VAWC - Anti Violence against Women and Their

Children Act of 2004 (Republic Act 9262)

1. What is VAWC?

Anti – Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 or otherwise
known as VAWC, is a law passed in the Philippines for the protection of
women and children from violence. This law establishes the parameters and
guidelines, in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the
Constitution and the Provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human
rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party. (Section 2 of R.A.
9262)

2. What are the acts of violence which are covered under R.A.
9262?

R.A. 9262 covers several acts of violence, which are:

(a) Sexual Violence – the acts which are sexual in nature;
(b) Psychological Violence – Acts or omissions causing or likely to cause
mental or emotional suffering of the victim;
(c) Economic Abuse – Acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially
dependent upon her abuser;

3. What are the kinds of sexual violence that could be covered

under this law?

Sexual violence are acts which are sexual in nature, committed against a
woman or her child, and are not limited to:
a) Rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or
her child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive
remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim’s body, forcing
him or her to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the
woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing
the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in
the same room with the abuser.
b) Acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual
activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical
or other harm or coercion.
c) Prostituting the woman or child.

4. What are the qualifications for an act or a series of acts to be

considered as a crime of violence against women through physical
harm?

The limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be considered as a

crime of violence against women through physical harm are the following:
a) It is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the
offender’s wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had a sexual or dating
relationship or with whom he has a common child;
b) It results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
(Dabalos v. RTC, Branch 59, Angeles City, G.R. No. 193960, 07
January 2013)

5. What are the elements of the crime of violence against

women through harassment?

The elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment

are:
a) The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the
offended woman;
b) The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series
of acts of harassment against the woman;
c) The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to her.
(Ang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 182835, 20 April 2010)
6. Define dating relationship as used under R.A. 9262.

It is a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a
continuing basis during the course of the relationship. The dating relationship
that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual
intercourse taking place between those involved. A casual acquaintance or
ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context
is not a dating relationship.

Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of
the "on-and-off" variety (away-bati), their romance cannot be regarded as
having developed "over time and on a continuing basis." But the two of them
were romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits, from October to
December of 2003. That would be time enough for nurturing a relationship
of mutual trust and love. An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between
two lovers is a common occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that
the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up during
periods of misunderstanding. Explaining what "away-bati" meant, Irish
explained that at times, when she could not reply to Rustan’s messages, he
would get angry at her. That was all. Indeed, she characterized their three-
month romantic relation as continuous. (Ang v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 182835, 20 April 2010)

7. Define sexual relations as used under R.A. 9262.

It refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of
a common child.

8. What are the kinds of psychological violence that could be

covered under this law?

Acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of

the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking,
damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse
and mental infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness
the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to
which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to
witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the
right to custody and/or visitation of common children.
9. How would the crime of violence be committed against women
and their children, as stated under R.A. 9262?
The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through
any of the following acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(c) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;
(d) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage
in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist
from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or
attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of
movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or
threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman
or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed
with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her
child's movement or conduct:

a. Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of

custody to her/his family;
b. Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of
financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing
the woman's children insufficient financial support;
c. Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal
right;
d. Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity or controlling the victim's own mon4ey
or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or
properties;
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose
of controlling her actions or decisions;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any
sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force,
physical harm, or through intimidation directed against the woman or her
child or her/his immediate family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or
through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not
be limited to, the following acts:

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman
or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman
or her child against her/his
will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to
animals or pets of the
woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the
woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children
of access to the woman's child/children.

10. When can I file an action under R.A. 9262?

It would depend on the act or acts of violence committed. Some acts
prescribe in twenty (20) years and some prescribe in ten (10) years.

11. What is a protection order?

A protection order is an order issued under this act for the purpose of
preventing further acts of violence against women or her child. And granting
other relief as may be needed. The relief granted under a protection order
serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing
any disruption in the victim’s daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and
ability of the victim to independently regain control of her life. The provisions
of the protection order shall be enforced by law enforcement agencies.

12. What are the various kinds of protection orders?

The various kinds of protection orders are:
a) Barangay protection order (BPO)
b) Temporary Protection Order (TPO)
c) Permanent Protection Order (PPO)

13. Where can I apply for a protection order?

Application for a protection may be filed with the appropriate Regional Trial
Court/Family Court or Municipal Court where the petitioner resides in case
of Temporary Protection Order (TPO) and Permanent Protection Order
(PPO), respectively.
Barangay Protection Order may be applied for in the Barangay where the
applicant resides or in accordance with Section 409 of the Local Government
Code of 1991.

14. What are the reliefs I can ask in a protection order?

The protection order that may be issued under R.A. 9262 shall include any,
some or all of the following reliefs:
a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or
committing, personally or through another, any of the acts mention in Article
5 of R.A. 9262;
b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning,
contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or
indirectly;
c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the residence of the
petitioner, regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for
the purpose of protecting the petitioner, or permanently where no property
rights are violated, and if respondent must remove personal effects from the
residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the
respondent has gathered his things and escort the respondent from the
residence;
d) Directing the respondent to stay away from the petitioner and
designated family or household member at a distance specified by the court,
and to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment, or any
specified place frequented by the petitioner and any designated family or
household member;
e) Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an automobile and
other essential personal effects, regardless of ownership, and directing
the appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany the petitioner to the
residence of the parties to ensure that the petitioner is safely restored to the
possession of the automobile and other essential personal effects, or to
supervise the petitioner’s or respondent’s removal of personal belongings;
f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to the
petitioner;
g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her
child if entitled to legal support. Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary,
the court shall order an appropriate percentage of the income or salary of
the respondent to be withheld regularly by the respondent’s employer for
the same to be automatically remitted directly to the woman. Failure to remit
and/or withhold or any delay in the remittance of support to the woman
and/or her child without justifiable cause shall render the respondent or his
employer for indirect contempt of court;
h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession of any
firearm or deadly weapon and order him to surrender the same to the court
for appropriate disposition by the court, including revocation of license and
disqualification to apply for any license to use or possess a firearm. If the
offender is a law enforcement agent, the court shall order the offender to
surrender his firearm and shall direct the appropriate authority to investigate
on the offender and take appropriate action on matter;
i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence inflicted,
including, but not limited to, property damage, medical expenses, child care
expenses and loss of income;
j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to provide petitioner
may need; and
k) Provision of such forms of relief as the court deems necessary to
protect and provide for the safety of the petitioner and any designated family
or household member, provided petitioner and designated family or
household member consists to such relief.
15. Who may file a Petition for Protection Orders?
A petition for Protection Order may be filed by the following:
a) The offended party;
b) The parents or guardians of the offended party;
c) The ascendants, descendants or collateral relatives within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity;
d) Officers or social workers of the DSWD or social workers of local
government units (LGUs);
e) Police officers, preferably those in charge of women and children’s
desks;
f) Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad;
g) Lawyer, counselor, therapist or healthcare provider of the petitioner;
h) At least two (2) concerned responsible citizens of the city or
municipality where the violence against women and their children occurred
and who has personal knowledge of the offense committed.
16. What are the differences between Barangay Protection Order,
Temporary Protection Order or Permanent Protection Order?
Barangay Protection Orders (BPO) refer to the protection order issued by
the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing
acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of R.A. 9262. BPO shall be effective for 15
days.
Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) refers to the protection order issued by
the court on the date of the filing of the application after ex
parte determination that such order should be issued. The court may grant
in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in R.A. 9262 and shall be
effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall order the immediate personal
service of the TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain
the assistance of law enforcement agents for the service.
Permanent Protection Order (PPO) refers to the protection order issued by
the court after notice and hearing. The court shall not deny the issuance of
protection order on the basis of the lapse of time between the act of violence
and the filing of the application. PPO shall be effective until revoked by the
court upon application of the person in whose favor it was issued.
17. What is a “Battered Woman Syndrome”?
The Battered Woman Syndrome is a repeated and cyclical violence against
a woman which results in the “immobilization of the latter’s ability to act
decisively in her own interest and making her feel trapped in a relationship
with no means of escape.” (People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981. 15
January 2004)
The Battered Woman Syndrome is now a defense which can be used by the
victim-survivors who really are suffering from the said syndrome at the
commission of a crime.

RA 9262 and Foreigners

G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child

RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his

minor child under Philippine law; and

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under

R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.27

At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the

instant petition despite the fact that the same was directly lodged with the
Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty
Development Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a ruling of
the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court
without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a
Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or
involved. This latter situation was one that petitioners found themselves in
when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In Republic
v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions
of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under
Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the
RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review
under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is taken
to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and
law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact,
of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appealis
elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law." (Emphasis
supplied)

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination
of the probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood
of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application
of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue must rest
solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.29

Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law –

the response thereto concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or not a foreign national
has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and
whether or not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to do so.

It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel

question of law concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly
commits acts and omissions punishable under special criminal laws,
specifically in relation to family rights and duties. The inimitability of the
factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by
this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases.
Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and remanding the same to the
CA would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in
the present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in the
administration of justice should prevail over the observance of the hierarchy
of courts.

Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition

meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioner’s contentions.

To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No.

9262, it is imperative that the legal obligation to support exists.

Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the
parent’s obligation to support his child. Petitioner contends that
notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article
26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying with his
obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.

On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear
basis presented by petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled
to financial support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce
Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial support.33

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article
19534 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is
a foreign citizen, since Article 1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the
principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are
concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the
same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies
to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect
to family rights and duties.36

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family
rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the
Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of
his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support
to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.37

In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –

Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the
principle that family rights and duties are governed by their personal law,
i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when staying in a
foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to

support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family Code as a
consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not,
however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son
altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present
case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands,
he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to
support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in
advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never
proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of
the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support
their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree),
because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts
are not authorized to takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proved.43

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands

in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this
doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our
courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic
or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the
obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant
case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the
obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-
compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce
obtained in a foreign land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the matter of status of
persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely
show that he is notliable to give support to his son after the divorce decree
was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the
second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent’s obligation to support
his child is specifically stated,46 which was not disputed by respondent.

We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law
of respondent states that parents have no obligation to support their children
or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find
applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American
Realty Corporation,47 to wit:

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter
were properly pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs.
Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and
established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or
order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and

those which have for their object public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle
imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of
action.

Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action,
the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a
ground for the dismissal of the others. Moreover, foreign law should not be
applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens
or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of
law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates
the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.48

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce
a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance
therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because
it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support
when the latter is entitled thereto.

We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no

longer liable to support his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San
Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she
should no longerbe considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she
should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has
to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a
wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served. (Emphasis added)50

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made
liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or
failing to give support topetitioner’s son, to wit:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime
of violence against women and their children is committed through any of
the following acts:

xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in
conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist
from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or
attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of
movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or
threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman
or child. This shall include, butnot limited to, the following acts committed
with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her
child's movement or conduct:

xxxx

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial

support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's
children insufficient financial support; x x x x

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the

woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor
childrenof access to the woman's child/children.51

Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support
to the child is considered anact of violence against women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines,

we find strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in
criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the
instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security
and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine
territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty
stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts
of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed
here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the
Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over
the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that
jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.

Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not
admitting, that there is a legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262
in the instant case, the criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground
of prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides
that:

SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f)
shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I)
shall prescribe in ten (10) years.

The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A.
No. 9262 is a continuing offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing
at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not
prescribed.

Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support
to petitioner’s child calls for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being admitted, we
hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has
jurisdiction over the case.

DEPORTATION

Deportation is defined as an administrative means in which a foreigner who

is sojourning or residing in a foreign country is removed or deported to his
own country after being adjudged by competent authority to be in violation
of immigration laws or has been declared a clear and present danger to the
tranquility of the community where he is (An Outline of Philippine
Immigration and Citizenship Laws, Vol. 1 (2006 Ed) by Ronaldo P.
Ledesma, page 284). The power to deport a foreigner is an inherent and
exclusive authority of the foreign country in which he is in.

DEPORTATION OF ALIENS

Section 37.
(A) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for
the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien:

1. Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act
by means of false and misleading statements or without inspection and
admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of entry or at
any place other than at a designated port of entry;

2. Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act,
who was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry;

3. Any alien who, after the effective date of this Act, is convicted in the
Philippines and sentenced for a term of one year or more for a crime
involving moral turpitude committed within five years after his entry to the
Philippines, or who, at any time after such entry, is so convicted and
sentenced more than once;

4. Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for a violation of the law
governing prohibited drugs;

5. Any alien who practices prostitution or is an inmate of a house of

prostitution or is connected with the management of a house of
prostitution, or is a procurer;

6. Any alien who becomes a public charge within five years after entry
from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen subsequent to entry;

7. Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or

condition under which he was admitted as a nonimmigrant;
8. Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates or teaches the overthrow
by force and violence of the Government of the Philippines, or of
constituted law and authority, or who disbelieves in or is opposed to
organized government or who advises, advocates, or teaches the assault or
assassination of public officials because of their office, or who advises,
advocates, or teaches the unlawful destruction of property, or who is a
member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining, advocating or
teaching such doctrines, or who in any manner whatsoever lends
assistance, financial or otherwise, to the dissemination of such doctrines;

9. Any alien who commits any of the acts described in sections forty-five
and forty-six of this Act, independent of criminal action which may be
brought against him: Provided, That in the case of an alien who, for any
reason, is convicted and sentenced to suffer both imprisonment and
deportation, said alien shall first serve the entire period of his
imprisonment before he is actually deported: Provided however, That the
imprisonment may be waived by the Commissioner of Immigration with the
consent of the Department Head, and upon payment by the alien
concerned of such amount as the Commissioner may fix and approved by
the Department Head;

10. Any alien who, at any time within five years after entry, shall have
been convicted of violating the provisions of the Philippine Commonwealth
Act Numbered Six Hundred and Fifty-Three, otherwise known as the
Philippine Alien Registration Act of 1941, or who, at any time after entry,
shall have been convicted more than once of violating the provisions of the
same Act;

11. Any alien who engages in profiteering, hoarding, or black-marketing,

independent of any criminal action which may be brought against him;

12. Any alien who is convicted of any offense penalized under

Commonwealth Act Numbered Four hundred and seventy-three, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Laws of the Philippines, or any law
relating to acquisition of Philippine citizenship;
13. Any alien who defrauds his creditor by absconding or alienating
properties to prevent them from being attached or executed;

(B) Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of

paragraph (a) of this Section at any time after entry, but shall not be
effected under any other clause unless the arrest in the deportation
proceedings is made within five years after the cause for deportation
arises. Deportation under clauses 3 and 4 shall not be effected if the court,
or judge thereof, when sentencing the alien, shall recommend to the
Commissioner of Immigration that the alien be not deported.

(C) No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific

grounds for deportation nor without being given a hearing under rules of
procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.

(D) In any deportation proceeding involving the entry of an alien the

burden of proof shall be upon the alien to show that he entered the
Philippines lawfully, and the time, place, and manner of such entry, and for
this purpose he shall be entitled to a statement of the facts in connection
with his arrival as shown by any record in the custody of the Bureau of
Immigration.

(E) Any alien under arrest in a deportation proceeding may be released

under bond or under such other conditions as may be imposed by the
Commissioner of Immigration.

Section 38.
An alien ordered deported shall, at the option of the Commissioner of
Immigration, be removed to the country whence he came, or to the foreign
port at which he embarked for the Philippines, or to the country of his
nativity or of which he is a citizen or subject, or to the country in which he
resided prior to coming to the Philippines.

Section 39.
If deportation proceedings are instituted within five years after entry,
unless deportation is made by reason of causes which arose subsequent to
the alien's entry, the cost of deportation from the port of deportation shall
be at the expense of the owner or owners of the vessel by which the alien
came; if that is not practicable, in such case and in all other cases, the cost
of deportation shall be payable from the appropriations available for the
purpose.

However, Supreme Court explains that an alien may be deported for being
“undesirable”

Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory
upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public
interest.[43] The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under
the authority of the sovereign power.[44] It is a police measure against undesirable
aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the
public good and the domestic tranquility of the people.[45]

Thus, a foreigner alleged to have assaulted his partner may be deported

from the Philippines, for being undesirable.