Dissertation by Luke Daley

Blood, Battle and Brigades: How Effective Were The
Soviet Naval Infantry During The Great Patriotic War

(1941-1945)?
Luke Anthony Daley
Submitted In Support of a Degree of: (BA) History with Politics
Academic Year: 2017-2018

This work is the product of independent research and writing conducted solely by I, Luke
Anthony Daley. Any merits or quotations that are due have been given. I fully understand the
terms and regulations that Edge Hill University impose on my work, and I hereby consent to
my work being tested for plagiarism and/or falsity, and I also consent to my work being held
by the University for educational analysis and further investigations of plagiarism or falsity.
I hereby sign my work with this signature:

For my late Grandmother, Phoebe, and my late Grandfather Sam.
You both are still sorely missed.
Credits and Acknowledgements:
My heart goes out to my mother, father, my sister and my girlfriend, of whom their support I
could not do without during my time at university. I have had a rough three years and the
past year has had some moments that could have stopped me from wanting to finish this
project. All of your support has not gone unseen and unappreciated, and I am proud to be
the first Daley/Greslow to graduate from university.
My thanks also goes to my friend Kieran Sands, who accompanied me and put up with me
for a week in Berlin. The cover photo was taken by him, and is his intellectual property, not
mine.
I must also thank my tutors at Edge Hill University, of whom have been very patient and
understanding when dealing with me in and out of classes (mostly out!). In particular Roger
Spalding, Paula Keaveney, Paddy Hoey and Nickiphoros Tsugarakis are some of the best
teaching staff I’ve ever encountered - and I’ve been through 2 high schools as well as further
education!
I must say I am grateful to have spoken to some of the finest historians in all the world in
preparing this piece. David Glantz, Gerhard Weinberg, Alexander Statiev and David Stahel,
your input was very helpful.
My thanks goes to my friends at Edge Hill University that made my classes fun and my
university experience a positive one. Hannah, James, Ben Attwood, Connor, Harry, Ahmed,
Ben Malone, Jack Wright, Jack Walsh, Will, AJ, and Francis. Ta.
Finally, there were also a few people who wished to remain anonymous and not credited,
and I will respect their wishes. I must say though, without a viable translator for Russian
texts, and an insight into Russian and Ukrainian military archives, I would have given up on
this project. I wish you and Dave all the best, and hope your move to London is as smooth
as possible.
Спасибо вам всем.

Thank you all.
2
Contents:
Preface -: 4
Chapter One - Of Whom, Do I Write?: 5
Chapter Two - The Baptism Of Fire, 9

In The Winter Cold :
Chapter Three - How Hard They Fought : 12
Chapter Four - Putting The ‘Naval’ : 23

In Naval Infantry
Chapter Five - Victory At Last : 27
Gallery -: 30
Chapter Six - Facts and Fables : 31
Summary-: 34
Bibliography: 36
3
Preface:
This is the dissertation Blood, Battle and Brigades: How Effective Were The Soviet Naval
Infantry During The Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)?. This has been written in order to
support a B.A. Hons in History With Politics at Edge Hill University. Researching and writing
this has taken me the time between August 2017 and May 2018. This project was a product
of my enthusiasm for Soviet history and military history in general. I initially proposed this
piece to Dr. Daniel Gordon. I knew right from the beginning that researching this subject was
going to be a hard and lengthy process, but despite the difficulties, I feel as though my
methods were sound and my conclusion is sufficient.
Not much has been written specifically telling the story of the Soviet Naval Infantry
during W.W.2 at all. I think my work is unique as of its subject matter, and of course how I go
one step further into trying to explain the tactics and how skilled or not these soldiers were,
in different battles and theatres. This is a piece of work in which I wish it could have been
more comprehensive. Such are the circumstances of writing on a subject like the Soviet
Naval Infantry in W.W.2.
There were language barriers, one German and one Russian. Luckily, German is a
common language catered for by translators in Western Europe, and much of the
information I needed from my trip to Berlin was often translated by museums/authorities into
English for me. Russian documents were translated by the partner of a close friend of mine
who is a Slavonic translator, herself originally born in Belarus. Other individuals who I had
correspondence with that ran Russian and Soviet history websites and projects, helped with
translating certain sources. All parties mentioned here did not want to be formally credited
and wanted their anonymity respected.
Secondly, the very nature of the Red Army was what makes it so hard to research.
Unlike other militaries, orders and reports were not filed and kept on paper form unless the
order reached the level above Brigade or even Divisional commanders (like Colonels and
Major-Generals). As a rough guide, a Rifle Brigade was around 3000-4000 men in the Red
Army, and a division could be up to 25,000 men. Many soldiers up to the rank of Sergeant
and Starshina (similar to a warrant officer) were illiterate or spoke alternative languages to
standard Russian, and many orders were verbal, telephoned or sent via runners. Finding
documents detailing smaller events than wholescale battles were hard to find if they ever
existed in the first place. Even if documents and witnesses survived the war, the
authoritarian nature of the Soviet state often omitted records of battle that were anything but
clear victories. Even though there are oral histories from veterans that are now free to speak
as of the Soviet Union’s collapse, these people are few in number - and we rely solely on
memory - something that can be warped or changed from reality.
I had particular difficulty accessing Naval archives in Russia. Russia has only
displayed online the documents associated with the Red Army, and not the Navy. I have
been told that even Russian citizens who go to the Naval Archives in St Petersburg only
have restricted access, and the Russian government needs to implement policies in order to
liberalize these archives. For some pieces of information there are only second hand
sources, and thus I regretfully have very few primary sources.
Let this document be as informative as possible to you.
Luke Anthony Daley.
4
Chapter One: Of Whom, Do I Write?
I must begin with a note I wrote at the entrance of the Schönholzer Heide Soviet War
Memorial, in Berlin. ‘No-one is here. Flowers are still on wreaths. The gardiners
haven’t finished. The Cenotaph is built on the graves of senior Red Army officers and
Heroes of the Soviet Union. 7000 war dead. The names of the dead are many and it
is daunting. Sailors may be buried here too’.The sailors I mentioned were those of
the Dnieper Military Flotilla 1 2 and 347th Naval Infantry Battalion of the 308th Red
Banner Infantry Division, who had taken part in the Battle of Berlin in 1945, under the
title and command of the 120th Guards Rifle Division.3 4 Members of the Naval
Infantry are also buried in Treptower Park, Berlin.5 There is also a small memorial to
them within the park, decorated with a miniature version of the Red Navy’s ensign.6 7
These men were initially tasked with securing the waterways of Berlin’s city centre,
with some soldiers being pressed into brief duties as what is colloquially known as
Naval Infantry. The Soviet Naval Infantry (S.N.I.) were units that performed as both
defensive ground units, and amphibious landing troops.8 The S.N.I. units were
operationally subordinate to naval fleet commanders. They conducted landings in
support of a front or theatre of operations as part of the combined efforts undertook
by the Red Army.9
1
Charles Sharp, Red Death: Soviet Mountain, Naval, NKVD, and Allied Divisions and Brigades 1941
to 1945 (West Chester, Ohio: Nafziger Collection, 1995).p.27.
2
Site Administrator, 1st brigade of the river ships of the Dnieper Military Flotilla (2008)
<http://1941-1945.at.ua/forum/37-398-1> [accessed 3 March 2018]. p.1.
3
Olesya Duty , 1 Bobruisk-Berlin Red Banner Brigade of the river ships (Navy) (2010)
<http://www.pobeda1945.su/division/2682> [accessed 3 March 2018]. p.1.
4
Vasily Tributs, 'The Baltic Fleet in the Final Operations of the war', Nauka Modern And Current
History Journal, (1970, quoting 1945 document). <http://militera.org//cards/show.html?card=45488>
[accessed 2 March 2018]. p.1.
5
Jon Brunberg, Sowjetisches Ehrenmal in Treptower Park, Berlin (Soviet War Memorial) (2014)
<http://www.war-memorial.net/mem_det.asp?ID=98> [accessed 8 May 2018].p.1.
6
Luke At Treptower. Kieran Sands. <https://imgur.com/Aw8RaOZ> (2017). See Cover Photo 1.
7
Idrisyn Evans, The Observer's Book of Flags, 3 edn (London: Frederick Wayne, 1963), p. 134.
8
Gunther Lippert, The Naval Infantry Units of the Soviet Fleet, trans. by US Navy (Washington:
Department of The Navy - Naval Intelligence Support Center, 1981).p.4.
9
Headquarters, Department Of The Army (US), The Soviet Army: Troops, Organisation, and
Equipment (Washington DC: Federation of American Scientists, 1991). p.185.
5
The term S.N.I. is one that can be applied to different units within numerous
theatres on the Eastern Front of World War Two (often called the Soviet-German 10
or the Great Patriotic War).11 The S.N.I were often formed out of ships’ crews or
Naval cadets that were inactive or seen as not being deployed effectively enough to
aid the war effort.12 The Soviet Union, although the biggest country ever to exist,
would have ports that are vulnerable to being blocked by long seasons of icy winter.
13
Even the non-Arctic ports of Novorossiysk and Leningrad were limited in their
effectiveness as harbours: Novorossiysk being shallow and small in size; Leningrad
being susceptible to freezing for many months of the year.14 When the Blitzkrieg hit,
and continued to hit the Soviet Union during Operation Barbarossa, many sailors of
the Red Navy were at port, iced in. The S.T.A.V.K.A., (the Main Command of the
Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R.)15 desperate for manpower, ordered the Red Navy to
commit personnel not active due to weather conditions to be fielded as land units.16
Many of these formations fought in the battles of Leningrad, Stalingrad, the Kerch
Peninsula, Sevastopol, Moscow and Berlin.17 18 19 These units had different tactics,
purpose and in some cases fall under different branches of the Soviet military. If
10
Richard Overy, The Soviet-German War 1941 - 1945 (2011)
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/soviet_german_war_01.shtml> [accessed 3 May
2017]. p.1.
11
Michael Billington, Soviet History: Great Patriotic War (2014)
<https://www.marxists.org/history/ussr/great-patriotic-war/index.htm> [accessed 22 March 2018]. p.1.
12
John Carroll, Soviet Naval Infantry (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Command and General
Staff College, 1977). p.47.
13
John Pike, The Russian Quest for Warm Water Ports (2017)
<https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/warm-water-port.htm> [accessed 22 March
2018]. p.1.
14
'Russia's Geography Problem’, dir. by Sam Wendover (Wendover Productions, 2017).
<https://youtu.be/v3C_5bsdQWg> [accessed 2 March 2018].
15
Vasily Danilov, Stavka (General Headquarters) Created In USSR (2018)
<https://www.prlib.ru/en/history/619333> [accessed 6 April 2018]. p.1.
16
Friedrich Ruge, The Soviets As Naval Opponents: 1941-1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
1979). p.33.
17
Staff College, 1977). p.38.
18
Victor Kamenir, 'Soviet Soldiers by Sea: The Soviet Naval Infantry', Warfare History Network, 9
December 2016,
<http://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/soviet-soldiers-by-sea-the-soviet-naval-infantry/>
[accessed 3 March 2018].p.1.
19
Office of Naval Intelligence, The Russian Navy: A Historic Transition (Washington DC, 2015), in,
<http://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/russia/Russia%202015screen.pdf?ver=2015-12
-14-082028-313> [accessed 27 April 2018].pp.18-19.
6
there is one thing I have learnt in my research, it is that Soviet Naval Infantry can be
confused with numerous military organisations. The terms: “Marines”,20 “Amphibious
Landing Forces”,21 and “Independent Maritime Army soldiers”22 are all used to
describe some of these forces. Even the term “commandos”,23 has been applied to
such units, even though these units were never intended or equipped for light
infantry operations and raiding missions.24 Many of these labels do not relate at all to
the tactics or the actions these units performed, nor do these terms accurately
describe the size and prevalence of these units. For example, marines describes
elite troops specializing in amphibious operations 25 - when Naval Infantry were
sometimes inexperienced, were considered huge formations, and were not primarily
trained for amphibious operations.26 27 I am not treating Red Army brigades that
included a minority of naval infantry, as opposed to a majority as proper naval
infantry units. There is some debate about this however. Yuriy Strekhnin writes that
many of the proper Naval Infantry Brigades under army control retained their
uniforms, or wore a mixture of army and navy uniform in combat. He reasons that
these units - which includes some Independant Coastal Army troops - were
nevertheless army formations and not naval ones, especially after the Battle of
Sevastopol.28 Strekhin forgets that the Soviet High Command classed Naval
Brigades as different units to ordinary Rifle Brigades, because they could be and
often were very different from similarly-sized Red Army formations. In the case of the
20
Harrison Salisbury, The 900 Days: The Siege Of Leningrad, 4th edn (London: Macmillan,
2000).pp.318-320.
21
William Baxter, The Soviet Way Of Warfare (Oxford: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986).p.158.
22
Military Factory, Battle of Sevastopol - (October 30th, 1941 - July 4th, 1942) (2018)
<https://www.secondworldwarhistory.com/battle-of-sevastopol.asp> [accessed 3 March 2018].p.1.
23
Yuriy Fedorovich Strekhnin, Commandos From The Sea: Soviet Naval Spetznaz In World War II,
trans. by James Gebhardt (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996). p.vii.
24
to 1945 (West Chester, Ohio: Nafziger Collection, 1995).pp.27-29.
25
Ed Grabianowski, How the U.S. Marines Work (2018)
<https://science.howstuffworks.com/marines.htm> [accessed 27 April 2018].p.1.
26
Bruce Watson and Susan Watson, The Soviet Navy: Strengths and Liabilities (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1986).p.48.
27
James Gebhardt, 'Soviet naval special purpose forces: Origins and operations in the second world
war', Journal of Soviet Military Studies, 2.4, (1989), 536-578, in Taylor And Francis Online
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13518048908429964?needAccess=true&instName=Ed
ge+Hill+University&instName=Edge+Hill+University&instName=Edge+Hill+University> [accessed 3
March 2018].pp.1-6.
28
trans. by James Gebhardt (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996). p.259.
7
Independent Coastal Army, it is argued by David Glantz that they were a separate
armed force and were neither a part of the navy or the army.29 I agree with this, due
to the fact that the Independent Coastal Army (I.C.A.) was specifically formed to
defend only the Crimea.30 I must also add that the I.C.A. was under only indirect
orders from Red Army Southern Front Command.31 However, the I.C.A. had much of
its composition reinforced by the 7th and 8th Naval Rifle Brigades in 1941.32 33 I
therefore consider the I.C.A. as an infantry army made up of some navy personnel,
but one that performed independently regardless of army orders and command, and
therefore was not a proper Red Army or Naval Infantry unit. One more thing to
consider is that units raised from naval ranks by the army were given the title Naval
Rifle, whereas the units formed by the navy were designated Naval Infantry.34 I will
refer to both types of these units, who retained their uniforms and identity, as Naval
Infantry units for simplicity.
To further clarify, I am writing about the Naval Infantry/Rifle units that were not
just ex-sailors or ex-marines, but were still considered by the Soviet command to be
actual Naval Infantry/Rifle units. I am not writing about Soviet paratroopers, or
non-infantry navy units that conducted amphibious operations. I am only writing
about Naval units that were involved in coastal defence, infantry operations,
brown-water (lake and river) warfare and amphibious landings. I am also excluding
units that fought against the Japanese on the Far-Eastern Front as this generally is
not considered part of the German-Russian conflict.35
All in all, the combat performance of the S.N.I. has been a subject of historical
debate, and through obtaining a massive amount information and evidence, this
piece aims to establish how successful - or not - the S.N.I. was between 1941 and
1945.
29
David Glantz, interviewed by Luke Daley, 3 March 2018. (Via Email).
30
'Soviet Storm: World War II in the East (Episode 3, The Defence of Sevastopol)’, dir. by Anna
Grazhdan (Star Media, 2011).
31
trans. by James Gebhardt (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996).p.259.
32
Earl Ziemke and Magna Bauer , Moscow To Stalingrad: Decision In The East, ed. by David Trask
(Washington DC: Centre of Military History: United States Army, 1987), in ,
<http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-EF-Decision/index.html> [accessed 27 April 2018]. p.105.
33
Clayton Donnell, The Defence Of Sevastopol 1941-1942: The Soviet Perspective (Barnsley: Pen
And Sword Military, 2016).pp.44-49.
34
35
The Pobediteli Project, Pobediteli (2017) <http://english.pobediteli.ru/flash.html> [accessed 5 May
2017].
8
Chapter Two: The Baptism of Fire, In The Winter Cold
In June 1941, Germany and her allies invaded the Soviet Union. The Red Army and
Navy were under-equipped, underprepared and were in the middle of major
reorganisation and arms-building projects.36 The Germans, having the element of
surprise, struck hard and deep into Soviet territory.37 By September, German artillery
was within range of the city of Leningrad, one of the main targets for the whole of
Operation Barbarossa.38 One of Russia’s largest cities, home to a naval base, came
under siege and the resulting battles involved the Soviet Naval Infantry in both
offensive and defensive operations.39
Shortly after the fall of the village of Mga, east of Leningrad, the first naval
troops to come into contact with the enemy were the ironically named 1st Naval
Infantry Brigade of the Baltic Fleet (not to be confused with the 1st Naval Infantry
Brigade of Black Sea Fleet).40 41 This Naval Infantry Brigade was formed before
Operation Barbarossa, and had took part in operations against the Finns.42 The
Brigade was therefore made up of hardened troops, yet after taking some casualties,
the unit absorbed much of the Student Naval Brigade, which was also based in
Leningrad. Even the cadets that made up the Student Naval Brigade had seen action
defending the Narva-Leningrad highway from the Finnish Army.43 All of the men who
made up the 1st Naval Brigade in 1941 were men that were highly educated, and
dedicated communists that were fanatically motivated; and in a sense already
veterans.44 The majority of the Brigade was formed from people who had learnt how
36
Gerhard Weinberg, A World At Arms: A Global History Of World War II, 6 edn (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010).pp.264-268.
37
'Assault On Leningrad Is Reported', The Evening Standard, 2 September 1941, p.1.
38
Albert Axell, Russia's Heroes: 1941-45, 2 edn (London: Constable & Robinson, 2001).pp.91-93.
39
'Russian Offensive Continued’ , dir. by (British Pathe, 1943).
40
to 1945 (West Chester, Ohio: Nafziger Collection, 1995).pp.31-32.
41
2000).pp.318-320.
42
Prit Buttar, Between Giants: The Battle for the Baltics in World War II (London: Bloomsbury, 2013),
[accessed 28 April 2018]. Via Google Books. pp.99-105.
43
to 1945 (West Chester, Ohio: Nafziger Collection, 1995).pp.31.
44
Captain Chernyshev (No first name given in report), 'Operational report of the headquarters of the
Naval Defense of Leningrad and Ozerny District', TsAMO archive, Fund 217, Inventory 1221, Case
195, Document 15, 24 June 1941, p.1-2.
<https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=114786397&backurl=q%5C%D0%BC%D0%BE%D1
9
to survive - through operations that resulted in heavy casualties - and probably did
not suffer from a lack of discipline or the potential for disobedience.45 The brigade
proceeded to engage strong German armoured formations, which had also been
equipped with deadly flamethrower tanks (likely Flammpanzer IIIs, attached to newly
up-gunned panzer III companies).46 47 Despite not having dedicated anti-tank
weapons, the Soviet Naval infantry were renowned as fearsome fighters up close,
and luckily they were often covered by a naval barrage when advancing. The sailors
of the 5th and 1st Naval Brigades, still clad in their dark uniforms proceeded to
accompany Marshal Voroshilov’s Red Army forces on the counterattack against the
Germans which took place on the Leningrad front, September 11th, 1941.48 After a
rousing speech by Colonel Parafilo, the naval infantrymen were given entrenching
tools in case of a lack of ammunition. Luckily the sailors successfully captured
several villages, one called Krasny Selo, and did not run out of ammunition.49 50 But
despite this, the Germans rapidly counter-attacked numerous times. With no
anti-tank capability except their anti-tank rifles, Voroshilov opted for a general retreat.
51
Despite being a tactical defeat in that the Soviets could not hold the ground they
had claimed from the enemy; this is an example of Soviet naval infantry successfully
%80%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%8F%20%D0%BF%D0%B5%D1%85%D0%BE%D1%82%D0
%B0::use_main_string%5Ctrue::group%5Call::types%5Copersvodki:rasporyajeniya:otcheti:peregovori
:jbd:direktivi:prikazi:posnatovleniya:dokladi:raporti:doneseniya:svedeniya:plani:plani_operaciy:karti:sh
emi:spravki:drugie::page%5C3> [accessed 3 March 2018]. pp.1-2.
45
Captain Chernyshev, 'Operational report of the headquarters of the Naval Defense of Leningrad and
Ozerny District', 24 June 1941, p.2.
46
David Bocquelet, Panzer III (2014)
<http://www.tanks-encyclopedia.com/ww2/nazi_germany/Panzer_III.php> [accessed 28 April
2018].p.1.
47
David Glantz, The Siege Of Leningrad 1941-1944: 900 Days of Terror (London: Brown Partworks,
2001).pp.34-35.
48
Blaine Taylor, Joseph Stalin’s Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov: A Soviet Survivor (2017)
<http://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/joseph-stalins-kliment-yefremovich-voroshilov-a-soviet-s
urvivor/> [accessed 28 April 2018].p.1.
49
Major General: Vladimir Shcherbakov and General Georgy Zhukov, 'The Fifth Marine Brigade
continues its offensive', TsAMO archive, Fund 217, Inventory 1221, Case 174 , 16 September 1941,
p.1-7.
%B0::use_main_string%5Ctrue::group%5Call::types%5Copersvodki:rasporyajeniya:otcheti:peregovori
:jbd:direktivi:prikazi:posnatovleniya:dokladi:raporti:doneseniya:svedeniya:plani:plani_operaciy:karti:sh
emi:spravki:drugie::page%5C9> [accessed: 3 March 2018].pp.1-7.
50
'More Intense Fighting Round Leningrad', The Times, 27 September 1941, p.1
51
2000).p.319.
10
combating German Heer units, some of which were armoured elements. Within the
coming winter months, much of the brigade would be killed, and the unit ceased to
exist by September 1941. 52
One of the Naval Brigades present throughout the Battle of Leningrad was the
4th Naval Infantry Brigade, which later on was redesignated the 260th Naval Infantry
Brigade.53 Raised by the Red Navy in July 1941, and exclusively being made up of
cadets at the Sergei Kirov Naval Academy, the brigade never came under Red Army
command.54 With relative independence, the brigade took part in the battle just
outside of Leningrad. Marshal Zhukov aimed to at least slow, if not stop the Germans
before they could completely surround the city of Leningrad. Amongst the small
gains of the ‘First Sinyavino Offensive’, 55 the 4th Naval Brigade could claim the
taking of some territory in Moskovskaya Dubrovka. This small operational success
took 10 days to complete however, and within the bigger picture did little to stem the
thrust of the Germans upon the city.56 It can be said though, that where other Soviet
army units failed, the fully independent 4th Brigade fought successfully, and can
perhaps be taken into account as an example of a Naval Infantry unit outstripping a
normal Rifle Brigade in success.
Following this, the Brigade continued to fight, primarily being assigned to
protect the ‘Road of Life’ 57 that delivered vital supplies to the city of Leningrad.
Without the lifeline of supplies carried over pack ice by trucks and horses, the city
would have starved (even more than it did). Unfortunately for the troops guarding
these positions, the Germans usually attacked en-masse in huge operations to try
and take the road; or alternatively used means of attack that minimized their own
casualties and maximized Soviet death tolls. The Luftwaffe systematically strafed
and bombed troops that rarely had anything but machine guns for anti-aircraft
defence. Batteries of dedicated anti-aircraft guns did exist, but they were mostly
located on Red Navy craft.58 The 4th Naval Brigade took casualties and could not
return fire effectively, since aircraft and artillery were what smashed their defences.
52
to 1945 (West Chester, Ohio: Nafziger Collection, 1995).pp.31.
53
Nils Holmbergh, The Soviet Naval Infantry and their Battles (2017)
<http://figurementors.com/the-soviet-naval-infantry-and-their-battles> [accessed 3 May 2018].p.1.
54
55
John Erickson, The Road To Stalingrad, 5th edn (London: Phoenix Giant, 1998).pp.381-382.
56
David Glantz, Barbarossa: Hitler's Invasion of Russia 1941 (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Tempus,
2001).pp.111-113.
57
John Westwood, Russia 1917 To 1964 (London: B.T. Batsford, 1966).pp.126-127.
58
David Glantz, Leningrad: City Under Siege 1941-1944, 2 edn (Kent: Grange Books, 2005).pp.78-80.
11
But, their objective for that winter was eventually accomplished - the Road of Life
stayed open - and Leningrad remained defiant.59 60
Chapter Three: How Hard They Fought
Despite being another defensive battle, fought by the Red Army against the
Germans and their allies, the Battle of Stalingrad would be a different one to any
other battle that preceded it. In September 1942, the German army had reached
Stalingrad’s city centre.61 The city was relentlessly bombed, and all across the Volga
positions were shelled by the Germans. Buildings became ruins, basements became
hardened bunkers, and any infrastructure there once was, was now a pile of rubble,
burnt and smashed by the onslaught.62 The bombardment no doubt killed many in
the city, yet those that survived had become further entrenched and even more hell
bent on revenge.63 Urban warfare is much harder to fight if the streets are not roads
anymore, and the enemy will occupy every single room in a house. This is what the
Germans encountered in Stalingrad. And eventually, they would encounter the Naval
Infantry here too.
The earliest recorded presence of S.N.I. in Stalingrad is of the 66th Naval
Rifle Brigade that arrived at Stalingrad in late July 1942.64 The unit occupied the
South and West frontlines, but eventually settled on the Southern sector of the city.
These sailors would fight for the rest of the Battle for South Stalingrad.65 To the north
of central Stalingrad, panzer elements sent by the Germans were being attacked by
3 seperate Soviet armies as part of a new offensive. The Soviet high command also
ordered a simultaneous assault on German forces to the south.66 The push south
59
Bob Carruthers and John Erickson, The Russian Front: 1941-1945 (London: Cassell,
1999).pp.60-61.
60
John Barber, Mark Harrison , The Soviet Home Front: 1941-1945 (London: Longman,
1991).pp.28-30.
61
Edward Acton, Tom Stableford, The Soviet Union: A Documentary History (Volume 2) 1939-1991
(Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2007).pp.135-139.
62
Chris Bellamy, Absolute War: Soviet Russia In The Second World War, 2 edn (Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 2008).pp.510-522.
63
Susan Bryan, Kumait Jawdat, John Newton and Teresa Pruden, Red Army Resurgent, ed. by
Gerald Simons, 3 edn (New Jersey: Silver Burdett, 1981).pp.138-145.
64
Peter Chen, Battle of Stalingrad (2018) <https://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=3>
65
'The Great Russian Offensive - Latest From The Stalingrad Front, dir. by (British Pathe, 1943).
66
David Glantz, 'The Struggle for Stalingrad City: Opposing Orders of Battle, Combat Orders and
Reports, and Operational and Tactical Maps. Part 2: The Fight for Stalingrad's Factory District-14
October–18 November 1942', The Journal For Slavic Military Studies, 21.2, (2008), 377-471, in
<http://www-tandfonline-com.edgehill.idm.oclc.org/doi/abs/10.1080/13518040802067383> [accessed
12
was led by the 57th and 64th Armies, of which the 66th Naval Rifles were a part of.
These offensive drives south proved to be just the solution to alleviating pressure on
General Chuikov’s crumbling defence of central Stalingrad.67 It can be positively
attributed to these naval infantrymen that their actions were pivotal in remedying the
situation at Stalingrad.
Also, to the surprise of the southern Soviet troops, the Germans had left
Romanian divisions to safeguard the front. In the ensuing fight, close quarters
combat was common, and the Romanians were both low on supplies and without
anything but rifles.68 On the other hand, the Soviets were equipped mainly with
submachine guns - perfectly suited to close quarters - and the S.N.I. made deadly
use of shovels in melee.69 Of particular note, was the standard submachine gun used
by the Soviets. The PPSh-41, with a huge 70 round magazine and a decent range of
300 metres, was a Soviet infantryman’s main advantage over an Axis soldier up
close.70 The Soviet Naval Brigades went as far as to replace some of their rifle
battalions with full submachine gun battalions, creating massive formations armed
with these deadly weapons. The large magazine meant reloading in mid-combat was
less common, the rapid rate of fire could at least pin the enemy down until they got
close.71 In addition to this, the Germans with their standard MP-40s had problems
with jamming (so much so that they often stole Russian SMGs), and they were only
carried by non-commissioned officers anyway.72 It is said that Romanian infantry,
especially on the attack, often dropped much of their equipment, and so it is hinted
that the Soviets did not face many units well-equipped for close quarters combat.73 74
8 May 2017].pp.378-443.
67
Steven Mercatante, Sixth Army's Flanks Outside Stalingrad: The Southern Sector (2016)
<http://globeatwar.com/article/sixth-armys-flanks-outside-stalingrad-southern-sector> [accessed 28
April 2018].p.1.
68
Jochen Hellbeck, Stalingrad: The City that Defeated the Third Reich (London: Hachette,
2015).pp.324-332.
69
'Twentieth Century Battlefields: 1942 Stalingrad, dir. by Dan Kendall (BBC, 2007).
70
Albert Seaton and Joan Seaton, The Soviet Army: 1918 to the Present (London: The Bodley Head,
1986). Appendix E.
71
Chris McNab, German Soldier Versus Soviet Soldier (Oxford: Osprey, 2017).pp.24-30.
72
Maxim Popenker, MP.38: MP.40 (2018)
<http://modernfirearms.net/en/submachine-guns/germany-submachine-guns/mp-38-mp-40-eng/>
[accessed 28 April 2018].
73
James Lucas, War on The Eastern Front 1941-1945: The German Soldier In Russia, 2 edn (New
York: Bonanza Books, 1982).p.49.
74
Jochen Hellbeck, Stalingrad: The City that Defeated the Third Reich (London: Hachette,
2015).pp.325-330.
13
Thus, the Soviet sailors quickly overran the two Romanian infantry divisions, with
only the strength of a couple brigades on some points of the front. The other Naval
Brigade present was the 154th Naval Infantry Brigade.75 Within the 154th Brigade,
Podpolkovnik (Battalion Commander) Ivan Barykin witnessed two particular events.
Ivan Ruban, a machine gunner from the same battalion as Barykin, had completely
decimated a German assault with ambushing machine gun tactics.76 In quick
succession, another sailor from the same unit named Mikhail Panikakha had
destroyed a German tank, and yet in the process sacrificed himself to do so. He held
a pair of molotov cocktails and prepared to charge a panzer, only for a lucky shot to
shatter a molotov and set him on fire. Without hesitation, Panikakha smashed the
other anti-tank grenade onto the tank and blew it into decommission.77 This again
shows how effective the Soviet Naval Infantry were: a Romanian division was
upwards of 100,000 men, and Soviet forces had made 2 such formations flee many
of their positions. 35,000 Romanians had been killed, no doubt due to superior
equipment and possibly morale.78 I mention morale due to the many accounts of
Romanians not being as dedicated to winning the battle as German ones.79
Elements of the 48th Panzer Corps finally stopped the brigades and their fellow Red
Army comrades, but ground had been gained West of the Soviet starting point.
Despite the heavy casualties took by the Soviets, they had managed to smash
Romanian defensive positions, and distract German armour from the front line. This
bought more time for the Soviets across the Volga River to build up defences and
send troops to remedy the aforementioned trouble General Chuikov was in; and is
another situation that highlights how successful the S.N.I. could be. This was a
crucial part of the Battle of Stalingrad, of which the outcome was in the balance. The
offensive taken by the S.N.I. was imperative to the victory for the Soviets.80 The 66th
Naval Rifles in particular contributed to the final operations in Stalingrad that forced
the capitulation of the Germans in spite of their other issues, according to Sharp.81
75
Charles Sharp, Red Death: Soviet Mountain, Naval, NKVD, and Allied Divisions and Brigades
1941 to 1945 (West Chester, Ohio: Nafziger Collection, 1995).p.48.
76
Michael Jones, Stalingrad: How The Red Army Triumphed, ed. by David Glantz, 2 edn (Barnsley:
Pen And Sword Military, 2009).pp.54-55.
77
Antony Beevor, Stalingrad (London: Penguin, 1999).pp.164-165.
78
Brian Taylor, Barbarossa To Berlin: A Chronology Of The Campaigns On The Eastern Front
1941-1945 (Volume Two) (Kent: Spellmount, 2004).pp.2-5.
79
Erich Weinert, Stalingrad Diary, ed. by John Dugdale, trans. by Egon Larsen (Dorset: I.N.G.,
1944).pp.11-12.
80
Martin Cherrett, The Unrelenting Battle For Stalingrad Continues (2017)
<http://ww2today.com/15th-october-1942-the-unrelenting-battle-for-stalingrad-continues> [accessed
28 April 2018].
81
14
Apart from the 66th and 154th Naval Rifle Brigades, other units were also
stationed in Stalingrad for the duration of 1942. Perhaps one of the most insightful
stories involving the S.N.I. was that of the 92nd Independent Rifle Brigade. This title
was not their original designation - they were originally known as the 111th Naval
Rifle Brigade - but after the heavy casualties suffered by the unit, they were
renamed.82 They would become legend through their actions in defending the grain
elevator at Stalingrad.
At first, the grain elevator was taken quite rapidly by German forces as they
pushed into the city, but the Red Army decided on the 15th of September that the
Germans needed to go. Before the S.N.I. were deployed, the 10th Red Army Rifle
Brigade took the structure initially.83 In late September of 1942, the 92nd
Independent Naval Rifle Brigade had successfully crossed the Volga River and
proceeded to counter attack against German forces.84 The counter-thrust by the
S.N.I. was one in which hand-to-hand combat and fierce fighting ensued. This
flanking attack coincided with about 20 men being told to occupy the grain elevator.85
The whole Northern push conducted by the 24th Panzer Division was cancelled out
by them now being flanked by Soviet troops.86
To try and amend the situation, the Germans sent in half of the 94th Infantry
Division, which consisted of thousands of men even when not at full strength.87 Over
the next 4 or 5 days, the soldiers defending the grain silo were subjected to a huge
artillery bombardment. Mobile 88mm flak guns and even artillery pieces up to
105mm in calibre (from 89th Panzer Artillery Regiment) attempted to level the
82
U.S. Army Combined Arms Centre, Russian Independent Rifle, Ski and Naval Brigades 1939-1945
(2018) <https://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CGSC/CARL/nafziger/939RXAF.PDF> [accessed 2 May
2018].p.5.
83
Stalingrad Battlefield Tours, Stalingrad Grain Elevator (2017)
<http://stalingradtours.com/en/sights/articul/stalingrad_grain_elevator> 0 [accessed 21 March
2018].p.1.
84
Nigel Thomas, World War II Soviet Armed Forces (2) 1942–43, ed. by Martin Windrow (Oxford:
Osprey, 2011).pp.42-43.
85
Pere Cardona, Stalingrad Grain Silo (2012)
<http://www.historiassegundaguerramundial.com/lugares/el-silo-de-grano-de-stalingrado/?lang=en>
[accessed 2 May 2018].p.1.
86
Mitch Williamson, The Grain Elevator – Stalingrad (2016)
<https://weaponsandwarfare.com/2016/05/17/the-grain-elevator-stalingrad/> [accessed 21 March
2018].p.1.
87
World Heritage Encyclopedia, 94th Infantry Division (Wehrmacht) (2018)
<http://www.self.gutenberg.org/articles/94th_infantry_division_(wehrmacht)> [accessed 2 May
2018].p.1.
15
structure.88 According to most sources, the incorrect ammunition was given to these
units - armour piercing rounds made holes in the building’s structure - but did not
smash it to pieces.89 10 German infantry charges in half as many days followed,
thinning the Soviet defender’s ranks, but there is no doubt that the 92nd Brigade
fought hard. A platoon of S.N.I. along with some Red Army machine-gunners had
held off half a division of troops and a good portion of a panzer division for nearly a
week.90 Even when the building was on fire and the units’ radio was out of action,
they fought on. Eventually after 2 more days of fighting, the Germans called up 200
men and 12 tanks (presumably from the 8th Corps, 24th Panzer Division, some
armed with flamethrowers) for a final assault.91 Subsequently, the Luftwaffe launched
numerous air strikes on the grain elevator as well, but no avail, some of the troops
trapped in the elevator proceeded to resist still. The very last attack by the Germans
that finally silenced the Soviet guns was taken up by 7 panzers: out of the original
12, 5 had been lost to breakdowns and Soviet accuracy with anti-tank rifles.
Eventually though, platoon commander Andrey Khozyainov was unable to
communicate with his superiors and short of heavy weapons ammunition. The Naval
Infantry had to flee the site or die. Many accounts say only a few men survived the
combat.92 However, some texts say his unit numbered more than one man after they
retreated from their defensive positions, including the testimony General-Polkovnik
Mereshko (deputy to Stalingrad’s commander - Chukov). He wrote: “our soldiers
were suffering terribly, and a few survivors had managed to retreat to Golodny Islan,
on the Volga”.93 In addition to this, Major-General Schylaev of the 39th Guards
Regiment stated that the 92nd Brigade’s survivors numbered enough to occupy
multiple boats and barges in their escape.94 The Soviet Naval Infantry numbering no
more than 50 men - not even enough for two platoons - drew the attention of about
88
U.S. Army Combined Arms Centre, German Army Group Seydlitz 1 December 1942 (2018)
<https://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CGSC/CARL/nafziger/942GLAR.pdf> [accessed 2 May 2018].p.1.
89
90
Martin Cherrett, The fight for the Stalingrad grain elevator (2017)
<http://ww2today.com/18th-september-1942-the-fight-for-the-stalingrad-grain-elevator> [accessed 21
March 2018].p.1.
91
Marcus Wendel, 24. Panzer-Division (2013)
<http://www.axishistory.com/axis-nations/150-germany-heer/heer-divisionen/4017-24-panzer-division
> [accessed 2 May 2018].p.1.
92
<http://stalingradtours.com/en/sights/articul/stalingrad_grain_elevator> 0 [accessed 21 March
2018].p.1.
93
Michael Jones, Stalingrad: How The Red Army Triumphed, ed. by David Glantz, 2 edn (Barnsley:
Pen And Sword Military, 2009).p.119.
94
Jones, Stalingrad: How The Red Army Triumphed. p.138.
16
half a German infantry division, a panzer corps and numerous Luftwaffe assets.
From what could be gathered, a week had been bought for the Soviets to bring in
reinforcements to defend the East bank of the Volga itself.95 Five tanks were put out
of action, and casualties for the Germans were so appalling that one German soldier
remarked: “If all the buildings of Stalingrad are defended like this, then none of our
soldiers will get back to Germany”.96 What isn’t often mentioned by sources
depicting these events is the psychological impact on German troops - it could be
said that this staunch defence undermined German morale in the Stalingrad and
inspired the vengeful feelings already felt by the Russians.97 Indeed, Chuikov after
the war in his memoirs remarked upon the Naval Infantry at the grain elevator as
some of the bravest troops within the Battle of Stalingrad, despite the fact that many
of them retreated.98 I believe Chuikov’s reason for praising these troops was due to
the high casualties they inflicted and took, and also because of the way they relieved
the forces defending the bank of the River Volga. If the Volga was occupied, the
Soviets would have lost a major foothold within their field of operations, and there is
no doubt that the 92nd Naval Infantry contributed to the halting of the German
advance, through effective street-fighting in the city.99 100
Before Stalingrad was even within the crosshairs of Hitler’s armies, a huge
threat existed towards any advancing German army’s southern flank.101 The Crimean
Peninsula, with the fortress city of Sevastopol and the home port of the Black Sea
Fleet stood as an important target for the Axis.102 After running the gauntlet of the
Crimea and a failed first attack on the city, the Germans proceeded to try and level
the city with some of the heaviest and biggest artillery pieces and air strikes ever
95
96
'The World at War’, dir. by Hugh Raggett, John Pett , David Elstein, Ted Childs, Michael Darlow,
Martin Smith (Fremantle Media, 1973). Note: This is a reference to Episode 9: ‘Stalingrad’.
97
Richard Overy, Russia's War (London: Penguin, 1997).pp.162-164.
98
Steven Thomas, Russian Naval Infantry in WW2 (2017)
<http://balagan.info/russian-naval-infantry-in-ww2> [accessed 3 March 2018].p.1.
99
David Stone, 'Stalingrad and the Evolution of Soviet Urban Warfare', The Journal Of Slavic Military
Studies, 22.2, (2009), 195-207, in
8 May 2017].
100
Mitch Williamson, The Elevator (2015) <https://weaponsandwarfare.com/2015/09/12/the-elevator/>
101
Arthur Merton, 'Nazis Begin Second Moscow Drive', The Daily Telegraph, 5 November 1941, p.1.
102
John Westwood, The Eastern Front: The Soviet-German War 1941-45 (London: Hamlyn,
1984).pp.89-90.
17
assembled. As of October 1941, the Black Sea Fleet and the Red Army were
defending the outer parts of the city, they had already held out for 3 months.103
After Sevastopol was placed under the command of the Trans-Caucasus
Front in late 1941, S.T.A.V.K.A. ordered fresh reinforcements for the besieged
Crimean garrisons. The first formation to arrive was the 79th Naval Rifle Brigade,
which went straight into action alongside the Independent Coastal Army.104 The
defence of the city was split into 4 zones by the Soviets, although this would be
converted to 3 zones of operation once the Belbek River and the adjacent northern
Soviet positions had been crushed.105 One zone contained the 7th and 79th Naval
Infantry brigades, and the northernmost sector was to be defended by the 8th Naval
Infantry Brigade.106 This breakthrough was exploited by Manstein, the German
commander in chief, and many of the defenders in the southern zones found
themselves flanked or cut off. In the three other zones and the city of Sevastopol
itself, anti-tank ditches and trenches were dug, and most of the coastal artillery
batteries were still in Soviet hands. These guns provided counter-battery fire and
most importantly artillery cover for infantry attacks against the main German
advance.
The 305mm coastal guns of Fort “Maxim Gorky 1”107 (a name given to it by
the Germans) sighted a German attack in November 1941. The German 72nd
Infantry Division was ordered to attack south, and effectively exploit the
breakthrough made at the eastern side of all 3 remaining Soviet defence areas. The
Germans’ 132nd Infantry Division tried desperately to also try and flank the Soviets,
but this move was countered by a determined 8th Naval Rifle Brigade.108 The
counter-attack and defence forced Manstein to halt the German attack for about a
week, only after more reserves arrived into the fray could the Germans gain more
ground. This perhaps serves as a hint as to how effective Naval Infantry could be in
defensive actions, although it is unclear due to the operational failures of the
103
Chris Bellamy, Absolute War: Soviet Russia In The Second World War, 2 edn (Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 2008).pp.458-460.
104
Susan Bryan, Kumait Jawdat, John Newton and Teresa Pruden, Red Army Resurgent, ed. by
Gerald Simons, 3 edn (New Jersey: Silver Burdett, 1981).pp.35-38.
105
Map of Troop Movements and Front Lines, Sevastopol 1941 (2017)
<http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/maps/1941S/Sevastopol/Sevastopol_Eng_Nov1_41.jpg>
[accessed 7 May 2018].p.1. (See the grey lines that divide territory horizontally).
106
'Battlefield: The Battle For The Crimea’, dir. by Dave Flitton (PBS, 2002).
107
Peter Chen, Battle of Sevastopol (2018) <https://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=214>
108
Combat in Sevastopol Vicinity: November 4th-11th 1941 (2017)
<http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/maps/1941S/Sevastopol/Sevastopol_Nov_4_11_41.JPG>
18
Germans and their stretched logistics. It is significant though that the actions of 3
German divisions (the 132nd was joined on its flanks by 50th and 22nd Infantry
Divisions) were countered by only a single Soviet Division and a Naval Rifle Brigade.
109
Whilst severely outnumbered, the Naval Infantry and the other Soviet units must
have put up a staunch defence.
All in all, the Black Sea Fleet had assembled nearly 50,000 personnel to fight
as naval infantry in the battle, and this figure was matched by the Red Army.110 Most
however were not trained for ground combat, but at the same time naval brigades
often contained 5 or 6 battalions of 3000-4000 men, which was plentiful considering
the shortages of manpower. There is some debate about the level of training these
troops had, which will be tackled later on in this piece. These Naval Infantry Brigades
such as the 7th had an independent artillery battalion; and the 79th Brigade had both
field guns and mortars in their artillery cohorts.111 Although previously clarified as not
naval infantry, the Independent Coast Army was also staffed up to about a fifth of its
personnel with naval infantry.
On the 7th of June 1942, what would be the decisive the German advance
finally came. The initial spearhead, made by the German 30th Infantry Corps proved
costly and at first ineffective.112 Despite the Luftwaffe systematically bombing Soviet
positions round the clock, the defences seemed to hold up.113 The Soviet 7th Naval
Brigade in their trenches and bunkers made a habit out of waiting for the enemy to
approach, and then to only fire their weapons at minimal range.114 This was deadly
since the Soviet Naval Infantry preferred semi-automatic rifles and submachine guns
to standard bolt action rifles.115
109
110
Oleg Beginin, Eastern Front: the defense of Sevastopol, 1942, (2010)
<http://www.weltkrieg.ru/battles/115-----1942-.html> [accessed 3 March 2018].p.1.
111
to 1945 (West Chester, Ohio: Nafziger Collection, 1995).pp.34-44..
112
Ray Stroupe, Tactical And Technical Trends And Developments (Washington: Military Intelligence
Service, War Department, 1942).pp.39-44.
113
Ralph Hewins, 'Enemy All out for Crimea', The Daily Mail, 4 November 1941.
<http://callisto.ggsrv.com/imgsrv/Fetch?contentSet=DMHA&recordID=DMHA-1941-1104-0001-F&high
light=00ff00+0.5+339+1872+75+18&highlight=00ff00+0.5+208+5045+68+21&scale=0.33&crop=7+28
5+276+1415&format=jpg> [accessed: 10 May 2017].p.1.
114
Russian Academy of Natural History, Defense of Sevastopol and Museum of the heroic defense of
Sevastopol (2016) <https://www.scienceforum.ru/2016/pdf/18474.pdf> [accessed 8 May 2018].p.4.
115
'Liberators: The Soldiers Of The Red Army’, Episode 11: Naval Infantry, (Discovery Channel,
2012).
19
In close quarters, the Naval Infantry carried weapons such as knives and
shovels.116 These weapons were very useful, and it is certain that an enemy that
does not advance or stay put is susceptible to retreating before the threat of close
combat approaches. The Naval Infantry in particular were slightly more suited to
night combat than their contemporaries. They owe this to their uniform - the black
sailor’s overalls - which made these men perfectly camouflaged at night-time.117 In
night combat, one of the most important things to consider for an attacking force is
the element of surprise.118 If a unit such as the Naval Infantry could appear out of
nowhere (as a new formation disembarking from transport shipping), the enemy
would not know of such a unit even existing.119 When a whole Naval Infantry Brigade
consisting of thousands of men had the ability to charge Romanian and German
positions at night, the impacts were devastating for the Axis. It is my belief that these
ambushes absolutely pulverized Axis morale, and did a great deal of damage to the
German and Romanian infantry’s view of a quick summer campaign.120 Close
quarters combat of this kind would result in few prisoners and these raids were
ultimately an example of the Naval Infantry performing successfully despite the
backdrop of Sevastopol being under siege. According to Grigory Zamikhovsky (a
veteran of the 7th Naval Brigade) these actions were how the Naval Infantry earned
their fearsome reputation as “The Black Death”.121
Even in the daytime, the Naval Infantry were prone to acting out feats of
valour. When ammunition ran out, sailors resorted to their entrenching tools and
bayonets in order to resist the Germans. Others bound grenades together and made
human-wave attacks against tanks - which would terrify the Germans - and
sometimes this completely halted panzers advancing.122
116
Gordon Rottman, Soviet Rifleman 1941-45 (Oxford: Osprey, 2007).pp.30-35.
117
Phil Yates, Soviet Naval Infantry Brigades: Morskoi Pekhoty Brigada (2009)
<https://www.flamesofwar.com/hobby.aspx?art_id=854> [accessed 3 March 2018].
118
Centre Of Military History, United States Army, Eastern Front: Night Combat, ed. by Bob
Carruthers (Barnsley: Pen And Sword Military, 2011).pp.20-23.
119
1979). pp.76-77.
120
Isakov Stepanovich, The Navy of the USSR in the Patriotic War, ed. by Aleksandrov Konstantin, 6
edn. (Moscow: Voyenmorizdat - Soviet Naval Publishing House, 1944), in Military Literature
(Russian), <http://militera.lib.ru/h/isakov/index.html> [accessed 2 March 2018].p.1.
121
Federal Agency for Press and Mass Communication (Russia), 'Grigori Yefimovich Zamikhovsky', I
Remember, 10 November 2017, p.1.
122
A. Kozlov, The Ballad of Five, Marine, p.1.
<http://www.mpeh.ru/articles/detail.php?SECTION_ID=100&ELEMENT_ID=918> [accessed 3 March
2018].p.1.
20
Despite these tactical innovations, there were massive casualties taken by the
all Soviet units, especially the Naval Infantry. Fort Maxim Gorky 1 ended up falling
under the guns of several 600mm mortars employed by the Germans.123 Even the
massive “Schwerer Gustav” gun, the largest ever used in combat, was fired at the
bunker complex.124 The massive artillery barrage devastated the fort’s front guard:
the 79th Naval Brigade, killing over 200 men in a single day, although the fort itself
was not knocked out.125 After this though, the Germans became concerned about
their casualty rates, including over 300 men dead and the destruction of several
assault gun platoons, most containing valuable Sturmgeschütz III self-propelled
artillery vehicles.126 However, it can be said that in the open the Naval Infantry were
especially vulnerable to concentrated artillery attacks, and they fared better in terms
of survival against having to deal with tanks and infantry. Even so, it is no surprise
that the 79th Naval Rifles fought more successfully against infantry and tanks - their
inventory consisted of more howitzers and radio sets than anti-aircraft guns of all
calibres.127
The Soviets had tried to break out and charge the depleted German and
Romanian formations ahead of them, but this was to little avail. The Battle of
Sevastopol had taken on a new style of fighting - one of attritional warfare - and the
Soviets were for once outnumbered on this front at this point.128 The 79th Infantry
Brigade was completely destroyed as of June 10th, of which many sources list as a
distaterous counterattack.129 The Naval Infantry left their positions and went on to
charge German infantry, with very little success.130 It is very likely that they fell victim
to long-range German machine gun fire before they could close with the enemy and
force a German retreat. This may have also been a last-ditch attempt to push the
Germans back in the face of ammunition and supplies shortages. This is evident
123
'Sevastopol: Never Surrender, dir. by Aleksandr Avilov (Russia Today, 2014).
124
1999).pp.99-101.
125
Robert Forczyk, Sevastopol 1942: Von Manstein's Triumph (London: Bloomsbury, 2008).p.50-53.
126
Service, War Department, 1942).pp.150-151.
127
128
secondworldwarhistory.com, Timeline of the Battle of Sevastopol (October 30th, 1941 - July 4th,
1942) (2017) <http://www.secondworldwarhistory.com/battle-of-sevastopol.asp> [accessed 8 May
2017].p.1.
129
Service, War Department, 1942).p.44.
130
Robert Forczyk, Sevastopol 1942: Von Manstein's Triumph (London: Bloomsbury, 2008).p.58.
21
through the Black Sea Fleet losses at this point in the battle (this force was the main
supply route for these troops), and the fact that the Naval Infantry were on their own:
no reinforcements could join them at their headquarters on Haccius Ridge.131
This desperation may have also stemmed from the rise in concentration of air
attacks being targeted against Maxim Gorky - the fort of which the 79th Naval Rifles
had been defending closely.132 The Soviet Naval infantry of the 7th and 79th
Brigades had been completely devastated, leaving a total of around 2500 German
casualties, about the same as what the 79th Brigade alone lost in the final battle.133
Furthermore, the already shattered 8th Brigade, as well as the reinforcements of the
138th and 142nd Brigades were completely destroyed by the end of the battle.134
They were amongst the last units to fall under German pressure, with the 142nd in
particular arriving mere days before the surrender of Sevastopol.135 It would seem
that the Naval Infantry were perhaps not a one-for-one match with the German
infantry at ranges beyond close quarters. Nevertheless though, the Germans did
have the help of the largest artillery support ever assembled, and the Soviets had
next to no air cover.136
Therefore, the Naval Infantry’s failure to defend may have simply been a
product of the German and Romanian ability to make tremendously strong offensive
operations. Sevastopol ultimately proved an operational failure, and yet a political
victory, won if not partially then mostly by the men of the Black Sea Fleet’s Naval
Infantry.137 It must be said that their stubborn resistance - regardless of the debate
131
132
<http://callisto.ggsrv.com/imgsrv/Fetch?contentSet=DMHA&recordID=DMHA-1941-1104-0001-F&high
light=00ff00+0.5+339+1872+75+18&highlight=00ff00+0.5+208+5045+68+21&scale=0.33&crop=7+28
5+276+1415&format=jpg> [accessed: 10 May 2017].p.1.
133
Robert Forczyk, Sevastopol 1942: Von Manstein's Triumph (London: Bloomsbury, 2008).pp.79-82.
134
Combat Journal 386', TsAMO archive, Fund 1708, Inventory 1, Case 3 , 6 April 1942, p.1-95.
<https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=130658499&backurl=division%5C7%20%D0%B1%D1
%80%D0%BC%D0%BF::begin_date%5C29.10.1941::end_date%5C30.10.1941::use_main_string%5
Ctrue::group%5Call::types%5Copersvodki:rasporyajeniya:otcheti:peregovori:jbd:direktivi:prikazi:posna
tovleniya:dokladi:raporti:doneseniya:svedeniya:plani:plani_operaciy:karti:shemi:spravki:drugie>
[accessed: 3 March 2018].p.1.
135
1941 to 1945 (West Chester, Ohio: Nafziger Collection, 1995).pp.47-48.
136
Joel Hayward, 'Von Richthofen's 'Giant fire-magic': The Luftwaffe's Contribution to the Battle of
Kerch, 1942', The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 10.2, (1997), 97-124, in Frank Cass
<http://www.joelhayward.org/Richthofens-Giant-Finished.pdf> [accessed 8 May 2018].pp.97-100.
137
2001).p.135.
22
about it stemming from desperation or heroism - bought valuable time for the Red
Army elsewhere.138 Some even write that this holding up of German and Romanian
forces was integral to the final halting of the Axis advance at points like Stalingrad
and the Caucasus Mountains; due to the fact that the Germans failed in these battles
because they did not having enough combat reserves.139 140
Chapter Four: Putting The ‘Naval’ In ‘Naval Infantry’
The Soviets in 1943, having thrown attacks already at the flanks of these Axis
armies, had realized that a head-on assault was the best course of action. Their
previous amphibious expeditions were unsupported and the unprepared nature of
Red Army units in amphibious warfare made the operation backfire completely, the
Naval Infantry failed in these first attempts to conquer Kerch.141 There was no more
room for failures; the Red Army more inland was making progress in first defending
the land around Krasnodar, and eventually pushing the Axis back into the Crimea. If
an operation was to bridge the gap between the Kerch and the Taman Peninsulas,
the real battle to retake the Crimea could begin, and the German forces in Ukraine
would once again have a thorn in their side.142
Before the Soviets settled on their course of action, it must be said that some
of the intelligence gathered by Soviet scouts for the operation was obtained by Naval
Infantry units behind the German lines.143 These intelligence missions were often
supported by local partisans (although a good number of these partisans may have
been ex-regular forces, now behind enemy lines but self-sufficient), and with the
138
John Westwood, The Eastern Front: The Soviet-German War 1941-45 (London: Hamlyn,
1984).pp.178-179.
.
139
Robert Beckhusen, Sevastopol’s Soviet Defenders Helped Save Stalingrad (2017)
<https://warisboring.com/sevastopols-red-army-defenders-helped-save-stalingrad/> [accessed 8 May
2018].p.1.
140
141
'Map of the location of naval brigades from rifle regiments in the Kerch Peninsula from 26 to 29
December 1941.', TsAMO archive, Fund 209, Inventory 1089, Case 94 , 26 December 1941, p.1.
%B0::use_main_string%5Ctrue::group%5Cmap::types%5Ckarti:shemi::page%5C4> [accessed: 4
March 2018].p.1.
142
Radio Free Europe, The Siege Of Sevastopol: Why The Crimean Campaign Means So Much To
Moscow (2014) <https://www.rferl.org/a/crimea-world-war/25375944.html> [accessed 8 May
2018].p.1.
143
trans. by James Gebhardt (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996).p.34.
23
favour of local populations they often evaded the Gestapo and German rearguard
troops.144
The Soviets decided that the head-on assault would also have to be an
amphibious one. The main Soviet formations that would land would be the 4th
Ukrainian Front, with elements of the Black Sea Fleet and Azov Flotilla.145 Part of the
4th Ukrainian Front (the equivalent to an army group) was the 56th Army, itself made
up of both Independent Coastal Army Troops and a contingent of Naval Infantry.146
This unit was the 83rd Naval Rifle Brigade, which had been reformed after another
battle a year earlier for Kerch had destroyed the unit.147 Despite an initial delay in
operations due stormy weather in the Kerch Strait and Sea of Azov, the Soviet plans
eventually went ahead. The landing would encompass thousands of troops, all in a
mixture of civilian and military light craft.148 Fishing boats, rowing boats, civilian
cutters and more joined the fleet of Soviet gunboats and destroyers. The Azov
Flotilla in particular ferried many of the troops to their positions. These units
nonetheless made it to the beaches, and promptly attempted to rid the road ahead of
Romanian and German units.
The first men on the beach at Eltigen were the 83rd Naval Brigade, joined by
some separately attached Naval Infantry battalions.149 The 83rd Brigade had 4 rifle
companies instead of the usual 3 within a Brigade, and they had a sapper company
as well.150 The sappers most likely were engineer units equipped with flamethrowers
and mine-clearing equipment, perfect for the storming of a beach that could be
mined or be overlooked by fortifications such as pillboxes.151 The Naval Infantry,
sometimes far from the shore, would jump into freezing waters and swim with full
144
Henry Sakaida, Heroes of The Soviet Union 1941-45 (Oxford: Osprey, 2004).pp.24-27.
145
Christopher Chant, Kerch-Eltigen Operation (2017)
<http://codenames.info/operation/kerch-eltigen-operation/> [accessed 8 May 2018].p.1.
146
147
Wayne Turner and Van Noten, Black Death: Late War Intelligence Briefing for a Soviet Naval
Infantry Brigade Morskaya Pekhota Batalon (2015)
<https://www.flamesofwar.com/hobby.aspx?art_id=1197> [accessed 3 March 2018].p.1.
148
Cliff Donald, Soviet Naval Infantry; A New Capability? (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College,
1971).pp.16-17.
149
L.Chernousko, 'The Marines landed first', Marine, p.1.
<http://www.mpeh.ru/articles/detail.php?SECTION_ID=100&ELEMENT_ID=514> [accessed: 2 March
2018].p.1.
150
151
A. Smirnov-Nesvicki, Ice crossing of the Kerch strait (2011)
<http://english.battlefield.ru/battles/22-1941/86-ice-crossing-of-the-kerch-strait.html> [accessed 3
March 2018].p.1.
24
combat equipment to their objectives.152 This is a testament to how hardy and
physically fit the Naval Infantry were, and their resolve can be said to be a product of
extreme determination.153 These troops stormed forwards and immediately took hold
of the beachhead near Eltigen, and forced the weak Romanian formations in the
defences to scatter.154 The fact that these operations were conducted at night greatly
benefitted the Naval Infantry - who as mentioned previously wore black uniforms -
although this had a limited effect on their attack because the element of surprise was
lost. They were covered by naval gunfire produced by their escorting destroyers and
motor torpedo boats, and this gave the Naval Infantry an opportunity to seize more
ground.155 By this time in the war, the Naval Infantry were usually used as scouts and
clearing troops in amphibious landings, so after the initial breakthrough was created
by these crack troops, they likely would have been withdrawn.156 This was done due
to the possibility of the high casualties Naval Infantry would take in attacking not only
from the sea, but doing so whilst conducting close quarter combat operations instead
of employing alternative combat styles. The past experiences of landing on the
Kerch Peninsula had the Soviets convinced that these troops would need to be
rotated out due to expected losses.
A few days later, reinforcements containing the bulk of the Independent
Coastal Army had fully landed near the hamlet of Yenikale, bringing 2000 more
troops ashore.157 Further artillery bombardments were now at the disposal of the
Soviet commanders, since the Soviet 18th Army had set up long range guns on the
tip of the Kerch Strait.158 5 days into the landing operation, the Soviets had landed
27,000 soldiers at Yenikale, including 4-5 separate Red Army divisions.159 At the end
of the first Kerch-Eltigen operation, the Soviets had captured just under 9 kilometres
152
153
'The Great Russian Offensive’ - Latest From The Stalingrad Front, dir. by (British Pathe, 1943).
154
A. Tymoshenko , 'The commander of the detachment of special assignment', Marine, p.1.
2018].p.1.
155
Staff College, 1977).p.41.
156
157
1979). p.124..
158
<http://codenames.info/operation/kerch-eltigen-operation/> [accessed 8 May 2018].p.1.
159
25
of land, but the shores at Eltigen were overrun.160 The main Soviet gains were in the
north and westward, near the city of Kerch, but the city itself was still in German
hands. After these initial gains however, the Red Navy and Red Army decisively
conquered the Axis forces at Kerch and went on to liberate much of the Crimea in
1943 and 1944.161
German sources and some Western sources list the Soviets’ gains in the
Kerch-Eltigen operation as only token results.162 163 This is due to the fact that the
German objective was to hold the city of Kerch and defend it as much as possible.
The surrounding land and the beaches meant little to the Germans, and this is why
they positioned their weakest units (such as the Romanians) on the approaches to
the coast.164 The view that the Soviets underperformed in these amphibious landings
probably stems from the fact that there are no lists of casualties and wounded from
the Axis side in this battle, and that the Soviets had lost 7000 men, approximately
4-5% of the force sent ashore.165 I have even seen Soviet casualty statistics within
the Kerch-Eltigen operation listed incorrectly, stating that 27,000 men were killed
outright, not killed, missing or wounded.166 This view has not been subject to
scrutiny until recent times, in which some historians - including Westerners such as
Atwater - have acknowledged the operational successes of the Soviets and their
relation to the Soviet attack’s goals at the time.167 The Soviets wanted to establish a
beachhead and gain enough ground to launch further attacks. The operation,
although open to further advances and reinforcements to consolidate these pushes
west; was not specifically intended to capture the city of Kerch and the entire Kerch
160
Project Gutenberg, Kerch–Eltigen Operation (2018)
<http://central.gutenberg.org/articles/kerch-eltigen_operation#The_Soviet_assault> [accessed 9 May
2018].p.1.
161
'Russian Offensive Continued’ , (British Pathe, 1943).
162
Evan Mawdsley, Thunder In the East: The Nazi-Soviet War 1941-1945 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005).pp.284-285.
163
Mungo Melvin, Sevastopol’s Wars: Crimea from Potemkin to Putin (Bloomsbury: London,
2017).p.547-550.
164
Center of Military History , German Defence Tactics Against Russian Breakthroughs, 3 edn
(Washington DC: United States Army, 2004).pp.43-45.
165
David Glantz and Jonathan House, When Titans Clashed: How The Red Army Stopped Hitler
(Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2015).p.119.
166
Sergei Grinevetsky, Igor Zonn, Sergei Zhiltsov, Aleksey Kosarev, Andrey Kostianoy, The Black
Sea Encyclopedia (Berlin: Springer, 2014).p.411.
167
Charles Atwater, Soviet Amphibious Operations in the Black Sea, 1941- 1943 (n.p. ,
1995).pp.11-18.
26
Peninsula.168 I doubt very much that the Soviets would aim to capture so much
territory when in past experiences they had come across serious meteorological,
combat training and technological issues.169
Later on in the Great Patriotic War, the Naval Infantry would once again see
action, and once again efficiently and adeptly guarantee victory.
Chapter Five: Victory At Last
With the Red Army in full gear and on the offence, by the start of 1945, many of the
Naval Rifle Brigades were disbanded or reassigned to purely naval duties.170Even
so, the Naval Infantry did stay active within the Soviet military up to 1945 and the
end of the war.
As far as I know and have read, some Naval Infantry units had made it as far
as Vienna in their operations against the Germans, having cut across Hungary and
forced the surrender of the pro-Axis government there.171.172 There was also at least
one Naval Infantry unit present in April 1945 within Berlin, and they were supported
and most likely deployed via craft that were part of the Dnieper Flotilla.173
The one unit I identified whilst in Berlin were members 347th Naval Infantry
Battalion of the 308th Red Banner Infantry Division, which was placed under guise of
the 120th Rifle Division as an Independent unit, although the size of this unit must
have only been a company (50-100 men).174 This makes sense due to the fact that
these sailors were probably spread between numerous small assault craft to both
protect their crews and serve as disembarking infantry when they needed to.
168
Gladkov Vasily Fedorovich, Mission to Eltigen, ed. by Aleksandrov Konstantin , 2 edn (Moscow:
Military Publishing, 1972).pp.167-190.
169
Valentinovich Abramov, The Kerch catastrophe of 1942 (2006)
<http://militera.lib.ru/h/abramov_vv/index.html> [accessed 2 March 2018].pp.3-4. (See Chapters 2
and 3).
170
171
trans. by James Gebhardt (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996). pp.246-247.
172
Peter Chen, Battle of Vienna (2018) <https://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=285>
173
174
Mikhail Piresin, 347th infantry regiment of the 308th Infantry Red Banner Division (2011)
<http://www.pobeda1945.su/division/3647> [accessed 3 March 2018].p.1.
27
The 60 or so craft Dneiper Flotilla with Naval infantry aboard first took part in
securing the waterways and bridgeheads across the Oder river, especially around
Kustrin.175
After being involved in the initial bombardment and advance on Berlin in early
1945, the Dneiper Flotilla moved to resupply and ferry wounded troops from combat
areas deep inside Berlin. Using the Oder and Spree Rivers to their advantage, the
gunboats of the Dnieper Flotilla were able to traverse much of the ruined city without
much difficulty. They proved very reliable and useful since most of Berlin was in
ruins, and rough terrain created by the Allied bombing and shelling proved a notable
obstacle for Soviet logistics.176 Henceforth, the Flotilla, who could navigate much of
the city proved very useful in that they could avoid being bogged down, and even
prevent themselves from ambushed by any remaining German units along the way.
177
Both units are honoured at the Soviet War Memorials at Treptower Park, and
Schönholzer Heide, in Pankow. Treptower Park has a memorial located at the
entrance to the graves of the Soviet war dead, which displays the Soviet Navy’s flag
and a short description of the dead from partaking units in the battle.178 There are
also numerous pieces of masonry/artwork that display Naval Infantry alongside
partisans and Red Army soldiers as one of three branches of the Soviet infantry. 179 I
do not think that the memorial and cemetery at Schönholzer Heide contains any Red
Navy sailors, due to the fact that all of the graves had Red Army symbols and
descriptions. None of the officers’ graves or the graves of Heroes of the Soviet Union
contained sailors or Naval Infantry. The only trace of the Red Navy at Schönholzer
Heide was a shield inscribed with the Soviet Naval Infantry badge on it, located at
the front of the cemetery.180 The Dnieper Flotilla is amongst the units listed on
plaques drawn up by the Soviet Surrender Museum, which now reside within the
175
John Erickson, The Road To Berlin (London: Weidenfeld and Nickleson, 1983).p.539.
176
The History Channel, Photo Galleries: World War II: Damage and Destruction (2018)
<https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/world-war-ii-history/pictures/world-war-ii-damage-and-des
truction/truck-carrying-troops> [accessed 9 May 2018].p.1.
177
Military Intelligence Division , Order of Battle of The German Army: 1 March 1945(Washinton DC:
United States War Department , 1945), in Scribd,
<https://www.scribd.com/doc/143932741/Order-of-Battle-of-the-German-Army-March-1945>
[accessed 9 May 2018].pp.425-450. (This document does not consider ammunition or supplies for
these units).
178
Figure 3: Red Navy Memorial at Treptower Park. Kieran Sands. <https://imgur.com/a/pqvvaUQ>
See Figure 3 on page 33 of this document.
179
Figure 5: Masonry/Artwork at Treptower Park. Luke Daley.<https://imgur.com/a/pqvvaUQ> See
Figure 5 on page 33 of this document.
Figure 2: Naval Infantry shield at Schonholzer Heide. Luke Daley.<https://imgur.com/a/pqvvaUQ>

180
See Figure 2 on page 33 of this document.
28
Deutsches-Russisches Museum based in Karlshorst, north of Berlin.181 182
As of this, Soviet sources describe the sailors of the Flotilla and the 347th
Naval Brigade as both the only Naval units to take part in the Battle of Berlin, but
also as units that played a pivotal role in helping secure waterways and structures
alongside the Red Army in 1945.183 Berlin was theirs.
181
Figure 1: Plaque displaying participating Soviet Units in the Battle of Berlin. Luke
Daley.<https://imgur.com/a/pqvvaUQ> See Figure 1 on page 33 of this document.
182
Figure 7: Information at Karlshorst on Figure 1 in English. Luke
Daley.<https://imgur.com/a/pqvvaUQ> See Figure 7 on page 33 of this document
183
Georgy Zhukov, Russian archive: The Great Patriotic War (5). The Battle for Berlin (2017)
<http://militera.lib.ru/docs/da/berlin_45/07.html> [accessed 2 March 2018].p.1.
29
Clockwise:
Figure 1: Plaque displaying participating Soviet Units in the Battle of Berlin. Figure 2: Naval
Infantry shield at Schonholzer Heide. Figure 3: Red Navy Memorial at Treptower Park. Figure 4:
Information poster at Tiergarten Soviet War Memorial. Figure 5: Masonry/Artwork at Treptower Park.
Figure 6: Information poster at the Deutsches-Russisches Museum. Figure 7: Information at
Karlshorst on Figure 1 in English.
30
Chapter Six: Facts and Fables
Ever since I started this project, I have had to deal with the large amount of
propaganda and untrustworthy sources that appear to represent Soviet Naval
Infantry during W.W.2. I will now discuss the true nature of Soviet Naval Rifle
Brigades, and I will try to clarify the role, combat techniques and successes or
failures of the Naval Infantry.
The first thing that many sources and historians conflict on when discussing
Naval Infantry is how they were trained and prepared for their operations. Historians
such as Alexander Statiev state that the Naval Infantry on the whole were nothing
short of inexperienced line infantry.184 Bruce Watson also agrees with this viewpoint,
writing that the Naval Infantry did not possess the right amount of training, equipment
and fire support in their first operations.185
Statiev goes on to say that the Naval Infantry had little impact due to their
training in any theatre - except for Sevastopol and the Far East.186 This view is
contested by Charles Sharp, who has documented the postings and impacts of
nearly every Naval Rifle Brigade the Red Navy and Army created.187 Sharp points
out time and again that the Naval infantry were at Leningrad and Sevastopol’s
defence, and they played a leading role in the battles of Stalingrad and
Kerch-Eltingen.188 On the subject of Stalingrad, Antony Beevor highlights how the
main thrust through the Romanian lines committed by the Soviet 64th Army, was
spearheaded by Naval Infantry Brigades.189 This spearhead proved to be a massive
blow to the Axis defences, and some list this attack as the start of the end of the
battle in favour of the Soviets.190 Naval Infantry units were also at the forefront of the
battle for the grain elevator in Stalingrad, which saw some of the fiercest fighting of
184
Alexander Statiev, interviewed by Luke Daley, 28 April 2018. (Via Email).
185
186
187
188
Ibid. ,pp.40-46.
189
Steven Mercatante, Sixth Army's Flanks Outside Stalingrad: The Southern Sector (2016)
<http://globeatwar.com/article/sixth-armys-flanks-outside-stalingrad-southern-sector> [accessed 28
April 2018].p.1.
190
David Stone, 'Stalingrad and the Evolution of Soviet Urban Warfare', The Journal Of Slavic Military
Studies, 22.2, (2009), 195-207, in
8 May 2017].p.1.
31
1942. My findings have been that it is untrue to say the Soviet Naval Infantry were a
force that did not have even a locally remarkable effect on the battles they
participated in. In the case of the Kerch-Eltingen Operation, the first and most
important units that were expected to storm the beaches before anyone else, were
the Naval Infantry Brigade.191 Although the Naval infantry were rotated out of service
at Kerch - after they eliminated the Axis beachside defences - without them storming
the beach the whole operation could have been jeopardized.192 I think Statiev is
simply misinformed about the role the Soviet Naval Infantry played in the war, and I
would not be surprised if this was the first time he had learnt of the Soviets’
amphibious landings in the Crimea.
Statiev also assumes that the Naval Infantry Brigades had no combat
experience prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, however he is mistaken.
According to Achkasov and Pavlovich, who point out that the Naval Infantry were
involved in sporadic amphibious landings in 1941, write that the Soviet Naval Infantry
were in combat against the Finns at Hanko.193 Charles Sharp does put a limit on this
experience gained against the Finns though, because the Soviets prior to 1941 only
had one brigade of Soviet Naval Infantry.194 So these men were experienced, but
were in short supply. Statiev and Watson are further opposed by Viktor Leonov and
Dave Flitton respectively. Leonov points out in his memoirs that scouts in the Naval
Infantry could be trained to the highest of levels present within the Soviet armed
forces.195 Leonov’s book Blood On The Shores essentially puts the Soviet Naval
Infantry in some respects and in some units on par with the training of British
commandos and U.S. marines.196 The History Channel, the publisher of a
documentary on the Soviet Naval Infantry, displayed how Naval Infantry could
receive speicalized training.197
Evan Mawdsley and Mungo Melvin describe the operations before and during
the Kerch-Eltingen Operation as either failures, or with negative casualty rates for
191
2018].p.1.
192
193
Vasily Achkasov and Nikolai Pavlovich, Soviet Naval Operations in the Great Patriotic War
1941-1945, trans. by US Naval intelligence Command, 3 edn (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
1981).p.99.
194
195
Viktor Leonov, Blood On The Shores: Soviet SEALs In World War II, trans. by James Gebhardt
(New York: Ivy Books, 1993).p.2.
196
Ibid., p.13.
197
Liberators: The Soldiers Of The Red Army’, Episode 11: Naval Infantry, (Discovery Channel, 2012).
32
the Soviets.198 199 They are supported by Statiev: who when interviewed stated that
the Soviet Naval Infantry were poorly equipped for amphibious landings.200 Viktor
Leonov wrote as of personal experience in the Naval Infantry scouts that he was
trained in amphibious landings off Solovetsky Island.201 In his notes, Leonov also
mentions that one of his comrades in the Soviet Naval scouts had been trained in
amphibious landings before, as early as 1940.202 Evgeny Abramov, a Russian author
whose works I had translated, stated that most sergeants who led squads were
combat veterans that had seen action203 Bruce Watson, wrote that Naval Infantry
after 1942 and 1943 had the art of amphibious raids perfected, after learning through
sheer combat experience.204
David Glantz when interviewed stated that Naval Infantry Brigades usually
had higher morale than other Red Army units.205 They regarded themselves as still
sailors and still wore their black uniforms, which served as a symbol of their
independence, and this may have affected the way they were also commanded.206
With this minor independence from the Army on certain command levels (some
Naval Brigades even only answered to their fleet commanders, and they were not
partaking in insubordination doing this),207 the troops may have had a boost to their
morale as sailors, not soldiers. This may have also rubbed off on the enemy, due to
the sailors’ uniform distinctions, and the way they preferred close combat more than
other Soviet units.208 Alexander Statiev seeks to explain the possibility of the Naval
infantry possessing higher morale than most troops, as the product of the Naval
198
199
Mungo Melvin, Sevastopol’s Wars: Crimea from Potemkin to Putin (Bloomsbury: London,
2017).p.547-550.
200
201
Viktor Leonov, Blood On The Shores: Soviet SEALs In World War II, trans. by James Gebhardt
(New York: Ivy Books, 1993).p.256.
202
Ibid., p.256.
203
Evgeny Abramov, "Black Death": Soviet Marines in battle (Moscow: Yauza, 2005).pp.570-582.
204
205
206
207
208
33
Infantry themselves, although he also states that the supposedly daring and
fearsome reputation that may have been established; was not a true reflection of
reality.209 I must say that if this was the case, then why did the Germans and
Romanians call the Naval Infantry the Black Death? Numerous sources such as
veteran Naval Infantryman Grigori Zamikhovsky state that the Romanians and
Germans at Sevastopol were amongst the first people to use this nickname for
armed sailors.210 Statiev is likely wrong to review the established reputation of the
Soviet Naval Infantry.
Independent of all of this debate, it must be said that Gerhard Weinberg
believes that Naval Infantry Brigades were as varied as any other Red Army or Navy
unit at the time.211 Weinberg stresses that whenever a success is claimed by an
individual combat unit, that may only be a product of an enemy unit’s failures.
Weinberg when interviewed, stated that conditions in battles like Stalingrad and the
combat within were rather a product of “the broader errors and failures of the
Germans and the more sensible conduct of operations by the Soviets” in this case.212
Summary:
I salute historians such as David Glantz and David Stahel who appreciate the actions
of the Soviet armed forces, regardless of their nationality, or the political regime that
led them.
I can strongly say there has simply been too much evidence recorded of the
Naval Infantry fighting in the face of overwhelming odds. Whether it was sheer
desperation, bravery or a self-concocted representation - higher morale was indeed
present in most Naval Infantry units, and morale boosting stories were salvaged from
some defeats.213 214 215
Too much has also been written on how ferocious Naval Brigades were in the
right circumstances. In night combat, they were truly terrifying with their black-green
uniforms camouflaging them.216 217 Their preference for short-ranged, but rapid-firing
209
210
Federal Agency for Press and Mass Communication (Russia), 'Grigori Yefimovich Zamikhovsky', I
Remember, 10 November 2017, p.1.
211
Gerhard Weinberg, interviewed by Luke Daley, 26 April 2018. (Via Email).
212
Ibid., (Via Email).
213
214
215
2001).p.135.
216
<http://figurementors.com/the-soviet-naval-infantry-and-their-battles> [accessed 3 May 2018].p.1.
34
weaponry gave them an unprecedented edge in distances under a few hundred
metres. 218 219 When in cities and forts like Stalingrad and Sevastopol, they made the
Axis pay dearly for their advances, although the Soviet casualty rate was almost
exclusively larger than the German rate.220 The Naval infantry in battles like
Sevastopol and Leningrad were especially vulnerable to attacks by artillery and
aircraft.221 Despite these circumstances though, the Naval infantry went on to
become a very adept multi-role branch of the Red Navy, if not because of its
makeshift improvisations at times.222 223
If the conditions were right, and the troops were equipped and trained
enough, the Soviet Naval Infantry could pose a serious threat to anyone they come
across.
217
218
Liberators: The Soldiers Of The Red Army’, Episode 11: Naval Infantry, (Discovery Channel, 2012).
219
220
David Glantz and Jonathan House, When Titans Clashed: How The Red Army Stopped Hitler
(Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2015).pp.117-120.
221
Robert Forczyk, Sevastopol 1942: Von Manstein's Triumph (London: Bloomsbury, 2008).p.50-53.
222
223
35
Bibliography:
Primary Sources:
Books and Documents:
Ira Freeman, 'Hammer and Sickle In Graz', Yank Magazine, 13 July 1945.
Military Intelligence Division War Department, Special Bulletins From The 1939-1940
Active Campaign In Europe (1) (Washington: Military Intelligence Division War
Department, 1940).
Military Intelligence Division War Department, Special Bulletins From The 1939-1940
Active Campaign In Europe (3) (Washington: Military Intelligence Division War
Department, 1940).
Ray Stroupe, Tactical And Technical Trends And Developments (Washington:

Military Intelligence Service, War Department, 1942).
Erich Weinert, Stalingrad Diary, ed. by John Dugdale, trans. by Egon Larsen (Dorset:
I.N.G., 1944).
Newspaper Articles:
Anonymous Correspondent, 'Soviet Heavy Tanks In Action: Nazi Prisoners'

Admissions Of Their "Terrifying Effect"', The Manchester Guardian, 7 July 1942.
<http://callisto.ggsrv.com/imgsrv/Fetch?contentSet=DMHA&recordID=DMHA-1941-1
104-0001-F&highlight=00ff00+0.5+339+1872+75+18&highlight=00ff00+0.5+208+504
5+68+21&scale=0.33&crop=7+285+276+1415&format=jpg> [accessed: 10 May
2017].
Arthur Merton, 'Nazis Begin Second Moscow Drive', The Daily Telegraph, 5
November 1941.
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36
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Other Media:
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Interviews:
David Stahel, interviewed by Luke Daley, 26 April 2018. (Via Email).
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Images:
Cover Image 1: Luke At Treptower. Kieran Sands. <https://imgur.com/Aw8RaOZ>
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<http://soviet-posters.chat.ru/matrose4.jpg> [accessed 3 March 2018], 1999.
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Daley.<https://imgur.com/a/pqvvaUQ>
Figure 2: Naval Infantry shield at Schonholzer Heide. Luke

Figure 3: Red Navy Memorial at Treptower Park. Kieran Sands.

<https://imgur.com/a/pqvvaUQ>
Figure 4: Information poster at Tiergarten Soviet War Memorial. Kieran

Sands.<https://imgur.com/a/pqvvaUQ>
Figure 5: Masonry/Artwork at Treptower Park. Luke

61
Figure 6: Information poster at the Deutsches-Russisches Museum. Luke
Figure 7: Information at Karlshorst on Figure 1 in English. Luke

Combat in Sevastopol Vicinity: November 4th-11th 1941 (2017)

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<http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/maps/1941S/Sevastopol/Sevastopol_En
g_Nov1_41.jpg> [accessed 7 May 2018].p.1. (See the grey lines that divide territory
horizontally).
62

Dissertation by Luke Daley

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Blood, Battle and Brigades: How Effective Were The

Soviet Naval Infantry During The Great Patriotic War

Luke Anthony Daley

Submitted In Support of a Degree of: (BA) History with Politics

Academic Year: 2017-2018

I hereby sign my work with this signature:

You both are still sorely missed.

Credits and Acknowledgements:

Спасибо вам всем.

Chapter One - Of Whom, Do I Write?: 5

Chapter Two - The Baptism Of Fire, 9

Chapter Three - How Hard They Fought : 12

Chapter Four - Putting The ‘Naval’ : 23

Chapter Five - Victory At Last : 27

Chapter Six - Facts and Fables : 31

Luke Anthony Daley.

Chapter Three: How Hard They Fought

1941 to 1945 (West Chester, Ohio: Nafziger Collection, 1995).p.44.

Chapter Four: Putting The ‘Naval’ In ‘Naval Infantry’

Chapter Five: Victory At Last

Figure 2: Naval Infantry shield at Schonholzer Heide. Luke Daley.<​https://imgur.com/a/pqvvaUQ​>

See Figure 2 on page 33 of this document.

Books and Documents:

Ray Stroupe, Tactical And Technical Trends And Developments (Washington:

Anonymous Correspondent, 'Soviet Heavy Tanks In Action: Nazi Prisoners'

'Assault On Leningrad Is Reported', The Evening Standard, 2 September 1941..

'Russia Offers Finland Soft Peace', P.M. Daily, 1 March 1944.

'More Soviet Tanks Than Ever', The Observer, 7 January 1942.

Soviet Tanks Surprise Germans', The Manchester Guardian, 8 July 1941.

'More Intense Fighting Round Leningrad', The Times, 27 September 1941.

A. Skleznev, 'Marine Troopers', Izvestia, 27 August 1941, p.1.

'Marine Guards!', Pravda, 20 June 1942, p.1.

Film, Video and Television:

'Liberation Of Stalingrad - Epic Report , (British Pathe, 1943).

'Russian Offensive Continued’ , (British Pathe, 1943).

Military Intelligence Division , Order of Battle of The German Army: 1 March

Books and Documents:

Mansur Abdulin, Red Road From Stalingrad: Recollections Of A Soviet Infantryman,

Nigel Askey, Operation Barbarossa: The Complete Organisational and Statistical

Edwin Bacon, The Gulag At War (London: Macmillan, 1994).

Yuri Balakshina, Defense of Sevastopol and Museum of the heroic defense of

Antony Beevor, Stalingrad (London: Penguin, 1999).

David Campbell, German Infantryman Versus Soviet Rifleman (Oxford: Osprey,

Center of Military History, German Defence Tactics Against Russian Breakthroughs,

Nick Cornish, Soviet Partisan 1941-45 (Oxford: Osprey, 2014).

Richard Daniel, A History of Russian and Soviet Naval Development (Naval

Norman Davies, Europe at War 1939–1945: No Simple Victory (London: MacMillan,

Tony Demchak, Reform, Foreign Technology, And Leadership In The Russian

Clayton Donnell, The Defence Of Sevastopol 1941-1942: The Soviet Perspective

Karen Farrington, Witness To World War II, 4 edn (Wigston, Leicestershire :

Robert Forczyk, Kursk 1943: Southern Front (Oxford: Osprey, 2017).

James Gebhardt, The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation: Soviet Breakthrough and

David Glantz, Barbarossa: Hitler's Invasion of Russia 1941 (Stroud, Gloucestershire:

Headquarters, Department Of The Army (US), The Soviet Army: Troops,

Guy Holliday, The Limits of intervention: Soviet Projection Capabilities (Monterey,

Edward Lewis, A Comprehensive Examination Of The Soviet Naval Infantry (New

Kenneth Macksey, The Guinness History of Land Warfare, 2 edn (Norwich:

Mungo Melvin, Sevastopol’s Wars: Crimea from Potemkin to Putin (Bloomsbury:

Richard Overy, Russia's War (London: Penguin, 1997).

Roger Reese, The Soviet Military Experience (London: Routledge, 2000).

Gordon Rottman, Soviet Rifleman 1941-45 (Oxford: Osprey, 2007)

Friedrich Ruge, The Soviets As Naval Opponents: 1941-1945 (Annapolis: Naval

Figure 2: Naval Infantry shield at Schonholzer Heide. Luke Daley.<https://imgur.com/a/pqvvaUQ>

The Pobediteli Project, Pobediteli (2017) <http://english.pobediteli.ru/flash.html>