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regional and global profile is rising.3 Since 2003, Indonesia has been
the driving force behind political and security community building
in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), even as it
strengthens bilateral partnerships with major powers such as the
United States, Russia, India, China and Australia. Indonesia has also
been actively engaged on many global issues such as climate change
and been an ardent supporter of global institutions including the G-
20 and the UN Security Council. Indonesia’s economic growth rates
in recent years of between 4 to 6 per cent annually have also been
impressive, especially given the difficulties faced by other countries
during the global financial crisis. Finally, the consolidation of
democracy has increased domestic resilience and earned the country
international approbation.4
This turn of events is quite remarkable given that a little over
a decade ago some analysts were predicting the “Balkanization” of
Indonesia following a series of economic and political crises which
accompanied the fall of President Soeharto, including an upsurge in
separatist activity and the violent separation of East Timor in 1999.5 While
it is clearly difficult to isolate the single most important reason behind
Indonesia’s recovery and increasing regional and global profile, some
observers have cited the country’s land and population size as providing
it with the capital to play a regional and even global leadership role.6
Indonesia is not only the largest country in Southeast Asia in terms of land
size and population, but also the world’s largest archipelagic state and
is rich in natural resources. An economist at Morgan Stanley has noted
that together with improved government finances and political stability,
the “natural advantage from demography and commodity resources is
likely to unleash Indonesia’s growth potential”.7
This line of reasoning seems to echo the Realist school of
International Relations which favours material factors — such as
economy, natural resources, population size and geography — as the
primary indicators of national power. As such, when a country such
as Indonesia possesses these material factors, and if it can manage its
domestic political affairs and maintain cohesion, its rise is more likely
to occur. Thus, some would argue that Indonesia’s rising profile is
due to its potential material powers, mainly, though not exclusively,
its size. Although this line of reasoning can be persuasive, as this
paper seeks to demonstrate, it only tells half the story. Indonesia’s
complex history, domestic political system and threat perceptions
suggests that what is required is a more nuanced assessment of the
country’s rising regional and global profile.
1747 that expanded sanctions on Iran due to its nuclear programme. The
inquiry embarrassed Indonesia as a UNSC member and undermined the
government’s nuclear non-proliferation stance. To complicate matters,
legislators have occasionally used foreign policy issues to attack the
president without providing constructive suggestions to improve policy.32
Many legislators in charge of foreign affairs also often lack the necessary
knowledge and expertise to make informed decisions.
In addition to the DPR’s role, the advent of democracy has also
increased the importance of public opinion in foreign policy decision-
making. In democracies, political leaders must justify their decisions in
an accountable and transparent manner; poor foreign policy decisions
made at the expense of the national or public interest can make re-
election harder to achieve. In the case of Indonesia, however, under
the image-conscious administration of President Yudhoyono, public
opinion on foreign policy issues is only heeded when dealing with
sensitive matters that could hurt his image, or when it could cost him
domestic support.33
However, despite these complications, the Foreign Ministry
believes that democracy is a very important source of “soft power” that
can enhance the country’s foreign policy and international image and
contribute to regional stability.34 Indeed, over the past decade, many of
the country’s major foreign policy initiatives have centred on democratic
ideas, including the creation of the ASEAN Political Security Community
(APSC) and the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF). The first draft of the APSC
(then still called the ASEAN Security Community proposal), which
totalled more than 70 specific ideas actually called for the promotion of
democracy and human rights, a commitment to free and regular elections,
and the formation of open, tolerant societies.35 The BDF was meant as
a forum to promote cooperation and further the spread of democracy
and good governance in Asia.
This “democratic resurgence” also helped to win over the support of
the United States, which would later cite the consolidation of democracy
in Indonesia as among the reasons behind the normalization of military-
to-military relations in 2005 and the US-Indonesia Comprehensive
Partnership Agreement in 2010.36 Some observers have argued that in
view of Indonesia’s democratic credentials, it should be encouraged to
take on a leadership role in the Muslim world. Arguably, however, this
approach is misguided.37 For one thing, Indonesians are not comfortable
injecting religion into foreign policy. And not only are they uneasy about
the binary distinction between “radical” and “moderate” Muslims in
world politics, they are also worried about potential resentment from
the country’s domestic minorities. Moreover, it would be difficult for
Table 1
Indonesia’s Threat Overview and Projections
Number Scenario
Figure 1
Indonesia’s Defence Budget, 1998–2010
(billion USD)
5
4.5
4.5
Defense budget (billion USD)
4
3.6
3.5
3.4 3.5
3
2.39
2.5 2.2
2.53 2.59
2 2.12
1.7 1.6
1.5
1.553
1.4
1
0.5
0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Figure 2
Indonesia’s Defence Gap
(Budget compared to requirements in billion USD)
16
14
12
10
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Budget Requirements
Source: Chart compiled from statistics in Andi Widjajanto et al., Reformasi Militer
Indonesia: 2009–2014 (Jakarta: Centre for Global Civil Society Studies, 2009).
Figure 3
Indonesia’s Defence Budget
(Share of GDP and National Budget)
5.00
4.53
4.50 4.23 4.31
4.00
3.50 3.33 3.36
3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00 0.83 0.85 0.83
0.66 0.62
0.50
0.00
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Note: Figures are slightly different from official accounts by MoD officials.
Source: Chart compiled from statistics contained in The Military Balance (London:
Routledge for IISS, issues 2006–10).
the current 1 per cent or less to at least 3 to 4 per cent over the
next decade.
From the preceding analysis two conclusions can be drawn.
First, Indonesia’s land and population “size” as well as diversity
actually perpetuates perceptions of internal threat within the
defence and foreign policy establishment. Second, Indonesia’s
defence spending is comparatively low for a country of its size
and security requirements, which means non-military means are
required to defend the country, such as diplomacy, which underlines
the rationale behind Indonesia’s contribution to regional and global
security. These traits underline the essence of Indonesia’s strategic
weakness stemming from the persistence of internal security threats
to the state and the inability of the military to cope with them.
It should be pointed out, however, that following the separation
of the National Police from the military in 1999, internal security
threats have become the responsibility of the former, except for
separatist insurgencies.
Figure 4
Indonesia’s Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Missions, 1957–2008
(Number of personnel)
5,000
4,545
4,500
3,960
4,000
3,457
3,500
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,670
1,474
1,500
1,043
1,000
581 545
500
0 0 79
0
1957 - 1962 - 1966 - 1971 - 1976 - 1981 - 1986 - 1991 - 1996 - 2001 - 2006 -
1961 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008
Figure 5
Indonesia’s Bilateral Defence Diplomacy
(2003–08)
70
60 58
50
40
30
20 17
13
10
0
Confidence Building Measures Defence Capability Defence Industrial Development
Source: Statistical figures based on the number of defence diplomatic events or activities
compiled from I’dil Syawfi, Aktifitas Diplomasi Pertahanan Indonesia Dalam Pemenuhan
Tujuan-Tujuan Pertahanan Indonesia (2003–2008), Master’s Thesis, University of
Indonesia, 2009.
Figure 6
Indonesia’s Bilateral Defence Diplomacy
(2003–08)
14
13
12
10
9
8
6 6
6
5 5 5
4
3 3 3
2
0
lia
ia
a
es
nd
si
in
or
di
re
ss
ra
an
ay
at
Ch
In
Ko
ap
la
Ru
st
St
Fr
al
r
ng
Au
he
th
M
d
Si
u
t
te
Ne
So
i
Un
e
Th
Source: Statistical figures based on the number of defence diplomatic events or activities
compiled from I’dil Syawfi, Aktifitas Diplomasi Pertahanan Indonesia Dalam Pemenuhan
Tujuan-Tujuan Pertahanan Indonesia (2003–2008), Master’s Thesis, University of
Indonesia, 2009.
Figure 7
Indonesia’s Defence Diplomacy with Southeast Asian Countries
(2003–08)
16
14
14
12
10
8
7
6
4
4
3 3
2 2
2
1
0
nd
ar
e
a
a
ei
or
ne
di
si
na
nm
un
la
ay
ap
bo
pi
ai
et
Br
ya
al
ip
ng
Th
am
Vi
M
ill
M
Si
Ph
C
e
Th
Source: Statistical figures based on the number of defence diplomatic events or activities
compiled from I’dil Syawfi, Aktifitas Diplomasi Pertahanan Indonesia Dalam Pemenuhan
Tujuan-Tujuan Pertahanan Indonesia (2003–2008), Master’s Thesis, University of
Indonesia, 2009.
Figure 8
Indonesia’s Multilateral Defence Diplomacy Venues
(1994–2009)
7.50%
20.50%
ARF-related events
ASEAN-related events
Others
72%
in 177 ARF-related events from 1994 until 2009, including the ARF
ministerial meeting, ARF Senior Officials’ Meeting (ARF-SOM), ARF
Inter-Sessional Group on Confidence Building Measures (ARF-ISG-
CBM), ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC) and the ARF Defence
Officials’ Dialogue (ARF-DOD).
For Indonesia, the larger quantitative portion of ARF rather
ASEAN-related defence diplomacy events is related to the realization
since the mid-1990s that engaging the major powers in security
discussions was critical. In terms of the ARF’s attributes, two significant
results are salient for Indonesia.53 First, the ARF is predicated on the
norms of behaviour stemming from the “ASEAN Way”. Consequently,
the ARF has become an important vehicle for Indonesia and ASEAN
to spread regional norms and identity sharing. Second, the ARF is
the only regional institution in the world that includes the United
States, Europe, China and other regional powers. This has allowed
Indonesia and ASEAN to engage and encourage a balance among the
Great Powers, while providing ASEAN and its neighbours a forum
to deepen mutual comfort levels. Put another way, the ARF can be
seen as a forum for Indonesia to expand strategic engagement with
the major powers.
Despite the higher frequency of ARF-related events and meetings,
on the more practical security issues closer to Indonesia’s own
interests, such as the use of military assets for disaster relief or
maritime security, Indonesia has been relying more on ASEAN-
related events, including the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting
(ADMM) and ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Forces Informal Meeting
(ACDFIM). Indonesian defence officials have also been involved in
the annual ASEAN Special Senior Officials’ Meeting (ASEAN Special
SOM), ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting, ASEAN Navy
Interaction, ASEAN Air Force Chiefs Conference, ASEAN Military
Intelligence Meeting and ASEAN Armies Rifles Meet. On average,
between 2000 and 2009, ASEAN, formally and informally, organized
fifteen meetings a year on defence or security related matters (see
Figure 9), in which Indonesia played an active role.54
In this regard, ASEAN-related events, though largely informal,
have been considered as a step forward in improving regional CBMs.
Indeed, according to Indonesia’s former Minister of Defence, ASEAN’s
multilateralism and regional community building have allowed the
creation of a “strategic space” needed to boost domestic economic
and political development while accommodating the interests of
extra-regional powers.55 Specifically, the belief among the defence
and foreign policy establishments is that such multilateral defence
Figure 9
Southeast Asian Multilateral Defence Diplomacy Meetings
(1994–2009)
25
21
20 20
19
18
16 16
15
14
10 10
8 8 8
6 6
5 5
1 1
0
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Conclusion
The preceding analysis suggests the following three conclusions.
First, Indonesia’s historical and political experiences laid the
foundation for the country’s “independent and active” foreign
policy. The manifestation of this doctrine is seen in the country’s
“moral force” or “soft power” in shaping the regional and global
environment through participation in international institutions, such
NOTES
Parts of this paper were presented at the 28th Annual International Conference on
Security Affairs, organized by the Research Institute for National Security Affairs
(RINSA), Korea National Defence University, Seoul, 30 August 2010. The author
would like to acknowledge the support of the Centre for Non-Traditional Security
Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and the thoughtful comments
and assistance from I’dil Syawfi, Hanani Prieta, Hazelia Margaretha, Lee Seok-Soo,
Jurgen Ruland, Sheldon Simon and two anonymous reviewers of Contemporary
Southeast Asia.
1
See A Century’s Journey: How the Great Powers Shape the World, edited by
Robert A. Pastor (New York: Basic Books, 1999); Pivotal States: A New Framework
for U.S. Policy in the Developing World, edited by Robert Chase, Emily Hill,
and Paul Kennedy (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000).
2
Franklin Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence:
From Sukarno to Suharto (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), p. 30.
3
See for example, Ann Marie Murphy, “Indonesia Returns to the International
Stage: Good News for the United States”, Orbis 53, no. 1 (2009): 65–79;
Magda Safrina, “Indonesia and the Global Rise of Economic, Political Power”,
Jakarta Post, 20 March 2010; Eduardo Lachica, “Jakarta’s Foray Into Armed
Diplomacy”, Far Eastern Economic Review (June 2007): 38–41; Anthony Deutsch
and Henny Sender, “Indonesia: Regional economic boom”, Financial Times,
7 June 2011.
4
See for example, Rizal Sukma, “Indonesian Politics in 2009: Defective Elections,
Resilient Democracy”, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 45, no. 3 (2009):
317–36.
5
For a debate on the breakup of Indonesia, see for example, Tim Huxley,
Disintegrating Indonesia? Implications for Regional Security, Adelphi Paper 349
(London: Oxford University Press for IISS, 2002); Robert Cribb, “Not the Next
Yugoslavia: Prospects for the Disintegration of Indonesia”, Australian Journal
of International Affairs 53, no. 2 (1999): 169–78.
6
See for example, Ann Marie Murphy, “Indonesia and the World”, in Indonesia:
The Great Transition, edited by John Bresnan (New York: Rowman & Littlefield,
2005), pp. 239–95.
7
Cited from David Kampf, “Rising Powers: BRIC and Beyond”, Foreign Policy
Blogs, <http://risingpowers.foreignpolicyblogs.com/category/indonesia/>.
8
For a recent debate on power in International Relations, see Stefano Guzzini,
On the Measure of Power and the Power of Measure in International Relations
(Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2009), pp. 5–15.
9
See Andrew F. Hart and Bruce D. Jones, “How do Rising Powers Rise?” Survival
52, no. 6 (2010/2011): 66; Andrew Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism and Global
Order: What Space for Would-be Great Powers?” International Affairs 82, no.
1 (2006): 1–3.
10
While Robert Pape argues that regional states do not directly challenge US military
preponderance but use non-military tools to delay, frustrate and undermine
unilateral US policies using international institutions, economic statecraft and
diplomatic arrangements, Indonesia uses similar strategies to compensate for
its strategic weakness. See Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United
States”, International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 7–45.
11
Cited from Wing Thye Woo and Chang Hong, “Indonesia’s Economic Performance
in Comparative Perspective and a New Policy Framework for 2049”, Bulletin
of Indonesian Economic Studies 46, no. 1 (2010): 35.
12
Cited from Robert Cribb and Michelle M. Ford, “Indonesia as an Archipelago:
Managing Islands, Managing the Seas”, in Indonesia Beyond the Water’s Edge:
Managing an Archipelagic State, edited by Robert Cribb and Michelle M. Ford
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), p. 1.
13
See Evan A. Laksmana, “Indonesia’s pivotal role in the US grand strategy”,
Jakarta Post, 6 October 2009.
14
Anthony L. Smith, Strategic Centrality: Indonesia’s Changing Role in ASEAN,
Pacific Strategic Paper 10 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000),
p. 8.
15
John B. Haseman, “Indonesia-Turbulent Times: From Autocracy to Democracy”,
in Strategic Asia 2003–4: Fragility and Crisis, edited by Richard J. Ellings and
Aaron Friedberg (Seatle: National Bureau for Asian Research, 2004).
16
See for example, Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord
in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984);
Sheng Ding, “Analyzing Rising Power from the Perspective of Soft Power: A
new look at China’s rise to the status quo power”, Journal of Contemporary
China 19, no. 64 (2010): 259.
17
For details on these two concepts and their place in Southeast Asian security,
see Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN
and the ARF (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp. 18–19.
18
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, “Revisiting our foreign policy”, Jakarta Post,
25 May 2005.
19
Bantarto Bandoro, “Reassessing Indonesia’s foreign policy”, Jakarta Post, 2 April
2008.
20
Hatta was not only among the country’s founding fathers and its first vice-
president, but also the chief architect of Indonesia’s foreign policy in the 1940s
and 1950s.
21
See Rizal Sukma, “The Evolution of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy: An Indonesian
View”, Asian Survey 35, no. 3 (1995): 305–6.
22
For an initial history of Indonesia’s foreign policy, see ibid., 306–14.
23
See Paige Johnson Tan, “Navigating a Turbulent Ocean: Indonesia’s Worldview
and Foreign Policy”, Asian Perspectives 31, no. 3 (2007): 148.
24
Ibid.
25
For details, see Rene L. Pattiradjawane, “Indonesia Dalam Politik Globalisasi”,
Kompas, 5 May 2010.
26
See Jorn Dosch, The Changing Dynamics of Southeast Asian Politics (Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007), pp. 20–22.
27
On the most basic explanation of the “two-level game”, see Robert Putnam,
“Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, International
Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–60.
28
For more details, see Kai He, “Indonesia’s Foreign Policy after Soeharto:
International Pressure, Democratization, and Policy Change”, International
Relations of the Asia-Pacific 8 (2008): 47–72.
29
On the personalistic nature of Indonesia’s foreign policy, especially under the
country’s first two presidents, see Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy
(London: The Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1983).
30
For details of the DCA debacle and the role of Commission 1, see Leonard C.
Sebastian and Evan A. Laksmana, “Defence Pact: Getting the Message Across”,
Straits Times, 20 July 2007.
31
Teguh Santosa et al., Komisi 1: Senjata-Satelit-Diplomasi (Jakarta: Suara Harapan
Bangsa, 2009), p. 181.
32
For more details on how parliamentary politics shapes Indonesia’s foreign policy,
see Jürgen Rüland, “Deepening ASEAN Cooperation through Democratization?
The Indonesian Legislature and Foreign Policymaking”, International Relations
of the Asia Pacific 9, no. 3 (2009): 373–402.
33
For a discussion on foreign policy and public opinion under President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono, see for example Hadi Soesastro and Evan A. Laksmana,
49
Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing
Regional Security Strategies”, International Security 32, no. 3 (2007): 126.
50
The Indonesian navy’s largest warship development is its SIGMA-class corvette
with the Netherlands, while the air force signed an agreement with South Korea
in 2010 to participate in its KFX advanced fighter programme.
51
See Markus Sihaloho, “No Extradition Treaty with S’pore due to ‘Unacceptable
Clause’: Lawmaker”, Jakarta Globe, 7 June 2011.
52
See Sheldon Simon, “Southeast Asian International Relations: Is There Institutional
Traction?”, in International Relations in Southeast Asia: Between Bilateralism and
Multilateralism, edited by N. Ganesan and Ramses Amer (Singapore: Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), pp. 38–39.
53
Alex J. Bellamy, “Security”, in Contemporary Southeast Asia, 2nd ed., edited
by Mark Beeson (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), pp. 189–90.
54
In discussions with the author from June to September 2010, several junior
diplomats and mid-level defence officials who had participated in ASEAN’s
defence diplomatic events made this argument, but never substantiate their
claim. And since the meeting notes are not publicly available it is also difficult
to confirm their accounts.
55
Juwono Sudarsono, “Indonesia, the Region, and the World”, Summary of
Presentation to the US Department of Defense Capstone Exercise, Jakarta, 11
August 2010.
56
A brief overview of Indonesia’s changing strategic environment can be found
in Evan A. Laksmana, “Review of 2009: RI’s changing geo-strategic currents”,
Jakarta Post, 9 January 2010.