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Introduction

Welcome to the FMEA Worksheet


This spreadsheet can be used to
1. Identify potential failure modes and their impact on product reliability.
2. Rank the potential defects to establish priority - The highest RPN value items deserve the most attention.
3. Capture owners, action plans, and status on high RPN items.
Note, FMEA's are living documents and this may be updated periodically.

Organization of Spreadsheet:
Descriptions - explains the spreadsheet cells
FMEA - the actual sheet used to enter data
Severity/Likelihood/Detectability - guidelines for the 1-10 rankins in these categories
Example - a partial exmample of an FMEA document

Sheet Protection:
Some sheets are protected. There is no password. Released for review: 31-Jul-98
A. Dembski rev 1
Descriptions

Description of FMEA Worksheet

Protection:The spreadsheets are not protected or locked.

System Potential FMEA Number


Subsystem Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Prepared By
Component (Design FMEA) FMEA Date
Design Lead Key Date Revision Date
Core Team Page of

Action Results

Potential P

New RPN
New Occ
New Sev

New Det
S D R Responsibility &
Potential Failure Potential Effect(s) Cause(s)/ r Current Design Recommended
Item / Function e e P Target Completion Actions Taken
Mode(s) of Failure Mechanism(s) of o Controls Action(s)
v t N Date
Failure b

0 0
Coolant Crack/break. Leak 8 Over pressure 8 Burst, validation 1 64 Test included in J.P. Aguire 0
containment. Burst. Side wall pressure cycle. prototype and 11/1/95 E. Eglin
Hose connection. flex. Bad seal. production 8/1/96
Coolant fill. M Poor hose rete validation testing.

0 0
Write down each failure mode 0 Response Plans and Tracking 0
and potential consequence(s) 0 0
of that failure. 0 0
0
RiskPriority Number - The combined weighting of 0
Severity - On a scale of 1- Severity, Likelihood, and Detectability.
10, rate the Severity of each RPN
0 = Sev X Occ X Det 0
failure (10= most severe).
See Severity sheet.
0 0
0 0
Likelihood - Write down the Detectability 0- Examine the current 0
potential cause(s), and on a design, then, 0on a scale of 1-10, rate 0
scale of 1-10, rate the the Detectability of each failure
0 0
Likelihood of each failure (10 = least detectable). See
(10= most likely). See 0
Detectability sheet. 0
Likelihood sheet. 0 0

Page 2
Likelihood - Write down the Detectability - Examine the current
potential cause(s), and on a design, then, on a scale of 1-10, rate
scale of 1-10, rate the the Detectability of each failure
Likelihood of each failure Descriptions
(10 = least detectable). See
(10= most likely). See Detectability sheet.
Likelihood sheet.
0 0

Page 3
Severity

Effect SEVERITY of Effect Ranking


Hazardous without Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode 10
warning affects safe system operation without warning
Hazardous with Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode 9
warning affects safe system operation with warning
Very High System inoperable with destructive failure without 8
compromising safety
High System inoperable with equipment damage 7

Moderate System inoperable with minor damage 6

Low System inoperable without damage 5

Very Low System operable with significant degradation of performance 4

Minor System operable with some degradation of performance 3

Very Minor System operable with minimal interference 2

None No effect 1

Page 4
Probability

PROBABILITY of Failure Failure Prob Ranking


Very High: Failure is almost inevitable >1 in 2 10
1 in 3 9
High: Repeated failures 1 in 8 8
1 in 20 7
Moderate: Occasional failures 1 in 80 6
1 in 400 5
1 in 2,000 4
Low: Relatively few failures 1 in 15,000 3
1 in 150,000 2
Remote: Failure is unlikely <1 in 1,500,000 1

Page 5
Detectability

Detection Likelihood of DETECTION by Design Control Ranking


Absolute Design control cannot detect potential cause/mechanism and 10
Uncertainty subsequent failure mode
Very Remote Very remote chance the design control will detect potential 9
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Remote Remote chance the design control will detect potential 8
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Very Low Very low chance the design control will detect potential 7
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Low Low chance the design control will detect potential 6
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Moderate Moderate chance the design control will detect potential 5
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Moderately High Moderately High chance the design control will detect 4
potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
High High chance the design control will detect potential 3
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Very High Very high chance the design control will detect potential 2
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Almost Certain Design control will detect potential cause/mechanism and 1
subsequent failure mode

Page 6
EXAMPLE

System
Subsystem
Component
Design Lead
Core Team

Potential Failure
Item / Function
Mode(s)

Seals
Coolant
containment.
Hose
connection.
Coolant fill. M
Sensor mount. Compression set
Seal
Sensor mount. Loosen during
Seal sensor
assembly/servic
e

Sensor mount. Damaged


Seal internal thread

Sensor mount. Damaged


Seal external thread

Coolant containment. Crack/break. Burst.


Hose connection. Side wall flex. Bad
Coolant fill. M seal. Poor hose rete

Coolant containment. Crack/break. Burst.


Hose connection. Side wall flex. Bad
Coolant fill. M seal. Poor hose rete

Coolant containment. Crack/break. Burst.


Hose connection. Side wall flex. Bad
Coolant fill. M seal. Poor hose rete

Page 7
EXAMPLE

System
Subsystem
Component
Design Lead
Core Team

Potential Failure
Item / Function
Mode(s)

Hold fluid, flow path, Stress crack


Heat transfer
structure

Hold fluid, flow path, Stress crack


Heat transfer
structure

Hold fluid, flow path, Stress crack


Heat transfer
structure
Hold fluid, flow path, Corrosion
Heat transfer
structure

Hold fluid, flow path, Corrosion


Heat transfer
structure

Hold fluid, flow path, Puncture


Heat transfer
structure

Hold fluid, flow path, Seam fail


Heat transfer
structure
Hold fluid, flow path, Burst fail
Heat transfer
structure

Page 8
EXAMPLE

System
Subsystem
Component
Design Lead
Core Team

Potential Failure
Item / Function
Mode(s)

Hold fluid, flow path, Plugged


Heat transfer
structure

Hold fluid, flow path, Ballooning


Heat transfer
structure

Page 9
EXAMPLE

Potential FMEA Number


Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Prepared By
(Design FMEA) FMEA Date
Key Date Revision Date
Page of

Action Results

New Occ
New Sev

New Det
S Potential Cause(s)/ D R Responsibility &
Potential Effect(s) r Current Design Recommended
e Mechanism(s) of e P Target Completion Actions Taken
of Failure o Controls Action(s)
v Failure t N Date
b

0
0

Leak 8 Gasket material 7 Pressure cycle 1 56 Use imported


w/cold shock. material
Leak. Fall inside 8 Fitting not held 2 Added rib. 1 16 Implement J.P. Aguire
tank in place holding rib in 11/1/95
design. New
fitting design.
Prototype
validation.

Cannot install 5 Damaged during 2 1 10


sensor installation or
transportation
Cannot install 4 Damaged during 3 1 12 Damaged fitting
wire nut shipment to not used by
piracicaba Piracicaba
Leak 8 Over pressure 8 Burst, validation 1 64 Test included in J.P. Aguire 11/1/95
pressure cycle. prototype and E. Eglin 8/1/96
production validation
testing.

Failed mount 5 Vibration 9 Vibration w/road 3 135 Obtain GMB J.P. Aguire
tapes vibration road tape.

Hose leak 6 Overpressure. Poor 5 Burst, validation 2 60 Obtain GMB clamps J.P. Aguire 12/1/95
clamp pressure cycle and clamping
w/GMB clamps. specification.

Page 10
EXAMPLE

Potential FMEA Number


Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Prepared By
(Design FMEA) FMEA Date
Key Date Revision Date
Page of

Action Results

New Occ
New Sev

New Det
S Potential Cause(s)/ D R Responsibility &
Potential Effect(s) r Current Design Recommended
e Mechanism(s) of e P Target Completion Actions Taken
of Failure o Controls Action(s)
v Failure t N Date
b

Air conditioning does This is a test of the 0 Operator instruction


not work. Sudden ADD POTENTIAL
refrigerant loss. CAUSE/MECHANIS
M OF FAILURE
system functionality

Air conditioning does This is a test of the 0 This is a test of the


not work. Sudden ADD POTENTIAL ADD
refrigerant loss. CAUSE/MECHANIS RECOMMENDED
M OF FAILURE ACTION system
system functionality functionality

Leak. Loss of heat 8 Wicking. Material 7 Thermal cycle 1 56 Included in Product E. Eglin 8/1/96
transfer. strength Specification
Air conditioning does this is a test while 0
not work. Sudden dan is here
refrigerant loss.

Leak. Loss of heat 8 Coolant quality. 7 SWAT, service 5 280 Brazilian coolant to J.P. Aguirre 11/1/95 Coolant ordered
transfer. Contamination. simulation. Coolant be evaluated. Zince
Environment - int/ext. evaluation. lined tubes may
need to be released.
Simulated service
test w/GMB coolant
to be performed.

Leak. Loss of heat 8 External damage. 10 Leak test. Simulated 1 80 100% cores tested in E. Eglin 8/1/96
transfer. Coolant velocity. No service. production.
reinf sawcut. Simulated service
included in Product
Specificatin.
Leak. Loss of heat 5 Environment - int/ext. 1 SWAT, service 1 5 Included in Product E. Eglin 8/1/96
transfer. simulation. Specification.
Leak. Loss of heat 8 Over pressure 2 Burst/leak pressure 5 80 GMB to study engine GMB 12/1/95 Study originated
transfer. contamination. cleanliness.

Page 11
EXAMPLE

Potential FMEA Number


Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Prepared By
(Design FMEA) FMEA Date
Key Date Revision Date
Page of

Action Results

New Occ
New Sev

New Det
S Potential Cause(s)/ D R Responsibility &
Potential Effect(s) r Current Design Recommended
e Mechanism(s) of e P Target Completion Actions Taken
of Failure o Controls Action(s)
v Failure t N Date
b

Loss of heat transfer. 8 Contamination. 7 1 56 GMB coolant to be J.P. Aguirre 11/1/95 Coolant ordered
Leakage due to Coolant quality. evaluated. GMB to
increase flow velocity study engine
cleanliness.

Leak. Loss of heat 5 Over pressure 9 8 360 GMB to study engine GMB 12/1/95
transfer. contamination. cleanliness.
Clustomer profile to
be determined.

0
0
0

Page 12
EXAMPLE

on Results
New RPN

0
0

Page 13
EXAMPLE

on Results
New RPN

Page 14
EXAMPLE

on Results
New RPN

0
0
0

Page 15
BOM ID Component
1 frame
Fork
2
Parts #: 005237
Head brg set
3
Parts #: 019009
Decal set
4
Parts #: 119054
Deck
5
Parts #: 030069
Deck bolts
6
Parts #: 030033
Stem asm.
7
Parts #: 011083
Handlebar
8
Parts #: 009078
Pad
9
Parts #: 105048
Grip
10
Parts #: 015038
Mag whl 14
11
Parts #: 045027
Tire
12
Parts #: 040039
Tube
13
Parts #: 041025
14 removed from the design
Brake lever
15
Parts #: 024042
Cbl/scng
16
Parts #: 025530
Brake shoe
17
Parts #: 12114
Rr calipher
18
Parts #: 023535
F.axl/brg st
19
Parts #: 053029
Nuts/rtnr
20
Parts #: 055006
comments

a specially picture or design transfered to wood, metal,


glass, etc

cable
FMEA SCOOTER

System
Subsystem
Component
Design Lead
Core Team

Line Potential Failure


Item / Function
ID Mode(s)

frame Break during


1 ride

Fork Detaching from


2
Parts #: 005237 wheel axis
Head brg set Rubber whear
3 Parts #: 019009

Decal set
4
Parts #: 119054
Deck Lose aderence
5 Parts #: 030069

Deck bolts Set loose along


6 Parts #: 030033 use
Stem asm. Set loose along
7 Parts #: 011083 use
Handlebar Break during
8 Parts #: 009078 ride

Pad Break during


9 Parts #: 105048 ride
Grip Detaching from
10 Parts #: 015038 handle bar
Mag whl 14 Damaging by hit
11 Parts #: 045027

Tire Tire flattening


12
Parts #: 040039

Page 19
FMEA SCOOTER

System
Subsystem
Component
Design Lead
Core Team

Line Potential Failure


Item / Function
ID Mode(s)

Tube Flattening
13
Parts #: 041025
Brake lever Detaching from
15
Parts #: 024042 brake cable
Cbl/scng Break the cable
16
Parts #: 025530
Brake shoe Detaching from
17
Parts #: 12114 brake cable
Rr calipher Break during ride
18
Parts #: 023535
F.axl/brg st Break during ride
19
Parts #: 053029
Nuts/rtnr Detach from axis
20
Parts #: 055006

Page 20
FMEA SCOOTER

System
Subsystem
Component
Design Lead
Core Team

Line Potential Failure


Item / Function
ID Mode(s)

Page 21
FMEA SCOOTER

Potential FMEA Number


Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Prepared By
(Design FMEA) FMEA Date
Key Date Revision Date
Page of

Action Results

New Occ
New Sev

New Det
S Potential Cause(s)/ D R Responsibility &
Potential Effect(s) r Current Design Recommended
e Mechanism(s) of e P Target Completion Actions Taken
of Failure o Controls Action(s)
v Failure t N Date
b

Crash of the Exposure to Select resistant 5 45 Change


bike 9 severe weather 1 frame material painting,
conditions and painting melting or frame
material
Wheels loose Poor Use of pin dams 6 54 Design pin dam
9 1
maintenance or hold
Damage on the Insuficient Resistant 5 45 Select more
Decal Set 3 lubrification 3 material resistant
material
0

Deck may get Poor sandpaper Use of resistant 3 27 Select more


slippery 3 material 3 sandpaper over resistant
deck material
Deck may fall from Screws not tight Proper nut and 4 36 Select proper nut
frame 9 1 screws set and screw set
enough
Handlebar may be Screws not tight Use of pin dams 3 27 Design pin dam or
set loose from frame 9 enough 1 hold

Accident Exposure to severe Select resistant 4 36 Select more resistant


9 weather conditions 1 handlebar material material
and painting

Handlebar may Exposure to severe Select resistant pad 4 36 Select more resistant
break causing an 9 weather conditions 1 handlebar material
accident
Rider may lose its Rubber wear Use of resistant 3 36 Select more resistant
grip 4 3 material for grip material

Rider may find Mag wheel hit Design it as retracted 5 60 Design more
dificulty on riding the 4 3 as possible - away retracted and
scooter from exterior hits resistant mag wheel

Rider may find Some sharp object Resistant material 3 72 Select more resistant
4 6
dificulty on riding the within the wheel material
scooter

Page 22
FMEA SCOOTER

Potential FMEA Number


Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Prepared By
(Design FMEA) FMEA Date
Key Date Revision Date
Page of

Action Results

New Occ
New Sev

New Det
S Potential Cause(s)/ D R Responsibility &
Potential Effect(s) r Current Design Recommended
e Mechanism(s) of e P Target Completion Actions Taken
of Failure o Controls Action(s)
v Failure t N Date
b

Rider may find Some sharp object Resistant material 3 72 Select more resistant
4 6
dificulty on riding the within the wheel material
scooter
Fail on brakes Brake cables not Holding pin or device 6 54 Design pin dam or
9 1
tight enough hold
Fail on brakes Poor material Resistant material 5 45 Select more resistant
9 1
material
Fail on brakes Brake cables not Holding pin or device 6 54 Select more resistant
9 1
tight enough material
Fail on brakes Poor material Resistant material 4 36 Select more resistant
9 1
material
Wheel instability Poor material Resistant material 4 36 Select more resistant
9 1
material
Wheel instability Screws not tight Proper nut and 4 36 Select proper nut
9 1
enough screws set and screw set
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Page 23
FMEA SCOOTER

Potential FMEA Number


Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Prepared By
(Design FMEA) FMEA Date
Key Date Revision Date
Page of

Action Results

New Occ
New Sev

New Det
S Potential Cause(s)/ D R Responsibility &
Potential Effect(s) r Current Design Recommended
e Mechanism(s) of e P Target Completion Actions Taken
of Failure o Controls Action(s)
v Failure t N Date
b

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Page 24
FMEA SCOOTER

on Results
New RPN

Page 25
FMEA SCOOTER

on Results
New RPN

Page 26
FMEA SCOOTER

on Results
New RPN

Page 27

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