Facts:
enumerated above by order of the proper court.
An administrative complaint was filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Palawan against then Mayor Alejandro Villapando of San Vicente,
Palawan for abuse of authority and culpable violation of the Constitution
for entering into a consultancy agreement with Orlando Tiape, a defeated
mayoralty candidate. Complainants argue that this amounted to
appointment to a government position within the prohibited one-year
period under Article IX-B, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
In his answer, Villapando invoked Opinion No. 106, s. 1992, of the
Department of Justice dated August 21, 1992, stating that the appointment
of a defeated candidate within one year from the election as a consultant
does not constitute an appointment to a government office or position as
prohibited by the Constitution.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan found respondent guilty and imposed on
him the penalty of dismissal from service. The Office of the President
affirmed the decision. Vice-mayor Pablico took his oath as municipal mayor
in place of Villapando.
The Court of Appeals declared the decisions of the SP and OP void, and
ordered Pablico to vacate the office.
Issue:
May local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President validly
impose the penalty of dismissal from service on erring elective local
officials?
Held:
Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. – An elective local official may
be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following
grounds:
x x x x x x
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds
It is clear from the last paragraph of the aforecited provision that the
penalty of dismissal from service upon an erring elective local official may
be decreed only by a court of law. Thus, in Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et
al., we held that “[t]he Office of the President is without any power to
remove elected officials, since such power is exclusively vested in the
proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of the
aforequoted Section 60.”
Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code, however, adds that – “(b) An elective local official
may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a)
of this Article [The grounds enumerated in Section 60, Local Government
Code of 1991] by order of the proper court or the disciplining authority
whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other.” The
disciplining authority referred to pertains to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the Office of the President.
As held in Salalima, this grant to the “disciplining authority” of the power
to remove elective local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the
Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations. No rule or
regulation may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law, such as the
Local Government Code. Implementing rules should conform, not clash,
with the law that they implement, for a regulation which operates to create
a rule out of harmony with the statute is a nullity. (Pablico vs. Villapando,
G.R. No. 147870. July 31, 2002)
Joson v. Executive Secretary [G.R. No. 131255. May 20, 1998]
08
AUG
FACTS

Petitioner Governor Joson was filed a complaint before the Office of the
President for barging violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan in the company of armed men. The case was endorsed to the
DILG. For failure to file an answer after three (3) extensions, petitioner was
declared in default and ordered the petitioner 60-day preventive
suspension. Petitioner later “Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation”. DILG
denied the motion declaring that the submission of position papers
substantially complies with the requirements of procedural due process in
administrative proceedings. Later, the Executive Secretary, by authority of
the President, adopted the findings and recommendation of the DILG
Secretary. The former imposed on petitioner the penalty of suspension
from office for six (6) months without pay.
ISSUES
Whether or not:
(a) Preventive suspension is proper;
(b) Procedural due process is violated;
(c) The resolution of DILG Secretary is invalid on the ground of undue
delegation; that it is the President who is the Disciplining Authority, not the
Secretary of DILG;
RULING
“(a) Yes. Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining
Authority at any time (a) after the issues are joined; (b) when the evidence
of guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the offense, there is great
probability that the respondent, who continues to hold office, could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records and other evidence. The act of respondent in allegedly barging
violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the
company of armed men constitutes grave misconduct. The allegations of
complainants are bolstered by the joint-affidavit of two (2) employees of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Respondent who is the chief executive of
the province is in a position to influence the witnesses. Further, the history
of violent confrontational politics in the province dictates that extreme
precautionary measures be taken.
“(b) Yes. The rejection of petitioner’s right to a formal investigation denied
him procedural due process. Section 5 of A. O. No. 23 provides that at the
preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority shall summon the
parties to consider whether they desire a formal investigation. This
provision does not give the Investigating Authority the discretion to
determine whether a formal investigation would be conducted. The
records show that petitioner filed a motion for formal investigation. There
is nothing in the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23 that provide that administrative cases
against elective local officials can be decided on the basis of position
papers. A.O. No. 23 states that the Investigating Authority may require the
parties to submit their respective memoranda but this is only after formal
investigation and hearing.
“(c) No. The DILG resolution is valid. The President remains the Disciplining
Authority. What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the power to
discipline. The power to discipline evidently includes the power to
investigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the power
derived from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local
government officials. A. O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to
investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be
constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation,
contrary to petitioner Joson’s claim.
Under the doctrine of qualified political agency “…which recognizes the
establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the
various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of EN BANC
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”

[G.R. No. 117618. March 29, 1996]

This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President provided in

the Constitution. Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the
presidency. As head of the Executive Department, the President, however, VIRGINIA MALINAO, petitioner, vs. HON. LUISITO REYES, in his capacity as
may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he Governor of the Province of Marinduque, SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN
is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the OF MARINDUQUE and WILFREDO RED, in his capacity as Mayor of Sta.
situation demand that he acts personally. The members of Cabinet may act Cruz, Marinduque, respondents.
for and in behalf of the President in certain matters because the President
cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers
personally all the time. Each head of a department is, and must be, the DECISION
President’s alter ego in the matters of that department where the
President is required by law to exercise authority.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus to annul the decision dated
October 21, 1994 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque,
dismissing the administrative case filed by petitioner against respondent
Mayor Wilfredo Red of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque. The ground for the present
petition is that the same body already found respondent Mayor guilty of
abuse of authority in removing petitioner from her post as Human
Resource Manager without due process in another decision which is now
final and executory.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Virginia Malinao is Human Resource Manager III of Sta. Cruz,
Marinduque. Respondent Mayor filed a case against her in the Office of the
Ombudsman for gross neglect of duty, inefficiency and incompetence.
While the case was pending, he appointed a replacement for petitioner.
On February 24, 1994 petitioner filed an administrative case, docketed as
Administrative Case No. 93-03, against respondent Mayor in the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque, charging him with abuse of
authority and denial of due process.
On August 12, 1994, the case was taken up in executive session of the
Sanggunian. The transcript of stenographic notes of the session[1] shows
that the Sanggunian, by the vote of 5 to 3 of its members, found
respondent Mayor guilty of the charge and imposed on him the penalty of
one-month suspension,
The result of the voting was subsequently embodied in a Decision dated
September 5, 1994,[2] signed by only one member of the Sanggunian,
Rodrigo V. Sotto, who did so as Presiding Chairman, Blue Ribbon
Committee, Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Copies of the Decision were served
on respondent Mayor Red as well as on respondent Governor Luisito Reyes
on September 12, 1994.
On September 14, 1994, respondent Mayor filed a manifestation[3] before
the Sanggunian, questioning the Decision on the ground that it was signed
by Sotto alone, apparently acting in his capacity and designated as
Presiding Chairman, Blue Ribbon Committee, Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
He contended that because of this the decision could only be considered as
a recommendation of the Blue Ribbon Committee and he was not bound
thereby.
On September 13, 1994, respondent Mayor sought the opinion of the
Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government
regarding the validity of the Decision.
In his letter dated September 14, 1994,[4] DILG Secretary Rafael M. Alunan
III opined that the decision alluded to does not appear to be in accordance
with Section 66 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and settled
jurisprudence since
in the instant case, the purported decision of the Blue Ribbon Committee
should have been submitted to, approved and/or adopted by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan as a collegial body inasmuch as the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan has the administrative jurisdiction to take cognizance thereof
in conformity with Section 61 and Section 66 of the Code. It is not for the
said committee to decide on the merits thereof, more so to impose the
suspension, as its duty and function is purely recommendatory. If it were at
all the intention of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to adopt entirely the
recommendation of the Blue Ribbon Committee, it should have so stated
and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, who may have
affirmatively voted thereon or participated in its deliberations, should have
affixed their respective signatures on whatever decision that could have
been arrived at. . . .
On the other hand petitioner sent a letter[5] on October 14, 1994 to
respondent Governor Reyes, demanding that the Decision suspending
respondent Mayor from office be implemented without further delay. KGD. SOTTO - No if he [respondent Mayor] is acquitted, then lets acquit it.
Whatever is the decision everybody goes to the majority.

In his letter dated October 20, 1994,[6] respondent Governor informed the
Sanggunian that he agreed with the opinion of the DILG for which reason (There was nominal voting from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan member.
he could not implement the Decision in question. For NOT GUILTY OR GUILTY)

On October 21, 1994,[7] the Sanggunian, voting 7 to 2, acquitted KGD. ZOLETA - I vote not guilty.
respondent Mayor of the charges against him. The vote was embodied in a
Decision of the same date, which was signed by all members who had thus
voted.[8]
KGD. MUHI - Guilty.

Hence this petition.

KGD. LIM - Not guilty.

I. Petitioners basic contention is that inasmuch as the Decision of

KGD. RAZA - First I would like to say that I will decide on the merit of the
September 5, 1994 had become final and executory, for failure of
case. The fact that the Civil Service ordered the reinstatement wherein
respondent Mayor to appeal, it was beyond the power of the Sanggunian
Virginia Molinao is included, only means that the Supreme Court duly
to render another decision on October 21, 1994 which in effect reversed
constituted has found the merit of the decision of the Civil Service.
the first decision.

I vote that the Mayor is guilty.

These contentions are without merit. What petitioner claims to be the
September 5, 1994 Decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan bore the
signature of only one member (Rodrigo V. Sotto) who signed the Decision
as Presiding Chairman, Blue Ribbon Committee, Sangguniang Panlalawigan. KGD. PINAROC - Guilty.
Petitioner claims that at its session on August 12, 1994, the Sanggunian by
the vote of five members against three found respondent Mayor guilty of
having removed petitioner as Human Resources Officer III without due
process and that this fact is shown in the minutes of the session of the KGD. DE LUNA - Guilty, there is no due process and to protect the integrity
Sanggunian. The minutes referred to read in pertinent part as follows: of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
KGD. LAGRAN - Guilty. Kgd. Lagran

KGD. ZOLETA - My reason for voting not guilty is that the mayor acted in Kgd. De Luna
good faith, he just followed the order of the reorganization recommended
by the Placement Committee.

Three (3) voted NOT GUILTY:

KGD. REJANO - The order of the reorganization was given by the Civil
Service Commission and based on the contention made by Kgd. Palamos
that since there should be reorganization to be conducted by the Civil Kgd. Rejano
Service Commission the mayor was supposed to go on with that
reorganization and based on the reorganization there should be a screening
committee to check whether the employees are really working efficiently. Kgd. Zoleta
Based on the case that has been given to Mrs. Malinao, based on the
witnesses, Ligeralde, Monterozo and Pastrana and then decided that Mayor
Red has done in good faith.
Kgd. Lim

So I vote Not Guilty.

KGD. SOTTO - Punishment...

Five (5) voted GUILTY:

Censure? Reprimand? Suspension?

Kgd. Muhi
KGD. LAGRAN - I suggest that only those who voted guilty should vote as to
what punishment should be given.

Kgd. Raza

KGD. LIM - All the members should be given the right to vote.

Kgd. Pinaroc
 KGD. MUHI - One month.

(THE VOTING PROCEEDED.)

KGD. RAZA - One month.

Kgd. Muhi - Suspension

KGD. PINAROC - One month.

Kgd. Raza - Suspension

KGD. LAGRAN - One month.

Kgd. Pinaroc - Suspension

KGD. DE LUNA - One month.

Kgd. Lagran - Suspension

KGD SOTTO - Be it on record that on August 12, 1994 during the Executive
Session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan en banc the respondent is hereby
Kgd. de Luna - Suspension found guilty.

KGD. ZOLETA - Since we voted not guilty therefore no punishment.
KGD. REJANO - No punishment.
Effective upon receipt of the Decision, copy furnished: the counsel for
Respondent, the Counsel for Complainant, the Municipal Treasurer, Sta.
Cruz, Marinduque, the Provincial Auditor, the Civil Service Commission,
Boac, Marinduque, the DILG, Boac, Marinduque, the Provincial Governor.

Contrary to petitioners claim, what the minutes only show is that on

KGD. LIM - No punishment.
August 12, 1994 the Sanggunian took a vote on the administrative case of
respondent Mayor and not that it then rendered a decision as required by
66(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) which provides as
KGD. SOTTO - How many months? follows:
66. Form and Notice of Decision. - (a) The investigation of the case shall be
terminated within ninety (90) days from the start thereof. Within thirty (30)
days after the end of the investigation, the Office of the President or the
sanggunian concerned shall render a decision in writing stating clearly and
distinctly the facts and the reasons for such decision. Copies of said
decision shall immediately be furnished the respondent and all interested
parties.
In order to render a decision in administrative cases involving elective local
officials, the decision of the Sanggunian must thus be in writing stating
clearly and distinctly the facts and the reasons for such decision. What the
Sanggunian, therefore, did on August 12, 1994 was not to render a
decision.
Neither may the so-called Decision prepared by Sanggunian Member
Rodrigo V. Sotto on September 5, 1994 be regarded as the decision of the
Sanggunian for lack of the signatures of the requisite majority. Like the
procedure in the Supreme Court, the voting following the deliberation of
the members of the Sanggunian did not necessarily constitute their
decision unless this was embodied in an opinion prepared by one of them
and concurred in by the others, in the same way that the voting following
the deliberation on a case in the Supreme Court becomes its decision only
after the opinion prepared by a Justice is concurred in by others composing
the majority. Until they have signed the opinion and the decision is
promulgated, the Justices are free to change their votes.[9]
Indeed, in his comment[10] in this case, Member Sotto admits that the
draft decision he prepared had only his signature due to the reluctance of
some Kagawads to affix their signatures. Consequently the draft never
became a decision. It is noteworthy that the draft was signed by Member
Sotto in his capacity as Presiding Chairman of the Blue Ribbon Committee
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and that it did not provide spaces for the
signatures of other members of the Sanggunian had it been intended that
it be signed by them. This fact led the DILG to conclude that the draft was
simply the report and recommendation of the Blue Ribbon Committee to
the Sanggunian.
Now, as already stated, the Sanggunian, at its session on October 21, 1994,
took another vote and, 7 to 2, decided to dismiss the case against
respondent Mayor. This time its decision was made in writing, stating the
facts and the law on which it was based, and it was signed by the members
taking part in the decision. This, and not the so-called decision of
September 5, 1994, is the decision of the Sanggunian.
Petitioner complains that no notice of the session by the Sanggunian on
October 21, 1994 was given to her. None was really required to be given to
her. The deliberation of the Sanggunian was an internal matter.
II. Petitioner brought this case by way of Petition for certiorari and
mandamus. A prime specification of the writ of certiorari, however, is that
there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law available to petitioner. But, in the case at bar,
petitioner could have appealed the decision of the Sanggunian to the
Office of the President as provided in 67(b) of the Local Government Code.
III. At all events, this case is now moot and academic as a result of the
expiration of respondents term during which the act complained of was
allegedly committed, and further proceedings against respondent Mayor
are barred by his reelection on May 8, 1995.
Pursuant to 66(b) of the Code, the penalty of suspension cannot exceed
the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for
every administrative offense. On the other hand, any administrative
disciplinary proceeding against respondent is abated if in the meantime he
is reelected, because his reelection results in a condonation of whatever
misconduct he might have committed during his previous term.[11]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.