check No. 0011003, dated May 08, 1997 in the
amount of ₱200,000.00, which check was issued in payment of an obligation,
but which check when presented for encashment with the bank, was
dishonored for the reason "drawn against insufficient funds" and inspite of
notice and several demands made upon said accused to make good said
check or replace the same with cash, he had failed and refused and up to the
present time still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of
Alberto Ligaray in the amount aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
After Wagas entered a plea of not guilty,2 the pre-trial was held, during which
the Defense admitted that the check alleged in the information had been
dishonored due to insufficient funds.3 On its part, the Prosecution made no
admission.4
At the trial, the Prosecution presented complainant Alberto Ligaray as its lone
witness. Ligaray testified that on April 30, 1997, Wagas placed an order for
200 bags of rice over the telephone; that he and his wife would not agree at
first to the proposed payment of the order by postdated check, but because
of Wagas’ assurance that he would not disappoint them and that he had the
means to pay them because he had a lending business and money in the
bank, they relented and accepted the order; that he released the goods to
Wagas on April 30, 1997 and at the same time received Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI) Check No. 0011003 for ₱200,000.00 payable to cash
and postdated May 8, 1997; that he later deposited the check with Solid
Bank, his depository bank, but the check was dishonored due to insufficiency
of funds;5 that he called Wagas about the matter, and the latter told him that
he would pay upon his return to Cebu; and that despite repeated demands,
Wagas did not pay him.6
On cross-examination, Ligaray admitted that he did not personally meet
Wagas because they transacted through telephone only; that he released the
200 bags of rice directly to Robert Cañada, the brother-in-law of Wagas, who
signed the delivery receipt upon receiving the rice.7
After Ligaray testified, the Prosecution formally offered the following: (a) BPI
Check No. 0011003 in the amount of ₱200,000.00 payable to "cash;" (b) the
return slip dated May 13, 1997 issued by Solid Bank; (c) Ligaray’s affidavit;
and (d) the delivery receipt signed by Cañada. After the RTC admitted the
exhibits, the Prosecution then rested its case.8
In his defense, Wagas himself testified. He admitted having issued BPI
Check No. 0011003 to Cañada, his brother-in-law, not to Ligaray. He denied
having any telephone conversation or any dealings with Ligaray. He
explained that the check was intended as payment for a portion of Cañada’s
property that he wanted to buy, but when the sale did not push through, he
did not anymore fund the check.9
On cross-examination, the Prosecution confronted Wagas with a letter dated
July 3, 1997 apparently signed by him and addressed to Ligaray’s counsel,
wherein he admitted owing Ligaray ₱200,000.00 for goods received, to wit:
This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated June 23, 1997 which is
self-explanatory. It is worthy also to discuss with you the environmental facts
of the case for your consideration, to wit:
It is true that I obtained goods from your client worth ₱200,000.00 and I
promised to settle the same last May 10, 1997, but to no avail. On this point,
let me inform you that I sold my real property to a buyer in Manila, and
promised to pay the consideration on the same date as I promised with your
client. Unfortunately, said buyer likewise failed to make good with such
obligation. Hence, I failed to fulfill my promise resultant thereof. (sic)
Again, I made another promise to settle said obligation on or before June 15,
1997, but still to no avail attributable to the same reason as aforementioned.
(sic)
To arrest this problem, we decided to source some funds using the subject
property as collateral. This other means is resorted to for the purpose of
settling the herein obligation. And as to its status, said funds will be
rele[a]sed within thirty (30) days from today.
In view of the foregoing, it is my sincere request and promise to settle said
obligation on or before August 15, 1997.
Lastly, I would like to manifest that it is not my intention to shy away from any
financial obligation.
xxxx
Respectfully yours,
(SGD.)
GILBERT R. WAGAS10
Wagas admitted the letter, but insisted that it was Cañada who had
transacted with Ligaray, and that he had signed the letter only because his
sister and her husband (Cañada) had begged him to assume the
responsibility.11 On redirect examination, Wagas declared that Cañada, a
seafarer, was then out of the country; that he signed the letter only to
accommodate the pleas of his sister and Cañada, and to avoid jeopardizing
Cañada’s application for overseas employment.12 The Prosecution
subsequently offered and the RTC admitted the letter as rebuttal evidence.13
Decision of the RTC
As stated, the RTC convicted Wagas of estafa on July 11, 2002, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as charged and he is hereby sentenced as follows:
To suffer an indeterminate penalty of from twelve (12) years of pris[i]on
mayor, as minimum, to thirty (30) years of reclusion perpetua as maximum;
To indemnify the complainant, Albert[o] Ligaray in the sum of ₱200,000.00;
To pay said complainant the sum of ₱30,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees;
and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.14
The RTC held that the Prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt all
the elements constituting the crime of estafa, namely: (a) that Wagas issued
the postdated check as payment for an obligation contracted at the time the
check was issued; (b) that he failed to deposit an amount sufficient to cover
the check despite having been informed that the check had been dishonored;
and (c) that Ligaray released the goods upon receipt of the postdated check
and upon Wagas’ assurance that the check would be funded on its date.
Wagas filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration,15 arguing that the
Prosecution did not establish that it was he who had transacted with Ligaray
and who had negotiated the check to the latter; that the records showed that
Ligaray did not meet him at any time; and that Ligaray’s testimony on their
alleged telephone conversation was not reliable because it was not shown
that Ligaray had been familiar with his voice. Wagas also sought the
reopening of the case based on newly discovered evidence, specifically: (a)
the testimony of Cañada who could not testify during the trial because he
was then out of the country, and (b) Ligaray’s testimony given against Wagas
in another criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
On October 21, 2002, the RTC denied the motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration, opining that the evidence Wagas desired to present at a
new trial did not qualify as newly discovered, and that there was no
compelling ground to reverse its decision.16
Wagas appealed directly to this Court by notice of appeal.17
Prior to the elevation of the records to the Court, Wagas filed a petition for
admission to bail pending appeal. The RTC granted the petition and fixed
Wagas’ bond at ₱40,000.00.18 Wagas then posted bail for his provisional
liberty pending appeal.19
The resolution of this appeal was delayed by incidents bearing on the grant
of Wagas’ application for bail. On November 17, 2003, the Court required the
RTC Judge to explain why Wagas was out on bail.20 On January 15, 2004,
the RTC Judge submitted to the Court a so-called manifestation and
compliance which the Court referred to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) for evaluation, report, and recommendation.21 On July 5, 2005, the
Court, upon the OCA’s recommendation, directed the filing of an
administrative complaint for simple ignorance of the law against the RTC
Judge.22 On September 12, 2006, the Court directed the OCA to comply with
its July 5, 2005 directive, and to cause the filing of the administrative
complaint against the RTC Judge. The Court also directed Wagas to explain
why his bail should not be cancelled for having been erroneously
granted.23 Finally, in its memorandum dated September 27, 2006, the OCA
manifested to the Court that it had meanwhile filed the administrative
complaint against the RTC Judge.24
Issues
In this appeal, Wagas insists that he and Ligaray were neither friends nor
personally known to one other; that it was highly incredible that Ligaray, a
businessman, would have entered into a transaction with him involving a
huge amount of money only over the telephone; that on the contrary, the
evidence pointed to Cañada as the person with whom Ligaray had
transacted, considering that the delivery receipt, which had been signed by
Cañada, indicated that the goods had been "Ordered by ROBERT
CAÑADA," that the goods had been received by Cañada in good order and
condition, and that there was no showing that Cañada had been acting on
behalf of Wagas; that he had issued the check to Cañada upon a different
transaction; that Cañada had negotiated the check to Ligaray; and that the
element of deceit had not been established because it had not been proved
with certainty that it was him who had transacted with Ligaray over the
telephone.
The circumstances beg the question: did the Prosecution establish beyond
reasonable doubt the existence of all the elements of the crime of estafa as
charged, as well as the identity of the perpetrator of the crime?
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
provides:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by
any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
xxxx
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation
when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein
were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the
drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check
within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or
holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds
shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or
fraudulent act.
In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision, the act of
postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the
efficient cause of the defraudation. This means that the offender must be
able to obtain money or property from the offended party by reason of the
issuance of the check, whether dated or postdated. In other words, the
Prosecution must show that the person to whom the check was delivered
would not have parted with his money or property were it not for the issuance
of the check by the offender.25
The essential elements of the crime charged are that: (a) a check is
postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the
check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (c)
damage to the payee thereof.26 It is the criminal fraud or deceit in the
issuance of a check that is punishable, not the non-payment of a
debt.27 Prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that the
drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his
check within three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor.
The Prosecution established that Ligaray had released the goods to Cañada
because of the postdated check the latter had given to him; and that the
check was dishonored when presented for payment because of the
insufficiency of funds.
In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the
crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.28 In that
regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that it
was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check.
Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person
with whom he was transacting over the telephone, thus:
Q:
On April 30, 1997, do you remember having a transaction with the accused in
this case?
A:
Yes, sir. He purchased two hundred bags of rice from me.
Q:
How did this purchase of rice transaction started? (sic)
A:
He talked with me over the phone and told me that he would like to purchase
two hundred bags of rice and he will just issue a check.29
Even after the dishonor of the check, Ligaray did not personally see and
meet whoever he had dealt with and to whom he had made the demand for
payment, and that he had talked with him only over the telephone, to wit:
Q:
After the check was (sic) bounced, what did you do next?
A:
I made a demand on them.
Q:
How did you make a demand?
A:
I called him over the phone.
Q:
Who is that "him" that you are referring to?
A:
Gilbert Wagas.30
Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash. Under
the Negotiable Instruments Law, this type of check was payable to the bearer
and could be negotiated by mere delivery without the need of an
indorsement.31 This rendered it highly probable that Wagas had issued the
check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else like Cañada, his brother-in-law,
who then negotiated it to Ligaray.1âwphi1 Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that
he did not himself see or meet Wagas at the time of the transaction and
thereafter, and expressly stated that the person who signed for and received
the stocks of rice was Cañada.
It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must
have used the check in order to defraud the complainant. What the law
punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere issuance of the worthless check.
Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply because he had issued the
check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still clearly show that it
had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by means of the
check.
Thirdly, Ligaray admitted that it was Cañada who received the rice from him
and who delivered the check to him. Considering that the records are bereft
of any showing that Cañada was then acting on behalf of Wagas, the RTC
had no factual and legal bases to conclude and find that Cañada had been
acting for Wagas. This lack of factual and legal bases for the RTC to infer so
obtained despite Wagas being Cañada’s brother-in-law.
Finally, Ligaray’s declaration that it was Wagas who had transacted with him Wagas. All that the Prosecution sought to elicit from him was whether he had
over the telephone was not reliable because he did not explain how he known and why he had known Wagas, and he answered as follows:
determined that the person with whom he had the telephone conversation
was really Wagas whom he had not yet met or known before then. We deem Q:
it essential for purposes of reliability and trustworthiness that a telephone
conversation like that one Ligaray supposedly had with the buyer of rice to be
Do you know the accused in this case?
first authenticated before it could be received in evidence. Among others, the
person with whom the witness conversed by telephone should be first
satisfactorily identified by voice recognition or any other means. 32 Without the A:
authentication, incriminating another person just by adverting to the
telephone conversation with him would be all too easy. In this respect, an Yes, sir.
identification based on familiarity with the voice of the caller, or because of
clearly recognizable peculiarities of the caller would have sufficed.33 The Q:
identity of the caller could also be established by the caller’s self-
identification, coupled with additional evidence, like the context and timing of If he is present inside the courtroom […]
the telephone call, the contents of the statement challenged, internal
patterns, and other distinctive characteristics, and disclosure of knowledge of
A:
facts known peculiarly to the caller.34

No, sir. He is not around.

Verily, it is only fair that the caller be reliably identified first before a
telephone communication is accorded probative weight. The identity of the
caller may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. According to Q:
one ruling of the Kansas Supreme Court:
Why do you know him?
Communications by telephone are admissible in evidence where they are
relevant to the fact or facts in issue, and admissibility is governed by the A:
same rules of evidence concerning face-to-face conversations except the
party against whom the conversations are sought to be used must ordinarily I know him as a resident of Compostela because he is an ex-mayor of
be identified. It is not necessary that the witness be able, at the time of the Compostela.36
conversation, to identify the person with whom the conversation was had,
provided subsequent identification is proved by direct or circumstantial During cross-examination, Ligaray was allowed another opportunity to show
evidence somewhere in the development of the case. The mere statement of how he had determined that his caller was Wagas, but he still failed to
his identity by the party calling is not in itself sufficient proof of such identity, provide a satisfactory showing, to wit:
in the absence of corroborating circumstances so as to render the
conversation admissible. However, circumstances preceding or following the
conversation may serve to sufficiently identify the caller. The completeness Q:
of the identification goes to the weight of the evidence rather than its
admissibility, and the responsibility lies in the first instance with the district Mr. Witness, you mentioned that you and the accused entered into [a]
court to determine within its sound discretion whether the threshold of transaction of rice selling, particularly with these 200 sacks of rice subject of
admissibility has been met.35 (Bold emphasis supplied) this case, through telephone conversation?

Yet, the Prosecution did not tender any plausible explanation or offer any A:
proof to definitely establish that it had been Wagas whom Ligaray had
conversed with on the telephone. The Prosecution did not show through Yes, sir.
Ligaray during the trial as to how he had determined that his caller was
Q:
But you cannot really ascertain that it was the accused whom you are talking Q:
with?
So, after that phone call[,] you deliver[ed] th[ose] 200 sacks of rice through
A: somebody other than the accused?

I know it was him because I know him. A:

Q: Yes, sir.37

Am I right to say [that] that was the first time that you had a transaction with Ligaray’s statement that he could tell that it was Wagas who had ordered the
the accused through telephone conversation, and as a consequence of that rice because he "know[s]" him was still vague and unreliable for not assuring
alleged conversation with the accused through telephone he issued a check the certainty of the identification, and should not support a finding of
in your favor? Ligaray’s familiarity with Wagas as the caller by his voice. It was evident from
Ligaray’s answers that Wagas was not even an acquaintance of Ligaray’s
A: prior to the transaction. Thus, the RTC’s conclusion that Ligaray had
transacted with Wagas had no factual basis. Without that factual basis, the
No. Before that call I had a talk[ ] with the accused. RTC was speculating on a matter as decisive as the identification of the
buyer to be Wagas.
Q:
The letter of Wagas did not competently establish that he was the person
who had conversed with Ligaray by telephone to place the order for the rice.
But still through the telephone? The letter was admitted exclusively as the State’s rebuttal evidence to
controvert or impeach the denial of Wagas of entering into any transaction
A: with Ligaray on the rice; hence, it could be considered and appreciated only
for that purpose. Under the law of evidence, the court shall consider
Yes, sir. evidence solely for the purpose for which it is offered,38 not for any other
purpose.39 Fairness to the adverse party demands such exclusivity.
Q: Moreover, the high plausibility of the explanation of Wagas that he had
signed the letter only because his sister and her husband had pleaded with
him to do so could not be taken for granted.
There was no instant (sic) that the accused went to see you personally
regarding the 200 bags rice transaction?
It is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State carries the onus
probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt,
A:
as a consequence of the tenet ei incumbit probation, qui dicit, non qui negat,
which means that he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove,40 and as a
No. It was through telephone only. means of respecting the presumption of innocence in favor of the man or
woman on the dock for a crime. Accordingly, the State has the burden of
Q: proof to show: (1) the correct identification of the author of a crime, and (2)
the actuality of the commission of the offense with the participation of the
In fact[,] you did not cause the delivery of these 200 bags of rice through the accused. All these facts must be proved by the State beyond reasonable
accused himself? doubt on the strength of its evidence and without solace from the weakness
of the defense. That the defense the accused puts up may be weak is
A: inconsequential if, in the first place, the State has failed to discharge the
onus of his identity and culpability. The presumption of innocence dictates
that it is for the Prosecution to demonstrate the guilt and not for the accused
Yes. It was through Robert.
to establish innocence.41 Indeed, the accused, being presumed innocent,
carries no burden of proof on his or her shoulders. For this reason, the first
duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of
the criminal. For even if the commission of the crime can be established,
without competent proof of the identity of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, there can be no conviction.42

There is no question that an identification that does not preclude a

reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any evidentiary
force.43 Thus, considering that the circumstances of the identification of
Wagas as the person who transacted on the rice did not preclude a
reasonable possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt did not measure up to the
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded in criminal cases.
Perforce, the accused’s constitutional right of presumption of innocence until
the contrary is proved is not overcome, and he is entitled to an
acquittal,44 even though his innocence may be doubted.45

Nevertheless, an accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be held civilly

liable where the preponderance of the established facts so
warrants.46 Wagas as the admitted drawer of the check was legally liable to
pay the amount of it to Ligaray, a holder in due course. 47 Consequently, we
pronounce and hold him fully liable to pay the amount of the dishonored
check, plus legal interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision

rendered on July 11, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, in Cebu
City; and ACQUITS Gilbert R. Wagas of the crime of estafa on the ground of
reasonable doubt, but ORDERS him to pay Alberto Ligaray the amount of
₱200,000.00 as actual damages, plus interest of 6% per annum from the
finality of this decision.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
 Manila amount of US$2,400.00 or its Philippine peso equivalent
of P100,000.00 as separation pay plus the amount of
US$186.69 representing complainants unpaid salary for
FIRST DIVISION seven (7) days or in the Philippine peso equivalent
of P7,840.98 or the total amount of P108,640.98. On top of
said amount, attorneys fees of P5,000.00 is also awarded.
SKIPPERS UNITED G.R. NO. 148893
PACIFIC, INC., SO ORDERED.[2]
Petitioner,
Present: On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the
Labor Arbiters Decision and dismissed petitioners appeal per its Decision
PANGANIBAN, C.J. dated February 26, 1999.[3] Petitioner sought reconsideration thereof but its
(Chairperson) motion was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated May 27, 1999.[4]
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Thus, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil
CALLEJO, SR., and action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R.
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. SP No. 53490.

NATIONAL LABOR On May 7, 2001, the CA[5] dismissed the petition and affirmed in toto
RELATIONS COMMISSION, the NLRC Decision dated February 26, 1999.[6] Petitioner filed a motion for
GERVACIO ROSAROSO, reconsideration which was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated July 3,
and COURT OF APPEALS, Promulgated: 2001.[7]
Respondents. July 12, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court with the following assignment of errors:

DECISION FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING

THAT PETITIONER ILLEGALLY DISMISSED THE PRIVATE
Respondent Gervacio Rosaroso* was signed up as a Third Engineer with RESPONDENT.
Nicolakis Shipping, S.A., a foreign firm, through its recruitment and manning
agency, herein petitioner Skippers United Pacific, Inc. The term of the contract SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
was for one year, starting July 10, 1997 to July 8, 1998, and with a salary of
US$800.00 and other benefits. Barely a month after boarding the vessel M/V THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR
Naval Gent on July 15, 1997, respondent was ordered to disembark in Varna, IN AWARDING PRIVATE RESPONDENT BACKWAGES
Bulgaria, on August 7, 1997, and repatriated to the Philippines. Immediately EQUIVALENT TO HIS THREE (3) MONTHS SALARY.[8]
after arriving in the Philippines, respondent filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and monetary claims on August 18, 1997.[1] Petitioners main contention is that the CA, the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter
erred in not giving full evidentiary value to the telexed Chief Engineers Report
In a Decision dated August 11, 1998, the Labor Arbiter found that respondent dated September 10, 1997, which specified the causes of respondents
was illegally dismissed: dismissal, quoted as follows:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is TO: SKIPPERS MNL

rendered finding the dismissal of complainant illegal. An order CC: SKIPPERS PIRAEUS
is issued directing the respondents to pay complainant the FM: MV NAVAL GENT
DT: SEPT. 10, 1997
DURING SHIP REPAIR AT PERAMA DD. 18/07-
31/07/97 OUR ATTENDING SUPT. ENGINEERS
CONSTANTLY OBSERVING ALL PERSONNELS ABILITY
AND ATTITUDE WITH REGARDS TO OUR TECHNICAL
CAPABILITY AND BEHAVIOURS WITH EMPHASY [SIC]
ON DISCIPLINE. IT IS ONLY UNFORTUNATE THAT THEY
NOTICED 3/E G. ROSAROSO AS BEING SLACK AND NOT
CARING OF HIS JOB AND DUTIES BEING HIRED AS
THIRD ENGR OFFICER, TO THE FULLEST BEYOND
THEIR EXPECTATION. AFTER TOO MUCH OF
CONSIDERATION AND DELIBERATION HAVING HIM
CONSTANTLY ADVISED BY 2/E F. DIAMOS ASKING FOR
HIS COOPERATION TO WORK AND HELP IN THE
ONGOING ENORMOUS REPAIRS. BUT FAILED TO HEED
AND REFUSED TO BE MOTIVATED. WE HAVE SEEKED
[SIC] ADVISE FROM YOUR OFFICE VIA PHONE,
SKIPPERS PIRAEUS THRU CAPT. KAMPANIS AND THE
PORT CAPT OF NICOLAKIS SHIPPING CAPT.
PAPASTILIANOS, OF WHAT TO BE DONE. THE OWNERS
RECOMMENDATION WAS TO REPLACED [SIC] HIM ON
THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
1) LACK OF DISCIPLINE HE RESENTED
DISCIPLINE. HE IS SEEN BY SUPT. ENGRS. ON
SEVERAL OCCASION DURING WORKING HOURS
STAYING ON PORTSIDE DECK SMOKING AND HAVING
SNACKS. MANY TIMES HE IS INSIDE THE GALLEY
CHATTING WITH CHIEF COOK DURING WORKING
HOURS AND HAVING SNACKS. HE TENDS TO BE
FREQUENTLY LATE FOR DUTY/WORK AND IS
GENERALLY UNRELIABLE.
2) IRRESPONSIBLE - HE HAS NOT SHOWN A
HIGH SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY AS 3/ENGR. HE IS
CAREFREE IN DISCHARGING HIS DUTIES IN
MAINTAINING THE ASSIGNED MACHINERIES, SUCH AS
BOILER, DIESEL GENERATORS, STARTING AIR
COMPRESSORS AND VARIOUS PUMPS. HE CANNOT BE
TRUSTED TO DO HIS JOB UNLESS SUPERVISED
PERPETUALLY.
3) LACK OF DILIGENCE - HE REQUIRES
CONSTANT PUSHING AND HAS TO BE WATCHED MOST
OF THE TIME. LACK OF INITIATIVE REGARDLESS OF
CONSTANT MOTIVATION.
SGD. JEROME A. RETARDO
CHIEF ENGR[9]
According to petitioner, the foregoing Report established that
respondent was dismissed for just cause. The CA, the NLRC, and the Labor
Arbiter, however, refused to give credence to the Report. They are one in
ruling that the Report cannot be given any probative value as it is
uncorroborated by other evidence and that it is merely hearsay, having come
from a source, the Chief Engineer, who did not have any personal knowledge
of the events reported therein.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that the charges against respondent are bare
allegations, unsupported by corroborating evidence. The Labor Arbiter stated
that if respondent indeed committed the alleged infractions, then these should
have, at the very least, been entered into the seamans book, or that a copy of
the vessels logbook presented to prove the same.[10] The Labor Arbiters
findings were sustained by the NLRC.[11]
The CA upheld these findings, succinctly stating as follows:
Verily, the report of Chief Engineer Retardo is utterly
bereft of probative value. It is not verified by an oath and,
therefore, lacks any guarantee of trustworthiness. It is
furthermore and this is crucial not sourced from the personal
knowledge of Chief Engineer Retardo. It is rather based on
the perception of ATTENDING SUPT. ENGINEERS
CONSTANTLY OBSERVING ALL PERSONNELS ABILITY
AND ATTITUDE WITH REGARDS TO OUR TECHNICAL
CAPABILITY AND BEHAVIOURS WITH EMPHASY (sic) ON
DISCIPLINE who NOTICED 3/E ROSAROSO AS BEING
SLACK AND NOT CARING OF HIS JOB AND DUTIES X X X
. Accordingly, the report is plain hearsay. It is not backed up
by the affidavit of any of the Supt. Engineers who purportedly
had first-hand knowledge of private respondents supposed
lack of discipline, irresponsibility and lack of diligence which
caused him to lose his job. x x x [12]
The Court finds no reason to reverse the foregoing findings.
To begin with, the question of whether respondent was dismissed for
just cause is a question of fact which is beyond the province of a petition for
review on certiorari. It is fundamental that the scope of the Supreme Courts
judicial review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is confined only to errors of
law. It does not extend to questions of fact. More so in labor cases where the
doctrine applies with greater force.[13]
The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have already determined the factual
issues, and these were affirmed by the CA. Thus, they are accorded not only
great respect but also finality,[14] and are deemed binding upon this Court so
long as they are supported by substantial evidence. [15] A heavy burden rests
upon petitioner to convince the Court that it should take exception from such
a settled rule.[16]
More importantly, the finding that respondent was illegally dismissed
is supported, not only by the evidence on record, but by jurisprudence as well.
The rule in labor cases is that the employer has the burden of proving
that the dismissal was for a just cause; failure to show this would necessarily
mean that the dismissal was unjustified and, therefore, illegal. [17] The two-fold
requirements for a valid dismissal are as follows: (1) dismissal must be for a
cause provided for in the Labor Code, which is substantive; and (2) the
observance of notice and hearing prior to the employees dismissal, which is
procedural.[18]
The only evidence relied upon by petitioner in justifying respondents dismissal
is the Chief Engineers Report dated September 10, 1997. The question that
arises, therefore, is whether the Report constitutes substantial evidence
proving that respondents dismissal was for cause.
Substantial evidence is defined as that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.[19] As all three tribunals found, the Report cannot be given any
weight or credibility because it is uncorroborated, based purely on hearsay,
and obviously merely an afterthought.While rules of evidence are not strictly
observed in proceedings before administrative bodies, [20] petitioner should
have offered additional proof to corroborate the statements described
therein. Thus, in Ranises v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[21] involving a seafarer who was repatriated to the Philippines for
allegedly committing illegal acts amounting to a breach of trust, as based on a
telex dispatch by the Master of the M/V Southern Laurel, the Court rejected
the weight given by the NLRC on the telex, to wit:
Unfortunately, the veracity of the allegations
contained in the aforecited telex was never proven by
respondent employer. Neither was it shown that
respondent employer exerted any effort to even verify the
truthfulness of Capt. Sonodas report and establish petitioners
culpability for his alleged illegal acts. Worse, no other
evidence was submitted to corroborate the charges against
petitioner.
Similarly in this case, petitioner should have presented other evidence
to corroborate its claim that respondents acts or omissions aboard the vessel
M/V Naval Gent warrant his immediate repatriation. Moreover, the fact that the
Report was accomplished on September 10, 1999, or more than a month after
respondent was repatriated, makes it all the more suspect, and was obviously
made to make it appear that there were valid reasons for respondents
dismissal.
Another analogous case worth citing is Pacific Maritime Services, Inc.
v. Ranay.[22] This case involved two seafarers repatriated to the Philippines for
committing acts on board the vessel M/V Star Princess, which acts amounted
to serious misconduct, insubordination, non-observance of proper hours of
work and damage to the laundry of the vessels crew and passengers. In
support of its claim that the respondents were validly dismissed, the petitioners
presented its lone evidence, a telefax transmission purportedly executed and
signed by a certain Armando Villegas, detailing the incidents which prompted
the termination of private respondents services. The Court, however, ruled that
the telefax transmission is not sufficient evidence, viz.:
Petitioners reliance on the telefax transmission
signed by Armando Villegas is woefully inadequate in meeting
the required quantum of proof which is substantial
evidence.For one thing, the same is uncorroborated. Although
substantial evidence is not a function of quantity but rather of
quality, the peculiar environmental circumstances of the
instant case demand that something more should have been
proffered. According to the account of Villegas, it appears that
the incidents he was referring to transpired with the
knowledge of some crew members. The alleged assault by
Gerardo Ranay on Villegas, for instance, was supposedly
witnessed by at least four other crew members. Surprisingly,
none of them was called upon to testify, either in person or
through sworn statements. Worse, Villegas himself who
omitted some vital details in his report, such as the time and
date of the incidents referred to, was not even presented as
witness so that private respondents and the POEA hearing
officer could have been given an opportunity to cross-
examine and propound clarificatory questions
regarding matters averred by him in the telefax transmission.
Moreover, although signed, the same was not under oath and,
therefore, of dubious veracity and reliability although
admissible. Likewise, the motive is suspect and the account
of the incidents dangerously susceptible to bias since it came
 from a person with whom private respondents were at
odds. All told, petitioners failed to make up for the weakness
of the evidence upon which they confidently anchored the
merits of their case.
Likewise, the belated submission of the report by
Villegas, long after the incidents referred to had taken place
and after the complaint had been lodged by
privaterespondents, weighs heavily against its credibility.
Petitioners did not show any convincing reason why said
report was only accomplished on September 22, 1989. They
merely argued that as in criminal cases, the witness is usually
reluctant to report an incident. At any rate, with present
technology, a ship out at sea is not so isolated that its captain
cannot instantly communicate with its office. It would appear
that the report, filed several months later, is but an
afterthought.
Therefore, the CA was correct in affirming the findings and
conclusions of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
Petitioner maintains that it complied with the requisites of procedural due
process. According to petitioner, respondent was constantly reprimanded and
rebuked for his acts. Petitioner also contends that the ships Master is
allowed to dismiss an erring seafarer without hearing under Section 17,
paragraph D of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
Standard Employment Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino
Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels. Paragraph D, Section 17,
however, is not applicable in respondents case.
Section 17 sets forth the disciplinary procedures against erring
seafarers, to wit:
Section 17. DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES
The Master shall comply with the following disciplinary
procedures against an erring seafarer:
A. The Master shall furnish the seafarer with a written notice
containing the following:
1. Grounds for the charges as listed in Section 31 of this
Contract.
2. Date, time and place for a formal investigation of the
charges against the seafarer concerned.
B. The Master or his authorized representative shall
conduct the investigation or hearing, giving the seafarer the
opportunity to explain or defend himself against the
charges. An entry on the investigation shall be entered into
the ships logbook.
C. If, after the investigation or hearing, the Master is
convinced that imposition of a penalty is justified, the Master
shall issue a written notice of penalty and the reasons for it to
the seafarer, with copies furnished to the Philippine agent.
D. Dismissal for just cause may be effected by the Master
without furnishing the seafarer with a notice of dismissal if
doing so will prejudice the safety of the crew or the
vessel. This information shall be entered in the ships logbook.
The Master shall send a complete report to the manning
agency substantiated by witnesses, testimonies and any other
documents in support thereof.
The foregoing provision was explained in Skippers Pacific, Inc. v.
Mira,[23] as follows:
Note that under Section 17 of what is termed the
Standard Format, the two - notice rule is indicated. An erring
seaman is given a written notice of the charge against him and
is afforded an opportunity to explain or defend himself. Should
sanctions be imposed, then a written notice of penalty and the
reasons for it shall be furnished the erring seafarer. It is only
in the exceptional case of clear and existing danger to the
safety of the crew or vessel that the required notices are
dispensed with; but just the same, a complete report
should be sent to the manning agency, supported by
substantial evidence of the findings. (Emphasis supplied)
There is nothing on record that shows that furnishing respondent with a notice
of dismissal will pose a clear and present danger to the vessel and its
crew. And even if the Master was justified in dispensing with the required
notice, still, it was essential that a complete report, substantiated by witnesses,
testimonies and any other documents in support thereof, was sent to the
manning agency. The record of this case is bereft of any such report and
supporting documents. Instead, respondent was verbally ordered to
disembark the vessel and repatriated to the Philippines without being told of
the reasons why.[24] Clearly, respondent was not accorded due process.
Finally, petitioner laments the award of backwages equivalent to three months
salary in favor of respondent. Petitioner argues that there is no basis for such
award. The Court is not persuaded.
A seafarer is not a regular employee as defined in Article 280 of the Labor
Code. Hence, he is not entitled to full backwages and separation pay in lieu
of reinstatement as provided in Article 279 of the Labor Code.[25] Seafarers
are contractual employees whose rights and obligations are governed
primarily by the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Filipino Seamen,
the Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment, and, more
importantly, by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, or the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.[26] While the POEA Standard
Employment Contract for Filipino Seamen and the Rules and Regulations
Governing Overseas Employment do not provide for the award of separation
or termination pay,[27] Section 10 of R.A. 8042 provides for the award of money
claims in cases of illegal dismissals, thus:
SECTION 1. All monetary obligations shall be settled
in the Philippine currency which is legal tender in
the Philippines. However, the parties may agree that the
obligation or transaction shall be settled in any other currency
at the time of payment.
Except for the foregoing clarification, the Court finds no cogent reason
to grant this petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 7, 2001 and
Resolution dated July 3, 2001 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 53490 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the monetary
awards of US$2,400.00 and US$186.69 made by the Labor Arbiter in its
Decision dated August 11, 1998, should be payable in its equivalent in
Philippine currency computed at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of
payment.

Section 10. Money Claims. x x x Let the heirs of deceased respondent represented by his surviving
wife, Carmen M. Rosaroso, residing at Hills View, Mohon II, Tisa, Cebu City,
xxx who are hereby deemed substituted as respondents, be sent a copy of herein
Decision.
In case of termination of overseas employment
without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or SO ORDERED.
contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement
of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per
annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less.

xxx

The award of salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or
for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less, is
not an award of backwages or separation pay, but a form of indemnity for the
worker who was illegally dismissed. The Labor Arbiter may have mislabeled it
as separation pay, nonetheless, the award was made in conformity with law.

However, in the interest of substantial justice and to avoid further litigation on

the matter,[28] it must be stressed that the peso amounts equivalent to the
dollar awards of the Labor Arbiter can not be enforced for being contrary to
law. The peso equivalent of the monetary award should be computed at the
peso to dollar exchange rate prevailing at the time of payment, [29] as provided
in Republic Act No. 8183, entitled An Act Repealing Republic Act Numbered
Five Hundred Twenty-Nine, As Amended, Entitled An Act to Assure the
Uniform Value of Philippine Coin and Currency, which provides:

SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 172607
Appelle,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
RUFINO UMANITO,
Appellant.
Promulgated
April 16, 2009
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
In our Resolution dated 26 October 2007, this Court resolved, for the very first
time, to apply the then recently promulgated New Rules on DNA Evidence
(DNA Rules)[1] in a case pending before us this case. We remanded the case
to the RTC for reception of DNA evidence in accordance with the terms of said
Resolution, and in light of the fact that the impending exercise would be the
first application of the procedure, directed Deputy Court Administrator Reuben
Dela Cruz to: (a) monitor the manner in which the court a quo carries out the
DNA Rules; and (b) assess and submit periodic reports on the implementation
of the DNA Rules in the case to the Court.
To recall, the instant case involved a charge of rape. The accused Rufino
Umanito (Umanito) was found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang,
La Union, Branch 67 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
Umanito was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ordered to indemnify the private complainant in the sum of P50,000.00. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals offered the judgment of the trial court. Umanito
appealed the decision of the appellate court to this court.
In its 2007 Resolution, the Court acknowledged many incongruent assertions
of the prosecution and the defense.[2] At the same time, the alleged 1989 rape
of the private complainant, AAA, had resulted in her pregnancy and the birth
of a child, a girl hereinafter identified as BBB. In view of that fact, a well as the
defense of alibi raised by Umanito, the Court deemed uncovering of whether
or not Umanito is the father of BBB greatly determinative of the resolution of
the appeal. The Court then observed:
x x x With the advance in genetics and the availability
of new technology, it can now be determined with reasonable
certainty whether appellant is the father of AAA's child. If he is
not, his acquittal may be ordained. We have pronounced that
if it can be conclusively determined that the accused did not
sire the alleged victim's child, this may cast the shadow of
reasonable doubt and allow his acquittal on this basis. If he is
found not to be the father, the finding will at least weigh heavily
in the ultimate decision in this case. Thus, we are directing
appellant, AAA and her child to submit themselves to
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing under the aegis of the
New Rule on DNA Evidence (the Rules), which took effect on
15 October 2007, subject to guidelines prescribed herein.[3]
The RTC of Bauang, La Union, Branch 67, presided by Judge Ferdinand A.
Fe, upon receiving the Resolution of the Court on 9 November 2007, set the
case for hearing on 27 November 2007[4] to ascertain the feasibility of DNA
testing with due regard to the standards set in Sections 4(a), (b), (c) and (e) of
the DNA Rules. Both AAA and BBB (now 17 years old) testified during the
hearing. They also manifested their willingness to undergo DNA examination
to determine whether Umanito is the father of BBB.[5]
A hearing was conducted on 5 December 2007, where the public prosecutor
and the counsel for Umanito manifested their concurrence to the selection of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) as the institution that would conduct
the DNA testing. The RTC issued an Order on even date directing that
biological samples be taken from AAA, BBB and Umanito on 9 January
2008 at the courtroom. The Order likewise enjoined the NBI as follows:
In order to protect the integrity of the biological samples, the
[NBI] is enjoined to strictly follow the measures laid down by
the Honorable Supreme Court in the instant case to wit:
Moreover, the court a quo must ensure that
the proper chain of custody in the handling of the
samples submitted by the parties is adequately borne
in the records, i.e.; that the samples are collected by
a neutral third party; that the tested parties are
appropriately identified at their sample collection
appointments; that the samples are protected with
tamper tape at the collection site; that all persons in
 possession thereof at each stage of testing thoroughly
inspected the samples for tampering and explained
his role in the custody of the samples and the acts he
performed in relation thereto.
The DNA test result shall be simultaneously disclosed to the
parties in Court. The [NBI] is, therefore, enjoined not to
disclose to the parties in advance the DNA test results.
The [NBI] is further enjoined to observe the confidentiality of
the DNA profiles and all results or other information obtained
from DNA testing and is hereby ordered to preserve the
evidence until such time as the accused has been acquitted or
served his sentence.[6]
Present at the hearing held on 9 January 2008 were AAA, BBB,
counsel for Umanito, and two representatives from the NBI. The RTC had
previously received a letter from the Officer-in-Charge of the New Bilibid
Prisons informing the trial court that Umanito would not be able to attend the
hearing without an authority coming from the Supreme Court. [7] The parties
manifested in court their willingness to the taking of the DNA sample from the
accused at his detention center at the New Bilibid Prisons on 8 February
2008.[8] The prosecution then presented on the witness stand NBI forensic
chemist Mary Ann Aranas, who testified on her qualifications as an expert
witness in the field of DNA testing. No objections were posed to her
qualifications by the defense. Aranas was accompanied by a laboratory
technician of the NBI DNA laboratory who was to assist in the extraction of
DNA.
DNA samples were thus extracted from AAA and BBB in the
presence of Judge Fe, the prosecutor, the counsel for the defense, and DCA
De la Cruz. On 8 February 2008, DNA samples were extracted from Umanito
at the New Bilibid Prisons by NBI chemist Aranas, as witnessed by Judge Fe,
the prosecutor, the defense counsel, DCA De la Cruz, and other personnel of
the Court and the New Bilibid Prisons.[9]
The RTC ordered the NBI to submit the result of the DNA examination
within thirty (30) days after the extraction of biological samples of Umanito,
and directed its duly authorized representatives to attend a hearing on the
admissibility of such DNA evidence scheduled for 10 March 2008. The events
of the 28 March 2008 hearing, as well as the subsequent hearing on 29 April
2008, were recounted in the Report dated 19 May 2008 submitted by Judge
Fe. We quote therefrom with approval:
2. That as previously scheduled in the order of the trial court
on 09 January 2008, the case was set for hearing on the
admissibility of the result of the DNA testing.
At the hearing, Provincial Prosecutor Maria Nenita A.
Opiana, presented Mary Ann T. Aranas, a Forensic Chemist of
the National Bureau of Investigation who testified on the
examination she conducted, outlining the procedure she
adopted and the result thereof. She further declared that using
the Powerplex 16 System, Deoxyribonuncleic acid analysis on
the Buccal Swabs and Blood stained on FTA paper taken from
[AAA], [BBB], and Rufino Umanito y Millares, to determine
whether or not Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological father
of [BBB], showed that there is a Complete Match in all of the
fifteen (15) loci tested between the alleles of Rufino Umanito y
Milalres and [BBB]; That based on the above findings, there is
a 99.9999% probability of paternity that Rufino Umanito y
Millares is the biological father of [BBB] (Exhibits A and series
and B and series).
After the cross-examination of the witness by the
defense counsel, the Public Prosecutor offered in evidence
Exhibits A and sub-markings, referring to the Report of the
Chemistry Division of the National Bureau of Investigation,
Manila on the DNA analysis to determine whether or not Rufino
Umanito y Millares is the biological father of [BBB] and Exhibit
B and sub-markings, referring to the enlarged version of the
table of Exhibit A, to establish that on the DNA examination
conducted on [AAA], [BBB] and the accused Rufino Umanito
for the purpose of establishing paternity, the result is
99.9999% probable. Highly probable.
The defense did not interpose any objection, hence,
the exhibits were admitted.
1. That considering that under Section 9,
A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, if the value of the Probability of Paternity
is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of
paternity, the instant case was set for reception of evidence for
the accused on April 29, 2008 to controvert the presumption
that he is the biological father of [BBB].
 During the hearing on April 29, 2008, the accused who
was in court manifested through his counsel that he will not
present evidence to dispute the findings of the Forensic
Chemistry Division of the National Bureau of Investigation.
The DNA samples were collected by the forensic
chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation whose
qualifications as an expert was properly established adopting
the following procedure:
a) The subject sources were asked to gargle
and to fill out the reference sample form. Thereafter, the
chemists informed them that buccal swabs will be taken from
their mouth and five (5) droplets of blood will also be taken from
the ring finger of their inactive hand;
b) Pictures of the subject sources were
taken by the NBI Chemist;
c) Buccal swabs were taken from the subject
sources three (3) times;
d) Subject sources were made to sign three
(3) pieces of paper to serve as label of the three buccal swabs
placed inside two (2) separate envelopes that bear their
names;
e) Blood samples were taken from the ring
finger of the left hand of the subject sources;
f) Subject sources were made to sign the
FTA card of their blood samples.
The buccal swabs and the FTA cards were placed in
a brown envelope for air drying for at least one hour.
g) Finger prints of the subject sources were
taken for additional identification;
h) The subject sources were made to sign
their finger prints.
i) Atty. Ramon J. Gomez, Deputy Court
Administrator Reuben dela Cruz and Prosecutor Maria Nenita
A. Oplana, in that order, were made to sign as witnesses to the
reference sample forms and the finger prints of the subject
sources.
j) After one hour of air drying, the Buccal
Swabs and the FTA papers were placed inside a white
envelope and sealed with a tape by the NBI Chemists;
k) The witnesses, Atty. Ramon J. Gomez,
Deputy Court Administrator Reuben dela Cruz, Prosecutor
Maria Nenita A. Opiana including the NBI Chemist, affixed their
signatures on the sealed white envelope;
l) The subjects sources were made to sign
and affix their finger prints on the sealed white envelope;
m) The chemists affixed their signatures on
the sealed envelope and placed it in a separate brown
envelope;
n) The subjects sources were made to affix
their finger prints on their identification places and reference
forms.
The same procedure was adopted by the Forensic
Chemists of the NBI in the taking of DNA samples from the
accused, Rufino Umanito at the New Bilibid Prison in the
afternoon of February 8, 2008.
Mary Ann Aranas, the expert witness testified that at
the NBI the sealed envelope was presented to Ms. Demelen
dela Cruz, the supervisor of the Forensic Chemistry Division to
witness that the envelope containing the DNA specimens was
sealed as it reached the NBI. Photographs of the envelope in
sealed form were taken prior to the conduct of examination.
With the procedure adopted by the Forensic Chemist
of the NBI, who is an expert and whose integrity and dedication
to her work is beyond reproach the manner how the biological
samples were collected, how they were handled and the chain
of custody thereof were properly established the court is
convinced that there is no possibility of contamination of the
DNA samples taken from the parties.
At the Forensic Laboratory of the National Bureau of
Investigation, the envelopes containing the DNA samples were
opened and the specimens were subjected to sampling,
extraction, amplification and analysis. Duplicate analysis were
made. The Forensic Chemist, Mary Ann Aranas caused the
examination of the blood samples and the buccal swabs were
separately processed by Mrs. Demelen dela Cruz.

In order to arrive at a DNA profile, the forensic
chemists adopted the following procedure: (1) Sampling which
is the cutting of a portion from the media (swabs and FTA
paper); (2) then subjected the cut portions for extraction to
release the DNA; (3) After the DNA was released into the
solution, it was further processed using the formarine chain
reaction to amplify the DNA samples for analysis of using the
Powerplex 16 System, which allows the analysis of 16 portions
of the DNA samples. The Powerplex 16 System are reagent
kits for forensic purposes; (3) After the target, DNA is
multiplied, the amplified products are analyzed using the
genetic analyzer. The Powerplex 16 System has 16 markers
at the same time. It is highly reliable as it has already been
validated for forensic use. It has also another function which is
to determine the gender of the DNA being examined.
Mary Ann Aranas, the Forensic Chemist, in her
testimony explained that the DNA found in all cells of a human
being come in pairs except the mature red blood cells. These
cells are rolled up into minute bodies called chromosomes,
which contain the DNA of a person. A human has 23 pairs of
chromosomes. For each pair of chromosome, one was found
to have originated from the mother, the other must have came
from the father. Using the Powerplex 16 System Results, the
variable portions of the DNA called loci, which were used as
the basis for DNA analysis or typing showed the
following: under loci D3S1358, the genotype of the locus of
[AAA] is 15, 16, the genotype of [BBB] is 15, 16, one of the pair
of alleles must have originated and the others from the
father. The color for the allele of the mother is red while the
father is blue. On matching the allele which came from the
mother was first determined [AAA], has alleles of 15 or 16 but
in the geno type of [BBB], 15 was colored blue because that is
the only allele which contain the genotype of the accused
Rufino Umanito, the 16 originated from the mother, [AAA]. In
this marker [BBB] has a genotype of 15, 16, 16 is from the
mother and 15 is from the father.
The whole process involved the determination which
of those alleles originated from the mother and the rest would
entail looking on the genotype or the profile of the father to
determine if they matched with those of the child.
In the analysis of the 16 loci by the Forensic
Chemists, amel on the 13th row was not included because this
is the marker that determines the gender of the source of the
loci.The pair XX represents a female and XY for a male. Rufino
Umanito has XY amel and [BBB] and [AAA] have XX amel. For
matching paternity purposes only 15 loci were examined. Of
the 15 loci, there was a complete match between the alleles of
the loci of [BBB] and Rufino (Exhibits A and B).
To ensure reliable results, the Standard Operating
Procedure of the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI in
paternity cases is to use buccal swabs taken from the parties
and blood as a back up source.
The said Standard Operating Procedure was adopted
in the instant case.
As earlier mentioned, DNA samples consisted of
buccal swabs and blood samples taken from the parties by the
forensic chemists who adopted reliable techniques and
procedure in collecting and handling them to avoid
contamination. The method that was used to secure the
samples were safe and reliable. The samples were taken and
handled by an expert, whose qualifications, integrity and
dedication to her work is unquestionable, hence, the possibility
of substitution or manipulation is very remote.
The procedure adopted by the DNA section, Forensic
Chemistry Division of the National Bureau of Investigation in
analyzing the samples was in accordance with the standards
used in modern technology. The comparative analysis of DNA
prints of the accused Rufino Umanito and his alleged child is a
simple process called parentage analysiswhich was made
easier with the use of a DNA machine called Genetic Analyzer.
To ensure a reliable result, the NBI secured two (2) DNA types
of samples from the parties, the buccal swabs as primary
source and blood as secondary source. Both sources were
separately processed and examined and thereafter a
comparative analysis was conducted which yielded the same
result.
The National Bureau of Investigation DNA Section,
Forensic Division is an accredited DNA testing laboratory in
the country which maintains a multimillion DNA analysis
equipment for its scientific criminal investigation unit. It is
manned by qualified laboratory chemists and technicians who
are experts in the field, like Mary Ann Aranas, the expert
witness in the instant case, who is a licensed chemists, has
undergone training on the aspects of Forensic Chemistry fro
two (2) years before she was hired as forensic chemists of the
NBI and has been continuously attending training seminars,
and workshops which are field related and who has handled
more than 200 cases involving DNA extraction or collection or
profiling.
The accused did not object to the admission of
Exhibits A and B inclusive of their sub-markings. He did not
also present evidence to controvert the results of the DNA
analysis.
Section 6. A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC provides that: If the
value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there
shall be a disputable presumption of paternity.
DNA analysis conducted by the National Bureau of
Investigation Forensic Division on the buccal swabs and blood
stained on FTA paper taken from [AAA], [BBB] and
Rufino Umanito y MillAres for DNA analysis to determine
whether or not Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological father
of [BBB] gave the following result:
FINDINGS: Deoxyribonuncleic acid analysis using the
Powerplex 16 System conducted on the
above-mentioned, specimens gave
the
following profiles;
xxx
xxx
There is a COMPLETE MATCH in all the fifteen (15)
loci tested between the alleles of Rufino Umanito y Millares
and [BBB].
REMARKS: Based on the above findings, there is a
99.9999% Probability of Paternity that
Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological
Father of [BBB]
Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted but may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence (Rule 131, Section 3, Rules of Court).
The disputable presumption that was established as a
result of the DNA testing was not contradicted and overcome
by other evidence considering that the accused did not object
to the admission of the results of the DNA testing (Exhibits A
and B inclusive of sub-markings) nor presented evidence to
rebut the same.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the trial court
rules that based on the result of the DNA analysis conducted
by the National Bureau of Investigation, Forensic Division,
RUFINO UMANITO y MILLARES is the biological father of
[BBB].[10]
Umanitos defense of alibi, together with his specific assertion that while he had
courted AAA they were not sweethearts, lead to a general theory on his part
that he did not engage in sexual relations with the complainant. The DNA
testing has evinced a contrary conclusion, and that as testified to by AAA,
Umanito had fathered the child she gave birth to on 5 April 1990, nine months
after the day she said she was raped by Umanito.
Still, Umanito filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal dated 16 February 2009. By
filing such motion, Umanito is deemed to have acceded to the rulings of the
RTC and the Court of Appeals finding him guilty of the crime of rape, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the
indemnification of the private complainant in the sum of P50,000.00. Given
that the results of the Court-ordered DNA testing conforms with the
conclusions of the lower courts, and that no cause is presented for us to
deviate from the penalties imposed below, the Court sees no reason to deny
Umanitos Motion to Withdraw Appeal. Consequently, the assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 15 February 2006 would otherwise be deemed
final if the appeal is not withdrawn.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Withdraw Appeal dated 16 February
2009 is GRANTED. The instant case is now CLOSED and TERMINATED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines On September 11, 1992, the Chief of Police of Sorsogon, Sorsogon,
Supreme Court filed a criminal complaint[5] for Frustrated Murder against petitioner. Four days
Manila thereafter, or on September 15, 1992, the complaint was amended, charging
petitioner with the crime of Murder, as the victim Leticia Aldemo[6] (Leticia) died
on September 14, 1992.[7] After conducting a hearing on the bail application of
SECOND DIVISION petitioner, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, on
December 18, 1992, granted him bail.[8] On January 11, 1993, the MTC
recommended the filing of Murder against petitioner, and then ordered the
BENJAMIN JESALVA, G.R. No. 187725 transmittal of the records of the case to the Provincial Prosecutor of
Petitioner, Sorsogon.[9]
Present:
Thus, petitioner was charged with the crime of Murder in an
CARPIO, J.,
Information[10] dated January 26, 1993, which reads:
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
That on or about the 9th day of September, 1992 in
- versus - PERALTA,
the Municipality of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon,
ABAD, and
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
MENDOZA, JJ.
the above-named accused, with intent to kill, taking
advantage of superior strength, with treachery and evident
Promulgated: premeditation with the use of motor vehicle and during night
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, time, did then and there [wilfully], unlawfully and feloniously
Respondent. January 19, 2011 attack, assault, manhandle and use personal violence upon
[Leticia] Aldemo, inflicting upon the latter serious and mortal
wounds which directly caused her death shortly thereafter, to
the damage and prejudice of her legal heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION When arraigned on March 1, 1993, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to the
offense charged.[11] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the
NACHURA, J.: trial, two varying versions arose.

Version of the Prosecution

Before this Court is a Petition for Review[1] on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision[2] dated October 17, 2008, which affirmed with modification the
decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, dated
November 18, 1997, finding petitioner Benjamin Jesalva alias Ben
Sabaw[4] (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.
The Facts
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are essentially
summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as follows:
In the evening of September 8, 1992, witness Gloria
Haboc, together with the victim Leticia Aldemo, Benjamin
Jesalva (petitioner), Elog Ubaldo,[12] Jo Montales and Romy
Paladin were at Nenas place playing mahjong. A certain Mrs.
Encinas and Atty. Alibanto were also there. At about 10 oclock
that night, Glorias group left Nenas place and boarded the
Isuzu panel of petitioner. With the exception of Jo Montales,
the group proceeded to Bistro Christina to eat and
drink. While Gloria had softdrink, Leticia drank two (2) bottles
of beer, and the rest consumed beer and [F]undador until
11:30 in the evening.
After they ate and drank, the group, with the exception of Elog
Ubaldo who flagged down a tricycle, once again boarded
petitioners Isuzu panel as it was usually petitioner who drove
them home. The victim Leticia Aldemo was seated at the front
seat. Petitioner dropped Romy Paladin at his house first,
followed by Gloria, who resided some 20 meters away from
Leticias house. While at Glorias house, petitioner wanted to
drink some more but Gloria told him to defer it until the next
day because the stores were already closed.Gloria then gave
Leticia three (3) sticks of barbecue and accompanied her and
petitioner at the gate. After petitioner and Leticia boarded the
Isuzu [panel], the former immediately accelerated his car and
went to the direction of 6th Street instead of
towards 7th Street where Leticias house was situated.
At about 12:20 early morning of September 9, 1992, the group
of SPO1 Edgardo Mendoza (SPO1 Mendoza) of the
Sorsogon PNP Mobile Patrol Section chanced upon
petitioners Isuzu [panel] in St. Rafael Subdivision in [Our
Ladys Village] OLV, Pangpang, Sorsogon. The police patrol
team approached the vehicle and SPO1 Mendoza focused a
flashlight at the front portion of the vehicle to check what was
going on. There, SPO1 Mendoza saw petitioner whom he
knew since childhood seated in front of the wheel so he called
out his name. Instead of heeding his call, however, petitioner
did not respond, immediately started the engine and sped
away toward Sorsogon town proper which is directly opposite
his place of residence which is Ticol, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
At about the same time that night, Noel Olbes, a driver for the
MCST Sisters holding office at the Bishops Compound in
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, was also in OLV Pangpang. While he was
walking from a certain Leas house, he saw a woman naked from
the waist down and lying on her belly on the highway. Her jeans
and [panty] were beside her. Because it was raining, Olbes pitied
her so he carried her and her things to the shed some 10 meters
away. As he was doing so, a tricycle being driven by Eduardo De
Vera focused its headlight in his direction. De Vera called out,
What is that? Because he received no response from Noel Olbes,
he decided to bring his passenger home first and just come back
to check the site later.
Meanwhile, upon reaching the shed, Olbes noticed that the
woman was bleeding that he even got stained with her
blood. Afraid that he might be implicated, he hurriedly left the
woman at Hazelwood such that when De Vera came back, he
no longer found Olbes. De Vera then proceeded to the police
station to report the incident to [SPO1] Balaoro.
De Vera, SPO1 Balaoro and SPO1 Sincua eventually
returned to comb the area but to no avail. On their way back
at about 1:15 oclock (sic) in the morning, they met Lt. Caguia
talking with Noel Olbes. De Vera lost no time in identifying him
to be the man he saw with the woman. At this point, Olbes
admitted the allegation but professed innocence. He admitted
he left the woman in Hazelwood where the police found her.
Eventually, Olbes was investigated by the police and was not
released until the next day. However, because the evidence
pointed to petitioner as the last person seen with the victim, a
search for him was conducted. He surrendered at one (1)
oclock in the afternoon accompanied by Fiscal Jose Jayona,
his first cousin.[13]
The prosecution highlighted that, per testimony of Gloria Haboc,
Leticia disclosed to her that petitioner was courting Leticia. However, Leticia
told petitioner that they should just remain as friends because she was already
married, and that she loved her handsome husband.[14] Moreover, the
prosecution asseverated that, at around 12:20 a.m. of September 9, 1992,
while conducting patrol in St. Rafael Subdivision, [15] together with other police
officers, Senior Police Officer 1 Edgardo Mendoza (SPO1 Mendoza), by using
his flashlight, saw petitioner on board his vehicle alone. Upon sight, petitioner
immediately started his vehicle and drove toward the town proper of Sorsogon,
which was directly opposite his residence in Ticol, Sorsogon, disregarding
SPO1 Mendozas calls.[16] Lastly, at about 1:00 p.m. of September 9, 1992,
petitioner, together with his first cousin Fiscal Jose Jayona (Fiscal
Jayona), went to the police station, wherein he voluntarily intimated to SPO4
William Desder (SPO4 Desder) that Leticia jumped out of his vehicle.[17] At
about 1:20 p.m. of September 9, 1992, SPO2 Enrique Renoria, together with
other police officers, Fiscal Jayona, and petitioner inspected the place, which
petitioner identified as the place where he and Leticia sat. They found
bloodstains thereat.[18]
After the prosecution presented twelve (12) witnesses, the defense
moved for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence. On February 21, 1994,
the defense filed before the RTC, Branch 51, its Demurrer to
Evidence,[19] which the RTC, Branch 51, denied in its Order [20] dated July 8,
1994. On August 11, 1994, the defense filed a Motion [21] for Reconsideration
of the Order dated July 8, 1994 and Inhibition of Presiding Judge, which the
prosecution opposed. The Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 51, voluntarily
inhibited himself from taking any further action in the case;[22] hence, the case
was re-raffled to the RTC, Branch 52. Acting on the pending Motion for
Reconsideration of the defense, the Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 52,
denied the same and set the reception of evidence of the defense.[23]
Version of the Defense
testimonies of SPO1 Eduardo Balaoro and Noel Olbes (Olbes), as follows:
In his relatively short stint on the witness stand, petitioner denied that
he killed Leticia. He testified that he did not have any reason to kill her, and
that he had many reasons why he should not kill her. [24] The prosecution
manifested that it would not conduct a cross-examination on the person of
petitioner as his testimony was tantamount to pure denial. [25] To prove that
there was a broken chain of circumstantial evidence, the defense presented,
as witness, Eduardo de Vera. The CA narrated:
12. Eduardo de Vera declared that on September 9,
1992 at about 12:30 a.m., he was driving his tricycle en route
to OLV, Pangpang, Sorsogon; upon reaching the junction of
the national road or highway, he saw a man and a woman
three meters from the edge of the road; he stopped his tricycle
and focused the headlight of his tricycle towards the two; he
saw the woman leaning on the left arm of the man while the
man was on a squatting position; he asked them what is that?
and did not get any response; that the man was hiding his face
and saw little blood on the clothes of the woman; he saw the
woman with clothes, a polo shirt and pants; he decided to
bring home his passenger home (sic) first and then returned
to the scene but found no one there; he reported the matter to
[SPO1] Balaoro, who immediately accompanied him to the
place; they searched for the man and woman but they could
not find them; they checked the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital
but nobody had been brought there; then they proceeded
back to the junction and later to the Sorsogon town proper;
upon reaching Barangay Tugos, they saw [Lt.] Caguia talking
with a man, whom he (De Vera) recognized as the man with
the woman; [Lt.] Caguia directed the man to go to Police Sub-
Station 1; at the police Sub-Station 1, he came to know the
name of the man Noel Olbes; he saw bloodstains on Olbes
arms, hands, face and nose; the police interrogated him about
it and he replied that he just helped the woman.
On cross-examination, he admitted that he has
known [petitioner] for a longtime; and he has good
relationship with him; [petitioner] was his bondsman in
Criminal Case No. 95-3989 for illegal possession of firearms
and because of this, he is indebted to him and he thus wants
to repay his gratitude to [petitioner]; [petitioner] requested him
to be a witness in the case.[26]
Relative to the subsequent events, the CA summarized the
6. SPO1 Eduardo Balaoro essayed that at around
1:00 a.m. of September 9, 1992, Eduardo De Vera reported
to him at the Police Sub-Station 1 that he saw a man, who
was in squatting position, and a woman, who had blood on the
upper right breast of her clothes, lean[ing] against the man
and that after De Vera brought his tricycle passenger home,
he returned to the site but he could not find the two anymore;
upon receiving the report, he (SPO1 Balaoro), together with
SPO1 Sincua and De Vera, proceeded to the diversion road,
at the junction going to the hospital and Pangpang, Sorsogon,
Sorsogon to investigate; they searched the place and went to
the hospital but found nothing; on their way back, at around
1:15 [a.m.] they saw Noel Olbes talking with Lt. Caguia at
Barangay Tugos; De Vera pointed to Olbes as the man he
saw with the woman at the crossing so they brought him to
Police Sub-Station 1 for investigation; Olbes told them that he
saw the woman lying on the side of the road so he tried to lift
her up but when he saw the tricycle (De Veras) he became
afraid as he might be implicated in the crime so he brought
her to Hazelwood, which is five meters away from the
highway; at 2:25 a.m. the patrol team found Leticia Aldemo,
whom they found naked from the waist down; at the garage of
Hazelwood; they found the long pants of the victim lying
beside her and noted that her panty was still on one of her
knees; the victims body appeared to have been laid down;
they did not find any blood in the garage except where the
victims body was found outside the garage, they saw the other
pair of shoes of a woman and thick bloodstains; he (SPO1
Balaoro) brought Olbes to Balogo station and entrusted him
to their investigator.
7. Noel Olbes testified that he is a driver for the
MCST Sisters who are holding office at the Bishops
 Compound in Sorsogon, Sorsogon; that on September 8,
1997, he went out with his friends Danny, Oca and Ely in
Almendras to drink a bottle of gin; at around 6:30 p.m. he went
to downtown Sorsogon and roamed around until 10:30 p.m.;
then he went to Bahay Kainan and at about 11:00 or 11:30
p.m., he went to Pena Fast Food and took a bottle of beer;
upon the invitation of Lea, he went inside Pena and drank
another bottle of beer; he brought Lea to her home at OLV,
Pangpang, Sorsogon, Sorsogon; from Leas house, he walked
and upon reaching the junction of OLV, he saw a woman lying
on her belly naked from the waist down; the woman was just
uttering guttural sound; her jeans and panty were just lying
beside her; taking pity on the woman and since it was raining
that night, he carried the woman to a nearby shed in order that
she would not be run over by motor vehicles; he also took the
panty and the jeans to the shed; he noticed that a tricycle
stopped for a while and focused its headlight on them and
proceeded on its way; when he laid down the woman in the
shed, he noticed that she was bleeding and he was stained
with her blood; after seeing the blood, he got scared and left;
he walked towards the Sorsogon town proper and after about
forty-five minutes, two policem[e]n apprehended him and
brought him to the police station for investigation; while being
investigated, he was not apprised of his constitutional rights
and made to sign the police blotter; he was detained as he
was a suspect for the injuries of the victim; after 7 or 8 hours,
he was released; and he executed a Sworn Statement and
affirmed its contents.[27]
Dr. Antonio Dioneda, Jr.[28] and Dr. Wilhelmino Abrantes (Dr. Abrantes)
testified on the injuries suffered by Leticia, which eventually caused her death:
9. Dr. Antonio Dionedas testified that he encountered on
September 9, 1992 a patient by the name of Leticia Aldemo,
who was in comatose state; she sustained the following
injuries (1) severe cerebral contusion; (2) 2.5 cm punctured
wound, occipital area (3) .5 cm punctured wound, parietal left
area[;] (4) multiple contusion hematoma antero lateral aspect
deltoid left area[;] (5) contusion hematoma 3rd upper left arm;
(6) contusion hematoma left elbow[;] (7) abrasion left elbow[;]
(8) hematoma, 3rd left thigh[;] (9) abrasion right knee[;] (10)
multiple confluent abrasion right foot[;] (11) contusion
hematoma right hand[;] (12) abrasion right elbow[;] (13)
contusion hematoma right elbow[;] and (14) skull-segmented
fracture parietal bone with separation.
He explained that the punctured wound in the occipital area
(lower back of the skull) was caused by a pebble which they
recovered from said area; the punctured wound on the
parietal left area was caused by a sharp object and may have
been secondary to a fall on a rough surface; the first three
findings could also have been caused by the punch made by
the perpetrator; the fourth finding could have been caused by
a blunt instrument or a punch or a strong grip; the fifth and the
sixth findings could have been caused also by some of the
above-mentioned means; the eighth finding could have been
caused by a fall or rubbing on a hard object; the ninth finding
could have been caused by a blunt instrument or a fist blow
while the tenth finding could have been caused by a fall on a
rough object and the knee rubbing on a rough object; the
eleventh finding could have been due to a fall or by being
dragged; the twelfth finding could be caused by a blunt
instrument or by a fall or by fist blow and the thirteenth finding
could also be caused by a fall or fist blow.
He stated [that] the victim died despite the operation
he performed on her.
xxxx
14. Dr. Wilhelmino Abrantes He explained the different
kinds of injuries sustained by the victim. In addition, he stated
that since there were wounds sustained by the victim in the
dorsum part of the foot and sustained injuries on both knees,
upper portion of the back of the hand, the victim could have
been thrown off while unconscious.[29]
The RTCs Ruling
On November 18, 1997, the RTC ruled in favor of the prosecution,
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on circumstantial
evidence, not of the crime of Murder, but of Homicide. The RTC ratiocinated
that, in the absence of any direct evidence or testimonies of eyewitnesses,
treachery was not established, and that evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength were not duly proven. Thus, the RTC disposed of the case
in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds
the accused Benjamin Jesalva alias Ben Sabaw guilty beyond
 reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide penalized under
Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code and considering that there
was no aggravating nor mitigating circumstances attendant
thereto and taking into consideration the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the court hereby sentences the accused to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay death
indemnity of the sum of P50,000.00 to the legal heirs of the
victim, plus P42,755.45 for compensatory damages
plus P50,000.00 by way of moral damages and P10,000.00
as attorneys fees (People v. Aguiluz, March 11, 1992).
SO ORDERED.[30]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA.[31]
The CAs Ruling
On October 17, 2008, the CA pertinently held, among others, that petitioner
could not point to Olbes as the culprit because, when Eduardo de Vera saw
the former holding on to Leticia in a squatting position, Olbes was in the act of
lifting her in order to bring her to the nearby shed. The CA opined that, if any
misdeed or omission could be attributed to Olbes, it was his failure to bring
Leticia to a nearby hospital, because his fear of being implicated in the crime
clouded his better judgment. Thus:
All told, We find that the prosecutions evidence suffice to
sustain the accused-appellants conviction for homicide.
As to the award of attorneys fees, We find the award
of P10,000.00 by the trial court meritorious, the records reveal
that services of private prosecutor was engaged.
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is
punishable by reclusion temporal. With the attendant
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender of accused-
appellant, the penalty reclusion temporal is imposed in its
minimum period. Accordingly, accused-appellant Benjamin J.
Jesalva should suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWELVE
(12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal as
maximum and SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor as minimum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52 dated
November 18, 1997 in Criminal Case No. 3243
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalty.
Accused-appellant Benjamin J. Jesalva is sentenced to serve
the indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision mayor, as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[32]
Undaunted, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[33] which the
CA, however, denied in its Resolution[34] dated April 7, 2009 for lack of merit.
Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:
A) THE COURT OF APPEALS AND RTC DECISIONS
CONVICTING PETITIONER OF THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE
BASED ON PURELY CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WERE
BOTH NOT IN ACCORD WITH ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE REQUIRING THAT SUCH BE ACTED
WITH CAUTION AND THAT ALL THE ESSENTIAL FACTS
MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE HYPOTHESIS OF
GUILT; AND
B) THE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE
TRIAL COURT, SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT
STATEMENTS MADE BY PETITIONER IN THE POLICE
STATION WERE ADMISSIBLE AS HE WAS THEN NOT
UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION DESPITE
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT HE WOULD
HAVE BEEN DETAINED BY THE POLICE HAD HIS FISCAL-
COMPANION NOT [TAKEN] HIM UNDER HIS CUSTODY.[35]
Petitioner argues that no evidence was ever introduced as to how,
when, and where Leticia sustained her injuries. No witness ever testified as to
who was responsible for her injuries. He refutes the prosecutions contention
that, even if he took the 6th Street, the same could still lead to the 7th Street,
where Leticias house is located. Petitioner stresses that Olbes should have
been considered as a suspect in this case, considering that he was the last
person seen with Leticia when she was still alive. He avers that the statements
he made at the police station are not admissible in evidence, considering that
he was, technically, under custodial investigation, and that there was no waiver
of his right to remain silent.[36] Moreover, petitioner alleges that the fatal injuries
sustained by Leticia, per the testimony of Dr. Abrantes, are consistent with a
fall, thereby suggesting petitioners innocence. Petitioner claims that the
evidence shows that there was more blood in Hazelwood than in the place
where Olbes spotted Leticia, thereby suggesting that something worse than
her jumping out of the vehicle might have happened. [37]
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the
OSG, argues that only questions of law may be entertained by this Court, and
that we accord great respect to factual findings of the trial court especially
when affirmed by the CA. The OSG insists that the CA, affirming the RTCs
ruling, did not err in convicting petitioner on the basis of circumstantial
evidence, because the particular circumstances enumerated by both the RTC
and the CA satisfactorily meet the requirements of the rules and of
jurisprudence for conviction. Moreover, the OSG claims that the statements
made by petitioner before SPO4 Desder, in the presence of Fiscal Jayona,
were voluntarily given and were not elicited on custodial investigation. Lastly,
the OSG counters that petitioner was not deprived of his rights since he was
never held for questioning by any police officer upon arriving at the police
station and, besides, he was accompanied by his first cousin, Fiscal Jayona. [38]
Our Ruling
The Petition is bereft of merit.
Custodial investigation refers to any questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. This presupposes that
he is suspected of having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying
to elicit information or a confession from him.[39] The rule begins to operate at
once, as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime, and direction is aimed upon a particular suspect who has been
taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory
questions which tend to elicit incriminating statements. [40] The assailed
statements herein were spontaneously made by petitioner and were not at all
elicited through questioning. It was established that petitioner, together with
his cousin Fiscal Jayona, personally went to the police station and voluntarily
made the statement that Leticia jumped out of his vehicle at around 12:30 a.m.
of September 9, 1992.[41] The RTC and the CA did not, therefore, err in holding
that the constitutional procedure for custodial investigation is not applicable in
the instant case.
Be that as it may, even without these statements, petitioner could still
be convicted of the crime of Homicide. The prosecution established his
complicity in the crime through circumstantial evidence, which were credible
and sufficient, and which led to the inescapable conclusion that petitioner
committed the said crime. Indeed, when considered in their totality, the
circumstances point to petitioner as the culprit.
Direct evidence of the commission of the crime charged is not the only
matrix wherefrom a court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. There
are instances when, although a witness may not have actually witnessed the
commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or
accused as the perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the latter is the
person last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the
commission of the crime. This is the type of positive identification, which forms
part of circumstantial evidence. In the absence of direct evidence, the
prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its
burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under condition where
concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted upon under all
circumstances, the guilt of vicious felons who committed heinous crimes in
secret or in secluded places will be hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to
prove.[42]
Thus, there can be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial
evidence when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads
to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion
of all the others, as the perpetrator of the crime. However, in order that
circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to convict, the same must comply
with these essential requisites, viz.: (a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.[43]
We accord respect to the following findings of the CA, affirming those
of the RTC:
After a thorough review of the records of the case, We
find that the circumstantial evidence proved by the
prosecution, when viewed in its entirety, points unerringly to
[petitioner] Benjamin Jesalva as the person responsible for
the death of the victim Leticia Aldemo. Truly, the following
combination of the circumstances which comprised such
evidence forms an unbroken chain that points to [petitioner]
and no other, as the perpetrator of the crime, to wit:
1. [Petitioner] Benjamin Jesalva (who was previously
courting the victim Leticia Aldemo, and whom
the latter advised to stop as she was already
 married) together with Gloria Haboc, and six
other individuals left Nena Ables house at 10
p.m. of September 8, 1992 after playing
mahjong thereat. They rode in [petitioners] red
panel.
2. Benjamin Jesalva, Leticia Aldemo, Gloria Haboc
and two others proceeded to Bistro Christina.
[Petitioner], together with other two male
companions, consumed one bottle of
Fundador, in addition to the three bottles of
beer. At 11:30 p.m., the group left the place.
3. After dropping one male companion at his house,
Benjamin Jesalva, together with Leticia
Aldemo, proceeded to bring Gloria Haboc to
her home, which was only twenty meters away
from Leticias residence.
4. After staying at Gloria Habocs house for five
minutes, and denied another drink, Benjamin
Jesalva immediately accelerated his vehicle en
route to 6th Street instead of the shorter and
direct route, the 7th street, where Leticia
Aldemos house is located;
5. Leticia Aldemo never reached home as testified by
her husband Efren Aldemo;
6. At around 12:20 a.m. of September 9, 1992, the
police patrolling the St. Ra[f]ael Subdivision
saw the red panel thereat and when they
approached and beamed a flashlight, they saw
Benjamin Jesalva behind the wheel, who
suddenly drove away in the direction of
Sorsogon town proper, opposite to where he
lives. SPO1 Eduardo Mendoza told Benjamin
Jesalva (whom he had known since his teen-
age years) to stop but the latter did not respond
or heed his call;
7. At 12:30 oclock (sic) of even date, Noel Olbes saw
the body of Leticia Aldemo sprawled on her
belly at the crossing/junction of OLV, Pangpang
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, naked from the waist
down. He lifted her up and brought the body at
Hazelwood, which is about 10 meters away
from the highway.
8. The police found the body of the victim at
Hazelwood at around 2:15 a.m. of the same
day, and brought her to
the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital in comatose
condition.
9. The police proceeded to inform the victims sister,
who in turn informed the victims husband of the
incident.
10. In the morning of September 9, 1992, the police
looked for Benjamin Jesalva to invite him at the
police station but was not able to find him.
11. At around 1:00 oclock p.m. of September 9,
1992, Benjamin Jesalva, together with his first
cousin, Asst. Prosecutor Jose Jayona,
presented himself at the PNP Sorsogon,
Sorsogon headquarters, where he voluntarily
stated that the victim Leticia Aldemo was his
passenger in his vehicle at about 12:30 in the
early morning of September 9, 1992 at St.
Rafael Subdivision but upon reaching the
crossing of OLV, Pangpang, Sorsogon,
Sorsogon near the Provincial Hospital, she
jumped out of his vehicle. These declarations
were recorded in the police blotter by PO1
Enrique [Renoria] upon the instruction of SPO4
William Desder, the PNP Sorsogon Chief
Investigator.
12. At about 1:30 p.m. of the same day, a police team,
together with [petitioner] and Asst. Prosecutor
Jayona, went to St. Ra[f]ael Subdivision to
conduct an ocular inspection. [Petitioner]
pointed to the police the place where he and the
victim spent their time. The police
photographed what appear[ed] to be
bloodstains just two meters away from the
place pointed by [petitioner].
13. Dr. Antonio Dioneda testified that the punctured
wound in the occipital area was caused by a
pebble which he recovered from said area; the
 punctured wound in the parietal left area was SO ORDERED.
caused by a sharp object and may have been
secondary to a fall on a rough surface, the
cerebral contusion, the punctured wound in the
occipital and in the parietal area could also be
caused by a punch by the perpetrator. As to the
multiple contusion hematoma anterior lateral
aspect of the deltoid left area was caused by a
blunt instrument or a punch or a strong grip; the
contusion hematoma on the upper left arm and
left elbow could as well be similarly caused by
a blunt instrument or a punch or a strong
grip. As to the abrasion on the right knee, the
same could have been caused by a blunt
instrument or a fist blow. The multiple confluent
abrasion[s] on the right foot could have been
caused by a fall on a rough object. The
abrasions on the right elbow could have been
caused by a blunt instrument or by a fall or by
a fist blow. The same is true with the contusion
hematoma found on the victims right elbow.[44]

Petitioners mere denial cannot outweigh the circumstantial evidence

clearly establishing his culpability in the crime charged. It is well-settled that
the positive declarations of a prosecution witness prevail over the bare denials
of an accused. The evidence for the prosecution was found by both the RTC
and the CA to be sufficient and credible, while petitioners defense of denial
was weak, self-serving, speculative, and uncorroborated. Petitioners silence
as to the matters that occurred during the time he was alone with Leticia is
deafening. An accused can only be exonerated if the prosecution fails to meet
the quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence. We find that the prosecution has met this quantum of proof in this
case.[45]

All told, we find no reversible error in the assailed CA decision which

would warrant the modification much less the reversal thereof.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the Court of Appeals

Decision dated October 17, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 22126, affirming with
modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon,
Sorsogon, in Criminal Case No. 3243, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No.179535 June 9, 2014
JOSE ESPINELI a.k.a. DANILO ESPINELI, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Jurisprudence teaches us that "for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to
support a conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same
time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent x x x."1 Thus,
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person.2
Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari3 is the July 6, 2007
Decision4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02252 which
modified the August 31, 1999 Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Imus, Cavite, Branch 90, by finding petitioner Jose Espineli a.k.a. Danilo
"Danny" Espineli (petitioner) guilty of the crime of homicide instead of
murder.
Also questioned is the CA’s September 14, 2007 Resolution6 denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.7
Factual Antecedents
On June 24, 1997, an Information8 charging petitioner with the crime of
murder was filed before the RTC,9 the accusatory portion of which reads as
follows:
That on or about the 15th day of December, 1996 in the Municipality of Imus,
Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, together with one (1) Sotero Paredes and
three (3) other unidentified persons, whose real names, identities and
whereabouts are still unknown, said Sotero Paredes having been earlier
charged with the same offense, and is now undergoing trial before Branch
90, of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, then armed with firearms,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill,
with treachery and evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior
strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack,
assault and shoot one Alberto Berbon y Downie with the use of said firearms,
thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds on his head and
different parts of his body which caused his instantaneous death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Alberto Berbon y Downie.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
Petitioner was arrested on July 1, 1997 and when arraigned on July 7, 1997
with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.11
The facts show that in the early evening of December 15, 1996, Alberto
Berbon y Downie (Alberto), a 49-year old Senior Desk Coordinator of the
radio station DZMM, was shot in the head and different parts of the body in
front of his house in Imus, Cavite by unidentified malefactors who
immediately fled the crime scene on board a waiting car.
Meanwhile, the group of Atty. Orly Dizon (Atty. Dizon) of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) arrested and took into custody one Romeo Reyes
(Reyes) for the crime of Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon. Reyes
confided to the group of Atty. Dizon that he was willing to give vital
information regarding the Berbon case. In due course, NBI Agent Dave
Segunial(NBI Agent Segunial) interviewed Reyes on February 10, 1997 and
reduced his statement into writing whereby Reyes claimed that on December
15, 1996, he saw petitioner and Sotero Paredes (Paredes) board a red car
while armed with a .45 caliber firearm and armalite, respectively; and that
petitioner told Paredes that "ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si
Berbon."12 Subsequently, Reyes posted bail and was released on February
14, 1997. Thenceforth, he jumped bail and was never again heard of. NBI
Agent Segunial testified on these facts during the trial.
The victim’s widow, Sabina Berbon (Sabina) likewise testified. According to
her, sometime in the third week of February 1997 Reyes sought financial
help so he could transfer his family to the province and protect them from any
untoward consequence that may result from his giving information to the NBI
regarding the death of Sabina’s husband. Sabina gave him the total amount
of ₱1,500.00 and promised to help him in applying for the witness protection
program. This was affirmed on the witness stand by Sabina’s brother,
Bartolome Pakingan. After that, however, Reyes never came back.
Another prosecution witness, Rodolfo Dayao (Rodolfo), testified that he sold
his red Ford Escort car to three persons who came to his residence in the
afternoon of September 1, 1996. He later identified the said car from the
photographs presented to him by the police officers.
Dr. Ludivino J. Lagat (Dr. Lagat), the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who
conducted a post-mortem examination on Alberto, declared in his Autopsy
Report that the victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds in the head and
body. He also stated that based on the size of the gunshot wounds or
entrance, high-powered guns were used in the killing.
Petitioner, on the other hand, did not adduce evidence for his defense.
Instead, he filed a Demurrer to Evidence13without leave of court. As no action
whatsoever was taken thereon by the trial court, petitioner just moved that
the case be deemed submitted for decision.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision14 dated August 31, 1999, the trial court adjudged petitioner
guilty of murder, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused JOSE ESPINELI a.k.a.
DANILO "Danny" ESPINELI, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
committing the crime of "Murder" as charged. He is, therefore, sentenced to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and is likewise ordered to
pay the heirs of Alberto Berbon y Downie, the civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00,
and actual and compensatory damages in the total amount of ₱135,000.00
as funeral expenses (Exhibit "H"), interment fee of ₱8,360.00 (Exhibit "C"),
medical expenses in the total amount of ₱1,519.45 (Exhibit[s] "D", "D-1" and
"D-2") and for the contract fees of Memorial Park Care the amount of
₱15,700.00 (Exhibit "E").
Furthermore, considering that he is a high risk prisoner, his transfer to the
National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila, is immediately
ordered.
SO ORDERED.15
Petitioner seasonably appealed his conviction before this Court. Pursuant,
however, to the Court’s pronouncement in People v. Mateo,16 the case was
ordered transferred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition through a
Resolution17 dated March 22, 2006.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision18 promulgated on July 6, 2007, the CA affirmed with
modification the findings of the trial court. It ratiocinated that since none of
the prosecution witnesses saw how the killing of the victim was perpetrated,
the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength cannot be
appreciated. Neither can nighttime serve as an aggravating circumstance as
the time of the commission of the crime was not even alleged in the
Information. In view thereof, the CA found petitioner guilty only of homicide
instead of murder. The decretal portion of the appellate court’s Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby
DISMISSED. The appealed Decision dated August 31, 1999 of the Regional
Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 90 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide and is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
In all other respects, the said decision STANDS.
In the service of his sentence, accused-appellant shall be credited in full with
the period of his preventive imprisonment.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.19
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration20 which the CA
denied in its Resolution21 dated September 14, 2007.
Hence, this Petition.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner posits that the CA should not have affirmed the Decision of RTC as
the latter erred:
1. x x x [in admitting, considering and giving] probative value to
Exhibit "A", the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" of [Reyes] because [he] was
not presented in court to confirm, affirm and authenticate the
contents of his sworn statement. It resulted in the denial of
petitioner’s constitutional right to confront and cross-examine his
accusers.22
 2. x x x [in convicting] the [petitioner] based on unproven,
inadmissible circumstantial evidence.23
3. x x x in not acquitting the petitioner for failure of the prosecution to
prove [his guilt] beyond reasonable doubt x x x.24
In sum, petitioner anchors his quest for the reversal of his conviction on the
alleged erroneous admission in evidence of the Sinumpaang Salaysay25 of
Reyes for being hearsay and inadmissible. He avers that the said sworn
statement should not have been given probative value because its contents
were neither confirmed nor authenticated by the affiant. Thus, all
circumstances emanating from or included in the sworn statement must be
totally brushed aside as lacking any evidentiary and probative value.
Petitioner emphasizes that as found by the courts below, there was no direct
evidence linking him to the crime; therefore, he wants this Court to review the
sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence upon which his conviction was
based as he believes that the same failed to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing
respondent People of the Philippines, concurs with the petitioner and
recommends his acquittal.26 It is also of the view that the prosecution failed to
discharge its burden of proving petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
Truly, "direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis
from which a court may draw its finding of guilt."27 The rules of evidence
allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion
of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence "which indirectly proves a
fact in issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the
evidence established."28 Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court,
circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to convict the offender "if i)there
is more than one circumstance; ii) the facts from which the inference is
derived are proven; and iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt."29 All the circumstances
must be consistent with one another, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that
he is innocent. Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld provided that the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused,
to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person.30
In this case, the circumstances found by the CA as forming an unbroken
chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that petitioner, to the
exclusion of all others, is the guilty person are the following:
1. In the morning of December 15,1996, petitioner was heard telling
his co-accused Sotero Paredes (Sotero) "ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng
bukas yang si Berbon" before boarding a red car. Sotero was holding
an armalite rifle while petitioner was armed with a .45 caliber pistol;
2. The said red car was identified or recognized by prosecution
witness Rodolfo to be the same car he had sold to Sotero for
₱10,000.00 in September 1996;
3. The victim Alberto was fatally shot later in the day (December 15,
1996) by unidentified gunmen who thereafter immediately fled riding
a red car; and
4. Post-mortem examination of the victim’s body showed that he
sustained multiple gunshot wounds, the nature, severity and
characteristics of which indicate that they were inflicted using high-
powered guns, possibly anarmalite rifle and .22 caliber pistol.31
The records reveal that there was no eyewitness to the actual killing of
Alberto. Thus the courts below were forced to render their verdict of
conviction on circumstantial evidence as sanctioned under Section 4, Rule
13332 of the Rules of Court. The central issue now confronting this Court is
whether the prosecution has amply proved by circumstantial evidence
petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The circumstantial evidence relied upon by the Court of Appeals sufficiently
support petitioner’s conviction.
The Court has carefully scrutinized the evidence presented in this case in the
light of the standards discussed above and finds the foregoing circumstantial
evidence sufficient to support a judgment of conviction. Several reasons
deserve our acceptance of the circumstances upon which petitioner’s
conviction was based, to wit:
First, NBI Agent Segunial testified that he had investigated Reyes and
reduced the latter’s statement into writing declaring, among others, that in the
morning of December 15, 1996, he (Reyes) overheard petitioner telling
Sotero "Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon" and saw them
armed with .45 caliber pistol and an armalite, respectively, before boarding a
red car. The CA gave weight to Reyes’ sworn statement in this wise:
The probative value of Romeo Reyes’s worn statement as to the words
spoken by appellant to his co-accused Sotero Paredes in the morning of
December 15, 1996 cannot be disputed. x x x33
Petitioner takes vigorous exception to the said findings, insisting that the said
sworn statement belongs to the category of hearsay evidence and therefore
inadmissible. He asserts that its contents were never confirmed or
authenticated by Reyes, thus, it lacks probative value.
The Court is unconvinced.
The hearsay evidence rule as provided under Section 36, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court states:
Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay
excluded. – A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception,
except as otherwise provided in these rules.
Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part on
the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by
whom it is sought to produce. However, while the testimony of a witness
regarding a statement made by another person given for the purpose of
establishing the truth of the fact asserted in the statement is clearly hearsay
evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement on the record
is merely to establish the fact that the statement, or the tenor of such
statement, was made. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when
what is relevant is the fact that such statement has been made, the hearsay
rule does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a matter of fact,
evidence as to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for
the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or is circumstantially
relevant as to the existence of such a fact.34 This is known as the doctrine of
independently relevant statements.35
In the present case, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial that while he was
investigating Reyes, the latter confided to him that he (Reyes) heard
petitioner telling Sotero "Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon"
and that he saw the two (petitioner and Sotero) armed with a .45 caliber
pistol and an armalite, respectively, before boardinga red car, cannot be
regarded as hearsay evidence. This is considering that NBI Agent Segunial’s
testimony was not presented to prove the truth of such statement but only for
the purpose of establishing that on February 10, 1997, Reyes executed a
sworn statement containing such narration of facts. This is clear from the
offer of the witness’ oral testimony.36 Moreover, NBI Agent Segunial himself
candidly admitted that he is incompetent to testify on the truthfulness of
Reyes’ statement.37 Verily then, what the prosecution sought to be admitted
was the fact that Reyes made such narration of facts in his sworn statement
and not necessarily to prove the truth thereof. Thus, the testimony of NBI
Agent Segunial is in the nature of an independently relevant statement where
what is relevant is the fact that Reyes made such statement and the truth
and falsity thereof is immaterial. In such a case, the statement of the witness
is admissible as evidence and the hearsay rule does not apply.38 Moreover,
the written statement of Reyes is a notarized document having been duly
subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Cesar A. Bacani, a supervising agent of
the NBI. As such, it may be presented in evidence without further proof, the
certificate of acknowledgment being a prima facie evidence of the due
execution of this instrument or document involved pursuant to Section 30 of
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. As held in Gutierrez v. Mendoza-Plaza,39 a
notarized document enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due
execution which must be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Here,
no clear and convincing evidence was presented by petitioner to overcome
such presumption. Clearly, therefore, the CA did not err in its appreciation of
Reyes’ sworn statement as testified to by NBI Agent Segunial.
Second, the identification and recognition through photograph by Rodolfo of
the 1971 Ford Escort red colored car as the same car he had sold to Sotero
in September 1996 clearly and convincingly prove that it was the very same
red car used in the killing of Alberto on December 15, 1996.
Third, Alberto was shot and killed on December 15, 1996 and the gunmen
immediately fled the scene riding a red car which was identified as the same
car previously sold by Rodolfo to Sotero.
Fourth, though the testimony of Dr. Lagat was limited to the post-mortem
examination of the cadaver of Alberto, his findings that the victim suffered
multiple gunshot wounds and that the same were caused by high-powered
guns, served as corroborative evidence and contributed in a significant way
in establishing the level of proof that the law requires in convicting petitioner.
Lastly, petitioner’s escape from detention on August 26, 1998 while the case
was pending can also be considered as another circumstance since it is a
strong indication of his guilt.
All told, this Court finds the concordant combination and cumulative effect of
the alleged established circumstances, which essentially were the same
circumstances found by the trial court and the appellate court, to have
satisfied the requirement of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.
Indeed, the incriminating circumstances, when taken together, constitute an
unbroken chain of events enough to arrive at the conclusion that petitioner
was responsible for the killing of the victim.
Besides, it is "[a]n established rule in appellate review x x x that the trial
court’s factual findings, including its assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, as well as the
conclusions drawn from the factual findings, are accorded respect, if not
conclusive effect. These factual findings and conclusions assume greater
weight if they are affirmed by the CA,"40 as in this case.
The Crime Committed and the Proper Penalty.
The Court agrees with the CA that petitioner is guilty only of the crime of
homicide in view of the prosecution’s failure to prove any of the alleged
attendant circumstances of abuse of superior strength and nighttime. As
aptly observed by the appellate court:
The circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a
situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the
aggressor, and the latter takes advantage of it in the commission of the
crime. However, as none of the prosecution witnesses saw how the killing
was perpetrated, abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated in this
case. Neither can nighttime serve as an aggravating circumstance, the time
of the commission of the crime was not even alleged in the
Information.41 (Citations omitted)
The penalty prescribed by law for the crime of homicide is reclusion
temporal.42 In view of the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of
the sentence should be within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium
term which has a duration of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum
should be within the range of prision mayor which has a duration of six (6)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Thus, the imposition by the CA of
an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, is in order.
Anent the award of actual damages, this Court sees no reason to disturb the
amount awarded by the trial court as upheld by the CA since the itemized
medical and burial expenses were duly supported by receipts and other
documentary evidence.
The CA did not grant any award of damages for loss of earning capacity and
rightly so. Though Sabina testified as to the monthly salary of the deceased,
the same remains unsubstantiated. "Such indemnity cannot be awarded in
the absence of documentary evidence except where the victim was either
self-employed or a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage
under current labor laws.''44 The exceptions find no application in this case.
In addition and in conformity with current policy, an interest at the legal rate
of 6% per annum is imposed on all the monetary awards for damages from
date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED.
The Decision dated July 6, 2007 and Resolution dated September 14, 2007
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02252 are AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONS that petitioner JOSE ESPINEL! a.k.a. DANILO
"DANNY'' ESPINEL! is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
ALBERTO BERBON y DOWNIE PS0,000.00 as moral damages as well as
interest on all the damages assessed at the legal rate of 6% per annum from
date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner’s Civil liability

While the CA correctly imposed the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,

it failed, however, to award moral damages. These awards are mandatory
without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim, owing
to the fact of the commission of murder or homicide.43 Thus, for moral
damages, the award of ₱50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim is only proper.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 210760 January 26, 2015
KYLE ANTHONY ZABALA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the July 15, 2013 Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) and its January 8, 2014 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No.
34428, entitled People of the Philippines v. Kyle Anthony Zabala. The
assailed CA Decision affirmed the July 7, 2011 Judgment in Crim. Case No.
1676-M-2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, Malolos City,
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft,
punishable under Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code. The
assailed Resolution, meanwhile, denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
The Facts
An Information was filed against petitioner Kyle Anthony Zabala (Zabala)
before the RTC, Branch 22, Malolos City, charging him with theft, the
pertinent text of which states:
That on or about the 18th day of June 2007 in San Jose del Monte City,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away with him,one envelope
containing cash amounting to SIXTY EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS
(Ph₱68,000.00) belonging to Randolph V. Alas, to the damage and prejudice
of the said owner in the amount of Ph₱68,000.00. Contrary to law.1
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued.
During the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the complaining
witness, Randolph Alas (Alas), and petitioner’salleged former girlfriend,
Marlyn Piñon (Piñon). On the other hand, the defense presented the
testimonies of petitioner and of one Muriel John Ganas (Ganas), his alleged
companion on the day that the incident took place.2
Version of the Prosecution
The evidence for the prosecution tends to establish that Zabala is a jeepney
driver who earns Two Hundred Pesos (₱200) to Four Hundred Pesos (₱400)
per day on an alternate day basis. Complainant Alas, meanwhile, works at
the Manila City Hall. It is through this job that he was able to save the Sixty-
Eight Thousand Pesos (₱68,000) stolen by Zabala.3 Piñon, on the other
hand, had been the girlfriend of Zabalafor about five months when the
incident pertinent to this case occurred.
Alas testified that he and Zabalawere neighbors in San Jose Del Monte City,
Bulacan. As neighbors,he had treated Zabala as his kumpare and would
often invite the latter to drinking sessions inside his house. At times, he
would also call Zabala to repair his vehicle, because Zabala is also a
mechanic. He would allow Zabala to follow him to his bedroom to get cash
whenever spare parts are to be bought for the repair of his vehicle.4
Alas further testified that on June 18, 2007, at about 4:00 in the morning, he
left his house to go to work. When he returned from work, at around 11:00 in
the evening, he discovered that his money amounting to Sixty Eight
Thousand Pesos (₱68,000), which he kept in an envelope inside his closet,
was missing.5 During that time, there were only five (5) persons living in their
house: Alas, his parents, his nine (9) year-old son, and his aunt. He asked
his parents and aunt if they knew where he kept his money, but they did not
know.6
Witness Piñon, on the other hand, testified that in the early morning of June
18, 2007, she and Zabala, her boyfriend at the time, were together at a store
owned by the latter, which was six to seven steps away from the
complainant’s house. She then saw Zabala climb the fence and scale the
tree in front of the complainant’s house, and enter the house. When he
returned, she noticed that he had a bulge in his pocket, which she later found
to be a plentiful sum of money. Zabala then brought her home, and agreed to
meet her again at about 10:00 in the morning. They then went to Greenhills,
where Zabala bought two Nokia mobile phones, which cost about Eight
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱8,500).7
Version of the Defense
For his defense, Zabala testified that in the early morning of June 17, 2007,
he was driving his passenger jeepney, together with his friend, witness
Ganas. They parted ways at around 6:00 in the morning of the following day.
During the whole time they were together, they did not drop by the house of
the private complainant. Neither did he have the time to meet Marilyn Piñon,
of whom he regarded only as an acquaintance and not his girlfriend.8
Witness Ganas corroborated the declaration of Zabala. He testified that he
was with petitioner, acting as the conductor, while petitioner was plying the
route of his driven jeepney. He had known petitioner since his childhood, and
was his good friend.9
Ruling of the RTC
On July 7, 2011, the RTC rendered its Judgment convicting petitioner of the
offense charged. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No. 1676-M-2008
CONVICTING accused KYLE ANTHONY ZABALA with the crime of theft
defined and penalized under the provisions of Article 308 and 309 of the
Revised Penal Code and is hereby [sentenced] to suffer imprisonment of,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the MINIMUM penalty of prision
correccional which is 6 years, to a MAXIMUM penalty of prision mayorin its
maximum period [of] 8 years.
Accused Zabala is likewise ordered to indemnify and pay the amount of sixty
eight thousand pesos (Php68,000.00) to complaining witness Randolph V.
Alas by way of reparation of the damage caused on him.
Furnish both the public prosecutor and defense counsel of this judgment
including the accused.10
Aggrieved by the Judgment, petitioner appealed to the CA, attributing to the
lower court the following errors: (1) there was a grave error in not giving
credence to petitioner’s version; (2) petitioner was convicted of the crime
charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt; and (3) petitioner cannot be convicted based on
circumstantial evidence.
Ruling of the CA
In its presently assailed Decision promulgated on July 15, 2013, the CA
denied the appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court, but with
modification as to the penalty to be imposed upon petitioner. The CA ruled
that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
the appellant through circumstantial evidence.
Citing People v. Modesto,11 the CA said:
x x x [T]he doctrine on circumstantial evidence has been recognized as part
of the legal tradition when it was declared that "a rule of ancient respectability
somolded into tradition is that circumstantial evidence suffices to convict only
if the following requisites concur: first, there is more than one circumstance;
second, the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
finally, the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.12
The CA then found that the series of circumstances present in this case
supports a conviction, and constitutes the basis for a reasonable inference of
the existence of the facts thereby sought to be proved.13
Rejecting the defense of petitioner, the CA ruled that he offered no evidence
other than an alibi to exculpate him from the crime charged. It then cited the
rule that alibi is a weakdefense, and cannot prevail over the positive
testimony of a truthful witness.14
The CA disposed of petitioner’s appeal as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed
decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, accused-appellant
is sentenced to six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to twelve
(12) years, eight (8) months and eight (8) days of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
Accused Zabala is likewise [ordered to] indemnify and pay the amount of
Sixty Eight Thousand Pesos (Php68,000.00) to complaining witness
Randolph V. Alas by way of reparation of the damage caused on him.15
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,but in its assailed Resolution dated
January 8, 2014,the CA denied it.
Thus, the present recourse before this Court. Petitioner now argues that
there is no sufficient evidence on record to support his conviction for the
charge of theft.
In its Comment, respondent People insists that the prosecution was able to
establish petitioner’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It argues that the CA
correctly ruled that the series of circumstances presented before the trial
court is sufficient to support a conviction. 16
The Issues
I.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE PETITIONER’S CONVICTION BY GIVING FULL
WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES’
TESTIMONIES.
II.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD FAILED
TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION.17
In fine, petitioner alleges that the evidence presented before the trial court is
insufficient to convict him of the offense charged.
The Court’s Ruling
We reverse the findings of the RTC and the CA. We agree with petitioner,
and find that the evidence presented below does not constitute proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, sufficientto convict petitioner of theft. Thus, he must be
acquitted.
Discussion
Given that the case for the prosecution is largely based on circumstantial
evidence, a short discussion on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to
convict an accused is in order.
Circumstantial evidence asbasis for conviction
It is a settled rule that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a
conviction, and that direct evidence isnot always necessary. This is but a
recognition of the reality that in certain instances, due to the inherent attempt
to conceal a crime, it is not always possible to obtain direct evidence. In
Bacolod v. People, this Court had the occasion to say:
The lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the
guilt of the accused cannot be proved by evidence other than direct
evidence. Direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, because circumstantial evidence, if sufficient, can
supplant the absence of direct evidence. The crime charged may also be
proved by circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or
presumptive evidence. Circumstantial evidence has been defined as that
which "goes to prove a fact or series of facts other than the facts in issue,
which, if proved, may tend by inference to establish a fact in issue."18
The Rules of Court itself recognizes that circumstantial evidence is sufficient
for conviction, under certain circumstances:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
(1) There is more than one circumstance;
(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
Moreover, in Lozano v. People, this Court clarified the application of the
circumstantial evidence rule:
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that
the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain
which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused,
to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. The circumstantial
evidence must exclude the possibility that some other person has committed
the crime.19 (emphasis in the original)
The prosecution failed to establish, by circumstantial
evidence, that petitioner is guilty of theft
Unfortunately, in the case at bar, this Court finds that the prosecution failed
to present sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict the petitioner of the
offense charged. We find that the pieces of evidence presented before the
trial court fail to provide a sufficient combination of circumstances, as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
To recall, the evidence of the prosecution purports to establish the following
narrative: first, that the complaining witness Alas hides ₱68,000 in cash in his
closet inside their house; second, that petitioner is aware that Alas hides
money in his bedroom closet; third, that on the night of the incident, petitioner
was with his then girlfriend, witness Piñon; fourth, that petitioner climbed
through the fence of Alas’s house, and was able to successfully gain
entrance to his house; fifth, that petitioner later went out of the house with a
bulge in his pockets; and sixth, that later that day, petitioner and Piñon went
shopping for a cellphone.
The foregoing narration––based on the testimonies of the two witnesses of
the prosecution, even if given full faith and credit and considered as
established facts––failsto establish that petitioner committed the crime of
theft. If at all, it may possibly constitute evidence that petitioner committed an
offense, but not necessarily theft.
In the case before the Court,the evidence presented by the prosecution fails
to establish the corpus delicti of theft. In Tan v. People, this Court said:
Corpus delicti means the "body or substance of the crime, and, in its primary
sense, refers to the fact that the crime has been actually committed." The
"essential elements of theft are (1) the taking of personal property; (2) the
property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done with intent of gain;
(4) the taking away was done without the consent of the owner; and (5) the
taking away is accomplished without violence or intimidation against persons
or force upon things." In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1)
that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious
taking.20
First, nobody saw Zabala enter the bedroom of Alas, where the money
amounting to ₱68,000 was allegedly kept and hidden. It is interesting to note
that while Alas testified that there were other persons living in that house, i.e.
his family members, the prosecution failed to put any of them on the witness
stand, to testify that they saw or heard something out of the ordinary at the
time the incident allegedly took place, or to explain why nobody else was
able to notice that the theft took place while Alas was absent. Witness Piñon,
meanwhile, merely testified that she saw Zabala scale the fence of Alas’
house and enter it. She did not actually see Zabala enter the room of Alas,
where the money was hidden.
Second, the evidence presented below is insufficient to determine without a
reasonable doubt that the ₱68,000 in cash was lost due to felonious taking,
and,more importantly, that it was petitioner who committed the felonious
taking. Even if believed in its entirety, the testimony of witness Piñon does
not show that when petitioner left the house of Alas, he was carrying the
₱68,000 incash which was supposedly lost. All that Piñon saw was the bulge
in petitioner’s pockets. Piñon’s testimony can considered as evidence to
prove that when petitioner entered the house of Alas, he did so because of
his intent to commit asportation.
Third, Piñon' s testimony fails to establish that Alas' pocket indeed contained
the stolen money, as she never actually saw what was inside the pocket of
Zabala. While she testified that later that day, they went to buy 2 cellphones
amounting to ₱8,500, she failed to testify whether the money that Zabala
used in paying for the cellphone was retrieved from the very same bulging
pocket which she saw earlier in the day, which would have led to the
conclusion that Zabala's pocket contained money. Failing this, what is left is
the fact that Pifion saw a bulge in Zabala's pocket, and there is no evidence
whatsoever to prove that his pocket in fact was used to hide the money that
he allegedly stole. The trial and appellate courts committed error in accepting
as fact that Zabala's pocket contained money, when there is a dearth of
evidence to support such allegation.
And fourth, the rule in circumstantial evidence cases is that the evidence
must exclude the possibility that some other person committed the crime.21 In
the case here, however, the prosecution failed to prove, or even allege, that it
was impossible for some other person to have committed the crime of theft
against Alas. The prosecution failed to adduce evidence that at the time the
theft was committed, there was no other person inside the house of Alas, or
that no other person could have taken the money from the closet of Alas.
Alas himself admitted that there were other residents in the house, but these
persons were never presented to prove their whereabouts at the time the
incident took place. This failure of the prosecution leads the Court to no other
conclusion but that they failed to establish that culpability could only belong
to Zabala, and not to some other person.
Given the foregoing discussion, We find that petit10ner was wrongfully
convicted of theft.1âwphi1 In the absence of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, the presumption of innocence must be upheld, and thus, petitioner
should be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, this petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the July 15, 2013
Decision of the Court of Appeals and its January 8, 2014 Resolution in CA-
G.R. CR No. 34428 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Kyle
Anthony Zabala is ACQUITTED of the offense of theft, on account of
reasonable doubt. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005]
ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND
MINOR MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE, REPRESENTED BY HIS
MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE ANGELA
PROLLAMANTE, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
At issue in this petition for certiorari [1] is whether or not the Court of
Appeals (CA) gravely erred in exercising its discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, in issuing a decision[2] and resolution[3] upholding the
resolution and order of the trial court,[4] which denied petitioners motion to
dismiss private respondents complaint for support and directed the parties to
submit themselves to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) paternity testing.
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins
alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and
support pendente lite before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 106.[5]
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992,
after which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly
impregnated Fe on her 34thbirthday on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnels
insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out
of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in
Quezon City. The babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as
the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later
refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate
financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for
adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.
On January 19, 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the
Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with
the open car door hitting Fes leg. This incident was reported to the police. In
July 2001, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been
undergoing chemotherapy. On March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin sued Arnel for
support.[6]
In his amended answer, Arnel denied having sired Martin because his
affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended in 1998, long before Martins
conception. He claimed that Fe had at least one other secret lover. Arnel
admitted that their relationship started in 1993 but he never really fell in love
with (Fe) not only because (she) had at least one secret lover, a certain Jun,
but also because she proved to be scheming and overly demanding and
possessive. As a result, theirs was a stormy on-and-off affair. What started as
a romantic liaison between two consenting adults eventually turned out to be
a case of fatal attraction where (Fe) became so obsessed with (Arnel), to the
point of even entertaining the idea of marrying him, that she resorted to various
devious ways and means to alienate (him) from his wife and family. Unable to
bear the prospect of losing his wife and children, Arnel terminated the affair
although he still treated her as a friend such as by referring potential customers
to the car aircon repair shop[7] where she worked. Later on, Arnel found out
that Fe had another erstwhile secret lover. In May 2000, Arnel and his entire
family went to the United States for a vacation. Upon their return in June 2000,
Arnel learned that Fe was telling people that he had impregnated her. Arnel
refused to acknowledge the child as his because their last intimacy was
sometime in 1998.[8]Exasperated, Fe started calling Arnels wife and family. On
January 19, 2001, Fe followed Arnel to the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club
parking lot to demand that he acknowledge Martin as his child. According to
Arnel, he could not get through Fe and the discussion became so heated that
he had no alternative but to move on but without bumping or hitting any part of
her body.[9] Finally, Arnel claimed that the signature and the community tax
certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the acknowledgment of Martins birth
certificate were falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected his marital status as
single when he was actually married and that his birth year was 1965 when it
should have been 1964.[10]
In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17, 2002, Arnel vehemently denied
having sired Martin but expressed willingness to consider any proposal to
settle the case.[11]
On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order
directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant
to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court.[12]
Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-
incrimination.[13] He also moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of
action, considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a forgery and
that, under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not
recognized by the putative father.[14] In his motion, Arnel manifested that he
had filed criminal charges for falsification of documents against Fe (I.S. Nos.
02-5723 and 02-7192) and a petition for cancellation of his name appearing in
Martins birth certificate (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-46669). He attached
the certification of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory that his
signature in the birth certificate was forged.
 The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the
parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the
applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Thus, this petition.
In a nutshell, petitioner raises two issues: (1) whether a complaint for
support can be converted to a petition for recognition and (2) whether DNA
paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating
petitioners constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.[15]
The petition is without merit.
First of all, the trial court properly denied the petitioners motion to dismiss
because the private respondents complaint on its face showed that they had
a cause of action against the petitioner. The elements of a cause of action are:
(1) the plaintiffs primary right and the defendants corresponding primary duty,
and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the
primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is determined
not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged.[16]
In the complaint, private respondents alleged that Fe had amorous
relations with the petitioner, as a result of which she gave birth to Martin out of
wedlock. In his answer, petitioner admitted that he had sexual relations with
Fe but denied that he fathered Martin, claiming that he had ended the
relationship long before the childs conception and birth. It is undisputed and
even admitted by the parties that there existed a sexual relationship between
Arnel and Fe. The only remaining question is whether such sexual relationship
produced the child, Martin. If it did, as respondents have alleged, then Martin
should be supported by his father Arnel. If not, petitioner and Martin are
strangers to each other and Martin has no right to demand and petitioner has
no obligation to give support.
Preliminaries aside, we now tackle the main issues.
Petitioner refuses to recognize Martin as his own child and denies the
genuineness and authenticity of the childs birth certificate which he purportedly
signed as the father. He also claims that the order and resolution of the trial
court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, effectively converted the complaint
for support to a petition for recognition, which is supposedly proscribed by law.
According to petitioner, Martin, as an unrecognized child, has no right to ask
for support and must first establish his filiation in a separate suit under Article
283[17] in relation to Article 265[18] of the Civil Code and Section 1, Rule
105[19] of the Rules of Court.
The petitioners contentions are without merit.
The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support
into one for recognition but merely allowed the respondents to prove their
cause of action against petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the
documentary evidence of acknowledgement. But even if the assailed
resolution and order effectively integrated an action to compel recognition with
an action for support, such was valid and in accordance with jurisprudence.
In Tayag v. Court of Appeals,[20] we allowed the integration of an action to
compel recognition with an action to claim ones inheritance:
In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and
successional rights from the putative or presumed parent, must prove his
filiation to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege in the
complaint that the putative father had acknowledged and recognized the
illegitimate child because such acknowledgment is essential to and is the
basis of the right to inherit. There being no allegation of such
acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition which
cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio
decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for
failure of the petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint,
but the prescription of the action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner
contends that the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges
that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is
actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be
considered as one to compel recognition. Further, that the two causes of
action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance,
may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.
As early as [1922] we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et al. (43
Phil. 763 [1922]) wherein we said:
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in
any event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child
and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one
which in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative,
provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct
causes of action are present in the particular case. In other words, there is
no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel
acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a
successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff
seeks additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing
so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule
should be here applied different from that generally applicable in other cases.
xxx
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by
this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions.
Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be
considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel
acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged,
may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance
against his coheirs x x x; and the same person may intervene in
proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father,
or mother x x x. In neither of these situations has it been thought necessary
for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The
obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other
persons who might take by inheritance are before the court; and the
declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings. (Underscoring
supplied)
Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as
in Tayag, the basis or rationale for integrating them remains the same.
Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to support depends completely
on the determination of filiation. A separate action will only result in a
multiplicity of suits, given how intimately related the main issues in both cases
are. To paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to
these proceedings.
On the second issue, petitioner posits that DNA is not recognized by this
Court as a conclusive means of proving paternity. He also contends that
compulsory testing violates his right to privacy and right against self-
incrimination as guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution. These contentions
have no merit.
Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA testing
as a means for determining paternity has actually been the focal issue in a
controversy, a brief historical sketch of our past decisions featuring or
mentioning DNA testing is called for.
In the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee[21] where the appellant was
convicted of murder on the testimony of three eyewitnesses, we stated as
an obiter dictum that while eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as
accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence
such as the fingerprint or the DNA test result(emphasis supplied).
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast in the
previous decade. In Pe Lim v. Court of Appeals,[22] promulgated in 1997, we
cautioned against the use of DNA because DNA, being a relatively new
science, (had) not as yet been accorded official recognition by our courts.
Paternity (would) still have to be resolved by such conventional evidence as
the relevant incriminating acts, verbal and written, by the putative father.
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA as
evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals:[23]
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods
unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we
have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the
capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis.
The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2)
copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA
from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test
as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case
comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA
evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science
when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said
result is to deny progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative
evidence in Philippine jurisprudence came in 2002 with our en banc decision
in People v. Vallejo[24] where the rape and murder victims DNA samples from
the bloodstained clothes of the accused were admitted in evidence. We
reasoned that the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an
association exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference sample.
The samples collected (were) subjected to various chemical processes to
establish their profile.
A year later, in People v. Janson,[25] we acquitted the accused charged
with rape for lack of evidence because doubts persist(ed) in our mind as to
who (were) the real malefactors. Yes, a complex offense (had) been
perpetrated but who (were) the perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or
other scientific evidence to still our doubts!
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC[26] where the Court en banc was
faced with the issue of filiation of then presidential candidate Fernando Poe
Jr., we stated:
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily
establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic
codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical
residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would
clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, this Court has
acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar,[27] we affirmed the
conviction of the accused for rape with homicide, the principal evidence for
which included DNA test results. We did a lengthy discussion of DNA, the
process of DNA testing and the reasons for its admissibility in the context of
our own Rules of Evidence:
Deoxyribonucleic Acid, or DNA, is a molecule that encodes the genetic
information in all living organisms. A persons DNA is the same in each cell
and it does not change throughout a persons lifetime; the DNA in a persons
blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and
shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells.
Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no
two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical
twins.
xxx xxx xxx
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should
consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were collected,
how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the
procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the
analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified
by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification
techniques. Based on Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it was determined that the
gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts
subject of examination. The blood sample taken from the appellant showed
that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP29/10
and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the victims
vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the
victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the
course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and
technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious
as we traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit
from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other
jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven
instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow (509 U.S. 579 (1993); 125 L. Ed. 2d 469) it was
ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be
used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were
allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial,
including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is
one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in
issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying
the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR
testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a
quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid
principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing
and the admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. In that case, DNA
samples from semen recovered from a rape victims vagina were used to
positively identify the accused Joel Kawit Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed
that the compulsory extraction of his blood sample for DNA testing, as well as
the testing itself, violated his right against self-incrimination, as embodied in
both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution. We addressed this as
follows:
The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all
compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-
incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of
the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence
sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of object
evidence taken from the person of the accused from the realm of self-
incrimination. These include photographs,[28] hair,[29] and other bodily
substances.[30] We have also declared as constitutional several procedures
performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests for women accused of
adultery,[31] expulsion of morphine from ones mouth[32] and the tracing of ones
foot to determine its identity with bloody footprints.[33] In Jimenez v.
Caizares,[34] we even authorized the examination of a womans genitalia, in an
action for annulment filed by her husband, to verify his claim that she was
impotent, her orifice being too small for his penis. Some of these procedures
were, to be sure, rather invasive and involuntary, but all of them were
constitutionally sound. DNA testing and its results, per our ruling
in Yatar,[35] are now similarly acceptable.
Nor does petitioners invocation of his right to privacy persuade us. In Ople
v. Torres,[36] where we struck down the proposed national computerized
identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not
bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle
scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and
the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper
safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and
seizures,[37] and the infringement of privacy of communication[38] where the
constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioners case
involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against self-
incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water. His hollow invocation of his
constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason that they
are not in any way being violated. If, in a criminal case, an accused whose
very life is at stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no
reason why, in this civil case, petitioner herein who does not face such dire
consequences cannot be ordered to do the same.
DNA paternity testing first came to prominence in the United States,
where it yielded its first official results sometime in 1985. In the decade that
followed, DNA rapidly found widespread general acceptance.[39] Several cases
decided by various State Supreme Courts reflect the total assimilation of DNA
testing into their rules of procedure and evidence.
The case of Wilson v. Lumb[40] shows that DNA testing is so commonly
accepted that, in some instances, ordering the procedure has become a
ministerial act. The Supreme Court of St. Lawrence County, New York allowed
a party who had already acknowledged paternity to subsequently challenge
his prior acknowledgment. The Court pointed out that, under the law,
specifically Section 516 of the New York Family Court Act, the Family Court
examiner had the duty, upon receipt of the challenge, to order DNA tests: [41]
516-a. Acknowledgment of paternity. (a) An acknowledgment of paternity
executed pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the social services law
or section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law
shall establish the paternity of and liability for the support of a child pursuant
to this act. Such acknowledgment must be reduced to writing and filed
pursuant to section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public
health law with the registrar of the district in which the birth occurred and in
which the birth certificate has been filed. No further judicial or administrative
proceedings are required to ratify an unchallenged acknowledgment of
paternity.
(b) An acknowledgment of paternity executed pursuant to section one
hundred eleven-k of the social services law or section four thousand one
hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law may be rescinded by either
signators filing of a petition with the court to vacate the acknowledgment
within the earlier of sixty days of the date of signing the acknowledgment or
the date of an administrative or a judicial proceeding (including a proceeding
to establish a support order) relating to the child in which either signator is a
party. For purposes of this section, the "date of an administrative or a judicial
proceeding" shall be the date by which the respondent is required to answer
the petition. After the expiration of sixty days of the execution of the
acknowledgment, either signator may challenge the acknowledgment of
paternity in court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of
fact, with the burden of proof on the party challenging the voluntary
acknowledgment. Upon receiving a partys challenge to an
acknowledgment, the court shall order genetic marker tests
or DNA tests for the determination of the childs paternity and shall
make a finding of paternity, if appropriate, in accordance with this
article. Neither signators legal obligations, including the obligation for child
support arising from the acknowledgment, may be suspended during the
challenge to the acknowledgment except for good cause as the court may
find. If a party petitions to rescind an acknowledgment and if the court
determines that the alleged father is not the father of the child, or if the court
finds that an acknowledgment is invalid because it was executed on the
basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, the court shall vacate the
acknowledgment of paternity and shall immediately provide a copy of the
order to the registrar of the district in which the childs birth certificate is filed
and also to the putative father registry operated by the department of social
services pursuant to section three hundred seventy-two-c of the social
services law. In addition, if the mother of the child who is the subject of the
acknowledgment is in receipt of child support services pursuant to title six-A
of article three of the social services law, the court shall immediately provide
a copy of the order to the child support enforcement unit of the social
services district that provides the mother with such services.
(c) A determination of paternity made by any other state, whether established
through the parents acknowledgment of paternity or through an
administrative or judicial process, must be accorded full faith and credit, if
and only if such acknowledgment meets the requirements set forth in section
452(a)(7) of the social security act.
(emphasis supplied)
DNA testing also appears elsewhere in the New York Family Court Act:[42]
532. Genetic marker and DNA tests; admissibility of records or reports of test
results; costs of tests.
a) The court shall advise the parties of their right to one or more genetic
marker tests or DNA tests and, on the courts own motion or the motion of
any party, shall order the mother, her child and the alleged father to submit to
one or more genetic marker or DNA tests of a type generally acknowledged
as reliable by an accreditation body designated by the secretary of the
federal department of health and human services and performed by a
laboratory approved by such an accreditation body and by the commissioner
of health or by a duly qualified physician to aid in the determination of
whether the alleged father is or is not the father of the child. No such test
shall be ordered, however, upon a written finding by the court that it is
not in the best interests of the child on the basis of res judicata,
equitable estoppel, or the presumption of legitimacy of a child born to a
married woman. The record or report of the results of any such genetic
marker or DNA test ordered pursuant to this section or pursuant to section
one hundred eleven-k of the social services law shall be received in evidence
by the court pursuant to subdivision (e) of rule forty-five hundred eighteen of
the civil practice law and rules where no timely objection in writing has been
made thereto and that if such timely objections are not made, they shall be
deemed waived and shall not be heard by the court. If the record or report
of the results of any such genetic marker or DNA test or tests indicate
at least a ninety-five percent probability of paternity, the admission of
such record or report shall create a rebuttable presumption of
paternity, and shall establish, if unrebutted, the paternity of and liability
for the support of a child pursuant to this article and article four of this
act.
(b) Whenever the court directs a genetic marker or DNA test pursuant to this
section, a report made as provided in subdivision (a) of this section may be
received in evidence pursuant to rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil
practice law and rules if offered by any party.
(c) The cost of any test ordered pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section
shall be, in the first instance, paid by the moving party. If the moving party is
financially unable to pay such cost, the court may direct any qualified public
health officer to conduct such test, if practicable; otherwise, the court may
direct payment from the funds of the appropriate local social services district.
In its order of disposition, however, the court may direct that the cost of any
such test be apportioned between the parties according to their respective
abilities to pay or be assessed against the party who does not prevail on the
issue of paternity, unless such party is financially unable to pay. (emphasis
supplied)
In R.E. v. C.E.W.,[43] a decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court, DNA
tests were used to prove that H.W., previously thought to be an offspring of
the marriage between A.C.W. and C.E.W., was actually the child of R.E. with
whom C.E.W. had, at the time of conception, maintained an adulterous
relationship.
In Erie County Department of Social Services on behalf of Tiffany M.H. v.
Greg G.,[44] the 4th Department of the New York Supreme Courts Appellate
Division allowed G.G., who had been adjudicated as T.M.H.s father by default,
to have the said judgment vacated, even after six years, once he had shown
through a genetic marker test that he was not the childs father. In this case,
G.G. only requested the tests after the Department of Social Services, six
years after G.G. had been adjudicated as T.M.H.s father, sought an increase
in his support obligation to her.
In Greco v. Coleman,[45] the Michigan Supreme Court while ruling on the
constitutionality of a provision of law allowing non-modifiable support
agreements pointed out that it was because of the difficulty of determining
paternity before the advent of DNA testing that such support agreements were
necessary:
As a result of DNA testing, the accuracy with which paternity can be proven
has increased significantly since the parties in this lawsuit entered into their
support agreement(current testing methods can determine the probability of
paternity to 99.999999% accuracy). However, at the time the parties before
us entered into the disputed agreement, proving paternity was a very
significant obstacle to an illegitimate child's access to child support. The first
reported results of modern DNA paternity testing did not occur until 1985.
("In fact, since its first reported results in 1985, DNA matching has
progressed to 'general acceptance in less than a decade'"). Of course, while
prior blood-testing methods could exclude some males from being the
possible father of a child, those methods could not affirmatively pinpoint a
particular male as being the father. Thus, when the settlement agreement
between the present parties was entered in 1980, establishing paternity was
a far more difficult ordeal than at present. Contested paternity actions at that
time were often no more than credibility contests. Consequently, in every
contested paternity action, obtaining child support depended not merely on
whether the putative father was, in fact, the child's biological father, but
rather on whether the mother could prove to a court of law that she was only
sexually involved with one man--the putative father. Allowing parties the
option of entering into private agreements in lieu of proving paternity
eliminated the risk that the mother would be unable meet her burden of proof.
It is worth noting that amendments to Michigans Paternity law have
included the use of DNA testing:[46]
722.716 Pretrial proceedings; blood or tissue typing determinations as to
mother, child, and alleged father; court order; refusal to submit to typing or
identification profiling; qualifications of person conducting typing or
identification profiling; compensation of expert; result of typing or
identification profiling; filing summary report; objection; admissibility;
presumption; burden of proof; summary disposition.
Sec. 6.
(1) In a proceeding under this act before trial, the court, upon
application made by or on behalf of either party, or on its own motion,
shall order that the mother, child, and alleged father submit to blood or
tissue typing determinations, which may include, but are not limited to,
determinations of red cell antigens, red cell isoenzymes, human
leukocyte antigens, serum proteins, or DNA identification profiling, to
determine whether the alleged father is likely to be, or is not, the father
of the child. If the court orders a blood or tissue typing
or DNA identification profiling to be conducted and a party refuses to
submit to the typing or DNA identification profiling, in addition to any
other remedies available, the court may do either of the following:
(a) Enter a default judgment at the request of the appropriate party.
(b) If a trial is held, allow the disclosure of the fact of the refusal unless
good cause is shown for not disclosing the fact of refusal.
(2) A blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling shall be conducted
by a person accredited for paternity determinations by a nationally
recognized scientific organization, including, but not limited to, the American
association of blood banks.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) If the probability of paternity determined by the qualified person
described in subsection (2) conducting the blood or tissue typing
or DNA identification profiling is 99% or higher, and
the DNA identification profile and summary report are admissible as
provided in subsection (4), paternity is presumed. If the results of the
analysis of genetic testing material from 2 or more persons indicate a
probability of paternity greater than 99%, the contracting laboratory
shall conduct additional genetic paternity testing until all but 1 of the
putative fathers is eliminated, unless the dispute involves 2 or more
putative fathers who have identical DNA.
(6) Upon the establishment of the presumption of paternity as provided in
subsection (5), either party may move for summary disposition under the
court rules. this section does not abrogate the right of either party to child
support from the date of birth of the child if applicable under section 7.
(emphasis supplied)
In Rafferty v. Perkins,[47] the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that DNA
test results showing paternity were sufficient to overthrow the presumption of
legitimacy of a child born during the course of a marriage:
The presumption of legitimacy having been rebutted by the results of the
blood test eliminating Perkins as Justin's father, even considering the
evidence in the light most favorable to Perkins, we find that no reasonable
jury could find that Easter is not Justin's father based upon the 99.94%
probability of paternity concluded by the DNA testing.
In S.J.F. and J.C.F. v. R.C.W.,[48] the North Dakota Supreme Court
upheld an order for genetic testing given by the Court of Appeals, even after
trial on the merits had concluded without such order being given. Significantly,
when J.C.F., the mother, first filed the case for paternity and support with the
District Court, neither party requested genetic testing. It was only upon appeal
from dismissal of the case that the appellate court remanded the case and
ordered the testing, which the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld.
The case of Kohl v. Amundson,[49] decided by the Supreme Court of
South Dakota, demonstrated that even default judgments of paternity could be
vacated after the adjudicated father had, through DNA testing, established
non-paternity. In this case, Kohl, having excluded himself as the father of
Amundsons child through DNA testing, was able to have the default judgment
against him vacated. He then obtained a ruling ordering Amundson to
reimburse him for the amounts withheld from his wages for child support. The
Court said (w)hile Amundson may have a remedy against the father of the
child, she submit(ted) no authority that require(d) Kohl to support her child.
Contrary to Amundson's position, the fact that a default judgment was entered,
but subsequently vacated, (did) not foreclose Kohl from obtaining a money
judgment for the amount withheld from his wages.
In M.A.S. v. Mississippi Dept. of Human Services,[50] another case
decided by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, it was held that even if paternity
was established through an earlier agreed order of filiation, child support and
visitation orders could still be vacated once DNA testing established someone
other than the named individual to be the biological father. The Mississippi
High Court reiterated this doctrine in Williams v. Williams.[51]
The foregoing considered, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the public respondent for upholding the orders of the trial court which
both denied the petitioners motion to dismiss and ordered him to submit
himself for DNA testing. Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
the remedy of certiorari is only available when any tribunal, board or officer
has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.[52] In Land Bank of the Philippines v. the Court of Appeals [53] where we
dismissed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, we discussed at
length the nature of such a petition and just what was meant by grave abuse
of discretion:
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction
of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison detre for the
rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so
engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error
is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its
jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such
a scenario, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where the
issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decisionnot the jurisdiction of the court to render said decisionthe same is
beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari.

The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a

petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
On the other hand, if the error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or
the act complained of was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or agency
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the
proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the said Rules. (emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness,
passion, prejudice or personal hostility that would amount to grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. The respondent court acted
entirely within its jurisdiction in promulgating its decision and resolution, and
any error made would have only been an error in judgment. As we have
discussed, however, the decision of the respondent court, being firmly
anchored in law and jurisprudence, was correct.

Epilogue

For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who
choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing
technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and
abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and
have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect
time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative
form of evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully
reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The Court of Appeals decision dated January 28, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No.
80961 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 172607
Appelle,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
RUFINO UMANITO,
Appellant.
Promulgated
April 16, 2009
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
In our Resolution dated 26 October 2007, this Court resolved, for the very first
time, to apply the then recently promulgated New Rules on DNA Evidence
(DNA Rules)[1] in a case pending before us this case. We remanded the case
to the RTC for reception of DNA evidence in accordance with the terms of said
Resolution, and in light of the fact that the impending exercise would be the
first application of the procedure, directed Deputy Court Administrator Reuben
Dela Cruz to: (a) monitor the manner in which the court a quo carries out the
DNA Rules; and (b) assess and submit periodic reports on the implementation
of the DNA Rules in the case to the Court.
To recall, the instant case involved a charge of rape. The accused Rufino
Umanito (Umanito) was found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang,
La Union, Branch 67 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
Umanito was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ordered to indemnify the private complainant in the sum of P50,000.00. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals offered the judgment of the trial court. Umanito
appealed the decision of the appellate court to this court.
In its 2007 Resolution, the Court acknowledged many incongruent assertions
of the prosecution and the defense.[2] At the same time, the alleged 1989 rape
of the private complainant, AAA, had resulted in her pregnancy and the birth
of a child, a girl hereinafter identified as BBB. In view of that fact, a well as the
defense of alibi raised by Umanito, the Court deemed uncovering of whether
or not Umanito is the father of BBB greatly determinative of the resolution of
the appeal. The Court then observed:
x x x With the advance in genetics and the availability
of new technology, it can now be determined with reasonable
certainty whether appellant is the father of AAA's child. If he is
not, his acquittal may be ordained. We have pronounced that
if it can be conclusively determined that the accused did not
sire the alleged victim's child, this may cast the shadow of
reasonable doubt and allow his acquittal on this basis. If he is
found not to be the father, the finding will at least weigh heavily
in the ultimate decision in this case. Thus, we are directing
appellant, AAA and her child to submit themselves to
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing under the aegis of the
New Rule on DNA Evidence (the Rules), which took effect on
15 October 2007, subject to guidelines prescribed herein.[3]
The RTC of Bauang, La Union, Branch 67, presided by Judge Ferdinand A.
Fe, upon receiving the Resolution of the Court on 9 November 2007, set the
case for hearing on 27 November 2007[4] to ascertain the feasibility of DNA
testing with due regard to the standards set in Sections 4(a), (b), (c) and (e) of
the DNA Rules. Both AAA and BBB (now 17 years old) testified during the
hearing. They also manifested their willingness to undergo DNA examination
to determine whether Umanito is the father of BBB.[5]
A hearing was conducted on 5 December 2007, where the public prosecutor
and the counsel for Umanito manifested their concurrence to the selection of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) as the institution that would conduct
the DNA testing. The RTC issued an Order on even date directing that
biological samples be taken from AAA, BBB and Umanito on 9 January
2008 at the courtroom. The Order likewise enjoined the NBI as follows:
In order to protect the integrity of the biological samples, the
[NBI] is enjoined to strictly follow the measures laid down by
the Honorable Supreme Court in the instant case to wit:
Moreover, the court a quo must ensure that
the proper chain of custody in the handling of the
samples submitted by the parties is adequately borne
in the records, i.e.; that the samples are collected by
a neutral third party; that the tested parties are
appropriately identified at their sample collection
appointments; that the samples are protected with
tamper tape at the collection site; that all persons in
possession thereof at each stage of testing thoroughly
inspected the samples for tampering and explained
 his role in the custody of the samples and the acts he
performed in relation thereto.
The DNA test result shall be simultaneously disclosed to the
parties in Court. The [NBI] is, therefore, enjoined not to
disclose to the parties in advance the DNA test results.
The [NBI] is further enjoined to observe the confidentiality of
the DNA profiles and all results or other information obtained
from DNA testing and is hereby ordered to preserve the
evidence until such time as the accused has been acquitted or
served his sentence.[6]
Present at the hearing held on 9 January 2008 were AAA, BBB,
counsel for Umanito, and two representatives from the NBI. The RTC had
previously received a letter from the Officer-in-Charge of the New Bilibid
Prisons informing the trial court that Umanito would not be able to attend the
hearing without an authority coming from the Supreme Court.[7] The parties
manifested in court their willingness to the taking of the DNA sample from the
accused at his detention center at the New Bilibid Prisons on 8 February
2008.[8] The prosecution then presented on the witness stand NBI forensic
chemist Mary Ann Aranas, who testified on her qualifications as an expert
witness in the field of DNA testing. No objections were posed to her
qualifications by the defense. Aranas was accompanied by a laboratory
technician of the NBI DNA laboratory who was to assist in the extraction of
DNA.
DNA samples were thus extracted from AAA and BBB in the
presence of Judge Fe, the prosecutor, the counsel for the defense, and DCA
De la Cruz. On 8 February 2008, DNA samples were extracted from Umanito
at the New Bilibid Prisons by NBI chemist Aranas, as witnessed by Judge Fe,
the prosecutor, the defense counsel, DCA De la Cruz, and other personnel of
the Court and the New Bilibid Prisons.[9]
The RTC ordered the NBI to submit the result of the DNA examination
within thirty (30) days after the extraction of biological samples of Umanito,
and directed its duly authorized representatives to attend a hearing on the
admissibility of such DNA evidence scheduled for 10 March 2008. The events
of the 28 March 2008 hearing, as well as the subsequent hearing on 29 April
2008, were recounted in the Report dated 19 May 2008 submitted by Judge
Fe. We quote therefrom with approval:
2. That as previously scheduled in the order of the trial court
on 09 January 2008, the case was set for hearing on the
admissibility of the result of the DNA testing.
At the hearing, Provincial Prosecutor Maria Nenita A.
Opiana, presented Mary Ann T. Aranas, a Forensic Chemist of
the National Bureau of Investigation who testified on the
examination she conducted, outlining the procedure she
adopted and the result thereof. She further declared that using
the Powerplex 16 System, Deoxyribonuncleic acid analysis on
the Buccal Swabs and Blood stained on FTA paper taken from
[AAA], [BBB], and Rufino Umanito y Millares, to determine
whether or not Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological father
of [BBB], showed that there is a Complete Match in all of the
fifteen (15) loci tested between the alleles of Rufino Umanito y
Milalres and [BBB]; That based on the above findings, there is
a 99.9999% probability of paternity that Rufino Umanito y
Millares is the biological father of [BBB] (Exhibits A and series
and B and series).
After the cross-examination of the witness by the
defense counsel, the Public Prosecutor offered in evidence
Exhibits A and sub-markings, referring to the Report of the
Chemistry Division of the National Bureau of Investigation,
Manila on the DNA analysis to determine whether or not Rufino
Umanito y Millares is the biological father of [BBB] and Exhibit
B and sub-markings, referring to the enlarged version of the
table of Exhibit A, to establish that on the DNA examination
conducted on [AAA], [BBB] and the accused Rufino Umanito
for the purpose of establishing paternity, the result is
99.9999% probable. Highly probable.
The defense did not interpose any objection, hence,
the exhibits were admitted.
1. That considering that under Section 9,
A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, if the value of the Probability of Paternity
is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of
paternity, the instant case was set for reception of evidence for
the accused on April 29, 2008 to controvert the presumption
that he is the biological father of [BBB].
 During the hearing on April 29, 2008, the accused who
was in court manifested through his counsel that he will not
present evidence to dispute the findings of the Forensic
Chemistry Division of the National Bureau of Investigation.
The DNA samples were collected by the forensic
chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation whose
qualifications as an expert was properly established adopting
the following procedure:
a) The subject sources were asked to gargle
and to fill out the reference sample form. Thereafter, the
chemists informed them that buccal swabs will be taken from
their mouth and five (5) droplets of blood will also be taken from
the ring finger of their inactive hand;
b) Pictures of the subject sources were
taken by the NBI Chemist;
c) Buccal swabs were taken from the subject
sources three (3) times;
d) Subject sources were made to sign three
(3) pieces of paper to serve as label of the three buccal swabs
placed inside two (2) separate envelopes that bear their
names;
e) Blood samples were taken from the ring
finger of the left hand of the subject sources;
f) Subject sources were made to sign the
FTA card of their blood samples.
The buccal swabs and the FTA cards were placed in
a brown envelope for air drying for at least one hour.
g) Finger prints of the subject sources were
taken for additional identification;
h) The subject sources were made to sign
their finger prints.
i) Atty. Ramon J. Gomez, Deputy Court
Administrator Reuben dela Cruz and Prosecutor Maria Nenita
A. Oplana, in that order, were made to sign as witnesses to the
reference sample forms and the finger prints of the subject
sources.
j) After one hour of air drying, the Buccal
Swabs and the FTA papers were placed inside a white
envelope and sealed with a tape by the NBI Chemists;
k) The witnesses, Atty. Ramon J. Gomez,
Deputy Court Administrator Reuben dela Cruz, Prosecutor
Maria Nenita A. Opiana including the NBI Chemist, affixed their
signatures on the sealed white envelope;
l) The subjects sources were made to sign
and affix their finger prints on the sealed white envelope;
m) The chemists affixed their signatures on
the sealed envelope and placed it in a separate brown
envelope;
n) The subjects sources were made to affix
their finger prints on their identification places and reference
forms.
The same procedure was adopted by the Forensic
Chemists of the NBI in the taking of DNA samples from the
accused, Rufino Umanito at the New Bilibid Prison in the
afternoon of February 8, 2008.
Mary Ann Aranas, the expert witness testified that at
the NBI the sealed envelope was presented to Ms. Demelen
dela Cruz, the supervisor of the Forensic Chemistry Division to
witness that the envelope containing the DNA specimens was
sealed as it reached the NBI. Photographs of the envelope in
sealed form were taken prior to the conduct of examination.
With the procedure adopted by the Forensic Chemist
of the NBI, who is an expert and whose integrity and dedication
to her work is beyond reproach the manner how the biological
samples were collected, how they were handled and the chain
of custody thereof were properly established the court is
convinced that there is no possibility of contamination of the
DNA samples taken from the parties.
At the Forensic Laboratory of the National Bureau of
Investigation, the envelopes containing the DNA samples were
opened and the specimens were subjected to sampling,
extraction, amplification and analysis. Duplicate analysis were
made. The Forensic Chemist, Mary Ann Aranas caused the
examination of the blood samples and the buccal swabs were
separately processed by Mrs. Demelen dela Cruz.

In order to arrive at a DNA profile, the forensic
chemists adopted the following procedure: (1) Sampling which
is the cutting of a portion from the media (swabs and FTA
paper); (2) then subjected the cut portions for extraction to
release the DNA; (3) After the DNA was released into the
solution, it was further processed using the formarine chain
reaction to amplify the DNA samples for analysis of using the
Powerplex 16 System, which allows the analysis of 16 portions
of the DNA samples. The Powerplex 16 System are reagent
kits for forensic purposes; (3) After the target, DNA is
multiplied, the amplified products are analyzed using the
genetic analyzer. The Powerplex 16 System has 16 markers
at the same time. It is highly reliable as it has already been
validated for forensic use. It has also another function which is
to determine the gender of the DNA being examined.
Mary Ann Aranas, the Forensic Chemist, in her
testimony explained that the DNA found in all cells of a human
being come in pairs except the mature red blood cells. These
cells are rolled up into minute bodies called chromosomes,
which contain the DNA of a person. A human has 23 pairs of
chromosomes. For each pair of chromosome, one was found
to have originated from the mother, the other must have came
from the father. Using the Powerplex 16 System Results, the
variable portions of the DNA called loci, which were used as
the basis for DNA analysis or typing showed the
following: under loci D3S1358, the genotype of the locus of
[AAA] is 15, 16, the genotype of [BBB] is 15, 16, one of the pair
of alleles must have originated and the others from the
father. The color for the allele of the mother is red while the
father is blue. On matching the allele which came from the
mother was first determined [AAA], has alleles of 15 or 16 but
in the geno type of [BBB], 15 was colored blue because that is
the only allele which contain the genotype of the accused
Rufino Umanito, the 16 originated from the mother, [AAA]. In
this marker [BBB] has a genotype of 15, 16, 16 is from the
mother and 15 is from the father.
The whole process involved the determination which
of those alleles originated from the mother and the rest would
entail looking on the genotype or the profile of the father to
determine if they matched with those of the child.
In the analysis of the 16 loci by the Forensic
Chemists, amel on the 13th row was not included because this
is the marker that determines the gender of the source of the
loci.The pair XX represents a female and XY for a male. Rufino
Umanito has XY amel and [BBB] and [AAA] have XX amel. For
matching paternity purposes only 15 loci were examined. Of
the 15 loci, there was a complete match between the alleles of
the loci of [BBB] and Rufino (Exhibits A and B).
To ensure reliable results, the Standard Operating
Procedure of the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI in
paternity cases is to use buccal swabs taken from the parties
and blood as a back up source.
The said Standard Operating Procedure was adopted
in the instant case.
As earlier mentioned, DNA samples consisted of
buccal swabs and blood samples taken from the parties by the
forensic chemists who adopted reliable techniques and
procedure in collecting and handling them to avoid
contamination. The method that was used to secure the
samples were safe and reliable. The samples were taken and
handled by an expert, whose qualifications, integrity and
dedication to her work is unquestionable, hence, the possibility
of substitution or manipulation is very remote.
The procedure adopted by the DNA section, Forensic
Chemistry Division of the National Bureau of Investigation in
analyzing the samples was in accordance with the standards
used in modern technology. The comparative analysis of DNA
prints of the accused Rufino Umanito and his alleged child is a
simple process called parentage analysiswhich was made
easier with the use of a DNA machine called Genetic Analyzer.
To ensure a reliable result, the NBI secured two (2) DNA types
of samples from the parties, the buccal swabs as primary
source and blood as secondary source. Both sources were
separately processed and examined and thereafter a
comparative analysis was conducted which yielded the same
result.
The National Bureau of Investigation DNA Section,
Forensic Division is an accredited DNA testing laboratory in
the country which maintains a multimillion DNA analysis
equipment for its scientific criminal investigation unit. It is
manned by qualified laboratory chemists and technicians who
are experts in the field, like Mary Ann Aranas, the expert
witness in the instant case, who is a licensed chemists, has
undergone training on the aspects of Forensic Chemistry fro
two (2) years before she was hired as forensic chemists of the
NBI and has been continuously attending training seminars,
and workshops which are field related and who has handled
more than 200 cases involving DNA extraction or collection or
profiling.
The accused did not object to the admission of
Exhibits A and B inclusive of their sub-markings. He did not
also present evidence to controvert the results of the DNA
analysis.
Section 6. A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC provides that: If the
value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there
shall be a disputable presumption of paternity.
DNA analysis conducted by the National Bureau of
Investigation Forensic Division on the buccal swabs and blood
stained on FTA paper taken from [AAA], [BBB] and
Rufino Umanito y MillAres for DNA analysis to determine
whether or not Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological father
of [BBB] gave the following result:
FINDINGS: Deoxyribonuncleic acid analysis using the
Powerplex 16 System conducted on the
above-mentioned, specimens gave
the
following profiles;
xxx
xxx
There is a COMPLETE MATCH in all the fifteen (15)
loci tested between the alleles of Rufino Umanito y Millares
and [BBB].
REMARKS: Based on the above findings, there is a
99.9999% Probability of Paternity that
Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological
Father of [BBB]
Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted but may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence (Rule 131, Section 3, Rules of Court).
The disputable presumption that was established as a
result of the DNA testing was not contradicted and overcome
by other evidence considering that the accused did not object
to the admission of the results of the DNA testing (Exhibits A
and B inclusive of sub-markings) nor presented evidence to
rebut the same.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the trial court
rules that based on the result of the DNA analysis conducted
by the National Bureau of Investigation, Forensic Division,
RUFINO UMANITO y MILLARES is the biological father of
[BBB].[10]
Umanitos defense of alibi, together with his specific assertion that while he had
courted AAA they were not sweethearts, lead to a general theory on his part
that he did not engage in sexual relations with the complainant. The DNA
testing has evinced a contrary conclusion, and that as testified to by AAA,
Umanito had fathered the child she gave birth to on 5 April 1990, nine months
after the day she said she was raped by Umanito.
Still, Umanito filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal dated 16 February 2009. By
filing such motion, Umanito is deemed to have acceded to the rulings of the
RTC and the Court of Appeals finding him guilty of the crime of rape, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the
indemnification of the private complainant in the sum of P50,000.00. Given
that the results of the Court-ordered DNA testing conforms with the
conclusions of the lower courts, and that no cause is presented for us to
deviate from the penalties imposed below, the Court sees no reason to deny
Umanitos Motion to Withdraw Appeal. Consequently, the assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 15 February 2006 would otherwise be deemed
final if the appeal is not withdrawn.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Withdraw Appeal dated 16 February
2009 is GRANTED. The instant case is now CLOSED and TERMINATED.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION A Complaint[3] for compulsory recognition with prayer for support
pending litigation was filed by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented
by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong
ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, G.R. No. 171713 (Rogelio) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City. In her
Complaint, Jinky prayed that judgment be rendered:
Petitioner, Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., (a) Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff Joanne Rodjin

Chairperson, Diaz as his daughter.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO, (b) Ordering defendant to give plaintiff monthly support

NACHURA, and of P20,000.00 pendente lite and thereafter to fix monthly
support.
REYES, JJ.

(c) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorneys fees in the

Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, sum of P100,000.00.
Represented by Her Mother and
Guardian, JINKY C. DIAZ, Promulgated:

Respondent. (d) Granting plaintiff such other measure of relief as maybe

just and equitable in the premises.[4]
December 17, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac City, she and
Rogelio got acquainted. This developed into friendship and later blossomed
DECISION into love.At this time, Jinky was already married to a Japanese national,
Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19 February 1993 by
Municipal Trial Court Judge Panfilo V. Valdez.[5]

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived
together at Fairlane Subdivision, and later at Capitol Garden, Tarlac City.

This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure assailing (1) the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals
dated 23 November 2005 and (2) the Resolution[2] of the same court dated 1
March 2006 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No.
70125.
From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived and
on 25 February 1998 was born at the Central Luzon Doctors
Hospital, Tarlac City.
Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home
after delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses
and provided for all of minor Joannes needs recognizing the child as his.
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped
supporting minor Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child.
Rogelio, despite Jinkys remonstrance, failed and refused and continued failing
and refusing to give support for the child and to acknowledge her as his
daughter, thus leading to the filing of the heretofore adverted complaint.
After summons had been duly served upon Rogelio, the latter failed to file any
responsive pleading despite repeated motions for extension, prompting the
trial court to declare him in default in its Order dated 7 April 1999. Rogelios
Answer with Counterclaim and Special and Affirmative Defenses was received
by the trial court only on 15 April 1999. Jinky was allowed to present her
evidence ex parte on the basis of which the trial court on 23 April
1999 rendered a decision granting the reliefs prayed for in the complaint.
In its Decision[6] dated 23 April 1999, the RTC held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff as his natural
child;
2. Ordering defendant to provide plaintiff with a monthly
support of P10,000.00 and further
3. Ordering defendant to pay reasonable attorneys fees in the
amount of P5,000.00 and the cost of the suit.
On 28 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of default and a motion
for reconsideration seeking the courts understanding, as he was then in a
quandary on what to do to find a solution to a very difficult problem of his life.[7]
On 29 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion for new trial with prayer that the
decision of the trial court dated 23 April 1999 be vacated and the case be
considered for trial de novo pursuant to the provisions of Section 6, Rule 37 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[8]
On 16 June 1999, the RTC issued an Order granting Rogelios Motion for New
Trial:
WHEREFORE, finding defendants motion for new trial to be
impressed with merit, the same is hereby granted.
The Order of this court declaring defendant in default and the
decision is this court dated April 23, 1999 are hereby set aside
but the evidence adduced shall remain in record, subject to
cross-examination by defendant at the appropriate stage of
the proceedings.
In the meantime defendants answer is hereby admitted,
subject to the right of plaintiff to file a reply and/or answer to
defendants counterclaim within the period fixed by the Rules
of Court.
Acting on plaintiffs application for support pendente lite which
this court finds to be warranted, defendant is hereby ordered
to pay to plaintiff immediately the sum of P2,000.00 a month
from January 15, 1999 to May 1999 as support pendente lite
in arrears and the amount of P4,000.00 every month
thereafter as regular support pendente lite during the
pendency of this case.[9]
The RTC finally held:

The only issue to be resolved is whether or not the defendant
is the father of the plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
Since it was duly established that plaintiffs mother Jinky Diaz
was married at the time of the birth of Joanne Rodjin Diaz, the
law presumes that Joanne is a legitimate child of the spouses
Hasegawa Katsuo and Jinky Diaz (Article 164, Family
Code). The child is still presumed legitimate even if the mother
may have declared against her legitimacy (Article 167, Ibid).
The legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the
following grounds provided for in Article 166 of the same
Code. Paragraph 1 of the said Article provides that there must
be physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual
intercourse with the wife within the first 120 days of the 300
days following the birth of the child because of
a) physical incapacity of the husband to have
sexual intercourse with his wife;
b) husband and wife were living separately in
such a way that sexual intercourse
was not possible;
c) serious illness of the husband which
prevented sexual intercourse.
It was established by evidence that the husband is a
Japanese national and that he was living outside of the
country (TSN, Aug. 27, 1999, page 5) and he comes home
only once a year. Both evidence of the parties proved that the
husband was outside the country and no evidence was shown
that he ever arrived in the country in the year 1997 preceding
the birth of plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
While it may also be argued that plaintiff Jinky had a
relationship with another man before she met the defendant,
there is no evidence that she also had sexual relations with
other men on or about the conception of Joanne
Rodjin. Joanne Rodjin was her second child (see Exh. A), so
her first child, a certain Nicole (according to defendant) must
have a different father or may be the son of Hasegawa
K[u]tsuo.
The defendant admitted having been the one who shouldered
the hospital bills representing the expenses in connection with
the birth of plaintiff. It is an evidence of admission that he is
the real father of plaintiff. Defendant also admitted that even
when he stopped going out with Jinky, he and Jinky used to
go to motels even after 1996. Defendant also admitted that on
some instances, he still used to see Jinky after the birth of
Joanne Rodjin. Defendant was even the one who fetched
Jinky after she gave birth to Joanne.
On the strength of this evidence, the Court finds that Joanne
Rodjin is the child of Jinky and defendant Rogelio Ong and it
is but just that the latter should support plaintiff.[10]
On 15 December 2000, the RTC rendered a decision and disposed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
Joanne Rodjin Diaz to be the illegitimate child of defendant
Rogelio Ong with plaintiff Jinky Diaz. The Order of this Court
awarding support pendente lite dated June 15, 1999, is
hereby affirmed and that the support should continue until
Joanne Rodjin Diaz shall have reached majority age.[11]
Rogelio filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied for lack of merit
in an Order of the trial court dated 19 January 2001.[12] From the denial of his
Motion for Reconsideration, Rogelio appealed to the Court of Appeals. After
all the responsive pleadings had been filed, the case was submitted for
decision and ordered re-raffled to another Justice for study and report as early
as 12 July 2002.[13]
During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals, Rogelios counsel
filed a manifestation informing the Court that Rogelio died on 21 February
2005; hence, a Notice of Substitution was filed by said counsel praying that
Rogelio be substituted in the case by the Estate of Rogelio Ong,[14] which
motion was accordingly granted by the Court of Appeals.[15]
In a Decision dated 23 November 2005, the Court of Appeals held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is
hereby GRANTED. The appealed Decision dated December
15, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch
63 in Civil Case No. 8799 is hereby SET ASIDE. The case is
hereby REMANDED to the court a quo for the issuance of an
order directing the parties to make arrangements for DNA
analysis for the purpose of determining the paternity of plaintiff
minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz, upon consultation and in
coordination with laboratories and experts on the field of DNA
analysis.
No pronouncement as to costs.[16]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution dated 1 March 2006.
In disposing as it did, the Court of Appeals justified its Decision as follows:
In this case, records showed that the late defendant-appellant
Rogelio G. Ong, in the early stage of the proceedings
volunteered and suggested that he and plaintiffs mother
submit themselves to a DNA or blood testing to settle the
issue of paternity, as a sign of good faith. However, the trial
court did not consider resorting to this modern scientific
procedure notwithstanding the repeated denials of defendant
that he is the biological father of the plaintiff even as he
admitted having actual sexual relations with plaintiffs
mother. We believe that DNA paternity testing, as current
jurisprudence affirms, would be the most reliable and effective
method of settling the present paternity dispute. Considering,
however, the untimely demise of defendant-appellant during
the pendency of this appeal, the trial court, in consultation with
out laboratories and experts on the field of DNA analysis, can
possibly avail of such procedure with whatever remaining
DNA samples from the deceased defendant alleged to be the
putative father of plaintiff minor whose illegitimate filiations is
the subject of this action for support.[17]
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues for resolution:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS RESPONDENTS COMPLAINT
FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION DESPITE ITS
FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED FAILED TO
PROVE THAT ROGELIO G. ONG WAS HER FATHER.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT DID NOT DECLARE RESPONDENT AS THE
LEGITIMATE CHILD OF JINKY C. DIAZ AND HER
JAPANESE HUSBAND, CONSIDERING THAT
RESPONDENT FAILED TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION
OF HER LEGITIMACY.
III
 WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT REMANDED THE CASE TO THE COURT A QUO
FOR DNA ANALYSIS DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS NO
LONGER FEASIBLE DUE TO THE DEATH OF ROGELIO G.
ONG.[18]
Petitioner prays that the present petition be given due course and the Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated November 23, 2005 be modified, by setting aside
the judgment remanding the case to the trial court for DNA testing analysis, by
dismissing the complaint of minor Joanne for compulsory recognition, and by
declaring the minor as the legitimate child of Jinky and Hasegawa Katsuo.[19]
From among the issues presented for our disposition, this Court finds it prudent
to concentrate its attention on the third one, the propriety of the appellate
courts decision remanding the case to the trial court for the conduct of DNA
testing. Considering that a definitive result of the DNA testing will decisively
lay to rest the issue of the filiation of minor Joanne, we see no reason to resolve
the first two issues raised by the petitioner as they will be rendered moot by
the result of the DNA testing.
As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of filiation of minor
Joanne for purposes of support in favor of the said minor.
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also
to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support
(as in the present case), or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on
the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the
child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity
action which parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses,
presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative
father and child.[20]
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed
legitimate.[21] As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of
legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy
or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of
legitimacy. We explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case
of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals[22]:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a
declaration in the statute but is based on the broad
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the
mother.The presumption is grounded on the policy to
protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and
consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article
255 of the New Civil Code[23] provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days
following the celebration of the marriage, and before three
hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other
than that of the physical impossibility of the husbands having
access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days
of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
 2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in
such a way that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.[24]
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by
any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or
a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.
There had been divergent and incongruent statements and assertions
bandied about by the parties to the present petition. But with the advancement
in the field of genetics, and the availability of new technology, it can now be
determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological father
of the minor, through DNA testing.
DNA is the fundamental building block of a persons entire genetic
make-up. DNA is found in all human cells and is the same in every cell of the
same person.Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a persons DNA profile can
determine his identity.[25]
DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample
obtained from an individual is examined. The DNA is processed to generate a
pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom the sample is
taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person, except for identical twins.
Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called DNA
(deoxyribonucleic acid). It is exclusive to an individual (except
in the rare occurrence of identical twins that share a single,
fertilized egg), and DNA is unchanging throughout life. Being
a component of every cell in the human body, the DNA of an
individuals blood is the very DNA in his or her skin cells, hair
follicles, muscles, semen, samples from buccal swabs, saliva,
or other body parts.
The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are
known as A (Adenine), G (guanine), C (cystosine) and T
(thymine). The order in which the four bases appear in an
individuals DNA determines his or her physical make up. And
since DNA is a double stranded molecule, it is composed of
two specific paired bases, A-T or T-A and G-C or C-G.These
are called genes.
Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs
distributed in a particular sequence. This gives a person his
or her genetic code. Somewhere in the DNA framework,
nonetheless, are sections that differ. They are known
as polymorphic loci, which are the areas analyzed in DNA
typing (profiling, tests, fingerprinting). In other words, DNA
typing simply means determining the polymorphic loci.
How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample obtained
or extracted, a molecular biologist may proceed to analyze it
in several ways. There are five (5) techniques to conduct DNA In the newly promulgated rules on DNA evidence it is provided:
typing. They are: the RFLP (restriction fragment length
polymorphism); reverse dot blot or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which
was used in 287 cases that were admitted as evidence by 37 SEC. 3 Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule, the
courts in the U.S. as of November 1994; DNA process; VNTR following terms shall be defined as follows:
(variable number tandem repeats); and the most recent which
is known as the PCR-([polymerase] chain reaction) based
STR (short tandem repeats) method which, as of 1996, was
xxxx
availed of by most forensic laboratories in the world. PCR is
the process of replicating or copying DNA in an evidence
sample a million times through repeated cycling of a reaction
involving the so-called DNA polymerize enzyme. STR, on the (c) DNA evidence constitutes the totality of the DNA profiles,
other hand, takes measurements in 13 separate places and results and other genetic information directly
can match two (2) samples with a reported theoretical error generated from DNA testing of biological samples;
rate of less than one (1) in a trillion.

(d) DNA profile means genetic information derived from DNA

Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, matches are
determined. To illustrate, when DNA or fingerprint tests are
done to identify a suspect in a criminal case, the evidence
collected from the crime scene is compared with
the known print. If a substantial amount of the identifying
features are the same, the DNA or fingerprint is deemed to be
a match.But then, even if only one feature of the DNA or
fingerprint is different, it is deemed not to have come from the
suspect.
As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show
variations between people. In each of these regions, a person
possesses two genetic types called allele, one inherited from
each parent. In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks
at a number of these variable regions in an individual to
produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of
the mother and child, it is possible to determine which half of
the childs DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half
must have been inherited from the biological father.The
alleged fathers profile is then examined to ascertain whether
he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal
types in the child. If the mans DNA types do not match that of
the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types
match, then he is not excluded as the father.[26]
testing of a biological sample obtained from a person,
which biological sample is clearly identifiable as
originating from that person;
(e) DNA testing means verified and credible scientific
methods which include the extraction of DNA from
biological samples, the generation of DNA profiles
and the comparison of the information obtained from
the DNA testing of biological samples for the purpose
of determining, with reasonable certainty, whether or
not the DNA obtained from two or more distinct
biological samples originates from the same person
(direct identification) or if the biological samples
originate from related persons (kinship analysis); and
(f) Probability of Parentage means the numerical estimate for
the likelihood of parentage of a putative parent
compared with the probability of a random match of
two unrelated individuals in a given population.
Amidst the protestation of petitioner against the DNA analysis, the resolution
thereof may provide the definitive key to the resolution of the issue of support
for minor Joanne. Our articulation in Agustin v. Court of Appeals[27] is
particularly relevant, thus:
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast
in the previous decade. In Pe Lim v. Court of Appeals (336
Phil. 741, 270 SCRA 1), promulgated in 1997, we cautioned
against the use of DNA because DNA, being a relatively new
science, (had) not as yet been accorded official recognition by
our courts. Paternity (would) still have to be resolved by such
conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating
acts,verbal and written, by the putative father.
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA
as evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of
Appeals [G.R. No. 125901, 8 March 2001, 354 SCRA 17]:
x x x Parentage will still be resolved
using conventional methods unless we adopt
the modern and scientific ways
available. Fortunately, we have now the
facility and expertise in using DNA test for
identification and parentage testing. The
University of the Philippines Natural Science
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct
DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR)
analysis. The analysis is based on the fact
that the DNA of a child/person has two (2)
copies, one copy from the mother and the
other from the father. The DNA from the
mother, the alleged father and child are
analyzed to establish parentage. Of course,
being a novel scientific technique, the use of
DNA test as evidence is still open to
challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate
case comes, courts should not hesitate to
rule on the admissibility of DNA
evidence. For it was said, that courts should
apply the results of science when
competently obtained in aid of situations
presented, since to reject said results is to
deny progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and
authoritative evidence in Philippine jurisprudence came in
2002 with out en banc decision in People v. Vallejo [G.R. No.
144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192] where the rape and
murder victims DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes of
the accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that the
purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an
association exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the
reference sample. The samples collected (were) subjected to
various chemical processes to establish their profile.
A year later, in People v. Janson [G.R. No. 125938, 4
April 2003, 400 SCRA 584], we acquitted the accused
charged with rape for lack of evidence because doubts
persist(ed) in our mind as to who (were) the real
malefactors. Yes, a complex offense (had) been perpetrated
but who (were) the perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA
or other scientific evidence to still our doubts.
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC [G.R. Nos.
161434, 161634 and 161824, 3 March 2004, 424 SCRA
277], where the Court en banc was faced with the issue of
filiation of then presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr., we
stated:
In case proof of filiation or paternity
would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or
would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing,
which examines genetic codes obtained from
body cells of the illegitimate child and any
physical residue of the long dead parent
could be resorted to. A positive match would
clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing v. Court
of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the
strong weight of DNA testing...
Moreover, in our en banc decision
in People v. Yatar [G.R. No. 150224, 19 May
 2004, 428 SCRA 504], we affirmed the
conviction of the accused for rape with
homicide, the principal evidence for which
included DNA test results. x x x.
Coming now to the issue of remand of the case to the trial court, petitioner
questions the appropriateness of the order by the Court of Appeals directing
the remand of the case to the RTC for DNA testing given that petitioner has
already died. Petitioner argues that a remand of the case to the RTC for DNA
analysis is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind, the
alleged impossibility of complying with the order of remand for purposes of
DNA testing is more ostensible than real. Petitioners argument is without basis
especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence[28] allows the conduct of DNA
testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, thus:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court
may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any
person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order
a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and
notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to
the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was
previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results
may require confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce
new information that is relevant to the proper
resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may
consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or
integrity of the DNA testing.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso
facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist
appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
As defined above, the term biological sample means any organic
material originating from a persons body, even if found in inanimate objects,
that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body
fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.[29]
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as
enumerated above as may be available, may be used for DNA testing. In this
case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate
biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.
And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA
testing. In People v. Umanito,[30] citing Tecson v. Commission on
Elections,[31] this Court held:
The 2004 case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections [G.R.
No. 161434, 3 March 2004, 424 SCRA 277] likewise
reiterated the acceptance of DNA testing in our jurisdiction in
this wise: [i]n case proof of filiation or paternity would be
unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to
obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained
from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical
residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to.
It is obvious to the Court that the determination of whether
appellant is the father of AAAs child, which may be
accomplished through DNA testing, is material to the fair and
correct adjudication of the instant appeal. Under Section 4 of
the Rules, the courts are authorized, after due hearing and
 notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing. However, while
this Court retains jurisdiction over the case at bar, capacitated
as it is to receive and act on the matter in controversy, the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not, in the
course of daily routine, conduct hearings. Hence, it would be
more appropriate that the case be remanded to the RTC for
reception of evidence in appropriate hearings, with due notice
to the parties. (Emphasis supplied.)

As we have declared in the said case of Agustin v. Court of Appeals[32]:

x x x [F]or too long, illegitimate children have been

marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their
existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing
technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such
ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed
in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed
as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when
DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and
authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore take
this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA
testing is a valid means of determining paternity.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and its Resolution dated 1
March 2006 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.