Battles in the Conciliatory War

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Battles in the Conciliatory War - The First Battle of Bull Run

What is the importance of the

The First Battle of Bull Run

The First Battle of Bull Run boosted the Confederacy’s morale, even to the point of perhaps
falsely believing that they could easily defeat the Union. The battle had the opposite effect on the
Union. It seemed that the overwhelming advantages of men and industry that the Union had
might not be enough to beat the Confederates, and the population now understood that the war
would be a protracted one.

Reference: Ordeal by Fire, pages 227–232

Forts Henry and Donelson

From a strategic point of view, the fall of Fort Donelson made the Confederate defense of
Nashville impossible. With both the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers now in Union control,
the city of Nashville had no choice but to surrender on February 25, 1862. The victory also gave
the Union a much needed morale boost.

Reference: Ordeal by Fire, pages 244–247

The Battle of Shiloh

The Battle of Shiloh, which resulted in nearly 2,000 soldiers being killed and 8,000 wounded on
both sides, shocked both the Confederacy and the Union, making citizens on each side realize
that the war would not end until one side was brutally defeated.

Reference: Ordeal by Fire, pages 247–250

The Seven Days Battles

General George McClellan was appointed for largely political reasons. He was a Democrat who
desired reconciliation with the South, and was perhaps the most powerful force in his party at
that time. Lincoln appointed McClellan commander of the Army of the Potomac, as well as
commander of all Union armies for a short time, because the president needed the support of the
Democrats to fight the war.

McClellan’s constant hesitation in the Peninsular Campaign, and especially the Seven Days
Battles, prompted McPherson to write, “Whatever defects existed in the Southern command were
exceeded by McClellan’s deficiencies as a fighting general.” (McPherson, 2010, p. 270).

Reference: Ordeal by Fire, pages 266–270

The Second Battle of Bull Run

Before the onset of the battle, General Pope ordered his troops to drill, while General Jackson’s
men were known to be in the vicinity. During the battle itself, Pope hesitated to use flanking
maneuvers to exploit obvious openings in the Confederate line.

After the battle, many Union soldiers blamed Pope for the defeat and were thus demoralized.
McClellan was also blamed for not sending reinforcements to Manassas, but Lincoln felt that
McClellan alone could restore morale in the Army of the Potomac. Pope was removed from his
command and sent to an outpost in the west, while McClellan retained his.

Reference: Ordeal by Fire, pages 276–282

The Battle of Antietam

If Great Britain and other European powers had officially recognized the Confederate States of
America, those nations could potentially have sent supplies and even troops to the Confederacy.
Lincoln was well-aware of this real threat.

Although Lee had once again outdone McClellan, Great Britain tacitly decided to withhold
recognition of a nation whose main force left the field of battle, as Lee had done after Antietam.
Lincoln capitalized on this by announcing passage of the Emancipation Proclamation, which, he
knew, would gain the approval of France and England.

Reference: Ordeal by Fire, pages 303–311

In January 1862 we witness disagreements with in the command as there is no strategic
plan in place for the Western theater. With political pressure coming from Washington,
the forces assigned to Buell move to invade East Tennessee. In January, Col Mills
Spring would see victory when the Confederates lost position of their defensive line.
This would create an opening for Cumberland Gap providing access to East
Tennessee.

At the Tennessee River in the direction of Fort Henry, Grant would lead the way to Fort
Donelson. McPherson (2010) would cite the fall of Fort Donelson did not make the
Confederate defense possible. The Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers would be under
Union command. Nashville would surrender on February 25, 1862 (pgs. 244-247).

April 6, 1862 would see the Confederate forces under the leadership of Johnston and
Beauregard attack Grant’s army. McPherson (2010) would state, “during that long day,
the 40,000 Confederates drove back the 33,000 Federals (p.249). Grant was not
prepared for this attack and a great battle would ensue. On the first day of battle the
Confederates were able to force Grant’s men back to the Tennessee. On April 7 th, the
Union sent additional men from Buell and began to attack driving back the
Confederates. Later, Grant would be criticized for not pursing the enemy and for the
loss of life sustained. McPherson (2010), “Shiloh was the ghastliest bloodbath in the
history of the Western Hemisphere thus far, though later Civil War battles would put it in
seventh place in this respect (p.250).

March 1862, General George McClellan led the Union forces to Ft. Monroe from
Washington. The Peninsular Campaign pushed the Union forces into Virginia. Joseph
E. led the Confederate forces against McClellan, This battle would be the largest fought
in Virginia. The capital of the Confederates was Richmond and McClellan threatens to
attack. The armies fought for two days with thousands dying and wounded. Johnston
suffered a leg wound at and could not continue.

The Seven Days Battles of June 25-July, 1862 provided to be tense as it appeared that
the Union would defeat the North. However, Robert E. Lee would counterattack and
push McClellan and his forces back to Richmond. These battles proved to Lincoln that
he could not win the war without ending slavery. He must destroy the engine that gives
the South its power.

The McClellan hesitation at the Seven Days Battles, prompted McPherson to write,
“Whatever defects existed in the Southern command were exceeded by McClellan’s
deficiencies as a fighting general” (McPherson, 2010, p. 270). In all the Seven Days,
the Union army actually lost only one battle—Gaines’ Mill—and the Confederates
suffered 20,000 casualties to the Federals’ 16,500 (6,000 of the latter were missing,
mostly captured; if killed and wounded only are counted, Southern losses were nearly
20,000 and Northern about 11,000) (McPherson, 2010, p.270).
could the North win. Slavery was key to the Southern infrastructure, so he decided to move against slavery. - See
more at: http://www.historynet.com/interview-with-civil-war-historian-james-mcpherson.htm#sthash.pxY6nTS1.dpuf

In March [1862], [General George] McClellan had moved his main force by sea from Washington to Fort Monroe;
then he began an advance toward the Confederate capital by way of the peninsula between the York and James
rivers. On 31 May, General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Confederate forces opposing him, was wounded at
the battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines. The next day Lee succeeded to Johnston's command, which he promptly
designated the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee applied his principles of concentrating force and seizing the initiative.
He had Jackson join him with the Valley Army, and, thus reinforced, he conducted a series of attacks against
McClellan just outside Richmond in the Seven Days battles of 25 June-1 July.

The battles saved Richmond and transformed Lee from an apparent failure to the hero of the Confederacy. Lee
himself was nevertheless disappointed with the Seven Days, because he had hoped to destroy the Army of the
Potomac...He progressed in his strategic convictions beyond the belief that the Confederacy must seize the initiative
to conclude also that the initiative must be pushed to a decisive, war-ending victory. Otherwise the superior
resources of the Union would enable it to outlast local or regional setbacks. The Confederacy must compel the North
to recognize its independence rapidly or it would not be able to do so at all.

The Battle of Shiloh would be a turning point for Sherman, allowing him to be a premier General
in the Civil War. McPherson (2003) cites that

McPherson, James M. (2003) [1988]. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. Oxford University Press.
ISBN 978-0-19-503863-7.