On Deferred Indefeasibility:
DAWALING SUMAIL vs. HONORABLE JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF COTABATO, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and MELQUIADES GEPULIANO
G.R. No. L-8278 April 30, 1955
Facts: Herein private respondent Gepuliano had filed a free patent application
for a parcel of land, which was approved and was finally issued to him on
September 26, 1949. The Patent was registered in the office of Register of
Deeds (RD), which office thereafter issued to him Original Certificate of Title
(OCT). Consequently, herein petitioner filed a civil case for the cancellation of
the OCT issued to Gepuliano, alleging that the latter thru fraud and
misrepresentation had filed with the Bureau of Lands a falsified application for
free patent for the lot, stating in his application that the parcel was not
occupied or claimed by any other person and that he had entered upon it and
introduced improvements thereon, when as a matter of fact, Gepuliano had
never occupied the land nor introduced improvements thereon, and that it was
him who had been in possession since shortly before the end of the Spanish
regime and that the Director of Lands through mistake or inadvertence had
approved the application and later issued Free Patent.
The Court issued an order stating that the subject lot was public land; that it was
applied for free patent by Gepuliano and the corresponding Patent had been
issued to him; that it does not appear from the complaint of Sumail that he had
exhausted all the remedies available to him such as an appeal to the Secretary
of the Department, and that the courts will not interfere with the administrator
by the Bureau of Lands of the public domain. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether Sumali’s action is proper
Held: No
 In ordinary registration proceedings involving private lands, courts
may reopen proceedings already closed by final decision or decree,
only when application for review is filed by the party aggrieved
within one year from the issuance of the decree of registration. Here,
there was no decree of registration because instead of an application
for registration under the Land Registration Act Gepuliano applied
for free patent under the Public Land Act.
 Assuming that even in bringing public land grants under the Land
Registration Law, there is a period of one year for review in cases of
fraud, how shall that period of one year be computed?
o For all practical purposes we might regard the date of the
issuance of the patent as corresponding to the date of the
issuance of the decree in ordinary registration cases,
because the decree finally awards the land applied for
registration to the party entitled to it, and the patent
issued by the Director of Lands equally and finally grants,
awards, and conveys the land applied for to the applicant.
The purpose and affect of both decree and patent is the
same.
o Assuming the Civil Case filed by Sumail was intended as a
petition for review of the public land grant and
conveyance to Gepuliano, on the ground of fraud, was it
filed within the period of one year?
 No. It was only filed on July 21, 1952, or almost
3 years after the issuance of the free patent. It
is, therefore, clear that the trial court no
longer had jurisdiction to entertain the
complaint for the reasons already state, but
not as contended by the Director of Lands that
it involved public land, over which he had
exclusive and executive control, because once
the patent was granted and the corresponding
certificate of title was issued, the land ceased
to be part of the public domain and became
private property over which the Director of
Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction.
 If Sumali’s action will be regarded as an action for reversion to the
Government of the lot in litigation, under the provisions of sections
91 and 124 of the Public Land Act, which provide for the annulment
of patents and titles previously issued, and the reversion of the lands
covered by them to the state, may he bring said action may he bring
such action?
o No. Section 101 of the Public Land Act provides that all
actions for the reversion to the Government of Lands of
the public domain or improvements thereon shall be
instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in
his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Case Digest in Land Titles and Deeds
Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 – 0007
1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
On Prescription of Action for Reconveyance based on Fraud:
EMILIANO S. CASIPIT and ANTONIA C. CASIPIT VDA. DE BEATO vs. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS et. al.
G.R. No. 96829 December 9, 1991
Facts: On April 1987, a complaint was filed by herein petitioners against private
respondents mainly for the recovery of a property, alleging that Emiliano Casipit
is the true and lawful owner of the questioned property located at Sinalhan, Sta.
Rosa, Laguna by virtue of continuous, uninterrupted, peaceful, open and public
possession in the concept of owner since 1930; that they were deprived of
ownership thereof by the Beatos through Narciso Beato, who filed a Petition for
Reconstitution of Titles in the name of Gabriel Beato, using fictitious
documents. Petitioners therefore prayed that TCT and other succeeding titles be
cancelled, as well as the tax declarations; that the questioned property be
reconveyed to them; that the document entitled, "Kasulatan ng Pagmamana at
Paghahati," insofar as it included the questioned property be rescinded; and
that private respondents be ordered to pay damages and attorney's fees.
The lower court dismissed the petition, holding that the defendants have a
better right than the plaintiffs, that the cause of action of the plaintiffs being
based on fraud, has prescribed for it must be filed within 4 years after the cause
of action arose. The issuance of the reconstituted title over the subject lot and
its registration in the office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna, in 1963 is the
starling date for the prescriptive period to commence. The respondent court
affirmed the said decision and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration,
hence, this petition.
Petitioners’ Contention: pursuant to the Certification issued by the Bureau of
Lands that Patent over the questioned property has not been issued to Gabriel
Beato, the "Kasulatan ng Pagmamana at Paghahati" is therefore a void contract.
This being the case, the action taken by petitioners is imprescriptible. Private
respondents Diaz spouses were buyers in bad faith because they had full
knowledge that Emiliano Casipit has been in actual possession in the concept of
owner of the questioned property and paid the real property taxes thereon.
Issue: Whether petitioners’ action already prescribed
Held: Yes
 There is no dispute that an action for reconveyance based on a void
contract is imprescriptible. However, this is not the case at bar.
 The action filed by petitioner before the trial court was 1) for
reconveyance based on fraud since the ownership of private
respondents over the questioned property was allegedly established
on "false assertions, misrepresentations and deceptive allegations";
and 2) for rescission of the "Kasulatan ng Pagmamana at Paghahati”.
Thus, the action for reconveyance based on fraud filed by petitioners
before the trial court is subject to prescription.
 Based on jurisprudence, the prescriptive period for the reconveyance
of fraudulently registered real property is 10 years reckoned from
the date of the issuance of the certificate of title.
o Conformably with these settled jurisprudence, the
prescriptive period for petitioners' action for
reconveyance is 10 years from August 30, 1963, the date
of the issuance of TCT in favor of Beato. Obviously, the
discussion on this subject matter is not beneficial to
petitioners because they filed the action for reconveyance
only on April 27, 1987.
 Hence, petition was dismissed.
On Prescription of Action for Reconveyance based on Void Contract:
SOLID STATE MULTI-PRODUCTS CORPORATION vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ANTENOR S. VIRATA and the DBP
G.R. No. 83383 May 6, 1991
Facts: Petitioner, a domestic corporation, filed an action for quieting of title
against the respondent estate of Virata alleging that it is the registered owner of
a parcel of land (a friar land) located at Imus, Cavite, which was covered by a
Certificate of Title issued on February 24, 1976; that Virata, during his lifetime
thru the use of fraud, caused the issuance of Certificate of Title on September 1,
1959 thru an administrative reconstitution of a nonexistent original title
covering the same parcel of land; that by reason of the said reconstitution and
subsequent issuance of TCT, there now exists a cloud on the title of petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent Virata denied the allegations in the complaint,
contending that his predecessor, one Mabini Legaspi, bought the subject
property through a public bidding, wherein consequently, a TCT was issued in
his name, and that subsequently a deed of sale was executed in favor of Virata.
Such deed was then registered with the Register of Deeds, who later on issued a
TCT to Virata. However, the Provincial Capitol building of Cavite which housed
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the Registry of Deeds was burned, destroying land records and titles in d
registry among which were the records relating to the subject property. Hence,
the RD administratively reconstituted the original TCT based on owner's
duplicate certificate.
Issue: Whether petitioner’s contention is meritorious
Held: Yes
 Sale of the subject land to Mabini Legaspi, respondent’s predecessor
is void
o There was neither allegation nor proof that the sale was
with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce. The absence of such approval made the
supposed sale null and void ab initio.
o Without the certificate of sale to prove the transfer of the
ownership of the land from the government Mabini
Legaspi and without the required approval of the sale by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, he did not in
any manner acquire ownership over the land in 1943.
o The ownership or title over the subject land remained in
the government until Peñaranda, petitioners predecessor,
lawfully acquired ownership over the same lot on
February 28, 1969 by virtue of a sales contract executed
in his favor.
 The issuance of a certificate of title in favor of Mabini Legaspi did not
vest ownership upon respondent over the land nor did it validate the
alleged purchase of the lot, which is null and void. Time and again, it
has been held that registration does not vest title. It is merely
evidence of such title over a particular property. Our land
registration laws do not give the holder any better title than that
what he actually has
 Did petitioner’s action prescribe? NO
o Although a period of one year has already expired from
the time the certificate of title was issued to Mabini
Legaspi pursuant to the alleged sale from the
government, said title does not become incontrovertible
but is null and void since the acquisition of the property
was in violation of law.
o Further, the petitioner herein is in possession of the land
in dispute. Hence, its action to quiet title is
imprescriptible.
On Prescription of Action for Reconveyance – Action to Quiet Title:
JULIANA CARAGAY-LAYNO, Assisted by Her Husband, BENITO LAYNO vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SALVADOR ESTRADA
G.R. No. L-52064 December 26, 1984
Facts: Herein petitioner and Mariano De Vera were first cousins. When De Vera
died, his widow and later on his nephew, herein private respondent, became
the administrator of his land property covered by an original certificate of title.
When an inventory was conducted on all properties of De Vera, a discrepancy
between the title and inventory was found. Such land discrepancy was occupied
by herein petitioner. Consequently, Estrada instituted suit against petitioner for
recovery of the Disputed Portion, which she resisted, mainly on the ground that
the Disputed Portion had been fraudulently or mistakenly included in the OCT,
so that an implied or constructive trust existed in her favor. She then
counterclaimed for reconveyance of property in the sense that title be issued in
her favor.
The Court held that petitioner’s action for reconveyance based on implied or
constructive trust has prescribed after 10 years, i.e. the subject land was
registered on September 1947 while petitioner’s action only commence on
March 1967.
Issue: Whether petitioner’s action already prescribed
Held: No
 The evidence discloses that petitioner, and his farther, had been in
actual open, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the
disputed portion in the concept of owner for about 45 years, until
said possession was disturbed in 1966 when Estrada informed
petitioner that the Disputed Portion was registered in Mariano DE
VERA's name.
 To substantiate her claim for fraud, petitioner declared that during
his lifetime, DE VERA, her first cousin, borrowed from her the Tax
Declaration of her land purportedly to be used as collateral for his
loan and sugar quota application; that relying on her cousin's
assurances, she acceded to his request and was made to sign some
Case Digest in Land Titles and Deeds
Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 – 0007
1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
documents the contents of which she did not even know because of
her ignorance
 Of significance is the fact, as disclosed by the evidence, that for 20
years from the date of registration of title in 1947 up to 1967 when
this suit for recovery of possession was instituted, neither the
deceased DE VERA up to the time of his death in 1951, nor his
successors-in-interest, had taken steps to possess or lay adverse
claim to the Disputed Portion. They may, therefore be said to be
guilty of laches as would effectively derail their cause of action.
Administrator ESTRADA took interest in recovering the said portion
only when he noticed the discrepancy in areas in the Inventory of
Property and in the title.
 The foregoing conclusion does not necessarily wreak havoc on the
indefeasibility of a Torrens title. For, mere possession of a certificate
of title under the Torrens System is not conclusive as to the holder's
true ownership of all the property described therein for he does not
by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of the land
illegally included. A Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction to
decree a lot to persons who have never asserted any right of
ownership over it.
 Petitioner, whose property had been wrongfully registered in the
name of another, but which had not yet passed into the hands of
third parties, can properly seek its reconveyance.
 Prescription cannot be invoked against petitioner for the reason that
as lawful possessor and owner of the Disputed Portion, her cause of
action for reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to quiet title to the
property, falls within settled jurisprudence that an action to quiet
title to property in one's possession is imprescriptible.
o Her undisturbed possession over a period of 52 years
gave her a continuing right to seek the aid of a Court of
equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a
third party and the effect on her own title.
 Under the circumstances, petitioner's right to quiet title, to seek
reconveyance, and to annul the title accrued only when she was
made aware of a claim adverse to her own. It was only then that the
statutory period of prescription may be said to have commenced to
run against her. Hence, petition was granted.
On Prescription of Action for Reconveyance – Res Judicata:
HEIRS OF TRINIDAD DE LEON VDA. DE ROXAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
MAGUESUN MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 138660 February 5, 2004
Facts: A petition to set aside the decree of registration over two unregistered
parcels of land in Tagaytay City granted to corporation respondent before the
RTC on the ground of actual fraud was filed by Trinidad de Leon Vda. De Roxas.
This was granted by the Supreme Court, on appeal (in a previous case).
Subsequently, Meycauyan filed a petition to intervene in the said case, alleging
that it purchased three parcels of land from Maguesun which form part of the
property awarded to the heirs of Roxas and that since it is a purchaser in good
faith and for value, the Court should afford it the opportunity to be heard, that
the adverse decision in the previous case cannot impair its rights as a purchaser
in good faith and for value. This was denied.
The heirs of Roxas then filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession with
the land registration court, after their motion for clarification was granted.
Meycauayan filed a Complaint for reconveyance, damages and quieting of title
with the trial court. Such complaint is almost an exact reproduction of the
Petition for Intervention filed by Meycauyan. Consequently, the trial court
dismissed for lack of merit Meycauayan's complaint for reconveyance, damages
and quieting of title, holding that the nullity of the OCT of Maguesun where
Meycauyan is not a party in the suit and which is the source of Meycauayan's
title, is now res judicata.
Issue: Whether Meycauyan’s action for reconveyance, damages and quieting of
title can be validly tried by the court
Held: No
 Courts will simply refuse to reopen what has been decided. They will
not allow the same parties or their privies to litigate anew a
question, once it has been considered and decided with finality.
Litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere. The
effective and efficient administration of justice requires that once a
judgment has become final, the prevailing party should not be
deprived of the fruits of the verdict by subsequent suits on the same
issues filed by the same parties.
 This is in accordance with the doctrine of res judicata which has the
following elements: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the
court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and
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 the parties; (3) the judgment must be on the merits; and (4) there
must be between the first and the second actions, identity of parties,
subject matter and causes of action.
 The application of the doctrine of res judicata does not require
absolute identity of parties but merely substantial identity of parties.
o There is substantial identity of parties when there is
community of interest or privity of interest between a
party in the first and a party in the second case even if the
first case did not implead the latter.
 The Court ruled in the previous case that Meycauayan's predecessor-
in-interest, Maguesun, committed actual fraud in obtaining the
decree of registration of the subject properties. The decision is such
case binds Meycauayan under the principle of "privity of interest"
since it was a successor-in-interest of Maguesun.
Exception to Curtain Principle: Caveat Emptor:
JUAN DACASIN, JOSE, MARIA, SORAHAYDA, FLORDELIZA, and FILIPINAS
MARAMBA vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, FELIPE CAPUA, SINFOROSA PADILLA,
GUALBERTO CALULOT and OLIMPIA LOMIBAO
G.R. No. L-32723 October 28, 1977
Facts: A parcel of land situtated in the barrio of Patayac Municipality of Sta.
Barbara, Pangasinan was being possessed by petitioner Jose Maramba, whose
possession was subsequently grabbed by Sabina Capua. Maramba filed a civil
case against Capua, but notwithstanding the same, the latter remained in
possession and later on sold the property to Gualberto Calulot, herein one of
the private respondents. The court ruled in favor of Maramba and ordered
Capua to vacate and deliver the land to the former. Unfortunately, the decision
was not executed within the reglementary period of 5 years from the time it
had become final.
Several years after, Calulot sold the subject land to respondent spouses Felipe
Capua and Padilla, who possessed the same despite a writ of possession was
executed in favor of Maramba. He then filed a case for revival of judgment
which was granted by the court. Upon Maramba’s death, his heirs sold the
property to petitioner Dacasin. Capua, together with Calulot, then filed an
action against petitioners, praying that he be declared as the absolute owner of
the subject property virtue of his purchase in good faith and by the continuous
possession of his immediate predecessor-in-interest Gualberto Calulot. This was
denied by the trial court, which was however reversed by CA, holding that
Capua has squarely raised the question of his own title obtained thru acquisitive
prescription; that it must have to be admitted that the property being
unregistered, ownership therein could be defeated by acquisitive prescription.
Issue: Whether the respondent court erred in its decision
Held: Yes
 Jose Maramba’s filing of action against Sabina Capua, latter’s
possession was thereby interrupted, hence, acquisitive prescription
did not transpire.
 The facts are aundisputed that the deed of sale executed between
Jose Maramba as vendee and Emiliana Abad as vendor in 1958 was
duly registered in the Registry of Deeds as well as the deed of sale
executed in 1929 between Emiliana Abad and the original owner
Florentino Quinajon.
 Under the law, Article 709 of the New Civil Code, titles of ownership
or of other rights over immovable property duly inscribed or
annotated in the Registry of Property constitute notice to third
persons and affords protection in favor of him who in good faith
relies upon what appears in the registry.
 As between two parties relying on their respective instruments of
sale of the same property, law and justice command that he who has
registered his deed must prevail over his adversary who has not done
so.
 The rule of caveat emptor requires the purchaser to be aware of the
supposed title of the vendor and he who buys without checking the
vendor's title takes all the risks and consequent to such failure. None
of the deeds of sale evidencing the ownership of Gualberto Calulot
and Felipe Capua were registered in the Registry of Property, hence
they cannot prevail over the rights of the petitioner who holds in his
favor the instrument of sale duly registered
Case Digest in Land Titles and Deeds
Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 – 0007
1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
Exception to Curtain Principle: Caveat Emptor on Mortgage of Real Property:
SOCORRO COSTA CRISOSTOMO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and NORMA SAN JOSE,
DIANA J. TORRES
G.R. Nos. 91383-84 May 31, 1991
Facts: Petitioner was the registered owner of a residential house and lot,
located in Mandaluyong and covered by a TCT. She has occupied the property
ever since she had her house built and has introduced other improvements
thereon. Later on, private respondent Norma San Jose offered to buy the
property, which was accepted by petitioner, payment of which shall come from
proceeds of a loan by San Jose using petitioner’s title as collateral but she issued
postdated checks to petitioner. On San Jose’s request, another deed of sale was
executed over the same property, which was then registered, such that
petitioner’s TCT was cancelled and a new TCT was issued.
Because of unfulfilled promises to make good the postdated checks, petitioner
demanded San Jose for the return of the title. However, the latter informed that
the title was in the possession of Diana J. Torres, the mortgagee. San Jose never
returned the said title as she had promised nor did she ever make any payment
to the petitioner.
Issue: Whether respondent Torres is a mortgagee in good faith
Held: No
 There are strong indications that Atty. Flor Martinez, the lawyer of
Diana J. Torres, the mortgagee, knew of the defect of San Jose's title.
 When Atty. Martinez personally inspected the property with San Jose
for her client Torres, she allowed herself to be introduced to Socorro
Crisostomo who was then actually occupying the house, as a Bank
Inspector of the Development Bank of Meycauayan, Bulacan from
whom the loan was being obtained, obviously to convince
Crisostomo that the procedure is in accordance with her agreement
with San Jose.
 Finally, when Torres herself visited the property she carefully evaded
seeing Crisostomo personally, the actual occupant thereof, who
could have easily enlightened her as to the true owner
 Based on jurisprudence, a person dealing with registered land has a
right to rely upon the fact of the Torrens Certificate of Title and to
dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party
concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that
would impel a reasonably cautious man to make further inquiries
o Even assuming that Torres does not in fact know the
circumstances of the sale, she is bound by the knowledge
of Atty. Martinez or by the latter's negligence in her
haphazard investigation because the negligence of her
agents is her own negligence
 It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser or mortgagee cannot close
his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard,
and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there
was no defect in the title of the vendor or mortgagor.
o His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his
willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence
of a defect in the vendor's or mortgagor's title, will not
make him an innocent purchaser or mortgagee for value,
if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact
defective, and it appears that he had such notice of the
defects as would have led to its discovery had he acted
with the measure of precaution which may be required of
a prudent man in a like situation
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