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AN ARISTOTELIAN APPROACH
TO QUANTUM MECHANICS

Gil Sanders

Abstract: Ever since the scientific revolution and the enlightenment, Aristotelian metaphysics has been
abandoned in favor of a mechanistic conception of matter that is now scientifically expressed exclusively
in mathematical language. This has led to ontological questions as to what features of reality these ab-
stract algorithms are supposed to represent. The measurement problem in Quantum Mechanics has made
this question particularly prominent. It is the contention of this paper that an Aristotelian perspective
should be taken seriously again because it provides a more plausible ontological interpretation of the
quantum algorithm. Once we understand that possibilities are actually potentials and that potentials are
real features of the world, we can see that both absolute determinism and absolute indeterminism can be
avoided and a sensible view of the world is restored.

Quantum mechanics (QM) has raised some very difficult metaphysical questions about

what kind of world the quantum algorithm describes. This algorithm has rigorously predicted,

without fail, all of the baffling behaviors of particles and yet it seems impossible that it should

describe something about what the physical world’s ontology is actually like. The idea of super-

position, for example, states that a particle that can have either a spin-y or spin-x state is (prior to

measurement) not in both, not in neither, and not in either state. Around measurement, the parti-

cle indeterministically collapses into either state. Without measurement, the particle operates de-

terministically without a definite state and/or position. The idea that prior to measurement some-

thing is in a superposition seems to be metaphysically impossible because it defies every logical

category that we can conceive and it directly conflicts with our experience of material objects as

continuously having definite properties. We have never directly observed superpositions, nor

could we have a clue as to what it would even mean to observe such a state of affairs.
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This has led to the notorious measurement problem. What exactly constitutes a measure-

ment in the first place? Does collapse actually occur, and if so, how does this work? Various an-

swers have been given by philosophers and physicists. The oldest and standard response is the

Copenhagen interpretation, but others like the Many-Worlds interpretation and Bohm’s interpre-

tation give answers that make different trade-offs. For every interpretation, there is some meta-

physically undesirable consequence. As Bell’s theorem deduced, each of these interpretations

must give up either determinism or some form of locality. A significant deal of QM seems to

challenge our deeply held metaphysical intuitions. This leads people to adopt one intuition (or

feature if you prefer) over another: Some restore a mechanistic determinism at the expense of

locality while a few others seem content to embrace indeterminism. This paper will explain in

more detail the measurement problem, critically evaluate the current interpretations, and will in-

troduce Aristotelian concepts like act-potency and hylomorphism to demonstrate that it provides

a powerful ontological account of QM.

The Measurement Problem

The measurement problem in QM has been expressed in different ways. There are two

fundamental dynamics in QM that appear inconsistent with each other. A dynamic refers to the

state of a physical system at some initial time that changes to a different state some later time in

accordance to a particular law or mathematical algorithm. The first dynamic is called Schro-

dinger Evolution. It is a fully deterministic algorithm that describes how physical systems in

general evolve from one state to another state when it is not being measured. The second dynam-

ic is called the Collapse Postulate. It is a nondeterministic algorithm (known as the wave func-

tion collapse) that describes a superposition of possible quantum states that probabilistically col-
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lapses into a particular state when measured. Under a standard interpretation of QM, this proba-

bility is not epistemic but is essential to the basic ontology of the world. These dynamics are two

fundamental laws about how quantum states evolve, and yet both cannot simultaneously hold.

The word “measured” was added to the laws to avoid an explicit contradiction, but science re-

quires a precise definition of what constitutes a measurement.

It turns out that precisely defining measurement is remarkably difficult – which is what is

known as the measurement problem. Wigner suggests that the collapse occurs precisely at the

level of consciousness. The conscious mind fixes its attentive eye to the entire state of affairs that

it seeks to observe, thus causing the entire system (including the brain, measuring devices and

particles) to collapse. Once it closes its attentive eye to this state of affairs, the system operates

under Schrödinger. The problem with this definition of measurement is that we now need to pro-

vide a precise definition of consciousness. Another proposal is that a state collapses when a mi-

croscopic system comes in contact with some macroscopic system, but this still requires us to

precisely define what constitutes a macroscopic system. Perhaps the best way to define mea-

surement is via some empirical event: the moment at which collapse occurs. This requires us to

perform experiments on the physical states both prior and after the collapse. Unfortunately, it

turns out that empirically we cannot differentiate between two competing theories of when col-

lapse occurs because measurement always impacts the environment. While it is strictly possible

to measure without impact, it’s practically impossible because perfectly isolating the trillions of

particles in a macroscopic system from the microscopic system is incredibly complicated and

would require vast amounts of energy that surpasses the present energy in our universe. 


A more technical way to describe the measurement problem is in terms of the wave func-
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tion. A wave function is a complete mathematical description of the properties of particles (rep-

resented as state vectors) in a physical system. By itself the wave function is a superposition of

all possible state vectors. With Schrödinger evolution, the wave function evolves as a linear su-

perposition of different states. It is deterministic in that the current vector state will physically

determine the resulting vector state. If we could know all the proceeding conditions, we could

predict with certainty what the resulting state vector would be. The wave function generally

evolves in accord to Schrödinger, but once some form of measurement is performed, the wave

function collapses in the sense that it no longer operates in accord to Schrödinger’s equation but

in accord to the collapse postulate. Through a linear combination of these state vectors, the once

indefinite superposition of state vectors nondeterministically produces some definite state vector.

In other words, the collapse postulate tells us that once a particle is measured, it is no longer in a

superposition of different states but collapses into a particle with definite properties and a defi-

nite position in a nondeterministic manner. The mathematical formalism of QM cannot tell us

when the wave function stops evolving deterministically. If observers or measuring devices can

be described deterministically, then why can’t we predict the resulting state vectors with certain-

ty as opposed to probabilistically? This seems logically contradictory.

Metaphysically, there are some serious problems here: how could the wave function pos-

sibly represent some real entity? It seems difficult, if not impossible to conceive that there could

be particles without definite properties. If we reify the wave function, it would entail that unmea-

sured particles normally exist as several mathematical possibilities in a state of superposition and

not as a concrete object unless measured. Or should we say that abstract mathematical objects

really exist out there? That seems absurd. And yet if we deny that it represents a real entity, it
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seems to question the thesis that science studies real entities, not fictional entities. Something

without definite properties does not seem capable of being measured in the first place. What

would it phenomenologically mean for a human to observe a cat that is in a superposition of be-

ing dead or alive? The whole notion appears incoherent not only because human consciousness

experiences only singular definite states but because it violates the laws of logic. Is physics now

in the business of doing speculative / incoherent metaphysics? A second metaphysical problem is

that if the microscopic world is indefinite, then it should entail that the macroscopic world is in-

definite as well since QM is meant to be an exhaustive description of all physical reality. That

directly contradicts our experience of the world being definite. Lastly, if we define measurement

as contact of macroscopic systems with microscopic systems, we have an epistemological prob-

lem. How can macroscopic measuring instruments give us information about microscopic ob-

jects? The macroworld is still explicable via classical physics, the microworld is not. Both appear

fundamentally different. Any plausible interpretation of QM must be able to address these meta-

physical problems. We shall look at what the current interpretations say, and then we will intro-

duce an Aristotelian approach as offering a more plausible ontology of quantum states.

Analysis of Current Interpretations

Without a doubt the measurement problem raises some serious questions, but most be-

lieve they are surmountable. Any interpretation that seeks to address this problem must explain

why at the point of measurement we do not detect superposition but a definite position. There are

two features that every interpretation must explain: quantum algorithm and phenomenology. The

former considers what the wave function represents ontologically, if any, and the latter considers
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how humans could experience the natural world as definite if it is fundamentally indefinite.

Every interpretation must carry with it metaphysical costs that are either undesirable or rationally

unacceptable. But it seems every interpretation must have an undesirable metaphysical cost. For

example, Bell’s theorem showed that no interpretation can have both locality and determinism as

classically conceived. If locality is abandoned then particles can causally affect another particle

at a distance without any intermediary contact between particles (aka spooky action at a

distance). But if we reject determinism for locality, then the world is indeterministic and it defies

a full scientific explanation. Both have the undesirable consequence of removing a rather plausi-

ble metaphysical intuition about the world. Another possible consequence is that quantum

physics can never know the world as it really is because whenever we observe something, our

mental structure imposes its subjectivity upon reality. Definite properties are simply the product

of a mind. This was Bohr’s view. Other interpretations take a radically different approach.

Bohm’s theory is deterministic and posits the wave function as a strangely real physical entity

that exists out there whereas collapse theories affirm that indeterminism is a real feature of the

world but deny that the wave function is a real entity. Determining which theory is true is rather

difficult because there is an underdetermination in the experimental data insofar as it is not suffi-

cient to establish any interpretation over the other. We must instead assess each interpretation to

see what kind of trade-offs or ontologies seem more plausible to us.

The standard and oldest interpretation of QM is the Copenhagen interpretation. Both

Bohr and Heisenberg are its founders, although both did not agree on every issue. Under this

view, physical systems objectively do not have definite properties prior to measurement. Inde-

terminism is a real feature of the world that is not reducible to our epistemic limitations – i.e., it
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denies that there are hidden variables. This is supported by a law of QM known as the Born’s

rule, which states that the probability of obtaining some measurement outcome is equal to the

square of the corresponding amplitude in a wave function. All of our experimental data confirms

Born’s Rule. Ontologically, this view holds that the wave function does not point to some really

existing material entity but it does represent the state of the system. This interpretation is largely

epistemic in that it focuses on explaining quantum phenomena rather than positing what it onto-

logically represents. Whatever this wave function represents, it becomes reified when a system is

measured. So measurement really does make a system definite, and this measurement is often

described as mechanical rather than conscious-driven by modern supporters. The problem with

this interpretation is that measurement is vague or undefined. Wigner’s interpretation of mea-

surement is commonly associated with Copenhagen, which states that consciousness causes col-

lapse, but how a mind could affect a physical system is widely disputed. Others like Einstein ob-

jected to the probabilistic nature of this theory with the famous statement, “God does not throw

dice,” to which Bohr replied, “Einstein, don't tell God what to do.” Another problem is that

metaphysically it still seems dubious to say that no concrete object exists before measurement.

As Einstein asked, is the moon not there until something measures it?

Bohm’s interpretation, by contrast, provides a completely deterministic view that pre-

serves the ontology of classical mechanics. This view postulates that every particle in the world

has a definite position, and that from knowledge of its current position and wave function we can

deduce with certainty what its position and wave function will be at any other time. Most surpris-

ingly, it treats the wave function not as representing some physical state but as really existing out

there as a physical thing. The wave function guides particles with definite trajectories. To appre-
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ciate how strange this is, it is essentially saying that several mathematical possible properties re-

ally exist out there as one single entity that is spread out throughout all of space, rather than con-

fined to one location. This makes the theory non-local in that it allows for instantaneous interac-

tion between particles over long distances, thereby making the behavior of particles quite unlike

classical physics. Because it’s non-local, it makes it explicitly at odds with special relativity.

Bohm’s theory avoids the measurement problem because he denies that an actual collapse of the

wave function ever occurs. All particles are in some definite position both prior and after mea-

surement. He accounts for the appearance of collapse in terms of decoherence. For this view,

properties are not intrinsic to the particles but are contextual in that they depend on the circum-

stances at the time of its measurement.

The last view we shall cover here is the Everett’s Many-Worlds interpretation. It also re-

jects the collapse of the wave function; instead the wave function is the universe, which continu-

ously evolves and splits into other wave functions. In other words, whenever something is in a

superposition, every possible measurement outcome actually occurs but in a separate universe.

For example, if a particle is in a superposition of being in either state spin-x or spin-y, we nor-

mally interpret this to to mean that it then collapses into a single state. But for Everett, the uni-

verse splits into two parallel worlds where all possible measurement outcomes become actual.

Once this split occurs, the two worlds never interact with each other, and this branching off hap-

pens endlessly whenever something is in a state of superposition. There are perhaps an infinite

number of worlds with alternate histories and different futures. One of the serious problems with

this view is that it fails to explain the probabilities given by the Born Rule. How can there be

probabilities in a theory that’s wholly deterministic? The second problem is that to talk about
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probability requires a preferred basis that identifies the range of measurement outcomes. This

preferred basis can only be determined by a decoherence process, but decoherence is itself prob-

abilistic. Some respond to this by reference to decision theory, but whether this response suc-

ceeds is a matter of controversy.

An Aristotelian Approach


That there are ever-increasing multitudes of interpretations in QM should not be surpris-

ing given physics’ heavy reliance on mathematical formalism. As Russell points out, “All that

physics gives us is certain equations giving abstract properties of their changes. But as to what it

is that changes, and what it changes from and to—as to this, physics is silent” (My Philosophical

Development, p. 13). The methodology of physics is such that it must use the exceedingly ab-

stract tools of mathematics in order to perform its inquiry. Mathematics is inherently quantitative

and structural by nature, thus it is in principle incapable of capturing qualitative aspects of nature

in the same way that a metal detector is in principle incapable of detecting plastic. Whatever does

not fit this quantifiable method, like immanent teleology and causal powers, must be ignored;

only mathematically definable properties are discoverable. The wave function, for example, is a

mere abstract equation that is standardly interpreted to be a representation of something concrete,

but as to what that is we do not know. At best physics can only give us a partial description of

reality (unless abstract structure is all that exists), it fails to tell us what is the inner qualitative

nature of the thing that exhibits this mathematical structure. After all, there must be some con-

crete physical object with qualities that this mathematical structure represents, otherwise we need

to deny scientific realism or affirm the existence of abstract objects. It is no surprise then that

physicists radically differ as to what the wave function represents, of which there is no consensus
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in sight, because it is beyond the scope of physics and enters the realm of metaphysics. The

quantum data alone is simply insufficient to single out any particular interpretation and it will

always be insufficient because empirical data, as Thomas Kuhn point out, is always subject to

interpretation (or paradigm shifts) and it is “particularly in periods of acknowledged crisis that

scientists have turned to philosophical analysis as a device for unlocking the riddles of their

field” (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions). This is particularly true for physics, as it is the

most abstract of all scientific fields so it inevitably ventures into metaphysical territory. As Ein-

stein recognized, it “turns out that one can, after all, not get along without metaphysics” (Ideas

and Opinions).

Metaphysics is inescapable, it’s now a question of whether we will do it correctly. As the

physicist Heisenberg noted, “good science is being unconsciously discarded because of bad phi-

losophy” (Die Naturwis-senschaften, 1976). Ever since Galileo and Newton, a mechanistic con-

ception of matter was assumed by modern science. It viewed matter as geometric extension (or

pure form), with the principle attributes of extension being size, shape, position, and motion.

These attributes were taken to be the primary qualities of a thing, which distinguishes it from

secondary qualities, the way something “feels like” to an observer. More specifically, the sec-

ondary qualities of an object include colors, tastes, sounds, smells, and the like. These qualities

do not exist apart from the mind that perceives it. Instead, secondary qualities like hot or cold

were redefined as particles in motion that have the power to produce in us certain sensations, but

the sensations were not descriptions of the particles themselves. Only primary qualities that

could be quantified were said to exhaust the objective features of the physical world. As Thomas

Nagel pointed out, the moderns insisted that “physical science should provide a mathematically
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precise quantitative description of an external reality” (Mind & Cosmos). The moderns wanted a

world that was precise, controllable, and predictable, which is exactly what a quantifiable ontol-

ogy of the physical world provided. In fact, the mechanical approach was so successful in New-

tonian physics that Aristotelianism was perceived as unnecessary. They rejected Aristotle’s no-

tion of substantial forms and replaced it with the idea that all physical objects are reducible to

particles. Every “kind” of object was just a different arrangement of particles; there was no sub-

stance that existed above these particles. They also rejected final causes and instead favored the

view that a particle has no inherent purpose unless God imposes purpose upon it in the way a

watchmaker externally imposes a time-telling purpose on mechanical parts. Aristotle by contrast

thought that purpose was not imposed but intrinsic to the very nature of things.

However, it turns out that excluding qualities from the world is wrought with problems. If

matter is essentially quantitative and devoid of any qualitative features, then it is impossible to

reduce a mind that is essentially qualitative to something that is essentially non-qualitative. At

best something quantitative can be correlated to some quality insofar as it has a power to pro-

duce a quality, but this power is not itself a quality (unless we accept Aristotle’s qualitative ac-

count of causal powers) so it can only produce a quality in something that is already essentially

qualitative. This is infamously known as the mind-body problem. As even Schrödinger recog-

nized, “the mind itself remains a stranger in this picture, it has no place in it, it can nowhere be

found in it” (Mind and Matter, 1956). Furthermore, a rejection of Aristotelian metaphysics led to

Hume’s attack against causation and his problem of induction, which posed a serious problem for

scientific realism. Hume viewed cause and effects as “loose and separate,” a notion Aristotle

would reject because causes and effects are strongly connected by their final cause or purpose.
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Even the laws of nature were difficult to understand under this mechanical view. It does not suf-

fice to explain the regularities of nature by making it in to a law. What is a law of nature in the

first place? How can something have regularities unless physical objects have final causes? It

became readily apparent that this mechanistic project was doomed to fail. But instead of return-

ing to an Aristotelian conception, the moderns insisted on rejecting its notion of formal and final

causes while creating a diverse set of dubious material ontologies. Ever since the arrival of QM,

it has become even more apparent that this conception of matter is woefully inadequate. Accord-

ing to the world renowned physicist, Heisenberg, the wave function “was a quantitative version

of the old concept of “potentia” in Aristotelian philosophy. It introduced something standing in

the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event, a strange kind of physical reality

just in the middle between possibility and reality” (1958, 41). What is needed then is a return to

Aristotelian metaphysics.

To explain what Heisenberg means by potentia, it’s necessary to introduce and defend

some Aristotelian concepts. A potentia is simply a thing’s potential to have its qualities or sub-

stance changed. For example, a piece of glass has the potential to shatter or it has the potential to

melt into a fluid. The former kind of change is a change of qualities or accidents, whereas the

latter is a change in substance. This stands in contrast to actus, which refers to the way a thing

actually is here and now. The piece of glass is actually clear, sharp, and of a particular shape here

and now, but it nevertheless could shatter or it could melt into fluid at some later time. Aristotle

used this act-potency distinction to prove where Parmenides went wrong in his argument against

the reality of change. For Parmenides, there are only two possible categories for change: being

and non-being. For change to occur requires being coming from non-being, or something from
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nothing, which is impossible. In other words, the piece of glass has being whereas the “glass flu-

id” is non-being here and now. In order for glass fluid to become a being, it must either get its

being from the piece of glass or from non-being. It cannot get its being from the piece of glass

because it is not fluid, so it must come into being from non-being. But it is impossible for some-

thing to come from nothing, so change must likewise be impossible. Parmenides mistakenly

thought that only actuality counts as being (or real), but as Aristotle explained, being should be

divided into two parts: act and potency. A glass’ potential to break, for example, is a real aspect

of its being and is not non-being even if that potential to break never gets actualized. A potential-

ity should not be confused with mere possibility. It is possible for a unicorn to exist, but it is not

possible for a piece of glass to become a unicorn because it lacks that potential whereas it does

have the potential to break. A piece of glass’ actuality limits the potential range of things that can

be actualized. Something rubber has the potential to bounce but glass lacks this potential because

their actuality is different.

If we are to preserve the reality of change, we must accept Aristotle’s act-potency distinc-

tion as it provides the best response to Parmenides. It is both common sensical and obvious to the

senses that change exists, and it is obvious that things do in fact have the potential to break. But

just incase there is someone whose common sense reasoning is shot dead by “woke

metaphysics,” let’s assume that it is not obvious or common sensical. Let’s start by denying that

potency is real. To account for change, we can either say the glass fluid was transported to re-

place the piece of glass or the glass fluid comes into being from nothing at the very instant we

think “change” occurs. If it is only transported, then while you may avoid melting the piece of

glass, you have still not avoided potency because that piece of glass must have the potential to be
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located somewhere else if it is to be transported. But if one proposes it came from nothing, then

this is logically impossible. Nothing cannot possibly produce anything since to be able to “possi-

bly create x” is to possess that property but nothingness by definition has no properties. It is

therefore very clear that potency is necessary if change is to be preserved. Suppose instead that

we deny the reality of change. Real change requires presentism, but an eternalist (or B-theorist)

would deny this presentism. Instead, like Parmenides they’d argue that we only have appear-

ances of change because objects exist in equally existing time slices with different properties. No

object or property of an object goes in and out of existence as the past, present, and future are

equally real. At best all that could be said is that at t1 an object with property x exists and at t2 a

similar object that lacks property x exists such that it appears that an object changed. An apt

analogy is a DVD. All points of a DVD exist, but it is illusory to think that the objects in the

movie are themselves changing. However, this argument cannot possibly succeed for it is a nec-

essary feature of conscious experience that it undergo real change. Even granting that all times in

the world are equally real, it is not equally real to our conscious experience. We only ever expe-

rience one moment and then we immediately experience the next moment. We never simultane-

ously experience moments in which both the cat is alive at t1 and the cat is dead at t2. So at the

very least, real change exists at the conscious level. But if real change exists at that level, then

we have no reason to deny its existence in the external world. It is a fact that the senses present

us with a world that changes. If our conscious experience transversed through time slices, each

time slice it occupies must change insofar as a conscious mind now exists in it when it previous-

ly did not. It is metaphysically impossible then for the world not to be changed by our conscious

experience of it, but this is precisely what an eternalist has to affirm if he wishes to insist that the
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external world is changeless. Lastly, rejecting real change threatens scientific realism insofar as

the scientific method observes and describe real changes of physical entities. Thus without di-

rectly appealing to any intuitions, we have briefly demonstrated that change must exist and that it

is best accounted for by the Aristotelian act-potency distinction.

As it turns out, modern physics makes the same mistake as Parmenides. They restrict the

“real” to actuality because their view of matter is still mechanistic, where material objects are

mere forms, which corresponds only to actuality. The Aristotelian conception of matter is decid-

edly hylomorphic in that all material substances are composed of form and matter. Form (or

structure) corresponds to actuality, whereas matter corresponds to the potency that persists

through change. This matter is the substrate of a material substance that is receptive to different

forms, whereas the form gives definite structure to the matter. Another way of putting this is that

matter is an indeterminate receptacle that individuates form and form is that which transforms

matter into a determinate kind of thing. No material object can exist without both form and mat-

ter. Matter by itself is just prime matter, which is pure potency, but pure potency cannot exist

without actuality because a potential is a potential of some actual thing, not a potential of noth-

ingness. Form by itself is just abstract structure, it cannot be a concrete thing without some mat-

ter to inform. Both matter and form are thus irreducible components of material objects. Since

matter and form are just more specific instances of potency and actuality, we already know that

this analysis is plausible given the above argument for Aristotle’s act-potency distinction. But

another argument from change should be made in favor of hylomorphism. Suppose again that a

piece of glass is changed into glass fluid. What makes it the case that it is the piece of glass itself

that got changed into glass fluid? There must be some underlying substrate that persists through
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the changes – otherwise you simply have things popping into being. This substrate must be mat-

ter, and what changes is the form that it possesses. Another argument is that the identical form of

“humanness” can exist in multiple beings so there must be something that individuates one from

another. What individuates or particularizes this form is the particular bit of matter that it in-

forms. In other words, both Socrates and Plato share the same substantial form of being a human

and it is this bit of matter as opposed to that bit of matter that differentiates one from the other,

along with their particular accidental properties.

A crucial consequence of hylomorphism is that it denies that the macro world is reducible

to particles. The particles in a substance do not exist as actual particles in a macro level sub-

stance but rather exist virtually as parts of a macro substance – i.e. the particles do not exist as

individual substances arranged as some pattern (contra reductionism) but exist only as parts of a

substance that confer and derive their actuality to and from the substantial form as a whole. A

substance is the “essence of a thing… what it is said to be in respect of itself” (Metaphysics Z.4.

1029b14). Something exists virtually insofar as it has the potential to exist as an individual sub-

stance but actually exists not as an individual substance but as a part of another substance by

both giving its actuality to this substance and having its actuality through the substance. A good

example is H20. The hydrogen and the oxygen do not exist as individual substances, but rather

exist as virtual parts of the water substance. The water thereby acquires powers that neither hy-

drogen nor oxygen have in themselves, but nor could these powers be acquired without either of

their particular actualities (as opposed to some other actual chemical) being so conjoined to be-

come a new substance. Thus in some sense, hydrogen and oxygen stop existing as actual things.

This view of “natural kinds” is readily defended today [Ellis, 2001; Cartwight, 1999; Oderberg,
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2007]. Hylormophism provides an explanatorily powerful account of reality that reductionism

lacks because it grounds a thing’s unique powers in its irreducible substance. It is difficult to ac-

count for why magnets have the power to attract metals in a way that water cannot if all sub-

stances are just different arrangements of particles like marbles scattered across the floor. The

powers of every particle are identical, so arranging them differently such that they produce dif-

ferent powers is rather magical if reductionism is true.

Additionally, hylomorphism entails a gradual spectrum of material beings with greater

degrees of potentiality to greater degrees of actuality. Something has greater actuality if it has

more determinate form (or qualities) and something has higher potency if it is more indetermi-

nate with respect to being more receptacle to various forms. For example, a piece of clay has

higher potency insofar as it is more malleable than a rock and thus more receptacle to various

forms. A rock can likewise be modified to receive various forms, but it requires a physical entity

with greater actuality or power to do so because it has more more determinate form as a solid

object. A human hand has sufficient actuality (or power) to mold a form onto the clay, but it does

not have sufficient actuality to mold a rock. Of course something need not always have greater

actuality than a being in order to produce a change in that being. Living things have more actual-

ity than a spider insofar as it is capable of sensory experience. However, despite living things

having more actuality than spiders, a spider can kill some living things with poison because some

living things lack greater actual solidity (or a greater immune system) to protect against it. More

fundamentally, all material things are comprised of matter. The closer you are to prime matter,

the less actuality that a thing possesses and the more potential it has to take on a contrariety of

forms. As Aristotle noted, matter is “universal and indefinite” (Metaphysics) so when you de-
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stroy a substance to break it down to its smaller parts, hylormophism predicts that you will find

higher levels of potency because you are getting closer to prime matter. This is precisely what we

find in QM. The macroscopic world has more actuality, which is why we experience it as more

definite or determinate, whereas the microscopic world has far less actuality, thereby creating far

less determinate behavioral patterns.

That the world is hylomorphic and is a gradual spectrum of actuality and potentiality

gives us a principled means of accounting for the questions posed in the measurement section.

Taking Aristotle’s ideas seriously dissolves quantum mysteries because it provides us with a

richer ontology of what is real. The mechanistic conception of matter, by contrast, does not admit

of degrees of actuality: material entities are either actual or not. In a paper entitled, Taking

Heisenberg's Potentia Seriously (2017), Ruth Kastner and her colleagues argue that Aristotle

“accounts naturally for the counter-intuitive features of quantum mechanics such as nonlocality,

entanglement, and instantaneous collapse.” Let’s start with the wave function, which if you re-

call, initially describes several mathematical possibilities (aka superposition) prior to collapse.

QM forces forces us to reify the wave function in some way because by itself it would suggest

that the quantum world only exists when we are measuring it, which is rather absurd. However,

according to Heisenberg the wave function should not be treated as being actual in the way that

Bohm or Everett propose. The Many-Worlds interpretation is quite frankly rather fanciful and

needlessly multiplies universes. It may have formidable explanatory power in areas, but as it

stands now, `it seems to have serious difficulties explaining probability (c.f. The Probability

Problem in Everettian Quantum Mechanics Persists, Foad). The Bohm interpretation over-reifies

the wave function by interpreting all mathematical possibilities as actually existing in some enti-
 !19

ty that stretches across spacetime, but fails to specify what kind of entity this would be. Rather

honestly, one cannot help but get the impression that there is something rather ad hoc or lavish

about these interpretations. This is because these interpretations implicitly assume an anti-Aris-

totelian metaphysic so they must believe that the wave function exists as an actual entity of some

sort or deny that it actually exists. But this is a false dilemma because potency is also a real fea-

ture of the world despite not being actual. It’s far more plausible to interpret the wave function as

real insofar as it describes a range of potential outcomes for particles that are low in act but great

in potency. This view reinterprets superpositions as being the potentials of a thing or state, not as

actual states in which all possibilities are realized. Unlike its rivals, Aristotelianism does not

posit new entities to solve a very specific empirical problem. The act-potency distinction is

something that permeates throughout all levels of reality already, it is not something convenient-

ly used to fit into the facts but is necessary to account for the facts. So when Aristotelians appeal

to potencies to account for QM, it is not ad hoc or lavish but has a natural explanatory advantage

over competing interpretations.

There are three fundamental problems: (1) defining measurement, (2) determining when

the wave function collapses, and (3) quantum entanglement. Aristotelianism sheds some insight

into both problems, but given its metaphysical nature, it encourages physicists to fill in the de-

tails. A somewhat quick and dirty definition of measurement is to define the macroscopic as

whatever is fully captured by classical physics and the microscopic as whatever is fully

captured by quantum physics. Using Aristotelian terminology, perceptible objects have higher

actualities whereas the non-perceptible objects have higher potencies. Something is perceptible if

a physical object is capable of being perceived by our senses via some sensory-enhancing in-
 !20

strument, whereas something is non-perceptible if we cannot observe the object itself with our

senses via some sensory-enhancing instrument but must infer its existence from its effects. So a

measurement device is just any perceptible object that comes into contact with something that is

non-perceptible. The next problem to address is explaining when the wave function collapses. It

is clear that it occurs somewhere around the moment of measurement, but Aristotelian mechanics

is not going to be able to give a precise quantitative answer in terms of time, it can only provide

a qualitative answer. Collapse occurs when a “quantum measurement event entails the actualiza-

tion of one of the potential outcomes inherent in a pure state” (Kastner, 2017). Thus collapse oc-

curs when there is contact between a perceptible object and a non-perceptible particle whereby

contact with the perceptible object actualizes a particular potential (spin-y as opposed to spin-x)

of the particle into a definite state. The actualization of certain outcomes at measurement has the

result of affecting the range of potential outcomes of some other particle: “actual events can in-

stantaneously and acausally affect what is next possible” (Kastner, 2017). A particular mystifying

problem in QM is known as the entanglement problem. Whenever a particle is measured to be in

spin-y or spin-x state, you can know with certainty that the measurement of another particle will

be in an opposite state no matter how far away the particle is. This is particularly mysterious be-

cause these particles cannot possibly be sending each other signals. Einstein was troubled by this

because it seemed to imply that there is “spooky action at a distance.” In other words, things can

act upon each other from a distance without physical interaction of objects in between. This

problem is resolved if you’re an Aristotelian. Suppose you intended to visit Los Angeles but un-

beknownst to you an earthquake sunk that traffic-ridden city into the ocean. This actualized event

changed the range of potential places that I (or anyone else) could visit without acting upon other
 !21

persons. In other words, actuality cannot directly alter a distant actuality without interaction but

it can instantaneously and acausally change a distant range of potentials. Kastner and her col-

leagues use potency to further address the two-slit experiment and null measurement.

Aristotelianism also provides a very plausible reply to the metaphysical issues that the

measurement problem raised. Why is it that the act of measurement causes a particle to collapse

from an indefinite state of superposition to a definite state? Recall the metaphysical problem: if

the microscopic world is indefinite as QM affirms, then it should entail that the macroscopic

world is indefinite as well, but this is not what we in fact find. There are no cats in a superposi-

tion of being dead or alive. Schrödinger was so puzzled by the standard interpretation of QM that

he used the cat thought experiment to demonstrate just how absurd that interpretation was. This

is of course all rather mysterious for a mechanical conception of matter because all macroscopic

devices are reducible to their microscopic particles. If all microscopic particles are equally actu-

al, then either all physical things are determinate or all things are indeterminate. Those who be-

lieve the former will come up with metaphysically lavish theories about many worlds, while

those like Wigner who believe the latter will claim that an immaterial mind is what provides de-

terminacy to an otherwise fully indeterminate world. Such a view, however, is subject to

Descartes’ infamous interaction problem and does nothing to explain how an immaterial sub-

stance would make a material substance definite. This is just not a problem for Aristotelians. As

Aquinas argues, “potency cannot raise itself to act; it must be raised to act by something that is in

act” (SCG I.16.3). In other words, only something that is actual can actualize a potential; a po-

tential cannot actualize itself. If it could actualize itself, it becomes inexplicable why a potency

does not actualize itself now as opposed to another time. It cannot be a coincidence that when
 !22

intense heat comes in contact with a piece of glass, it actualizes this piece of glass’ potential to

become glass fluid. The same applies at the quantum level. Since measurement of particles at the

quantum level have such high potency, physical objects at the macroscopic level (i.e. the mea-

surement devices) actualize this particle’s potential state into something definite because of their

higher actuality.

For Aristotelians this does not require consciousness because non-conscious things actu-

alize potentials all of the time. This high potency is described by the wave function as represent-

ing a state of superposition in which there are several mathematical possibilities, but instead of

possibilities we are interpreting them as potentialities. Macroscopic objects have higher actuality

because the potency of the particles lose their low actuality when it becomes a part of an ir-

reducible substance that absorbs their actuality to create something with a higher actuality. Hy-

lormophism can therefore easily explain why the macroscopic world is not indeterminate like the

microscopic world because it rejects reductionism in the first place. As a closing note, it is abso-

lutely fascinating that Aristotle described something like superposition over a millennia ago:

“The contradictory states proceed from one and the same capacity, the matter of the thing being

the cause equally of its existence and of its non-existence. Hence contradictories would be

present together in actuality “ (Metaphysics). He even says the potential is for “both alike, or nei-

ther.” This is very similar to how we defined superposition at the beginning of this paper and

sounds quite similar to Schrödinger’s cat experiment. For Schrödinger it appeared to be absolute

nonsense because he mistakenly thought there is only actuality and non-actuality, but for Aristo-

tle it is perfectly sensible since potentiality must be part of the ontology of the world. Measure-
 !23

ment causing collapse is therefore just a very special case of something actualizing the potency

of another thing, an occurrence that happens in the world all of the time.

A return to Aristotelian metaphysics eliminates that false dilemma and restores a common

sensical view of reality that was thought to be impossible. There is neither absolute determinism

nor absolute indeterminism under this view. As Feser notes, “for a cause to be sufficient to ex-

plain its effect it is not necessary that it cause it. It need only make the effect

intelligible” (Scholastic Metaphysics, p. 135). Something need not determine an effect in order

to be intelligible as a cause; it need only provide conditions that would make it likely. As

Heisenberg pointed out about the probabilistic nature of the atom, “One might perhaps call it an

objective tendency or possibility, a “potentia” in the sense of Aristotelian philosophy.” If we

bring back final causality, we bring back a tendency toward a certain outcome, which would suf-

ficiently account for an effect despite not being deterministic. While physical objects can certain-

ly be deterministic, especially if it is more determinate in its actuality, it can also fail to be de-

terministic for various reasons that will not be explained here. This is very unlikely to persuade

the skeptic, but it will hopefully show that Aristotelianism offers an eminently plausible account

of QM that should be thoughtfully considered rather than outrightly dismissed as “outdated” or

“irrelevant”. It is more relevant today than it ever was and if allowed to, it can revolutionize our

understanding of science.
 !24

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