Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 33, No. 2 (2011), pp. 157–82 DOI: 10.

1355/cs33-2a
© 2011 ISEAS ISSN 0129-797X print / ISSN 1793-284X electronic

Indonesia’s Rising Regional and

Global Profile: Does Size Really
Matter?
EVAN A. LAKSMANA

This paper seeks to challenge the view that Indonesia’s geographical

and population size account for its rising regional and global profile.
Instead, it makes three inter-related arguments. First, the manifestations
of Indonesia’s foreign policy and global profile have always been based
on its ability to harness the country’s normative and moral voice.
Second, while democratization since 1998 has allowed Indonesia to
restore its reputation in world affairs and provided it with a new
source of “soft power”, it has also complicated foreign policy-making.
Third, Indonesia’s large geographical size and population have been
a source of persistent internal security threats, and because the
government has been unable to meet national defence requirements,
the growth in its defence diplomacy activities reflect the country’s
continuing strategic weakness rather than its strength.

Keywords: Indonesia, foreign policy, defence diplomacy, strategic weakness.

Scholars have long regarded Indonesia as among the world’s most

important regional powers and a “pivotal” one at that.1 Indeed, in the
decades following independence in 1945, many Indonesian leaders felt
that the country’s size, resources and revolutionary history entitled
Jakarta to a leadership role in Southeast Asia.2 While the subsequent
history of the country’s trajectory in world affairs has not always
reflected such self-conceptions, many now argue that Indonesia’s

EVAN A. LAKSMANA is a Researcher with the Centre for Strategic and

International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta, and also currently a Fulbright
Presidential Ph.D. Scholar at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and
Public Affairs, Syracuse University, New York.

157

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 158 Evan A. Laksmana

regional and global profile is rising.3 Since 2003, Indonesia has been
the driving force behind political and security community building
in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), even as it
strengthens bilateral partnerships with major powers such as the
United States, Russia, India, China and Australia. Indonesia has also
been actively engaged on many global issues such as climate change
and been an ardent supporter of global institutions including the G-
20 and the UN Security Council. Indonesia’s economic growth rates
in recent years of between 4 to 6 per cent annually have also been
impressive, especially given the difficulties faced by other countries
during the global financial crisis. Finally, the consolidation of
democracy has increased domestic resilience and earned the country
international approbation.4
This turn of events is quite remarkable given that a little over
a decade ago some analysts were predicting the “Balkanization” of
Indonesia following a series of economic and political crises which
accompanied the fall of President Soeharto, including an upsurge in
separatist activity and the violent separation of East Timor in 1999.5 While
it is clearly difficult to isolate the single most important reason behind
Indonesia’s recovery and increasing regional and global profile, some
observers have cited the country’s land and population size as providing
it with the capital to play a regional and even global leadership role.6
Indonesia is not only the largest country in Southeast Asia in terms of land
size and population, but also the world’s largest archipelagic state and
is rich in natural resources. An economist at Morgan Stanley has noted
that together with improved government finances and political stability,
the “natural advantage from demography and commodity resources is
likely to unleash Indonesia’s growth potential”.7
This line of reasoning seems to echo the Realist school of
International Relations which favours material factors — such as
economy, natural resources, population size and geography — as the
primary indicators of national power. As such, when a country such
as Indonesia possesses these material factors, and if it can manage its
domestic political affairs and maintain cohesion, its rise is more likely
to occur. Thus, some would argue that Indonesia’s rising profile is
due to its potential material powers, mainly, though not exclusively,
its size. Although this line of reasoning can be persuasive, as this
paper seeks to demonstrate, it only tells half the story. Indonesia’s
complex history, domestic political system and threat perceptions
suggests that what is required is a more nuanced assessment of the
country’s rising regional and global profile.

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 Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profile 159

Understanding Indonesia as a rising power is important because

it is one of Southeast Asia’s key leaders and is also an active
participant in Asia’s emerging regional security architecture. At the
theoretical level, explaining why rising powers rise the way they
do is also significant if we are to understand the future of regional
stability and order. While there is no commonly accepted definition
of “power” in International Relations — let alone what definitively
constitutes a rising power8 — there seems to be several “middle
powers”, such as Turkey, South Africa, Brazil and Indonesia that
not only possess growing economic and political might, but also
have the potential as well as aspiration to challenge the legitimacy
of the post-Second World War order. Some of these countries have
been pushing for more pluralist conceptions of global architecture
in various international forums and have been deepening relations
between and among themselves, perhaps even with a view to creating
a bloc of their own.9
However, this paper does not seek to elaborate on the implications
of rising powers such as Indonesia for regional stability and global
order, or whether or not Indonesia has truly risen. Instead, it accepts
the emerging consensus among scholars and observers that Indonesia’s
regional and global profile has been on the rise in recent years and
seeks to provide a more nuanced assessment behind the country’s rise.
It also aims to challenge the prevailing view that “size matters” in
explaining Indonesia’s foreign policy outlook and regional and global
leadership. Using Indonesia’s rising regional and global security profile
as a case study, it argues instead that normative values, domestic
politics and its strategic environment better explain Indonesia’s current
profile in regional and global affairs. Specifically, this paper submits
three inter-related arguments.
First, despite its “material sources of power” (especially its
large land and population size), the manifestations of Indonesia’s
foreign policy and regional and global profile have always been
based on its ability to harness the country’s normative and moral
authority in global affairs, especially in international institutions.
This is reflected in both the country’s “independent and active”
foreign policy doctrine as well as the continued focus on addressing
domestic problems. Second, democratization since 1998 has created
two paradoxical trends. On the one hand, Indonesia’s consolidation
of democracy has allowed it to regain its reputation in world affairs
and provided it with a new source of “soft power”. On the other
hand, democracy has also complicated foreign policy-making because
of the proliferation of interested parties and stakeholders, and the

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 160 Evan A. Laksmana

importance of public opinion. Under the image-conscious presidency

of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, these factors obfuscate the country’s
foreign policy coherence and rationality.
Finally, instead of boosting the country’s regional and global
profile, Indonesia’s large geographical space and population have been
a source of persistent internal security threats. And as the government
has been unable to meet national defence requirements, Indonesia’s
growing defence diplomatic activities may be more a reflection of
the country’s continuing strategic weakness rather than its strength.
In International Relations parlance, this is Indonesia’s own version
of “soft balancing” — as a recovering power, not necessarily a rising
one.10 While these arguments are not entirely novel in themselves
— scholars of Third World countries in the 1960s made similar
claims — it seeks to highlight the persistence of Indonesia’s foreign
policy principles and strategies.

Indonesia’s Foreign Policy: Why Norms (Still) Matter

Observers of Indonesia often cite the country’s size as among the
primary modalities for its regional and global role. In 2009, the
population of Indonesia stood at 230 million (the fourth largest in
the world). The country’s land area amounts to 1.9 million square
kilometres (placing it 16th in the world in terms of land mass).11 At
over 18,000 islands, the Indonesian archipelago is the largest in the
world, covering an area of 2.8 million square kilometres, expanding
to 7.9 million square kilometres including its exclusive economic
zone (EEZ).12 Indonesia has the world’s largest Muslim population,
though it is not an Islamic theocratic state. Indonesia also occupies
a geo-strategically important location between the Pacific and Indian
Oceans, forming a bridge between Asia and Australia and controlling
strategic sea lanes of communications vital to military and commercial
activities between the Pacific Basin, Europe, East Asia, the Middle
East and South Asia.13 Indonesia also has sovereign rights in the
Straits of Malacca, one of the world’s busiest waterways.
Since the 1940s, successive Indonesian foreign policy-makers,
political elites and observers have invoked these material assets as
evidence that Indonesia is entitled to play the role of a regional
leader and global player. Observers of contemporary Indonesia have
made similar assumptions about Indonesia’s foreign policy and global
status. Anthony Smith, for instance, has argued that Indonesia’s
stature as a regional and global leader “has hitherto been determined
by its large population, geographical position, and its economic

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 Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profile 161

potential”.14 John Haseman has posited that Indonesia’s large and

predominantly moderate Muslim population, strategic location and
abundant resources make it a regional power of great importance
to the United States.15 Conversely, however, these material assets,
when coupled with Indonesia’s aggressive policies in the past (such
as during Konfrontasi in the 1960s and the 1975 invasion of East
Timor), have created unease among its neighbours.
These concerns notwithstanding, when placed within the overall
historical trajectory of Indonesia’s foreign policy, it appears that
instead of hard realpolitik based on material powers, international and
regional institutions dominate the country’s foreign policy, especially
since it rejoined the UN in 1966 and became a founding member
of ASEAN in 1967. Membership of ASEAN has been particularly
important, and one of the constant themes in the foreign ministry’s
pronouncements has been that ASEAN is the “cornerstone” of
Indonesia’s foreign policy. In addition, many of Indonesia’s major
regional and global achievements are often executed or proposed
through various international institutions such as the UN, Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process, the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF), the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and others. In the main, foreign
policy-makers seem to echo neo-liberal institutionalists who posit
that international institutions can serve the national interest in the
pursuit of mutual gains.16
In addition to its commitment to international institutions,
Indonesia also continues to adhere to the principles of non-intervention,
multilateralism and other norms that contribute to regional stability.
In fact, Indonesia’s foreign policy officials often claim in private that
while material achievements may not always be easily measured
when it comes to the country’s foreign policy, they are proud that
many of their efforts have generated new ideas and thinking on
important regional and global affairs. These include, for example, the
notion of “regional resilience” and “consensus building” that have
for decades defined much of the security discourse in Southeast
Asia. 17 More recently, President Yudhoyono has suggested that
Indonesia act as “a peace-maker, confidence-builder, problem-solver,
and bridge-builder”.18 Following democratization in 1998, this role
is believed to be achievable by “introducing and promoting new
sketches of the country’s profile, portraying a democratic Indonesia,
change, courage, and internationalism” which could result in “a
greater international recognition of Indonesia’s capacity to solve acute
international issues”.19

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 162 Evan A. Laksmana

It can be inferred that in the conduct of Indonesia’s foreign policy,

much of the material assets that scholars believe to be important
are seldom critical determinants. Instead, Indonesia’s regional and
global profile seems to be reflective of its normative values, or, in the
words of former Vice President Mohammad Hatta, its “moral force”.20
These normative values, enshrined and institutionalized since the
1940s, essentially stem from the “independent and active” doctrine,
as well as Indonesia’s formative experiences in the struggle against
colonialism.21 The “independent” component holds that Indonesia
should chart its own course in foreign affairs independently of any
external party, while the “active” part holds that the country should
not sit idly by, but be actively involved in international affairs so
as to shape the regional and global environment.
These normative foundations guided Indonesia throughout the
Cold War and provided it with prestige and credibility, especially
through membership of international institutions such as NAM and
ASEAN. In practice, of course, we can argue that Indonesia was not
so much neutral per se, but played off one superpower against the
other. The practical manifestations notwithstanding, the “independent
and active” doctrine suggests that while effectively grounded in the
country’s national interest, Indonesian foreign policy should also
be based on shared values and principles, reflecting the country’s
unique historical, cultural and political experience.22 These values
also reflect the country’s unchanging view of international relations,
despite changes in political leadership, that world politics is seen as
dominated by the large, developed nations which design institutions
and act exclusively in their own self-interest.23 As such, Indonesia’s
role is to actively and independently be the “benevolent expositor
of peace and the interests of the developing world”.24
Therefore, the role of ideas and institutions in Indonesian foreign
policy is not a new phenomenon. Most recently, the country has
been expressing its assertiveness by debating novel ideas, crafting new
images of democracy and gradually supporting manageable change
in the regional and global environment. With regards to the latter,
today Indonesia seeks to sustain a “dynamic equilibrium” among the
regional and global powers to the benefit of all — a core tenet in
the so-called “Natalegawa Doctrine”, named after Indonesia’s current
foreign minister, Marty Natalegawa.25 However, as the following
sections will show, while norms and values often underpin Indonesia’s
foreign policy beliefs, the nature of domestic politics continues to
play a significant role in shaping how those beliefs are manifested.

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 Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profile 163

Democracy and Indonesia’s Foreign Policy: A Double-edged Sword?

The dramatic overhaul of Indonesia’s political system following the
end of authoritarianism in 1998 and the introduction of genuine
democracy has had profound implications for the country’s foreign
policy. Generally, democratization changes the structures and actors
involved in the process of foreign policy-making at two levels.26 At
the national level, domestic constituencies pressure the government
to adopt policies they favour; simultaneously, however, governmental
actors seek power by building coalitions among these constituencies.
At the international level, governmental actors seek to satisfy domestic
pressures while limiting the harmful impact on foreign relations. While
both authoritarian and democratic leaders need to play this two-level
“game”, democratization increases the degree of pressure on decision-
makers to do so, mainly because of the expansion of the number of
actors involved and the role of public opinion.27
In terms of foreign policy therefore, democratization amplifies
the nexus between internal pressures of domestic political legitimacy
and coalition, with external pressures stemming from the international
system and the need to maintain the country’s foreign relations.28 For
Indonesia, democratization has significantly changed, though not fully
replaced, the traditional “personalistic and presidential” nature of its
foreign policy.29 Specifically, this materializes in the growing role and
strength of the People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan
Rakyat or DPR), the national parliament, in foreign policy-making and
decisions through its Commission 1 on Defence and Foreign Affairs.
Constitutional amendments have empowered the DPR to endorse or
reject presidential nominees for ambassadorial posts, conduct legal
inquiries into the president’s foreign policy and ratify international
agreements signed by the government. The refusal by the DPR to endorse
and ratify the 2007 Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) between the
governments of Indonesia and Singapore is a case in point.30 Also, while
claiming to be more concerned with the “supporting infrastructure of
foreign policy”, Commission 1 conducted “fit-and-proper tests” for more
than 60 ambassadorial candidates between 1999 and 2004.31
This is a significant departure from the past, when the foreign
policy-making process centred on presidential personalities and their
interests. Yet, while in theory this strengthens the checks-and-balances
mechanism of foreign policy, the growing role of parliament often
obfuscates the coherence and pragmatism of the Foreign Ministry’s
decisions. In mid-2007, for example, Commission 1 launched an official
inquiry into the government’s decision to support UNSC Resolution

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 164 Evan A. Laksmana

1747 that expanded sanctions on Iran due to its nuclear programme. The
inquiry embarrassed Indonesia as a UNSC member and undermined the
government’s nuclear non-proliferation stance. To complicate matters,
legislators have occasionally used foreign policy issues to attack the
president without providing constructive suggestions to improve policy.32
Many legislators in charge of foreign affairs also often lack the necessary
knowledge and expertise to make informed decisions.
In addition to the DPR’s role, the advent of democracy has also
increased the importance of public opinion in foreign policy decision-
making. In democracies, political leaders must justify their decisions in
an accountable and transparent manner; poor foreign policy decisions
made at the expense of the national or public interest can make re-
election harder to achieve. In the case of Indonesia, however, under
the image-conscious administration of President Yudhoyono, public
opinion on foreign policy issues is only heeded when dealing with
sensitive matters that could hurt his image, or when it could cost him
domestic support.33
However, despite these complications, the Foreign Ministry
believes that democracy is a very important source of “soft power” that
can enhance the country’s foreign policy and international image and
contribute to regional stability.34 Indeed, over the past decade, many of
the country’s major foreign policy initiatives have centred on democratic
ideas, including the creation of the ASEAN Political Security Community
(APSC) and the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF). The first draft of the APSC
(then still called the ASEAN Security Community proposal), which
totalled more than 70 specific ideas actually called for the promotion of
democracy and human rights, a commitment to free and regular elections,
and the formation of open, tolerant societies.35 The BDF was meant as
a forum to promote cooperation and further the spread of democracy
and good governance in Asia.
This “democratic resurgence” also helped to win over the support of
the United States, which would later cite the consolidation of democracy
in Indonesia as among the reasons behind the normalization of military-
to-military relations in 2005 and the US-Indonesia Comprehensive
Partnership Agreement in 2010.36 Some observers have argued that in
view of Indonesia’s democratic credentials, it should be encouraged to
take on a leadership role in the Muslim world. Arguably, however, this
approach is misguided.37 For one thing, Indonesians are not comfortable
injecting religion into foreign policy. And not only are they uneasy about
the binary distinction between “radical” and “moderate” Muslims in
world politics, they are also worried about potential resentment from
the country’s domestic minorities. Moreover, it would be difficult for

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 Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profile 165

Indonesia to play a leading role in the Muslim world when Middle

Eastern countries do not necessarily “accept” Jakarta’s leadership.
In short, democratization in Indonesia has created two paradoxical
trends in terms of the country’s rising regional and global profile. On
the one hand, a consistent and coherent foreign policy is more difficult
to achieve due to the growing complexity of foreign policy-making
(especially the role of parliament and public opinion). But on the
other hand, democracy provides Indonesia with an excellent window
of opportunity to raise its regional and global profile.

Indonesia’s Enduring Strategic Weaknesses

Indonesia’s physical size, demographic plurality, socio-ethnic diversity
and porous borders, as well as the nature of contending domestic
political competition, have all been drivers of many of the country’s
internal security threats and conflicts.38 While of course each conflict
and security threat in the country’s history may be unique to specific
political and socio-economic contexts, the perceptions of state security
actors, primarily the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) and the Ministry
of Defence (MoD), are generally quite similar. They believe that the
internal challenges that threaten the country’s domestic stability and
“unitary state” have always dominated Indonesia’s strategic and
security environment and always will. A study conducted by the
University of Indonesia, for example, concluded that out of 249 combat
operations undertaken by the Indonesian military and police from
1945 to 2004, 67 per cent addressed internal security threats.39 As
such, a sense of insecurity and internal weakness pervades strategic
thinking among military planners. For instance, the dominance of
the army in the TNI, and the expansion of its Territorial Command
Structure (geared to maintain “territorial management” and ensure
a web of control and surveillance all the way down to the village
level across the country), is indicative of the military’s internal
security mindset. This mindset has led the military to adopt an
“offensive” posture when it comes to addressing internal threats, but
a “defensive” posture when faced with external threats. The fact that
the new State Defence Doctrine (issued in 2008) focuses largely on
“non-military threats” such as ideology, politics, and socio-economic
problems, further entrenches this mindset.40
This sense of internal insecurity continues to influence defence
and foreign policy-making today and is likely to do so for the
foreseeable future. In a 2010 document published by the MoD
outlining the country’s actual and potential threats over the next two

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 166 Evan A. Laksmana

decades, internal security threats still featured prominently, though

the scenarios also incorporated non-traditional security challenges
such as climate change (see Table 1). Therefore, while formally the

Table 1
Indonesia’s Threat Overview and Projections

Indonesia’s Projected Threats (until 2029)

Actual Threats Potential Threats

Terrorism Global warming

Separatism Disruption of sea lane security
Border disputes and outer island Environmental degradation
managements Pandemics
Natural disasters Financial crisis
Illegal smuggling Cyber crime
Horizontal conflicts Foreign aggression
Energy scarcity Food and water crises

Indonesia’s Threat Scenarios

Number Scenario

1 Foreign military power involved in local separatist movement

2 Use of force in border conflicts
3 Foreign presence combined with military presence in securing
access to Indonesia’s energy resources
5 Foreign military presence in Indonesia’s Sea Lanes of
Communication to secure economic routes
4 Foreign military presence to fight terrorists within Indonesia

Flash Point Zones Possible Scenario

Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (Aceh) Scenarios 1, 2, and 3

Riau and Riau Islands Scenarios 2, 3, and 4
Eastern Borneo (Kalimantan) Scenarios 2 and 3
Western Borneo (Kalimantan) Scenario 2
Northern Sulawesi Scenarios 2 and 4
South eastern Sulawesi Scenario 5
Lombok Scenario 4
East Nusa Tenggara Scenarios 2 and 3
The Moluccas Scenarios 1, 3, and 4
Papua and Western Papua Scenarios 1, 2, and 3
The Malacca Straits Scenarios 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5
Sea Lanes of Communications Scenario 5 along with illegal activities
and environmental degradation
Source: Adapted from Ministry of Defence, Minimum Essential Force (Jakarta: Ministry
of Defence, 2010).

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 Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profile 167

TNI and MoD do not participate in the formulation of foreign policy,

their views nevertheless help shape Indonesia’s foreign policy. And
as we shall see in the following section, Indonesia’s rising regional
and global security profile is also shaped by this perception of
internal strategic weakness. This further confirms Franklin Weinstein’s
assertion in the 1970s that perceptions of weakness shape Indonesia’s
foreign policy to a large extent.41
Aside from this perceived internal weakness, the government and
parliament have also been unable to fulfil the defence requirements
as submitted by the MoD every year, although it should be noted
that compared to a decade ago, Indonesia’s defence budget has more
than doubled (see Figure 1). While clearly a significant improvement
for the cash-strapped TNI — whose commercial units suffered heavy
losses during the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis and is now officially
barred from commercial activities — the armed forces’ funding
requirements have never been fully met.

Figure 1
Indonesia’s Defence Budget, 1998–2010
(billion USD)

5
4.5
4.5
Defense budget (billion USD)

4
3.6
3.5
3.4 3.5
3
2.39
2.5 2.2
2.53 2.59
2 2.12
1.7 1.6
1.5
1.553
1.4
1

0.5

0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Note: Figures have not been adjusted for inflation.

Source: Table compiled from statistics in The Military Balance (London: Oxford
University Press/Routledge for IISS, issues 1999–2010).

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 168 Evan A. Laksmana

Indeed, the defence budget has only provided approximately 30

to 40 per cent of TNI and MoD budgetary requests (see Figure 2).
As a consequence, officials argue that as a result of such budgetary
constraints, the overall operational readiness of the navy and air
force only ranges from 40 to 65 per cent. It should be noted,
however, that the MoD has not done a satisfactory job of publicly
explaining in detail the basis and rationale of their budgetary
requests each year.
In addition, as a percentage of the national budget and GDP,
Indonesia’s defence budget is miniscule relative to the country’s
size and security requirements (see Figure 3). Even when compared
to other Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia’s defence budget is
considered well below what it should be. Internal policy discus-
sions and MoD publications, however, have stressed that in
order for them to sufficiently have the financial support needed
to procure new equipment and increase operational readiness,
defence spending as a percentage of GDP should be raised from

Figure 2
Indonesia’s Defence Gap
(Budget compared to requirements in billion USD)

16

14

12

10

0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Budget Requirements

Source: Chart compiled from statistics in Andi Widjajanto et al., Reformasi Militer
Indonesia: 2009–2014 (Jakarta: Centre for Global Civil Society Studies, 2009).

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 Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profile 169

Figure 3
Indonesia’s Defence Budget
(Share of GDP and National Budget)

5.00
4.53
4.50 4.23 4.31
4.00
3.50 3.33 3.36
3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00 0.83 0.85 0.83
0.66 0.62
0.50
0.00
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Percentage of GDP Percentage of National Budget

Note: Figures are slightly different from official accounts by MoD officials.
Source: Chart compiled from statistics contained in The Military Balance (London:
Routledge for IISS, issues 2006–10).

the current 1 per cent or less to at least 3 to 4 per cent over the
next decade.
From the preceding analysis two conclusions can be drawn.
First, Indonesia’s land and population “size” as well as diversity
actually perpetuates perceptions of internal threat within the
defence and foreign policy establishment. Second, Indonesia’s
defence spending is comparatively low for a country of its size
and security requirements, which means non-military means are
required to defend the country, such as diplomacy, which underlines
the rationale behind Indonesia’s contribution to regional and global
security. These traits underline the essence of Indonesia’s strategic
weakness stemming from the persistence of internal security threats
to the state and the inability of the military to cope with them.
It should be pointed out, however, that following the separation
of the National Police from the military in 1999, internal security
threats have become the responsibility of the former, except for
separatist insurgencies.

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 170 Evan A. Laksmana

Indonesia’s Rising Security Profile: Killing Two Birds with

One Stone?
Indonesia’s international security role can be viewed from two levels.
At the global level, Indonesia seeks to adhere to its normative
and historical commitments to actively contribute to world peace
as enshrined in the 1945 Constitution. This is mainly achieved
through its contributions to UN peacekeeping missions. In terms of
missions and personnel contributions, Indonesia has been an active
participant, sending a total of 88 contingents and missions between
1957 and 2008 (see Figure 4). While Indonesia’s participation in UN
missions over the past five decades has not been consistent, since
2006 Jakarta has been determined to raise its profile in peacekeeping
operations. In 2010, with 1,765 peacekeepers, Indonesia was among
the top twenty contributors of uniformed personnel.42 This is a sharp
increase since 2005 when it only ranked 47th in terms of military
contributions. Among Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia claims to
be the largest contributor to UN peacekeeping missions. It should be
noted that in recent years, however, it has been the United States,
primarily through the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), that
has helped assist this effort, including $2 million to transport TNI

Figure 4
Indonesia’s Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Missions, 1957–2008
(Number of personnel)

5,000
4,545
4,500
3,960
4,000
3,457
3,500

3,000

2,500

2,000
1,670
1,474
1,500
1,043
1,000
581 545
500
0 0 79
0
1957 - 1962 - 1966 - 1971 - 1976 - 1981 - 1986 - 1991 - 1996 - 2001 - 2006 -
1961 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008

Source: Author’s dataset from UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Indonesian

military documents.

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 Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profile 171

vehicles to Lebanon, and another $2.3 million to train Indonesian

peacekeepers in 2009.43
As Chair of ASEAN in 2011, Indonesia has suggested it becomes
the hub for a “network of peacekeeping centres” in Southeast Asia,
as part of efforts to create an ASEAN Political Security Community
(APSC). Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa has even stated that
Indonesia’s ultimate goal is to become one of the ten biggest
contributors to UN peacekeeping operations.44 Aside from troops,
Indonesia also dispatched a warship in August 2010 to join the
Maritime Task Force (MTF) of the United Nations Interim Force in
Lebanon (UNIFIL), its second contribution since 2009. The plan to
establish a Peacekeeping Training Centre in Sentul, West Java also
appears to be progressing.
As noted earlier, Indonesia’s defence diplomacy activities are
designed to compensate for its strategic weakness by enhancing
regional trust-building and engaging major regional powers such as
the United States, China, India and Australia. This is mainly achieved
through regional multilateral institutions, multilateral and bilateral
free trade agreements, bilateral strategic partnerships or security
cooperation, as well as multilateral security cooperation. For the
sake of analytical brevity and space, the following sections will only
address Indonesia’s bilateral and multilateral defence diplomacy.

Bilateral Defence Diplomacy

Since the 1990s, militaries and their defence ministries all over the
world have taken on a growing range of cooperative undertakings.
Defence diplomacy — the peacetime use of armed forces as a tool
of foreign and security policy — is among the primary activities
in this domain.45 Defence diplomacy is also a process that may
involve state officials (politicians, security personnel and intelligence
services) as well as non-governmental organizations, think-tanks
and civil society. This conception of defence diplomacy is broader
than “military diplomacy” which focuses only on “the use of the
military to advance diplomacy and its engagement in various security
arrangements”.46 In the case of Indonesia, the TNI and MoD are
generally the leading agencies, though there are cases where they
have been “seconded” to foreign ministry officials. This reflects
the crucial role of the military (which also dominates the MoD) in
shaping Indonesia’s regional and global security profile.
Indonesia pursues three types of bilateral defence diplomacy:
(1) implementing confidence building measures (CBMs), (2) activities

01 Evan.indd 171 7/25/11 11:10:03 AM

 172 Evan A. Laksmana

aimed at enhancing domestic defence capabilities, and (3) developing

the country’s domestic defence industries.47 CBMs include state visits,
dialogues and consultations, information sharing, strategic partnerships,
officer exchanges and combined military exercises. Diplomacy to
increase defence capabilities includes military assistance and weapons
acquisitions. Diplomacy for defence industrial development generally
includes technology transfer, R&D cooperation and joint ventures.
Between 2003 and 2008, Indonesia conducted 88 defence
diplomacy activities (see Figure 5), the majority of which involved
CBMs, signifying two main developments.48 First, Indonesia continues
to believe in the utility of military diplomacy to strengthen regional
security through the implementation of CBMs at a time when it is
unable to fully safeguard the country’s security interests. Jakarta
also seeks to develop a degree of comfort among its partners and
engage potential rivals. Second, there is a growing realization in
the country’s defence establishment that it can utilize diplomacy
to improve its own defence capabilities and strengthen its domestic
defence industries. This is particularly important for Indonesia in
view of the negative impact US sanctions in the 1990s had on the
operational effectiveness of the TNI.

Figure 5
Indonesia’s Bilateral Defence Diplomacy
(2003–08)

70

60 58

50

40

30

20 17
13
10

0
Confidence Building Measures Defence Capability Defence Industrial Development

Source: Statistical figures based on the number of defence diplomatic events or activities
compiled from I’dil Syawfi, Aktifitas Diplomasi Pertahanan Indonesia Dalam Pemenuhan
Tujuan-Tujuan Pertahanan Indonesia (2003–2008), Master’s Thesis, University of
Indonesia, 2009.

01 Evan.indd 172 7/25/11 11:10:05 AM

 Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profile 173

In total, Indonesia engaged 32 countries in its defence

diplomacy, of which the top ten were the country’s most crucial
security partners (and weapons suppliers) as well as potential
rivals. The composition of the countries that Indonesia has engaged
also suggests the growing need to diversify its strategic partners
“based on shared intraregional security concerns”.49 The United
States, Australia and China have been the top three countries
towards which Indonesia’s defence diplomacy activities have been
directed (see Figure 6). Aside from the various bilateral defence
diplomacy activities with these countries, Indonesia has also signed
strategic partnership agreements with all three, as well as with
India. It is also worth noting that in recent years China, France,
South Korea and the Netherlands have become important sources
of weapons platforms and defence technological assistance for
Indonesia.50

Figure 6
Indonesia’s Bilateral Defence Diplomacy
(2003–08)

14
13
12

10
9
8

6 6
6
5 5 5
4
3 3 3
2

0
lia

ia

a
es

nd
si

in

or

di

re
ss
ra

an
ay
at

Ch

In

Ko
ap

la
Ru
st
St

Fr
al

r
ng
Au

he

th
M
d

Si

u
t
te

Ne

So
i
Un

e
Th

Source: Statistical figures based on the number of defence diplomatic events or activities
compiled from I’dil Syawfi, Aktifitas Diplomasi Pertahanan Indonesia Dalam Pemenuhan
Tujuan-Tujuan Pertahanan Indonesia (2003–2008), Master’s Thesis, University of
Indonesia, 2009.

01 Evan.indd 173 7/25/11 11:10:08 AM

 174 Evan A. Laksmana

Singapore and Malaysia represent the country’s closest neighbours

but are also viewed as potential rivals. Indonesia’s relationship with
Malaysia has deteriorated due to maritime boundary disputes and
other issues, while contentious issues with Singapore include the
absence of an extradition treaty, though this results more from the
unwillingness of the Indonesian parliament to ratify the treaty that
was signed as a package deal with Defence Cooperation Agreement
(DCA) mentioned above. Indonesian MPs recently argued that the
DCA could potentially infringe on Indonesia’s territory and endanger
its security as it might allow Singaporeans to train with a third
party force on Indonesian soil — and because allegedly almost half
of the training area “turned out to be protected forests”.51 Another
recent contentious issue is the city state’s import of sand used for
land reclamation projects, which could be construed by some to
potentially alter its maritime boundaries with Indonesia. Given these
underlying enmities, defence diplomacy as CBMs can arguably be
seen as a foreign policy mechanism to help safeguard Indonesia’s
territorial integrity while simultaneously ensuring regional security.
Indonesia has also conducted bilateral defence diplomacy with nearly
all its ASEAN partners (see Figure 7).

Figure 7
Indonesia’s Defence Diplomacy with Southeast Asian Countries
(2003–08)

16
14
14

12

10

8
7
6
4
4
3 3
2 2
2
1
0
nd

ar
e

a
a

ei
or

ne

di
si

na

nm

un
la
ay

ap

bo
pi
ai

et

Br
ya
al

ip
ng
Th

am
Vi
M

ill

M
Si

Ph

C
e
Th

Source: Statistical figures based on the number of defence diplomatic events or activities
compiled from I’dil Syawfi, Aktifitas Diplomasi Pertahanan Indonesia Dalam Pemenuhan
Tujuan-Tujuan Pertahanan Indonesia (2003–2008), Master’s Thesis, University of
Indonesia, 2009.

01 Evan.indd 174 7/25/11 11:10:12 AM

 Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profile 175

The above data and analysis suggest that Indonesia’s contribu-

tion to regional security through bilateral defence diplomacy is
(1) mainly focused on increasing regional stability through CBMs, and
(2) is targeted at its most important regional neighbours (Singapore,
Malaysia and Australia) and the Great Powers (United States, China,
India and Russia) so as to safeguard the country’s territorial and
national integrity, while improving the capacity of domestic defence
industries. This suggests that not only do shared norms still matter in
shaping Indonesia’s foreign policy and profile, but that the country’s
rising bilateral defence diplomacy represents one side of its strategy
to compensate for its strategic weakness — the other side being
multilateral engagement.

Multilateral Defence Diplomacy

Indonesia’s multilateral defence diplomacy efforts are primarily
centred on ASEAN-related events and institutions, especially the
ARF. This is despite the scepticism of some scholars who have
argued that while ASEAN may have the potential to be a “security
community”, the organization’s norms of non-interference and focus
on economic over security issues, makes it difficult for the regional
grouping to seriously tackle the region’s core traditional and non-
traditional security challenges.52 Between ASEAN and the ARF, the
latter occupies quantitatively more of Indonesia’s multilateral defence
diplomatic activities (see Figure 8). Indonesian officials participated

Figure 8
Indonesia’s Multilateral Defence Diplomacy Venues
(1994–2009)

7.50%

20.50%
ARF-related events
ASEAN-related events
Others
72%

Note: Figures based on number of events or meetings held.

Source: Author’s dataset based on Indonesian Foreign Ministry website and ASEAN-
related documents.

01 Evan.indd 175 7/25/11 11:10:14 AM

 176 Evan A. Laksmana

in 177 ARF-related events from 1994 until 2009, including the ARF
ministerial meeting, ARF Senior Officials’ Meeting (ARF-SOM), ARF
Inter-Sessional Group on Confidence Building Measures (ARF-ISG-
CBM), ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC) and the ARF Defence
Officials’ Dialogue (ARF-DOD).
For Indonesia, the larger quantitative portion of ARF rather
ASEAN-related defence diplomacy events is related to the realization
since the mid-1990s that engaging the major powers in security
discussions was critical. In terms of the ARF’s attributes, two significant
results are salient for Indonesia.53 First, the ARF is predicated on the
norms of behaviour stemming from the “ASEAN Way”. Consequently,
the ARF has become an important vehicle for Indonesia and ASEAN
to spread regional norms and identity sharing. Second, the ARF is
the only regional institution in the world that includes the United
States, Europe, China and other regional powers. This has allowed
Indonesia and ASEAN to engage and encourage a balance among the
Great Powers, while providing ASEAN and its neighbours a forum
to deepen mutual comfort levels. Put another way, the ARF can be
seen as a forum for Indonesia to expand strategic engagement with
the major powers.
Despite the higher frequency of ARF-related events and meetings,
on the more practical security issues closer to Indonesia’s own
interests, such as the use of military assets for disaster relief or
maritime security, Indonesia has been relying more on ASEAN-
related events, including the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting
(ADMM) and ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Forces Informal Meeting
(ACDFIM). Indonesian defence officials have also been involved in
the annual ASEAN Special Senior Officials’ Meeting (ASEAN Special
SOM), ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting, ASEAN Navy
Interaction, ASEAN Air Force Chiefs Conference, ASEAN Military
Intelligence Meeting and ASEAN Armies Rifles Meet. On average,
between 2000 and 2009, ASEAN, formally and informally, organized
fifteen meetings a year on defence or security related matters (see
Figure 9), in which Indonesia played an active role.54
In this regard, ASEAN-related events, though largely informal,
have been considered as a step forward in improving regional CBMs.
Indeed, according to Indonesia’s former Minister of Defence, ASEAN’s
multilateralism and regional community building have allowed the
creation of a “strategic space” needed to boost domestic economic
and political development while accommodating the interests of
extra-regional powers.55 Specifically, the belief among the defence
and foreign policy establishments is that such multilateral defence

01 Evan.indd 176 7/25/11 11:10:14 AM

 Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profile 177

Figure 9
Southeast Asian Multilateral Defence Diplomacy Meetings
(1994–2009)

25

21
20 20
19
18
16 16
15
14

10 10
8 8 8
6 6
5 5

1 1
0
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Note: Figures based on number of events or meetings held.

Source: Author’s dataset based on Indonesian Foreign Ministry website and ASEAN-
related documents.

diplomatic activities is meant to ensure regional stability and security

against a backdrop of (1) increasing geopolitical competition among
the Great Powers, (2) the rise of non-traditional security challenges,
and (3) ongoing territorial and boundary disputes.56 The informality
of the events meanwhile reflects the realization on the part of
policy-makers that given the region’s history and changing strategic
environment, there is a need to engage regional countries on difficult
security issues in a gradual, manageable way.

Conclusion
The preceding analysis suggests the following three conclusions.
First, Indonesia’s historical and political experiences laid the
foundation for the country’s “independent and active” foreign
policy. The manifestation of this doctrine is seen in the country’s
“moral force” or “soft power” in shaping the regional and global
environment through participation in international institutions, such

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 178 Evan A. Laksmana

as the UN and ASEAN, and successive governments’ adherence to

the principles of non-intervention and multilateralism. The country’s
foreign policy elite also claim collectively that they generated new
ideas and thinking on issues related to important regional and
global issues. Indonesia’s democratization has enhanced its “soft
power”. However, and secondly, democratization has made it more
difficult for Indonesia to pursue a stable and coherent foreign policy.
This is primarily due to the growing complexity of foreign policy-
making, especially given the increasing role of the parliament and
public opinion. Third, Indonesia’s strategic weakness dominates the
thinking of the defence and military establishment, which in turn
has influenced foreign policy-makers.
These three arguments underlie the thinking and rationale of
Indonesia’s growing global security role through the UN as well as
the country’s growing engagement in multilateral defence diplomacy,
both through ASEAN and the ARF. While it cannot be entirely denied
that Indonesia’s size plays into the perceptions of its neighbours and
observers, a more nuanced assessment that considers the country’s
values, domestic politics, and strategic environment enable us to better
understand its rising profile. At the broader level, the analysis presented
suggests that material capabilities alone — economic, size, geography,
and military — cannot fully account for the rise of global powers. In
other words, for us to understand why some rising powers rise the way
they do, we need to delve into other non-material factors.

NOTES
Parts of this paper were presented at the 28th Annual International Conference on
Security Affairs, organized by the Research Institute for National Security Affairs
(RINSA), Korea National Defence University, Seoul, 30 August 2010. The author
would like to acknowledge the support of the Centre for Non-Traditional Security
Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and the thoughtful comments
and assistance from I’dil Syawfi, Hanani Prieta, Hazelia Margaretha, Lee Seok-Soo,
Jurgen Ruland, Sheldon Simon and two anonymous reviewers of Contemporary
Southeast Asia.
1
See A Century’s Journey: How the Great Powers Shape the World, edited by
Robert A. Pastor (New York: Basic Books, 1999); Pivotal States: A New Framework
for U.S. Policy in the Developing World, edited by Robert Chase, Emily Hill,
and Paul Kennedy (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000).
2
Franklin Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence:
From Sukarno to Suharto (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), p. 30.
3
See for example, Ann Marie Murphy, “Indonesia Returns to the International
Stage: Good News for the United States”, Orbis 53, no. 1 (2009): 65–79;

01 Evan.indd 178 7/25/11 11:10:16 AM

 Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profile 179

Magda Safrina, “Indonesia and the Global Rise of Economic, Political Power”,
Jakarta Post, 20 March 2010; Eduardo Lachica, “Jakarta’s Foray Into Armed
Diplomacy”, Far Eastern Economic Review (June 2007): 38–41; Anthony Deutsch
and Henny Sender, “Indonesia: Regional economic boom”, Financial Times,
7 June 2011.
4
See for example, Rizal Sukma, “Indonesian Politics in 2009: Defective Elections,
Resilient Democracy”, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 45, no. 3 (2009):
317–36.
5
For a debate on the breakup of Indonesia, see for example, Tim Huxley,
Disintegrating Indonesia? Implications for Regional Security, Adelphi Paper 349
(London: Oxford University Press for IISS, 2002); Robert Cribb, “Not the Next
Yugoslavia: Prospects for the Disintegration of Indonesia”, Australian Journal
of International Affairs 53, no. 2 (1999): 169–78.
6
See for example, Ann Marie Murphy, “Indonesia and the World”, in Indonesia:
The Great Transition, edited by John Bresnan (New York: Rowman & Littlefield,
2005), pp. 239–95.
7
Cited from David Kampf, “Rising Powers: BRIC and Beyond”, Foreign Policy
Blogs, <http://risingpowers.foreignpolicyblogs.com/category/indonesia/>.
8
For a recent debate on power in International Relations, see Stefano Guzzini,
On the Measure of Power and the Power of Measure in International Relations
(Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2009), pp. 5–15.
9
See Andrew F. Hart and Bruce D. Jones, “How do Rising Powers Rise?” Survival
52, no. 6 (2010/2011): 66; Andrew Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism and Global
Order: What Space for Would-be Great Powers?” International Affairs 82, no.
1 (2006): 1–3.
10
While Robert Pape argues that regional states do not directly challenge US military
preponderance but use non-military tools to delay, frustrate and undermine
unilateral US policies using international institutions, economic statecraft and
diplomatic arrangements, Indonesia uses similar strategies to compensate for
its strategic weakness. See Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United
States”, International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 7–45.
11
Cited from Wing Thye Woo and Chang Hong, “Indonesia’s Economic Performance
in Comparative Perspective and a New Policy Framework for 2049”, Bulletin
of Indonesian Economic Studies 46, no. 1 (2010): 35.
12
Cited from Robert Cribb and Michelle M. Ford, “Indonesia as an Archipelago:
Managing Islands, Managing the Seas”, in Indonesia Beyond the Water’s Edge:
Managing an Archipelagic State, edited by Robert Cribb and Michelle M. Ford
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), p. 1.
13
See Evan A. Laksmana, “Indonesia’s pivotal role in the US grand strategy”,
Jakarta Post, 6 October 2009.
14
Anthony L. Smith, Strategic Centrality: Indonesia’s Changing Role in ASEAN,
Pacific Strategic Paper 10 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000),
p. 8.
15
John B. Haseman, “Indonesia-Turbulent Times: From Autocracy to Democracy”,
in Strategic Asia 2003–4: Fragility and Crisis, edited by Richard J. Ellings and
Aaron Friedberg (Seatle: National Bureau for Asian Research, 2004).

01 Evan.indd 179 7/25/11 11:10:16 AM

 180 Evan A. Laksmana

16
See for example, Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord
in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984);
Sheng Ding, “Analyzing Rising Power from the Perspective of Soft Power: A
new look at China’s rise to the status quo power”, Journal of Contemporary
China 19, no. 64 (2010): 259.
17
For details on these two concepts and their place in Southeast Asian security,
see Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN
and the ARF (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp. 18–19.
18
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, “Revisiting our foreign policy”, Jakarta Post,
25 May 2005.
19
Bantarto Bandoro, “Reassessing Indonesia’s foreign policy”, Jakarta Post, 2 April
2008.
20
Hatta was not only among the country’s founding fathers and its first vice-
president, but also the chief architect of Indonesia’s foreign policy in the 1940s
and 1950s.
21
See Rizal Sukma, “The Evolution of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy: An Indonesian
View”, Asian Survey 35, no. 3 (1995): 305–6.
22
For an initial history of Indonesia’s foreign policy, see ibid., 306–14.
23
See Paige Johnson Tan, “Navigating a Turbulent Ocean: Indonesia’s Worldview
and Foreign Policy”, Asian Perspectives 31, no. 3 (2007): 148.
24
Ibid.
25
For details, see Rene L. Pattiradjawane, “Indonesia Dalam Politik Globalisasi”,
Kompas, 5 May 2010.
26
See Jorn Dosch, The Changing Dynamics of Southeast Asian Politics (Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007), pp. 20–22.
27
On the most basic explanation of the “two-level game”, see Robert Putnam,
“Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, International
Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–60.
28
For more details, see Kai He, “Indonesia’s Foreign Policy after Soeharto:
International Pressure, Democratization, and Policy Change”, International
Relations of the Asia-Pacific 8 (2008): 47–72.
29
On the personalistic nature of Indonesia’s foreign policy, especially under the
country’s first two presidents, see Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy
(London: The Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1983).
30
For details of the DCA debacle and the role of Commission 1, see Leonard C.
Sebastian and Evan A. Laksmana, “Defence Pact: Getting the Message Across”,
Straits Times, 20 July 2007.
31
Teguh Santosa et al., Komisi 1: Senjata-Satelit-Diplomasi (Jakarta: Suara Harapan
Bangsa, 2009), p. 181.
32
For more details on how parliamentary politics shapes Indonesia’s foreign policy,
see Jürgen Rüland, “Deepening ASEAN Cooperation through Democratization?
The Indonesian Legislature and Foreign Policymaking”, International Relations
of the Asia Pacific 9, no. 3 (2009): 373–402.
33
For a discussion on foreign policy and public opinion under President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono, see for example Hadi Soesastro and Evan A. Laksmana,

01 Evan.indd 180 7/25/11 11:10:16 AM

 Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profile 181

“Indonesia”, in Does Fairness Matter?, edited by Hakan Altinay, Global

Working Papers No. 37 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2010),
pp. 18–19.
34
See Philips J. Vermonte, “Demokratisasi dan Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia:
Membangun Citra Diri”, in Mencari Desain Baru Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia,
edited by Bantarto Bandoro (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International
Studies, 2005), pp. 37–39.
35
For details on the ASEAN Security Community proposal and the events and
reasoning behind it, see Christopher Roberts, ASEAN’s Myanmar Crisis: Challenges
to the Pursuit of a Security Community (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 2010), pp. 180–84.
36
The idea that the United States helped Indonesia rise to regional and global
prominence is explored in Laksmana, “Indonesia’s pivotal role in the US grand
strategy”, op. cit.
37
For a review of US-Indonesia relations, especially American expectations of
Indonesia, see Evan A. Laksmana, “U.S., Indonesia Must Avoid False Promises
and Pitfalls”, World Politics Review, 26 March 2010.
38
See for example Violent Conflicts in Indonesia: Analysis, Representation,
Resolution, edited by Charles A. Koppel (London: Routledge, 2006); Jacques
Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003).
39
Figures cited from Andi Widjajanto and Artanti Wardhani, Hubungan Intelijen:
Negara 1945–2004 (Jakarta: Center for Global Civil Society Studies, University
of Indonesia, 2008), pp. 39–43.
40
Departemen Pertahanan, Doktrin Pertahanan Negara (Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal
Strategi Pertahanan, 2008).
41
Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence, op. cit.,
pp. 20–46.
42
See UN-DPKO, United Nations Peacekeeping: Background Note, <http://www.
un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/backgroundnote.pdf>.
43
See John Haseman and Eduardo Lahica, The U.S.-Indonesia Security Relationship:
The Next Steps (Washington, D.C.: United States Indonesia Society, 2009),
p. ix.
44
Cited from “Foreign Minister: 2011 RI contact of peacekeeping centers”, Antara
News, 18 January 2011.
45
Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles
for Military Cooperation and Assistance, Adelphi Paper No. 365 (London:
Routledge for IISS, 2004), p. 6.
46
Military diplomacy here is defined by B.S. Sachar, “Military Diplomacy Through
Arms Transfers: A Case Study of China”, Strategic Analysis 28, no. 2 (2004):
290.
47
Adapted from Idil Syawfi, “Aktifitas Diplomasi Pertahanan Indonesia Dalam
Pemenuhan Tujuan-Tujuan Pertahanan Indonesia (2003–2008)”, Master’s Thesis,
University of Indonesia, 2009.
48
Ibid.

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 182 Evan A. Laksmana

49
Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing
Regional Security Strategies”, International Security 32, no. 3 (2007): 126.
50
The Indonesian navy’s largest warship development is its SIGMA-class corvette
with the Netherlands, while the air force signed an agreement with South Korea
in 2010 to participate in its KFX advanced fighter programme.
51
See Markus Sihaloho, “No Extradition Treaty with S’pore due to ‘Unacceptable
Clause’: Lawmaker”, Jakarta Globe, 7 June 2011.
52
See Sheldon Simon, “Southeast Asian International Relations: Is There Institutional
Traction?”, in International Relations in Southeast Asia: Between Bilateralism and
Multilateralism, edited by N. Ganesan and Ramses Amer (Singapore: Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), pp. 38–39.
53
Alex J. Bellamy, “Security”, in Contemporary Southeast Asia, 2nd ed., edited
by Mark Beeson (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), pp. 189–90.
54
In discussions with the author from June to September 2010, several junior
diplomats and mid-level defence officials who had participated in ASEAN’s
defence diplomatic events made this argument, but never substantiate their
claim. And since the meeting notes are not publicly available it is also difficult
to confirm their accounts.
55
Juwono Sudarsono, “Indonesia, the Region, and the World”, Summary of
Presentation to the US Department of Defense Capstone Exercise, Jakarta, 11
August 2010.
56
A brief overview of Indonesia’s changing strategic environment can be found
in Evan A. Laksmana, “Review of 2009: RI’s changing geo-strategic currents”,
Jakarta Post, 9 January 2010.

01 Evan.indd 182 7/25/11 11:10:17 AM

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