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18
I N T E R N A T I O N A L M O N E T A R Y F U N D
Wor l d Economi c a nd F i na n ci a l S ur v ey s
I N T E R N A T I O N A L M O N E T A R Y F U N D
©2018 International Monetary Fund
Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Disclaimer: The Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) is a survey by the IMF staff published twice
a year, in the spring and fall. The report draws out the financial ramifications of economic issues high-
lighted in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO). The report was prepared by IMF staff and has
benefited from comments and suggestions from Executive Directors following their discussion of the
report on April 2, 2018. The views expressed in this publication are those of the IMF staff and do not
necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Directors or their national authorities.
Recommended citation: International Monetary Fund. 2018. Global Financial Stability Report: A
Bumpy Road Ahead. Washington, DC, April.
Tables
Table 1.1. Correlation of Bitcoin with Key Asset Classes and within Crypto Assets 24
Annex Table 2.1.1. Riskiness of Credit Allocation: Economies Included in the Analysis 82
Annex Table 2.1.2. Country-Level Data Sources and Transformations 83
Annex Table 2.2.1. Cyclicality of the Riskiness of Credit Allocation 84
Annex Table 2.2.2. Impact of Financial Conditions and Lending Standards on the Riskiness of
Credit Allocation 85
Annex Table 2.2.3. Impact of Policy and Institutional Settings on the Riskiness of Credit Allocation 86
Annex Table 2.3.1. Panel Logit Analysis: Probability of the Occurrence of a Systemic Banking Crisis 88
Annex Table 2.3.2. Panel Logit Analysis: Banking Sector Equity Stress Risk 89
Annex Table 2.3.3. Impact of the Riskiness of Credit Allocation on Downside Risks to Growth 90
Annex Table 3.1.1. Data Sources 119
Annex Table 3.1.2. Economies and Cities Included in the Analyses 121
Annex Table 3.2.1. House Price Gap Synchronization at Country Level and Bilateral Linkages 123
Annex Table 3.2.2. House Price Gap Synchronization at Country Level and Global Factors 124
Annex Table 3.3.1. Capital Account Openness and Synchronicity 127
Annex Table 3.3.2. Global Investors, House Price Dispersion, and Synchronicity:
Regression Results 129
Figures
Figure 1.1. Global Financial Conditions 2
Figure 1.2. Growth-at-Risk 4
Figure 1.3. Nonfinancial Private Sector Debt 5
Figure 1.4. Market Interest Rates, Central Bank Balance Sheets, and US Financial Indicators 6
Figure 1.5. US Inflation Expectations and Term Premium 8
Figure 1.6. Term Premium Correlations, Spillovers, and Exchange Rate Relationships 9
Figure 1.7. Valuations of Global Equities 11
Figure 1.8. Valuations of Corporate Bonds 13
Figure 1.9. Leveraged Loan Issuance, Quality, and Developments after Regulatory Guidance 14
Figure 1.10. Correlations and Interconnectedness 16
Figure 1.11. Measures of Leverage and Investment Funds with Derivatives-Embedded Leverage 18
Figure 1.12. Strong Inflows into Exchange-Traded Funds Pose Challenges for the Less Liquid
Fixed-Income Markets 20
Figure 1.13. Crypto Assets: Size, Price Appreciation, Realized Volatility, and Sharpe Ratio 23
Figure 1.14. Share of Trading Volumes across Exchanges, Crypto Assets, and Fiat Currencies 25
Figure 1.15. Improving Fundamentals, Increased Foreign Currency Issuance 27
Figure 1.16. Creditor Base and External Financing Vulnerabilities 29
Figure 1.17. Rising Vulnerabilities and More Complex Creditor Composition 31
Figure 1.18. Stylized Map of Linkages within China’s Financial System 33
Figure 1.19. Chinese Banking System and Financial Market Developments and Liabilities 34
Figure 1.20. Risks and Adjustment Challenges in Chinese Investment Products 36
Figure 1.21. Chinese Insurers 37
Figure 1.22. Advanced Economy Bank Health 39
Figure 1.23. US Dollar Credit Aggregates and Bank Intragroup Funding Structures 41
Figure 1.24. Non-US Banks’ International Dollar Balance Sheets 42
Figure 1.25. Non-US Banks’ International US Dollar Liquidity Ratios 44
Figure 1.26. Foreign Exchange Swap and Short-Term Bank Funding Markets 45
Figure 1.1.1. US Asset Prices 47
Figure 1.2.1. Estimated Term Premiums 49
Figure 1.3.1. Nonbanks Have Increased Their Credit Exposure in the US Leveraged Loan Market 51
Figure 2.1. Financial Conditions Have Been Loose in Recent Years 58
Figure 2.2. Low-Rated Nonfinancial Corporate Bond Issuance Has Been High in Some Advanced
Economies 59
Figure 2.3. Key Drivers of the Riskiness of Credit Allocation 61
Figure 2.4. The Riskiness of Credit Allocation Is Cyclical at the Global Level 63
Figure 2.5. Selected Economies: Riskiness of Credit Allocation, 1995–2016 64
Figure 2.6. The Riskiness of Credit Allocation Rises When a Credit Expansion Is Stronger 66
Figure 2.7. The Association between the Size of a Credit Expansion and the Riskiness of Credit
Allocation Is Greater When Lending Standards and Financial Conditions Are Looser 66
Figure 2.8. The Riskiness of Credit Allocation Rises to a High Level before a Financial Crisis,
and Falls to a Low Level Thereafter 67
Figure 2.9. Higher Riskiness of Credit Allocation Signals Greater Risk of a Systemic Banking Crisis 68
Figure 2.10. Higher Riskiness of Credit Allocation Signals Greater Risk of Banking Sector Stress 68
Figure 2.11. Higher Riskiness of Credit Allocation Signals Higher Downside Risks to GDP Growth 69
Figure 2.12. The Association of the Riskiness of Credit Allocation with Downside Risks to GDP
Growth Depends on the Size of Credit Expansion 70
Figure 2.13. The Association of a Credit Expansion with the Riskiness of Credit Allocation Depends
on Policy and Institutional Settings 71
Figure 2.1.1. Measuring the Riskiness of Credit Allocation 74
Figure 2.1.2. Histograms of Measures of the Riskiness of Credit Allocation 75
Figure 2.2.1. China: Profitability of Credit Allocation, 1997–2016 76
Figure 2.2.2. China: Profitability of Credit Allocation, by Ownership and Sector 77
Figure 2.3.1. The Riskiness of Credit Allocation and Financial Conditions 78
Figure 2.4.1. Impulse Response of Cumulative Real GDP Growth to a High-Yield Share Shock
Given a Credit Boom 80
Figure 3.1. House Price Gains in Selected Cities and Countries Have Been Widespread 94
Figure 3.2. Widespread House Price Gains Have Accompanied Accommodative Financial Conditions 95
Figure 3.3. Institutional Investor Participation Has Been on the Rise 96
Figure 3.4. Global Financial Conditions, Portfolio Channels, and Expectations Contribute to House
Price Synchronization, as Do Supply Constraints and Local Policy 98
Figure 3.5. Synchronization Has Steadily Increased across Countries and Cities 100
Figure 3.6. The Relative Contribution of the Global Factor Has Grown 101
Figure 3.7. Instantaneous Quasi Correlation of House Price Gaps Shows Financial Cycle Properties 102
Figure 3.8. Relative Contribution of the Global Factor Varies across Regions 103
Figure 3.9. Economies Differ in Their House Price Interconnectedness 104
Figure 3.10. Interconnectedness among Cities’ House Prices Varies 105
Figure 3.11. Average Country-Level Housing Market Spillovers Have Increased 106
Figure 3.12. Bilateral Links between Countries Are Associated with House Price Synchronization 106
Figure 3.13. Greater Financial Openness Is Associated with Higher House Price Synchronization 107
Figure 3.14. On Average, the Global Factor for House Prices Has Increased along with That
for Equities 107
Figure 3.15. Global Financial Conditions, as Proxied by Global Liquidity, Have Different
Associations with House Price Synchronization across Countries and Cities 108
Figure 3.16. House Price Synchronization Predicts a Downside Risk to Economic Growth at
Short Horizons 108
Figure 3.1.1. Real House Prices in 40 Largest US Cities by Population 111
Figure 3.2.1. Housing Return Predictability 113
Figure 3.2.2. Predictability of Returns on Housing and Capital Account Openness 113
Figure 3.3.1. Large-Scale Land Acquisitions over Time by Target Region 115
Figure 3.4.1. Macroprudential Tools Indirectly Reduce House Price Synchronicity 118
Online Annexes
Annex 1.1. Option-Implied Volatility: The Quantity and Price of Risk for Stocks and Bonds
Annex 1.2. Bank International Dollar Funding Methodology
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1 percentage point).
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Minor discrepancies between sums of constituent figures and totals shown reflect rounding.
As used in this report, the terms “country” and “economy” do not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is a state
as understood by international law and practice. As used here, the term also covers some territorial entities that are
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enhanced PDF, Mobi, and HTML: http://elibrary.imf.org/Apr18GFSR.
The Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) assesses key risks facing the global financial system. In normal times,
the report seeks to play a role in preventing crises by highlighting policies that may mitigate systemic risks, thereby
contributing to global financial stability and the sustained economic growth of the IMF’s member countries.
The analysis in this report has been coordinated by the Monetary and Capital Markets (MCM) Department
under the general direction of Tobias Adrian, Director. The project has been directed by Fabio Natalucci and
Dong He, both Deputy Directors, as well as by Claudio Raddatz and Anna Ilyina, both Division Chiefs. It has
benefited from comments and suggestions from the senior staff in the MCM Department.
Individual contributors to the report are Ali Al-Eyd, Adrian Alter, Sergei Antoshin, Anil Ari, Magally Bernal,
Christian Bogmans, Luis Brandão-Marques, Peter Breuer, Jeroen Brinkhoff, John Caparusso, Qianying Chen,
Sally Chen, Yingyuan Chen, Kevin Chow, Fabio Cortes, Jane Dokko, Dimitris Drakopoulos, J. Benson Durham,
Martin Edmonds, Alan Xiaochen Feng, Rohit Goel, Tryggvi Gudmundsson, Hideo Hashimoto, Sanjay Hazarika,
Frank Hespeler, Henry Hoyle, Mohamed Jaber, David Jones, Mitsuru Katagiri, Will Kerry, Oksana Khadarina,
Ashraf Khan, Divya Kirti, Robin Koepke, Romain Lafarguette, Jiaqi Li, Yang Li, Sheheryar Malik,
Rebecca McCaughrin, Aditya Narain, Thomas Piontek, Jochen Schmittmann, Dulani Seneviratne, Juan Solé,
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Gemma Diaz from the Communications Department led the editorial team and managed the report’s
production with support from Linda Kean and editorial assistance from Sherrie Brown, Lucy Scott Morales,
Nancy Morrison, Katy Whipple, AGS, and Vector Talent Resources.
This particular issue of the GFSR draws in part on a series of discussions with banks, securities firms, asset
management companies, hedge funds, standard setters, financial consultants, pension funds, central banks, national
treasuries, and academic researchers.
This GFSR reflects information available as of March 30, 2018. The report benefited from comments and
suggestions from staff in other IMF departments, as well as from Executive Directors following their discussion of
the GFSR on April 2, 2018. However, the analysis and policy considerations are those of the IMF staff and should
not be attributed to Executive Directors or their national authorities.
S
tarting with this report, Chapter 1 of the interest rates after years of very easy financial conditions
Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) will and take active steps to reduce these risks. Asset price
regularly provide a quantitative assessment of spillovers have important implications for the housing
the degree to which future GDP growth faces market. As explained in Chapter 3, house price correla-
downside risks from financial vulnerabilities, using a tions across countries and across major cities have been
Growth-at-Risk (GaR) framework. The GaR approach trending up during the past 30 years, suggesting that
links financial conditions to the distribution of future spillovers via the housing sector may play a prominent
GDP growth outcomes and provides a framework role in a future crisis.
for assessing the trade-off between supporting growth A variety of indicators point to vulnerabilities from
in the short term and putting financial stability and financial leverage, a deterioration in underwriting
future growth at risk over the medium term. Our standards, and ever more pronounced reaching for yield
current assessment through the prism of GaR is that, behavior by investors in corporate and sovereign debt
over the past six months, short-term downside risks markets around the world. Chapter 2 presents an inno-
to global financial stability have increased somewhat, vative gauge of the riskiness of credit allocation. The new
reflecting somewhat tighter financial conditions amid metric computes the difference in vulnerability between
investors’ concerns about newly announced trade mea- the firms with the largest and smallest expansions in
sures. Even so, still-accommodative financial condi- debt. This indicator exhibits strong forecasting power
tions continue to be supportive of economic growth. for downside risks to GDP growth, and is currently at
Taking a longer view, downside risks, as measured by medium to elevated levels in several countries. A host
GaR, remain large: easy financial conditions continue of more conventional metrics of corporate debt vulner-
to fuel financial vulnerabilities, leaving the global ability around the world, including a deterioration in
economy exposed to the risk of a sharp tightening nonprice terms and underwriting standards in debt deals,
in financial conditions. Policymakers thus face the suggest that market risks are rising, as easy financial con-
twin challenges of continuing to support growth in ditions support high issuance and strong global capital
the short term by keeping monetary policy accom- flows. In low-income countries, the share of private and
modative as well as reining in rising financial stability non–Paris Club creditors is increasing, and greater use of
risks in the medium term by deploying micro- and collateralized debt exposes borrowing countries to poten-
macroprudential policy tools. tially costly debt restructurings in the future.
Managing the gradual process of monetary policy Over the past year, crypto assets trading has emerged
normalization will be tricky against this backdrop of as a new potential vulnerability. Price volatility of
elevated medium-term risks, and will require careful crypto assets has been much higher than that of com-
communication from central banks and policymakers modities, currencies, or stocks. Financial stability risks
to reduce the risks from a sharp tightening of financial could arise from leveraged positions taken by inves-
conditions. The spike in volatility in global equity mar- tors in this new asset class, infrastructure weaknesses
kets in early February has brought into focus the risk of cryptocurrency exchanges, and fraud, in addition
of abrupt, adverse feedback loops in a period of asset to elevated volatility. Regulators around the world are
price adjustments. The recently increased trade tensions responding to the growing use of crypto assets through
have led to investors’ jitters, and a wider escalation of various measures, including enforcement actions, indi-
protectionist measures could ultimately take a toll on rect interventions via the banking system, and outright
the global economy and on global financial stability. bans. While crypto assets may generate new vulner-
Many markets still have stretched valuations, and may abilities, they also create opportunities and, indeed, a
experience bouts of volatility in the period ahead, in the number of central banks around the world are consid-
context of continued monetary policy normalization in ering the issuance of central bank digital currency.
some advanced countries. Investors and policymakers Tobias Adrian
should be cognizant of the risks associated with rising Financial Counsellor
T
he global economic outlook has continued Valuations of risky assets are still stretched, with
to improve, as discussed in the April 2018 some late-stage credit cycle dynamics emerging,
World Economic Outlook, with the pace reminiscent of the precrisis period. This makes markets
of economic growth picking up and the exposed to a sharp tightening in financial conditions,
recovery becoming more synchronized around the which could lead to a sudden unwinding of risk premi-
world. While still supportive of economic growth, ums and a repricing of risky assets. Moreover, liquidity
global financial conditions have tightened somewhat mismatches and the use of financial leverage to boost
since the October 2017 Global Financial Stability returns could amplify the impact of asset price moves
Report (GFSR). Such a tightening reflects primarily on the financial system. Although no major disrup-
the bout of equity volatility in early February and a tions were reported during the episode of volatility in
decline in risky asset prices at the end of March follow- early February, market participants should not take
ing concerns about a wider escalation of protectionist too much comfort. Investors and policymakers must
measures. remain attuned to the risks associated with higher
Short-term risks to financial stability have increased interest rates and greater volatility. Policymakers should
somewhat relative to the previous GFSR, and medium- address financial vulnerabilities by using more actively
term risks continue to be elevated. Financial vulner- the micro- and macroprudential tools at their disposal
abilities, which have accumulated during years of or by enhancing their toolkits as needed—for example,
extremely low rates and volatility, could make the road to address risks in the nonbank financial sector.
ahead bumpy and could put growth at risk. Indeed, The banking sector has become more resilient since
Growth-at-Risk analysis (described in Chapter 3 of the the global financial crisis. However, it is important
October 2017 GFSR) shows that risks to medium- to ensure that the postcrisis regulatory reform agenda
term economic growth, stemming from easy financial is completed. In advanced economies some weaker
conditions, remain well above historical norms. banks still need to strengthen their balance sheets, and
In advanced economies, stronger growth momen- some institutions operating internationally run dollar
tum and the firming of inflation have eased to some liquidity mismatches. A sudden spell of turbulence in
extent a key challenge facing central banks: maintain- financial markets could expose these mismatches and
ing the monetary accommodation required to support crystallize dollar funding strains.
the economic recovery while addressing medium-term A number of emerging market economies have
financial vulnerabilities. But the firming of inflation taken advantage of an extended period of benign exter-
also brings risks. For example, inflation may pick up nal financial conditions to improve their fundamentals.
faster than currently anticipated, possibly propelled However, they could be vulnerable to a sudden tight-
by significant fiscal expansion enacted in the United ening of global financial conditions or spillovers from
States. Central banks may respond to higher inflation monetary policy normalization in advanced economies,
more aggressively than currently expected, which could resulting in an increase in risk aversion and capital
lead to a sharp tightening of financial conditions. This flow reversals. The severity of such potential shocks
tightening could spill over to risky asset prices, bank will differ across countries, depending on economic
dollar funding markets, and both emerging market fundamentals and the policy responses to those shocks.
economies and low-income countries, as discussed Although regulators in China have taken steps to
below. To minimize these risks, central banks should address risks stemming from the interconnectedness of
continue to normalize monetary policy gradually and the banking and shadow banking sectors, vulnerabili-
communicate their decisions clearly to support the ties remain high. Further regulatory actions are crucial
economic recovery. to continue reducing risks in the financial sector.
The technology behind crypto assets has the poten- ability of banking stress, in addition to the previously
tial to make the financial market infrastructure more documented signals provided by credit growth. Coun-
efficient. However, crypto assets have been afflicted by try authorities can use the measures introduced in this
fraud, security breaches, and operational failures, and chapter to monitor the buildup of vulnerabilities via
have been associated with illicit activities. At present, risk taking in credit allocation. The chapter discusses
crypto assets do not appear to pose financial stability policies that can mitigate the increase in credit riski-
risks, but they could do so should their use become ness during credit expansions.
more widespread without appropriate safeguards. Chapter 3 documents a striking increase in house
Chapter 2 takes a comprehensive look at the evolu- price synchronization among 40 countries and 44
tion of the riskiness of corporate credit allocation, major cities in advanced and emerging market econo-
given concerns that the continued search for higher mies over the past several decades. The exposure of
yield may have led banks and investors to extend too countries and cities to global financial conditions may
much credit to risky borrowers. The chapter docu- help explain that increase. Rising housing valuations
ments a pattern in which the firms obtaining more since the global financial crisis raise the specter of a
credit are relatively riskier during periods of strong simultaneous decline in house prices should financial
credit expansion, especially when lending standards conditions reverse. The chapter suggests that height-
are loose or financial conditions are easy. An increase ened synchronicity of house prices can signal a higher
in the riskiness of credit allocation signals heightened probability of adverse scenarios for the real economy,
downside risks to GDP growth and a higher prob- especially when credit is high or rapidly expanding.
The following remarks were made by the Chair at the conclusion of the Executive Board’s discussion of the
Fiscal Monitor, Global Financial Stability Report, and World Economic Outlook on April 2, 2018.
E
xecutive Directors broadly shared the key protectionism and inward-looking policies. Record-
messages of the flagship reports and found high levels of global debt, geopolitical tensions, and
the analytical chapters topical, relevant, and climate events also threaten global growth prospects.
insightful. They welcomed the broadbased Against this backdrop, Directors underscored that
recovery of the global economy, supported by a pickup the cyclical upswing provides a golden opportunity to
in investment and trade. Directors observed that global advance policies and reforms to strengthen medium-
growth is expected to rise further in the near term. term prospects and reduce vulnerabilities. Priorities are
Meanwhile, inflation remains muted in many countries. to raise potential output, ensure the gains are widely
Subdued labor productivity growth and population shared, enhance economic and financial resilience, and
aging continue to hold back growth in advanced econo- safeguard debt sustainability. Directors stressed that
mies. While the recent commodity price increase has a multilateral framework that is open, resilient, and
supported a recovery in commodity-dependent emerg- adhered to by all can support growth and benefit the
ing market and developing economies, the ongoing global economy. Enhanced commitment to multilateral
adjustment processes continue to weigh on growth. cooperation is particularly needed to reduce trade bar-
Directors agreed that risks around the short-term riers and distortionary trade practices, and to promote
outlook are broadly balanced, but beyond the next a rule-based multilateral trading system that works for
several quarters, risks are tilted to the downside. On all. Directors also called for multilateral cooperation to
the upside, the cyclical pickup in advanced economy further reduce incentives for cross-border profit shifting
growth may prove stronger than expected as slack in and tax evasion, avoid tax competition, implement
labor markets may be larger than currently assessed. the postcrisis financial regulatory reform agenda, and
On the downside, a sharp tightening of global finan- address other shared challenges such as refugees, secu-
cial conditions could have negative repercussions for rity threats, cyber risks, and climate change. Reducing
growth, while financial vulnerabilities accumulated excess external imbalances requires policy efforts to lift
over years of low interest rates could amplify the the contribution of domestic sources of growth above
impact of asset price movements on the financial sys- overall GDP growth in surplus countries and to boost
tem, putting growth at risk in the medium term. Most potential output and saving in deficit countries.
Directors noted that the tax reform in the United Directors concurred that monetary accommodation
States is procyclical and may trigger inflation pressure should continue in advanced economies with infla-
and a faster-than-anticipated withdrawal of monetary tion below target. Where output is close to poten-
accommodation, as well as widen global imbalances, tial and inflation is rising toward target, a gradual,
although the view was also expressed that the reform data-dependent, and well-communicated withdrawal
would boost investment and efficiency, and thus move of monetary support is warranted. Directors sup-
the US economy to a higher, sustainable growth path. ported the call for fiscal policy to start rebuilding
An abrupt tightening of global financial conditions, buffers now, where appropriate, to create room for an
especially if accompanied by capital flow reversals, eventual downturn and prevent fiscal vulnerabilities
could be challenging for several emerging markets and from becoming a source of stress. Fiscal adjustment is
low-income developing countries, notwithstanding warranted in most countries, calibrated to avoid pro-
improved resilience of their financial systems. Down- cyclicality and anchored on fiscal reforms that increase
side risks are particularly evident from escalating trade productivity and promote human and physical capital.
In countries that have ample fiscal space and are ing market and developing economies enhance their
operating at or close to capacity, fiscal policy should be resilience to external shocks. Directors welcomed
used to facilitate growth-enhancing structural reforms. China’s progress in reducing financial vulnerabilities
Directors also saw a role for fiscal policy in promot- and encouraged further efforts to strengthen its regula-
ing equality, and for labor and immigration policies in tory and supervisory frameworks, particularly in the
boosting labor supply. shadow banking sector.
Directors agreed that digitalization presents both Directors noted that low-income developing coun-
opportunities and risks. Digitalization can reduce tax tries face multiple challenges in their effort to progress
compliance costs, improve spending efficiency, and toward the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals.
enhance social protection. At the same time, it cre- They expressed concern over the broad-based increase
ates challenges for fiscal policy and the international in public debt burdens, the increasing number of
tax system. Directors noted that mitigating risks countries at high risk of debt distress, and data gaps.
from digitalization would require a comprehensive These underscore the urgent need for fiscal prudence,
reform agenda, adequate resources, and a coordinated improved debt management capacity, and greater debt
approach toward a long-term vision of the interna- transparency on the part of both debtors and credi-
tional tax architecture. tors, as well as concerted efforts from the international
Directors welcomed the increased resilience of community. Several countries need to make room in
the banking system and stressed the importance of their budgets to accommodate higher spending on
completing and implementing the postcrisis regula- social services, such as health care and education, and
tory reform agenda. They encouraged policymakers public investment, by mobilizing domestic revenues
to develop and deploy micro- and macroprudential and improving spending efficiency. Commodity
tools to address financial vulnerabilities, and to closely exporters and those vulnerable to climate-related events
monitor risks related to credit allocation and increas- face additional complex challenges of diversifying their
ingly synchronized house prices across countries. The economies. While country circumstances differ, com-
global implications of Brexit-related challenges also call mon priorities for promoting economic diversification
for close cross-border cooperation. Directors concurred and employment include increasing access to credit,
that, while crypto assets do not pose an immediate expanding vocational skills training, and improving the
threat to financial stability, if widely used, they may quality of infrastructure.
raise issues about investor and consumer protection, Directors expressed concern over the stalled progress
money laundering, and tax evasion. in the catching-up process of emerging market and
Directors agreed that enhancing the quality of developing economies. They noted that, to facilitate
credit intermediation, avoiding credit booms that income convergence, policies should aim to strengthen
lead to excessive risk taking, and, where feasible, governance, improve educational and health outcomes,
permitting exchange rate flexibility can help emerg- and lower entry barriers for new firms.
Outlook for Financial Stability Global financial conditions have tightened some-
Despite ongoing monetary policy normalization in what, on balance, since the October 2017 Global
some advanced economies and some signs of firming Financial Stability Report (GFSR), reflecting the spike
inflation, global financial conditions are still very in equity market volatility in early February and inves-
accommodative relative to historical norms. Although tors’ jitters in late March about a wider escalation of
supportive of near-term growth, easy financial condi- trade tensions (Figure 1.1, panel 1). Nonetheless, even
tions also continue to facilitate a buildup of financial as the US Federal Reserve has continued to normalize
fragilities, increasing risks to global financial stabil- monetary policy, global financial conditions remain
ity and economic growth over the medium term. broadly accommodative relative to historical norms
across both advanced and emerging market econo-
Still-Easy Financial Conditions Continue to Support mies. Figure 1.1 (panels 1 and 2) shows global and
Economic Growth regional financial conditions indices (FCIs), as well as
their key components.
With global economic recovery now stronger and
Although still-easy financial conditions support
more synchronized (as discussed in the April 2018
economic growth in the near term, they may also
World Economic Outlook [WEO]), monetary pol-
contribute to a buildup of financial imbalances,
icy authorities in advanced economies have started
excessive risk taking, and mispricing of risks. The
to, or are gearing up to, normalize their monetary
growth-at-risk (GaR) approach—which links finan-
policy stance (see “Monetary Policy Normalization in
cial conditions to the distribution of future GDP
Advanced Economies”). Over the years since the global
growth outcomes—provides a framework for assess-
financial crisis, accommodative monetary policy has
ing the intertemporal trade-off between supporting
been crucial to ensuring a sustainable global economic
growth in the near term and putting financial stabil-
recovery. But with inflation well below target and
ity and future growth at risk over the medium term.1
buoyant market sentiment, central banks in advanced
The key steps in this approach are as follows: First, a
economies have faced a difficult balancing act of
model of output growth is estimated as a function of
keeping interest rates low to support the economy
current economic and financial conditions. Second,
and addressing financial vulnerabilities that could put
this model is used to forecast conditional distribu-
growth at risk in the medium term. The recent firming
tions of growth for different horizons. Finally, to
of inflation has provided policymakers with more
gauge the impact of financial conditions on growth
leeway to address financial vulnerabilities, including
prospects, changes in the forecasted severely adverse
by deploying and developing micro- and macropru-
growth outcomes (those that occur with a 5 percent
dential tools.
probability, also called the “tail” of the distribution)
Prepared by staff from the Monetary and Capital Markets Depart- for different horizons are compared with previous
ment (in consultation with other departments): Fabio Natalucci forecasts. Changes in financial conditions that result
(Deputy Director), Anna Ilyina (Division Chief), J. Benson Durham in a deterioration in severely adverse growth forecasts
(Advisor), Hideo Hashimoto (Advisor), Ali Al-Eyd (Deputy Division
Chief), Peter Breuer (Deputy Division Chief), Will Kerry (Deputy
(that is, a leftward shift in the tail) can be interpreted
Division Chief), Sergei Antoshin, Magally Bernal, Jeroen Brinkhoff, as financial vulnerabilities potentially increasing
John Caparusso, Sally Chen, Yingyuan Chen, Kevin Chow, Fabio toward macrocritical levels. This means that these
Cortes, Dimitris Drakopoulos, Martin Edmonds, Rohit Goel, Tryg-
vulnerabilities could magnify the severity of an eco-
gvi Gudmundsson, Sanjay Hazarika, Frank Hespeler, Henry Hoyle,
Mohamed Jaber, David Jones, Ashraf Khan, Robin Koepke, Yang
Li, Sheheryar Malik, Rebecca McCaughrin, Aditya Narain, Thomas
Piontek, Jochen Schmittmann, Juan Solé, Ilan Solot, Nour Tawk, 1See Chapter 3 of the October 2017 GFSR for a description of
Jeffrey Williams, Akihiko Yokoyama, and Han Zaw. the growth-at-risk methodology.
Global financial conditions have tightened somewhat, but remain supportive of growth.
1. Global Financial Conditions Index
(Standard deviations)
4
2 Tightening
0
–2 2017:Q3
–4
–6
± one standard deviation from 2017:Q3
–8
–10
2012 13 14 15 16 17 18:Q1
The price of risk is low, markets are buoyant, and leverage is high across both advanced and emerging market economies.
2. Global and Regional FCIs and Their Components
Quintiles
Tighter Easier
Global FCI Components Oct. 2017 GFSR
1. Short-term rates
2. Long-term real rates
3. Term spread
4. Corporate spread
5. Interbank spread
6. Equity price growth
7. Equity return volatility
8. Credit to GDP
9. Credit growth
10. House price growth
Global FCI (1–10)
Regional FCIs
United States
Euro area
Japan
China
EM excluding China
Regional Price of Risk FCIs
United States
Euro area
Japan
China
EM ex-China
1991 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
nomic downturn in the future, even without neces- tions, which could provide a separate and substantial
sarily leading to a systemic financial crisis. headwind to growth.
Supportive financial conditions tend to dampen the near-term risks, with growth-at-risk forecasting the severely adverse outcome (for example,
with 5 percent probability) for global growth at about 3 percent or less one year ahead.
1. Percentiles of One-Year-Ahead Growth Forecast Densities
(Percent)
6 6
4 4
2 2
0 0
–2 –2
–4 –4
–6 –6
–8 5th percentile –8
–10 Median –10
95th percentile
–12 –12
–14 –14
1991 93 95 97 99 2001 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 18
Q1
But easy financial conditions also raise the odds of adverse growth Medium-term risks to growth have increased in recent years ...
outcomes in the medium term—the three-year-ahead growth
distribution has a much fatter left tail than the one-year-ahead growth
distribution.
2. Growth Forecast Densities at 2018:Q1 3. Severely Adverse Growth Outcomes (5th Percentile)
(Probability) at Different Future Horizons
(Percent)
1.2 3.35
One year ahead Forecast path at 2018:Q1
1.0 Three years ahead At 2017:Q3
At 2016:Q4 2.35
0.8
0.6 1.35
5th percentile
0.4
0.35
0.2
0.0 –0.65
–1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 One year Two years Three years
Percent ahead ahead ahead
... and are well above historical norms, given the current financial conditions.
4. GaR Forecasts of Severely Adverse Growth Outcomes: Percentile Ranks
Quintiles
Worst Best
1991 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff estimates.
Note: Growth-at-risk (GaR) refers to the set of outcomes that fall into the 5th percentile of (conditional) forecast densities of global growth. Panel 2 presents forecast
densities for growth, one and three years ahead. In panel 4, the color shading depicts the percentile rank for the 5th percentile threshold of densities for one-year-
and three-year-ahead growth. Red denotes lower growth outcomes.
prolonged period of low interest rates has fueled search Figure 1.3. Nonfinancial Private Sector Debt
for yield and compressed market risk measures (see
1. Credit-to-GDP Ratio
“Reach for Yield or Overreach in Risky Assets?” section). (Percent)
Although the recent bout of volatility in global 220 Advanced economies without
200
equity markets (Box 1.1) did not lead to any major 180
Advanced economies a crisis in 2007–08
hit by a crisis in
dislocations, the episode underscores the need for 160 2007–08
investors and policymakers to remain attuned to the 140
120
risks associated with rising interest rates after years of 100
low rates and low volatility. 80 China
60
40
Monetary Policy Normalization in 20
Emerging market economies
(excluding China)
Advanced Economies 0
1970 75 80 85 90 95 2000 05 10 15
The buildup of financial vulnerabilities over the past
few years has left financial markets exposed to the risk 2. House Price Growth and Credit, 2017:Q3
of a sharp tightening of financial conditions. In this HUN
10
context, central banks must strike a delicate balance of CAN IRL
CZE ISR AUS SWE
Figure 1.4. Market Interest Rates, Central Bank Balance Sheets, and US Financial Indicators
Easy global financial conditions are underpinned by advanced Policy rate expectations still point to gradual rate hikes.
economy central banks’ large asset holdings.
1. Change in Central Banks’ Balance Sheet Assets 2. Estimated Average Short-Term Interest Rates through Two Years
(Trillions of US dollars) (Percent)
16 40 3.0
United States Aggregate stock as a share of GDP United States
United Kingdom (percent, right scale) United Kingdom 2.5
12 Euro area Germany 2.0
Japan 30 Japan
Aggregate stock 1.5
8 1.0
0.5
20
4 0.0
–0.5
0 10 –1.0
2005 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 2013 14 15 16 17 18
Term premiums have remained compressed in major economies and S financial conditions have continued to ease despite policy rate
are near historic lows. hikes ...
3. Estimated 10-Year Term Premiums 4. Financial Conditions and US Federal Funds Rate
(Percent)
3.0 1993–94 0.0
United States
2.5 Germany Tightening of 1999–2000
–1.0 –1.0
2007 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Federal funds rate (percent)
... while the US dollar has weakened ... ... and measures of in ation compensation have remained relatively
muted.
5. US Real Effective Exchange during Federal Reserve Hiking Cycles . Five ear Five ear ea n ation S a
(Index) (Percent)
Mar. 1983 Feb. 1988 Feb. 1994 United States (left scale)
115 Jun. 1999 Jun. 2004 Dec. 2015 3.0 Euro area (left scale) 1.6
Japan (right scale)
Index (month of first hike = 100)
110
1.2
2.5
105
0.8
100 2.0
0.4
95
1.5
90 0.0
85 1.0 –0.4
–6 –3 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 2014 15 16 17 18
Months relative to first hike
to previous hiking cycles (Figure 1.4, panels 3 and 4). • The signaling channel of balance sheet reduction may
The tightening cycle so far has not offset the broader be muted, especially compared with the significant
weakness of the dollar since the beginning of the normal- signaling effects associated with implementation of
ization process in the United States (Figure 1.4, panel 5). asset purchases. This is because the Federal Reserve
Moreover, although measures of inflation compensation has mapped out the unwinding of its balance sheet
have moved a bit higher recently with the firming in into the future, with a “high hurdle” for revision.
inflation, they continue to be relatively low in the United At least in the United States so far, the unwinding
States and other countries (Figure 1.4, panel 6).4 of balance sheet measures is less data dependent
Several factors may help explain why the effects of the than the purchase program. Guidance around the
Federal Reserve’s policy actions on term premiums (and initial balance sheet reduction contains much less
thus financial conditions) have been somewhat muted to information about the future path of the traditional
date, compared with the sizable decline following initial tool compared with possible signaling effects of asset
implementation of unconventional balance sheet policies:5 purchases. Indeed, at the nominal lower bound,
• Liquidity considerations point to likely asymmetric unconventional policy tools supplement traditional
responses of term premiums to asset purchases, on levers. But when removing accommodation, policy
the one hand, and shrinkage of balance sheets, on rates have no upper bound.
the other. For example, many studies find that the
Federal Reserve’s first asset purchase program had
a larger effect than subsequent programs. One pos- Are Term Premiums Too Low Given Economic Variables
sible explanation is that the first rounds may have and Other Fundamentals?
ameliorated illiquidity and extinguished potential Term premiums remain very low by historical
fire sales of assets. By contrast, the initial withdrawal standards. But are they “too low” relative to economic
of unconventional accommodation seems unlikely fundamentals? The answer to this question is central to
to have had the concomitant and opposite effect of determining the implications of the prolonged period
boosting liquidity premiums and therefore yields. of monetary policy accommodation for global financial
• Central bank purchase programs may have “structurally” markets. Even though a variety of shocks could push
lowered term premiums, especially in the current envi- term premiums higher, the impact of these shocks on
ronment of lower equilibrium policy rates. Investors financial markets could be sudden and more pro-
likely expect asset purchases to remain in the policy nounced if term premiums are too low given the stage
toolkit in the future, whether or not central banks of the economic cycle.
reduce their asset holdings to near precrisis levels.6 To Model estimates suggest that term premiums are not
commit credibly to abandoning these tools may prove too low. Analysis finds that term premiums are broadly
difficult. Moreover, policymakers are presumably more in line with investors’ expectations for growth, inflation,
likely than before to pull these levers, given new limits and the current stance of monetary policy. As shown in
to conventional measures, because equilibrium or Box 1.2, the estimated term premium has remained near
terminal policy interest rates (the rate that is consistent the lower bound of fitted model values over the past
with full employment and capacity utilization and sta- few years, in line with the large-scale monetary accom-
ble prices) may be lower today as a result of underly- modation needed to support the economic recovery.8
ing structural factors in the economy that keep interest In addition, the gap between the estimated and the
rates nearer their nominal lower bound.7 model-based weighted-average estimated term premi-
ums has been closing recently, suggesting that term
4Inflation compensation, typically referred to as breakeven
premiums are largely in line with investors’ expectations
inflation rates, is defined as the inflation rates that, if realized, would
leave an investor indifferent between holding an inflation-protected for economic fundamentals. However, the model also
Treasury security and a nominal Treasury security. suggests that term premiums are significantly vulnerable
5As such, careful studies of the effects of unconventional policy mea-
to any revisions in those expectations, particularly with
sures (including Gagnon and others 2010) may be less relevant, if not
somewhat misleading, to understanding the reversal of these measures.
6In addition, a possible sustained dearth of global risk-free assets 8Figure 1.2.1 in Box 1.2 shows the average and range of 900
could also durably lower the level of the term premium. model-fitted values for the Adrian, Crump, and Moench (2013)
7These factors include demographic effects and changes in produc- term premium estimate, conditional on various economic and
tivity, among others. See Chapter 2 of the April 2017 GFSR. financial factors, for the United States and Germany.
Figure 1. . S n ation ectation an er Pre iu possibly as a result of the recent fiscal expansion at a late
stage of the credit cycle. In response to the revision in
Term premiums have moved lower, and uncertainty about future in ation
has declined. the inflation outlook, the Federal Reserve may withdraw
1. US Term Premium and Dispersion of 10-Year-Ahead monetary policy accommodation at a faster pace than
n ation ectation currently anticipated. In this scenario, term premiums
Percent
4.5 1.0 could suddenly decompress, risk premiums could rise,
Ten-year term premium (left scale)
4.0 Dispersion of 10-year-ahead in ation forecasts 0.9 and global financial conditions could tighten sharply, with
3.5 (three-quarter moving average, right scale) 0.8 possible adverse consequences for the global economy.
3.0
2.5 0.7 Emerging markets are vulnerable to spillovers
2.0 0.6 from an abrupt tightening in global financial condi-
1.5 0.5 tions. Gradual and well-telegraphed normalization of
1.0
0.5
0.4 monetary policy in advanced economies has provided
0.0
0.3 a period of favorable external conditions, and inves-
0.2
–0.5 tor sentiment toward emerging markets has remained
–1.0 0.1
1991 93 95 97 99 2001 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17
constructive. The favorable conditions have allowed
weaker issuers to access markets, and the creditor base
Markets are not pricing in sharply higher in ation. now includes investors more inclined to turn over their
. ar et lie Probabilit o ig n ation portfolios. If the tightening cycle is accompanied by a
Percent c ance o P n ation 3 ercent over five ear
50
rise in investor risk aversion, portfolio flows to emerg-
ing markets could fall by at least one-quarter under
United States
40 Euro area realistic assumptions (see “Vulnerabilities in Emerg-
ing Markets, Low-Income Countries, and China”
30
section). This drop would increase rollover risks and
20
the cost of funding in these countries. Low-income,
small, non-investment-grade borrowers are particularly
10 exposed to such risks because they have seen a sharp
rise in debt vulnerabilities over the past few years.
0
2010 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis; and IMF Correlations among Global Term Premiums
staff estimates. (and Expected Rates) Underscore Risks of
Note: In panel 2, euro area options are illiquid. CPI = consumer price index.
International Spillovers
Rapid decompression of term premiums could
respect to uncertainty about the future path of inflation quickly spill over to global financial markets. Key
and growth, or the path for monetary policy. questions are the extent to which movements in term
premiums are correlated across countries today, and
thus primed for contagion, and the direction and
Financial Markets Remain Vulnerable to an intensity of such spillovers. Some evidence indicates
Inflation Surprise that sovereign term premiums among major economies
Although the expected path of policy rates has (Canada, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, United
recently increased somewhat in some countries, markets States) move very closely together, even as investors’
continue to price in a gradual pace of monetary tight- expectations for policy rate paths in these countries
ening. Uncertainty about future inflation outcomes has have diverged. This trend seems to have preceded the
diminished in tandem with declining term premiums Federal Reserve’s lift-off from the nominal lower bound
(Figure 1.5, panel 1). In addition, market participants in December 2015, and is in line with the view that
are not currently pricing in a risk of sharply higher infla- asset purchases may be a stronger driver of spillovers
tion over the next few years (Figure 1.5, panel 2). than standard monetary policy via short interest rates
An upside surprise to inflation could pose a challenge (Figure 1.6, panel 1).
to investors and policymakers. For example, inflation Moreover, model estimates indicate the impact of
in the United States may increase faster than expected, spillovers between G4 (Germany, Japan, United King-
Figure 1.6. Term Premium Correlations, Spillovers, and Exchange Rate Relationships
Term premiums in major advanced economies move very closely Spillovers between G4 term premiums are elevated, with the
together even as market expectations of policy rate paths diverge. United States dominating the direction.
1. Term Premiums and Expected Rate Correlations 2. Net Pairwise Spillovers between the US Term Premium and
Percent e laine b fir t rinci al co onent German, Japanese, and UK Premiums
(Percent)
90 Two-year expected rate 25
5x5-year forward premium 20
80
15
70
10
60 5
0
50
–5
40
–10
30 –15
1997 99 2001 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 1994 98 2002 06 10 14 18
Short rates dominate movements in exchange rates between the ... and the sterling-US dollar cross rates.
euro-US dollar ...
3. Spot US Dollar Exchange Rate Betas: Euro 4. Spot US Dollar Exchange Rate Betas: British Pound
6 6
Two-year expected rate Two-year expected rate
5 5x5-year forward premium 5x5-year forward premium 5
4 4
3
3
2
2
1
0 1
–1 0
–2 –1
1997 99 2001 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 1997 99 2001 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17
dom, United States) term premiums is elevated, with In this environment, spillovers from a faster
spillovers from the United States to the other countries withdrawal of US Federal Reserve monetary policy
mainly dominating (Figure 1.6, panel 2).9 Although accommodation in the wake of an inflation surprise
the net impact of such spillovers appears notably lower and associated repricing of inflation risk and term pre-
than at the height of the crisis, alongside higher cor- miums could rapidly tighten US and global financial
relations of term premiums this suggests considerable conditions. This could challenge major central banks,
scope for a rapid rise in interest rates to be transmitted such as the European Central Bank, that are not as far
to global markets. along in the normalization process, perhaps forcing
them to respond through additional accommodation.
Although term premiums may be more correlated
9The methodology, by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012), obtains a
at present, perhaps because of global factors, central
time-varying spillover index using rolling generalized forecast error
variance decompositions in a generalized vector autoregression banks’ strategies regarding conventional policy tools
model. The framework measures directional spillovers by using the remain critical for communicating the stance of mon-
normalized elements of the variance decomposition matrix. The etary policy. For example, term premium differentials
net pairwise spillovers are then calculated by taking the difference
between the total spillovers transmitted from market i to all markets
do not appear to have dominated the transmission
j and the spillovers transmitted from all markets j to market i. of monetary policy through exchange rates, at least
among the G4.10 In fact, the sensitivity of currencies investors to take additional risk, some central banks
to expected short rate differentials has remained ele- around the globe have either been raising policy rates
vated in recent years (Figure 1.6, panels 3 and 4). This or preparing investors for an eventually less accommo-
finding holds both on average over the past 20 years dative stance. And although the share of assets with
and for estimates for the latest sensitivity. negative yields remains sizable globally, this fraction
has ticked down in recent months. So, rather than a
reach for yield prompted by central bank accommo-
Continued Clear Monetary Policy Communication Is dation, there may be outright speculative overreach in
Essential to Avoid Market Disruptions some risky assets.11
Gradual removal of monetary accommodation The key questions are the extent to which finan-
and clear communications will help anchor market cial vulnerabilities have increased since the previous
expectations and prevent undue volatility. To support GFSR, how the constellation of current accommoda-
the recovery and ensure inflation objectives are met, tive financial conditions and vulnerabilities compares
monetary authorities should maintain accommodation, with past episodes of financial stress, and whether
as needed. When normalizing policy, central banks asset valuations appear stretched, given current cyclical
should do so in a gradual and well-communicated conditions. This final determination matters. If asset
manner. They should also provide guidance on pro- valuations are not judged to be significantly out of
spective changes to policy frameworks if such changes line with fundamentals, policymakers can continue to
are warranted. Gradualism and clear communications normalize monetary policy gradually and to implement
are crucial given the confluence of still relatively low macroprudential and other regulatory measures aimed
inflation, easy global financial conditions, and rising at lessening financial stability risks. In contrast, if asset
financial vulnerabilities. To address the buildup in misalignments are significant and may put growth
financial vulnerabilities and avoid putting growth at at risk in the future, a more forceful policy response
risk, policymakers should also deploy and develop may be needed.
appropriate micro- and macroprudential tools. To shed some light on rising financial vulnerabil-
ities, this section focuses on asset price valuations in
equity, corporate bond, and leveraged loan markets; on
Reach for Yield or Overreach in Risky Assets? financial leverage, including that embedded in deriv-
Against a backdrop of mounting vulnerabilities, risky asset ative products; and on liquidity mismatches related to
valuations appear overstretched, albeit to varying degrees the proliferation of certain types of investment funds
across markets, ranging from global equities and credit and strategies (for example, exchange-traded funds).
markets, including leveraged loans, to rapidly expanding
crypto assets (discussed in the next section). Moreover, the
increasing use of financial leverage to boost returns and Equity Valuations Remain Expensive
the growing influence of some passive investment vehicles, The ongoing global economic recovery, strong
particularly exchange-traded funds (ETFs) in less liquid corporate performance, and still-low interest rates have
underlying markets, could amplify the impact of asset supported equity prices, on balance, since the previ-
price moves on the financial system. ous GFSR (Figure 1.7, panel 1). In the United States,
and through the spate of volatility beginning in early
Financial Vulnerabilities Continue to Build amid Easy February, equity market capitalization has risen from
Financial Conditions 95 percent of GDP in 2011 to 155 percent of GDP in
The unconventional monetary policies implemented March 2018. Rising global equity prices have sup-
since the global financial crisis, including both asset
purchases and forward guidance, clearly and by design 11“Reach for yield” may be a dated description of current investor
encouraged investors to reach for yield. But today’s behavior and financial asset price developments. Following Hanson
policy environment differs. Rather than encourage and Stein (2015), the effects are transitory, and the lengths of these
episodes depend on the capacity of so-called return-oriented arbitra-
geurs to take offsetting positions. Insofar as financial conditions are
10Based
on estimated dynamic correlations following Cappiello, very accommodative (for example, the ability and willingness to take
Engle, and Shepphard (2006). on leverage), any reach for yield should not have persisted.
150 200
100
100
50
0 0
2009 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 2005 07 09 11 13 15 17
In the United States, valuations are high relative to their historical However, US equity valuations appear low relative to US Treasuries.
averages and pre-GFC peak, and to other countries.
3. Valuation Metrics 4. Valuation Metrics
(Dotted arrows: 2008–12; solid arrows: 2012–18; (Z-scores)
squares: long-term average)
26 3 –3
Emerging markets Japan PE (left scale)
24 United States China CAPE (left scale)
2 –2
Price-to-earnings ratio
Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; Citigroup Index LLC; ICE Bank of America Merrill Lynch; JPMorgan Chase & Co; IMF, World Economic Outlook (WEO) database;
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI); Standard & Poor’s; Thomson Reuters IBES; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: bps = basis points; CAPE = cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings ratio; EM = emerging market; EMEA = Europe, Middle East, Africa; EPS = earnings per share;
ERP = equity risk premium; GFC = global financial crisis; Latam = Latin merica; PE = price-to-earnings ratio.
ported a moderate rebound in new issuance, especially still high—have edged lower, especially in China and
in emerging markets (Figure 1.7, panel 2). other emerging markets (Figure 1.8, panel 4). Effective
These developments raise questions about val- interest rates paid by the corporate sector moved higher,
uations and potential investor excesses. Standard particularly outside the United States. As a result, inter-
price-to-earnings and price-to-book valuation metrics est coverage ratios have dipped everywhere except China
remain elevated in most regions (Figure 1.7, panel 3). and the United States (Figure 1.8, panel 5).
For the United States, these measures remain rela- Recent US tax reform will have important implica-
tively high compared to both historical levels and tions for the corporate sector. As discussed in the April
current valuations in other countries. Indicators that 2017 GFSR, most US companies will gain from the
incorporate longer-term averages of realized earnings reform. However, historical experience in the United
to capture expectations, such as cyclically adjusted States in the 1980s and with the repatriation tax hol-
price-to-earnings, continue to support this assessment, iday in 2004 suggests that financial risk taking often
even after the volatility spike in February and the slide follows tax policy changes, as evidenced by heightened
in equity prices in March on concerns about trade ten- purchases of financial assets, mergers and acquisitions,
sions (Figure 1.7, panel 4). dividends, and share buybacks. The cap on the tax
Some measures of the US equity risk premium, in deductibility of interest expense will reduce incentives
which equity valuations are conditional on the level of for debt financing, which tends to affect highly lever-
interest rates, suggest that shares have been closer to aged companies disproportionately (Figure 1.8, panel
fair value. Indeed, strong near-term earnings expecta- 6). These firms may face funding pressures because of
tions, as well as historically low interest rates, sustain higher interest expenses, more volatile earnings, and a
comparatively wide equity risk premiums (Figure 1.7, more compressed schedule for adapting their funding
panel 5). However, this approach is highly sensitive structure to the new tax code.
to profit forecasts as well as to different assumptions
about the discount factor. Equity valuations deteriorate
under alternative, less sanguine proxies for earnings, Signs of Overheating Are Evident in the
such as longer-term averages or nominal GDP growth. Leveraged Loan Market
Also, higher projected paths for interest rates similarly The leveraged loan market, consisting of commercial
narrow the equity premium and imply richer valua- loans extended to borrowers who are non–investment
tions (Figure 1.7, panel 6). grade or already have significant amounts of debt, is seen
by market participants as a barometer for broader risk
taking. Global credit markets have grown massively in
Corporate Bond Valuations Are Stretched and Credit recent years. Global leveraged loan issuance hit a record
Quality Is Deteriorating in Risky Segments high in 2017 of $788 billion, surpassing the precrisis high
With central banks in advanced economies continu- of $762 billion in 2007. Most issuance occurred in the
ing to lift policy rates from the nominal lower bound or United States, amounting to $564 billion (Figure 1.9,
signaling a not-too-distant commencement of the nor- panel 1). Since 2007, US institutional leveraged loans
malization process, the share of negative-yielding global outstanding have doubled to almost $1 trillion, compared
bonds has dipped lower since the October 2017 GFSR. with $1.3 trillion in US high-yield bonds outstanding.12
This ratio, however, remains significant (Figure 1.8, While refinancing volumes have been significant given the
panel 1). Against a backdrop of low default rates, corpo- low-interest-rate environment, borrowing to fund mergers
rate spreads remain at very low levels, even in the riskiest and acquisitions, leveraged buyouts, dividends, and share
segments (Figure 1.8, panel 2). Favorable financial con- buybacks still accounts for half of total issuance amid
ditions have boosted corporate bond issuances. Issuance improving global growth (Figure 1.9, panel 2).
of riskier bonds has surged, and the share of lower-grade
bonds (BBB-rated) in the investment-grade universe has
been rising (Figure 1.8, panel 3). 12Institutional leveraged loans include term loans structured
Strong economic growth and corporate restructuring specifically for institutional investors, such as loan funds, collat-
eralized loan obligations, real money investors, and hedge funds,
efforts, particularly in the energy sector, have sup- though there are some banks that buy institutional term loans. These
ported corporate profitability; and debt ratios—while tranches include first- and second-lien loans.
15 2,500
US BBs
US Bs
US CCCs
EU BBs
EU Bs
EM BBs
EM Bs
2013 14 15 16 17
10 35 2
1
0 30 0
1998 2000 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 1999 2001 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17:Q3
As a result, interest coverage ratios have dipped, except for the United Highly levered firms are more likely to be impacted by the S corporate
States and China. tax reform.
5. Interest Coverage Ratios 6. Comparison among High- and Low-Leveraged US Firms
(EBIT to interest expense)
14 80 76 12
United States Europe Low leverage 11
12 China EMs excluding High leverage 10
10 China 60
8
8 6
40 6
6 29
4
4 20
2 2
5
1
0 0 0
1999 2001 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17:Q3 Number of Gross debt Average maturity
firms proportion where (years)
interest expense
30 percent EBITD
(percent)
Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; ICE Bank of America Merrill Lynch; JPMorgan Chase & Co; Standard & Poor’s; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: In panel 2, the full sample is from 1999 to 2018. In panels 4 and 5, the full sample from 1999 to 2005 from the source is limited. In panel 6, high leveraged is
defined as firms with net debt divided by EBITD four times. Real estate and utilities sectors are not included. EBIT = earnings before interest and taxes;
EBITD = earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amorti ation; EM = emerging market.
Figure 1.9. Leveraged Loan Issuance, Quality, and Developments after Regulatory Guidance
Loan issuance reached record highs in 2017 ... ... with the share of proceeds used to fund acquisitions and
shareholder enhancements still large.
1. New Issue Global Leveraged Loan Volume 2. Global Leveraged Loan Issuance by Use of Proceeds
(Billions of US dollars) (Percent)
900 100
800 US issuers Other 90
Non-US issuers
700 80
600 Refinancing 70
500 60
50
400 Dividends and 40
300 buybacks Mergers and
acquisitions 30
200 20
100 10
Leveraged buyouts
0 0
1998 2000 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 2005 07 09 11 13 15 17
Covenant protections have weakened over time ... ... leading to potentially lower recovery rates in the next default cycle.
3. New Issue Covenant-Lite US Leveraged Loans and Covenant 4. Average Annual First Lien US Loan Implied Recovery Rates
Quality Index (Percent)
80 4.5 100
Covenant-lite percent of new 82% average
70 issuance (left scale) Global 69% average 90
4.0 financial
60 Moody’s loan covenant quality 80
index score (right scale) crisis
50 3.5 70
40 60
Higher scores 3.0
30 equal weaker 50
20 covenants 40
2.5
10 30
0 2.0 20
2007 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 2003 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Highly leveraged loan deals have increasingly been arranged by ... while adjustments to earnings expectations have led to less
nonbank lenders ... conservative leverage calculations.
5. Fraction of US Deals with a Nonbank Entity as Lead Agent 6. Percent of US Deals with EBITDA Adjustments
(Percent)
30 50
Greater than six times total leverage Mergers and acquisitions
25 All loan issuance Leveraged buyouts
All deals 40
20
30
15
20
10
5 10
0 0
2005 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 2001 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17
Sources: Barclay’s; Moody’s Default and Recovery database; Standard & Poor’s Leveraged Commentary and Data; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: In panel 3, the Moody’s Loan Covenant Quality Index score is a yearly average; data are unavailable from 2008 to 2010 due to lack of rated leveraged loan
issuance. A higher Covenant Quality Index score represents weaker covenant protections. In panel 4, implied recovery rates are based on loan prices one month after
default. EBITDA = earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization.
The global leveraged loan market now offers an (usually in the form of corporate bonds) to protect
interesting example of the extent to which reach for loans in the event of a default. But the average debt
yield has supported issuance and adversely affected cushion of first-lien covenant-lite loans is now only
price and nonprice terms, as well as credit quality, 15 percent, down from about 33 percent before the
despite efforts by regulators to rein in risk taking.13 financial crisis. Although the number of defaults so
Strong issuance and lofty valuations, including a weak- far in this cycle has been limited, weakening investor
ening of nonprice terms such as investor protections, protections and eroding debt cushions have coincided
could exacerbate the next default cycle. A sharp rise in with lower average recovery rates for defaulted loans
defaults following a tightening of financial conditions, (69 percent), compared with the precrisis average of
or a shutdown of the market at the extreme, could 82 percent (Figure 1.9, panel 4).
have large negative implications for the real economy Regulators in the United States and Europe have
given the growing size of the loan market to date and taken actions aimed at curbing market excesses.15 One
the role it plays in channeling funding to corporations. unintended consequence of these actions appears to
Signs of late credit cycle dynamics are already be a migration of activity away from banks toward
emerging in the leveraged loan market and, in some institutional investors, such as collateralized loan obli-
cases, are reminiscent of past episodes of investor gations, bank loan mutual funds, private equity firms,
excesses. Lower-quality companies continue to enjoy and other private funds (Kim, Plosser, and Santos
ample access to credit. Yet at the same time, ratings 2017). (See Box 1.3 for a discussion of the changing
have deteriorated. In the United States, the percentage investor base in the US leveraged loan market.) As
of new loan issuance rated single-B or lower increased noted, institutional leveraged loans outstanding have
from about 25 percent in 2007 to 65 percent in 2017, grown rapidly in recent years, with institutional inves-
although this trend could partly reflect some changes tors increasingly playing an important role in highly
in rating agencies since the crisis.14 Meanwhile, new leveraged loan deals (Figure 1.9, panel 5). In addition,
deals include fewer investor protections, such as looser nonprice terms, which are more difficult to monitor,
covenants and thinner subordination in the capi- have been loosening. Weaker covenants have reportedly
tal structure. For example, covenant-lite loans have allowed borrowers to inflate projections of earnings
evolved from a specialty structured debt instrument before interest expenses, taxes, depreciation, and amor-
before the financial crisis to the largest market segment tization (EBITDA) and to borrow more after the clos-
today. Covenant-lite loans made up 75 percent of new ing of the deal. New loans with EBITDA add-backs or
institutional loan issuance in 2017. In addition, the adjustments that conceal deteriorated leverage metrics
quality of loan covenants has continued to deteriorate have reached new highs (Figure 1.9, panel 6).16
(Figure 1.9, panel 3).
To be fair, weaker covenants may reflect the loan
market’s changing investor base as loans mature into
a widely accepted asset class in investors’ portfolios.
But looser provisions inherently provide fewer warning 15For example, in March 2013 US federal banking agencies issued
signals about a potential default and may thereby result guidance to reduce risk in the leveraged loan market, both for loans
in lower recovery rates. For example, in the recent retained on banks’ balance sheets and for those repackaged for sale to
other parties. More recently, in May 2017 the ECB issued supervi-
past banks typically demanded a first-lien claim on sory guidance concerning expectations around leveraged transactions
collateral as well as sufficient loss-absorption capacity in Europe and the ongoing monitoring of the fundamental credit
quality of leveraged exposures. In particular, US and European
13There is no universal definition for leveraged loans, but the supervisors recommended that banks follow heightened risk man-
term usually refers to a speculative-grade loan for which the obli- agement when a borrower’s debt exceeds six times its earnings before
gor’s postfinancing leverage (as measured by debt-to-assets ratio, interest expense, taxes, depreciation, and amortization.
debt-to-equity ratio, cash-flow-to-total-debt ratio, or other such 16EBITDA add-backs generally consist of pro forma fees and
standards unique to particular industries) significantly exceeds indus- expenses (expected to be eliminated following an acquisition deal) that
try norms. Leveraged borrowers typically have diminished ability increase the pro forma EBITDA during the loan syndication process.
to adjust to unexpected events and changes in business conditions For additional debt after deal closing, most structures include a debt
because of their higher ratio of total liabilities to capital. incurrence clause that allows the borrower to add debt subject to the
14Cohen and Manuszak (2013) find that increased competition satisfaction of certain financial ratios along with fixed-dollar debt bas-
among credit rating agencies from 2002 to 2007 led to lower subor- kets that generally permit the borrower to incur debt without reference
dination levels and less stringent ratings. to a maintenance covenant or other financial ratio.
In the United States, correlations between individual stocks and across Within the global equity market, cross-country correlations have
sectors have picked up. rebounded somewhat.
1. Average Correlations 2. Average Correlations
(90-day rolling versus S&P 500; cap weighted) er u t e nite State five ear rolling in o
1.0 Taper US 1.0
Presidential February tantrum election
election turbulence 0.9
0.9 Brexit 0.8
Tax reform 0.7
0.8 bill introduced
0.6
0.5
0.7 0.4
Advanced economies 0.3
0.6 EMs excluding China 0.2
Across sectors
China
Within sectors 0.1
0.5 0.0
Jan. 2015 Jan. 16 Jan. 17 Jan. 18 2001 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17
The average correlations across major asset classes have remained ... while market turnover has been relatively low.
relatively high ...
3. Average Correlations with S&P 500 4. Corporate Bond Market Turnover
(Ratio of trading volumes to amounts outstanding, percent)
1.0 Commodities 250
0.8 US Treasuries Investment-grade bonds
0.6 US credit High-yield bonds 200
0.4
150
0.2
0.0
100
–0.2
–0.4 50
–0.6
–0.8 0
1990 92 94 96 98 2000 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 2005 07 09 11 13 15 17 18
Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; Haver Analytics; Market Axess; and IMF staff estimates.
Note: In panel 4, data are as of end-February 2018. EM = emerging market. S&P = Standard & Poor’s.
The Price of Volatility Remains Low But realized volatility and underlying forecasts
Another critical issue is how much risk investors of future volatility also increased. Both near- and
perceive around asset valuations. Indeed, valuations for longer-term equity options now appear close to, if not
options, on the one hand, and underlying securities, below, levels consistent with volatility forecasts. There-
on the other, are distinct, strictly speaking. During fore, the premium investors require to compensate
the turmoil in global equity markets in early February, for volatility risks was little changed, on net, which is
implied volatilities derived from equity options, which ultimately consistent with persistently accommodative
reflect information not only about investors’ expecta- financial conditions, as well as a renewed willingness
tions for volatility but also the premium they require on the part of investors to sell volatility. A broadly sim-
to bear volatility risk, spiked sharply from subdued ilar picture arises across other asset classes, including
levels. The VIX term structure, based on short- to US dollar swaptions.
longer-dated option expiration dates, not only shifted Correlations within and across asset classes are also
higher but also inverted briefly (see Online Annex 1.1 important indicators of financial conditions. Indeed,
on implied volatility pricing).17 correlations among even typically unrelated assets tend
to increase sharply during financial crises, making
17See Online Annex 1.1 at www.imf.org/en/Publications/GFSR diversification difficult as investors’ overall portfolio risk
for more details. increases. Correlation measures have rebounded of late,
albeit from subdued levels relative to historical norms. However, other forms of financial leverage appear to
Within the US stock market, correlations between be on the rise:
individual stocks and across sectors picked up some- • Synthetic collateralized debt obligations (CDOs):
what after the completion of major tax legislation and Analysts estimate synthetic CDO issuance to have
increased further after the spike in volatility in February surged to between $80 billion and $100 billion in
2018 (Figure 1.10, panel 1). Global equity market cor- 2017—well below precrisis levels but up from about
relations also rebounded in recent months, even before $20 billion a year in 2014–15 (Figure 1.11, panel 1).
the drop in global share prices (Figure 1.10, panel 2). Some market participants also speculate that insti-
Finally, broader correlations across asset classes have tutional investors are actively increasing leverage to
increased, which suggests that global diversification has boost yields using total return swaps and asset swaps,
become somewhat more difficult (Figure 1.10, panel 3). although little evidence is available at this point.
It should be noted, however, that trends in realized • Margin debt: The margin debt from stock borrowing
statistical correlations may understate the prospects of stands at a record $580 billion in the United States,
contagion risk. Indeed, both correlations and volatility about 2 percent of overall market capitalization as of
tend to increase at precisely the most inopportune and the end of 2017 (Figure 1.11, panel 2).18 Although
unforeseeable times; namely, when prices of risky assets this share is below the peak in 2008, it is still quite
swoon. In addition, market turnover has been relatively elevated. Also worrisome, the current net exposure19
low, especially for high-yield bonds, which may com- of investors involved in stock margin borrowing is
pound price discovery distortions and illiquidity in the at record negative highs relative to overall market
future (Figure 1.10, panel 4). capitalization compared with the past 25 years (Fig-
Beyond asset price correlations and volatility, the ure 1.11, panel 3).
ongoing structural changes in the investment man- • Use of financial leverage by investment funds: Mean-
agement industry affect interconnectedness and the while, assets under management of large regulated
potential for spillovers across markets. For example, bond investment funds that actively use derivatives
broker dealers’ intermediation role has declined in have increased to more than $1.5 trillion, about
recent years, leading to a greater role for the non- 17 percent of the world’s bond fund sector (Fig-
bank sector. Institutional investors include both firms ure 1.11, panel 4). The use of embedded leverage
dedicated to high-frequency trading across markets, through derivatives is increasing as fund managers
which have become more prominent, and also other seek to enhance low yields. The lack of sufficient data
market participants, such as insurance companies and collection and oversight by regulators compounds
pension funds, which may be using less procyclical the risks.20 Gross notional exposure of bond funds
investment strategies. In any case, these new market to derivatives is worrisome. The average derivatives
structures have not been tested during a significant leverage (defined as gross notional exposure) of an
market downturn. asset-weighted sample of more than 200 US- and
European-domiciled bond funds has risen from
Increasing Use of Financial Leverage May Amplify Risks 215 percent to 268 percent of assets over the past
four years (Figure 1.11, panel 5). The level of deriv-
As the financial crisis illustrates, leverage can amplify
negative shocks through pernicious feedback loops.
Sharp price declines can lead to investor runs and fire 18Stock margin borrowing data can also include fixed-income
sales of liquid and safe assets to cover redemptions and securities, but most transactions are related to stocks. The data
include both retail and institutional investor transactions.
margin requirements. 19Defined as the difference between debit balances and free credit
There have been some noteworthy developments balances in customers’ security margin and cash accounts.
20No disclosure requirements for detailed leverage information
since the crisis. For example, lower volumes of repur-
for regulated investment funds are in place in the United States, and
chase agreements (repos), at least relative to market cap- requirements are in place only on a selected basis in some European
italization, may be reflective of less financial leverage. countries. Implementing comprehensive and globally consistent
In the years before the global financial crisis, investors reporting standards across the asset management industry would
give regulators better data with which to locate leverage risks. For
widely used repos and leverage to boost returns. But
example, reporting standards should include enough information on
stricter regulations, as well as changes in bank business derivatives to show funds’ sensitivity to large moves in underlying
models, have significantly reduced repo activity. rate and credit markets.
Figure 1.11. Measures of Leverage and Investment Funds with Derivatives-Embedded Leverage
Although well below precrisis levels, synthetic CDO issuance is coming ... with elevated stock borrowing by margin indicating greater leverage
back ... risk in US equity markets ...
1. Synthetic CDO Issuance 2. Margin Debt from Stock Borrowing
(Billions of US dollars)
700 700 Margin debt (billions of US dollars, left scale) 2.9
600 600 Margin debt (percent of market
capitalization, right scale) 2.5
500 500
2.1
400 400
1.7
300 300
1.3
200 200
100 100 0.9
0 0 0.5
2005 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 1992 94 96 98 2000 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16
... and net exposures in margin accounting for stock borrowing There is strong growth in the AUM of selected large regulated bond
reaching record negative levels. funds that use derivatives ...
3. Net Exposure of Investors with Margin Debt 4. Assets under Management of Selected Bond Funds
(Percentage of market capitalization) (Trillions of US dollars)
2.0 2.0
Investor positive net exposure Funds active in derivatives with no reported leverage
1.5 (margin debt < free cash + credit balance in margin accounts) Funds with reported leverage
1.0 1.5
0.5
1.0
0.0
–0.5 0.5
–1.0 Investor negative net exposure
(margin debt > free cash + credit balance in margin accounts)
–1.5 0.0
1992 94 96 98 2000 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 2004 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
... with rising gross notional exposures ... ... that can exceed multiples of fund net asset values.
5. Average Derivatives Leverage of Selected Bond Funds 6. Derivatives Leverage and AUM across the Different Funds
(Gross notional exposure as a percentage of net asset value) (Gross notional exposure percentage; billions of US dollars)
400 Asset-weighted leverage 25th percentile 75th percentile 3,000
Leverage
(percent)
350 2,000
1,000
300
0
250
0
of US dollars)
AUM (billions
200 20
40
150
60
80 180 80
100
2013–14 2014–15 2015–16 2016–17
Sources: Annual reports of selected regulated investment funds; Bloomberg Finance L.P.; Federal Reserve; Financial Industry Regulatory Authority; ICE Bank of
America Merrill Lynch; and IMF staff estimates.
Note: Selected EU-domiciled investment funds report a gross notional exposure of their derivative positions in their annual report. Funds with reported leverage in
derivatives positions in the sample account for over $1 trillion of these assets, including the assets of the US-domiciled version of the same EU-domiciled funds that
report leverage. Although these funds are separate investment vehicles, they share the same mandate and portfolio manager and therefore have closely matched
portfolios, exhibiting a high correlation of returns. The remaining $500 billion of assets correspond to a group of selected funds that do not report leverage in
derivatives positions but are known to be active in derivatives (the funds’ latest annual reports list at least 15 derivatives positions). In panels 2 and 3, margin debt
data may also include nonequity securities such as bonds. In panel 6, the data are as of the latest annual reports. AUM = assets under management;
CDO = collateralized debt obligation.
atives notional exposure in the sample ranges quite is no conclusive evidence about the broader impact
significantly: the bottom 25th percentile of funds has of large outflows from less liquid bond ETFs on
embedded derivatives leverage in the 100 to 150 per- underlying markets,25 the fast growth of these ETFs is
cent range. But the top 25th percentile shows funds worth monitoring, given their potential for increasing
with average leverage between 300 and 2,800 percent contagion risks:
(Figure 1.11, panel 6).21 Some investors may enter • Frequent trading: Investors in ETFs appear to trade
derivatives contracts to hedge unwanted risk. How- more actively than market participants in the under-
ever, others may do so to boost returns, which, in lying asset class, which may increase contagion risk.
turn, can amplify shocks during periods of stress.22 To start, unlike flows into retail mutual funds, ETF
flows are very volatile (Figure 1.12, panel 4). Less
liquid bond markets, such as high-yield bonds, lack
Growth in Less Liquid Bond ETFs May Raise Financial the depth and breadth to accommodate large and
Stability Concerns frequent transactions.26 Even during the financial
The assets under management of ETFs invested crisis, outflows from high-yield bond investment
in less liquid assets—bank loans and high-yield and funds were limited, with a maximum monthly
emerging market bonds—have risen rapidly to more outflow of 2.5 percent (of assets) in October 2008.
than $140 billion (Figure 1.12, panel 1). Although the Monthly ETF outflows now often exceed 3 percent
share of high-yield bond and emerging market bond (of assets), which may become more of a concern as
ETF assets is still small (less than 5 percent of the total the market share of ETFs rises.
market value of underlying bond markets), it more than • Sensitivity to changes in risky asset prices: As evidenced
tripled from 2010 to 2017 (Figure 1.12, panel 2).23 during the February episode of volatility in equity
ETFs offer several benefits to investors: they enhance markets, the sensitivity of high-yield and emerging
price discovery, provide an alternative source of market bond ETFs to S&P 500 returns is higher
liquidity through exchange trading, facilitate hedging than the sensitivity of their underlying indices to
and diversification, and charge lower fees than other S&P 500 returns. This suggests that the rise in
investment funds.24 Indeed, ETFs can provide addi- ETFs, particularly those investing in relatively illiq-
tional liquidity to less liquid bond markets: only about uid assets, may increase contagion risk and possibly
one-fifth of transactions in high-yield and emerging amplify price moves across asset markets during
market bond ETFs prompt a corresponding transac- periods of stress. Greater investment in passive
tion in the underlying market as a result of outflows investment strategies, such as ETFs, may be related
from ETFs; that is, a destruction of ETF shares (Fig- to the rise in cross-asset correlations during periods
ure 1.12, panel 3). of stress, one of the main attributes of contagion.
However, the extension of ETFs to less liquid bond Benchmark-focused investors are more likely to be
markets may pose risks related to liquidity mismatches driven by common shocks than by the idiosyncratic
between ETFs and underlying assets. Although there fundamentals of assets they invest in.27
21While US and European regulated investment funds are subject to 25There is some evidence that the largest holdings of high-yield
explicit leverage limits, derivatives exposures may mask implicit lever- bond ETFs are increasingly and more systematically underperforming
age since there is less explicit regulation on leverage, particularly in the the broader market during days of large outflows. During these days
United States. See Chapter 1 of the April 2015 GFSR for more detail. (top 5th percentile of daily shares destroyed), the largest 10 bond
22There are 14 funds in the sample (with about $25 billion in holdings of US high-yield bond ETFs showed significantly greater
assets under management) that report both the gross notional underperformance to the market in the 2015–17 period as compared
exposure of their derivatives and a leverage exposure, adjusted for with the 2010–11 period, when their ownership of the underlying
discretionary hedging and netting. About two-thirds of their gross market was less than a quarter of what it is today. There is no evi-
derivatives notional exposure is not dedicated to hedging and net- dence, however, of large redemptions from these ETFs having a signif-
ting, but to boosting returns and additional risk. icant impact on the pricing of the broader underlying market. This is
23Data on the share of the loan market are not included owing to not at all surprising given that their share of the underlying high-yield
lack of data availability. and emerging market bond markets is still less than 5 percent.
24ETFs are generally index-tracking funds that are traded on 26This limitation is reflected in the lower trading volumes, smaller
exchanges and allow investors to gain exposure to several asset classes trading size, smaller share of large trades, and less frequent trading
on a real-time basis at a relatively low cost compared with higher-fee of the less liquid fixed-income markets. Some high-yield bonds do
regulated investment funds that do not offer intraday liquidity. ETFs not even transact on a daily basis. See Chapter 1 of the Octo-
thereby enhance price discovery and offer liquid and transparent ber 2014 GFSR.
investment and hedging alternatives. 27See Chapter 1 of the April 2015 GFSR.
2
50
1
0 0
2007 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 2008 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Although ETFs can provide additional liquidity to the less liquid bond ... their investor base is significantly more ight prone ...
markets ...
3. atio o verage ra ing olu e to S are De tro e or reate or . Flo a a Percentage o Net et alue or ig iel on
S ig iel an on F F an egulate nve t ent Fun
Si ont oving average Percent
8 ETFs 20
US high-yield bonds EM bonds
Regulated investment funds
7 15
10
6
5
5
0
4 –5
3 percent (of NAV) out ows
3 –10
2012 13 14 15 16 17 2008 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
... and their greater sensitivity to major liquid markets increases contagion risks.
0.6
EM and US high-yield ETFs
0.5 Underlying indices
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
2008 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; EPFR Global; Haver Analytics; ICE Bank of America Merrill Lynch; and IMF staff estimates.
Note: The market value of underlying bonds in panel 2 is calculated using ICE Bank of America Merrill Lynch indices. EM = emerging market; ETF = exchange-traded
fund; NAV = net asset value. S&P = Standard & Poor’s.
Risks Arising from the Buildup of Financial Crypto Assets: New Coin on the Block, Reach for
Vulnerabilities Should Be Managed Yield, or Asset Price Bubble?
Regulators and financial market participants should Amid stretched valuations in many risky asset classes,
avoid complacency and be mindful of the risk of crypto assets have erupted onto the financial landscape
sudden bouts of extreme volatility. Although financial and their prices have skyrocketed. Some of the technolog-
markets functioned well during the turbulence in early ical advances behind them have the potential to increase
February, the episode was largely confined to global the efficiency of payment systems and the financial
equity markets. Asset valuations remain stretched, and infrastructure. There has been a notable proliferation of
rising interest rates may be accompanied by a repricing crypto assets in recent years and major US exchanges have
of risky assets and further spikes in volatility. Regula- launched futures contracts. However, crypto assets have
tors should, therefore, ensure that financial institutions also been afflicted by notorious cases of fraud, security
maintain robust risk management standards, including breaches, and operational failures and have been asso-
through the close monitoring and assessment of expo- ciated with illicit activities. At present, crypto assets do
sures to asset classes deemed to be overvalued. Finan- not appear to pose macrocritical financial stability risks.
cial market participants should remain attuned to the Policymakers, however, will need to be nimble, innova-
risks associated with rising interest rates and monetary tive, and cooperative to tackle potential financial stability
policy normalization. challenges should crypto assets be used more widely.
Given signs of late-stage credit cycle dynamics,
policymakers should use the macroprudential tools at Crypto Assets: A New Asset Class and Means of Payment?
their disposal more actively. In addition to deploying Crypto assets have the potential to combine the
standard capital- and borrower-based macroprudential benefits of traditional currencies and commodities.28
instruments, regulators should improve credit risk Like fiat money, they can potentially be exchanged for
monitoring, also focusing on deterioration of nonprice other currencies, be used for payments, and store val-
terms and investor protection. Regulators should also ue.29 As investment products, they may offer portfolio
be mindful of the unintended consequences of regula- diversification, although their ability to do so is still
tory measures, including migration of activity toward limited by their short track record, regulatory uncer-
more opaque segments of the financial system. tainty, and primitive market infrastructure.
Finally, the macroprudential toolkit needs to be The technology underlying crypto assets—distributed
expanded to address risks in the nonbank financial sec- ledger technology (DLT)—could also lead to more
tor. For example, regulators should do the following: efficient market infrastructure (IMF 2016a and CPMI
• Endorse a clear and common definition of financial lever- 2017). This technology differs from traditional payment
age in investment funds: This definition would improve systems, which require a clearing entity, such as a central
transparency, particularly for derivatives positions. bank, that settles transactions and distributes funds
Lack of progress on regulation covering the use of between participants. DLT, in contrast, uses multiple
derivatives is also a concern that should be addressed. copies of the central ledger, which are kept by individual
• Continue to strengthen supervisory frameworks for entities. Blocks of transactions are subsequently validated
liquidity risk management in investment funds: and recorded, forming a historical chain—hence the
Although the International Organization of Securities name blockchain. New units of the major crypto assets
Commissions’ latest report on liquidity risk manage- are supplied by “miners” who solve a cryptographic
ment for collective investment funds (IOSCO 2018) puzzle as part of the validation process and receive a
provides welcome guidance on this front, there is new coin in return. This procedure, however, is costly
scope for the country authorities to monitor further
the effectiveness of existing liquidity risk management 28The term “crypto asset” is used here to refer to digital currencies
the possibility of conducting stress test exercises. assets as a medium of exchange for payments.
in terms of both energy and time. The supply process been correlated with other assets, and therefore could
differs somewhat across crypto assets and allows for provide diversification benefits to investors, on balance.
some flexibility. For example, there is an upper limit on The unconditional correlation between Bitcoin and
the eventual outstanding amount of Bitcoins. But crypto other asset classes was close to zero between September
assets can be designed without such an upper limit, thus 2015 and March 2018 (Bank of America Merrill Lynch
mimicking more closely the money supply dynamics in 2017; Burniske and White 2017) (Table 1.1, panel
traditional fiat money systems. 1).31 Even during the most recent bout of volatility,
Crypto assets have been touted as a new form of the correlation of Bitcoin with most mainstream assets
money. However, they are still far from fulfilling the did not appear to change significantly. Pairwise correla-
three basic functions of money. While they may serve tions between different crypto assets are comparatively
as a store of value, their use as a medium of exchange subdued, again despite tremendous variance in returns
has been limited, and their elevated volatility has (Table 1.1, panel 2). Although these correlations are pos-
prevented them from becoming a reliable unit of itive, they are somewhat lower than correlations with G4
account. These shortcomings could change with wider sovereign yields and equities.32 However, it is important
adoption and technological improvements, and some to note that these correlations may change over time. So
crypto assets may be able to perform the functions of while some investors are beginning to investigate whether
money better, thus putting competitive pressure on crypto assets could be an asset class in their own right, it
fiat currencies (Box 1.4). is too early to draw clear conclusions.
Even after accounting for recent price corrections, Dedicated crypto-asset exchanges (CEs) provide
crypto assets have experienced spectacular apprecia- liquidity, leverage, and custodial services. More than
tion over the past year, spurred by the global reach for 180 CEs are transacting in thousands of different coins
yield. Nonetheless, they represent only a small share of across jurisdictions, adding up to an average daily vol-
the global financial system. Their total market value is ume of $30 billion. Still, liquidity tends to be highly
less than 3 percent of the combined G4 central bank concentrated in a select few coins and exchanges.
balance sheets (Figure 1.13, panel 1). Bitcoin alone The top 14 CEs account for more than 80 percent
accounts for 47 percent of crypto assets’ market value, of reported volume (Figure 1.14, panel 1), and the
while the next two largest crypto assets, Ethereum top 10 crypto assets account for 82 percent of the
and Ripple, account for 15 percent and 8 percent, total reported volume (Figure 1.14, panel 2). Among
respectively. As such, crypto assets currently pose currency pairs with fiat currency on one side, the US
limited challenges to fiat currencies or to the conduct dollar dominates with 71 percent of volume, followed
of monetary policy. The dramatic growth in the sector, by the yen and the euro with about 14 percent and
however, may pose risks to financial stability in the 11 percent, respectively (Figure 1.14, panel 3).
future and thus warrants vigilance by regulators. In December 2017, the Chicago Mercantile
Much attention has been devoted to the skyrocket- Exchange (CME) and Chicago Board Options
ing prices of crypto assets in 2017, which has invited Exchange (CBOE) introduced Bitcoin futures con-
comparisons with past speculative bubbles (Fig- tracts. For now, however, futures volumes represent a
ure 1.13, panel 2). However, after accounting for price small fraction of overall trading activity on the CME
volatility, risk-adjusted returns have not dramatically and CBOE and only 2.3 percent of reported trading in
exceeded those of mainstream assets over the medium the Bitcoin cash market on CEs (Figure 1.14, panel 4).
term, though they have in the most recent year (Fig- However, CEs are a major source of risk for inves-
ure 1.13, panel 3).30 For example, the Sharpe ratio tors, given their opaque and often unregulated nature.
of crypto assets was relatively close to the risk-reward Security breaches and exchange failures have led to
ratio of the S&P 500 over the past three years, and it periods—albeit short-lived—of high volatility and
was below what investing in so-called FANG stocks
(Facebook, Amazon, Netflix, Google) would yield 31September 2015 is used as the starting point of the sample
(Figure 1.13, panel 4). However, crypto assets have not because of data availability limitations before then.
32To assess conditional correlations, another multivariate GARCH
Figure 1.13. Crypto Assets: Size, Price Appreciation, Realized Volatility, and Sharpe Ratio
Crypto assets account for a small fraction of G4 central bank balance Comparison with historical bubbles.
sheets.
1. Market Capitalization of Crypto Assets 2. Price Changes
(Billions of US dollars) (Number of times the starting price)
700 6 60
0 0 0
–0.8 –0.6 –0.3 0 0.2 0.5 0.8
Dec. 2016
Jan. 17
Feb. 17
Mar. 17
Apr. 17
May 17
Jun. 17
Jul. 17
Aug. 17
Sep. 17
Oct. 17
Nov. 17
Dec. 17
Jan. 18
Feb. 18
Mar. 18
Number of years around the peak
Bitcoin s reali ed volatility is much higher than that of other asset Risk-adjusted returns of crypto assets have not dramatically exceeded
classes. those of other mainstream assets.
3. Volatility Bitcoin 4. Annualized Sharpe Ratio of the Selected Asset Classes
(Percent) EM FX (95th percentile)
350 EM FX 3.0
Oil
300 Past one year 2.5
Gold
Ripple Past three years 2.0
250
Ethereum
1.5
200
1.0
150
0.5
100 0.0
50 –0.5
0 –1.0
FANGs
Crypto assets
US real estate
S&P 500
US bonds
Gold
Oil
EM FX
2015 16 17 18
Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; CoinDance; CoinMetrics; European Central Bank; Haver Analytics; national central banks; Yale International Center for Finance; and
IMF staff estimates.
Note: Panel 3 is based on 90-day realized volatility. In panel 4, crypto assets is an average across Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, and Ripple. The Sharpe ratio is the
average return earned in excess of the risk-free rate per unit of total risk. EM = emerging market; FANGs = equal-weighted index of highly traded stocks of
technology and tech-enabled companies such as Facebook, ma on, Net ix, and lphabet s Google; F = foreign exchange; G4 = Group of Four (euro area, Japan,
United Kingdom, United States); TOPIX = Tokyo Stock Price Index.
Table 1.1. Correlation of Bitcoin with Key Asset Classes and within Crypto Assets
The unconditional correlation between Bitcoin and other asset classes has been close to zero.
1. Unconditional Covariance Matrix of Daily Returns within Selected Asset Classes
Long US Chinese
Bitcoin S&P 500 Treasury ETF Euro Renminbi Gold
Bitcoin 1.00 0.02 0.02 –0.04 0.04 0.03
Standard & Poor’s 500 0.02 1.00 –0.32 –0.05 –0.09 –0.14
Long US Treasury ETF 0.02 –0.32 1.00 0.11 –0.07 0.39
Euro –0.04 –0.05 0.11 1.00 –0.37 0.42
Chinese renminbi 0.04 –0.09 –0.07 –0.37 1.00 –0.28
Gold 0.03 –0.14 0.39 0.42 –0.28 1.00
Pairwise correlations among the various crypto-asset pairs remain low.
2. Unconditional Covariance Matrix of Daily Returns within Selected Crypto Assets
Bitcoin Monero Ethereum Ripple Litecoin
Bitcoin 1.00 0.36 0.35 0.28 0.49
Monero 0.36 1.00 0.40 0.23 0.29
Ethereum 0.35 0.40 1.00 0.22 0.30
Ripple 0.28 0.23 0.22 1.00 0.33
Litecoin 0.49 0.29 0.30 0.33 1.00
Sources: Bloomberg L.P.; and IMF staff estimates
Note: Correlations are calculated over September 2015–March 2018. ETF = exchange-traded fund.
severe losses. Data on trading volumes can be unreli- • Leveraged trading: CEs have set generous limits on
able, especially since CEs operate under heterogeneous leveraged positions, in some cases reportedly 15
rules with different fee structures, investor bases, and times, 25 times, and even 100 times (Deutsche
levels of regulatory oversight. Bank 2017).33 As in any exchange, sudden deprecia-
tions prompt margin calls and amplify price moves.
Separately, concerns have also been raised about
Financial Stability Risk Assessment futures contracts traded on the CME and CBOE,
It is impossible to know the extent to which crypto given that clearing members in these exchanges bear
assets may transform the financial infrastructure and the risk associated with these contracts through their
whether most new crypto assets are likely to disap- obligation to the guarantee fund, even if they do not
pear as in past episodes of technological innovation participate directly in the market.34 Still, the com-
(as many tech companies did during the boom of the bination of low asset return correlations discussed
late 1990s, for example). Before they can transform previously and crypto assets’ small footprint within
financial activity in a meaningful and lasting manner, the financial system suggests that the risk of spill-
crypto assets will first need to earn the confidence overs from idiosyncratic price moves in crypto assets
and support of consumers and financial authorities. to the wider market may be limited at this point.
The initial step in this process will involve coming to • Integration into mainstream financial products: The
a consensus within the global regulatory community proliferation of crypto-asset-related investment funds,
about what crypto assets are—for example, a secu- ETFs, and futures contracts increases the opportu-
rity or a currency—and the role they can play in the
33Leverage limits have been reported at 15 times an investor’s cash
financial system. Although Bitcoin was indeed created
deposits in Japan’s bitFlyer exchange (“Bitcoin feeding frenzy fuelled
to circumvent a lack of trust among trading parties by 15 times leverage, says exchange,” https://www.ft.com/content/
(Nakamoto 2008), a series of notorious fraud cases has 7f02cdba-dbd6-11e7-a039-c64b1c09b482). Other exchanges offer
undermined this goal, suggesting increased prudential even more extreme leverage opportunities of up to 100 times (see
www.bitmex.com). In practice, however, industry contacts indicate
regulation may be needed. At present, crypto assets do
that actual average leverage tends to be between 3 and 8 times.
not appear to pose risks to financial stability. However, 34“Open letter to CFTC chairman Giancarlo regarding the listing
regulators should be vigilant to the potential for finan- of crypto-asset derivatives,” from the US Futures Industry Associa-
cial stability challenges that could arise should crypto tion to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission regarding the
introduction of futures contracts on crypto assets (https://fia.org/
assets be used more widely. A few aspects that deserve articles/open-letter-cftc-chairman-giancarlo-regarding-listing-crypto
monitoring are highlighted below. -asset-derivatives).
Figure 1.14. Share of Trading Volumes across Exchanges, Crypto Assets, and Fiat Currencies
Trading volume is highly concentrated, with 80 percent of volume Volume share across crypto assets is led by Bitcoin, Ethereum, Ripple,
traded on just 14 exchanges. and Tether.
1. Cumulative Market Share across the Various Cryptoexchanges, 2. Reported Volumes by Cryptocurrency, March 2018
March 2018 (Percent)
(Percent)
100 Others 19%
95 percent volume = 36 exchanges
Cumulative market share
Composition of reported volumes has shifted away from the Chinese Bitcoin futures volumes remain low.
exchanges.
3. Bitcoin: Reported Volumes by Fiat Currency 4. Bitcoin Futures as a Proportion of Cash Volume
(Percent) (Percent)
100 6.0
0 0.0
Dec. 28, 2017
Jan. 1, 18
Jan. 15, 18
Jan. 29, 18
Feb. 12, 18
Feb. 26, 18
Mar. 12, 18
Mar. 26, 18
Jun. 2016 Sep. 16 Dec. 16 Mar. 17 Jun. 17 Sep. 17 Dec. 17 Mar. 18
Chinese renminbi Euro Japanese yen
Korean won Others US dollar
Sources: Bitcoinity; Bloomberg Finance L.P.; CoinMarketCap; and IMF staff estimates.
nities for mainstream investors to incorporate these financial stability risks may become more promi-
assets into their portfolios. However, this broadening nent because the critical prudential and safety-net
of the investor base could result in increased correla- functions of existing banking systems (for example,
tion between crypto assets and traditional assets over consumer protection, resolution regulations, and
time, increasing the potential for transmission of systemic liquidity management by the central bank)
shocks, especially during episodes of risk aversion. would safeguard a smaller segment of the financial
• Partial disintermediation of the banking system: A system, and the ability of central banks to function as
large shift away from fiat money toward crypto assets a lender of last resort may also be curtailed.
could add challenges to banks’ business models. Such • Cross-border considerations: The lack of transparency in
a shift, if on a broad scale, would result in a more the markets and the rapid pace of growth could cause
decentralized financial system in which banks would market disruptions. Those disruptions could be trans-
play a smaller role in traditional lending business and mitted across national boundaries given the borderless
in payment systems. In such a decentralized system, nature of the underlying transaction mechanisms, a
development that could be further facilitated by the have issued guidelines with the intent to regulate
differing national regulatory approaches. ICOs based on economic function and the purpose for
which the token is issued, its tradability, and its trans-
Investor Protection and Anti-Money-Laundering Aspects ferability. In contrast, China, and Korea have cracked
down on some trading activities.
Crypto assets also present concerns for investor and
Future policymaking will need to be nimble, inno-
consumer protection, as highlighted by the Interna-
vative, and cooperative. The IMF can help advance the
tional Organization of Securities Commissions and in
agenda on regulation of crypto assets by offering advice
related forums. In this regard, securities regulators have
and by serving as a forum for discussion and interna-
drawn attention to the risks around ICOs, mostly on
tional collaboration. National authorities and inter-
the back of the increasing targeting of ICOs to retail
national standard setters are encouraged to intensify
investors by parties located outside the investor’s home
cooperation on the monitoring of crypto assets and on
jurisdiction, thus escaping the purview of the relevant
the consistency of the regulatory approach. Immediate
securities regulator. Risks around ICOs include the
action is needed to close data gaps that inhibit effective
heightened potential for fraud, cross-border distribu-
monitoring of potential risks and their links to the core
tion risks relating to heterogeneous regulatory regimes,
financial system; support systemic risk assessment and
information asymmetries, technological flaws, and
timely policy responses; and underpin measures to pro-
liquidity risks partly caused by the lack of reliable mar-
tect consumers, investors, and market integrity. And
ket makers and opaque trading practices.35
given the borderless nature of crypto assets and risks of
By design, crypto-asset transactions entail a high
regulatory arbitrage, drawing out common elements of
degree of anonymity. This results in a potentially major
effective regulatory approaches to facilitate consistent
new vehicle for money laundering and the financing of
international cooperation is essential. Such common
terrorism. Therefore, regulators and supervisors will have
elements could include good practices and regulatory
to be particularly vigilant regarding money laundering
requirements to promote the transparency and integ-
and the financing of terrorism when it comes to design-
rity of ICOs and to strengthen the risk management
ing the appropriate environment for crypto assets (IMF
and robustness of crypto-asset exchanges.
2016a). Preventive measures such as reporting require-
ments, customer due diligence, and transaction moni-
toring could be employed to ensure that crypto assets
provide similar safeguards to traditional money against
Vulnerabilities in Emerging Markets, Low-
money laundering and the financing of terrorism.
Income Countries, and China
A number of emerging market economies have taken
Policy Response advantage of benign external financial conditions to
address imbalances and build buffers; in others, however,
Ultimately, regulators need to decide what role
vulnerabilities have continued to build. Monetary policy
crypto assets could play in the financial system. So
normalization in advanced economies could result in a
far, views have varied widely, often within the same
tightening of global financial conditions and a reduction in
jurisdiction (see FATF 2015). In the United States, the
capital flows, increasing rollover risk and adversely affecting
Commodity Futures Trading Commission sees crypto
productive investment. With weaker issuers increasingly
assets as a commodity, whereas the Internal Revenue
able to access capital markets and with fickle investors
Service considers them property, and the Securities
playing a larger role in recent years, stress amplifiers have
and Exchange Commission (SEC) has acted on a
risen. In addition, a considerable number of low-income
case-by-case basis, including by halting some ICOs.36
countries and other small non-investment-grade issuers have
Discrepancies also appear across countries. After host-
experienced a sharp deterioration in debt sustainability.
ing a large share of recent ICOs, the Swiss authorities
Meanwhile, the creditor composition in these countries has
35Fordetails, see IOSCO (2017). become more complex, posing policy challenges for ongoing
36Forexample, the SEC ruled last year that tokens issued by a vir- and prospective debt restructuring. In China, regulators
tual organization known as “The DAO” were securities, hence sub- have taken a number of steps to reduce risks in the finan-
ject to federal regulation. More recently, the SEC halted some ICOs
and launched a probe into several crypto assets. The SEC’s chairman cial system. Despite these efforts, however, vulnerabilities
has promised increased scrutiny to prevent fraud in this area. remain elevated. The use of leverage and liquidity transfor-
Portfolio ows have been robust. Reserve coverage has improved, but a tail of weak countries remains.
1. Nonresident Portfolio Flows to EMs 2. Reserves as a Share of External Financing Needs
(Three-month rolling sum in billions of US dollars) (Percent of countries)
Portfolio debt Portfolio equity
140 60
<50% 50–100%
120
100 50
80 40
60
40 30
20
0 20
–20 10
Taper RMB US
–40 tantrum shock election
–60 0
2013 14 15 16 17 18 2005 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
EMs were less vulnerable to dollar appreciation during 2014–15 than Sovereign issuers had a record year in 2017, and the share of
in the late 1990s. non-investment-grade issuers is on the rise.
3. Change in Emerging Markets’ Net Foreign Assets during 4. Sovereign Issuance of International Bonds by Rating
Periods of Dollar Appreciation (Percent of total)
40 100 220
IDN Issuance (billions of US dollars,
12-month rolling sum, right scale) 200
Change in net foreign assets
30 80 180
ZAF 160
THA
(percent of GDP)
20 THA
60 140
SAU POL MYS
RUS 120
10 IND IDN
SAU BRA 100
CHN MEX TUR 40 80
0
MYS TUR 60
MEX IND 20
–10 CHN POL RUS Weaker credit quality 40
ZAF BRA issuers accessing markets 20
–20 0 0
–20 0 20 40 60 80 2011 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Exchange rate depreciation Not rated CCC or below
(percentage change versus US dollar) B BB
Linear trend (period 1998–99) Period 1998–99 BBB A or above
Linear trend (period 2014–15) Period 2014–15
Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; Bond Radar; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007); Institute of International Finance; IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF
staff estimates.
Note: Panel 2 sample includes 54 EM economies that are part of an external debt sovereign benchmark index. Data labels in panel 3 use International Organization
for Standardization (ISO) country codes. EM = emerging market; RMB = renminbi.
mation in risky investment products remains widespread, Nonresident portfolio flows to emerging market
with risks residing in opaque corners of the financial system. economies rose to an estimated $240 billion during
2017—twice the pace observed in the previous two
Has the Prolonged Search for Yield Made Emerging years (Figure 1.15, panel 1). Although market interest
Market Economies More Vulnerable? rates in advanced economies have risen notably over
Investor sentiment toward emerging markets has the past six months, emerging market assets have gen-
remained favorable since the previous GFSR, under- erally performed well over the same period, even after
pinned by improving growth prospects and robust accounting for the episode of volatility in global equity
portfolio flows. Real GDP growth in emerging market markets in early February.
economies is projected to reach 4.9 percent in 2018, The gradual and well-telegraphed normalization of
the fastest pace since 2013 (see the April 2018 WEO). monetary policy in advanced economies has pro-
vided a window of opportunity for emerging market countries more susceptible to a reversal in capital
economies. Current account deficits have generally flows. The growing role of fickle investors is evidenced
narrowed since 2013 but remain large in a number of by an upward trend in the “investor base risk index”
emerging markets and are projected to widen, espe- based on Arslanalp and Tsuda (2012) (Figure 1.16,
cially for commodity-importing countries (see the panel 1).37 Foreign investor participation helps
April 2018 WEO). Strong capital inflows have enabled deepen capital markets, but high shares of foreign
some countries to strengthen reserve buffers, leaving ownership can also increase vulnerability to interest
a smaller tail of countries with low reserve adequacy rate and rollover risks; for example, in the event of a
(Figure 1.15, panel 2). Corporate fundamentals have risk aversion episode. Foreign ownership of sovereign
also been improving (see “Reach for Yield or Over- bonds remains high among several emerging market
reach in Risky Assets?” section and Figure 1.8, panels economies (Figure 1.16, panel 2). Among nonbank
4 and 5). A strong recovery in earnings has improved investors, mutual funds and ETFs stand out as poten-
interest coverage, and corporate debt levels have fallen tial sources of volatility because they are associated
somewhat recently but remain elevated in several coun- with increased sensitivity of flows to global financial
tries (see October 2017 GFSR). conditions (for example, Cerutti, Claessens, and Puy
A sharp appreciation of the US dollar could pose 2015; Converse, Levy-Yeyati, and Williams 2018).
challenges to some countries, even as external balance These investment funds now own nearly one-sixth
sheets at an aggregate level have become less vulnerable of fixed-income assets included in emerging market
to exchange rate depreciations. Against the backdrop of benchmark indices, and more than a third in some
an increase in foreign currency sovereign and corporate countries (Figure 1.16, panel 3).
issuance, a stronger US dollar could put pressure on The reduction in portfolio flows to emerging
emerging markets. Borrowers that obtained credit in markets expected to result from monetary policy
foreign currency would see the domestic currency value normalization in the United States in the coming
of their liabilities rise, making it more challenging to years could put countries with weak fundamentals
service and repay debt. A sudden episode of risk aver- at risk. Assuming the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet
sion could be accompanied by capital outflows, reduce normalization proceeds as announced and the federal
productive investment, and put growth at risk in some funds rate is raised to 3.6 percent by early 2020, as
emerging markets. However, many emerging market projected in the April 2018 WEO, portfolio flows
economies have continued to improve their net foreign to emerging markets are estimated to be reduced by
currency positions, thus reducing their exposures an average of $40 billion a year in 2018–19.38 This
to currency depreciations. Indeed, when the dollar estimate assumes a smooth normalization process
appreciated in 2014–15, net foreign asset positions in which there is no increase in investor risk aver-
improved in most emerging markets, a reflection of sion. If, instead, the policy tightening process were
increased foreign currency assets and higher reliance on accompanied by a rise in risk aversion on the order
both equity liabilities and domestic currency borrow- of magnitude observed after the renminbi deval-
ing (Figure 1.15, panel 3; also see IMF 2016b). uation of August 2015, portfolio flows could be
Aggregate measures of net external balances may, reduced by a total of $60 billion a year over the same
however, mask vulnerabilities arising from offset- period, equivalent to one-quarter of annual inflows
ting gross positions and imbalances at a sectoral
level. Indeed, gross issuance of foreign currency
37The investor base risk index aims to capture the likelihood
corporate and sovereign debt securities rose to new
of sudden outflows, given the different types of investors that
highs in 2017, allowing even weaker issuers to hold sovereign debt (Arslanalp and Tsuda 2012). The measure is
access markets (Figure 1.15, panel 4). The share of calculated based on the historical relationship between changes in
non-investment-grade issuance has risen to more than investor holdings of sovereign debt and sovereign bond yields. The
index ranges from 0 to 100. The higher the score, the greater the
40 percent over the past 12 months, boosted by the likelihood of a sudden investor outflow. According to this measure,
return to bond markets of issuers such as Egypt and the most fickle investor type is foreign nonbanks, followed by foreign
smaller issuers in sub-Saharan Africa. banks, foreign central banks, domestic nonbanks, domestic banks,
and the domestic central bank.
Furthermore, exposure to less committed, poten- 38Estimates are based on an econometric model discussed in the
tially “flighty,” investors is growing, which makes October 2017 GFSR.
The investor base for EM sovereign debt has become more fickle in Vulnerabilities in public debt structure remain high for several
recent years. countries.
1. nve tor a e i n e ggregate ro erging ar et . Public Debt el b Nonre i ent an Deno inate in Foreign urrenc
cono ie (Share of total)
50 25th–75th percentile 80
Fund investors account for a growing share of EM portfolio asset Countries with high financing needs could be vulnerable to a
holdings. tightening of global financing conditions.
3. Exposure to Fund Investors 4. Reserve Adequacy and External Financing Needs
S are o bon in benc ar in ice o ne b inve t ent
funds, percent)
18 50 RUS THA 250
Total (left scale) Range of countries (right scale) UKR 45
16 EGP ig e ternal financing re uire ent
IDN 40 PHL 200
MAL
Reserves/ARA metric
HUN ARG
ROU 35 BRA KAZ IND ROU
14 PHL PER 30 150
MEX IDN MEX Reserve adequacy range
12 COL 25 COL POL
RUS 20 CHL 100
10 TUR 15 CHN HUN ZAF MYS
POL TUR
8 10 PAK 50
ZAF THA CHL BRA
5
IND CHN
6 0 0
2012 13 14 15 16 17 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
verage external financing requirements, 2018–20
Sources: EPFR Global; JPMorgan Chase & Co.; and IMF staff estimates.
Note: Panel 1 uses the data set from rslanalp and Tsuda (2012 updated). Panel 2 uses 2017 data or latest available. In panel 3, exposures to fund investors are
measured as assets under management at investment funds (based on EPFR data) divided by the amount outstanding of bonds in EM local currency and hard
currency benchmark indices (based on JPMorgan data). Panel 4 uses the IMF s ssessing Reserve dequacy ( R ) metric estimates for 2017, not ad usted for
capital controls. Data labels in the figure use International Organi ation for Standardi ation (ISO) country codes. EM = emerging market.
in 2010–17.39 Countries that have not addressed that rising interest rates could weigh on growth and
vulnerabilities (such as low reserve adequacy) during aggravate financial stability risks. Commodity pro-
the favorable period could be particularly at risk of ducers could be further affected if monetary tighten-
a reversal in capital flows from rapid tightening of ing is accompanied by weakening commodity prices
global financial conditions (Figure 1.16, panel 4). (Husain and others 2015).
Moreover, countries with fixed exchange rates at
different stages of the economic cycle face the risk
Countries Should Prepare for Tighter Financial
Conditions by Pursuing Adequate Policies
39Specifically, a 100-basis-point increase in the spread on US
Policymakers in emerging markets should use current
BBB-rated corporate bonds was assumed, which is on par with the
favorable conditions to prepare for a potential retrench-
increase observed from July 2015 to February 2016.
ment in capital flows that may be accelerated by mon- In recent years, however, public debt vulnerabili-
etary policy normalization in advanced economies and ties have increased because of revenue declines for
associated tightening in financial conditions. Vulnerable commodity-exporting countries, exchange rate depre-
countries could be disproportionately affected and should ciations, consolidation of previously unaccounted for
strengthen fundamentals in preparation for less benign state-owned enterprise debt, and rising interest rate
external financial conditions (Sahay and others 2014; costs attributable to higher shares of nonconcessional
Chen, Mancini-Griffoli, and Sahay 2014). To build debt.40 More than 45 percent of low-income coun-
resilience and reduce the likelihood of outflows, coun- tries were at high risk of, or already in, debt distress
tries should maintain sound macroeconomic, structural, as measured by debt sustainability ratings in 2017
financial, and macroprudential policies, taking into (Figure 1.17, panel 1),41 while several countries have
account their cyclical position, balance sheet vulnerabil- debt-to-GDP levels close to what they were when debt
ities, and macroeconomic policy space. Because capital relief was granted (see April 2018 Fiscal Monitor).
outflow pressures can be driven by external rather than In addition, vulnerabilities are on the rise not just
domestic factors, it is also necessary to build appropriate in the current set of low-income countries but also
buffers that can be used during stress, possibly by taking in a wider set of small non-investment-grade issuers,
advantage of low interest rates to borrow long term. which includes countries that have “graduated” from
Buffers include building international reserves to support low-income country status (Figure 1.17, panel 2).
exchange rate regimes in periods of stress or taking steps The increase in private and non–Paris Club creditors
toward making the exchange rate regime more flexible has led to a substantial change in creditor composi-
where appropriate. Monitoring firms’ foreign exchange tion over the past decade. Among countries recently
exposures and ensuring their capacity to absorb exchange surveyed by the IMF, the combined share of external
rate risks would also help emerging market economies financing provided by commercial creditors increased
cope with a reduction in capital inflows. from 7.5 percent to 15 percent (Figure 1.17, panel 3)
If external financial conditions deteriorate sharply, between 2007 and 2016, and financing from non–
a rapid and appropriate macroeconomic and finan- Paris Club creditors has risen from 18.5 to 37 percent.
cial policy response to capital outflow pressures is Among non–Paris Club creditors, China has taken a key
particularly important (IMF 2012, 2015, 2016c). role in providing external financing. Since 2010, China
Exchange rates often serve as a critical shock absorber, has provided commitments of more than $100 billion
but in countries with sufficient reserve buffers, foreign a year, on average, in financing to emerging market
exchange intervention can be useful for preventing economies,42 over $30 billion of which has been to
disorderly market conditions and allowing the econ- low-income countries. This change in debt composition
omy to gradually adjust to a new equilibrium. In the has been more pronounced in several heavily indebted
context of outflow pressures, capital flow manage- poor countries (HIPCs) that have received debt relief
ment measures should only be implemented in crisis and are now in debt difficulty (Figure 1.17, panel 4).43
situations or when a crisis is considered imminent, and The shift to a more diverse composition of creditors
should not substitute for any needed macroeconomic can facilitate faster accumulation of debt and can also
adjustment. When warranted, such measures should make debt resolution more complex. The involvement
be transparent, temporary, and nondiscriminatory and of new non–Paris Club official, as well as private, credi-
should be lifted once crisis conditions abate. tors remains relatively untested. There is less experience
recent years.
Rising Public Debt Vulnerabilities in Low-Income 41The group of low-income countries refers to countries eligible
Countries and Small Non-Investment-Grade Sovereigns for concessional financing through the Poverty Reduction Growth
Trust. For a definition of low-income developing countries,
Debt burdens have increased and affordability has
see IMF 2018.
deteriorated over the past few years among low-income 42According to estimates using data from AidData at the College
More than 45 percent of LICs are at high risk or in debt distress. Debt-servicing costs have risen across small non-investment-grade
EM issuers.
1. Debt Sustainability Ratings 2. Debt Service as a Share of Exports
(Percent of PRGT-eligible countries with DSAs) (Percent of small high-yield EMs)
50 90
45 In debt distress High risk >25 percent 20–25 percent 15–20 percent 80
40 70
35 60
30
50
25
40
20
15 30
10 20
5 10
0 0
2007 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 2007 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Composition of creditors of public debt has changed substantially ... ... particularly in several post-HIPC countries.
3. External Debt Creditor Composition . ternal re itor o o ition o Po t P ountrie in Debt Di ficult
(Percent of public and publicly guaranteed external debt) (Percent of public and publicly guaranteed external debt)
WB, IDB, IMF, AfDB, AsDB, and Paris Club Other multilateral Non–Paris Club excluding China China
Bonds Commercial banks Other commercial
100 100
80 80
60 60
40 40
20 20
0 0
2007 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 2007 16
Sources: Bank for International Settlements; IMF-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-WB Joint External Debt Statistics; 2017 survey of IMF
country desks; World Bank International Debt Statistics; IMF, International Financial Statistics database; and various IMF staff reports.
Note: Panel 1 debt sustainability assessment ratings for LICs are based on the Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries. Panel 2 sample includes
35 non-investment-grade relatively small issuers that are part of JP Morgan’s EMBIG index. Each has a weight of less than 2 percent of the index. Panel 3 is based
on 37 LIDCs where continuous data are available from 2007 to 2016. Panel 4 countries included are Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana,
Mauritania, Mo ambique, and ambia. Figures are in simple averages and may be overly in uenced by the experience of countries with very high levels of debt.
Other commercial creditors include oil traders. AfDB = African Development Bank; AsDB = Asian Development Bank; DSA = Debt Sustainability Analysis;
EM = emerging market; EMBIG = JPMorgan’s Emerging Market Bond Index Global; HIPC = highly indebted poor country; IDB = Inter-American Development Bank;
LIC = low-income country; LIDC = low-income developing country; PRGT = Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust; WB = World Bank.
with their engagement before and during debt distress to pay debt in lieu of cash. Both commercial and bilat-
than with traditional official lenders. Many of them eral lenders have resorted to collateralized lending, as
have not been part of debt resolution in the past, but highlighted in recent debt distress cases (for example,
they could be called on to provide support in such cases. Chad, Republic of Congo, Venezuela) that are yet to
The use of collateralized debt can further complicate be resolved.44 Apart from such cases, however, details
debt resolution and lower recovery rates for creditors on collateralized deals remain scant.45 Given that sover-
with unsecured claims. Some commodity-producing
44For details on recent debt distress cases in low-income develop-
countries offer their exports as collateral; for example,
ing countries, see IMF (2018).
by issuing senior loans through state-owned enterprises 45Bräutigam, Gallagher, and Hwang (2016) find that one-third
or by pledging commodity shipments that can be used of Chinese loans to Africa are secured by commodity exports,
eigns have significant protections from seizure of assets, Official creditors, when needed, should emphasize
most creditors are reliant on good faith negotiations timely resolution of debt distress cases to avoid poten-
to secure recovery in distress.46 The direct claim on an tial spillovers and to minimize the costs for both the
asset or a revenue stream, however, can grant holders issuer and creditors. Transparent and broad creditor
of collateralized debt favorable treatment. Thus, collat- coordination should be encouraged, especially when
eralized claims could impair the ability of the sovereign the set of lenders is diverse. New official creditors
to offer more generous terms in a renegotiation of its should consider the benefits of adopting sustainable
unsecured debt, and require a more significant haircut lending rules, such as those endorsed by the Group
on remaining debt to ensure debt sustainability. of 20. Finally, borrowers and official creditors should
The higher share of private sector creditors could ensure transparency of the contractual terms for new
make low-income countries and other vulnera- debt, including debt that is issued by entities related to
ble emerging market borrowers more sensitive to a the sovereign.
tightening of global financial conditions. The increase
in the share of Eurobonds and commercial loans
with shorter maturities can expose issuers to higher Shadow Banking Reform and Risk in China
rollover and interest rate risk. These new avenues of The large-scale and opaque interconnections of the
financing are untested, and it is unclear whether they Chinese financial system continue to pose stabil-
will remain available if financial conditions tighten ity risks (Figure 1.18). China’s RMB 250 trillion
significantly, particularly for first-time and low-rated (300 percent of GDP) banking system is tightly
issuers. Part of this new debt is held by investors linked to the shadow banking sector through its
who do not specialize in this sector and may choose exposure to off-balance-sheet investment vehicles.
to allocate their funds elsewhere if higher-yielding These vehicles are largely funded through the issu-
opportunities become more abundant in more tra- ance of investment products (RMB 75 trillion),
ditional hard currency assets (for example, US high with roughly half sold to multiple investors as
yield). In addition, the anticipation of complex debt high-yielding alternatives to bank deposits and half
resolutions and potentially lower recovery rates could held by single investors, including banks.47 They
trigger more rapid market repricing at the first sign of invest in various assets, such as bonds, bank depos-
sovereign stress. its, and nonstandard credit assets, as well as in other
investment products. Insurance companies also have
considerable exposure to these vehicles because they
Policies Should Address Rising Debt Vulnerabilities invest in their products and use them as a source of
To ensure a sustainable debt burden, policymakers funding. These little-regulated vehicles have played
should reduce vulnerabilities related to the structure of a critical role in facilitating China’s historic credit
their debt and attract a stable investor base, including boom and have helped create a complex web of expo-
through local bond market development. Debt man- sure between financial institutions.
agers should minimize risks emanating from rollovers, Banks are exposed to investment vehicles along
potential foreign exchange mismatches, and collateral- many dimensions—as investors, creditors, borrow-
ization. Countries should explore state contingent debt ers, guarantors, and managers. These vehicles rely
instruments that may offer some protection against on banks’ short-term financing to use leverage and
unforeseen shocks such as natural disasters, assuming manage their maturity mismatches. Banks, in turn,
these instruments are priced at reasonable cost for the receive significant flows from these vehicles in the
issuer by investors (IMF 2017b).
47Bank-issued non-principal-guaranteed wealth management
and Bräutigam and Gallagher (2014) find that roughly half of the products account for the majority of products sold to multiple inves-
$132 billion in Chinese financing to Latin America and Africa is tors. As used herein, investment products include asset management
commodity backed. products issued by securities brokers, fund companies and their
46Sovereign states are typically granted immunity for noncom- subsidiaries, trust companies, and insurers. Money market funds
mercial activities in international courts. The two jurisdictions most and other public mutual funds are more strictly regulated and not
commonly used for international debt issuance formalize this immu- included. Other forms of nonbank credit activities also carry risks
nity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (United States) but are not considered in this section; for instance, money market
and under the State Immunity Act (United Kingdom). funds, other public mutual funds, and exposures between firms.
Investment vehicles
Assets Liabilities
Households, Bank deposits and debt Repo and other borrowing
firms, government Direct
Corporate and government bonds
financing vehicles Investment investment Households
Credit and other illiquid assets products and firms
Governments, (RMB 75 trillion)
policy banks To: Investment products
Sources: Asset Management Association of China; CEIC; ChinaBond; People’s Bank of China; and IMF staff estimates.
Note: Investment products include non-principal-guaranteed bank-issued wealth management products and asset management products issued by other financial
institutions depicted. Numbers shown are total on-balance-sheet assets for banks and financial institutions, and total investment products outstanding as of
end-2017 or latest available reporting period. Numbers for other financial institutions do not include fund management companies and their subsidiaries due to lack
of data. See also Ehlers, ong, and hu (2018). RMB = renminbi.
form of deposits and bond investments. Banks and ment vehicles and other borrowing between financial
other financial institutions are also direct investors institutions. Since the summer of 2016, regulators have
in investment products. Small and medium-sized incorporated bank-sponsored investment vehicles in
banking institutions and insurance companies are the macroprudential framework and have taken other
particularly exposed, with investment products steps to curb financial sector leverage and intercon-
accounting for one-fifth and one-third of their assets, nectedness.48 Proposed asset management rules would
respectively. About one-quarter of investment vehicle also overhaul the investment product market beginning
assets, in turn, are invested in other vehicles, leading in 2018. In addition to limits on investment vehicle
to opaque cross-holding and leverage structures that leverage and complexity, banks would be gradually
are difficult for regulators and investors to monitor. restricted from investing in these vehicles or providing
Banks in particular are seen as implicitly guarantee- them with financial support. This restriction would
ing the RMB 25 trillion in investment products they limit their ability to implicitly guarantee investment
manage, which allows them to package high-risk products’ fixed-yield returns, effectively converting
credit investments as low-risk retail savings products. roughly half of the market from deposit-like products
Investment vehicles managed by nonbank financial into mutual funds. In addition, the insurance regulator
institutions are perceived to be higher risk, but in has clamped down on the sale of short-term invest-
most cases banks still bear some risk as creditor, end ment products by life insurers.
investor, or guarantor.
The authorities have substantially tightened the 48For more details on China’s financial system stability assessment
regulatory framework to reduce risks related to invest- and associated policy recommendations, please refer to IMF (2017a).
Figure 1.19. Chinese Banking System and Financial Market Developments and Liabilities
Regulatory tightening has sti ed growth in financial sector leverage ... but capital positions are becoming more stretched and underlying
and in risky investment products ... profitability continues to fall.
1. China: Three-Month Changes in Investment Products Outstanding 2. Chinese Banks: Tier 1 Capital Ratio and Preprovision Operating
and Small and Medium Banks’ Financial Sector Claims Profit to et
(Trillions of renminbi) (Percent)
CET1 ratio Preprovision operating profits ratio
8 12.0 2.4
Investment products
Bank claims on 11.5 Small and 2.3
6
financial sector medium banks
11.0
Bank liabilities to 2.2
4
financial sector 10.5
2.1
2 10.0
2.0
9.5
0 Big 5 banks
9.0 1.9
–2 1.8
8.5
–4 8.0 1.7
Jun. 2015 Dec. 15 Jun. 16 Dec. 16 Jun. 17 Dec. 17 2011 12 13 14 15 16 17:Q3 2011 12 13 14 15 16 17:Q3
Bank vulnerabilities remain elevated as funding costs rise ... ... and liquidity remains stretched.
3. Chinese Bond Prices: Corporate Credit Spreads and Short-Term 4. Chinese Small and Medium Banks: Short-Term Nondeposit Funding
Unsecured Bank Funding Costs an ig ualit i ui et
HQLA (percent of bank assets, left scale)
Short-term nondeposit funding (percent of bank assets, left scale)
6.0 Yield spread: Corporate (AAA) 1.9 25 Ratio of short-term nondeposit funding to HQLA (right scale) 2.6x
and government three-year bonds
5.5 (percentage points, right scale) 1.7
20 2.4x
5.0 Three-month negotiable 1.5
4.5 certificate of deposit yield 1.3
(percent, left scale) 15 2.2x
4.0 1.1
3.5 0.9 10 2.0x
3.0 0.7
5 1.8x
2.5 0.5
2.0 0.3 0 1.6x
Dec. 2015
Feb. 16
Apr. 16
Jun. 16
Aug. 16
Oct. 16
Dec. 16
Feb. 17
Apr. 17
Jun. 17
Aug. 17
Oct. 17
Dec. 17
Feb. 18
2015 16 17:H1
Sources: Asset Management Association of China; Bloomberg Finance L.P.; CEIC; People’s Bank of China; S&P Global Market Intelligence; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Panel 4 is based on a sample of 10 banks that disclose HQLA and contractual maturities. Short-term is less than three-month contractual maturity or on
demand. China s HQL definition disallows required reserves held at the People s Bank of China. CET1 = common equity Tier 1; HQL = high-quality liquid assets.
Chinese Banks Have Made Progress in Deleveraging, but annual basis in 2016 to less than 20 percent at the end
Risks Remain Elevated of 2017, and banks’ holdings of investment products
Tighter regulations have lowered growth in banks’ issued by other banks has also declined sharply.
use of risky short-term funding and in investment Financial stability risks nonetheless remain high, and
products, slowing the buildup of bank vulnerabilities. smaller banks are particularly vulnerable. Bank buffers
Lending by small and medium-sized banks through continue to thin at many of the country’s commercial
investment vehicles has slowed, as has their use of banks. In addition to still-elevated investment vehi-
wholesale short-term financing and the overall volume cle exposures, core Tier 1 capital ratios are declining
of investment products outstanding (Figure 1.19, and remain near minimum levels for many small and
panel 1). Notably, growth of banks’ exposure to other medium-sized banks, while preprovision profitabil-
financial institutions fell from about 80 percent on an ity also continues to weaken (Figure 1.19, panel 2).
Following tighter regulatory constraints, money market (Figure 1.20, panel 3). Without bank-guaranteed fixed
rates have risen sharply, leading to wider corporate bond yields on investment products, the generally risk-averse
spreads, particularly for weaker borrowers (Figure 1.19, retail investor base is likely to shift toward less risky
panel 3). Highlighting liquidity risks faced by small and instruments, a development that would reduce net
medium-sized banks, reliance on short-term nondeposit demand for already illiquid corporate bonds.50 Banks
funding remains high, and short-term wholesale liabil- will also need to gradually recognize some portion of
ities are still more than double the available liquidity the corporate credit exposure held through investment
buffers at smaller banks (Figure 1.19, panel 4). vehicles as loans or bonds, requiring capital and pro-
visioning costs that will cut into loan growth capacity.
For small and medium-sized banks, even absorbing
Reforming China’s Investment Product Market— half of these exposures over two years would reduce net
An Important Conduit for Shadow Credit—Poses new loan growth from 17 percent to 6 percent, unless
Challenges to Financial Stability banks raise new capital (Figure 1.20, panel 4) (see also
A key challenge for the reform agenda will be phas- the October 2017 GFSR).
ing out implicit guarantees for investment vehicles.
Because they primarily hold illiquid and long-term
assets, such as corporate bonds and nonstandard credit China’s Insurance Sector Has Grown Rapidly, Increased
assets, these vehicles rely on guarantees to borrow and Its Risk Profile, and Become Closely Linked with Other
to meet maturing short-term liabilities to product Parts of the Financial System
holders. As a result, investment vehicles are now the Chinese life insurers have grown rapidly, and their
largest net borrower in China’s repurchase market, share prices have been volatile. Insurers’ assets have
driving overall market activity, often with relatively more than tripled in size over the past seven years,
illiquid collateral (Figure 1.20, panel 1). Furthermore, growing in line with the rest of the Chinese financial
direct lending by large banks to their sponsored vehi- system (Figure 1.21, panel 1). Growth has been fueled
cles amounts to about 10 percent of their investment by “universal life insurance,” flexible savings products
product liabilities, on average.49 (in 2015 and 2016), and more traditional life policies
Without such financial support, investment vehi- (in 2017) (Figure 1.21, panel 2). At the same time,
cles would need to hold safer, more liquid asset insurers’ share prices have risen sharply, accompanied
portfolios to avoid rollover and refinancing risks. by an increase in volatility reflecting perceived elevated
Yet allocations to such assets have recently decreased risks (Figure 1.21, panel 3). Recently, the regulator
among bank-sponsored investment vehicles, falling to took control of a large insurance group that had
one-third in 2017, from about half in 2015 (Fig- financed a rapid expansion into other business areas
ure 1.20, panel 2). Rising use of illiquid assets and with short-term high-guarantee investment products.
borrowing suggests dependence on implicit guarantees The shift into riskier investments entails vulnera-
is still trending up, underscoring the difficulty of prog- bilities for insurers and the system at large. To attain
ress in this critical area. the high guaranteed returns of their long-term policies
Reducing risks in the investment product market (4 percent, in many cases) amid the relatively small
will require further slowing credit growth in the near and illiquid corporate bond market, insurers have
term, which is necessary to ensure financial stability shifted their investments from bonds and deposits to
and sustainable growth in the medium term. Invest- equity, funds, and “other assets” (Figure 1.21, panel
ment vehicles have bought nearly all the net increase in 4). These other assets include asset and wealth man-
corporate and financial bond issuance in the past three agement products, debt and equity products, and
years and hold 70 percent of such bonds outstanding participations in joint ventures (Figure 1.21, panel 5).
These large investments in infrastructure, real estate,
49Eight banks (including four of the Big Five lenders) disclose
and loan portfolios concentrate credit risks, including
active direct lending to their investment vehicles, which account for for insurers with limited expertise in credit assessment.
nearly half of the bank-managed investment product market (more
than RMB 10 trillion in non-principal-guaranteed wealth manage- 50More than 80 percent of outstanding wealth management
ment products). This lending was equivalent to 15 percent of these products are billed as low risk, rated as 1 or 2 on an industry group–
banks’ core Tier 1 capital as of mid-2017. defined scale to 5 (with 5 being riskiest).
Jun. 2013
Jun. 14
Jun. 15
Jun. 16
Reforming investment products will further slow credit growth by ... and limiting small banks’ ability to increase lending without fresh
weakening demand for corporate and financial bond issuance ... capital.
3. China Bond Market: Corporate and Non-Policy-Bank Financial Bonds 4. Chinese Small and Medium Banks: Two-Year Estimated Loan Growth
Outstanding, by Holder Capacity Given Shadow Credit Recognition Assumption1
(Trillions of renminbi) (Percent)
35 20
Banks and other NBFIs 17.5 percent
30 Public mutual funds 15
Investment vehicles 11 Annual loan growth
25 (mid-2017)
10
20 6
Estimated two-year loan growth2
5
15 0
0
10
5 –5
–5
0 –10
Dec. 2014 Jun. 15 Dec. 15 Jun. 16 Dec. 16 Jun. 17 Dec. 17 25 50 75 100
Percentage of shadow credit recogni ed as loans
Sources: China Clearing and Depository Corporation; National Interbank Funding Sources: Bank financial reports; S P Global Market Intelligence; and IMF staff
Center; People’s Bank of China; Shanghai Clearing House; WIND; and IMF staff calculations.
1
calculations. Shadow credit is defined as 100 percent of banks investments in third-party
Note: Public mutual fund holdings shown are interpolated semi-annual data. unconsolidated structured products and 20 percent of their sponsored non-principal-
NBFI = nonbank financial institution. guaranteed wealth management products. Based on a sample of 25 listed banks
with available disclosures. Assumes banks receive no external capital and maintain
static capital and profitability ratios. Shadow credit recognition entails raising risk
weightings for selected assets to 100 percent from initial weightings of 25 and 0
percent for structured products and wealth management products, respectively.
2
Growth rates shown are annuali ed. Negative number indicates loan book would
need to shrink to initially accommodate existing shadow credit. Loan growth shown
is net of loans converted from existing shadow credit.
Chinese insurers have grown rapidly ... ... fueled by life insurance sales.
1. Insurance Sector Total Assets 2. Annual Insurance Premiums
(Trillions of renminbi)
20 25 4.0
Total (trillions of renminbi, left scale) Property insurance
Percent of GDP (right scale) Traditional life 3.5
Percent of financial system (right scale) 20 Universal life
15 3.0
15 2.5
10 2.0
10 1.5
5 1.0
5
0.5
0 0 0.0
2010 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 2013 14 15 16 17
Insurers shares have risen sharply, accompanied by high volatility. Increased revenues have been invested in higher-risk assets but
capital has not been raised.
3. Equity Performance and Volatility 4. Non-Fixed-Income Assets and Capital
China insurance China banks Heng Seng index (Percent of total assets)
160 50 50
Equity, funds, and
140 40 40
“other assets”
120 30 30
100 20 20
Capital
80 10 10
60 0 0
2014 15 16 17 18 2014 15 16 17 18 2013 14 15 16 17
Other assets are mainly portfolios of infrastructure pro ects, real ariation of alternative investments and capital buffers within the
estate, and loans provided by asset managers. sector is large.
5. Decomposition of “Other Assets,” 2016 6. Capital and Alternative Investments, 2016
(Percent of other assets) (Percent of assets)
55
Largest Rest of
15 life 45
Alternative investments
sector
insurers
35
Equity funds and schemes
25%
Asset management 25
products and wealth
management Associates and Real 15
products Debt schemes oint ventures estate
30% 27% 12% 6%
5
4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Capital
Sources: nnual reports; Bloomberg Finance L.P.; China Insurance Regulatory Commission; Morgan Stanley Capital International; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: In panel 3, volatility is calculated as the annuali ed standard deviation of the relative price change for the 60 most recent trading days closing price. In panel 5,
an associate is an entity in which the company group has a long-term interest of generally not less than 20 percent of the equity voting rights and over which it is in
a position to exercise significant in uence. Panels 5 and 6 are based on annual reports of the 15 largest life insurers. These companies cover two-thirds of the total
assets of the Chinese insurance sector. In panel 6, the si e of the bubbles denotes total assets.
Furthermore, the uncertain and volatile returns on As recommended by the IMF’s recent Financial Sector
these assets may not match the minimum yields prom- Stability Assessment (IMF 2017a), authorities should
ised to policyholders. Increased illiquid assets covered prioritize strengthening policy frameworks and financial
by deposit-like insurance products raise exposure institutions’ liquidity and capital buffers to prevent the
to redemptions at short notice.51 When faced with dismantling of implicit guarantees from inadvertently
net cash outflows, insurers may need to sell off their bringing forward stability risks. Equally important,
illiquid assets, potentially adding to market volatility. authorities must address the wide range of nonregula-
In addition, insurers are in some instances part of tory factors that have driven the proliferation of risky
financial conglomerates encompassing several sectors.52 investment products and excessive demand for credit
While these links give insurers the ability to sell their more broadly; for instance, GDP growth targets.54
products within their own networks, they bring risks The insurance supervisory regime should continue
of spillovers across sectors. to evolve toward a transparent, market- and risk-based
Whether all insurers have sufficient resilience against regime that includes close cooperation with other
these vulnerabilities is uncertain. Current regulations authorities. The authorities have strengthened over-
require relatively low capital charges for infrastructure sight of insurers by curtailing the sale of “universal
investments, joint ventures, and real estate compared life” policies and addressing duration mismatches. The
with, for instance, corporate bonds. Moreover, capital introduction of a stronger prudential standard in the
requirements for investments in funds are fixed and not China Risk-Oriented Solvency System in 2016 was
based on the risks of the underlying assets.53 Despite the another important step. Nevertheless, the increase in
elevated risks, capital levels have remained unchanged insurers’ “other assets” suggests further work is needed.
(Figure 1.21, panel 4). Medium-sized and smaller insurers Additional transparency on the nature, credit quality,
have invested more heavily in alternative assets and have and valuation of these investments, as well as a thorough
weaker capability to manage related risks (Figure 1.21, review of prudential treatment to adequately reflect the
panel 6). In addition, risk assessments are clouded by risks of the underlying assets, are needed. The profile of
complex and opaque company structures and uncertainty liabilities—including duration and surrenders—should
about the exact nature and credit quality of the underly- be closely monitored, and further action to curb unusual
ing investments, including implicit guarantees. liquidity risks should be considered. Finally, the size,
complexity, and interconnectedness of the largest life
insurers require enhanced group supervision, strong
Authorities Should Continue to Reform the Investment
cross-sector coordination, and a framework for recovery
Product Market and Enhance the Insurance
and resolution should one of them fail. The recently
Supervisory Regime
announced merger of the China Insurance Regulatory
Addressing remaining financial risks is key to pro- Commission and the China Banking Regulatory Com-
moting financial stability in China. The proposed asset mission should facilitate closer cooperation with respect
management reforms are a promising blueprint for to insurance and banking supervision.
gradually taming risks within the investment product
sector. Regulators should, however, further limit leverage
for lower-risk products and eventually require that Funding Challenges of Internationally
implicitly guaranteed off-balance-sheet business carry the Active Banks
same capital and liquidity buffers as on-balance-sheet Although banks have strengthened their consolidated
business. Careful sequencing of reforms is also critical. balance sheets over the past decade, dollar balance sheet
liquidity remains a source of vulnerability. International
51About one-fifth of life insurers’ liabilities are deposits and dollar lending continues to increase, dominated by
policyholders’ investments, which are presumed to be more easily non-US banks operating through international branch
withdrawn by policyholders than traditional life insurance products.
52One-third of the consolidated balance sheets of the five
networks. Most rely heavily on short-term wholesale
largest insurance groups consists of banking, asset management, or dollar funding and, at the margin, on volatile foreign
other activities.
53The risk factor applied to infrastructure equity plans is 12 per- 54For example, budget constraints at state-owned enterprises and
cent, to real estate it is 8 to12 percent, and for 10-year AA-rated local governments should be tightened, and the system’s vulnerabil-
corporate bonds it is 15 percent. The risk factor applied to bond ity to slower credit growth should be reduced via improvements to
funds is 6 percent. insolvency and debtor workout regimes.
Asia-Pacific
(March 2018)
... including capital buffers and funding profiles. But work to fortify balance sheets should continue.
3. Buffer and Loan-to-Deposit Ratios 4. Euro Area Nonperforming Loans
(Percent of sample bank assets) (Billions of euros)
Total sia-Pacific Euro area North America Other Europe
Bank buffer ratio (percent): <4 >4 Others Cyprus, Greece, and Portugal Ireland, Italy, and Spain
100 1,200
80
60 1,000
40
20 800
0
Loan-to-deposit ratio (percent): <100 >100 600
100
80 400
60
40 200
20
0 0
2007 17 2007 17 2007 17 2007 17 2007 17 2009 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; IMF, Financial Soundness Indicators database; S&P Global Market Intelligence; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: In panel 1, US bank assets have been adjusted for derivatives netting. Panels 2 and 3 are based on a sample of 691 banks headquartered in advanced
economies. In panels 2 to 4, where 2017 data are unavailable, the latest published figures are used. sia-Pacific = ustralia, Japan, orea, New ealand, and
Singapore; North merica = Canada and the nited States; Other Europe = Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Swit erland, and the nited ingdom; Bank
buffers = Tier 1 common capital plus loan loss provisions less 60 percent of nonperforming loans as a percentage of tangible assets (ad usted for derivatives netting
at S banks). The 60 percent figure is an assumption used for this analysis and not a regulatory requirement.
exchange swap markets. A sharp tightening of financial some banks’ business models, as discussed in previous
conditions could expose structurally vulnerable liquidity GFSRs (Figure 1.22, panel 1).
positions and trigger forced asset sales or even defaults, But balance sheet metrics suggest that banks’
amplifying and transmitting market turbulence. consolidated financial positions have been fortified
over the past decade.55 In 2007 almost 40 percent
of the sample, by assets, had weak buffers and high
Banks Have Bolstered Their Balance Sheets, but These loan-to-deposit ratios, but this proportion is now less
Efforts Need to Continue, Especially at Weaker Institutions than 10 percent (Figure 1.22, panel 2). This improve-
Markets are providing mixed signals about
55The October 2017 GFSR looked at global banks, but this
the health of the banking sector. Equity market
analysis is based on a sample of almost 700 advanced economy
price-to-book ratios vary across banks, likely reflect- banks. Also see BIS (2018) for a discussion on the enhanced resil-
ing investor concerns about the sustainability of ience of banks.
ment has been achieved by increasing capital and The International Dollar Banking System Faces a
liquidity, raising provisions, and improving funding Structural Liquidity Mismatch
profiles in response to enhanced prudential standards, Demand for US dollar–denominated assets from
stricter supervision, better risk management practices outside the United States continues to grow rapidly.
at banks, and pressure from investors. Demand remains robust, since the US dollar is often
Although bank buffers have increased in aggregate the default currency for commodities, energy, trade
(Figure 1.22, panel 3), there is a tail of weaker banks, credit, and corporate borrowers (especially in emerg-
representing about 20 percent of sample assets, with ing market economies). Banks and other institutional
lower levels of capital and provisions against non- investors in low-interest-rate advanced economies also
performing loans (NPLs).56 These banks are mainly seek dollar assets to enhance yields. Although dollar
concentrated in Europe (inside and outside the euro bonds outstanding have increased rapidly, loans remain
area) and would be more susceptible to shocks such the largest form of credit (Figure 1.23, panel 1). Banks
as a sudden bout of market turmoil or an unexpected are central to this system through both lending and
economic downturn. The combination of a pickup derivatives market activities.
in economic growth, actions taken to reduce these Non-US banks occupy a dominant position in the
NPLs, and policy measures by the European author- provision of US dollar credit (Figure 1.23, panel 2).
ities have contributed to a decline in the stock of Banks intermediate dollars internationally through
NPLs in recent quarters (Figure 1.22, panel 4), but branches in the United States and elsewhere; these
NPL levels remain high at some banks.57 So while branches are relatively free to transfer funds across
the economic recovery will certainly help reduce borders. Non-US banks’ branches in the United States
NPLs, a comprehensive strategy—involving strict have been dollar borrowers from overseas, on net, since
supervision, ambitious NPL reduction targets, mod- 2011, but the gross flows in each direction remain
ernizing insolvency and foreclosure frameworks, and considerable (Figure 1.23, panel 3). By contrast,
further developing distressed debt markets—needs to US subsidiaries of foreign banks gather retail dollar
be fully implemented to address the NPL problem deposits but are limited in their flexibility to transfer
at its root. funds intragroup across borders or legal entities, so
Banks have also improved their funding profiles; they play little role in the international dollar system
nonetheless, more could be done to bolster resil- (Figure 1.23, panel 4) (McCauley, McGuire, and von
ience against liquidity risks in some institutions.58 Peter 2010; McCauley and von Peter 2012).
About one-third of sample banks, by assets, still have This section, therefore, assesses funding and liquidity
loan-to-deposit ratios in excess of 100 percent (Fig- across non-US banks’ international US dollar balance
ure 1.22, panel 3). This does not necessarily mean sheets, defined to include non-US banks’ dollar posi-
that these banks will fail to meet regulatory mea- tions outside the United States plus their US branches,
sures, such as the liquidity coverage ratio.59 But these but excluding their US subsidiaries. The discussion
results do suggest that attention should continue to focuses on country banking systems, and is based on
be paid to liquidity risks, particularly with respect top-down country aggregate balance sheet information
to the dollar-funding profiles of banks operating combined with a bottom-up aggregate of non-US
internationally. banks’ branches in the United States (see Online
Annex 1.2).60
Overall, non-US banks’ international US dollar
balance sheets rely more on short-term or wholesale
56The buffer ratio is Tier 1 common capital and provisions minus dollar funding than do their consolidated balance
60 percent of NPLs as a percentage of tangible assets (adjusted for sheets (Figure 1.24, panel 1). These short-term whole-
derivatives netting at US banks). The 60 percent figure is an
sale instruments—interbank deposits, commercial
assumption used for this analysis rather than a regulatory requirement.
57In March, the European Commission and European Central paper, and certificates of deposit—along with relatively
Bank proposed new measures targeting NPLs. unstable (corporate, nontransactional, and uninsured)
58See also Chapter 3 of the October 2013 GFSR for a discussion
Figure 1.23. US Dollar Credit Aggregates and Bank Intragroup Funding Structures
While dollar bonds outstanding have increased rapidly, loans remain ... dominated by non-US banks operating through international branch
the largest form of credit ... networks.
1. Dollar Credit Extension by Non-US Entities, by Instrument 2. Banks’ US Dollar-Denominated Claims Outside the United States
(Trillions of US dollars)
14 Bonds issued by nonbank sector (trillions of US dollars, left scale) 70 18
Bank loans to nonbanks (trillions of US dollars, left scale) Non-US banks
12 US banks 16
Bank loan share (percent, right scale)
65 14
10
12
8 10
60
6 8
6
4 55 4
2 2
0 50 0
2000 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 2000 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16
Non-US banks’ international branches are key dollar intermediation ... while subsidiaries play a very limited role.
channels ...
3. US Branches of Non-US Banks: Intragroup Borrowing and Lending 4. US Subsidiaries of Non-US Banks: Intragroup Borrowing and Lending
(Billions of US dollars) (Billions of US dollars)
800 Due to overseas—intragroup Due to overseas—intragroup 70
Borrowing Borrowing
600 Due from overseas—intragroup Due from overseas—intragroup 60
Net—intragroup Net—intragroup
400 50
200 40
0 30
–200 20
–400 10
–600 Lending 0
Lending
–800 –10
2005 07 09 11 13 15 17 2005 07 09 11 13 15 17
Sources: Bank for International Settlements; Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council; Federal Reserve call reports; and IMF staff calculations.
deposits are prone to outflows and can generate refi- funding ratio.62 The aggregate stable funding ratio is
nancing risk under stressed conditions. lower for US dollar international balance sheets than
This use of short-term funding makes international for consolidated (aggregate position in all curren-
US dollar balance sheets structurally vulnerable to cies) balance sheets, and the international US dollar
liquidity risks. This vulnerability can be assessed using liquidity ratio is lower than the reported LCRs for
two indicators—a liquidity ratio61 that approximates banks’ consolidated positions (Figure 1.24, panel 2).63
the Basel Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and a stable US dollar liquidity ratios vary widely between banking
61The liquidity ratio is estimated high-quality liquid assets divided 62The stable funding ratio is stable funding (total deposits plus
by estimated funding outflows over a short stress period (see Online long-term securities and swap funding) divided by loans (see Online
Annex 1.2 for more details). This mimics the Basel framework’s Annex 1.2 for more details). This is intended to be broadly analo-
liquidity coverage ratio but relies on more limited disclosure of gous to the Basel framework’s net stable funding ratio but probably
assets (to measure high-quality liquid assets) and liabilities (to generates higher estimates since it does not apply available stable
measure one-month stress outflow). Analysis of the sensitivity of the funding haircuts to wholesale deposits. For Japan, 70 percent of
liquidity ratio to changes in the underlying assumptions (in Online swap funding is greater than one year in duration and is therefore
Annex 1.2) suggests that the estimates shown here may be somewhat treated as stable, based on Bank of Japan data; for other countries,
overstated; that is, dollar liquidity ratios as measured by the Bank for 50 percent of swap funding is included in stable funding.
International Settlements Liquidity Coverage Ratio would probably 63Global systemically important banks now meet the consoli-
Non-US banks tend to rely on short-term or wholesale US dollar funding. Their US dollar liquidity is usually weaker than their overall positions.
1. Funding Mix, 2016 2. Liquidity Indicators: Consolidated and US Dollar Balance Sheet
(Percent) (Percent)
Swaps Interbank Other ST market Bonds Deposits Dollar stable funding ratio Consolidated stable funding ratio
100 150
90 Stable
80 deposit 125
70 100
60
Less
50 stable 75
40 deposit
30 Dollar liquidity ratio 50
20 Consolidated liquidity
coverage ratio (reported) 25
10
0 0
Consolidated International dollar 2006 08 10 12 14 16
(all currencies) Total = Non-US + US
operations branches
100 Germany
60 Canada 10
Canada
40 France
0
20 Japan
Switzerland
0 –10
France
–20
–20
–40 Japan
Switzerland
–80 –30
50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 50 75 100 125 150 175
Liquidity ratio 2017 (percent) Stable funding ratio 2017 (percent)
Sources: Bank for International Settlements; bank financial statements; Bank of Japan; Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council; S P Global Market
Intelligence; and IMF staff estimates and analysis.
Note: Measurement of the liquidity ratio and stable funding ratio is explained in the text and in more detail in Online nnex 1.2. International dollar = dollar
claims liabilities in non- S offices and in S branches of non- S banks. ST = short-term.
systems—the French and German aggregate liquidity Only the Japanese banking system’s liquidity ratio
ratios are somewhat lower than their peers’, though declined over the same period, although it currently
they have been rising over the past few years, and stands at about 100 percent (Figure 1.25, panel
the German banking system’s stable funding ratio is 3). This decline reflects a rise in interbank liabili-
below the levels in some other countries (Figure 1.24, ties used to fund an increase in loans and securities
panels 3 and 4). (Figure 1.25, panel 5).
Overall, US dollar liquidity ratios have improved Aggregate US dollar stable funding ratios, however,
since the global financial crisis. This improvement are largely unchanged over 2006–17 (Figure 1.25,
has largely been driven by large increases in High panel 2). Individual banking systems have shown
Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA, reserves at central little progress in strengthening stable funding ratios,
banks and holdings of official sector bonds), proba- and in some the ratio has actually fallen (Figure 1.25,
bly in response to intensifying regulatory scrutiny of panel 4). These declines reflect rapid growth in dollar
short-term liquidity positions (Figure 1.25, panel 1). loans—particularly in the Canadian, French, and Japa-
nese banking systems—that has exceeded banks’ ability tite to supply dollars may be more procyclical than
or willingness to source deposits (Figure 1.25, panel banks’. Because these new players place the yen they
6). This situation is perhaps due to a reach for yield receive in swap transactions in Japanese government
in banks looking to boost profitability by expanding bills, their ability to provide dollar funding in the
lending across borders through an increased matu- yen-dollar market may also be constrained by the
rity mismatch. Systems whose stable funding ratios scarcity of high-quality yen assets in the market;
have improved (UK and German banking systems) about 85 percent of short-term Japanese government
accomplished this only by shrinking dollar loans (Fig- bills are now held by non-Japanese investors and the
ure 1.25, panel 6). Bank of Japan.
Banks Use Foreign Exchange Swaps to Meet Short-Term Several Forces Are Tightening Dollar Funding Conditions
Currency Funding Mismatches, but This Market May Not
Be a Reliable Backstop in Periods of Stress US dollar funding markets have begun to tighten.
Market participants have pointed to a number of
Non-US banks use foreign exchange swap markets factors behind this, including an expected rise in
to meet short-term currency needs. While some banks Treasury bill issuance, US companies changing their
have lengthened the tenor of their swap positions, investment patterns ahead of repatriating offshore
banks still plan to tap swap markets when liquidity is assets, and continued central bank normalization.
tight. Non-US banks’ dependence on cross-currency This tightening can be illustrated by the widening
swaps varies, but two facts stand out: their use has of the dollar LIBOR-OIS spread (the difference
increased overall over the past decade, and Japanese between the London interbank offered rate and the
banks rely relatively heavily on these instruments overnight indexed swap rate) in recent months (Fig-
(Figure 1.26, panel 1). These developments are con- ure 1.26, panel 6).
cerning, because cross-currency basis swap spreads have Moreover, country-specific liquidity regulations,
moved sharply in the past (Figure 1.26, panel 2) and while helping to strengthen national financial systems,
because swap markets have been more volatile than may inadvertently introduce frictions in international
other short-term funding sources such as repo and funding markets. Some regulators have increased
interbank markets (Figure 1.26, panel 3). This suggests restrictions on or surveillance of cross-border intra-
that swap markets may not be a reliable backstop in group liquidity flows in recent years and are extend-
periods of stress. ing the perimeter of their liquidity requirements to
Furthermore, the yen-dollar market—a crucial foreign banks operating in their country (Buch and
source of bank funding—may have become more Goldberg 2015; Gambacorta, van Rixtel, and Schi-
procyclical because of changes in market structure. As affi 2017; Goldberg and Gupta 2013; Reinhardt and
sovereign yields have fallen below policy guaranteed Riddiough 2014).
return targets, Asian life insurers have sought yield The combination of balance sheet vulnerabilities
in dollar-denominated securities. The need to hedge and market tightening could trigger funding prob-
currency risk has driven a surge in demand for swaps lems in the event of market strains. Market turbu-
(Figure 1.26, panel 4). US banks’ dollar swap supply lence may make it more difficult for banks to manage
has not kept up with this growing demand.64 Non- currency gaps in volatile swap markets, possibly
traditional lenders, such as hedge funds and sovereign rendering some banks unable to roll over short-term
wealth funds, have stepped in to meet this demand dollar funding. Banks could then act as an amplifier
and now account for about 70 percent of the supply of market strains if funding pressures were to compel
of foreign currency derivatives to Japanese financial banks to sell assets in a turbulent market to pay their
institutions (Figure 1.26, panel 5). But their appe- liabilities that are due. Funding pressure could also
induce banks to shrink dollar lending to non-US bor-
64The size of US banks’ short-tenor dollar swap supply is esti-
rowers, thus reducing credit availability. Ultimately,
mated by their holdings of claims on the Japanese official sector, as
non-Japanese investors receiving yen in swap transactions typically there is a risk that banks could default on their dollar
invest the yen in short-term Japanese government bills. obligations.
Rapid growth of dollar claims is a key challenge ... ... as is rapid loan growth.
5. Dollar Claims and HQLA Growth 6. Dollar Loans and Deposits Growth
(Percent, annualized growth between 2006 and 2017) (Percent, annualized growth between 2006 and 2017)
30 Bubble si e: 15
Total S 10
dollar claims Bubble si e: JPN
Growth in deposits
20 DE Loans as percent
FRA CAN 5
of total claims
Growth in HQL
0 –10
e li ne Challenged
45-degre DE –15
CHE Challenged
–10 –20
–10 –5 0 5 10 15 –10 –5 0 5 10 15
Growth in total S dollar claims Growth in loans
Sources: Bank financial statements; Bank for International Settlements; Bank of Japan; Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council; S P Global Market
Intelligence; and IMF staff estimates and analysis.
Note: Dollar claims are loans and securities denominated in dollars. Data labels in the figure use International Organi ation for Standardi ation (ISO) country codes.
HQL = high-quality liquid assets; LR = liquidity ratio; LT = long-term; SFR = stable funding ratio; STL = short-term liabilities.
Figure 1.26. Foreign Exchange Swap and Short-Term Bank Funding Markets
Some non-US banks are reliant on cross-currency funding via swaps. Cross-currency basis swap spreads have widened sharply in the past ...
1. US Dollar Cross-Currency Funding Ratio 2. Three-Month Cross-Currency Basis Swaps
(Net cross-currency derivatives as percent of total assets) (Basis points)
50 Non-US banks CAN CHE DEU FRA GBR JPN 0
40 –20
–40
30
–60
20 Sterling
–80
10 Yen
–100
0 –120
–10 Euro
–140
–20 –160
2000 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 2011 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
... and foreign exchange swaps are more volatile than other short-term Demand to hedge foreign currencies by sian financial institutions is
funding sources. increasing ...
3. Sixty-Day Realized Volatility of Three-Month US Dollar Funding Rates 4. Demand for Foreign Exchange Derivatives by Asian Financial Institutions
(Basis points a day) (Billions of US dollars)
10 2,000
FX swap South Korea
9
GC repo Taiwan Province of China
8
OIS Japanese institutional investors 1,500
7 LIBOR Japanese banks
6
5 1,000
4
3
500
2
1
0 0
2011 13 15 17 2010 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
... while the supply is shifting from banks to nontraditional financial US dollar LIBOR-OIS spreads have widened recently.
institutions.
5. Supply of Foreign Exchange Derivatives to Japanese Financial 6. Three-Month LIBOR-OIS Spreads
Institutions (Basis points)
(Billions of US dollars)
1,400 100
Non-Japanese banks US dollar
90
1,200 Non-Japanese, nontraditional lenders Euro
80
Yen
1,000 70
British pound
60
800 50
68% 71%
600 40
61% 75% 70% 65% 30
51% 59%
400 20
32% 29% 10
200 35%
49% 41% 39% 25% 30% 0
0 –10
2010 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 2011 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Sources: Annual reports; Bank for International Settlements; Bank of Japan; Bloomberg Finance L.P.; Financial Supervisory Commission (Taiwan Province of China);
the Korean Life Insurance Association; and IMF staff estimates.
Note: In panels 4 and 5, the latest data are as of September 2017. In panel 4, data for Korea life insurers and the National Pension Service are estimated assuming
100 percent hedging of their foreign investments. For Taiwan Province of China life insurers, the assumption is a 50 percent hedging of their foreign investments.
Data labels in panel 1 use International Organization for Standardization (ISO) country codes. FX swap = foreign exchange swap (average of euro-dollar and
yen-dollar); GC repo = general collateral repurchase agreement; LIBOR = London interbank offered rate; OIS = overnight indexed swaps.
Funding Market Risks Call for Disclosure as Well help investors and analysts better assess international
as Gradual and Coordinated Implementation liquidity and maturity mismatches.
of Regulations • Regulators should develop or maintain
The Basel liquidity framework, centered on the currency-specific liquidity risk frameworks, includ-
LCR, has significantly improved banks’ consolidated ing stress tests, emergency funding strategies, and
balance sheet resilience against short-term funding resolution planning. Coordination and sharing
shocks, and both capital and liquidity regulations have of information among regulators are crucial to
driven considerable improvement in banks’ longer-term reduce any unintended cross-border spillovers from
funding stability. But there is still a need to address jurisdiction-specific liquidity requirements.
risks from foreign currency liquidity mismatches. • Central bank swap lines should be retained to
• Banks should ensure that currency-specific mis- provide foreign exchange liquidity in periods of
matches within individual entities in their banking systemic stress. This should help prevent foreign
groups continue to be managed effectively to reduce currency funding difficulties from spilling over to
the risk of funding strains. other parts of the financial system.
• Consideration should be given to enhancing disclo-
sure of foreign currency funding risks.65 This would Finally, while implementation of the Basel III
package of reforms has helped strengthen the bank-
ing sector, there is still some ground to be covered,
65The Basel Committee’s 2008 Principles for Sound Liquidity and completing the postcrisis reform agenda is vital
Risk Management and Supervision contained guidance on managing (Box 1.5). Ensuring the independence of supervision
liquidity risk, including in different currencies. This guidance
included a principle on the public disclosure of information on will be crucial in this effort, as will be addressing the
liquidity risk. new challenges posed by technology.
This box was prepared by J. Benson Durham and Will Kerry. for more details.
35
2.9
30
Ten-year yield
(right scale) 2.8
25
20
2.7
15
10 2.6
Feb. 1 Feb. 2 Feb. 5 Feb. 6 Feb. 7 Feb. 8 Feb. 9
2018
Box 1.3. The Changing Investor Base in the US Leveraged Loan Market
With the US leveraged loan market experiencing Figure 1.3.1. Nonbanks Have Increased Their
impressive growth over the past several years, the buyer Credit Exposure in the US Leveraged Loan Market
base has shifted further toward institutional investors
The US leveraged loan investor base has shifted further
(Figure 1.3.1, panel 1). Similar to the precrisis period,
toward CLOs and asset managers.
structured financial products, such as collateralized
1. US Leveraged Loan Investor Base
loan obligations (CLOs), are an important source of (Percent of new issuance)
demand for low-quality credit. Since 2014, CLOs CLO Loan mutual funds
have purchased more than half of total issuance of Hedge, distressed, and Insurance companies
leveraged loans. US CLOs accounted for 57 percent of high-yield funds Banks and securities firms
leveraged loans outstanding in 2017, with $495 billion Finance companies
in assets under management. CLO issuance (sale of 2%
CLO tranches to outside investors to fund purchases
of loans) reached $118 billion in 2017, above precrisis 2006 48% 10% 14% 6% 20%
levels. Loan mutual funds (including exchange-traded
funds) are another important institutional investor 6% 1%
class. They have grown from roughly $20 billion
in 2007 to $170 billion in assets in 2017, and now 2017 57% 21% 5% 10%
account for more than 20 percent of the institutional
loan market (Figure 1.3.1, panel 2).
Increased holdings of leveraged loans by institu- 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
tional investors such as loan mutual funds and CLOs
at the expense of banks may affect market dynamics CLO formation and loan fund growth remain robust.
during times of stress. The migration of loan assets 2. US CLO Issuance and Bank Loan Fund Assets under
to open-end loan mutual funds offering daily liquid- Management
(Billions of US dollars)
ity may exacerbate price moves in the event of large
140 CLO issuance (left scale) 180
investor redemptions under distress (Braithwaite and
120 Bank loan mutual fund and 160
others 2014). Furthermore, market participants cite an ETF AUM (right scale) 140
increase in demand for CLO tranches by asset man- 100
120
agers, insurance companies, and pension funds, which 80 100
now account for 45 percent of AAA CLO market
60 80
share. In the years leading up to the financial crisis,
60
AAA CLO tranches were routinely funded in the 40
40
repurchase agreement (repo) market and through other 20 20
means, essentially using financial leverage to boost
0 0
meager AAA spreads. The unwinding of such lever- 2001 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17
aged positions reportedly amplified loan price moves
when investors became uncertain about the safety and Sources: EPFR Global; S&P Leveraged Commentary and Data; and
liquidity of higher-rated structured products. At this IMF staff calculations.
Note: AUM = assets under management; CLO = collateralized loan
point, the use of financial leverage to fund CLO posi- obligation; ETF = exchange-traded fund.
tions appears to be limited. Similarly, investors do not
seem to be widely using total return swaps as a vehicle
for gaining leveraged exposure to the loan market
(another common instrument employed in 2006–07).
This box was prepared by Dong He and Ashraf Khan. 1See CPMI (2018).
———. 2018. “Macroeconomic Developments and Prospects Laeven, Luc, and Fabian Valencia. 2012. “Systemic Banking
in Low-Income Developing Countries.” IMF Policy Paper, Crises Database: An Update.” IMF Working Paper 12/163,
Washington, DC. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). Lane, Philip R., and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti. 2007. “The
2013. Principles of Liquidity Risk Management for Collective External Wealth of Nations Mark II: Revised and Extended
Investment Schemes. Madrid. Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 1970–2004.”
———. 2017. “IOSCO Board Communication on Concerns Journal of International Economics 73 (2): 223–50.
Related to Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs).” Madrid. https:// Li, Canlin, and Min Wei. 2013. “Term Structure Modeling with
www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS485.pdf. Supply Factors and the Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale Asset
———. 2018. Recommendations for Liquidity Risk Manage- Purchase Programs.” International Journal of Central Banking
ment for Collective Investment Schemes. Madrid. 9 (1): 3–39.
Kim, Sooji, Matthew C. Plosser, and Joao A. C. Santos. 2017. Nakamoto, Satoshi. 2008. “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic
“Macroprudential Policy and the Revolving Door of Risk: Cash System.” https://bitcoin.org/en/bitcoin-paper.
Lessons from Leveraged Lending Guidance.” Staff Report Reinhardt, Dennis, and Steven Riddiough. 2014. “The Two Faces
815, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. of Cross-Border Banking Flows: An Investigation into the Links
King, Michael, and Dagfinn Rime. 2010. “The $4 Trillion Ques- between Global Risk, Arms-Length Funding and Internal Capi-
tion: What Explains FX Growth since the 2007 Survey?” BIS tal Markets.” Bank of England Working Paper 498, London.
Quarterly Review (December). Sahay, Ratna, Vivek Arora, Thanos Arvanitis, Hamid Faruqee,
McCauley, Robert, Patrick McGuire, and Goetz von Peter. 2010. Papa N’Diaye, Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli, and an IMF
“The Architecture of Global Banking: From International to Team. 2014. “Emerging Market Volatility: Lessons from the
Multinational.” BIS Quarterly Review (March). Taper Tantrum.” IMF Staff Discussion Note 14/09, Interna-
McCauley, Robert, and Goetz von Peter. 2012. “After the tional Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Global Financial Crisis: From International to Multi- Wright, Jonathan H. 2011. “Term Premia and Inflation Uncer-
national Banking?” Journal of Economics and Business tainty: Empirical Evidence from an International Panel
64 (1): 7–23. Dataset.” The American Economic Review 101 (4): 1514–34.
Summary
T
he prolonged period of loose financial conditions in recent years has raised concerns that financial
intermediaries and investors in search of yield may have extended too much credit to risky borrowers,
potentially jeopardizing financial stability down the road. These concerns are related to recent evidence
for selected countries that periods of low interest rates and easy financial conditions may lead to a decline
in lending standards and increased risk taking.
Against this backdrop, this chapter takes a comprehensive look at the evolution of the riskiness of corporate
credit allocation—that is, the extent to which riskier firms receive credit relative to less risky ones, its relationship
to the strength of credit expansions, and its relevance to financial stability analysis for a large number of advanced
and emerging market economies since 1991. The chapter focuses on the allocation of credit across firms rather
than the aggregate volume of credit or credit growth.
The chapter finds that the riskiness of credit allocation rises during periods of fast credit expansion, especially
when loose lending standards or easy financial conditions occur concurrently. Globally, the riskiness of credit
allocation increased in the years preceding the global financial crisis and peaked shortly before its onset. It declined
sharply after the crisis and rebounded to its historical average in 2016, the latest available year for globally compa-
rable data. As financial conditions loosened in 2017, the riskiness of credit allocation might have risen further.
An increase in the riskiness of credit allocation signals heightened downside risks to GDP growth and a higher
probability of banking crises and banking sector stress, over and above the previously documented signals provided
by credit growth. Thus, a riskier allocation of corporate credit is an independent source of financial vulnerability.
The results highlight the importance of monitoring the riskiness of credit allocation as an integral part of
macro-financial surveillance. The new measures constructed in this chapter are simple to compute, rely mostly
on firm-level financial statement data that are available in many countries, and can be readily replicated for use
in macro-financial surveillance. For this purpose, policymakers would benefit from collecting these data in a
timely manner.
The chapter shows that various policy and institutional settings may help policymakers mitigate the increase in
the riskiness of credit allocation that takes place during relatively fast credit expansions. A tightening of the macro-
prudential policy stance, greater independence of the supervisory authority from banks, a smaller government
footprint in the corporate sector, and greater minority shareholder protection are all related to a smaller increase in
the riskiness of corporate credit allocation during these episodes.
17
1991
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
2000
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
ing financial stability down the road. As described in
Chapter 1, persistently easy financial conditions may
Source: IMF staff estimates.
lead to a continued search for yield with too much Note: higher level of the financial conditions index (FCI) means financial
money chasing too few yielding assets, pushing inves- conditions are tighter. The sample comprises 41 advanced and emerging market
economies. For methodology and variables included in the FCI, refer to nnex 3.2
tors beyond their traditional risk tolerance into riskier of the October 2017 Global Financial Stability Report.
investments. Indeed, the share of bond issuance by
nonfinancial corporations with low ratings (high-yield
and BBB-rated bonds) has rebounded from its crisis credit relative to less risky firms. Empirical studies dating
trough in the United States and is at or near an all-time to the mid-1990s for the United States provide evidence
high in the euro area and the United Kingdom (Fig- that the riskiness of corporate credit allocation increases
ure 2.2). At the same time, the October 2017 Global during economic expansions and declines during
Financial Stability Report (GFSR) highlighted that some recessions (for example, Lang and Nakamura 1995;
indicators of nonfinancial corporate vulnerability had Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1996).2 More recently,
picked up in several major economies. Although greater Greenwood and Hanson (2013) offer further evidence
risk taking by financial intermediaries could be part of a of such behavior in the United States during the past
healthy economic recovery, it may breed vulnerabilities few decades: the riskiness of corporate credit allocation
that could harm future growth if excessive. rises when credit growth is stronger, the short-term
Country-level studies have documented that the com- Treasury bill yield is lower, the term spread is lower,
position of corporate credit flows changes with financial or high-yield bond returns are higher. Corroborating
conditions and that the riskiness of corporate credit evidence comes from Spain, where riskier firms had
allocation is procyclical. The riskiness of corporate credit nearly the same access to the bank loan market as less
allocation is the extent to which riskier firms receive risky firms in the years preceding the global financial
crisis, but significantly less access during the crisis and
early recovery period (Banco de España 2017). In the
Prepared by a staff team led by Jérôme Vandenbussche and com-
posed of Luis Brandão-Marques, Qianying Chen, Oksana Khadarina, euro area, riskier firms increased their borrowing more
and Peichu Xie under the general guidance of Claudio Raddatz than less risky firms following the rally in euro area sov-
and Dong He. The chapter benefited from contributions by Divya ereign bonds triggered by the European Central Bank’s
Kirti and Jiaqi Li. Claudia Cohen and Breanne Rajkumar provided
editorial assistance.
1See IMF (2016) and the October 2015 GFSR for recent analyses 2A decline in the riskiness of credit allocation during recessions
of the evolution of corporate debt across countries. has sometimes been referred to as a “flight to quality.”
announcement in 2012 that it stood ready to conduct Figure 2.2. Low-Rated Nonfinancial Corporate Bond Issuance
Outright Monetary Transactions (Acharya and others Has Been High in Some Advanced Economies
(Percent of total nonfinancial corporate bond issuance)
2016). Analyses of granular data from Spain and the
United States also reveal a positive association between Euro area Japan United Kingdom United States
low short-term interest rates and the probability of 80
extending loans to risky borrowers (Jiménez and others
70
2014; Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, and Suarez 2017).
Against this backdrop, this chapter takes a com- 60
prehensive look at the evolution of the riskiness of
corporate credit allocation, its relationship to the size 50
of credit expansions, and its relevance to financial
stability analysis. 40
17
1997
98
99
2000
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
or default risk may be more or less suitable to differ-
ent market and data environments. For this reason,
Sources: Dealogic; and IMF staff estimates.
the chapter discusses four options for measuring the Note: “Low-rated” refers to high-yield and BBB-rated bonds; the simple three-year
riskiness of corporate credit allocation—henceforth, moving average is shown. Shaded areas indicate periods during which global real
the “riskiness of credit allocation.” In constructing GDP growth was less than 2.5 percent.
more likely when public debt is high. However, they show that high conjecture that the compositional change in the supply of credit
levels of public debt tend to exacerbate the effects of private sector with respect to risk is more important for financial stability than the
deleveraging after financial crises, as does IMF (2016). Recent papers volume of credit. Kirti (2018) shows that an increase in the share of
also suggest that credit spreads—the extra yield paid by bonds issued high-yield bond issuance during a credit boom predicts lower future
by firms with low credit ratings relative to firms with the best credit growth (see also Box 2.4).
ratings—are particularly low before a financial crisis (Krishnamurthy 6For a conceptual framework of financial stability monitoring, see
and Muir 2017). López-Salido, Stein, and Zakrajšek (2017) provide Adrian, Covitz, and Liang (2015).
• How does the riskiness of credit allocation relate to The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows:
measures of financial conditions over time? Does it The chapter first lays out a stylized conceptual frame-
generally rise during periods of high credit growth? work for macro-financial shocks and the riskiness of
Is it more likely to increase when high credit growth credit allocation. It then describes the construction of
is associated with strong risk appetite? the new measures, their evolution at the global level
• To what extent does the riskiness of credit allocation and in selected economies, their cyclical properties,
help predict financial sector stress and downside and their relationship to various indicators of financial
risks to GDP growth? How far in advance can it conditions. Next, the chapter turns to the empirical
predict these occurrences? Do the predictive prop- analysis of the relationship between the new indicators
erties of the riskiness of credit allocation reinforce and future financial instability as well as downside risks
those of credit growth documented in the exist- to GDP growth. The last core section further explores
ing literature? determinants of the riskiness of credit allocation and
• How is the dynamic of the riskiness of credit alloca- its cyclicality, including macroprudential policies and
tion affected by the regulatory, supervisory, and legal aspects of the supervisory, legal, and institutional
environments? What is the link between the cyclical- frameworks. The last section concludes and presents
ity of the riskiness of credit allocation and common policy implications.
indicators of banking sector soundness?
Fluctuations in credit quantity and the riskiness of Figure 2.3. Key Drivers of the Riskiness of Credit Allocation
credit allocation can also be driven by variations over
time in investor beliefs, risk appetite, or perceptions Corporate net worth Risk appetite
of economic uncertainty, which directly affect credit
spreads and expected volatility. In good times, those
most optimistic about asset values can borrow exten- Price of risk
sively to acquire these assets, thereby pushing up asset
prices. Following bad news, uncertainty and volatility
Lending standards
rise, leading lenders to require higher margins, trig-
gering deleveraging and fire sales (Geanakoplos 2010).
To the extent that optimism is positively correlated Credit constraints
with risk, this mechanism can also generate procyclical
variations in the riskiness of credit allocation.8 It is also (In a boom)
possible that in good times investors form unduly opti- Credit demand Credit supply
determining the riskiness of credit allocation and its a positive macroeconomic or financial shock, which strengthens the
asset side of banks’ balance sheets. Adrian and Shin (2014) show that
cyclicality through several channels. Banks gather the Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) model translates into a model of
and generate information about the creditworthiness procyclicality.
of potential borrowers and thus can provide credit 10Traditional portfolio allocation models predict that a higher
macro-financial stability. Directing an increased share of borrower vulnerability: the leverage ratio, the inter-
lending to riskier firms may be fully rational and prof- est coverage ratio (ICR), and the debt-to-profit ratio
itable and reflect the normal functioning of a healthy (or debt overhang). All three ratios have a strong
financial system in some phases of the business and monotonic relationship with credit ratings (Moody’s
credit cycles, or it may reflect improvements in inter- 2006). The ICR is also sometimes used as a proxy
mediaries’ risk-management technologies. Alternatively, for a credit rating (for example, Damodaran 2014).
it may reflect poorer screening of borrowers, excessive A market-based indicator of credit risk, the expected
risk taking (or neglect of risk), and misallocation of default frequency (EDF), is also used.14
financial resources and may therefore have widespread • Starting from information on a firm-level vulnera-
detrimental consequences on the soundness of financial bility indicator, a raw measure is computed as the
intermediaries and the economic performance of the average of this indicator among firms whose debt
economy down the road.11 Furthermore, in the latter (the sum of loans and bonds) increases the most
case, higher riskiness is much more a reflection of com- minus the average computed among firms whose
positional shifts in lending toward riskier firms than a debt increases the least—or declines the most. This
reflection of an aggregate buildup of leverage. raw measure is then transformed into the final
measure by subtracting its country-specific mean to
remove any influence of the country-specific sectoral
The Riskiness of Credit Allocation and Its composition and to ensure both cross-country and
Evolution across Countries cross-measure comparability. An increase in the mea-
A first step in the chapter’s analysis is the construc- sure signals that the vulnerability of firms getting
tion of new measures capturing the riskiness of corpo- relatively more credit has risen relative to the vulner-
rate credit allocation. ability of firms getting relatively less credit. A pos-
• The riskiness of credit allocation cannot be assessed itive (negative) value of the measure indicates that
from aggregate macroeconomic or financial data the riskiness of credit allocation is above (below) its
because they do not reflect the heterogeneity of country sample average. Box 2.1 provides a detailed
firms. The chapter builds on work by Greenwood explanation of how the measure is constructed and
and Hanson (2013) to construct such new measures how to interpret its magnitude.15
based on various indicators of firm vulnerability
for a set of 55 economies (26 advanced econo- The evolution of the riskiness of credit allocation
mies and 29 emerging market economies) over the across countries suggests clear global patterns (Fig-
1991–2016 period using data for listed firms.12 ure 2.4). Its dynamic at the global level is broadly the
• Four firm-level vulnerability indicators are consid- same across the four borrower vulnerability indicators
ered to construct the measures. Methodologies for used. Starting from elevated levels in the late 1990s,
assessing default risk generally rely on accounting it fell in 2000–04 in the aftermath of the Asian
information or on a combination of accounting and Russian crises and of the burst of the dot.com
and market information.13 In the chapter, several equity bubble, reached its historical low in 2004, rose
common accounting-based ratios are used to capture steeply during 2004–08, and hit a peak at the onset
ties (see Farhi and Werning 2016 and references therein). designed sophisticated rating methodologies that also incorporate
12Data are sourced from the Worldscope database, which provides judgment (for example, Standard and Poor’s 2013).
a rich set of annual financial variables for listed firms. Annex 2.1 14In their study of credit quality in the United States, Greenwood
provides details on the sample and explanations on the data and Hanson (2013) focus the core of their analysis on the EDF
cleaning process. and demonstrate the robustness of their result when using leverage
13Scoring methods are based on a small set of accounting ratios. or the ICR. Acharya and others (2016) measure riskiness using the
These include the Z-score (Altman 1968, 2013) and the O-score (Ohl- ICR. Banco de España (2017) includes leverage and the ICR in its
son 1980). Other methods add market-based variables and use more small set of indicators aimed at capturing financial soundness. See
advanced statistical techniques to compute relative weights (Shumway Annex 2.1 for a precise definition of the firm-level indicators used in
2001; Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi 2011). Other approaches have the chapter.
instead focused on using Merton’s (1974) option pricing formula 15While it is challenging to establish a “neutral” level for the risk-
as the basis for modeling to construct measures of expected default iness of credit allocation, its average over an extended period could
frequency (such as Moody’s KMV model). Credit rating agencies have be a good proxy.
Figure 2.4. The Riskiness of Credit Allocation Is Cyclical at the Global Level
(Index; global median)
of the global financial crisis. It then declined sharply • The dynamics in the United States (Figure 2.5,
over the next two years and was slightly below its panel 1) and Japan (Figure 2.5, panel 2) are very
precrisis level at the end of 2016, the latest available similar in both cyclicality and magnitude.17 The
data point. most recent period (2014–16), however, suggests
This global dynamic is reflected at the country level, a divergence: the riskiness of credit allocation
with some country-specific nuances. Figure 2.5 shows decreased in the United States to a relatively low
the evolution of the riskiness of credit allocation in level, while in Japan it remained at a level that is
eight major economies using the leverage-based mea- relatively high in historical perspective.18
sure and the EDF-based measure during 1995–2016. • Figure 2.5, panels 3 and 4, show contrasting devel-
The two measures display similar patterns in the first opments in two of the largest euro area countries.
six countries, but sometimes provide contrasting sig- Spain (Figure 2.5, panel 3) had a credit boom
nals in the last two countries, documenting a degree of
complementarity across measures in some countries or 17The pattern in the United States closely resembles that in Green-
wood and Hanson (2013). The decline in Japan in the first half of
periods:16
the 2000s is consistent with the findings of Fukuda and Nakamura
(2011) in their study of zombie lending.
18In the United States, corporate leverage increased across the
0.5 0.5
0.0 0.0
–0.5 –0.5
–1.0 –1.0
1995
96
97
98
99
2000
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
1995
96
97
98
99
2000
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
3. Spain 4. Germany
2.5 1.0
1.5
0.5
0.5
0.0
–0.5
–0.5
–1.5
–2.5 –1.0
1995
96
97
98
99
2000
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
1995
96
97
98
99
2000
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
5. India 6. China
1.2 1.2
0.8 0.8
0.4 0.4
0.0 0.0
–0.4 –0.4
–0.8 –0.8
–1.2 –1.2
1995
96
97
98
99
2000
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
1995
96
97
98
99
2000
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
1.5
0.5
0.5
0.0
–0.5
–0.5
–1.5
–2.5 –1.0
1995
96
97
98
99
2000
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
1995
96
97
98
99
2000
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s, which was directions in recent years, with the leverage-based
followed by a deep recession during the global measure at a low level at the end of 2016. As in
financial crisis and the euro area sovereign debt Korea, there is a disconnect between the dynam-
crisis. Measures of the riskiness of credit alloca- ics of the two measures for the United Kingdom
tion for this country reflect these developments (Figure 2.5, panel 8) during the 1990s and the
quite well: a steep rise in riskiness took place in 2010s. This disconnect could be due to the effect
the mid- to late 1990s, leading to very high levels of the volatility of firm-level equity prices on the
of riskiness until the crisis of 2008, which trig- EDF-based measure but is a little puzzling given the
gered a sudden and large fall of the indicator. This depth of financial markets in that country. None-
pattern is consistent with the findings of Banco de theless, the two measures point to rising riskiness of
España (2017) mentioned in the introduction to credit allocation before the global financial crisis in
the chapter. By contrast, variations in the riskiness Korea and the United Kingdom.
of credit allocation in Germany (Figure 2.5, panel
4), a country that did not have a credit boom These patterns raise several questions regarding the
during the 20-year period, have remained within cyclicality of the riskiness of credit allocation. Does it
the same narrower range as the United States and systematically rise when GDP growth and credit
Japan, and the measure has moved into positive growth are strong? If so, does this increase depend on
territory in recent years, suggesting a higher level other measures of financial conditions that can signal
of risk taking. expansions in credit supply, such as credit spreads or
• The evolution of the riskiness of credit allocation a broad financial conditions index? To shed light on
in India (Figure 2.5, panel 5) has broadly followed these questions, the econometric analysis that follows
global patterns, and the measure was at a relatively focuses on the relationship between the riskiness of
low level in 2016. The synchronization of China credit allocation, the state of the business cycle, and
(Figure 2.5, panel 6) with global developments is financial conditions using standard cross-country
weaker—peaks and troughs appear to occur with panel regressions (see Annex 2.1 for data sources and
a two- to three-year lag. The finding of a peak in Annex 2.2 for details on methodology).
2009–10 is consistent with recent evidence that the Periods of faster economic and credit expansion are
implementation of a large stimulus plan beginning associated with riskier credit allocations. Regression
at the end of 2008 led to a misallocation of credit analysis indicates that the riskiness of credit alloca-
(Cong and others 2017). Most of the recent liter- tion is procyclical: it increases when GDP growth
ature on credit allocation in China has focused on or changes in the domestic credit-to-GDP ratio are
the link between credit and firm-level productivity stronger. The first finding is consistent with standard
of capital (or profitability) rather than firm-level financial accelerator mechanisms, and the second
credit risk. Using China as an example, Box 2.2 points to mechanisms in which credit supply shocks
illustrates how a set of new profitability-based affect macro-financial outcomes through a risk-taking
indicators, constructed similarly to the new vulnera- channel. The association of credit expansion with
bility indicators discussed in the core of this chapter, greater riskiness of credit allocation is statistically
can provide additional insights into the quality of significant for all four measures. A one standard devia-
credit allocation. tion increase in the change of the credit-to-GDP ratio
• Developments in Korea (Figure 2.5, panel 7) (equivalent to an increase of 5.5 percentage points) is
highlight that only the accounting-based measure associated with an increase in the riskiness of credit
indicated high riskiness before this country’s crisis allocation of 0.12–0.25 standard deviation, depending
in the late 1990s. The EDF-based measure, con- on the exact measure (Figure 2.6). Results are sim-
structed using equity market information, does not ilar for advanced and emerging market economies,
signal any potential problem related to the riskiness although the dispersion of the estimated relationship
of credit allocation at that time, suggesting that is larger in the latter, most likely because of their
equity market investors were too optimistic and that smaller sample size.
accounting-based measures better reflected funda- The association between larger credit expansions
mentals. Also, the two measures point in different and riskier allocations is stronger when financial con-
Figure 2.6. The Riskiness of Credit Allocation Rises When a Figure 2.7. The Association between the Size of a Credit
Credit Expansion Is Stronger Expansion and the Riskiness of Credit Allocation Is Greater
(Standard deviations of the riskiness of credit allocation) When Lending Standards and Financial Conditions Are Looser
(Standard deviations of the riskiness of credit allocation)
0.30
0.45
Loose conditions Tight conditions
0.25 0.40
0.35
0.20
0.30
0.25
0.15
0.20
0.10 0.15
0.10
0.05
0.05
0.00
0.00
All economies Advanced economies Emerging market –0.05
economies Lending Financial Corporate VIX
standards conditions index spreads
Sources: Worldscope; and IMF staff estimates.
Note: The figure shows the range of impact of a contemporaneous increase in the Sources: Worldscope; and IMF staff estimates.
change in the credit-to-GDP ratio by one standard deviation on the four (leverage-, Note: The figure shows the range of impact of a contemporaneous increase in the
interest coverage ratio–, debt overhang–, and expected default frequency–based) change in the credit-to-GDP ratio by one standard deviation on the four (leverage-,
measures of the riskiness of credit allocation. Dark-colored (light-colored) bars interest coverage ratio–, debt overhang–, and expected default frequency–based)
indicate that the effects are statistically significant at the 10 percent level or higher measures of the riskiness of credit allocation when lending standards or financial
for four (three) measures out of four. See Annex 2.2 for details on methodology. conditions (financial conditions index, corporate spreads, and I ) are “loose” or
“tight.” The level of a variable is defined as loose (tight) when it is equal to the
25th percentile (75th percentile) of its distribution. Dark-colored (light-colored)
bars indicate that the effects are statistically significant at the 10 percent level or
higher for four (one) measures out of four. See Annex 2.2 for details on
methodology. VIX = Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index.
ditions are loose. A credit expansion accompanied by
loose financial conditions or loose lending standards is
more likely to be driven by shifts in credit supply and
higher risk appetite of financial intermediaries. Regres- of financial conditions on the riskiness of credit allo-
sion analysis provides evidence of such a channel: cation (Box 2.3).19
both variables amplify the cyclicality of the riskiness These trends and properties of the riskiness of
of credit allocation. Specific components of financial credit allocation are generally confirmed when using
conditions appear to matter more than others. In a different sample that covers both listed and unlisted
particular, low corporate credit spreads (or high global firms. The robustness of the results discussed above is
risk appetite, proxied by the Chicago Board Options checked by constructing similar measures using data
Exchange Volatility Index [VIX]) during credit that cover a wider universe of firms (both listed and
expansions result in allocations that are riskier than unlisted), but for a smaller set of countries and over
those observed when the expansions are accompanied fewer years.20 The similarity is very reassuring consid-
by high credit spreads (or low global risk appetite) ering the significant differences in the cross-sectional
(Figure 2.7). Furthermore, a higher stock market coverage of the two databases.
price-to-book ratio is associated with a higher level of
the riskiness of credit allocation. Additional analysis
studying the joint dynamics of the riskiness of credit 19Measurement of these effects assumes that the financial condi-
allocation, financial conditions, credit expansions, and tions index responds contemporaneously to all other variables, while
the riskiness of credit allocation responds with a lag.
economic growth using a panel vector autoregression 20This robustness analysis is based on the Orbis database and
confirms these findings and shows a significant effect covers only 50 economies from 2000. See Annex 2.1 for details.
Figure 2.8. The Riskiness of Credit Allocation Rises to a High Level before a Financial Crisis, and Falls to a
Low Level Thereafter
(Index; median across all crisis episodes; 11-year window)
Sources: Laeven and Valencia (forthcoming); Worldscope; and IMF staff estimates.
Note: Systemic banking crises are defined as in Laeven and alencia (forthcoming). The crisis occurs at time 0. Data are demeaned at the country level. The panels
show the median across all crisis countries in a balanced panel. The riskiness measures are constructed as explained in Box 2.1. Median leverage (EDF) refers to the
median of the firm-level leverage (EDF) variable. Median ICR refers to the negative of the median of the firm-level ICR. Median debt overhang refers to the negative
of the median of the EBITD -to-debt ratio. EBITD = earnings before interest payments, taxes, depreciation, and amorti ation; EDF = expected default frequency;
ICR = interest coverage ratio.
The Riskiness of Credit Allocation and Information on the econometric framework is pro-
Macro-Financial Stability vided in Annex 2.3.
Does the riskiness of credit allocation help predict The riskiness of credit allocation has a very clear
episodes of financial instability and downside risks to inverted-U shape around systemic financial crisis epi-
growth? To answer these questions, the econometric sodes. The dynamic of the riskiness of credit allocation
analysis builds on the existing empirical literature on in the period at the start of a crisis is unambiguous: it
the determinants of risks to the financial sector and rises gradually during the five years preceding the crisis,
real activity, and augments the literature’s specifica- reaches a relatively high level, and then falls following
tions with the riskiness of credit allocation. Specif- the onset of the crisis. This is true regardless of the
ically, using cross-country regressions, this section firm-level indicator chosen to construct the riskiness
analyzes whether this new measure constitutes an measure (Figure 2.8). Interestingly, the riskiness of credit
early warning indicator of a systemic financial crisis allocation signals a forthcoming crisis much better than
and of banking sector stress, and whether it is a
predictor of low realizations of future GDP growth.21 age, and to the inclusion of a measure of the high-yield share of bond
issuance. The results, however, are weaker if the post-2008 period is
21The results described in this section are robust to the inclusion of excluded from the sample. The analysis of predictive performance is
standard corporate vulnerability indicators, such as median firm lever- in-sample (all available observations are used to estimate the models).
Figure 2.9. Higher Riskiness of Credit Allocation Signals Figure 2.10. Higher Riskiness of Credit Allocation Signals
Greater Risk of a Systemic Banking Crisis Greater Risk of Banking Sector Stress
(Proportional increase in the odds of a banking crisis) (Proportional increase in the odds of banking sector stress)
5.0 2.5
2.0
4.5
1.5
1.0
4.0
0.5
3.5 0.0
Leverage Interest Debt overhang Expected default t t+1 t+2 t+3
coverage ratio frequency
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Source: IMF staff estimates. Note: The figure shows the multiplicative effect of a one standard deviation
Note: The figure shows the multiplicative effect of a one standard deviation increase of the riskiness of credit allocation on the odds of bank equity stress in a
increase in the riskiness of credit allocation on the odds of a systemic banking time window from t to t + h, in which h = 0, 1, 2, 3. Bank equity stress is defined
crisis, as defined in Laeven and alencia (forthcoming). See nnex 2.3 for as annual bank equity excess return over the short-term government bond yield
methodology. that is lower than the country-specific mean by at least one standard deviation.
Each bar shows the minimum and maximum effects across the four (leverage-,
interest coverage ratio–, debt overhang–, and expected default frequency–based)
measures. Dark-colored (light-colored) bars indicate that the effects are
the underlying conventional corporate vulnerability indi- statistically significant at the 10 percent level or higher for four (two) measures out
of four. See nnex 2.3 for methodology.
cators when considered individually (see the blue lines
in Figure 2.8): these more traditional indicators pick up
significantly only when the crisis has already struck.
The riskiness of credit allocation also helps fore-
Regression analysis confirms that a greater riski-
cast banking sector equity stress up to three years in
ness of credit allocation increases the odds of a future
advance. Because the identification and timing of the
systemic banking crisis (Figure 2.9). The effect in the
occurrence of a systemic financial crisis are somewhat
crisis model is measured in addition to the effect of the
subjective and crises are rare events, it is useful to seek
change in credit volumes, which has been emphasized
confirmation of the results obtained in a crisis model
in the literature, and the effect of financial conditions.
by using a banking sector equity stress model for
Thus, for a given size of credit expansion, a greater
which the number of events is larger and the timing is
riskiness of credit allocation implies a higher proba-
completely objective.23 Regression analysis shows that
bility of a financial crisis. A one standard deviation
the riskiness of credit allocation adds predictive power
increase in the riskiness measure increases the odds of a
to such a model for any horizon from zero to three
crisis by a factor of about four.22 The gain in explana-
years (Figure 2.10). A one standard deviation increase
tory power when adding the riskiness variable, between
in the riskiness of credit allocation increases the odds
11 and 25 percentage points, is also reasonably large.
by a factor of 1.3 to 2, making banking sector stress up
22The odds of a crisis refer to the ratio of the probability of
observing a crisis to the probability of not observing it. For instance, 23A banking sector equity stress episode occurs when the
in the sample used in the estimation, the probability of observing annual excess equity return of the banking sector is lower than
a crisis is about 5 percent. Thus, the probability of not observing a the country-specific mean by at least one standard deviation. Such
crisis is about 95 percent, and the odds of a crisis are 5.3 percent episodes are relevant for macro-financial stability because they are typ-
(100*5/95). A fourfold increase from this level would raise the odds ically followed by significant negative credit supply shocks, which, in
to 21 percent. turn, can translate into declines in economic activity and employment.
Figure 2.11. Higher Riskiness of Credit Allocation Signals Higher Downside Risks to GDP Growth
(Percentage points of GDP growth)
0.0 0.0
–0.2 –0.2
–0.4 –0.4
–0.6 –0.6
–0.8 –0.8
–1.0 –1.0
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3
0.0 0.0
–0.2 –0.2
–0.4 –0.4
–0.6 –0.6
–0.8 –0.8
–1.0 –1.0
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3
to two times more likely, depending on the measure financial conditions. The effect on the downside
and the horizon. risks to growth is significant when measures of
A riskier credit allocation signals downside risks the riskiness of credit allocation are constructed
to growth in the short to medium term. The analysis based on a sample that covers unlisted as well as
examines the predictive power of the riskiness of listed firms.
credit allocation on two percentiles (20th and 50th) The effects of a riskier credit allocation complement
of cumulative real GDP growth one to three years those of credit expansions on growth-at-risk over the
into the future.24 The riskiness of credit allocation medium term. One might expect that credit booms
is strongly related to the median and left tail of the that are accompanied by a rise in the riskiness of credit
growth distribution over all horizons. In line with allocation pose stronger downside risks to growth than
the findings described previously on banking sector those that are not. The analysis indicates that they do.
stress risk, the new measure provides information on This simultaneous rise in credit volumes and riskiness
downside risks to growth over the short to medium signals elevated risks to growth two and three years
term (Figure 2.11). These effects are in addition to ahead. This finding is consistent with recent evidence
those of changes in the credit-to-GDP ratio and showing that an increase in the high-yield share of
bond issuance in advanced economies during credit
24The approach builds on Adrian, Boyarchenko, and Giannone booms is associated with lower future mean GDP
(2016) and Chapter 3 of the October 2017 GFSR. growth (see Box 2.4 and Kirti 2018).
Figure 2.12. The Association of the Riskiness of Credit Allocation with Downside Risks to GDP Growth Depends on the Size
of Credit Expansion
(Percentage points of GDP growth)
0.0 0.0
–0.5 –0.5
–1.0 –1.0
–1.5 –1.5
–2.0 –2.0
–2.5 –2.5
Low credit growth Mean credit growth High credit growth Low credit growth Mean credit growth High credit growth
Conversely, during credit contractions or relatively selected aspects of the supervisory, legal, and institu-
soft credit expansions, a higher riskiness of credit allo- tional frameworks—come into play. The determinants
cation does not increase downside risks to future GDP of the level and credit cyclicality of the riskiness of
growth. When the change in the credit-to-GDP ratio credit allocation vary somewhat depending on which
is well below its historical average—for example, in the underlying firm-level vulnerability indicator is used.
aftermath of a recession or a creditless recovery—the The analysis that follows focuses on determinants
association between higher riskiness of credit allocation whose robustness is apparent across all four measures.25
and downside risks to GDP growth is weaker, and its The quantitative effects of these structural determinants
sign can reverse if the credit expansion is sufficiently on the cyclicality of the riskiness of credit allocation
weak. Figure 2.12 shows that at a three-year horizon, are summarized in Figure 2.13.
when the change in the credit-to-GDP ratio is low by Bank capital appears to have little significant effect
historical standards, an increase in risk taking has no on the cyclicality of the riskiness of credit alloca-
significant impact on downside risks to growth. This tion. Recent empirical studies on how bank capital
finding indicates that a rise in the riskiness of credit
allocation is harmless in some phases of the cycle. 25The effect on the credit cyclicality of the riskiness of credit allo-
affects the relationship between financial conditions Figure 2.13. The Association of a Credit Expansion with the
and credit flows to risky firms provide contrasting Riskiness of Credit Allocation Depends on Policy and
results.26 This literature indicates that the link between Institutional Settings
(Standard deviations of the riskiness of credit allocation)
credit conditions, firm riskiness, and bank risk taking
is likely to depend on country circumstances. There- 0.4
Lower setting Higher setting
fore, it may not be surprising that only suggestive
evidence is found that conventional measures of 0.3
banking system capitalization or leverage matter for 0.2
the cyclicality of the riskiness of credit allocation:
greater buffers are generally associated with greater 0.1
cyclicality of the riskiness of credit allocation, but not
0.0
in a robust manner.
However, macroprudential policy tightening reduces –0.1
the cyclicality of the new vulnerability measure. An
–0.2
increase in regulatory capital requirements curtails
domestic banks’ risk-bearing capacity by reducing the –0.3
availability of free capital that banks can use to provide
–0.4
loans. Regression analysis confirms that tightening
of the macroprudential policy stance dampens the –0.5
increase in the riskiness of credit allocation associated Leverage Ceilings and Supervisor Rareness of Minority
ratio penalties on independence state-owned shareholder
with faster credit growth. The result holds for changes constraint credit growth enterprises protection
in minimum leverage ratio and changes in ceilings
and penalties related to credit growth.27 Increases in Sources: Worldscope; and IMF staff estimates.
Note: The figure shows the range of impact of a contemporaneous increase in the
capital conservation buffers also reduce the level of the change in the credit-to-GDP ratio by one standard deviation on the four (leverage-,
riskiness of credit allocation. The capital conservation interest coverage ratio–, debt overhang–, and expected default frequency–based)
measures of the riskiness of credit allocation when policy and institutional settings
buffer and the minimum leverage ratio are policy (leverage ratio constraint, ceiling and penalties on bank credit growth, indepen-
instruments that were introduced as part of the regu- dence of supervisory authority from banks, rareness of state-owned enterprises,
and minority shareholder protection) are at a “lower” setting or a “higher” setting.
latory changes following the global financial crisis. The A lower (higher) setting for macroprudential policy means no policy change (one
findings of the chapter thus suggest that postcrisis reg- tightening action during the year). A lower (higher) setting for the other variables
ulatory tightening has had an impact on the evolution means a level equal to the 25th percentile (75th percentile) of their distribution.
Dark-colored (light-colored) bars indicate that the effects are statistically
of the riskiness of credit allocation and has played a significant at the 10 percent level or higher for four (three) measures out of four.
Empty bars indicate that the effects are statistically insignificant at the 10 percent
level for the four measures. See Annex 2.2 for details on the methodology.
26On the one hand, Jiménez and others (2014) show that in Spain
others (2017) and Uluc and Wieladek (2017) provide evidence that mented before the global financial crisis in the sample. Changes to
tightening capital or provisioning requirements can result in greater ceilings and penalties related to credit growth occur in only four
risk taking by banks. countries in the sample.
The sensitivity of the riskiness of credit allocation to policymakers engage in efforts to collect these granular
domestic credit growth also responds to some aspects data as swiftly as possible.30
of the institutional and legal environments. A smaller Various institutional and policy settings may
government footprint in the nonfinancial corporate help policymakers tame the increase in the riskiness
sector reduces the cyclicality of the new measure. of credit allocation that occurs during large credit
Greater protection of minority shareholders has an expansions. A more independent banking supervisor
effect in the same direction. This latter finding high- can better exert control over lending and origina-
lights the importance of sound corporate governance tion standards during good times, when risks appear
frameworks for financial stability, as documented in contained. Sounder corporate governance standards—
Chapter 3 of the October 2016 GFSR. which may reduce the ability of vulnerable firms’
managers to “gamble for resurrection” or engage in pet
projects—should be promoted. And several macro-
Conclusions and Policy Implications prudential policies, such as the tightening of some
A riskier credit allocation is a source of vulnerability regulatory capital requirements, may reduce the ability
that may threaten financial stability. Policymakers and or willingness of banks to lend to vulnerable firms.31
supervisors should pay close attention to its evolution. Furthermore, policymakers could also address the
Both the volume and allocation of credit matter for potential consequences of an increase in the riskiness
financial stability. A period of high credit growth is of credit allocation during a period of strong credit
more likely to be followed by a severe downturn or growth through increased provisioning requirements
financial sector stress over the medium term if it is and thicker countercyclical capital buffers. The cali-
accompanied by an increase in the riskiness of credit bration of capital buffers should arguably consider the
allocation. Thus, while policymakers should be alert to riskiness of credit allocation.32 Finally, policies aimed
periods of rapid credit expansion or increasing riskiness at directing credit to certain firms or sectors of the
of credit allocation, they should pay special attention economy without due consideration of underlying
when they take place together. Supervisors should credit risk should be discouraged in periods of strong
monitor credit origination standards and the riskiness credit growth.
of credit allocation on a continuous basis, intensify The riskiness of credit allocation at the global level
supervisory scrutiny during episodes of large credit has rebounded since its post-global-financial-crisis
expansion and loose financial conditions, and require trough and was back to its historical average at the end
corrective action if needed.29 of 2016. The relatively mild credit expansion in recent
The riskiness of credit allocation can be mea- years, combined with postcrisis regulatory tighten-
sured using firm-level financial statement data that ing, contributed to a softer rebound in the riskiness
are available in many countries and used for finan- of credit allocation than might be expected given
cial surveillance. The measures of the riskiness of the very loose financial conditions. However, global
credit allocation constructed for this chapter exploit patterns hide relevant country-level heterogeneity, and
cross-sectional information on firm-level net debt the rise of the riskiness of credit allocation in certain
issuance and firm-level vulnerability. Several firm-level
30Financial statement data for domestically listed firms is often
indicators of vulnerability (including leverage, interest
available to policymakers quarterly or semiannually. Therefore,
coverage ratio, debt overhang, and expected default policymakers in many countries should be able to easily construct
frequency) can be used to construct a measure. Each the measures introduced in the chapter for their own country with
is suitable to specific country and data environments. shorter lags and at higher frequency than those reported in the
chapter based on internationally comparable data.
The measures are simple to compute and can be readily 31The evidence provided in the chapter is tentative. Further
used for macro-financial surveillance. Of course, the research needs to be performed to better understand the effect of
usefulness of these indicators for surveillance purposes macroprudential policy on the riskiness of credit allocation.
32Exploring issues related to calibration and timing of macropru-
will depend on the speed with which the underlying
dential policy actions as well as associated GDP growth trade-offs
data become available. It is important, therefore, that are, of course, essential and should be concrete next steps in the
analysis. In particular, delving into the role thicker capital buf-
fers could play in improving macro-financial outcomes following
29In
periods when credit is stagnant or falling, a higher riskiness of a rise in the riskiness of credit allocation to a high level would
credit allocation is less of a vulnerability. seem warranted.
countries has been more pronounced. As financial on the corporate sector, the riskiness of credit alloca-
conditions loosened further in 2017, the riskiness of tion to households may also be relevant and may not
credit allocation might have continued to rise, which necessarily follow the same patterns. Monitoring this
warrants close monitoring and heightened vigilance. dimension of credit allocation is difficult, especially for
Furthermore, relatively low credit allocation riskiness is a broad set of countries, but evidence from selected
not inconsistent with a large increase in conventional household surveys reported in the October 2017
corporate vulnerability indicators, such as average GFSR suggests that the indebtedness of lower-income,
leverage, as has been observed in some major econo- more vulnerable households has increased in recent
mies in recent years. Finally, while this chapter focuses years in various countries.
0.20 0.20
0.15 0.15
Fraction
Fraction
0.10 0.10
0.05 0.05
0.00 0.00
–5 –4 –3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 5 –4 –2 –1 0 1 2 4
0.20 0.20
0.15 0.15
Fraction
Fraction
0.10 0.10
0.05 0.05
0.00 0.00
–5 –4 –3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 5 –5 –4 –3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 5
the country level to construct the histograms shown in allocations.2 Their distributions have the shape of a
the figure and in the analysis. Differences in the aver- bell curve and have a standard deviation of about one.
age value of the indicator across countries may reflect
differences in the industrial composition of their 2The long-term average of the measure in each country could
corporate sectors, so these differences cannot be inter- also be interpreted as representing the neutral allocation of credit
preted to mean that some countries have riskier credit in the absence of cyclical fluctuations.
Box 2.2. Credit Allocation in China: Is Credit Flowing to the Most Profitable Firms?
Because nonfinancial corporate debt in China has Figure 2.2. . China rofita ilit o Credit
continued to expand at a brisk pace, understanding Allocation 1997–2016
how credit has been allocated may help assess the (Index)
extent to which vulnerabilities are building.1 Concerns
regarding credit allocation and related medium-term 1.2
macro-financial risks in China have recently focused Profitability
on productivity and profitability rather than on credit 0.8 of credit allocation
risk because of the strong presence of the state in the
corporate and financial sectors and the associated
risk transfers to the sovereign (Song and Xiong 2018; 0.4
Cong and others 2017). This box constructs a new
measure of credit allocation quality that compares the 0.0
profitability of firms whose credit is growing the fastest
to the profitability of firms whose credit is growing
the slowest—henceforth, the profitability of credit –0.4 Riskiness
of credit allocation
allocation—in the same way as described in Box 2.1 to
evaluate these concerns.2,3 –0.8
Although the riskiness of credit allocation has
markedly declined in China since 2012, the profit-
–1.2
ability of credit allocation has experienced only a
1997
98
99
2000
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
mild recovery and remained relatively low at the end
of 2016 (Figure 2.2.1). The profitability of credit
allocation rose significantly in the early 2000s fol- Sources: WIND data; and IMF staff estimates.
Note: Data are demeaned and shown as simple three-year moving
lowing the reforms to state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
averages. The riskiness of credit allocation is based on leverage
in the 1990s, but it started declining just before the data. See nnex 2.1 for definition of the variables.
global financial crisis along with an acceleration in
the credit-to-GDP ratio. This indicator continued
declining during and after the global financial crisis
as a large stimulus plan was put in place in 2009–10. attention for their relatively high share of credit flows
The riskiness of credit allocation also started climb- in recent years (IMF 2017a), their role as policy
ing in that period, but declined significantly after tools for achieving growth targets and development
2011–12, while the profitability of credit allocation goals (Maliszewski and others 2016; Song and Xiong
experienced only a mild recovery and remains low by 2018), and their low relative profitability (Dollar
historical standards. and Wei 2007). From 2007 to 2011, the decline in
The decline in the profitability of credit allocation the profitability of credit allocation took place both
over the past decade has been stronger among SOEs within the universe of SOEs and within the universe
and firms in traditional sectors. SOEs have drawn of private firms. However, while the decline has
continued since then within the group of SOEs, the
This box was prepared by Qianying Chen and Peichu Xie, profitability of credit allocation has improved among
with assistance from Juno Xinze Yao. private firms (Figure 2.2.2, panel 1). Furthermore,
1For concerns about the expansion of credit in China, see
within some sectors considered to be the new engines
IMF (2017a, 2017b). The outstanding stock of corporate debt in
China reached about 163 percent of GDP at the end of 2017.
of Chinese growth (IMF 2017b) the profitability of
2The credit risk dimension of the quality of credit allocation in credit allocation has stabilized or improved over the
China may also have more implications for medium-term growth past 10 years. This is in contrast with more traditional
and the fiscal sector than for short-term financial stability (Song sectors in which a sharp fall has taken place. These
and Xiong 2018). The literature is typically focused on the share sectors used to play a key role as China’s drivers of
of credit to firms with public ownership or with relatively poor
fundamentals in total credit (Lam and others 2017).
economic growth and have the most severe overcapac-
3See Annex 2.1 for details on data sources. ity issues and contain a large share of distressed, or
2009 0
2004
0.0 –1
2010
2011 2013
–2
2012
–0.5 2014
2016 2015 –3
–1.0 –4
–1.0 –0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Non-state-owned enterprises Rank
“zombie” firms (Lam and others 2017). The quality are consistent with those of Lam and others (2017)
of credit allocation within other industries has also and call for a sectoral approach to the analysis of
declined since 2006, but to a much lesser extent (Fig- financial vulnerabilities and associated medium-term
ure 2.2.2, panel 2). These findings complement and financial stability risks in China.
Box 2.3. The Joint Dynamics of the Riskiness of Credit Allocation, Financial Conditions, Credit
Expansions, and GDP Growth
This box analyzes the joint dynamics of the horizon, as well as to credit expansion and higher GDP
leverage-based measure of riskiness of credit allocation, growth (Figure 2.3.1).1 The response of the riskiness of
financial conditions, credit growth, and the business
cycle. The results of a panel vector autoregression 1The panel VAR includes the financial conditions index
(VAR) using annual data for 41 countries from 1991 to (FCI), GDP growth, change in credit to the private sector to
2016 suggest that loosening financial conditions leads GDP, and the leverage-based measure of the riskiness of credit
to riskier credit allocation over a two- to three-year allocation, as well as country fixed effects, and uses one lag. The
VAR is estimated using Abrigo and Love’s (2016) generalized
method of moments package for Stata (pvar), which in this case
This box was prepared by Luis Brandão-Marques. is warranted because of the relatively short time series available
that the riskiness of credit allocation comes first, followed by to previously credit-constrained firms with low creditworthiness.
credit growth and GDP growth, and the FCI is last. Although Therefore, the perceived increase in the riskiness of the allocation
economic theory does not provide clear guidance for which of credit across firms is followed by higher credit growth.
variables should come first, these results assume that the FCI 3The panel VAR augmented with lending standards also
responds contemporaneously to all other variables. In addition, shows that GDP first rises, but then declines after an increase in
the analysis assumes that the riskiness of credit allocation does the riskiness of credit allocation. This could be consistent with
not respond contemporaneously to credit growth, GDP growth, the higher riskiness of credit allocation feeding the trade-off
or financial conditions; it responds only with a lag. Changing between current economic and financial conditions and future
the ordering of the other variables or including more lags in the financial vulnerabilities (Adrian and Liang 2018). However,
specification does not materially affect results. higher-frequency data are probably needed to tease out all effects.
Box 2.4. The High-Yield Share during a Credit Boom and Output Growth
This box focuses on an alternative measure of the Figure 2.4.1. Impulse Response of Cumulative
riskiness of credit allocation, the high-yield (HY) share Real GDP Growth to a High-Yield Share Shock
of bond issuance (see Kirti 2018 for details). The HY Given a Credit Boom
share is based solely on information from bond mar- (Percent)
kets. It provides a simple, complementary approach to
the main metrics used in this chapter. The HY share 1.0
95 percent confidence interval
can be constructed for a sample of 38 countries, with 0.5
Impulse response
coverage for some starting in 1980. Greenwood and
Hanson (2013) construct the HY share for the United 0.0
States and show its relevance for predicting excess
–0.5
bond returns; López-Salido, Stein, and Zakrajšek
(2017) also show that it has macroeconomic relevance –1.0
for the United States.
For the analysis in this box, the HY share is based –1.5
on issuance by nonfinancial corporations and govern-
–2.0
ments. It is procyclical: it rises when recent economic
performance has been good and falls when recent –2.5
economic performance has been bad. A procyclical HY
share suggests extrapolative dynamics, consistent with –3.0
the narratives of Minsky (1977, 1986) and Kindle-
–3.5
berger (1978). The HY share also moves in line with
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5
survey measures of bank lending standards.
Focusing on a set of 25 advanced economies, this Sources: Bank for International Settlements; Dealogic; IMF, orld
box examines whether credit booms with a rising HY Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: The sample comprises 25 advanced economies. Time
share are followed by lower GDP growth in subse-
periods are shown on the x-axis.
quent years. Credit booms are defined here as episodes
in which the change in the credit-to-GDP ratio
over the previous five years is high relative to recent
international experience. To examine the role of the during a credit boom lowers cumulative GDP growth
HY share, local projection specifications that interact over the next three years by 2 percentage points. The
dummies for credit booms with the average change in HY share also helps separate good from bad credit
the HY share over the course of the boom are used. booms: the probability of growth being low following
Credit booms with a rising HY share are followed a credit boom is very low given a “good” HY indicator
by lower growth over the subsequent three to four and substantially higher given a “bad” HY indicator.
years. Figure 2.4.1 shows the impulse response for an These results suggest that issuance quality (using the
increase in the HY share over the course of the boom. HY share as a proxy) during a credit boom contains
A one standard deviation increase in the HY share information about growth out to three or four years
and that credit booms with a rising HY share merit
This box was prepared by Divya Kirti. special attention from policymakers.
Annex 2.1. Description and Definition The WIND database, which covers listed Chi-
of Variables nese firms, is used for the analysis in Box 2.2. The
The core of this chapter uses firm-level data from advantage of using WIND over Worldscope is that it
the Worldscope database, which covers the universe provides annual information on ownership. Obser-
of listed firms in many economies around the world. vations are dropped if (1) key financial variables (net
The sample is first cleaned by dropping financial debt issuance, total assets, leverage, EBITDA, interest
sector firms (except those in the real estate sector). expenses, and market capitalization) are missing; (2)
Second, observations are dropped if their values are values are incompatible with the economic content
incompatible with the economic content of the data; of the data (such as negative values of total assets,
for example, when market capitalization, total assets, total liabilities, market capitalization, or interest
total debt, total liability, or interest expenses are expenses); (3) values deviate from accounting identi-
strictly negative or when the operating profit margin ties (for example, the sum of total liability and equity
or the ratio of short-term debt to total debt exceeds book value is greater than total assets by 5 percent or
100 percent. Third, observations are kept only if full more); or (4) the inception date is missing or invalid.
information on net debt issuance; leverage; earnings In addition, only one observation a year is kept for
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization firms listed on several stock markets. Only years
(EBITDA); and market capitalization is available. with at least 50 nonfinancial (including real estate)
Then, only economy-year pairs with no fewer than 40 firms are kept. In the end, about 37,000 firm-year
firms and available information on aggregate credit pairs from 1995 to 2016 are used in the analysis.
to the private sector are kept.33 After all cleaning, Ownership information is available for most firms
about 500,000 nonfinancial firm-year observations only from 2004.
from 55 economies during 1991 to 2016 are left The leverage ratio is defined as the ratio of total
in the sample. debt to total assets. The interest coverage ratio (ICR)
The Orbis database is used for the robustness anal- is defined as the ratio of interest expenses to EBITDA.
ysis. It covers both listed and unlisted firms. The data The debt overhang measure is defined as the ratio of
are cleaned following the guidance in Kalemli-Özcan total debt to EBITDA. The expected default frequency
and others (2015). In addition, only observations (EDF) is computed using the Black-Scholes-Merton
with full information on net debt issuance, leverage, model as in Vassalou and Xing (2004). The ingre-
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), loans, and dients in the model are the value of equity, the sum
long-term debt are kept. Then, only economy-year of short-term debt and half of long-term debt and
pairs with at least 50 nonfinancial (including real interest payments, expected returns, the risk-free rate,
estate) firms are kept. In the end, the Orbis sam- and the volatility of the price of equity. The return
ple covers 50 economies. Data availability in several on assets (used in Box 2.2) is defined as the ratio
economies is relatively poor for the 1990s, and panels of EBITDA to total assets. Because availability of
are very unbalanced in most economies before 2005. A EBITDA is poor for some countries in the Orbis
balance is struck by choosing 2000 as the start date for database, EBIT is used instead to compute the debt
the Orbis-based analysis. overhang indicator. Availability of data on interest
expenses is also poor for several countries in Orbis,
so the ICR is not used in this robustness exercise.
33For the construction of the interest coverage ratio–based indi- Computing the EDF requires firm-level equity
cator, a minimum of 40 observations for interest expenses is also market information and therefore cannot be done for
required. An exception is made for one borderline case (Ireland),
for which some years have only 38 or 39 observations. For the unlisted firms.
construction of the debt overhang–based indicator, a minimum The list of economies included in the analysis is
of 40 observations for non-zero debt is also required. For the provided in Annex Table 2.1.1. Other data sources,
construction of the expected default frequency–based indicator,
definitions, and transformations used in this chapter’s
a minimum of 40 observations for expected default frequency is
also required. analysis are summarized in Annex Table 2.1.2.
Annex Table 2.1.1. Riskiness of Credit Allocation: Economies Included in the Analysis
Start Year Start Year
Worldscope Orbis Worldscope Orbis
Advanced Economies Emerging Market Economies
Australia* 1991 2000 Argentina* 2000 n.a.
Austria* 1991 2002 Brazil* 1992 2000
Belgium* 1991 2000 Bulgaria* 2006 2000
Canada* 1991 2000 Chile* 1995 2000
Czech Republic* 1997 2000 China* 2000 2000
Denmark* 1991 2000 Croatia 2006 2000
Estonia n.a. 2000 Egypt 2006 n.a.
Finland* 1991 2000 Hungary* n.a. 2000
France* 1991 2000 India* 1993 2002
Germany* 1991 2000 Indonesia* 1992 2002
Greece* 1994 2000 Jordan 2006 n.a.
Hong Kong SAR 1991 2002 Kuwait 2006 2009
Iceland n.a. 2000 Malaysia* 1991 2000
Ireland* 1999 2000 Mexico* 1995 2000
Israel* 2000 2002 Morocco 2009 n.a.
Italy* 1991 2000 Oman 2006 n.a.
Japan* 1991 2000 Pakistan 1995 2000
Korea* 1993 2000 Peru* 2001 2002
Netherlands* 1991 2000 Philippines* 1996 2002
New Zealand* 1999 n.a. Poland* 2000 2000
Norway* 1991 n.a. Romania 2006 2000
Portugal* 1996 2000 Russia* 2005 2000
Singapore 1991 2000 Saudi Arabia 2006 n.a.
Slovak Republic n.a. 2000 Serbia 2010 2000
Spain* 1991 2000 South Africa* 1991 2000
Sweden* 1991 2000 Sri Lanka 2006 2006
Switzerland* 1991 2000 Thailand* 1993 2000
United Kingdom* 1991 2000 Turkey* 1997 n.a.
United States* 1991 2000 Ukraine 2008 2000
Vietnam* 2007 2005
Source: IMF staff.
Note: End year for Worldscope is 2016; for Orbis, 2015. n.a. = data not available.
* The financial conditions index is available (see the October 2017 Global Financial Stability Report for the methodology).
Annex 2.2. The Determinants of the Riskiness gap) and credit cycle (real credit growth), and to esti-
of Credit Allocation mating two-way clustered standard errors at country
This annex provides a general overview of the empir- and year levels.
ical methodologies used in this chapter to analyze the
cyclical determinants of the riskiness of credit allo- Cyclicality of the Riskiness of Credit Allocation
cation and its relationship to institutional and policy The empirical specification is as follows:
variables. A finding is defined as robust across measures
when the regression coefficient is significant for at least Riskinessi,tX = α Xi + γ Xt + β X1 ∆ Crediti,t + β X2 ∆GDPi,t
two of the four measures and when the sign is identical
+ β X3 Appreciationi,t + ε Xi,t , (A2.2.1)
across all four measures. Consistency of the signs of the
effects in level and in interaction is also required. in which X ∈ {leverage, interest coverage ratio, debt
The results are robust to using alternative data overhang, expected default frequency} represents a
sources for credit, including credit data compiled borrower vulnerability or credit risk indicator and, cor-
by the Bank for International Settlements (both for respondingly, Riskinessi,tX measures the riskiness of credit
total credit to the nonfinancial private sector and for allocation based on that indicator for country i at time
credit to the nonfinancial corporate sector), to using t. ∆Credit is the change in the ratio of bank credit to
different ways to capture the business cycle (output the nonfinancial private sector to nominal GDP, and
∆GDP is real GDP growth. Domestic currency appre- are clustered at the country level, as before. The term
ciation against the US dollar is included to control for FCi,t represents a financial conditions index (FCI),
a potential mechanical valuation effect on the riskiness financial variables representing specific components of
of credit allocation from debt denominated in foreign the broad index, or a measure of lending standards.
currency. Both country (α Xi ) and year (γ Xt ) fixed effects Both ∆Credit and FC are demeaned at the country
X
are included. The standard errors are clustered at the level. The estimated coefficient δˆ measures the level
country level for all specifications. effect of FCi,t on the riskiness of credit allocation
Results are provided in Annex Table 2.2.1. The when demeaned ∆Credit is 0. The estimated coeffi-
X
results also hold if the fiscal position is controlled for cient θˆ captures the marginal effect on the credit
through the general government structural balance. cyclicality of the riskiness of credit allocation caused
In addition, the results are robust (and coefficients by a change in the FCI, financial variables, or lend-
quantitatively very similar) when instrumenting GDP ing standards.
growth and the change in the credit-to-GDP ratio The results for lending standards, FCI, corporate
by their lagged values to account for their potential spreads, stock market price-to-book ratio, and log
endogeneity. VIX (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility
Index) are shown in Annex Table 2.2.2. Columns
Financial Conditions, Lending Standards, and the (1)–(5) show the results obtained when each financial
Riskiness of Credit Allocation variable enters the regression individually. The impact
The following equation is estimated: of other financial variables, such as stock market vola-
tility, a credit boom dummy (as defined in Dell’Aric-
Riskinessi,tX = α Xi + γ Xt + β X Controlsi,t + δ X FCi,t cia and others 2016), length of credit boom, a
dummy to capture different phases of a credit boom,
+ θ X × FCi,t × ∆ Crediti,t + ε X , (A2.2.2)
i,t cross-border bank-flows-to-GDP ratio, and housing
in which Controlsi,t is a vector of control variables price inflation is also investigated. However, none of
including change in the credit-to-GDP ratio, real these variables has a robust significant impact on the
GDP growth, and domestic currency appreciation as riskiness of credit allocation, so they are not included
discussed in the previous section. The standard errors in the table.
Annex Table 2.2.2. Impact of Financial Conditions and Lending Standards on the Riskiness of Credit Allocation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Robustness
Variables Dependent Variable: Riskiness of Credit Allocation Based on Leverage Sign Significance
Change in Credit-to-GDP Ratio 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Bank Lending Standards –0.10 4 1
(0.07)
Change in Credit-to-GDP Ratio –0.03* 4 4
Bank Lending Standards (0.02)
Financial Conditions Index (FCI) –0.05 3 0
(0.07)
Change in Credit-to-GDP Ratio –0.01** 4 4
FCI (0.00)
Corporate Credit Spreads –0.07 4 0
(0.06)
Change in Credit-to-GDP Ratio –0.02** 4 2
Corporate Credit Spreads (0.01)
Stock Price-to-Book Ratio 0.20*** 4 4
(0.06)
Change in Credit-to-GDP Ratio 0.01 4 0
Stock Price-to-Book Ratio (0.01)
Change in Credit-to-GDP Ratio –0.04** 4 3
Log (VIX) (0.02)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 266 824 663 949 986
Number of Countries 21 41 37 51 55
R2 0.39 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.31
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: Real GDP growth and domestic currency appreciation against the US dollar are controlled for in all regressions. Increase in bank lending standards
means stricter bank lending standards. Increase in financial conditions index means tighter financial conditions. Dependent variable = riskiness of credit allo-
cation based on leverage for columns (1)–(5). For robustness, the cyclicality of the other three measures of the riskiness of credit allocation (based on interest
coverage ratio, debt overhang, and expected default frequency) is investigated in the full sample. The number of measures (out of four) that have the same
sign and that are significant at the 10 percent level or higher is reported in columns (6) and (7). See Annex Table 2.1.1 for countries and years in the sample.
See Annex Table 2.1.2 for definitions and source of all variables. In all specifications, standard errors are clustered at the country level. Standard errors are in
parentheses. VIX = Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
Policy and Institutional Settings and the Riskiness of clustered at the country level. The term Zi,t represents
Credit Allocation different measures of financial market depth, banking
system soundness, macroprudential policy, the legal
This analysis investigates the role played by financial
and institutional framework, and banking supervi-
market depth, banking system soundness, macropru-
sion quality. All financial development and financial
dential policy, selected aspects of the legal and insti-
soundness variables enter the regression in the form
tutional framework, and banking supervision quality
of a one-year lag to eliminate potential endogene-
on the riskiness of credit allocation. The following
ity concerns. The estimated coefficient ρˆ X measures
equation is estimated:
the level effect of Zi,t on the riskiness of credit allo-
Riskinessi,tX = α Xi + γ Xt + β X Controlsi,t + ρ X Zi,t cation when demeaned ∆Credit is 0. The estimated
coefficient φˆ X captures the marginal effect on the
+ φ X × Zi,t × ∆ Crediti,t + ε X , (A2.2.3)
i,t credit cyclicality of the riskiness of credit allocation
in which Controlsi,t is the same set of control variables with respect to a change in each of the Zi,t variables.
as in the previous section. The standard errors are Because of lack of sufficient time series variation, data
86
Dependent Variable: Riskiness of Credit Allocation Based on Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Legal and Robustness
Financial Macroprudential Supervision Institution
Variables Soundness Policy Quality Aspects Sign Significance
Change in Credit-to-GDP Ratio 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.12*** –0.00 0.15***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Lag Buffers from Banking Default 0.01 3 0
(0.01)
Change in Credit-to-GDP Ratio Lag Buffers from Banking Default 0.005** 3 2
(0.002)
Net Tightening of Capital Conservation Buffers –0.45** 4 3
(0.05) (0.05)
Net Tightening on Ceilings and Penalties on Bank Credit Growth –0.57 –0.57 4 2
(0.54) (0.54)
Change in Credit-to-GDP Ratio Net Tightening on Ceilings and Penalties on Bank Credit Growth –0.07** –0.07** 4 4
(0.03) (0.03)
Change in Credit-to-GDP Ratio Independence of Supervisory Authority from Bank –0.09*** 4 3
(0.02)
Change in Credit-to-GDP Ratio Rareness of State-Owned Enterprises –0.01* 4 4
(0.01)
Change in Credit-to-GDP Ratio Minority Shareholder Protection Index –0.02*** 4 3
(0.01)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 861 976 976 976 976 929 739 898
Number of Countries 55 54 54 54 54 52 37 46
R2 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.34 0.34
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: Dependent variable = riskiness of credit allocation based on leverage. Real GDP growth and domestic currency appreciation vis-à-vis the US dollar are controlled for in all regressions. Column (4) is a horse race between
different macroprudential policies. The number of measures (out of four) that have the same sign and that are significant at the 10 percent level or higher is reported in columns (9) and (10). For the macroprudential policies, the
robustness information is based on the horse race. See Annex Table 2.1.1 for countries and years in the sample. See Annex Table 2.1.2 for definitions and sources of all variables. In all specifications, standard errors are clustered at
the country level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
CHAPTER 2 THE RISKINESS OF CREDIT ALLOCATION: A SOURCE OF FINANCIAL VULNERABILITY?
for all variables related to the legal and institutional The Impact of the Riskiness of Credit Allocation on
framework and supervisory quality are averaged at Systemic Banking Crisis Risk
the country level and enter the regression only as an The logarithm of the odds ratio of the start of a
interaction term. systemic banking crisis is analyzed using the following
The results are shown in Annex Table 2.2.3. Col- panel logit model:
umns (1)–(3) and (5)–(7) show the results obtained
when each variable found to be robustly significant P[Crisisstartt = 1| Xi,t−1]
log _________________
enters the regression individually.34 Column (4) pres- P[Crisisstartt = 0| Xi,t−1]
ents the results of a horse race between the macropru- = α i + β ∆ Crediti,t−1
mv3 + γRiskiness mv3
i,t−1
dential measures that are significant when entering
individually. + δ Controlsi,t−1
mv3 + u ,
i,t (A2.3.1)
Shleifer 2006), corruption index (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 1 percent level to reduce the influence of outliers.
and Shleifer 2006), and the corporate governance opacity index 36This specification differs from Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor
(Brandão-Marques, Gelos, and Melgar 2013). None of these (2016a) in that it uses real GDP growth instead of real GDP
are found to have a robust significant impact on the riskiness of growth per capita. The results are robust to using real GDP
credit allocation. growth per capita.
Annex Table 2.3.1. Panel Logit Analysis: Probability of the Occurrence of a Systemic Banking Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Dependent Variable: Start of a Systemic Banking Crisis
Change in Credit-to-GDP Ratio 0.202*** 0.141* 0.0565 0.0745 0.0808 –0.0902
(0.0699) (0.0737) (0.0849) (0.100) (0.108) (0.131)
Financial Conditions Index –1.742** –2.536*** –2.686*** –2.907*** –4.441***
(0.682) (0.611) (0.604) (0.724) (0.854)
Riskiness_Leverage 1.924***
(0.674)
Riskiness_Interest Coverage Ratio 2.533***
(0.861)
Riskiness_Debt Overhang 2.087***
(0.461)
Riskiness_Expected Default Frequency 2.113***
(0.734)
sion: the risk of a banking sector equity price stress model (including two-way-clustered standard errors of
event. This risk is examined using the following frame- the coefficients).
work, as in Baron and Xiong (2017):
to using alternative estimators for the panel logit ent empirical framework by IMF (2016).
Annex Table 2.3.2. Panel Logit Analysis: Banking Sector Equity Stress Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Dependent Variable: Bank Equity Crash between t and t + h (h = 1,3)
t+1 t+3 t+1 t+3 t+1 t+3 t+1 t+3
Change in Credit-to-GDP Ratio –0.000975 0.0129 0.0294 0.0306 0.0316 0.0317 0.0345 0.0253
(0.0381) (0.0433) (0.0309) (0.0357) (0.0365) (0.0427) (0.0437) (0.0464)
Riskiness_Leverage 0.898*** 0.727***
(0.246) (0.246)
Riskiness_Interest Coverage
Ratio 0.690*** 0.717**
(0.256) (0.320)
Riskiness_Debt Overhang 0.569** 0.440
(0.223) (0.271)
Riskiness_Expected Default 0.451* 0.321
Frequency (0.274) (0.296)
mated using quantile regressions with nonadditive of the riskiness of credit allocation on growth is also
fixed effects to examine the relationship between examined using a logit regression with a low-growth
the riskiness of credit allocation and the 20th and outturn dummy as the dependent variable. In that
50th percentiles of the future growth distribution. exercise, low-growth outturn is equal to 1 when the
Regressions with and without the interaction between cumulative real GDP growth rate over the future h
the change in the credit-to-GDP ratio and riskiness years (from t to t + h) is below the 20th percentile
are both estimated. The results are shown in Annex of its country-specific distribution and equal to zero
Table 2.3.3. Similar results are obtained for the otherwise. The findings confirm those obtained in the
leverage-based measure using Orbis data. The impact quantile regression framework.
Ratio
Riskiness_ICR
Riskiness_Debt –0.406* –0.328** –0.522*** –0.229*
Overhang (0.237) (0.140) (0.161) (0.132)
Change in –0.146*** –0.204***
Credit-to-GDP (0.0297) (0.0277)
Ratio
Riskiness_Debt
Overhang
Riskiness_ –0.879*** –0.383** –0.942*** –0.397**
Expected Default (0.243) (0.161) (0.233) (0.190)
Frequency
Change in –0.0798 –0.171***
Credit-to-GDP (0.0749) (0.0199)
Ratio
Riskiness_
Expected Default
Frequency
Observations 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 592 592 592 592 532 532 532 532
Number of 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 39 39 39 39
Countries
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Explanatory variables enter the regressions as the lag of their simple three-year moving average and are demeaned at the country level; the change in credit-to-GDP ratio is winsorized at 1 percent.
Controls include real GDP growth and a financial conditions index. pt = percentile.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Summary
R
ising house prices have been a feature of the economic recovery in many countries since the global finan-
cial crisis. But recent increases have also been occurring in an accommodative monetary policy environ-
ment in many advanced economies, raising the specter of financial instability should financial conditions
reverse and simultaneously lead to a decline in house prices.
This chapter analyzes whether and how house prices move in tandem across countries and major global cities;
that is, the synchronicity of global house prices. On the one hand, higher house price synchronization and deeper
global links in housing markets may be beneficial. On the other hand, higher synchronization may be the result of
global financial conditions influencing local house price dynamics and housing markets, thereby propagating local
economic and financial shocks. The analysis in this chapter aims to inform the views that policymakers ought to
take on the synchronicity in house prices.
Strikingly, the chapter finds an increase in house price synchronization, on balance, for 40 countries and 44
major cities in advanced and emerging market economies. The chapter’s analysis suggests that countries’ and cities’
exposure to global financial conditions may provide an explanation for the increase in house price synchronization.
Moreover, cities in advanced economies may be particularly exposed to global financial conditions, perhaps owing
to their integration with global financial markets or to their attractiveness for global investors searching for yield or
safe assets.
Thus, policymakers cannot ignore the possibility that shocks to house prices elsewhere may affect domestic
markets. While house price synchronization in and of itself may not warrant policy intervention, the evidence
presented in this chapter suggests that heightened synchronicity of house prices can signal a downside tail risk
to real economic activity, especially when taking place in a buoyant credit environment. The chapter finds that
macroprudential policies seem to retain some ability to influence local house price developments even in countries
with highly synchronized housing markets, and that macroprudential policy measures put in place to tame rising
vulnerabilities in a country’s financial sector may have the additional effect of reducing a country’s house price
synchronization with the rest of the world. These unintended effects are worth considering when evaluating the
trade-offs of implementing macroprudential and other policies.
trusts (REITs), and institutional investors appear Sources: Bank for International Settlements; CEIC Data Co. Ltd; Emerging Markets
to have grown (Figure 3.3), and anecdotes point to Economic Data Ltd; Global Financial Data Solutions; Haver Analytics; IMF, Research
increasing investor participation in select housing mar- Department house price data set; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development; and IMF staff calculations.
kets, such as Amsterdam, Melbourne, Sydney, Toronto, Note: Data used in this figure comes from the sources listed above, and therefore
they could differ from data published by national authorities. Nominal house prices
are de ated by consumer price in ation, when real house prices are not readily
available in the sources above. Cities selected are the largest cities in each
Prepared by a staff team consisting of Jane Dokko (team economy in the sample based on population owing to data availability, and overlap
leader), Adrian Alter, Mitsuru Katagiri, Romain Lafarguette, with the top 50 cities for global investors identified by Cushman akefield
and Dulani Seneviratne, with contributions from Anil Ari, (2017). Labels in the figure use International Organi ation for Standardi ation (ISO)
Christian Bogmans, and Alan Xiaochen Feng, under the general codes. Latest available data as of 2017:Q2 for most economies; fewer than 15
guidance of Claudio Raddatz and Dong He. Claudia Cohen and economies have data through 2017:Q3.
Breanne Rajkumar provided editorial assistance.
1Moreover, global financial conditions may affect the comove-
ment in commercial real estate prices, but the chapter does not
analyze the synchronicity in commercial real estate prices because
high-quality, cross-country comparable data are limited to fewer than
10 countries.
Figure 3.2. Widespread House Price Gains Have Accompanied Accommodative Financial Conditions (Diffusion Index of
House Price Growth and Global Financial Conditions)
(Left scale = percent; right scale = standard deviations)
80 6 80 6
60 4 60 4
40 2 40 2
20 0 20 0
0 –2 0 –2
1986:Q1
87:Q3
89:Q1
90:Q3
92:Q1
93:Q3
95:Q1
96:Q3
98:Q1
99:Q3
2001:Q1
02:Q3
04:Q1
05:Q3
07:Q1
08:Q3
10:Q1
11:Q3
13:Q1
14:Q3
16:Q1
1986:Q1
87:Q3
89:Q1
90:Q3
92:Q1
93:Q3
95:Q1
96:Q3
98:Q1
99:Q3
2001:Q1
02:Q3
04:Q1
05:Q3
07:Q1
08:Q3
10:Q1
11:Q3
13:Q1
14:Q3
16:Q1
Diffusion index orld financial conditions index (right scale)
3. Emerging Market Economies: Country Level 4. Emerging Market Economies: City Level
100 8 100 8
80 6 80 6
60 4 60 4
40 2 40 2
20 0 20 0
0 –2 0 –2
1996:Q1
97:Q1
98:Q1
99:Q1
2000:Q1
01:Q1
02:Q1
03:Q1
04:Q1
05:Q1
06:Q1
07:Q1
08:Q1
09:Q1
10:Q1
11:Q1
12:Q1
13:Q1
14:Q1
15:Q1
16:Q1
1996:Q1
97:Q1
98:Q1
99:Q1
2000:Q1
01:Q1
02:Q1
03:Q1
04:Q1
05:Q1
06:Q1
07:Q1
08:Q1
09:Q1
10:Q1
11:Q1
12:Q1
13:Q1
14:Q1
15:Q1
16:Q1
Source: IMF staff calculations.
Note: Diffusion index is based on year-over-year growth rates of real house prices. This index measures the share of positive house price growth observations in
each quarter.
and Vancouver (Zillow Research 2017; Bloomberg At the same time, however, the links across hous-
News 2018).2 ing markets may transmit or amplify financial and
Synchronicity, or the correlation, in house prices macroeconomic shocks, increasing the exposure of
should concern policymakers because it may signal local housing markets to global financial conditions
stronger transmission of external shocks to local hous- or to shocks affecting foreign investors active in local
ing markets. The global integration of housing markets markets. As a result, policymakers’ ability to address
may contribute to house price synchronization, as well imbalances in the housing market through national
as to more liquidity in housing and mortgage mar- or local policies may be constrained, particularly if
kets, higher capital flows from abroad, and enhanced house prices across many countries decline at once. In
risk-sharing opportunities for households and lenders. this case, a decline in external demand may exacerbate
the challenges of stabilizing household balance sheets,
financial markets, and economic activity. In this sense,
2Other factors, such as illicit capital flows, motives for tax evasion, or
Figure 3.3. Institutional Investor Participation Has Been on synchronization increased in recent years? Did it
the Rise increase before the global financial crisis?
1. Real Estate Investment Trusts
• What factors contribute to or dampen synchronic-
(Market capitalization of REITs normalized by the total market ity? Is there a role for financial factors, or is house
capitalization; index, 2005:Q1 = 100) price synchronization related mainly to the comove-
Developed markets: overall ment in economic activity? Do bilateral or two-way
Developed markets: residential
United States: overall links between country or city pairs matter for syn-
United States: residential chronicity or do only global factors matter?
Developed markets (excluding United States): overall • Should policymakers pay attention to house price
Developed markets (excluding United States): residential
300 synchronicity to gain a better understanding of
financial vulnerabilities and risks?
250
The chapter’s focus on house price synchronization
200 should not detract from the important task of moni-
toring house prices in individual markets. In fact, the
150
analysis in the chapter seeks to complement bilateral
100 surveillance efforts and country-level analysis that can
explore house price valuation and dynamics using
50 sophisticated models and rich data.
2005:Q1 07:Q1 09:Q1 11:Q1 13:Q1 15:Q1 17:Q1
indicating that the demand for housing may also be analyzing house price synchronization. Second, stylized
influenced by investors. facts are presented to document trends and heterogene-
• Higher house price synchronization corresponds to ity in house price synchronization across advanced and
increased downside risks to growth at horizons of up emerging market economies. Third, potential contrib-
to one year, controlling for other financial and mac- utors to house price synchronization are analyzed, as is
roeconomic conditions. This finding suggests that the importance of this measure for economic growth.
the comovement in house prices can help predict The final section concludes with a policy discussion.
the tail risk of an economic downturn.
House Price Synchronicity:
The policy discussion for this chapter centers around A Conceptual Framework
the following sets of issues: House prices may move in tandem across countries
• Policymakers may wish to monitor the synchroniza- and major cities because of synchronous supply and
tion of house prices with respect to other countries, demand factors (Figure 3.4).3 Supply-side consid-
in addition to the over- or undervaluation of house erations include the costs of construction and land
prices within a country. To that end, increasing acquisition. On the demand side, demographics, tax
the granularity, timeliness, and coverage of data on and other policy considerations, and depreciation and
house prices within countries would help provide maintenance play a role. Financial factors, such as
richer indicators for bilateral and multilateral sur- the mortgage interest rate, the risk premium on assets
veillance. In addition, more comprehensive data on with similar risk characteristics as housing, household
the participation of global and institutional inves- leverage, and the expected nominal house price appre-
tors in housing markets would strengthen surveil- ciation rate, also matter.4
lance efforts. The comovement in economic fundamentals may
• Macroprudential policies seem to retain some ability be a source of house price synchronization. Several
to influence local house price developments in of these factors, such as construction costs, taxes, and
countries with highly synchronized housing markets, demographics, tend to be slow moving and may lead
albeit to a lesser extent than in those that are less to synchronization only over long horizons. However,
synchronized. Consistently, macroprudential policy other economic fundamentals, such as rent, income,
measures put in place to tame rising vulnerabilities and inflation, may lead to comovement in housing
in a country’s financial sector are followed by a prices at shorter terms.5 Indeed, the coincidence of
decline in a country’s house price synchronization, recessions and housing downturns is well-documented,
suggesting that some of the drivers of synchroniza- with trade and financial links between countries
tion operate through local financial intermediaries. possibly playing a contributing role (Claessens, Kose,
Fiscal-based policies, such as ad valorem and buyers’ and Terrones 2011; Kose, Otrok, and Prasad 2012;
stamp duty taxes, may also lower house price syn- Kalemli-Özcan, Papaioannou, and Peydró 2013;
chronization, but less so than other measures, such Leamer 2015).
as limits on loan-to-value ratios. These unintended Simultaneous changes to financial factors can also
effects are an aspect to consider when evaluating the lead to greater house price synchronization. Changing
trade-offs of implementing macroprudential and interest rates, risk premiums, or expected capital gains
other policies (IMF 2013).
• Other policies that enhance resilience to global
3For an example of an asset pricing model that decomposes supply
financial shocks may also dampen house price
and demand factors for housing, see Poterba (1984) and Poterba,
synchronicity. This chapter presents evidence that Weil, and Shiller (1991).
exchange rate flexibility plays a role, but policies that 4Together, these nonfinancial and financial demand-side factors
deepen domestic real estate markets—or consumer determine the annual cost of homeownership, which is a function
of the user cost of housing. See US Department of Housing and
financial protections that discourage excessive or Urban Development (2000) for the precise details of how user costs
predatory lending to households—may also help. are calculated in the United States, and Poterba (1984) and Poterba,
Weil, and Shiller (1991) for a more general discussion.
5See the October 2013 World Economic Outlook (WEO) for a
The rest of this chapter covers four areas. First, discussion of the factors contributing to the synchronization in
the next section provides a conceptual framework for business cycles.
Figure 3.4. Global Financial Conditions, Portfolio Channels, and Expectations Contribute to House Price Synchronization,
as Do Supply Constraints and Local Policy
Expectations
Country A Country B
Global investors
Global lenders
Domestic Domestic
Supply Supply
financial financial
constraints constraints
conditions conditions
Business Business
Local policy Local policy
cycle cycle
Trade, FDI
may increase the comovement in house prices through • Portfolio channels: The presence of common lenders
the following mechanisms (Figure 3.4):6 or investors allows for the interdependence in house
• Changes in global financial conditions: The interna- prices in both crisis and normal times for reasons
tional transmission of financial conditions, such as potentially unrelated to economic fundamentals.8
those occurring because of a change in monetary For example, a shock in one country may lead
policy in one large country, usually occurs through global financial institutions to pull back on mort-
capital flows (Chapter 3 of the April 2017 GFSR).7 gage lending in many countries, perhaps to maintain
These flows do not need to go directly into housing capital requirements (Allen and Gale 2000; Ceto-
investments as long as they affect credit availability relli and Goldberg 2011). Alternatively, investors
and mortgage rates in the receiving country. In addi- experiencing distress in one market may liquidate
tion, an increase in the global demand for safe assets leveraged housing investments in other countries,
may compress the rates of sovereign bonds consid- possibly to meet margin calls or in anticipation of
ered as low risk, thereby holding down mortgage future redemptions, or may rebalance their portfo-
rates and supporting booming house prices across lios to follow predetermined investment mandates
many countries at once (Bernanke and others 2011). (Kodres and Pritsker 2002). Or shocks in one coun-
try can result in changes to investors’ risk appetite
and lead them to increase or withdraw their housing
6The user cost may also shift simultaneously across countries if
investments from many countries at once (Acharya
there is a coordinated tax reform that similarly changes tax rates or
aligns the tax deductibility of mortgage interest, but this chapter
and Pedersen 2005). In the housing market, recent
does not focus on these issues.
7Hirata and others (2012) find a role for a broader range of global
shocks, such as those to interest rates, productivity, credit, and 8See Chapter 2 of the April 2016 GFSR for a discussion of the
developments point to the growing contribution flexibility may dampen the impact of global financial
of global and institutional investors to house price conditions because monetary policies may have more
dynamics in select major cities (Hekwolter of bite under such circumstances.
Hekhuis, Nijskens, and Heeringa 2017). Though Fluctuations in home values pose risks to house-
they are limited in number in the aggregate, the holds and financial institutions even if they occur in
geographic concentration of investors in certain only one country at a time. In a booming house price
cities may make house price synchronization more environment, households may engage in excessive risk
apparent among cities than among countries. These taking (Mian and Sufi 2009; Bhutta and Keys 2016),
channels may also contribute to house price syn- financial institutions may relax lending standards
chronization in normal times through arbitrage and (Demyanyk and Van Hemert 2009; Dell’Ariccia, Igan,
mortgage rates. and Laeven 2012; Chapter 2 of the April 2018 GFSR),
• Changes in expected capital gains: A coordinated and there may be overbuilding (Haughwout and
change in households’ or investors’ views of future others 2011). Thus, once the boom ends, a decline in
house prices across many countries can also result house prices may result in risks to macroeconomic and
in synchronicity. These changes in expectations can financial stability. Consumption may fall given that
be driven by rational views regarding future funda- housing is often the largest component of household
mentals (Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai 2005), but wealth in many countries, and household delever-
also by bouts of overoptimism, psychological factors, aging may be a further drag on growth (Chapter 2
and speculation (Shiller 2015). Rational or irrational of the October 2017 GFSR; Mian and Sufi 2009).
beliefs about house prices can propagate through Furthermore, banks’ exposures to house prices can
social networks, word of mouth, and other interper- cause them financial difficulties and may lead them
sonal links (Bailey and others 2016). If a wake-up to curtail many forms of lending, which, in turn, can
call leads to reassessment of these beliefs, perhaps lower employment (Berrospide, Black, and Keeton
in response to a shock in one country, a widespread 2016; Glancy 2017). Moreover, housing is a physical
realignment of house prices with fundamentals asset that requires maintenance and cannot be moved,
could occur (Goldstein 1998). There could even be so fire sales are often associated with blight and crime,
a systematic overcorrection if house prices exhibit which are destabilizing at the local level, because
momentum and excess variance relative to funda- distressed homes often sit vacant before they are sold
mentals (Case and Shiller 1990; Glaeser, Ponzetto, (Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak 2011; Anenberg and
and Shleifer 2016). Kung 2014). These costs are borne not just by the
households living in neighborhoods with distressed
As with many financial assets, institutional charac- sales but also by financial institutions if the legal sys-
teristics may influence whether financial factors lead tem is such that the ownership of foreclosed properties
to simultaneous changes in house prices across coun- is transferred to them.
tries. For example, financial integration can expose The challenges to macro-financial stability posed by
mortgage markets to global financial conditions and a house price decline in a given country can be larger
expose local financial markets to sudden stops in if the decline is synchronized with declines in other
capital flows (Chapter 3 of the April 2017 GFSR). countries. In this case, the pullback in consumption
Moreover, a country’s financial integration may and investment driven by balance sheet deleveraging
create a favorable environment for global investors to would coincide with a decline in external demand,
purchase housing directly, allowing global factors to
influence local house prices and local shocks to spread
arise through the specialization of production or because of how
more widely through a variety of mechanisms (see financially integrated banks differentially increase lending to coun-
earlier discussion).9 In contrast, greater exchange rate tries experiencing productivity shocks and contribute to divergent
output growth (Kalemli-Özcan, Papaioannou, and Peydró 2013).
9See Forbes (2012); Bekaert, Lundblad, and Siegel (2011); Finally, greater participation of foreign investors, especially those
Bekaert and Harvey (2000); Burger, Warnock, and Cacdac Warnock with long horizons, may be able to stabilize asset prices, including
(2012); and Miyajima, Mohanty, and Chan (2015) on equity and housing, if they behave countercyclically and take advantage of fire
bond market integration. Theoretically, greater financial integration sale opportunities. This would lead to a dampening of other drivers
may also correspond to less house price synchronization given that of synchronicity, although evidence on this countercyclical behavior
housing purchases are tied to business cycles. This relationship may may be limited (Chapter 2 of the April 2014 GFSR).
Figure 3.5. Synchronization Has Steadily Increased across leaving little room for the current account to offset the
Countries and Cities contraction in domestic demand. Indeed, in the past,
(Median synchronization; closer to zero denotes higher synchronization)
large and widespread house price swings have been
Country pairs Linear trend (country pairs) Major city pairs associated with periods of financial instability across
1. Within Advanced Economies many countries at once (Claessens, Kose, and Terrones
–0.05 2008, 2011; Reinhart and Rogoff 2008). These risks
would be compounded if a pullback among global
Higher synchronization
–0.25
House Price Synchronization in
1991:Q1
92:Q3
94:Q1
95:Q3
97:Q1
98:Q3
2000:Q1
01:Q3
03:Q1
04:Q3
06:Q1
07:Q3
09:Q1
10:Q3
12:Q1
13:Q3
15:Q1
16:Q3 Countries and Cities
Different measures of house price synchronization
2. Within Emerging Market Economies
capture distinct dimensions of this phenomenon.
0.00 Synchronization can be measured in different ways and
at different frequencies. To capture these distinctions,
this chapter uses a broad set of measures applied to
Higher synchronization
–0.10
synchronized in countries and cities in advanced
and emerging market economies (Figure 3.5).11
–0.15
The synchronization in the house price gap reflects
medium-term changes to how shocks propagate
–0.20
across countries or cities (see Annexes 3.2 and Figure 3.6. The Relative Contribution of the Global Factor
3.3).12 Between 1991 and 2016, synchronicity is Has Grown
(Window = 15 years; percent)
lower among major cities in advanced economies
than among the countries where they are located, 60 Upper and lower bound (75th and 25th percentiles)
but it has gradually moved closer to country-level Median
synchronicity. This pattern is intriguing because
50
synchronicity should be lower among cities that are
affected by idiosyncratic shocks that average out at
the country level, and it indicates that the factors 40
driving house price synchronicity have become
disproportionately more important for cities. This 30
finding motivates a closer look at the house price
dynamics of major cities. Among emerging mar-
20
kets, synchronicity between countries and between
major cities is similar, perhaps for purely statistical
reasons (the major city often represents the bulk of 10
the national house price index) or because of more
integrated internal housing markets. 0
• In many advanced economies, moreover, the
1986:Q1
88:Q1
90:Q1
92:Q1
94:Q1
96:Q1
98:Q1
2000:Q1
02:Q1
04:Q1
06:Q1
08:Q1
10:Q1
12:Q1
14:Q1
16:Q1
increase in synchronization is evident in the ris-
ing share of the variation in house price growth
explained by a common global factor (Figure 3.6). Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: The figure shows the rolling estimation with a 15-year window for the share
A dynamic factor model estimates that the share of of the variation in house price growth explained by a common global factor in the
the variance explained by the estimated global factor dynamic factor model. See nnex 3.3.
increases from about 10 percent to 30 percent over
the period from 1971 to 2016.13 This common
global factor summarizes the long-term contribu- economies.14 For example, the housing boom of the
tion of many sources of house price synchronicity, 2000s extended to many advanced economies, and
including the role of global financial developments simultaneous declines in house prices triggered large
and the tightening of financial links, among others financial sector losses worldwide during the global
(see Annex 3.3). financial crisis. Common shocks appear to affect
emerging market economies differently, as evidenced
The short-term comovement in house prices by the fact that the comovement in house prices is less
increases sharply around the time of global recessions likely to shoot up around the time of global recessions.
in advanced economies. This can be seen in Figure 3.7, Among advanced economies, the increase in short-term
which depicts the instantaneous quasi correlation, a synchronicity before recessions is much larger between
measure of short-term comovement, in house price major cities than between countries. This again
gaps. The sharp increases around global economic suggests that the factors driving this synchronous
downturns are noticeable and may reflect common movement may particularly affect major cities in
shocks affecting housing markets in many advanced advanced economies.
Countries and cities differ in how synchronized
they are. Their exposure to the common global factor
varies, with a larger contribution of this factor to
12A similar pattern is found when using seven-year rolling correla-
house prices in countries and cities in Europe than
tions in house price gaps.
13The factor loadings and vector autoregression parameters are in other regions (Figure 3.8). In addition, advanced
simultaneously estimated by the two-step procedure proposed in economies are more exposed than emerging market
Koop and Korobilis (2013) using data for 19 advanced economies
from the second quarter of 1971 to the fourth quarter of 2016.
This procedure requires long time series, so it cannot be adequately 14The instantaneous quasi correlation is constructed not to have a
applied to most emerging market economies. trend (see Annexes 3.2 and 3.3).
Figure 3.7. Instantaneous Quasi Correlation of House Price Gaps Shows Financial Cycle Properties (Median Shown)
1. Country Pairs: Within Advanced Economies 2. Major City Pairs: Within Advanced Economies
1.4 1.4
1.2 1.2
1.0 1.0
0.8 0.8
0.6 0.6
0.4 0.4
0.2 0.2
0.0 0.0
–0.2 –0.2
1995:Q1
96:Q2
97:Q3
98:Q4
2000:Q1
01:Q2
02:Q3
03:Q4
05:Q1
06:Q2
07:Q3
08:Q4
10:Q1
11:Q2
12:Q3
13:Q4
15:Q1
16:Q2
1995:Q1
96:Q2
97:Q3
98:Q4
2000:Q1
01:Q2
02:Q3
03:Q4
05:Q1
06:Q2
07:Q3
08:Q4
10:Q1
11:Q2
12:Q3
13:Q4
15:Q1
16:Q2
3. Country Pairs: Within Emerging Market Economies 4. Major City Pairs: Within Emerging Market Economies
1.0 1.0
0.8 0.8
0.6 0.6
0.4 0.4
0.2 0.2
0.0 0.0
–0.2 –0.2
–0.4 –0.4
1995:Q1
96:Q2
97:Q3
98:Q4
2000:Q1
01:Q2
02:Q3
03:Q4
05:Q1
06:Q2
07:Q3
08:Q4
10:Q1
11:Q2
12:Q3
13:Q4
15:Q1
16:Q2
1995:Q1
96:Q2
97:Q3
98:Q4
2000:Q1
01:Q2
02:Q3
03:Q4
05:Q1
06:Q2
07:Q3
08:Q4
10:Q1
11:Q2
12:Q3
13:Q4
15:Q1
16:Q2
5. Country Pairs: Between Advanced and Emerging Market Economies 6. Major City Pairs: Between Advanced and Emerging Market Economies
0.6 0.6
0.4 0.4
0.2 0.2
0.0 0.0
–0.2 –0.2
–0.4 –0.4
–0.6 –0.6
1995:Q1
96:Q2
97:Q3
98:Q4
2000:Q1
01:Q2
02:Q3
03:Q4
05:Q1
06:Q2
07:Q3
08:Q4
10:Q1
11:Q2
12:Q3
13:Q4
15:Q1
16:Q2
1995:Q1
96:Q2
97:Q3
98:Q4
2000:Q1
01:Q2
02:Q3
03:Q4
05:Q1
06:Q2
07:Q3
08:Q4
10:Q1
11:Q2
12:Q3
13:Q4
15:Q1
16:Q2
economies to global factors. Over time, the relative Figure 3.8. Relative Contribution of the Global Factor Varies
importance of the global factor has increased, but not across Regions
(Percent)
uniformly across advanced economies.15
Countries and cities also differ in how intercon- 1. Country Level
nected they are. The approach in Diebold and Yilmaz 40
(2014) offers one way to measure the interconnected-
ness in housing markets via an examination of quar- 30
terly house price growth correlations.16 This approach
shows that, after controlling for various global factors, 20
countries’ housing markets account differentially for
house price developments in other countries. More- 10
over, countries differ in the degree to which their
house prices can be attributed to other countries’ house 0
prices. For example, many large advanced economies’ dvanced Emerging Europe and sia North and
economies market other South
housing markets are closely interconnected, as sug- economies merica
gested by their central location and proximity to other
economies in a network map representing the links 2. City Level
40
in housing markets (Figure 3.9). In contrast, many
emerging market economies show weaker connectivity
with other countries. 30
ISR
AUS
FIN CHE
ZAF
SWE
DNK
BEL CAN
GBR COL
USA NZL
FRA
IRL
ESP
ITA HKG
PRT SGP
CHL
KOR HUN
RUS
JPN
NLD
IDN CHN
DEU MYS
AUT
THA
Analyzing Contributors to House Price Countries with deeper financial links, as captured by
Synchronization their bilateral banking linkages, exhibit more synchroni-
What are the factors behind house price synchro- zation (Figure 3.12). This result, which is independent
nization? What is the role of financial factors? As of the comovement in output and other economic fun-
discussed earlier, the comovement in house prices damentals, is consistent with financial factors propagat-
may arise from synchronous business cycles or other ing local economic or financial developments between
nonfinancial economic fundamentals. To distinguish
among potential factors, the econometric framework
these issues. The analyses are performed at the country-pair level using
analyzes house price synchronization within country quarterly data from 1990 through 2016 for 40 countries (as well as
and city pairs over time.18 for major city pairs) using two synchronicity measures: (1) negative
value of the absolute difference in house price gaps (synch1), in which
a value closer to zero suggests that the differences in house price gaps
18The bilateral panel data approach removes hard-to-observe between two countries have declined; and (2) instantaneous quasi
country characteristics influencing synchronicity in house prices across correlation of house price gaps (QCORR), in which a higher value
countries or cities, such as strong cultural ties, similar mortgage market implies that the house price gaps of both countries are simultaneously
design, or similar tax treatment of housing capital gains. Thus, the above or below their respective historical averages. See Annex 3.2 for a
results discussed in this section are less likely to be confounded by technical discussion of the econometric model.
Hls
Syd HKG
Snt
Osl
Stc
Mmb
Lnd
Msc Mnl
Vnn
Tky Brl
Ack SGP
Trn Prs
Rom
Lim
Ams Brs
NYC
Jkr MxC
Dbl Dub
Sel
Mdr
Bgt
Shn
two countries.19 Moreover, the magnitude of the in transmitting shocks across countries (for example,
relationship is nearly as large as that between business see Allen and Gale 2000; Calvo and Mendoza 2000;
cycle synchronization and house price synchronization, Perri and Quadrini 2011). For instance, when a negative
suggesting that financial frictions, such as contagion and shock affects a country (or a set of countries), banks
sudden capital flow stops, may play an important role may retrench from activity abroad, triggering a credit
crunch in other countries, which might lead to deeper
19These conclusions are robust to the inclusion of monetary policy recessions and lower asset prices.20
synchronization and bilateral trade linkages as controls. While a
causal link from bilateral banking linkages to house price synchro- 20For example, during the global financial crisis, subsidiaries
nicity cannot be directly established from this analysis, the inclusion of foreign banks had to reduce their operations in eastern Europe
of country-pair fixed effects and multiple time-varying bilateral because of the subprime crisis and the new regulatory environment
determinants reduces the possibility of confounding factors. Also, (Chapter 2 of the April 2015 GFSR). However, the results discussed
reverse causality, in which house price synchronicity increases bilat- here and in the literature are limited in identifying the mechanisms
eral banking linkages, is difficult since diversification motives should by which bank retrenchment may occur, as data on bilateral banking
lead to a negative correlation between these two variables. flows do not differentiate by their intended use.
Figure 3.11. Average Country-Level Housing Market Spillovers Figure 3.12. Bilateral Links between Countries Are
Have Increased Associated with House Price Synchronization
(Percentage points)
0.09
3.0 1990–2006 2007–16
0.08
2.5 0.07
0.06
Standard deviations
2.0
0.05
1.5 0.04
0.03
1.0
0.02
0.5 0.01
0.00
0.0 Business cycle Bilateral bank
Total Es to Es EMEs to Es to EMEs EMEs to Es synchroni ation of ij integration of ij
EMEs
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Source: IMF staff estimates. Note: Synchronicity is measured by the synch1 of gaps measure; see Annex 3.2
Note: The figure is based on a vector autoregression of country-level house price for computation methodology. Figure shows statistically significant standardi ed
growth rates (quarter over quarter), controlling for global factors, for two sample coefficients that are calculated using the coefficients in specification 4 in nnex
periods (1990–2006 and 2007–16). Spillovers are defined as the share of the Table 3.2.1 and their respective standard deviations, and presented in terms of
house price variance in a country that can be accounted for by changes in another standard deviations of the dependent variable; this specification also controls for
single country. For methodology, see Chapter 2 of the pril 2016 Global Financial global financial conditions (proxied through global liquidity) in addition to
Stability Report. Es = advanced economies; EMEs = emerging market economies. country-pair fixed effects and quadratic and linear time trends (standard errors are
clustered at multiway at time, country i, and country j ). The standard deviation for
business cycle synchroni ation is 0.0124 and 1.040 for bilateral bank integration.
See Country-Pair Analysis section of Annex 3.2 for further details. i = country 1
and j = country 2 in the country pair.
A country’s financial openness contributes to house
price synchronicity. Among advanced and emerging
market economies, countries with greater capital
account openness, as proxied by the Chinn-Ito index, Moreover, global financial factors play a role even after
are more exposed to global factors (Figure 3.13). accounting for the comovement in business cycles,
Moreover, among the advanced economies that can which points to an independent role for global factors
be observed for a longer period, the rise in exposure in accounting for house price synchronization.
to the global factor is observed in parallel with the Greater exchange rate flexibility appears to
increase in the comovement in equities documented dampen the importance of global financial condi-
here, in previous GFSRs, and elsewhere (Figure 3.14; tions (Figure 3.15). The impact of global liquidity is
Jordà and others 2017). Taken together, these results lower in countries with high exchange rate flexibility,
suggest that house price synchronization can be perhaps because countries with this feature may have
understood in the broad context of the asset price tools for dealing with imbalances resulting from
synchronization spurred by the evolution of finan- exposure to global financial conditions (Obstfeld,
cial openness. Ostry, and Qureshi 2017).21 For instance, in coun-
Past increases in global liquidity, as well as good tries where local currency loans prevail and exchange
market sentiment and loose global financial condi- rates are flexible, central banks may have a stronger
tions, are strongly associated with a higher short-term
comovement in house prices. These relationships apply
to the instantaneous quasi correlation in house price 21Nominal rigidities may be less relevant in countries with
gaps when looking within country pairs in advanced exchange rate flexibility, dampening the role for global finan-
and emerging market economies (Figure 3.15). cial conditions.
Figure 3.13. Greater Financial Openness Is Associated with Figure 3.14. On Average, the Global Factor for House Prices
Higher House Price Synchronization Has Increased along with That for Equities
(Window = 15 years; percent)
50
80
45 House prices Equity prices
40 70
House price synchronicity (percent)
35 60
30
50
25
40
20
15 30
10 20
5
10
0
Less than 0 0 to 2 More than 2 0
1986:Q1
88:Q1
90:Q1
92:Q1
94:Q1
96:Q1
98:Q1
2000:Q1
02:Q1
04:Q1
06:Q1
08:Q1
10:Q1
12:Q1
14:Q1
16:Q1
Capital account openness
Figure 3.15. Global Financial Conditions, as Proxied by Figure 3.16. House Price Synchronization Predicts a
Global Liquidity, Have Different Associations with House Downside Risk to Economic Growth at Short Horizons
Price Synchronization across Countries and Cities ( uantile re ression coefficients percenta e points of P)
–0.3
–0.4
0.06
–0.5
–0.6
0.04
–0.7
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
0.02 Quantile
negatively affect the lower tail of the growth distribu- house price synchronization may capture the influence of underlying
financial and nonfinancial drivers of synchronization, these results
tion, over and above the risks associated with the price are qualitatively unchanged when controlling for the role of business
of risk, leverage, and external conditions (Chapter 3 of cycle synchronization.
is high, the magnitude of the relationship between The effectiveness of demand-side macroprudential
house price synchronization and future growth is about policy measures may vary with the degree of house
two-thirds that of financial conditions, which measure price synchronicity (Box 3.4). For instance, the
the price of risk. introduction of demand-side macroprudential policy
measures, such as loan-to-value limits, is typically
Policy Discussion followed by a decline in house price growth, but this
decline is larger and more persistent in countries with
Increasingly, house prices have become determined at
low house price synchronicity. Policymakers may thus
the global level. Local factors, such as land-use regu-
have additional control over house price dynamics
lations, tax policy, and demographics, still account for
in countries where house price synchronicity is low
most of the variation in house prices, but during the
and global investors may have a less prominent role.
past three decades, house prices have become increas-
Nonetheless, the decline in house prices observed after
ingly synchronized across countries, especially among
the introduction of macroprudential policy measures in
major cities. Thus, policymakers cannot ignore the pos-
high-synchronicity countries suggests that the drivers
sibility that shocks to house prices elsewhere may affect
of synchronicity operate at least partially through the
domestic markets. The evidence presented in this chap-
local financial intermediaries that are usually targeted
ter suggests that this trend is associated with the process
by these measures. Macroprudential policy measures
of global financial integration, which, despite the many
aimed at dampening the accumulation of domestic
benefits, may have contributed to the “financialization”
financial vulnerabilities may have the additional con-
of housing (Box 3.2). The behavior of housing as a
sequence of reducing a country’s house price synchro-
financial asset is particularly notable in light of hous-
nization (Box 3.4). Fiscal-based measures, such as ad
ing’s physical immobility. If synchronization leads to
valorem and buyers’ stamp duty taxes, may also lower
contagion during crises, the ramifications for housing
house price synchronization, but to a lesser extent than
markets may be more damaging for the real economy
demand-based measures, such as loan-to-value limits.
than in the case of financial assets (Dornbusch, Park,
This does not mean that such policy tools should target
and Claessens 2000). This is because households hold
the reduction of synchronicity. Rather, to the extent
most of their assets and liabilities in housing and mort-
that they are able to tame excesses in domestic housing
gages, respectively, and because of financial institutions’
markets, macroprudential policy measures can also
outsized exposure to house prices.
reduce the comovement between domestic and foreign
Monitoring synchronization in addition to the
house prices and potentially mitigate the influence of
over- or undervaluation of house prices may help
global financial conditions. This unintended effect is an
policymakers understand the trade-offs associated with
aspect to consider when evaluating the consequences of
greater global links in housing markets. House prices
macroprudential policy measures (IMF 2013).
may comove because business cycles are synchronized
Policymakers wishing to deter foreign buyers of real
or because of financial factors such as global financial
estate for the purpose of alleviating valuation pres-
conditions, portfolio channels, or expected capital
sures will likely face a number of challenges. For one,
gains. While house price synchronization in and of
systematically identifying the impact of foreign buyers
itself may not warrant policy intervention, it points
on housing affordability is difficult because of data
to the scope for global financial conditions and global
limitations. And without a conclusive evidence base on
investors to influence local house price dynamics.
their impact, there may be uncertainty in the appropri-
Moreover, the evidence presented in this chapter sug-
ate timing and method of intervention in the housing
gests that heightened synchronicity of house prices can
market (Bank of Canada 2017).24 A range of policy
signal a downside tail risk to real economic activity,
instruments, including tax policy, land-use regulation,
especially in an environment with buoyant credit and
high leverage. Thus, increasing the granularity, time- 24For example, in Hong Kong SAR, a buyers’ stamp duty tax
liness, and coverage of data on house prices may help affecting foreign buyers has faced limited success in taming house
provide richer indicators for bilateral and multilateral price appreciation, though other housing market policies have had a
moderating effect on prices (IMF 2018b). In Canada, foreign buyer
surveillance. Also, more comprehensive data on the
taxes in Vancouver and Toronto are expected to mitigate housing
participation of global investors in housing markets market imbalances, but authorities are aware of the uncertainty and
would strengthen surveillance efforts. scope for spillovers to other areas (Bank of Canada 2017).
and macroprudential policy measures, may be contem- (Chapter 3 of the April 2017 GFSR). Others may
plated to address affordability concerns in residential include policies that deepen domestic real estate
real estate markets, but the effectiveness of these tools markets or consumer financial protections to limit
is far from certain. Moreover, some policies may be excessive or predatory lending to households. While
circumvented, leading to implementation challenges. this chapter does not explore the impact of these
Last, limiting house purchases in one city or country policies, existing research suggests that such abuses can
may steer foreign buyers elsewhere, leaving a role for accelerate during and reinforce housing booms (Bond,
national or international policy coordination. Musto, and Yilmaz 2009), and when financial shocks
More generally, policies that enhance resilience to occur, consumer protections may help both insulate
global financial shocks may also dampen house price households’ balance sheets and limit the fallout from
synchronicity. In the context of housing markets, household deleveraging, particularly among households
exchange rate flexibility seems to play an important with high marginal propensities to consume (Campbell
role, likely by giving more flexibility to monetary and others 2011; Mian, Rao, and Sufi 2013; Chapter 2
authorities to influence their domestic conditions of the October 2017 GFSR).
Ratio
12.4 5
Housing serves a dual purpose: it is a residential
good for the local population and an investment
good for investors across the globe (Bernanke 2005,
2010; Sá, Wieladek, and Towbin 2014; Badarinza and 12.2 4
Ramadorai 2016; Sá 2016). In its capacity as an asset
for investment, housing is substitutable geographically
and may attract significant amounts of funds from
global investors. If this is the case, shocks to demand 12.0 3
Jan. 1996
Jan. 99
Jan. 2002
Jan. 05
Jan. 08
Jan. 11
Jan. 14
Jan. 17
from global investors may be a source of synchronicity
in house prices across cities and countries.
This possibility can be tested by looking at the
behavior of house price dispersion, which can capture Sources: US Census Bureau; Zillow Group; and IMF staff
global investor demand. Global investors may prefer calculations.
high-end properties in major cities for several reasons.
First, information asymmetries may be less severe for
high-end properties situated in recognizable areas.
ratio of the top and bottom deciles of house prices.1
Second, investors with anonymity concerns may wish
Consistent with rising demand from global investors,
to minimize the number of properties they own.
house price dispersion has increased sharply in recent
Third, the possibility of future migration may lead
decades (Figure 3.1.1).2 Moreover, there is substantial
them to prefer these markets. To the extent that global
investors prefer high-end houses, their prices will rise
1This is equivalent to the interpercentile range at log scale.
disproportionately in response to an increase in global
The percentiles are determined by pooling house price estimates
investor demand. In other words, an increase in house from Zillow at the granularity of individual ZIP codes. Cities
prices in a global city like London should lead to a are ranked according to 2015 population estimates from the US
larger increase in high-end US house prices than in Census Bureau.
2An alternative interpretation is that luxury houses are located
the median house price, bringing about a rise in house
price dispersion. in areas with tighter constraints on housing supply and therefore
experience greater price rises in response to a common rise in
A measure of house price dispersion in the 40 demand. However, this interpretation cannot account for the
largest US cities can be constructed by taking the positive significant relationship between house price dispersion
and house prices in foreign cities despite controlling for domestic
This box was prepared by Anil Ari. determinants of housing demand (see Annex Table 3.3.2).
between US house price dispersion and house prices price dispersion eliminates any confounding factors that have a
in alternative investment destinations outside the uniform impact across the distribution of US house prices. Regres-
United States. House prices in major cities outside sion results are reported in Annex Table 3.3.2. These cities were
selected based on the criteria of Cushman & Wakefield (2017) and
the United States—Beijing, Dublin, Hong Kong
data availability. The control variables include the unemployment
SAR, London, Seoul, Shanghai, Singapore, Tokyo, rate as a proxy for economic fundamentals; the Chicago Board
Toronto, and Vancouver—are positively associated Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) as a proxy for risk appe-
with US house price dispersion. The coefficient tite; and the effective federal funds rate, 30-year fixed-rate average
associated with the foreign city index is positive and mortgage interest rates, and the mortgage-backed security holdings
of large domestically chartered commercial banks (excluding
significant in all specifications considered, including
mortgage-backed securities with government guarantees) as proxies
those that control for potential domestic determi- for ease of access to financing. Specifications with a time trend and
nants of house prices. These findings indicate that a dummy variable for the global financial crisis are also considered.
Figure 3.2.1. Housing Return Predictability Figure 3.2.2. Predictability of Returns on Housing
and Capital Account Openness
0.20
1.0
0.15 0.8
0.6
R2
0.10
R2
0.4
0.05
0.2
0.00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0.0
Year 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
Capital account openness
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: The forecasting equation uses the current price-to-rent ratio Sources: Chinn and Ito (2006); and IMF staff estimates.
to predict future capital gains in housing assets. The y-axis in this Note: The y-axis shows the R 2 from the housing return forecasting
figure shows the R 2 from the forecasting equation, that is, the equation, which measures the proportion of variance in the future
proportion of variance in the future housing return explained by housing return nine years ahead explained by the current
the current price-to-rent ratio. The forecasting horizon ranges price-to-rent ratio.
from 1 year to 10 years. The median R 2 among countries in the
sample is plotted in this figure.
2015; Cerutti, Dagher, and Dell’Ariccia 2017; Vandenbussche, 3The relative magnitude of the effect of macroprudential
Vogel, and Detragiache 2015) suggests that the role of mac- measures averages about one-half of the effect of global factors
roprudential policies in mitigating house price imbalances is and about one-third of the effect of bilateral financial integration.
less consistent than when household credit is considered. For Consistent with Figure 3.15, both global factors and financial
instance, loan-targeted measures (Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey integration are positively associated with house price synchronicity.
2017) and those that complement monetary policy (Bruno, 4When only periods with credit booms are considered, the
Shim, and Shin 2017) seem to be most effective in mitigating results are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar, although
house price growth. In contrast, there is no robust evidence for the relationships are slightly less significant.
the effectiveness of policies such as risk weighting and provision- 5In some instances, fiscal-based measures target speculative
ing requirements (Kuttner and Shim 2016). investments, including by foreign buyers (see IMF 2018b).
On average, house prices are affected more by Supply-side measures targeting bank capital and
demand-side macroprudential policies in loan-specific measures, including loan-to-value
low-synchronicity countries. limits, seem effective in reducing synchronicity with
the global cycle.
1. Average House Price Growth and Demand-Side 2. Impact of Macroprudential Measures on House Price
Macroprudential Policies Synchronicity (Standard deviations)
High-synchronicity countries (above 50th percentile)
Low-synchronicity countries (at or below 50th percentile)
8 0.04
House price growth (percentage points)
0.00
4
2
–0.04
Supply side:
–5 –4 –3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Fiscal-based
measures
All measures
All loans
Demand side
general
capital
loans
LTV
Bilateral-Level Variables
Bilateral Bank Claims vis-à-vis Bilateral locational cross-border claims on residency Bank for International Settlements, International
Counterparty Economies basis Banking Statistics confidential databases
Bilateral Gross Trade vis-à-vis Gross exports vis-à-vis counterparty economies IMF, Direction of Trade database; IMF staff calculations
Counterparty Economies
Global-Level Variables
Global Liquidity Total claims of all Bank for International Settlements Bank for International Settlements; Haver Analytics
reporters vis-à-vis the world, in percent of world GDP
US Financial Conditions Positive values of the FCI indicate tighter-than-average IMF, October 2017 Global Financial Stability Report
Index financial conditions. For methodology and variables (Chapter 3)
included in the FCI, refer to Annex 3.2 of the
October 2017 Global Financial Stability Report.
Global Financial Conditions Based on a PCA of all FCIs estimated; positive values IMF, October 2017 Global Financial Stability Report
Index of the FCI indicate tighter-than-average financial (Chapter 3)
conditions. For methodology and variables included
in the FCI, refer to Annex 3.2 of the October 2017
Global Financial Stability Report.
VIX Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index Haver Analytics
MOVE Merrill Lynch Option Volatility Estimate Index Bloomberg Finance L.P.
US Shadow Interest Rates Wu-Xia and Krippner shadow federal funds rates Bloomberg Finance L.P.; Haver Analytics
Global Oil Prices Petroleum prices, US dollar a barrel Bloomberg Finance L.P.; IMF, Global Data Source
database
Global Commodity Prices Commodity prices: all primary commodities IMF, Global Data Source database
Source: IMF staff.
Note: CEMBI = Corporate Emerging Markets Bond Index; FCI = financial conditions index; MOVE = Merrill Lynch Option Volatility Estimate Index; PCA = principal
component analysis; VIX = Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index.
Wakefield (2017). An additional sample comprising 76 cities based on the top 30 cities for global investors in Cushman & Wakefield’s (2017) Global Capital Mar-
kets 2017 report’s economic scale, financial center, technology hub, and innovation pillars is also used in robustness checks. In the latter data set, if none of the
cities in an economy (where data are available) are chosen based on the four pillars stated above, the largest city by population owing to data availability is used.
Annex 3.2. Measuring Synchronization and in which HPgapit and HPgapjt stand for house price
Country-Pair Analysis gaps of countries i and j, respectively, at quarter t,
Measuring Synchronization and the gaps are measured as explained in note 25.
¯
HPgapi and ¯ HPgapj are the average house price gaps
First, the instantaneous quasi correlation (Morgan, of countries i and j, respectively, and σ gap
i and σ gap
j are
Rime, and Strahan 2004; Kalemli-Özcan, Papaioan- the standard deviations of house price gaps of countries
nou, and Perri 2013; Kalemli-Özcan, Papaioannou, i and j, respectively.
and Peydró 2013; Duval and others 2016) in house Second, the negative of the absolute difference of
price gaps25 is defined as follows: house price gaps in countries i and j at quarter t is
HPsynchijt = calculated as follows:
(HPgapit − ¯
HPgapi) (HPgapjt − ¯
HPgapj)
QCORRijt = _________________________
σ gap σ gap , HPsynchijt = Synch1 ijt = − |HPgapit − HPgapjt | .
i j
(A3.2.1)
(A3.2.2)
25House price gaps are measured by extracting the cyclical compo- Third, based on a dynamic factor model (Kose,
nent of real house prices using the band-pass filter of Christiano and Otrok, and Prasad 2012; Kose, Prasad, and Terrones
Fitzgerald (2003), with a maximum length of 20 years to capture 2003; Del Negro and Otrok 2007), the synchroniza-
medium-term financial cycles. The cyclical components of house
prices are then taken as a ratio of house price levels to obtain house tion measure for house prices for country i, sync hL,i,t,
price gaps. As a robustness check, house price gaps are also con- is defined as:
structed using a Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter with a lambda
varL(λ i,t gt) + varL(λ r,i rk,t)
of 400,000, which is commonly used as the lambda relevant for synchL,i,t = _________________ or
financial cycles. House price gaps broadly consistent with those of varL(hi,t)
the Christiano and Fitzgerald (CF) filter are obtained. The CF filter varL(λ i,t gt)
is chosen for the analysis because it computes the cyclical component synchL,i,t = ________ , (A3.2.3)
for all observations without being prone to tail bias.
varL(hi,t)
in which varL( ⋅ ) is the realized variance from period INSTij denotes dummies that equal 1 if both countries
t − L to t, λ i,t , and λ r,i are the factor loadings to the have a high level of an institutional characteristic (that is,
global, gt, and regional, rk,t , factors. In the model, economic development level, capital account openness,
the quarterly growth rate of house prices for country exchange rate flexibility, or financial development).30
i in period t, hi,t consists of the global factor, gt, the OTHERij includes other controls (for example, institu-
regional factor for region k (k = Europe, Asia, and the tional factors). All regressors are lagged by one quarter.
Americas), rk,t, and the country-specific idiosyncratic In addition, linear and quadratic time trends (tr) are
component, ci,t. See Annex 3.3 for more details on the included. The term α ij is the country-pair fixed effects
dynamic factor models and related analyses. capturing unobservable time-invariant idiosyncratic
factors common to country-pairs i and j, such as geo-
graphic proximity. The error term is ε ijt.31 Importantly,
Country-Pair Analysis26 country-pair fixed effects capture how time-invariant
This analysis uses bilateral country-pair panel data supply-side and regulatory considerations influence house
to estimate the impact of business cycle synchroni- price synchronicity between two countries. Results are
zation, bilateral financial links, and global factors on presented in Annex Tables 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.32
house price synchronization. The baseline econometric
specification presented below is estimated at quarterly Robustness Checks
frequency spanning the period 1990–2016, for 40 In addition to the results in Annex Tables 3.2.1 and
countries:27 3.2.2, various robustness checks are performed, with
the main findings broadly unchanged. For instance,
HPsynchijt = α ij + β 1 BCSijt − 1 + β 2 FININTijt − 1
alternative proxies for global liquidity include the US
+ β 3 GLOBALt − 1 financial conditions index (FCI), global FCI, Chi-
cago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX),
+ β 4 INS Tijt − 1 x GLOBALt − 1
US shadow interest rates (in the spirit of Wu and
+ β 5 OTHERijt − 1 + tr + ε ijt, (A3.2.4) Xia 2016; and Krippner 2013).33 The specifications
above were also estimated by replacing business cycle
in which HPsynchijt is the synchronization of house
synchronization with interest rate synchronization to
price gaps between country-pairs i and j at quarter t.
investigate the contribution of synchronized monetary
BCSij denotes business cycle synchronization between
policies to house price synchronization. Interest rate
countries i and j.28 FININTij refers to bilateral finan-
synchronization is found to be a statistically significant
cial integration between countries i and j.29 GLOBALt
driver of house price synchronization on its own when
is the global factor proxied by changes in global liquidity
either synchronicity measure is used (either Synch1 or
(see Annex Table 3.1.1 for descriptions of variable).
quasi correlation). However, the statistical significance
of interest rate synchronicity above and beyond other
26Prepared by Adrian Alter and Dulani Seneviratne.
27Although
financial factors, such as global liquidity and bilateral
the house price time series in this analysis, partic-
ularly for advanced economies, start several decades before 1990, banking links, is robust only to a less stringent manner
the econometric analysis is restricted to series beginning in 1990
because the availability of data on bilateral banking links significantly 30High level is defined based on the top fifth of the distribution
improves that year. Four emerging markets out of the sample of 44 of institutional characteristics at any time. In addition, robustness
countries in the econometric analysis are excluded because of the checks were performed by defining the institutional factors as high if
short length of their house price time series. both countries are at or above the 75th or 66th percentiles instead of
28Business cycle synchronization measures are calculated similarly the 80th percentile.
to house price synchronicity. 31To account for serial correlation, following Cameron, Gelbach,
29Financial integration is measured using bilateral locational bank- and Miller (2011), standard errors are multiway clustered (at country
ing statistics on residency basis obtained from Bank for International i, country j, and time level, where appropriate).
Settlements International Banking Statistics confidential databases. 32Similar analyses for city-level house prices were performed, in
Bilateral banking integration is measured as the logarithm of the which the dependent variable is city-level house price gap synchro-
sum of bilateral claims of country i vis-à-vis country j and bilateral nization, and the explanatory variables are the same as the variables
claims of country j vis-à-vis country i as a ratio of the sum of the presented in this annex (see Figure 3.15 for city-level results).
GDPs of countries i and j. Additional forms of bilateral financial 33Although results are robust to these alternative proxies for
integration measures, such as bilateral portfolio links and bilateral the global factor, when some proxies are combined with the most
direct investment links, are not used in the analysis because of their stringent manner of standard error clustering, the level of statistical
lower frequency and much shorter time span. significance declines.
Annex Table 3.2.1. House Price Gap Synchronization at Country Level and Bilateral Linkages
Dependent Variable: House Price Gap
Synchronization of Country Pair i and j (Synch1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Business Cycle Synchronization of ij 0.766*** 0.675** 0.733*** 0.657** 0.658** 0.746*** 0.725*** 0.725*** 0.675** 0.706**
(0.254) (0.293) (0.243) (0.254) (0.253) (0.262) (0.261) (0.262) (0.253) (0.337)
Bilateral Bank Integration of ij 0.006* 0.007** 0.012 0.009* 0.007** 0.007* 0.007** 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Global Factor (global liquidity) –0.001 –0.001 –0.001 –0.001 –0.001 –0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Bilateral Bank Integration Interacted with:
× EMEs-EMEs Dummy –0.016*
(0.009)
× EMEs-AEs Dummy –0.009
(0.010)
× High Capital Account Openness with the World –0.005
(0.003)
× High Exchange Rate Regime (ij ) –0.005
(15 categories; high = more flexible) (0.004)
× High Exchange Rate Regime (ij ) –0.001
(6 categories; high = more flexible) (0.004)
× High Financial Openness with the World (ij ) –0.019***
(0.004)
GFC Period Dummy Interacted with:
× Business Cycle Synchronization of ij –0.080
(0.516)
× Bilateral Bank Integration of ij 0.008**
(0.004)
× Global Factor 0.001
(0.001)
Post-GFC Period Dummy Interacted with:
× Business Cycle Synchronization of ij 0.380
(0.456)
× Bilateral Bank Integration of ij 0.007
(0.005)
× Global Factor 0.004
(0.003)
GFC Dummy 0.048***
(0.011)
Post-GFC Dummy 0.042***
(0.009)
Observations 65,450 65,343 49,384 49,384 49,384 43,871 46,708 46,708 47,353 49,384
R2 0.353 0.498 0.386 0.356 0.356 0.361 0.356 0.356 0.360 0.360
Multiway Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Two-way
Time FE and Country-Pair FE Yes Yes
Time FE, Country-Pair FE, and country*time FE Yes
Quadratic Trend and Country-Pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Pair FE Yes
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: GFC Period Dummy = a dummy variable that equals 1 during 2008–09 and zero otherwise. Post-GFC Period Dummy = a dummy variable that equals 1 during 2010–16 and zero
otherwise. All regressors are lagged by one quarter. Institutional characteristics dummies are included in specifications 5 through 9, but are not shown above (specifically, dummy variables
for EMEs-EMEs, EMEs-AEs, high capital account openness, high exchange rate regime, and high financial openness are included in specifications 5 through 9, but not shown). High = a
dummy variable that equals 1 when both countries are in the top fifth of the institutional characteristic. Standard errors (in parentheses) are three-way clustered (at country i, country j, and
date), with the exception of regression 10, in which errors are two-way clustered (at country i, country j ). The standard deviation for business cycle synchronization is 0.0124 and 1.040 for
bilateral bank integration. AEs = advanced economies; EMEs = emerging market economies; FE = fixed effects; GFC = global financial crisis; Synch1 = synchronization measure introduced
in the text of this annex.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
Annex Table 3.2.2. House Price Gap Synchronization at Country Level and Global Factors
Dependent Variable: House Price Gap
Synchronization of Country Pair i and j
(Quasi correlation) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Business Cycle Synchronization of ij 0.025* 0.030** 0.022 0.026* 0.026* 0.025* 0.026* 0.026* 0.026** 0.042
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.033)
Bilateral Bank Integration of ij –0.011 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.022 0.022 0.012 –0.016
(0.033) (0.031) (0.031) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.032) (0.034)
Global Factor (global liquidity) 0.016** 0.016** 0.020** 0.019*** 0.019** 0.018** 0.022*
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013)
Global Factor Interacted with:
× EMEs-EMEs Dummy –0.001
(0.009)
× EMEs-AEs Dummy 0.000
(0.006)
× High Capital Account Openness with the World –0.002
(0.005)
× High Exchange Rate Regime (ij ) –0.023***
(15 categories; high = more flexible) (0.008)
× High Exchange Rate Regime (ij ) –0.009
(6 categories; high = more flexible) (0.007)
× High Financial Openness with the World (ij ) 0.003
(0.006)
GFC Period Dummy Interacted with:
× Business Cycle Synchronization of ij –0.032
(0.038)
× Bilateral Bank Integration of ij –0.022
(0.035)
× Global Factor –0.025*
(0.012)
Post-GFC Period Dummy Interacted with:
× Business Cycle Synchronization of ij –0.039
(0.035)
× Bilateral Bank Integration of ij 0.010
(0.033)
× Global Factor –0.029
(0.018)
GFC Dummy –0.137**
(0.060)
Post-GFC Dummy –0.044
(0.052)
Observations 65,450 65,343 49,384 49,384 49,384 43,871 46,708 46,708 47,353 49,384
R2 0.227 0.354 0.251 0.230 0.230 0.233 0.224 0.223 0.241 0.232
Multiway Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Two-way
Time FE and Country-Pair FE Yes Yes
Time FE, Country-Pair FE, and country*time FE Yes
Quadratic Trend and Country-Pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Pair FE Yes
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: GFC Period Dummy = a dummy variable that equals 1 during 2008–09, and zero otherwise. Post-GFC Period Dummy = a dummy variable that equals 1 during 2010–16, and
zero otherwise. All regressors are lagged by one quarter. Institutional characteristics dummies are included in specifications 5 through 9, but are not shown above (specifically, dummy
variables for EMEs-EMEs, EMEs-AEs, high capital account openness, high exchange rate regime, and high financial openness are included in specifications 5 through 9, but not
shown). High = a dummy variable that equals 1 when both countries are in the top fifth of the institutional characteristic. Standard errors (in parentheses) are three-way clustered (at
country i, country j, and date), with the exception of regression 10, in which errors are two-way clustered (at country i, country j ). AEs = advanced economies; EMEs = emerging market
economies; FE = fixed effects; GFC = global financial crisis.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
of standard error clustering (for instance, clustering at others 2012; Del Negro and Otrok 2007; Jara and
the country-pair and time dimension or computing Romero 2016; and Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar 2017).
robust standard errors instead of the multiway clus- For simplicity, assume the economy consists of two
tering of standard errors used in the main analyses). countries, i and j. Based on the framework in Doyle
Moreover, trade integration was included as an addi- and Faust (2005), house prices in each country, hi and
tional control, but found not to be statistically signif- hj, can be decomposed into a common factor, ε c, and
icant. When equity price synchronization is included an idiosyncratic factor for each country, ε i and ε j:
as an additional control, the results presented in Annex
hi = ε c + ε i + γ hj , and hj = ε c + ε j + γ hi . (A3.3.1)
Tables 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 remain broadly unchanged.
However, equity price synchronization itself does not Here, 0 ≤ γ < 1 represents the interconnectedness
consistently have a statistically significant relationship of house prices between the two countries. Simple
with house price synchronization. arithmetic yields the following:
Various clustering alternatives were used (clustering
1 − γ2[ i
at country-pair level, two-way at country i and country hi = ____ j ( ) c]
1 ε + γ ε + 1 + γ ε , and
(1 − γ 2) 2 σ hi σ hj [ ( it jt)
variables using the last value of the previous period 1
= _________ γ ε 2 + ε 2 + (1 + γ) ε it ε jt
instead. The interaction term of the global factor and
foreign exchange regime is still found to be statistically
+ (1 + γ)(ε it ε ct + ε ct ε jt + ε 2ct)]. (A3.3.3)
significant, in addition to the global factor itself.
The relationship between house price gap synchro- When γ is not very large, the squared terms for idio-
nicity and business cycle synchronization is found to be syncratic shocks, ε 2it + ε 2jt, do not have large effects on
positive and statistically significant when using the Jordà, this measure. In addition, since the interaction terms,
Schularick, and Taylor (2017) data set, which starts in ε i ε j , ε i ε c , and ε c ε j , fluctuate around zero, system-
1870 for 17 advanced economies at annual frequency. atic movements of q cijt are driven by the square term
Additional analysis was limited by data availability. of the common shock (1 + γ) ε 2c . Hence, this measure
is suitable for identifying short-term comovement of
Annex 3.3. Technical Annex house prices that is caused by the common shock and,
indeed, as seen in Figure 3.7, sharp movements in the
Measuring Synchronicity: Conceptual Issues34 instantaneous quasi correlation are observed around
Measuring whether house prices move in tandem global recessions in advanced economies, which, in this
can take many approaches; this chapter focuses on framework, points to a role for a common rather than
three commonly used techniques to take advantage of an idiosyncratic shock driving the spike.
each method’s strengths (for example, see Hirata and Second, the bilateral absolute difference in house
prices between two countries (a dijt) is defined in this
34Prepared by Mitsuru Katagiri framework as follows:
1 ε −ε .
a dijt = − |hit − hjt| = − ___ (A3.3.4) assumed to follow the vector autoregression jointly
1 + γ | it jt|
with global output, global inflation, and the global
In contrast to the instantaneous quasi correlation,
interest rate, which are the first principal components
this measure is independent of the common shock
of each sequence across countries, and the time-varying
because it cancels out. Given that idiosyncratic shocks
factor loadings and the vector autoregression param-
are independent of one another and that their abso-
eters are simultaneously estimated by the two-step
lute difference moves almost randomly, this measure
procedure proposed in Koop and Korobilis (2013).
is suitable for assessing a long-term trend in synchro-
The relationship between house price synchroniza-
nicity driven by changes in γ (the interconnectedness
tion and financial and trade openness is examined by
of house prices). Hence, the increasing trend in a dijt,
the panel regression using the synchronization mea-
as is observed in both advanced and emerging market
sured by estimating a dynamic factor model (synchL,i,t ):
economies, implies that the interconnectedness of
housing markets across countries represented by γ has synchL,i,t = α i + δ t + β 1 kaopeni,t + β 2 t ri,t
been increasing over the long term. + γ Zi,t + ε i,t , (A3.3.7)
Third, the relative contribution of the global factor in
country i (r ci) is defined in this framework as follows: in which α i is a country fixed effect and δ t is a
time dummy. Here, financial openness is measured
( 1 − γ )
1 + γ
var _____2 ε c by capital account openness as represented by the
σ 2c
r ci = _________ = _________ . (A3.3.5)
var(hi) 1 + γ 2
______ σ 2 + σ 2 Chinn-Ito index (Chinn and Ito 2006), kaopeni,t, and
2 i c
(1 + γ) trade openness is measured by the ratio of gross trade
As long as we estimate these variances using a rela-
volume to GDP, t ri,t. A vector of control variables, Zi,t,
tively long-term window (for example, 15 years), this
includes the level of real GDP and consumer price
measure is suitable for identifying a long-term trend in
index inflation. We use 15 years for the length of
synchronization. An observed increasing trend in r ci,
the fixed window for sync hL,i,t for the baseline results
as is the case in advanced economies in the past two
and present results for 20 years as a robustness check.
decades, could include any or all of three possibili-
Also, for the measures of financial and trade openness,
ties: (1) the size of common shocks has become larger
kaopeni,t and t ri,t, the weighted average over the length
(σ c has risen); (2) the size of idiosyncratic shocks has
( i,t − l)
of the window that is, _________ 1 ∑ l = 0
L − 1 (l + 1)x
become smaller (σ i has declined); and (3) the intercon- ∑ l = 0
L (l + 1)
is used. The weighted average assigns greater weight
nectedness has become tighter (γ has risen). Hence, this
to the periods close to the beginning of the window
measure is a comprehensive measure for house price
because financial and trade openness may take some
synchronicity, but it is empirically difficult to separately
time to have effects on synchronization.
identify the above three cases using this measure.
For house price synchronization, Annex Table 3.3.1
shows that β 1 and β 2 are positive and statistically signifi-
Estimation of a Dynamic Factor Model35 cant. This result implies that, among 19 advanced econ-
House price dynamics are decomposed into the omies that can be observed for a longer period, increases
common and idiosyncratic factors by a dynamic factor in financial and trade openness over time partly account
model with time-varying parameters. In the model, for the rise in exposure to the global factor. Financial
the quarterly growth rate of house prices for country openness also explains the increase in the comovement
i in period t, hi,t, consists of the global factor, gt, the in equities. Taken together, those results suggest that
regional factor for region k (k =Europe, Asia, and the house price synchronization can be understood as part
Americas), rk,t, and the country-specific idiosyncratic of asset price synchronization induced by the progress of
component, ci,t: financial openness more generally.
hi,t = λ g,i gt + λ r,i rk,t + ci,t, (A3.3.6)
Growth at Risk36
in which λ g,i and λ r,i are the factor loadings on the
global and regional factors. The regional factor is Data Partitioning
extracted by region from the residuals after extracting To avoid parameter inflation and to reduce noise
the global factor. The global and regional factors are in financial time series, financial data are aggregated
35Prepared by Mitsuru Katagiri. 36Prepared by Romain Lafarguette.
data-reduction process. By contrast, the PCA approach As discussed in Komunjer (2013), quantile regressions rely on
only aggregates information about the common trend specific functional form assumptions and have some important
advantages in forecasting the conditional distribution of the variable
among financial indicators.38 of interest. These advantages include the optimality of the condi-
tional quantile estimator as a predictor of the true future quantile;
37The tables in Annex 3.2 in Chapter 3 of the October 2017 robustness of the estimation to extreme outliers and violations of
Global Financial Stability Report describe the specific financial normality and homoscedasticity of the errors; flexibility, in terms
indicators used. of allowing for time-varying structural parameters and the optimal
38LDA assumes independence of normally distributed data and weighting of predictors depending on country, horizon, and the part
homoscedastic variance among each class, although LDA is consid- of the distribution that is of interest; and the ability to avoid over-
ered robust when these assumptions are violated. See Duda, Hart, fitting (compared with more complex models such as copulas and
and Stork (2001). See Izenman (2009) for a thorough exposition of extreme value theory). Panel quantile regressions are estimated using
the LDA technique. the methodology proposed by Koenker (2004).
The role of house price synchronicity in signaling and the mortgage-backed security holdings of large
downside and upside risks to future growth can also domestically chartered commercial banks (excluding
function through amplification effects, particularly in mortgage-backed securities with government guar-
conjunction with higher leverage or tighter financial antees) as proxies for ease of access to financing. γ t
conditions. To investigate this amplification mecha- is a time trend, and GF Ct is a dummy variable for
nism, an augmented specification is considered: the global financial crisis.40 Specification (1) regresses
HP Dt on FCt and a time trend; (2) includes the
yt + h,q = α hq pt + β hq Aggt + γ hq yt + ϕ hq ft + θ hq HPt control variables. Specifications (3) and (4) use the
+ ς hq HPt × Aggt(or pt) + ϵ ht,q.
first difference of the dependent variable to elimi-
(A3.3.9)
nate potential common trends. Specification (4) also
The coefficient ς hq represents the amplification effect includes the global financial crisis dummy GF Ct. See
of the impact of house price synchronicity when Annex Table 3.3.2.
leverage increases or when financial conditions tighten.
Overall, this approach disentangles the contribution of
changes in house price synchronicity from the evolving Methodology: Box 3.4
price of risk, credit aggregates, and shocks to the exter- The analysis in Box 3.4 gauges the effectiveness of
nal environment to forecasting risks to GDP growth. macroprudential tools in reducing house price synchro-
It thereby provides insights into which variables signal nicity across 41 countries from 1990:Q2–2016:Q4.
growth tail risks over different time horizons. This can More specifically, the following panel regression speci-
help policymakers and others design a surveillance fication is estimated, with i denoting the country and t
framework that seeks to embed information flowing in representing the quarter:
at different frequencies.
HP Si,t = ρBC Si,t − 1 + βMP Pi,t − 1
+ γ Xi,t − 1 + α i + ϵ i,t, (A3.3.11)
Methodology for Boxes
in which i denotes country fixed effects. The depen-
Methodology: Box 3.1
dent variable HPS refers to house price cycle syn-
Four alternative regression specifications are consid- chronicity (instantaneous quasi correlation) with
ered to analyze the role of global investors. The main the global cycle. BCS is business cycle synchronicity
specification can be written parsimoniously as: with the rest of the world. X is a vector of controls
HP Dt = β 0 + β 1 FCt + β 2 Xt + β 3 γ t (including a global factor, financial integration with
the world, and institutional characteristics). MPP is a
+ β 4 GF Ct + ε t, (A3.3.10) macroprudential tool (such as limits on loan-to-value
in which the dependent variable HP Dt is the ratio of ratios or debt-to-income ratios or fiscal-based mea-
the 90th percentile of house prices to the 10th per- sures that include sellers’ and buyers’ stamp duty
centile in the 40 largest US cities by population. The taxes) or a macroprudential group index (such as
independent variable of interest, FCt, is an unweighted loan-targeted, supply-side [capital, general, loans], or
real US$ average of house prices in non-US destina- demand-side tools).41
tions for global investors. Xt is a vector of domestic
control variables that includes the unemployment rate
as a proxy for economic fundamentals, the Chicago
Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) as a 40GF C equals 1 during 2008 and 2009.
proxy for risk appetite, and the effective federal funds t
41For more details regarding the macroprudential tools database,
rate, 30-year fixed-rate average mortgage interest rates, see Alam and others (forthcoming).
Annex Table 3.3.2. Global Investors, House Price Dispersion, and Synchronicity: Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Ratio of 90th Percentile (1) (2) (3) (4)
of House Prices to the 10th Percentile in the
40 Largest US Cities by Population Levels Differences
Foreign City House Price Index (FCt) 0.600*** 0.339** 0.019** 0.019**
(0.000) (0.031) (0.039) (0.039)
VIX Index –0.002** 0.000** 0.000**
(0.041) (0.021) (0.022)
Federal Funds Rate (effective) 0.002 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.952) (0.009) (0.009)
Mortgage Interest Rates –0.011 0.005** 0.005**
(0.654) (0.017) (0.017)
Bank MBS Holdings 0.434* –0.002 –0.002
(0.053) (0.883) (0.881)
Unemployment Rate 0.012 –0.003 –0.003
(0.652) (0.145) (0.148)
Time Trend 0.025*** 0.024***
(0.000) (0.000)
Financial Crisis Dummy (GFCt) –0.000
(0.528)
Constant 0.188* 0.287** –0.001 –0.001
(0.073) (0.016) (0.618) (0.619)
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