PUBLICATIONS occasional

PAPER
NOVEMBER 2017
ISSUE 10.11

FRONTLINE:
MARAWI
 OCCASIONAL PAPER NOVEMBER 2017
02
FRONTLINE:
The so-called Marawi crisis—which began with the Islamic State-
inspired Maute Group takeover in 23 May 2017 and officially ended with
Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana’s pronouncement of termination
of all combat operations on 24 October 2017—has brought into the
limelight the extent and limits of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP)’s warfighting capability to mount Military Operations on Urban
Terrain (MOUT). Since its formal organization as a professional armed
force in 1935, the AFP has been extensively engaged in jungle warfare
mostly against Communist and Moro insurgents (and recently, Al-Qaeda
affiliated extremist groups), and is relatively new to Islamic State-style
urban warfare. Given the novelty, gravity and sophistication of the
emerging security threat, the author deems it proper and fitting to trace
the historical events leading to the Marawi conflict, critically assess the
Philippine MOUT as counterterrorist response, and identify concrete
ways forward that shall help enhance the capabilities of the AFP to win
Image Credit: davaotoday.com
C 2017 STRATBASE ADR INSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
MARAWI
MARAWI CRISIS
The relative novelty of Islamic State-style urban warfare vis-à-vis the AFP's limited
institutional memory on MOUT proved to be the single most formidable challenge that
caused the war to drag on for five months and the state of emergency to remain in effect.
future wars in urban centers. In particular, the objectives of this paper are
the following:
1. Come up with a comprehensive picture of the Philippine security
landscape, taking into consideration the constellation of enabling
factors on domestic, regional and global fronts which culminated
in the militant takeover of Marawi;
2. Identify the challenges and constraints to the effective conduct
of MOUT in Marawi;
3. Propose a set of policy recommendations for the appreciation
of the Philippine defense and security establishment in general and
the Philippine military in particular to enhance its combat readiness
against future Marawi-style, territorial occupation of urban centers
by Islamic State-inspired militants.
* The views and opinions expressed in this Paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute.
www.adrinstitute.org
OCCASIONAL PAPER NOVEMBER 2017
03
The Philippine Security Landscape and Beyond
Domestic
The Politics of Rido and the Tale of the Warring Clans
The spark that set ablaze to Marawi may be traced back to what
Wilfredo Magno Torres III dubs as rido, the Maranao term for clan
feud or the “state of recurring hostilities between families and
kinship groups characterized by a series of retaliatory acts
Image Credit:www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/173037-maute-group-rise-family-terrorism
C 2017 STRATBASE ADR INSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
of violence carried out to avenge a perceived affront or
injustice”.1 The Maute clan—a rich and powerful political family
in the southern region of Mindanao under the influence of matriarch
and businesswoman Farhana Maute—got embroiled in a bitter
dispute with Butig Mayor Dimnatang Pansar after the clan lost a
bidding over civil contracts in the municipality.2 Joseph Franco
narrates that, in order for the Mautes to avenge their loss and
coerce the Pansars to grant the contracts, the former
tactically adopted terrorist imagery and rebranded
themselves as Islamic State-Ranao.3
The feud between the Mautes and the Pansars of Lanao
region may then be viewed as the latest—and arguably, one of
the deadliest—in the long, tumultuous history of rido in select
conflict-ridden areas of Mindanao. There were several cases in
the past where a local rido set a chain of events leading to full-
scale armed conflicts: These include the feuds in Dapiawan (2004)
and Linantangan (2005) in Maguindanao which involved the AFP,
the paramilitary Civilian Volunteer Organizations (CVO), and the
separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).4 Another
classic case is the Shariff Aguak incident (2006) which
dragged paramilitary forces under a political clan
and elements of the MILF into open hostilities.5
Relative Stagnation of the Bangsamoro Peace Process
Aside from rido, the other layer in the complex web of violence in
the Marawi crisis is Moro separatism vis-a-vis Islamist extremism
as well as the oscillation of Moro rebels between these two poles
of the political ideological spectrum. The Maute clan has deep ties
with the MILF by blood and marriage: Military sources reveal that
the patriarch and engineer Cayamora Maute used to be a senior
official of the Moro insurgent group6 while Rommel Banlaoi cites
that Farhana Maute was related to the former military head of the
www.adrinstitute.org
OCCASIONAL PAPER NOVEMBER 2017

04
MILF.7 Meanwhile, Omar and Abdullah Maute—the so-called Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) Chief Gatot Nurmantyo admitted into Malaysia to prepare for terror attacks in Malaysia and abroad.15
Maute brothers who planned and led the Marawi siege—are first that there are already Islamic State sleeper cells in all Indonesian Lastly, Malaysian police counter-terrorism division head Ayob
cousins of Azisa Romato, the wife of the late MILF Vice Chairman provinces, except Papua.13 Malaysian Inspector General of Police Khan Mydin Pitchay told that Myanmar is likely to be the target of
for Military Affairs Alim Abdul Aziz Mimbantas and Khalid Abu Bakar discovered the presence of a new Islamic State Islamic State terror attack (and possibly, even the new incubator for
were former MILF members themselves.8 extremist cell that intended to transform Sabah as transit point for Islamic State militancy) in light of the alleged persecution of Muslim
sending more Islamic State members to the Philippines.14 Then Rohingya in Rakhine state.16 These sporadic Islamic State terror
Notwithstanding the depth and breadth of familial connections with another cell of Islamic State militants based in the state of Kelantan cells served as additional sources of manpower, firearms
the MILF, however, the Maute brothers and their cohorts diverged has been found to be smuggling weapons from southern Thailand and funding to the Maute Group and allies in Marawi.
from the MILF leadership over political ideology and criticized
the latter for agreeing to enter into a peace agreement with the
Philippine government under the administration of then President
Benigno Aquino III.9 They decided to split from the mainstream
rebel group in 2014 and pledged bay-ah or allegiance to Abu Bakr
Al Baghdadi, the self-proclaimed emir of the Islamic State.10 This
later on brought the Maute Group into the same extremist camp as
the other small, breakaway groups which were also critical of the
Bangsamoro peace process, such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
– Isnilon Hapilon faction, the Ansarul Khilafah Philippines (AKP), and
the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), among others.
The non-passage of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) during the
16th Congress11 justified their position on the alleged futility of the
peace agreement and vindicated their schism with the MILF. Darryl
Esguerra reports that the Mautes utilized the non-passage as strong
rallying cause to lure civilians, mostly minors as child warriors12 and
sought to expand their support base among disgruntled Moros.

Regional

Proliferation of Islamic State Cells in Southeast Asia

To further complicate security matters in Mindanao, Islamic State

terror cells proliferate in neighboring countries in Southeast Asia.
Image Credit: International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

C 2017 STRATBASE ADR INSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. www.adrinstitute.org
OCCASIONAL PAPER NOVEMBER 2017

05
Growing Uncertainty Over the Philippine-US Alliance

Formal counterterrorism cooperation between the Philippines

and the United States, through Joint Special Operations Task
Force-Philippines (JSOTFP) has remained deactivated since
2015.17 This paved way to a downscaling of US involvement
to counterterrorism operations in the Philippines from advising
and assisting Filipino troops down to the tactical level to
merely providing advice and assistance at the operational and
strategic levels of command.18 In addition, President Rodrigo
Duterte’s ambivalence towards the United States in pursuit
of closer trade, commercial and defense ties with China and
Russia cast doubt over the strategic utility of the annual
PH-US Balikatan Exercises in the overall counterterrorism
thrust given the heightened risk of further reduction of
American (and other foreign allied) troops assisting the Filipino
forces.19 Furthermore, Oliver Ward reports that US Non-
Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs
(NADR) funding for Philippine counterinsurgency operations
shrank from US$ 6.1 million in 2015 to US$ 3.6 million in
2017.20 These security developments in the Philippine-US
alliance reduced the level of material, financial, technical,
logistical, and intelligence support to Manila’s counterterrorism
efforts. To a certain degree, this affected the combat
readiness of the AFP in quelling the Maute Group and
allies at a critical juncture when the Islamic State is eyeing
Mindanao as its primary operational base in Southeast Asia.
Image Credit:.aseantoday.com/2017/08/philippines-the-isis-hub-of-southeast-asia/

C 2017 STRATBASE ADR INSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. www.adrinstitute.org
OCCASIONAL PAPER NOVEMBER 2017
06
Global
Collapse of the Islamic State Central and the Rise of Wilayats
The significant development in the Middle East which has
transformed Mindanao, particularly Marawi from backwater into
one of the new frontlines of the international jihadist movement
is the collapse of Al Baghdadi’s Islamic Caliphate carved out of
key centers and peripheral regions of Iraq and Syria. Since 2014,
US- and Russia-backed coalitions launched air strikes and ground
combat operations which eventually pushed back the Islamic State
militants, culminating in the recapture of Mosul, Iraq in 29 June
201721 and their de facto capital Raqqa, Syria in 17 October 2017.22
According to senior US military officials, as many as 60,000 Islamic
State fighters have perished since 2014 while their leadership/
administrative structure, propaganda machine, and sources
of revenue were almost completely destroyed.23
The loss of territory of the Islamic Caliphate in the Sunni-dominated
heartland prompted the Islamic State Central to decentralize the
threat through strengthening its wilayats (provinces) while declaring
new ones.24 In November 2016, Al-Baghdadi himself identified
the Philippines as one of the so-called “Pillars of the Caliphate” or
prospective site of a wilayat, along with Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt,
Libya, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia,
Yemen, Somalia, and West Africa.25 The self-proclaimed
emir envisioned distant wilayats such as the one in the Philippines
to serve as bastions of Islamic State power and future
launching pads for attacking enemies.26
Ms. Laisa Alamia, argues that by historical accident, the enabling
C 2017 STRATBASE ADR INSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
conditions that were present in other states that gave rise to
the Islamic State were also present in Mindanao.27 In particular,
the narrative of state brutality against Philippine Muslim minority,
particularly during the Martial Law years of former President
Ferdinand Marcos; decades of armed confrontation between the
Philippine government and Moro separatist groups leading to the
death of 120,000 lives and massive displacement of civilians; high
poverty level and low levels of human development; and lack of
education, scarce job opportunities, and inadequate social
services render Mindanao fertile for violent extremism.28
Lastly, the symbolic value of Marawi cannot be overstated.
Historically, it has been the center of Islam in Mindanao, the
traditional heartland of violent resistance to authority since the
Spanish colonial era.29 One may speculate that it is for these
reasons that Marawi has been the militants’ choice for
setting up the capital of future Islamic State wilayat.
The Islamic State Threat in the Philippines and the Armed
Forces of the Philippines’ Counterterrorist Response
The Militants Take Over Marawi
Consequently, Al-Baghdadi’s designation of the Philippines in
general and Marawi in particular as the envisioned center of Islamic
State in Southeast Asia “internationalized” the local Maute-Pansar
rido and positioned the Maute Group and allies as the vanguards of
caliphate-building in Southeast Asia. The consolidation of the Islamic
State-inspired militants officially began when Abu Sayyaf – Basilan
faction leader Isnilon Hapilon and his men swore allegiance or bay-
ah to the Islamic State and its Caliph, Al-Baghdadi on 04 August
www.adrinstitute.org
OCCASIONAL PAPER NOVEMBER 2017

07
2014.30 Soon after the Islamic State Central recognized
Hapilon as emir, the Maute Group began using the
title, “IS-Ranao” to signify a division of the new as-yet-
undeclared province of Islamic State and distinguish it
from BIFF which became “IS-Maguindanao” and
ASG – Hapilon faction as “IS-Basilan”.31

After splitting from its mother organization, the MILF,

in 2014, the Maute Group steadily grew in strength.
The group tapped social media as the new machine to
quickly spread the radical ideology, recruit militants, and
rejuvenate Southeast Asia’s terror networks,32 thereby
widening its domestic recruitment and support base in
Central Mindanao. In the same year, it also established
Ragayan, Poctan, Butig as its command and training
base.33 Then from February to March 2016, it expanded
its base and established three strongholds throughout
Lanao del Sur, displacing nearly 30,000 people.34 Its
sources of funding include narcotics trade, money
from Islamic Central Central, private remittances, and
money laundering activities.35 Lastly, military intelligence
sources reveal that the Maute Group invited battle-
hardened local and foreign jihadists to train new
recruits, including orphaned children for modern
urban warfare, such as use of sniper weapons
and, allegedly, even suicide bomb jackets.36

By virtue of its newfound allegiance to the Islamic State,

particularly Al-Baghdadi as the caliph and Hapilon as
the emir, the Maute Group became part of the umbrella
organization dubbed as Daulah Islamiya Wilayatul
Mashriq (DIWM) or Islamic State Province in East Asia.37
On the left is the presumed organizational structure of
DIWM based on government intelligence:38 Below are the

Image Credit:.rappler.com/thought-leaders/173037-maute-group-rise-family-terrorism

C 2017 STRATBASE ADR INSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. www.adrinstitute.org
OCCASIONAL PAPER NOVEMBER 2017
08
terrorist activities carried out by the Maute Group in preparation
for the militant takeover of Marawi:
During an exclusive interview with Major General Restituto
Padilla, Jr., he disclosed that former AFP Chief of Staff General
Eduardo Año ordered the Philippine military to conduct focused
List of Terrorist Activities of Maute Group before the Marawi Siege 39
C 2017 STRATBASE ADR INSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
military operations in Zamboanga—Basilan—Sulu—Tawi-Tawi
(ZamBaSulTa) area in December 2016 as part of the decapitation
strategy against Hapilon.40 To prevent assassination or arrest,
Hapilon and some of his most trusted men secretly moved to
Lanao del Sur. On 23 May 2017, Lieutenant Colonel Jo-ar Herrera
told that upon learning about Hapilon’s whereabouts, they sought
to conduct law enforcement operations in partnership with police
forces in order to arrest the emir who at that time was allegedly
conducting community organizing among residents in Marawi.41
However, the Maute Group [together with ASG – Hapilon faction,
BIFF, AKP and foreign jihadists] greeted state security forces with
heavy gunfire in Basak Malulut, thereby preventing the arrest of the
emir.42 Soon thereafter, the militants simultaneously took control
over Barangays Saber, Sarimanok, Mapandi, Amai Pakpak, the
area near the provincial jail, Malutlut, and Calookan in downtown
Marawi, setting up several checkpoints, damaging government
and private facilities, and causing mass panic among the civilians.43
To symbolize their takeover of the city and intent to secede
from the Philippine republic, the militants hoisted the
black flag of the Islamic State inside Amai Pakpak
Hospital.44 The battle for Marawi has begun.
The Republic Strikes Back
When the fateful siege of Marawi erupted, President Duterte
immediately issued Proclamation No. 216 which has effectively
placed Mindanao under Martial Law.45 The rationale of the
proclamation is to suppress rebellion.46 Arguably, the primary
response of the Philippine government to quell the threat from the
Maute Group was to launch Military Operations on Urban Terrain
(MOUT). The US Marine Corps Warfighting Publication
(MCWP) 3-55.3 provides succinct definition of MOUT:
www.adrinstitute.org
OCCASIONAL PAPER NOVEMBER 2017
09
Philippine Marines cross the Mapandi Bridge in Marawi City on 30 August 2017
Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) is defined
as all military actions planned and conducted on a topographical
complex and its adjacent terrain where manmade construction
is the dominant feature. It includes combat in cities, which is that
portion of MOUT involving house-to-house and street-by-street
fighting in towns and cities. MOUT effects the tactical options
available to a commander. A built-up area is a concentration of
structures, facilities, and populations, such as villages, cities,
and towns, that form the economic and cultural focus for the
surrounding area.47
C 2017 STRATBASE ADR INSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
Image Credit:.rappler.com/nation/180663-military-opens-mapandi-bridge-marawi-media
Notably, the AFP took a critical role in combating the Maute Group
and allies in Marawi. It operationalized Development Support and
Security Plan (DSSP) Kapayapaan as its counterterrorist campaign
plan.48 From the sudden eruption of armed conflict on 23 May 2017
until the official cessation of combat operations on 23 October 2017,
the AFP carried out sustained military operations—which Major
General Padilla coins as “Locate-Degrade-Destroy”—in order
to defeat the terrorist groups, deter other armed peace
spoilers, and support law enforcement operations.49
The US-trained Light Reaction Regiment (LRR) is the specific unit of
the Philippine military that is trained for urban warfare.50 “In principle,
this positioned them to take the lead role in painstakingly flushing
out the Maute Group and allies which were strategically located in
key posts within the city, such as in Banggolo, Marawi’s financial
district and site of the tallest and fortified buildings.51 Members of
the elite unit are trained to become either as assaulters or snipers,
and their skills are designed for urban combat, hostage rescue, and
neutralization of high-value targets.52 They were originally trained
by the Americans after the 11 September 2001 World Trade Center
bombing.53 Army Chief Lieutenant General Noel Coballes told
that after the Zamboanga Siege in September 2013, the AFP
doubled its size from a battalion (3 companies or about
300 troops) to a regiment composed of 6 companies.54
In Marawi, however, the LRR experienced tactical and operational
challenges owing to the vastness and complexity of the urban
battlefield.55 This prompted the AFP to expand the scope of
simultaneous combat, intelligence and interception operations.
Reinforcements from Scout Rangers and the Marines were sent to
provide support in clearing one house and building after another.56
However, since the bulk of these units have been mostly engaged
in jungle warfare and recently pulled out of the forests of Bohol and
Sulu, they encountered operational difficulties in Marawi, and hence,
sustained heavy casualties.57 To further add muscle to military
ground forces, 500 Philippine National Police-Special Action Force
(PNP-SAF) troopers were deployed in the battle zone.58 Mechanized
Infantry Division (MID) vehicles were sent to Marawi as well: four (4)
mechanized battalions, one cavalry squadron and one light armored
troop. According to Captain Emman Adriano, these units
consist of more than 120 armored vehicles of various types,
such as M-113A2 armored personnel carriers.59
www.adrinstitute.org
 OCCASIONAL PAPER NOVEMBER 2017

10

Given the scarcity in AFP’s intelligence, surveillance

and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, the Philippine military
sought US and Australian technical assistance, such
as the deployments of P3 Orion60 and AP-3C Orion,61
respectively. Moreover, the AFP called in the Philippine
Air Force’s FA-50 fighter jets62 and OV-10 Bronco63 to
conduct surgical air strikes. Finally, in order to contain
Marawi and stave off the influx of reinforcements from
other terror cells, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia
launched Trilateral Maritime Patrol on 19 June 201764
and Trilateral Air patrol on 12 October 2017.65 Maritime
Command Centers (MCCs) were established in each
participating country—Tarakan in Indonesia, Tawau
in Malaysia and Bongao in the Philippines—to
implement increased intelligence sharing and
joint patrols in Sulu and Celebes Seas.66

After five grueling months, the Philippine state security

forces—with the support of regional and extra-regional
security partners—emerged victorious over the Maute
Group and allies, thereby succeeded in thwarting the
ambition of the Islamic State to establish the capital of its
wilayat in Marawi. On 24 October 2017, Defense Secretary
Delfin Lorenzana officially ended urban warfare in
Marawi and announced the termination of all combat
operations in the area.67 On the right are the quick figures
on the casualties of war during the time of declaration:

C 2017 STRATBASE ADR INSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. www.adrinstitute.org
 OCCASIONAL PAPER NOVEMBER 2017
11
Analysis
President Duterte’s declaration of Martial Law is reflective of the
Philippine government’s radical shift in its approach towards violent
extremism and eventual acknowledgment of the existence and
gravity of the Islamic State threat in Mindanao. Proclamation No.
216 provided the legal justification for the Philippine military to
expand its room for maneuverability in warfighting, as shown in the
widening of scope of operations (combat, intelligence, interception)
to suppress the threat of rebellion by the Maute Group and allies.
However, the relative novelty of Islamic State-style urban warfare
vis-à-vis the AFP’s limited institutional memory on MOUT proved
to be the single most formidable challenge that caused the war
to drag on for five months and the state of emergency to remain
in effect. Arguably, the 2013 Zamboanga Siege is the major
incident in recent memory which can be categorically classified
as “urban warfare”. However, the post-Zamboanga Siege reforms
(i.e. expansion of LRB into LRR) would be proven relatively
insufficient to address the myriad of threats posed by wider terrain
of sprawling concrete structures with prepositioned, ideologically-
motivated, and battle-hardened local and foreign militants.
Arguably, the delay in the passage of the National Security
Act restrained to an extent the Commander-in-Chief through
the National Security Council (NSC) to seamlessly integrate
the doctrines, strategies, tactics, logistics, and operations of
the assigned units for urban warfare prior to the Marawi siege.
Furthermore, a military observer remarked that the AFP joint/
combined arms manuals for intra- and inter-agency operations
fell short in taking into account the peculiarities of Marawi urban
C 2017 STRATBASE ADR INSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
terrain.68 In particular, the manuals are silent in providing specific
countermeasures to address the Islamic State militants’ new
urban warfare tactics, such as the utilization of parallel walls with
“concentric holes” as firing point extension that delays soldiers’
advancement; coordinated use of booby traps/improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) and sniper fire to ensnare and shoot
soldiers along narrow alleys; and the deployment of human shields
to raise the socio-political cost of war and fuel popular resentment
against government forces.69 Both the lack of enabling policies
to support a strong command-and-control structure as well as
insufficiencies in intra- and inter-agency manuals for joint/combined
arms operations to address new urban warfare tactics may have
contributed to incidents of poorly coordinated assaults and
friendly fire, such as the 01 June 2017 incident wherein an air
strike killed 11 soldiers and wounded seven others.70
Furthermore, Article XVIII Section 25 of the 1987 Constitution
severely constrained the Philippine government to request for direct
military assistance or “boots on the ground” regional and extra-
regional security partners, especially on combat operations at a
critical juncture wherein the Maute Group and allies have diversified
its pool of recruits, incorporated battle-hardened foreign jihadists
within its ranks, and adopted more sophisticated technologies of
violence for urban warfare perfected in the urban battlefields of
Mosul and Raqqa. While the contributions of the US and Australian
armed forces (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance)
and Indonesian and Malaysian armed forces (joint maritime and
aerial patrols) were crucial in helping turn the tide of war towards
government side, the author believes that these security allies
and partners could have contributed more in preventing the
prolongation of war if not for the constitutional restriction.
Lastly, the high cost of war prompts a critical revaluation not only
of the existing policies, doctrines, strategies, tactics, logistics, and
operations for MOUT but also the Philippine defense industrial
and technological base to cater to the country’s specific national
security requirements. The Marawi siege demonstrated the
growing need for quality indigenous technology and reliable
domestic production capability to support the requirements for
waging modern urban warfare. Some of the “hard assets” that
could have been used more extensively to alter the calculus for
counterterrorism operations against the Maute Group and allies
include high-precision unmanned aerial vehicles (i.e. drones) for
reconnaissance and surgical strikes, long-range sniper rifles,
automatic grenade launchers, and anti-infantry/anti-garrison
tanks for clearing operations, among others. Meanwhile, “soft
assets” such as enhanced Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
(C4ISR) could have interlinked the soldiery amongst themselves
and with their “hard assets” and provided a solid
backbone for joint defense operations.
Towards Comprehensive Security:
Conclusion and Way Forward
The looming specter of the Islamic State in Southeast Asia,
symbolized by the quest for transformation of Marawi City, Lanao
www.adrinstitute.org
 OCCASIONAL PAPER NOVEMBER 2017
12
del Sur into the new capital of the envisioned Islamic State wilayat
in the region reflects three new trends on violent extremism in the
Philippines: First, it reveals the aspiration and capability of Maute
Group together with elements of the ASG, AKP, BIFF, and other
affiliates under DIWM to transform itself from a decentralized
terrorist movement into a caliphate-building entity. Second, it
signifies a new wave of “internationalization” of violent extremism
in the Philippines through the transformation of a local rido into
rebellion and establishment of direct linkage between the Islamic
State central command and DIWM. This has rendered possible
the influx of battle-hardened foreign jihadists, funds transfer, and
importation of new technologies of violence perfected in the
battlefields of Iraq and Syria. Third, it illustrates a radical
departure from the traditional, jungle warfare and signals the
dawn of modern urban warfare in the Philippines.
These emerging trends require the Philippine military to undergo
critical introspection of its theoretical-conceptual foundation
and practical application of MOUT. While it is laudable for the
Philippine defense and security establishment to have defeated
the Maute Group and allies in Marawi, it is equally important
for it to internalize the lessons from the Marawi experience and
take a more proactive approach in crippling the terror network,
infrastructure and lifeline of other militant groups before they
conduct another Marawi-style territorial occupation or launch other
terroristic activities. With the Philippine military’s latest anti-terror
campaign plan, the DSSP Kapayapaan, already in effect, the
C 2017 STRATBASE ADR INSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
AFP ought to effectively carry out full-spectrum counterterrorism
response, which includes enhancement of intelligence-gathering
operations, disruption of flow of funds and ammunitions,
interception of suspected terrorists, countering of Islamic State
online propaganda, and sustainment of surgical strikes in order to
deny the terrorists safe haven in Mindanao with the least
possible civilian casualties and property damages.
In order to facilitate the implementation of such actions, the Duterte
administration should prioritize the passage of the proposed
National Security Act. This shall empower the Philippine President
through the National Security Council (NSC) and aided by the
Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) to gain more effective command and
control over the AFP as well as other law enforcement agencies,
i.e. Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Philippine Coast
Guard (PCG) in the fight against terrorism, and bestow upon him
greater flexibility and autonomy to forge defense and security
agreements with government and non-government
stakeholders both locally and internationally.
In addition, given that the AFP has been extensively engaged in
jungle warfare and is relatively new to Islamic State-style modern
urban warfare, it is imperative for the Philippine military to take into
consideration the militants’ new urban warfare tactics as it reorients
its MOUT doctrine towards greater interoperability. Furthermore, it
must strenghten its defense ties with countries that have relatively
well-established doctrines, operational concepts, strategies/tactics
and facilities for that purpose. Hence, it may opt to reactivate the
JSOTFP and re-expand PH-US Balikatan Exercises for the US
and Australian governments to be able to provide more extensive
material, technical, logistical and intelligence support to Filipino
troops on tactical, operational and strategic levels of command. To
facilitate institutional learning in modern urban warfare against the
Islamic State-inspired militants, the AFP may also opt to consider
entering into formal cooperation with other countries with
relatively rich corpus of knowledge and experience in
counterterrorism, such as Israel and Singapore.
Furthermore, the proliferation of multinational Islamic State terror
cells within the Philippines’ borders and across its neighboring
countries in Southeast Asia necessitates the Philippine government
to carefully reexamine Article XVIII Section 25 of the 1987
Constitution—which imposes constitutional restrictions to the
entry of foreign troops. In line with this, the Philippine government
should openly discuss with its ASEAN counterparts the possibility
of putting more flesh to the bones of ASEAN commitment to
comprehensive security by reviewing the 2001 ASEAN Declaration
on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism framework as well as
liberalizing the interpretation of “non-interference”—the fifth
principle in the ASEAN Charter which could well become a legal,
political and normative obstacle to regionalizing the Islamic State
terror threat and adopting a more coordinated, effective and
expedient counterterrorist response at the regional level. These
radical steps will then enable special units of the AFP as well as
www.adrinstitute.org
 OCCASIONAL PAPER NOVEMBER 2017

13
the PNP and PCG to upgrade their mode of conducting anti-terror operations with fellow ASEAN militaries and law enforcement
agencies from mere intelligence sharing and joint maritime patrols to joint combat operations through
the creation and deployment of a fully capable joint multinational force upon formal request of
the Philippine government or any other ASEAN member-state in distress.

Finally, the Philippine defense and security establishment ought to beef up its Research and Development (R&D) component. On
the departmental level, the Department of National Defense may opt to create a new R&D Center specializing in Revolution in
Military Affairs (RMA) that shall help further streamline the procurement process under Republic Act No. 10349 or the “Revised
AFP Modernization Act”. The proposed center shall provide expert opinion to the Secretary of National Defense on the specific
range of capabilities that ought to be procured and/or developed in relation to the existing and future capabilities of Islamic
State-inspired militants. The policy recommendations of the center may then serve as bases for possible modifications to
capability development programs of the AFP’s major service branches for internal security operations.

On the bureau level, the AFP should revitalize the Government Arsenal as its R&D Center and expand its role to include: a.)
facilitation of technology transfer in partnership with the governments and private companies of security allies and partners;
and b.) development of modest local production capability for light, medium and heavy materiel through the revival
of the Self-Reliant Defense Posture program and proliferation of defense industrial zones in close coordination
with the Philippine Economic Zone Authority and local and international investors.

C 2017 STRATBASE ADR INSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. www.adrinstitute.org
 OCCASIONAL PAPER NOVEMBER 2017
14
REFERENCES
1
Wilfredo Magno Torres III, Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in
Mindanao (Makati City: The Asia Foundation, 2007), 8.
2
Raju Gopalakrishnan and Manuel Mogato, “The Mautes of the Philippines:
From Monied Family to Islamic State”, Reuters, 23 June 2017, accessed 20 November
2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-militants-matriarch/the-mautes-
of-the-philippines-from-monied-family-to-islamic-state-idUSKBN19E0A9.
3
Ibid.
4
Wilfredo Magno Torres III, Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in
Mindanao, 8.
5
According to Bantay Ceasefire Report 2006, a bomb exploded in Shariff
Aguak on 23 June 2006 which was intended for Maguindanao Governor Datu Andal
Ampatuan Sr. Seven members of the convoy were killed. The incident later on trig-
gered major armed confrontation between the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit
(CAFGU) and Civilian Volunteer Organization allegedly under the control of Governor
Ampatuan on the one hand, and elements of the MILF’s 105th Base Command on the
other hand. As a result, thousands of families were displaced and the peace process
between the Philippine government and the MILF was on the verge of collapse. To
contain the spread of violence, the Philippine government and the MILF supported by
Joint CCCH-IMT mechanism and civil society groups established a buffer zone. (Ibid,
8-9.)
6
Katerina Francisco, “Fast Facts: What you should know about the Maute
Group”, Rappler, 24 May 2017, accessed 20 November 2017, https://www.rappler.
com/newsbreak/iq/170772-fast-facts-maute-group.
7
Raju Gopalakrishnan and Manuel Mogato, “The Mautes of the Philippines:
From Monied Family to Islamic State”, Reuters.
8
Darryl Esguerra, “ISIS, MILF, Lanao: Things to Know about the Maute
Group”, Inside Manila, 24 May 2017, accessed 20 November 2017, https://insidema-
nila.ph/article/1676/isis-milf-lanao-things-to-know-about-the-maute-group.
9
Katerina Francisco, “Fast Facts: What you should know about the Maute
Group”, Rappler, 24 May 2017, accessed 23 November 2017, https://www.rappler.
com/newsbreak/iq/170772-fast-facts-maute-group.
10
Carmela Fonbuena, “Terror in Mindanao: The Mautes of Marawi”, Rappler,
26 June 2017, accessed 20 November 2017, https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/
in-depth/173697-terrorism-mindanao-maute-family-marawi-city.
11
Jose Rodel Clapano, “Congress buries Bangsamoro Bill”, Philippine Star,
04 February 2016, accessed 20 November 2017, http://www.philstar.com/head-
lines/2016/02/04/1549507/congress-buries-bangsamoro-bill.
12
Darryl Esguerra, “ISIS, MILF, Lanao: Things to Know about the Maute
Group”, Inside Manila.
C 2017 STRATBASE ADR INSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
13
Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja, “Terror cells in most Indonesian provinces now:
Military”, The Straits Times, 14 June 2017, accessed 20 November 2017, http://www.
straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/terror-cells-in-most-indonesian-provinces-now-military.
14
Hata Wahari, “Malaysian Police Uncover, Disrupt ‘New IS Cell’”, Benar
News, 23 January 2017, accessed 20 November 2017, http://www.benarnews.org/
english/news/malaysian/is-cell-01232017131917.html.
15
“ISIS cell found smuggling weapons into Malaysia”, The Straits Times, 05
May 2017, accessed 20 November 2017, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/
isis-cell-found-smuggling-weapons-into-malaysia.
16
Rozanna Latiff, “Myanmar faces danger from Islamic State militants, Ma-
laysian police say”, Reuters, 04 January 2017, accessed 20 November 2017, https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-security-rohingya/myanmar-faces-danger-from-
islamic-state-militants-malaysian-police-say-idUSKBN14O0PX.
17
Sam LaGrone, “US Officially Ends Special Operations Task Force in the
Philippines, Some Advisors May Remain”, US Naval Institute News, 27 February 2015,
accessed 20 November 2017, https://news.usni.org/2015/02/27/u-s-officially-ends-
special-operations-task-force-in-the-philippines-some-advisors-may-remain.
18
Ibid.
19
Jessica Bartolome, “US, Philippines scale down troops for 2017 Balikatan
exercises”, GMA News Online, 04 May 2017, accessed 20 November 2017, http://
www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/609529/us-phl-reduce-troops-attending-
2017-balikatan-war-games/story/.
20
Oliver Ward, “Philippines: The ISIS Hub of Southeast Asia?”, ASEAN
Today, 27 August 2017, accessed 20 November 2017, https://www.aseantoday.
com/2017/08/philippines-the-isis-hub-of-southeast-asia/.
21
Khaled al-Ramahi, Maher Chmaytelli, “Iraq declares end of caliphate after
capture of Mosul mosque”, Reuters, 29 June 2017, accessed 20 November 2017,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-mosul/iraq-declares-end-of-
caliphate-after-capture-of-mosul-mosque-idUSKBN19K0YZ.
22
Anne Barnard and Hwaida Saad, “Raqqa, ISIS ‘Capital,’ Is Captured, US-
Backed Forces Say”, The New York Times, 17 October 2017, accessed 20 November
2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/world/middleeast/isis-syria-raqqa.html.
23
Jason Burke, “Rise and fall of Isis: its dream of a caliphate is over, so what
now?”, The Guardian, 21 October 2017, accessed 20 November 2017, https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/21/isis-caliphate-islamic-state-raqqa-iraq-islamist.
24
Rohan Gunaratna, “Global Threat Forecast”, RSIS Counter Terrorist Trends
and Analyses, Vol. 9, Issue 1 (January 2017): 4.
www.adrinstitute.org
 OCCASIONAL PAPER NOVEMBER 2017

15

25
Bardia Rahmani and Andrea Tanco, “ISIS’s Growing Caliphate: Profiles of
39
Katerina Francisco, “Fast Facts: What you should know about the Maute
58
Philippine National Police, 182 Marawi SAF Troopers Given Heroes Wel-
Affiliates”, Wilson Center, 19 February 2016, accessed 20 December 2016 in Rohan Group”, Rappler. come At Camp Bagong Diwa, Philippine Government.
Gunaratna, “Global Threat Forecast”, RSIS Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol.
9, Issue 1 (January 2017): 4-5. 40
Interview with Major General Restituto Padilla, Jr. AFP, 10 November 2017. 59
Priam Nepomuceno, “Majority of MID assets now seeing action in Marawi
City”, Northbound Philippines News Online, 09 July 2017, accessed 23 November

26
Rohan Gunaratna, “Global Threat Forecast”, RSIS Counter Terrorist Trends 41
“Government forces battle Maute group in Marawi City”, MindaNews, 2017, http://northboundasia.com/2017/07/09/majority-mid-assets-now-seeing-ac-
and Analyses, Vol. 9, Issue 1 (January 2017): 5. 23 May 2017, accessed 22 November 2017, http://www.mindanews.com/top-sto- tion-marawi-city/.
ries/2017/05/soldiers-maute-group-battle-in-marawi-city/.
27
Ann P. Santos, “How Two Brothers Took Over a Filipino City for ISIS”, The
60
Carmela Fonbuena, “Marawi battle zone: Urban warfare challenges Philip-
Atlantic, 12 August 2017, accessed 21 November 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/ 42
Ibid. pine military”, Rappler.
international/archive/2017/08/philippines-isis/536253/.
43
Ibid.
61
“Australia offers to train Philippine troops in Islamic State fight”, ABS-CBN
28
Perennial socio-economic disenfranchisement contributes to radicalization News, 29 August 2017, accessed 22 November 2017, http://news.abs-cbn.com/
of Muslim Filipinos. The Asia Foundation reports that out of the 20 poorest provinces 44
Ibid. overseas/08/29/17/australia-offers-to-train-philippine-troops-in-islamic-state-fight.
in the Philippines, 11 are in Mindanao. Moreover, official statistics from the World Bank
show that 48.2 percent of family in ARMM lived below the poverty line in 2015, com-
45
Malacanang Palace, Proclamation No. 216: Declaring a State of Martial 62
“AFP launches surgical air strikes to flush out Maute group in Marawi City”,
pared with the national average of 16.5 percent. Also, data from the Philippine Statis- Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mind- ABS-CBN News, 25 May 2017, accessed 22 November 2017, http://news.abs-cbn.
tics Authority show that the ARMM had the highest out-of-school population at 14.4 anao, Philippine Government. com/news/05/25/17/afp-launches-surgical-air-strikes-to-flush-out-maute-group-in-
percent in comparison with the national average of 10.6 percent. (Ibid.) marawi-city.
46
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, Philippine Government.

29
Neil Jerome Morales and tom Allard, “The Maute brothers: Southeast 63
Tyler Rogoway, “The OV-10 Bronco Is Wailing On ISIS Yet Again, This Time
Asia’s Islamist ‘time bomb’”, Reuters, 12 June 2017, accessed 21 November 2017,
47
Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) In The Philippines”, The Drive, 11 June 2017, accessed 22 November 2017, http://
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-militants-maute/the-maute-brothers- 3-55.3, US Government. www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/11395/the-ov-10-bronco-is-wailing-on-isis-yet-
southeast-asias-islamist-time-bomb-idUSKBN19302Q. again-this-time-in-the-philippines.
48
Interview with Major General Restituto Padilla, Jr. AFP, 10 November 2017.

30
Maria A. Ressa, “Senior Abu Sayyaf leader swears oath to ISIS”, Rap- 64
Euan McKirdy, “Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines launch joint patrols to
pler, 04 August 2014, accessed 21 November 2017, https://www.rappler.com/
49
Armed Forces of the Philippines, Development Support and Security Plan tackle ISIS threat”, CNN International, 19 June 2017, accessed 22 November 2017,
nation/65199-abu-sayyaf-leader-oath-isis. “Kapayapaan” 2017-2022, Philippine Government. http://edition.cnn.com/2017/06/19/asia/indonesia-malaysia-philippines-isis/index.
html.
31
“Pro-ISIS Groups in Mindanao and Their Links to Indonesia and Malaysia”, 50
Carmela Fonbuena, “Marawi battle zone: Urban warfare challenges Philip-
Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, IPAC Report No. 33 (25 October 2016): 15. pine military”, Rappler, 19 June 2017, accessed 22 November 2017, https://www. 65
Arnaz M. Khairul, “Fight against terror: Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia
rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/173050-battle-zone-marawi-urban-warfare. launch joint trilateral air patrol”, New Straits Times, 12 October 2017, accessed 22 No-
32
Maria A. Ressa, “Senior Abu Sayyaf leader swears oath to ISIS”, Rappler. vember 2017, https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2017/10/290345/fight-against-
51
Ibid. terror-malaysia-philippines-indonesia-launch-joint.
33
“Pro-ISIS Groups in Mindanao and Their Links to Indonesia and Malaysia”,
Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict: 16. 52
Ibid. 66
Euan McKirdy, “Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines launch joint patrols to
tackle ISIS threat”, CNN International.

34
Katerina Francisco, “Fast Facts: What you should know about the Maute
53
Carmela Fonbuena, “Philippines to double size of elite anti-terror troops”,
Group”, Rappler. Rappler, 07 January 2014, accessed 22 November 2017, https://www.rappler.com/
67
“All quiet in Marawi; 42 terrorists dead”, Inquirer, 24 October 2017, ac-
nation/47411-philippines-double-size-anti-terror-troops. cessed 22 November 2017, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/940135/all-quiet-in-marawi-

35
Prof. Pamela Fabe (presentation, Public Lecture on the Marawi Crisis, Que- 42-terrorists-dead.
zon City, Philippines, 24 October 2017). 54
Ibid.
68
Interview with an anonymous military observer, 10 November 2017.

36
Maan Macapagal, “Maute trains children for combat – military intel”, ABS-
55
Carmela Fonbuena, “Marawi battle zone: Urban warfare challenges Philip-
CBN News, 20 June 2017, accessed 22 November 2017, http://news.abs-cbn.com/ pine military”, Rappler. 69
Ibid.
news/06/20/17/maute-trains-children-for-combat-military-intel.
56
Ibid. 70
“Military airstrike kills 11 soldiers In Marawi”, Philippine Star, 01
37
Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Maute Group and rise of family terrorism”, Rap- June 2017, accessed 23 November 2017, http://www.philstar.com/head-
pler, 15 June 2017, accessed 22 November 2017, https://www.rappler.com/thought- 57
Ibid. lines/2017/06/01/1705700/military-airstrike-killed-10-soldiers-marawi
leaders/173037-maute-group-rise-family-terrorism.
38
Ibid.

C 2017 STRATBASE ADR INSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. www.adrinstitute.org
10.11
VOLUME

ABOUT
Mark Davis Madarang Pablo
is a Senior Research Associate at the Stratbase ADR Institute. In 2017,
he graduated First Class Honours from the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore
with a Master of Science in Strategic Studies. Prior to joining ADRi,
Mr. Pablo specialized in Strategic Studies. He began his career as
a Defense Researcher/Analyst in the Office for Strategic Studies
and Strategy Management (OSSSM), the think tank of the General
Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from 2013-2015.
He graduated Cum Laude from the Ateneo de Manila University in 2012
with a bachelor’s degree in Political Science and Philosophy.

Stratbase ADR Institute

is an independent international and strategic research
organization with the principal goal of addressing the
issues affecting the Philippines and East Asia
9F 6780 Ayala Avenue, Makati City
Philippines 1200
V 8921751
F 8921754
www.stratbase.ph

C 2017 STRATBASE ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. Image Credit: peacebuilderscommunity.org