The Philosophical Legacy of Behaviorism PDF

THE PHILOSOPHICAL LEGACY OF BEHAVIORISM
THE PHILOSOPHICAL
LEGACY OF BEHAVIORISM
Edited by
BRUCE A. THYER
University of Georgia, Athens, USA
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.

Library of Coogress Catalogiog-io-Publicatioo Data
The philosophicallegacy of behaviorism I edited by Bruce A. Thyer.

p. cm. -- (Studies in cognitive systems : v. 22)
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
ISBN 978-90-481-5231-5 ISBN 978-94-015-9247-5 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-015-9247-5
1. Behaviorism (Psychology)--Philosophy. 2. Psychology--Philosophy. 1. Thyer,
Bruce A. II. Series.
BF199.P45 1999
150.19'43--dc21 99-22918
ISBN 978-90-481-5231-5
Printed an acid-free paper
Ali Rights Reserved

© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1999
No part of this publication may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without written permission from
the copyright owner.
Series Preface
This series will include monographs and collections of studies devoted to the
investigation and exploration of knowledge, infonnation, and data-processing
systems of all kinds, no matter whether human, (other) animal, or machine. Its
scope is intended to span the full range of interests from classical problems in
the philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology through issues in
cognitive psychology and sociobiology (concerning the mental capabilities of
other species) to ideas related to artificial intelligence and computer science.
While primary emphasis will be placed upon theoretical, conceptual, and
epistemological aspects of these problems and domains, empirical, experi-
mental, and methodological studies will also appear from time to time.
In the present volume, Bruce Thyer has brought together an impressive
collection of original studies concerning philosophical aspects of behaviorism,
which continues to exert considerable influence even in the era of the
Cognitive Revolution. From its early origins and basic principles to its
analysis of verbal behavior, consciousness, and free-will, determinism, and
self-control, this work offers something of value for everyone with a serious
interest in understanding scientific method in application to human behavior.
Indeed, as the editor remarks, behaviorism is as much a philosophy as it is an
approach to the study of behavior. The breadth and depth of this approach
receives proper representation in this work devoted to its rich and varied
philosophical legacy.
J.H.F.
v
BA. Thyer (ed.). The Philosophical Legacy of Behaviorism, v.
© 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Table of Contents
Series Preface v
Bruce A. Thyer / Editor's Preface ix
James Dinsmoor / Foreword 1
Michael L. Commons and Eric A. Goodheart / The Origins of
Behaviorism 9
Jay Moore / The Basic Principles of Behaviorism 41
Richard Garrett / Epistemology 69
Ernest A. Vargas / Ethics 89
Jon S. Bailey and Robert J. Wallander / Verbal Behavior 117
Steven C. Hayes, Kelly G. Wilson, and Elizabeth V. Gifford /
Consciousness and Private Events 153
Bruce Waller / Free Will, Determinism and Self-Control 189
Roger Schnaitter / Some Criticisms of Behaviorism 209
Subject Index 251
Name Index 257
vii
Editor's Preface
Mankind will possess incalculable advantages and extraordinary control over human
behavior when the scientific investigator will be able to subject his fellow men to the
same external analysis he would employ for any natural object, and when the human
mind will contemplate itself not from within but from without (Pavlov, 1906).
As the philosophy of a science of behavior, behaviorism called for probably the most
drastic change ever proposed in our way of thinking about man. It is almost literally a
matter of turning the explanation of behavior inside out (Skinner, 1974, p. 249).
When I undertook the editing of this book I approached a fellow faculty

member of my university, a distinguished philosopher in his own right, about
his suggestions for a possible publisher. His reaction: "Why bother? Behav-
iorism is dead". This took me somewhat by surprise, as I had recently returned
from the annual convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, whose
program was laden with philosophical papers dealing with various aspects of
behaviorism. I knew that the works of B. F. Skinner continued to be cited at
a high rate (Thyer, 1991), and that the behavioral publishing industry was a
thriving one. The philosophical journal Behaviorism (now titled Behavior and
Philosophy) had been in print since 1972 and remained a respected scholarly
outlet.
Despite my colleague's Nietzsche-like response, I decided to persist in my
task of developing this work. Fortunately I was able to recruit an able team of
chapter contributors, philosophers and psychologists, with considerable
expertise in the subject. Our aim was to produce a collection of original
chapters, each one dealing with a major topic of general philosophy -
epistemology, ethics, consciousness, language, free will, determinism and self-
control, and the result is before you.
By way of introduction to this volume, let me define our subject matter.
Behaviorism is a philosophy. My office dictionary offers some of the
following statements under its definitions of Philosophy: the " ... logical
analysis of the principles underlying conduct, thought, knowledge, and the
nature of the universe: included in philosophy are ethics, aesthetics, logic,
epistemology, metaphysics, etc ... the general principles or laws of a field of
knowledge ... a particular system of principles for the conduct of life .. , a study
of human morals, character, and behavior '" " (Guralnick, 1980, p. 1069). It
ix
B.A. Thyer (ed.), The Philosophical Legacy of Behaviorism, ix-xv.
x Editor's Preface
is clear that there is considerable overlap between the subject matter of

psychology, and that of philosophy, namely human behavior.
From the perspective of the philosophical behaviorist, behavior refers to the
actions of the human body. No distinction is made between observable and
unobservable activities. Overt actions, peristaltic movements, heart beats,
secreting glands, feeling states and brain activities, even those giving rise to
the activities called thoughts, dreams, and hopes, are all seen as behavior.
Contrary to popular opinion, behaviorism is keenly interested in developing
sophisticated, logically sound, and empirically-supported accounts of mental
activity and of affective reactions. Where behaviorism departs from alternative
approaches to explaining these phenomena lays in its focus, namely the
natural external environment in which a person lives. Behaviorism's environ-
mental determinism can be distinguished, say, from Freud's mental determin-
ism. Likewise, behaviorism is distinct from the biological determinism of the
geneticist, the physiologist, or the neurologist. Many disciplines study
behavior - the distinguishing feature of behavior analysis is its focus on how
behavior arises from transactions between actions and environmental
responses.
The philosophical antecedents of contemporary behaviorism involve a
number of sources, movements, and individuals. Skinner cited Mach,
Poincare, and Comte, as among the more pertinent personages (Skinner,
1987), and positivism, logic, parsimony, operationism, and empiricism are
among the relevant (but not isomorphic) principles. Behaviorism is a compo-
nent of a larger field, called behavior analysis. Behavior analysis itself is
comprised of the philosophy of science called behaviorism, a methodological
and basic research domain (called the experimental analysis of behavior), and
a practical arena (called applied behavior analysis), devoted to solving
significant problems of society. Each domain has its derivative journals (e.g.,
Behavior and Philosophy, the Journal of the Experimental Analysis of
Behavior, the Journal ofApplied Behavior Analysis) and professional societies
(the Association for Behavior Analysis: An International Association; Division
25 (the Experimental Analysis of Behavior) of the American Psychological
Association; the Society for the Quantitative Analysis of Behavior, the
European Association for Behaviour Analysis, etc.).
The foundations of behavior analysis are relatively simple and surprisingly
easy to understand.
1. People engage in behavior.
2. Behavior consists of everything the body does, public or private.
3. To some (unknown) extent, behavior is a function of fundamental
mechanisms of learning, namely respondent conditioning, operant condi-
tioning, and learning through imitation.
Editor's Preface xi
4. These mechanisms of learning exert their influence through the physical

environment in which the person lives, using processes involving the
stimuli which precede behavior, the external association of events, and
the consequences which follow behavior.
5. To accurately understand (and perhaps predict and control) behavior, one
must learn how environmental experiences develop behavior. Once this is
known, it may become possible to deliberately alter our environment in
order to produce certain desirable behaviors and to reduce undesirable
ones.
As Skinner put it: "I am not trying to change people, all 1 want to do is
change the world in which they live" (B. F. Skinner, 1972, cited in Bjork,
1993, p. 233).
What are the implications of these views for philosophy? To understand
ethical behavior would require, from a behavioral perspective, the isolation of
those learning experiences which give rise to what can be labeled as ethical or
unethical comportment by individuals. If this can be done, then by enhancing
those environmental conditions which produce ethically-behaving human
beings, ethical behavior can be promoted. An early inquiry along these lines
was conducted by Risley and Hart (1968). When preschool children were
reinforced for saying that they had engaged in 'X' activity (e.g., painting),
irrespective of whether or not they actually did engage in 'X' during the day,
saying that they participated in 'X' was greatly increased. But, if they were
then only reinforced for stating that they did 'X' when they had indeed
actually engaged in 'X', then truthfulness (correspondence between what they
said and did) increased as well. In other words, when preschool children were
reinforced for telling the truth, truthful reports greatly increased.
It may be that consistent truthfulness is partially a function of neurochem-
istry, of one's genetic endowment, of a person's 'character', the cognitivist's
'information processing mechanisms', or of the Freudian super-ego. The
behaviorist disavows none of these possible (internal) factors as being
potentially relevant. Rather, the behaviorist says:
Go ahead, study those factors. Try to see how well you can predict and control behavior
using those independent variables. Meantime, I will examine the possible role of how
one's environment reinforces and punishes telling the truth. I will examine the influence
of truthful role models, and other factors derived from social learning theory, to develop
an environmentally-based account. If successful, I will then see if it is possible to inten-
tionally construct psychosocial and physical environments which promote truthfulness.
We shall see who eventually produces the best science and the most effective ways to
improve society.
This is, of course, a reasonable position for a scientist to take. The geneticist
is not criticized because of her focus on hereditarian mechanisms, and of the
neglect of operant factors. Similarly, the psychoanalyst largely ignores
xii Editor's Preface
learning factors in favor of pwported intrapsychic dynamics. For the sociobi-

ologist causation is sought via the mechanism of kin selection, and the
neurologist looks for diseases of the central nervous system. Does the
behavior analyst claim that all human comportment will eventually be
explicable in terms of learning theory? Decidedly not! But it is likely that
learning mechanisms will be involved to some degree and it seems worthwhile
to explore their potential role to the greatest possible extent. This is the role
of behavior analysis, aided by the philosophy of behaviorism. There is no
claim to an exclusive possession of the "truth", no denigration of alternative
perspectives on understanding human behavior in all of its diversity. There is
a calm confidence that in the fullness of time, empirical research will slowly
reveal nature's truths and the value of the various competing scientific
approaches.
Behaviorism, while not denying the profound influence that the so-called
'cognitive revolution' has had within contemporary philosophy and psychol-
ogy, remains somewhat skeptical that significant advances will be forthcom-
ing from this perspective in either field. Skepticism, tempered with a respect
for empirical data and rationalism, remains the best safeguard against the
premature adoption of any new philosophical position. If genuine progress is
made in addressing philosophical issues and psychological problems via
cognitive science, these will be welcomed by the behaviorist, irrespective of
the implications such advances will have for the behavioral position.
For another exarnple related to philosophy, let us take the issue of aesthet-
ics: Watanabe, Sakamoto, and Wakita (1995) trained pigeons to accurately
discriminate between a series of painting by Monet and Picasso. Then, when
the animals were exposed to novel pictures by Monet and Picasso, ones they
had never seen before, they retained the ability to successfully tell the
difference between the two painters! Moreover, the birds had apparently
acquired the ability, not directly trained, to discriminate unfamiliar works of
Cezanne and Renoir (Impressionists) from those of Braque and Matisse
(Cubists)! How many liberal arts graduates can reliably tell the difference
between the works of Monet and Picasso? Such a refined aesthetic sense is
regrettably rare these days. Now, no one is claiming that pigeons are art
critics, but the fundamental learning processes through which other animals
acquire discriminative skills are clearly related to some degree (obviously not
completely) to explaining how human beings develop aesthetic capabilities.
The topic of self-control is a relevant one to the field of philosophy. How
do humans acquire skills in self-control? This touches on the issue of free will,
making choices, and other important issues important to understanding the
human condition. All things being equal, it seems that people prefer obtaining
rewards immediately over delayed rewards. To chose a delayed reward over
Editor's Preface xiii
an immediate one is an important skill, crucial to success in life. How is this

acquired? Schweitzer and Sulzer-Azaroff (1988) provide some leads, using
children noted by their teachers for being "impulsive". Initially, before
training, the children chose smaller, less delayed reinforcers over larger,
delayed ones, when playing a simple game for which they could earn edibles
and trinkets. By starting with very small time delays, the children were taught
to chose larger delayed reinforcers over immediate smaller ones. At the
conclusion of the study, the children were patiently waiting for relatively
lengthy periods of time in order to obtain greater amounts of rewards, in stark
contrast to their initial behavior of immediately choosing to get small rewards.
Such studies have implications for understanding the development of self-
control by human beings as a part of natural developmental processes.
Analogous situations arise quite naturally in everyday life, wherein children
can chose rewards 'now' or 'later'. It would seem reasonable that children
fortunate enough to be exposed to situations wherein delayed choice resulted
in greater rewards would develop apparently "naturally occurring" self-
control, in contrast to children not exposed to such learning experiences.
There can be little doubt that Pavlovian processes have some bearing on the
development of the preferences and aversions of humans, that exposure to role
models influences how one behaves, and that the consequences of one's verbal
behavior influences what and how we learn to speak. The point of origin for
behavior is consistently sought for in the natural environment in which a
person lives. The behaviorists' niche in science is the careful examination of
such environmentally-based learning experiences. These causes of behavior
are assumed to reside in a natural world, a monistic world untroubled by
Cartesian dualisms, teleology, or vitalism. Ultimately, behavior analysis may
be seen as ecology: "that branch of biology that deals with the relations
between living organisms and their environments ... the complex of relations
between a specific organism and its environment" (Guralnick, 1980, p. 442).
Thus, when the subject matter of behavior analysis begins dealing with
ethics, values, language, consciousness, making choices, and arriving at
logical decisions, we have arrived at the domain of philosophy. Some of
Skinner's earliest works provided conceptual behavior analyses of topics such
as (these are chapter titles) "Emotion", "Self-Control", "Thinking", "The
Self', "Religion", and "Personal Control" (see Skinner, 1953). His interest in
such matters continued until his death. Among his final essays were such titles
as 'The origins of cognitive thought' (Skinner, 1989), and 'Outlining a science
of feelings (Skinner, 1987). His sketch for a behavioral epistemology
remained one of his unfinished works (cf. Wiener, 1996).
While Skinner is no longer with us, his intellectual legacy remains. His
students, and their own successive generations of students, are continuing to
xiv Editor's Preface
work at expanding the explanatory power of empirically-based learning

theories as applied to the various fields of philosophy. In the present volume,
Michael Commons and Eric Goodheart provide us with an overview of the
philosophical origins of behaviorism, while Jay Moore describes the basic
principles of the field. Richard Garrett addresses behavioral perspectives on
epistemology, while Earnest Vargas describes a behaviorological look at
ethics. Jon Bailey and Robert Wallender tackle the difficult subject of verbal
behavior (akin to, but not the same field as, "language"), logically followed
by a related chapter dealing with the philosophical field of ontology, Hayes,
Wilson and Gifford's treatment of consciousness and private events. Bruce
Waller reviews behavioral perspectives on free will, determinism, and self-
control, and to add balance to the previous seven chapters, the final essay by
Roger Schnaitter provides a critical analysis of behaviorism as a philosophy.
All of these chapters are original contributions commissioned especially for
this book. As such, it is hoped that they illustrate the ongoing vitality of
behavioral perspectives on contemporary and perennial philosophical issues,
and will serve as a springboard for future research, empirical and conceptual,
on the contributions of behaviorism to the field of philosophy.
To large extent, the value of a particular point of view lies in its ability to
predict and control behavior. A pertinent quote from Karl Marx is inscribed
on his tomb in Highgate Cemetery in London: "The philosophers have only
interpreted the world in various ways. The point however, is to change it".
From such a perspective, behaviorism is alive and thriving.
Bruce A. Thyer
The University of Georgia
Athens, Georgia U.S.A.
REFERENCES
Bjork, D. (1993). B.F. Skinner: A Life. New York: Basic Books.

Guralnick, D.B. (1980). Webster's New World Dictionary (second college edition). Cleveland,
OH: William Collins.
Pavlov, I. P. (1906). Scientific study of so-called psychic processes in the higher animals. [cf.
J. Kaplan (Ed.). Bartlett's familiar quotations (16th edition, p. 558). Boston: William
Brown].
Risley, T. R. and Hart, B. (1968). Developing correspondence between the non-verbal and
verbal behavior of preschool children. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 1,267-281.
Schweitzer, J. B., and Sulzer-Azaroff, B. (1988). Self-control: Teaching tolerance for delay in
impulsive children. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 50,173-186.
Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behavior. New York: Free Press.
Skinner, B. F. (1974). About behaviorism. New York: Knopf.
Editor's Preface xv
Skinner, B. F. (1987, May 8). Outlining a science of feeling. The Times Literary Supplement,
p. 490, 502.
Skinner, B. F. (1989). The origins of cognitive thought. American Psychologist, 44, 13-18.
Thyer, B. A. (1991). The enduring intellectual legacy ofB. F. Skinner: A citation count from
1966 - 1989. The Behavior Analyst, 14,73-75.
Watanabe, S., Sakamoto, I., and Wakita, M. (1995). Pigeons' discrimination of painting by
Monet and Picasso. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 36, 165-174.
Wiener, D. N. (1996). B.F. Skinner: Benign Anarchist. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.
RECOMMENDED FuRTHER READINGS
Catania, A. C. and Hamad, S. (Eds.). (1988). The selection of behavior - The operant
behaviorism of B. F. Skinner: Comments and consequences. New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Chase, P. N., and Parrot, L. I. (Eds.). (1986). Psychological aspects of language. Springfield,
IL: Charles C. Thomas.
Hayes, L. J. (1991). Dialogues on verbal behavior. Reno, NY: Context Press.
Hayes, S. C. (Ed.). (1989). Rule-governed behavior: Cognition, contingencies, and instructional
control. New York: Plenum.
Hayes, S. c., and Hayes, L. I. (Eds.). (1992). Understanding verbal relations. Reno, NY:
Context Press.
Julia, P. (1983). Explanatory models in linguistics: A behavioral perspective. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Lee, V. L. (1988). Beyond behaviorism. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum and Associates.
Leigland, S. (Ed.). (1992). Radical behaviorism: Willard Day on psychology and philosophy.
Reno, NV: Context Press.
Newman, B. (1992). The reluctant alliance: Behaviorism and humanism. Buffalo, NY:
Prometheus Books.
Rachlin, H. (1991). Introduction to madern behaviorism. New York: Freeman.
Sagal, P. T. (1981). Skinner's philosophy. Lanham, NY: University Press of America.
Wann, T. W. (Ed.). (1964). Behaviorism and phenomenology. Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press.
Zuriff, G. E. (1985). Behaviorism: A conceptual reconstruction. New York: Columbia
University Press.
JAMES A. DINSMOOR
Foreword
For most people, I think, the history of psychology divides into two parts.
Certainly this has been true in my own case. Even though my entry into
graduate school came about midway through the hundred-odd years that have
passed since the founding of the American Psychological Association, to me
the fIrst half of that century has always seemed like "history," and of the
ancient variety at that, and the second half entirely contemporary. I suspect
that the same kind of division holds for later generations as well. What we
have directly experienced seems immediate and important, but what we have
only heard about or read about seems very remote and much less relevant. As
a result, there may be profound and far-reaching differences between the
generations in our perception of what has gone on.
Behaviorism, as described by the sources available when I began my
graduate work, involved a redefInition of the subject matter of psychology. It
arose in reaction to the structuralism of Wundt and Titchener, and it sought to
place our discipline within the framework of the natural sciences. "It implies
... a willingness to study human reactions exactly as other events in the natural
world are studied" (Heidbreder, 1933, p. 238). Its program included three
major planks. First, at the philosophical level, the behaviorists rejected the
structuralists' attempt to distinguish between the world of physical events and
the world of conscious states (philosophical dualism); they were steadfast
materialists. Second, at the methodological level, the behaviorists abjured
introspection, preferring to deal only with things the scientist can observe
directly, without the mediation of another organism. "States of conscious-
ness," said Watson (1919, p. 1), " ... are not objectively verifiable and for that
reason can never become data for science." (Incidentally, I can find no conflict
between this statement about data and Skinner's comments on private events.)
Finally, the goal of the behaviorists was not the analysis of conscious states
but the prediction and control of behavior. It might be disingenuous to insist
that the theories constructed and the empirical data gathered by individual
behaviorists be completely excluded from this characterization, but they are
not part of the definition, and it should be noted that in this regard there has
been a wide range of variation from one individual to the next. The writings
of Pavlov or Watson, for example, cannot be used as a guide to the positions
taken by Skinner.
1
B.A. Thyer (ed.). The Philosophical Legacy of Behaviorism. 1-8.
2 Dinsmoor
The story as told by cognitive psychologists is that behaviorism had come

to dominate psychology by the nineteen-fifties, only to be overthrown by a
counter-revolution in the nineteen-sixties. At one level, this may be true, but
at another level I see a great deal of continuity. Something very like cognitive
psychology has always been with us. When I entered graduate school in 1943,
it was painfully evident that psychologists who claimed to be "scientific," let
alone those who proclaimed themselves to be "behaviorists," were a decided
minority within the profession. Clinical psychologists were usually Freudian,
or at least "psychodynamic," in their orientation. Although several historical
"schools" of psychology were still featured in our textbooks, most academic
psychologists had no such ideological affiliations. If questioned, they might
have replied that they simply relied on ordinary common sense, meaning that
the concepts they used in their work were not very different from those that
prevailed among the general population.
In terms of intellectual prestige, to be sure, the distribution was entirely
different. This is the scene described by historians of psychology when they
write about the dominance of the behaviorists. The pages of the Psychological
Review, which was virtually the only outlet for theoretical material in
psychology, were filled with articles on the language and the logic of science,
as applied to psychology, and on the niceties of theory construction. As it was
primarily the behaviorists who were concerned with these issues, it is not
surprising that they dominated the discussion.
Most of the empirical data in what was then known as "experimental"
psychology (a label used in those days to distinguish basic research from such
categories as clinical, abnormal, social, educational or industrial psychology,
which rarely used experimental methods) appeared in one or the other of two
journals, the Journal of Experimental Psychology and the Journal of Com-
parative and Physiological Psychology. A large part of the content of those
journals was devoted to the competing theoretical systems of Edward C.
Tolman, who described himself as a "cognitive behaviorist" (note which was
the adjective and which was the noun) and Clark L. Hull, who championed
"reinforcement theory." In the years before his death, Hull's was without any
question the leading name in experimental and theoretical psychology.
(Skinner was a respected but at that time still relatively minor figure.) This is
not just my recollection. It can be supported by survey data. In an obituary
written shortly after Hull's death, Kenneth Spence (1952) - Hull's lieutenant
and an important theorist in his own right - noted that during the decade from
1941 through 1950, 40% of all studies appearing in the two experimental
journals (70% of those in learning and motivation) cited at least one article by
Hull. Similarly, Hovland (1952) found that 40% of the articles in the previous
two years of the Journal of Experimental Psychology, and the Psychological
Foreword 3
Review cited Hull, while in another survey Ruja (1956) found that even in the
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology from 1949-1952 Hull's Princi-
ples of Behavior was cited 105 times and its runner-up only 25.
To my generation, the choice between learning theorists like Hull, Tolman,
Guthrie (another behaviorist), Spence, and Skinner was a real one; it generated
a great deal of thinking and no little debate about the respective merits of their
competing points of view. It was clear that behaviorism included a variety of
approaches. Within that tradition, some of us felt that Skinner represented the
most viable current, but his views were those of a mere mortal, not sanctified
by an overpowering reputation. They were subject to debate. The result is that
I did not and do not think of behaviorism exclusively in terms of Skinner's
particular precepts, worthy though they may be.
After the deaths of Hull, Tolman, Guthrie, and Spence, however, their
followers appeared to lose direction, and their programs faltered, but Skinner's
influence grew. Although they did not convene every year, Conferences on the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior began meeting in 1947 (Dinsmoor, 1987);
the Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior began publication in
1958. Behaviorists like I. P. Pavlov (who, despite his protestations to the
contrary, I place in this category), J. B. Watson, N. E. Miller, E. R. Guthrie,
and O. H. Mowrer, had long held an interest in practical applications, and soon
the terms 'behavior modification' and 'behavior therapy' began to appear in
the literature and in the titles of academic journals. In Great Britain, the
inspiration came mainly from Hull (see Eysenck, 1964) but in the United
States it came primarily from Skinner (see Goodall, 1972; Martin and Pear,
1978; Ullman and Krasner, 1965). The Journal ofApplied Behavior Analysis
began publication in 1968.
By that time, Skinner had emerged as the best known although not the only
important behaviorist. Wright (1970) asked a random sample of members of
the American Psychological Association, many of whom were clinicians, to
list the names of those who had most importantly influenced twentieth-century
psychology. The name most frequently mentioned was Freud, to be sure, but
Skinner came second on the list, followed, in order, by Watson, Pavlov, and
Hull. The same four names, plus that of Tolman, appeared in a different order
in a survey of 91 departmental chairmen conducted by Seberhagen and Moore
(1969). In a poll of 2,340 graduate students and 368 graduate faculty pub-
lished by Lipsey (1974), Skinner was favored as the individual they "most
respected," far outrunning his nearest competitor.
My first contact with the cognitive revolution, as it is sometimes called,
came from a book entitled Cognitive Psychology, written by Ulric Neisser
(1967). In 1968, George Miller, a psycholinguist who wrote about "the
4 Dinsmoor
processing and storing of information," was elected President of the American

Psychological Association.
Aware that a significant trend was developing, I began preparing for the
debate. I tried to find a meaning to attach to the word 'cognitive'. One of the
senses in which it was used, of course, was with reference to thinking and
related processes (e.g., attention, verbal behavior, perception, memory, and
problem solving) as a content area, but it was evident that its proponents were
promoting it as something more than that, as a point of view. I asked a number
of people who now professed to be cognitive psychologists what distinguished
their approach from that of other psychologists but failed to hear any answer
that was either consistent or that corresponded to empirical fact.
Computers were becoming available for psychological research. They were
useful not only in programming behavioral contingencies of considerable
complexity but also in presenting sophisticated visual displays, timing
responses, and accumulating detailed data on sequences of events. Computers
were far more interesting than memory drums, and for many cognitive
psychologists, they became a metaphor or model for the living organism.
Elaborate flow charts began to appear in the literature, representing the
hypothetical workings of the human mind, with a variety of carefully labelled
rectangles linked by arrows pointing from one to the other and sometimes
back again.
When I criticized the cognitive approach in a journal that regularly
publishes "peer commentaries" on its main or "target" articles (Dinsmoor,
1983), the authors of several of the commentaries suggested that it was the use
of mediating states or processes that distinguished it from behaviorism. For
me, however, this was the wrong line of cleavage. To anyone who is familiar
with the history of the field, such a distinction does not make sense. It is true
that after once laying claim to having anticipated Tolman in the use of
intervening variables (Skinner, 1938/1991), Skinner in particular has held
them to a minimum. But to one of my generation Skinner does not embrace
all of behaviorism. Pavlov, for example, phrased almost all of his conclusions
in terms of hypothetical events in the nervous system, and Hull, Tolman, and
Spence all made intervening variables the primary objects of their inquiry.
The fact that the mediating variables proposed by the cognitive psycholo-
gists have other names and other functions than those postulated by Hull and
Tolman does not lead to the conclusion that they stem from a different
philosophy of science. Although Hull and Tolman did not refer to short-term
memory, for example, or to information processing, storage, and retrieval, the
two assemblages of hypothetical links they proposed were very different from
one another. Tolman even included "representations," a term which has
remained very popular with the cognitive nonbehaviorists.
Foreword 5
One possible distinction between the cognitivists and the behaviorists is that
the Hullians, at least, were all extremely careful to define their constructs in
terms both of their establishing operations and of their effects on behavior. As
Hull himself put it, they "anchored" their intervening variables at both their
ends to empirical observations. Although Tolman was not as rigorous as Hull
in his definitional structure, he accepted the same principle. The best of the
cognitivists have followed suit, but a great many seem entirely oblivious to the
issue, and I worry that the second group may simply have discarded scientific
standards, along with those who have promoted them. If so, that seems more
like a step backward than a step ahead.
The moment of illumination came when a candidate for a position in our
department gave a colloquium to the assembled faculty. After trying and
failing to account for his data in concrete detail, he concluded that it might be
necessary to turn to a cognitive explanation - and on this note ended his talk.
Apparently he believed that adopting a cognitive approach absolved him of
any need for specificity.
Over the years, I have searched persistently for the tenets of cognitive
psychology and I have found none. As far as I have been able to determine,
the word "cognitive" serves primarily as a magic wand that transforms mice
into horses, a pumpkin into a stagecoach, and Cinderella's rags into a gown
for the ball. It is like a vial of holy water that one can sprinkle over one's
manuscript. It has no substantive content, but it demonstrates that one is au
courant with the latest fashion in psychology. This is not to imply that no
worthwhile data have been collected by cognitive psychologists. My mentors,
Fred Keller and Nat Schoenfeld, may have been systematic in their interpreta-
tion, but they were eclectic in their compilation of empirical findings (e.g.,
Keller and Schoenfeld, 195011995), and I try to be the same.
About 1970 I began teaching sections of the undergraduate learning course
at Indiana University, including some material on verbal learning. To locate
the data I needed to present to my students, I read current textbooks in the
area, which frequently went out of their way to attack behaviorism. I was
interested in that material, because only if I could locate and understand the
criticisms would I be able to compose a relevant response. Space does not
permit a detailed survey to prove my point, but my conclusion was that these
authors had little contact with the actual writings of any behaviorist, ancient
or modem. What they presented were not the living beings but scarecrows of
their own devising. It was not scholarly analysis but naive bashing.
My next thought may seem radical to some, but I believe that the cognitive
revolution did not represent an intellectual challenge but rather an emotional
backlash against the intellectual domination of psychology by the behaviorists.
To a substantial extent, it was fueled by a revolt of those who did not want to
6 Dinsmoor
be bothered by the responsibilities of science. Although some people grow up

more tough-minded than others, none of us are behaviorists by birth. We all
begin with a set of concepts promulgated by seemingly omniscient parents and
backed in large part by our educational institutions, religious and secular. In
order to become scientific students of behavior, we have to learn to slice the
world up in different ways than other people do, and that takes training. In the
years prior to World War II, the best of the graduate departments were
reasonably successful in instilling in their students a respect for scientific
standards. The editors of the Psychological Review and other journals
maintained the pressure. Consequently, those willing to learn acquired a
considerable degree of sophistication. But science is hard work. It requires
definition of terms, analytic thinking, and writing according to certain rules.
Many students resented the criticisms they received from their professors, and
many contributors chafed at the restrictions imposed by more scientifically
minded editors.
When the authors of 13 textbooks in the history of psychology were polled
concerning important trends within the profession, "the contributions of B. F.
Skinner" and "the increasing influence of cognitive psychology" tied for
second place. But the first thing on these authors' list was the remarkable
growth in the number of people trained in psychology (Gilgen, 1981). In the
years following World War II, the membership of the American Psychological
Association, which serves as a rough index to the total number of psycholo-
gists in the country, underwent an enormous increase. When I was a graduate
student, it was about four thousand; by 1994, the latest figures I have available
(Fowler, 1995), it was 132,400. The influx of students was too great for our
graduate departments to handle. The sheer number of those entering psychol-
ogy each year overwhelmed the established departments, and the new
programs launched by smaller departments were not always of the same
caliber. Many of the newcomers were applied in their interests and not greatly
impressed with the importance of theory construction. The federal government
began issuing grants in support of academic research, and in the ensuing
competition for funds both the faculty and the students at our best institutions
began to concentrate on the highly specialized information that was necessary
for the conduct of their research, letting broader concerns fall by the wayside.
There may also have been a change in values. When I first entered
academia, and indeed until fairly recently, it seemed to me that graduate
students, certainly, and sometimes their professors, were a dissident lot,
alienated from the world of commerce and industry (see Hogan and Schroe-
der, 1981). Who else would enter an occupation so devoid of opportunity for
economic advancement? When more money became available for academic
pursuits, however, the composition changed. Increasingly, our universities
Foreword 7
began to resemble business enterprises, and the search for profit began to
displace the search for truth as a governing principle. Inner-directed idealists
have to some extent been replaced by other-directed careerists (see Riesman,
1950).
Clearly, the behaviorists are in the minority. But they have always been in
the minority, both within the discipline of psychology and, perhaps more
importantly, within the world at large, which exerts a profound influence on
what transpires within psychology. Sometimes I compare behaviorism to a
vessel laden with great treasure making its way across a vast sea of popular
belief. We have to keep the bilge pumps operating. But citation analysis
indicates we are still afloat (Friman, Allen, Kerwin, and Larzelere, 1993), and
when I compare the large institutional structure of my particular brand of
behaviorism today with the small band of enthusiasts that gathered in 1947
(Dinsmoor, 1987), I am not disheartened.
Department of Psychology
Indiana University
Bloomington, Indiana
REFERENCES
Dinsmoor, J. A. (1983). Observing and conditioned reinforcement. Behavioral and Brain

Sciences, 6, 693-728 (Includes commentary).
Dinsmoor, J. A. (1987). A visit to Bloomington: The fIrst Conference on the Experimental
Analysis of Behavior. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 48, 441-445.
Eysenck, H. J. (Ed.) (1964). Experiments in behaviour therapy. New York: Macmillan.
Fowler, R. D. (1995). 1994 Report of the Chief Executive OffIcer. American Psychologist, 50,
600-611.
Friman, P. c., Allen, K. D., Kerwin, M. L. E., and Larzelere, R. (1993). Changes in modern
psychology: A citation analysis of the Kuhnian displacement thesis. American Psychologist,
48, 658-664.
Gilgen, A. R. (1981). Important people in post World War II American psychology: A survey
study. Journal Supplement Abstract Service, Document No. 2171.
Goodall, K. (1972). Shapers at work. Psychology Today, 6 (6),53-62,132-138.
Heidbreder, E. (1933). Seven Psychologies. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Hogan, R., and Schroeder, D. (1981). Seven biases in psychology. Psychology Today, 15 (7),
8-14.
Hovland, C. I. (1952). Clark Leonard Hull: 1884-1952. Psychological Review, 59, 347-350.
Keller, F. S., and Schoenfeld, W. N. (1995). Principles ofpsychology: A systematic text in the
science of behavior. Acton, MA: Copley (Originally published 1950).
Lipsey, M. W. (1974). Research and relevance: A survey of graduate students and faculty in
psychology. American Psychologist, 29, 541-553.
Martin, G., and Pear, J. (1978). Behavior modification: What it is and how to do it. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive psychology. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
8 Dinsmoor
Riesman, D. (1950). The lonely crowd: A study of the changing American character. New
Haven: Yale.
Ruja, H. (1956). Productive psychologists. American Psychologist, 11, 148-149.
Seberhagen, L. W., and Moore, M. H. (1969). A note on ranking the important psychologists.
Proceedings of the 77th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, 4,
849-850.
Skinner, B. F. (1991). The behavior of organisms: An experimental analysis. Acton, MA:
Copley (Originally published 1938).
Spence, K. W. (1952). Oark Leonard Hull: 1884-1952. American Journal of Psychology, 65,
639-646.
Ullman, L. P., and Krasner, L. (Eds.) (1965). Case studies in behaviour modification. New
York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
Watson, J. B. (1919). Psychology from the standpoint of a behaviorist. Philadelphia. PA:
Lippincott.
Wright, G. D. (1970). A further note on ranking the important psychologists. American
Psychologist, 25, 650-651.
MICHAEL LAMPORT COMMONS
AND ERIC ANDREW GOODHEART
The Origins of Behaviorism
This chapter will review the cultural evolution of the experimental and
quantitative analysis of behavior. We review and apply behavioral stage
theory because it makes an ideal means of accounting for the evolution of
modem behavior analysis. Stage theory posits that, as individuals progress
from lower stages to higher stages, their perception of the world becomes
increasingly decentered (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958, Werner, 1940, 1957) from
themselves. This process of decentering occurs in individual humans over a
relatively short period of time if sufficient cultural contingencies are provided.
The process begins at birth and tapers off in adulthood. The same process of
decentration is at work over a much larger time frame, namely that of cultural
evolution. We argue that if decentration progresses far enough, mentalistic
notions of causes of behavior such as free will are replaced by non-mentalistic
or more behavioral notions of cause. Thus, cultural evolution recapitulates
individual development. We will trace how decentration was selected for, fIrst
historically in other fIelds, and how it results in the late 20th century with AI
and neural nets.
We do not attempt to review the standard discussions of the history of
Skinner's behavior analysis or the historical details enumerated in them. For
such reviews, see books by Rachlin (1976, 1992, 1994), or Zuriff (1986a,
1986b, 1995) for a more standard history. Willard Day (1983, 1992, 1995) has
provided discussion of many key issues. We also commit the historical sin of
Presentism (seeing the past in terms of the present) and non-relativism.
In societies, the process of decentering is analogous to the process that
occurs in individuals, although it lasts much longer. As primitive societies
evolve, the causes and explanations of behavior shift from a spirit or spirits
within the self to processes occurring both within and beyond the self. This
shift ultimately results in the abandonment of mentalistic explanations of
reality in favor of materialistic explanations, of which modem behavior
analysis constitutes an example. Primitive societies embrace the animistic
world view, seeing themselves and objects constituting the external environ-
ment as inhabited by souls, each endowed with different forms of will. Such
explanations aim to account for the phenomenological experience of the self,
me or I, or spirits, humors, demons, devils, bloods (e.g., bad blood, evil blood,
etc.), and other entities in the world. More advanced societies move away
9
B.A. Thyer (ed.), The Philosophical Legacy of Behaviorism, 9-40.
10 Commons and Goodheart
from the self as god, embracing instead polytheistic or monotheistic religions

that represent man as distinct from the divine, rather than being coextensive
with the divine. Man becomes God's child, moving away from just the self.
But the earth becomes God's world, the center of the universe. As the process
of decentering progresses, the earth is displaced from the center and is now
perceived to revolve around the sun. As the physical laws that order the
universe are discovered, God retreats from the universe, becoming at the most
a creator whose intervention in the world of his creation is hardly missed. At
each stage of social development, society progresses, not by discarding what
came before, but by integrating it within a more hierarchically complex level
of organization. Thus, at the highest stages of social development, the
phenomenological experience of the self is no longer considered as consub-
stantial with reality but rather as an effect of physical laws that can be
observed to operate in other realms. Behavior analysis is a science of
psychology that is conducted at these highest stages of social development.
WHAT IS BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS?
Behavior analysis treats events as data. Events are potentially detectable

perturbations. The perturbations are measured with respect to some ground
state - the current state of affairs. Perturbations are statistically unusual
variations in the current state of affairs. Formally, an event can be said to be
real and to have existed if and only if it is detectable by two independent
paths. For example, if I tell you that the president called me, you have one
path: my report. One other path is necessary to confirm that the president
called me. The phone company records show that the president called me on
a phone used only by the president. Without the phone records, one could
conclude that the reported conversation was just my hallucination. Perturba-
tions do not have to be directly observed. They can be inferred from long
tortuous methods, as is the case with "black holes." The possibility of the
existence of events can be considered independently of empirical evidence,
simply because a theory suggests their existence. Because of these ways of
determining existence of events, stimulus and behavioral events are classes
functionally defined by their effects on the environment or other behavior.
To claim that an event has occurred is itself problematic. There seems to be
only one necessary restriction on asserting that an event has occurred. The
restriction requires that there be two independent paths to its detection. This
restriction is rather weak compared to those required by operationalism but
strong compared to intuitionism and phenomenonology. The requirement of
two independent paths of detection eliminates mentalistic and phenome-
The Origins of Behaviorism 11
nonological explanations. This requirement means that if one observes a

subject's behavior and hypothesizes a cause, such as the exercise of "free
will," then the behavior may represent only one path of detection (Wheel-
wright, 1935, 1951). However, detecting the behavior does not prove that the
hypothetical cause is the actual cause; an independent second path for
detecting the hypothesized causal event must be found. If only one path is
available; that is, if only one effect can be detected, then there is no way to
determine the cause of that effect. The effect is sometimes erroneously said to
"cause itself', as is the case in mentalistic explanation. In order for free will
to exist, one must be able to imagine what a second path of detection might be.
To our knowledge, no second path has yet been proposed for detecting free
will. Yet, behavior analysis has to account for the illusory modes of explana-
tion (Dennett, 1987, 1988, 1991) in order to be reasonably complete.
Behavior analysis tends not to examine individual events in isolation. An
event that is unique and cannot be reproduced usually falls outside the domain
of behavior analysis, which studies classes of events. It is because an event
belongs to a class of events that its occurrence can be predicted and explained.
An important part of the task of behavior analysis is to discriminate classes of
events from one another; for the "identity" of an event is determined by both
its similarity to other events in its class and its difference from events
belonging to other classes. Because the number of classes of events is
unknowable, the "identity" of an event can never be completely determined.
Hence, both Skinner and Pavlov eschew Cartesian mechanism for adaptive
processes that determine class membership. The strong Darwinian element of
Pavlov's theory stresses the higher organisms' adaptation (Windholz, 1987).
THE DEVELOPMENTAL MODEL
We are interested in the process whereby an event becomes data and how this
process evolves from antiquity to the present. This evolution begins in
primitive societies and culminates with the appearance of modern behavior
analysis in the mid 20th century. This evolution can be subdivided into distinct
stages of development that mirror to some extent the stages of human
development.
The General Stage Model (GSM) of Commons and Richards (1984a,
1984bb) is a system that classifies development in terms of a task-required
hierarchical organization of required response. The model was derived in part
from Piaget's (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958) notion that the higher-stage actions
coordinate lower-stage actions by organizing them into a new, more hierarchi-
cal, complex pattern. The stage of an action is found by answering the
following two questions: a) What are the organizing actions? b) What are the
stages of the elements being organized?
Specifically (Commons, Sonnert, Gutheil, and Bursztajn, 1991), hierarchi-
cal complexity refers to the number of recursions that the coordinating actions
must perform on a set of primary elements. Actions at a higher order of
hierarchical complexity: a) are defined in terms of actions at the next lower
order of hierarchical complexity; b) organize and transform the lower-order
actions; c) produce organizations of lower-order actions that are new and not
arbitrary, and cannot be accomplished by those lower-order actions alone.
After meeting these conditions, we say the higher-order action coordinates the
actions of the next lower order. Stage ofpeiformance is defined as the highest
order of hierarchical complexity of the task solved.
For example, multiplying 3(9+2) requires a distributive action at the
concrete order of hierarchal complexity. The distributive action is as follows:
3(9+2) = (3x9) + (3x2) = 27+6 = 33. The action coordinates (organizes)
adding and multiplying by uniquely organizing the order of those actions. The
distributive action is therefore one order more complex than the acts of adding
and multiplying alone. Although someone who simply adds can arrive at the
same answer, being able to do both addition and multiplication in a coordi-
nated manner indicates a greater freedom of thought and action. Through such
task analysis, the hierarchial complexity of a task may be determined.
In the General Stage Model, stage is defined as follows. An action is at a
given stage when it successfully performs a task of a given hierarchical order
of complexity. When people successfully perform a task at a given order of
hierarchical complexity, the stage of their performance is considered to be of
equivalent order. These orders are also described by Case (1985), Fischer,
Hand and Russell (1984) and Pascual-Leone, (1976, 1980, 1984). In a most
simple sense, at each stage in the sequence, a more complex equiValence
relation may be exhibited. Such equivalence operations fall into the episte-
mological domain and inform the other developmental dimensions (Commons
and Rodriguez, 1990). The General Stage Model is described in Table 1.
In human development the process of decentration begins in infancy. At the
lowest infant stage, sensory and motor, humans' perception and action are not
coordinated. There is no "outside of self'. At the circular sensory-motor stage,
reaching coordinates movement with the discrimination of place. Reaching
trajectories appear to be referenced to the midline of their bodies. They
perceive the rest of their environment as an extension of themselves. By the
sensory-motor stage, they perceive themselves as distinct from their environ-
ment. They perceive single relationships between events when the events in
question are within a dyad. With nominal stage actions, either simple cause-
and-effect relations are named (e.g. "give") or the objects of the actions are
Table 1
Life-span Age Kohlberg Piaget Unit of Social Perspective-Taking
stages Range Modified Form Hierarchical
General Stage Complexity
Model
3b 8-10 213 lib Dual Act Discriminates how own actions affect other's
concrete Logic and behavior. One's own causes-behavior-outcome
operations Arithmetic in sequence is related to another's sequence, and
Actual Cases visa versa.
4a 10-12 3 IlIa Variables, Asserts a third-persou or neutral other by

abstract Propositions generalizing cause-and-effect chains oftwo
operations individuals' behaviors, The neutral observer
determines which side in a conflict is correct by
finding the outcome preferred by the largest
number of persons. The finding of the mode is the
algebraic assessment allowed at this stage.
4b 12-17 3/4 llIb Relations. Isolates specific causal relations in complex sets
formal Equations, of interactions in a linear fashion. Detects the
operations Logical actual causal chain of command in the hierarchy
Arguments as well.
5a 18+ 4 Post- Systems Discriminates behavioral framework of other as

systematic formal integrated system of tendencies and relationships;
operations coordinates linear causality with hierarchical
organization; places different perspectives in
hierarchy of preference. The perspective
generated has a single unifying structure.
5b 20+ 4/5,5,6 Metasystems Compares, contrasts, transforms and synthesizes

meta- individuals' perspectives of systems. History and
systematic genetics shape perspectives. Treating systems of
vertical and horizontal causal relations as the
objects. Allows systems to be compared and
contrasted in terms of their properties. The focus
is on the similarities and differences in each
system's form, as well as constituent causal
relations and actors within them.
6. ? 6 Paradigms Recognizes independently-constructed

paradigmatic perspectives as either incomplete or inconsistent,
understands necessity of co-construction of new
perspectives through dialogue and collaboration.
named ("milk"). This is the only form of explanation available to early

hominids. Note that the cause and effect are outside of the toddler. By the
sentential stage, the sequence of events is named. This leads to reports of
information to the external world (e.g. "Cat run"). At the preoperational stage,
these causal sequences are then arranged temporally, allowing for what looks
like a story or an argument, but one that lacks logic or empirical demonstra-
tion. Such young children do not discriminate what explanations will be taken
as possibly true by others. At the primary stage, true cause and effect
relationships can be tested when the events are presented in isolation. Simple
logical deduction is correctly carried out as in some of the simple syllogisms
of Aristotle (1935; Ross, 1977).
The concrete stage is the first stage at which an individual can be consid-
ered a social being. By this stage, humans discriminate how their own actions
affect others' behavior. One's own sequence of causes, resulting behavior, and
outcome is related to another's sequence, and vice versa. Concrete perspec-
tive-taking is necessary for the development of the oral traditions of the most
primitive societies, for it allows for the representation of multiple actors
participating in a single, chronologically ordered narrative.
At the abstract stage, humans assert a third-person or neutral other by
generalizing cause-and-effect chains of two individuals' behaviors. The
neutral observer determines which side in a conflict is correct by finding the
outcome preferred by the largest number of persons. The finding of the mode
is the algebraic assessment possible at this stage. This proficiency at general-
izing experience allows for the narrative representation of group norms and
stock characters embodying stereotypes. Abstract stage perspective-taking is
required for the formulation of aphorisms, which in traditional societies
provide an accepted means of "understanding" human behavior.
At the formal stage, humans isolate specific causal relations in complex sets
of interactions in a linear fashion. They detect actual causal chains empiri-
cally. At this stage, behavior is seen as rule-governed (i.e., governed by
univariate causality) and its rules can be tested by empirical evidence. What
is true no longer depends on the view of others. The simplest calendar cannot
be devised without formal operational proficiency. The earliest calendars of
primitive societies may be regarded as sets of rules governing social behavior
(e.g, when to plant, when to harvest, when to borrow, when to spend). At this
stage, these rules are followed because of their proven benefit (grain planted
in winter will not sprout; grapes harvested in May are inedible). Simple rules
can be strung together (e.g., If I plant in April, then I will be ready to harvest
in September).
At the systematic stage, humans discriminate the behavioral framework of
the other as an integrated system of tendencies and relationships, coordinate
linear causality with hierarchical organization, and order different perspectives
in a hierarchy of preference. The perspectives generated have a single "true"
unifying structure. At this stage, behavioral science is seen as an interlocking
set of relationships, with the truth of each in interaction with embedded
testable relationships. At this stage, behavior is seen as governed by mulivari-
ate causality (i.e., numerous contingencies may be required to produce single
outcomes). Other systems of explanation or even other sets of data collected
by adherents of other explanatory systems tend to be rejected.
At the metasystematic stage, humans compare, contrast, transform, and
synthesize individuals' perspectives of systems. History and genetics shape
perspectives. Treating systems of vertical and horizontal causal relations as the
objects allow systems to be compared and contrasted in terms of their

properties. The focus is on the similarities and differences in each system's
form, as well as constituent causal relations and actors within them. Philoso-
phers, scientists, and others examine the logical consistency of sets of rules.
Doctrinal lines are replaced by a more formal understanding of assumptions
and methods used by investigators.
At the paradigmatic stage, humans recognize independently constructed
perspectives as either incomplete or inconsistent and understand the necessity
of co-construction of new perspectives through dialogue and collaboration.
The process of cultural development has yet to reach this stage.
One possible endpoint of this process of decentering is to recognize oneself
as a distinct entity in one's environment but to perceive at the same time that
the laws of nature operate both on oneself and one's environment - a unity.
Thus, in one's universe, which includes both one's self and one's environ-
ment, there is no privileged position from which to examine reality. This
would suggest that learning in one realm can be generalized to the other. This
represents the expansive view of modem behavior and quantitative analysis.
Having studied the process of decentering in individual development, let us
now examine this process as it occurs in cultural evolution as applied to the
development of behavior analysis. Although cultural historians tend to reify
culture, speaking of it as an entity that transcends the sum of individuals who
belong to it, from our perspective a culture is no more than the system of
behaviors of its members and how those behaviors are controlled. Remember,
these are incredibly complex interactions, for members set contingencies for
other members as part of the atmosphere of the culture.
WHY THE STAGE OF AN INVENTOR OF CULTURE AND THE STAGE OF

CULTURE DIFFER
Individual and cultural development have a straightforward relationship to one

another. The stage of cultural development is limited by the highest stage of
performance of a member. From the ero-Magnon Homo Sapiens Sapiens on,
we argue there were members that behaved at the paradigmatic stage. The
requirement is for only one such member. Only one member at a time invents,
even though the invention might be a joint enterprise in other regards. Even
in a co-operative behavior, one person has the behavior first, even if only a
millisecond before the other. Yet that inventing behavior is totally dependent
upon others' past inventions. Inventions can only build upon the last inven-
tions and are limited by the stage of those inventions. That is why the stage we
assign to cultures can be so much lower than the stage attained by the most
developed individuals.
Even though individuals might act at the highest stages, e.g., paradigmatic,
societal development always lags behind individual development because at
each stage of cultural development the cultural innovators outstrip their
contemporaries with respect to development, at least within their domain of
innovation. In order for a culture to progress, there must be a supply of these
innovators who work with minimal support from their culture. The size of this
supply seems to be the largest bottleneck in cultural development.
There must be a cultural backdrop that can downward-assimilate discovery.
A discovery may be regarded as a new pattern of behavior performed by an
individual or individuals in various situations. Dawkins (1982) calls these
behavior patterns memes. Memes are to cultural evolution what genes are to
evolutionary biology: the basic unit of information that is transmitted from one
individual to another. Formal and informal education is the means by which
memes are acquired (Cavalli-Sforza, Feldman, Chen, Kuang-Ho, and
Dornbusch, 1982). Increasing support for the development of people reasoning
at a lower stage insures that people can downward-assimilate discovery.
Innovators must be teachers in order for their new memes to be acquired by
others. Findings need to be spread by infection of memes (Commons, Krause,
et al.; Tivers, 1985). This dramatically slows the process of discovery. A
particular set of contingencies is required in order for new cultural information
to be transmitted. In detecting a set of contingencies that apply in a particular
situation, an individual is thereby infected with the meme carried by those
contingencies. In executing a behavior that is controlled by that set of
contingencies, the individual is further infected. Thus, there are degrees of
infection by memes. Moreover, because any contingency selects behavior, it
can represent one or more memes. The infecting meme is the subject's
resulting behavior. All effective educating, training, and communicating result
in a transmission of memes. Findings need to be stored to be passed on. The
rate depends upon increasing contagion so that the innovators come into
contact with the most advanced forms of the present culture. The demand
process also has to be at work so that innovation pays off.
LEVEL OF SUPPORT AND STAGE DEMAND
The way that we locate the highest stages of individuals is by examining

historical figures, the stage of the tasks they carried out in solving the
problems, and what sort of support for the activity existed. We also understand
what are the general stage demands on large numbers of members of the
culture. The invention of scientific culture by an individual required the

paradigmatic stage. In the most basic sense, scientific culture is one in which
experiments are conducted and the results transmitted widely throughout the
community. The development of scientific culture is illustrated by the
manufacturing of tools dedicated to specific purposes. Such invention and
manufacture require people to conduct experiments to determine which shaped
tools work best for each purpose (scrapers, cutters, spear points, etc.). Hence,
variable tool manufacture and use require formal operations. First, as
Commons and Richards (1995) show, if there is no support for the invention,
the lowest stage possible for the invention would be the paradigmatic stage.
Finding a problem increases stage demand by one (Arlin, 1975, 1977, 1984).
Finding the question that allows for finding a problem to address the question
increases stage demand by yet another stage. Finding and identifying the
underlying phenomenon requires one more stage. Essentially there is no direct
stimulus control because there is nothing one is asked. Nor is there a history
of reinforcement that would induce the subject to detect the phenomenon.
Only after a phenomenon is recognized may questions be formulated and
problems designed. Second, for tools to be widely manufactured and used, the
average stage would be formal. And finally, the distribution of stage scores are
approximately 1 stage per standard deviation in the population from early Cro-
Magnon. That distribution guaranteed that while there would be a means
sufficient to support a number of tool and strategy developers, the variance
would support the existence of the paradigmatic stage. In this paper we talk
about the normative cultural stage rather than the highest stages of leaders
within the culture as we do in Chernoff, Miller, and Commons (in prepara-
tion). The rate of cultural invention depends then on a large number of factors,
only one being the availability of very high-stage inventors. This accounts for
why we have always had paradigmatic inventors and yet never had a paradig-
matic culture. In fact, the stage of the culture approaches the stage of the
inventors, progressing gradually from the formal stage to the systematic stage
and then from the systematic stage to the metasystematic stage. As the stage
of culture increases, the amount of support for invention increases.
FACTORS THAT IMPEDED THE DEVELOPMENT OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND

A SCIENCE OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
Acquisition has been a major concern of behavior analysis. Why did the
development of scientific psychology as exemplified by behavior analysis lag
behind other cultural developments? Rate of change is at the heart of behavior
analysis. Because we all have a sense of will, it has been hard to see that will
is not the explanation for behavior. Our illusory perceptions of our sense of
will as a cause of behavior interfere with our developing a scientific psychol-

ogy. The illusion of freewill and the phenomenon of consciousness continue
to the present and continue to dominate most branches of psychology and
behavioral science. Human beings do not generally detect the brain's
processing of events preceding the plan, intent, or impulse to act. The plan and
impulse itself, however, is detectable and has two consequences. First,
because the source of plans, intention, and impulses is covert, the "self' is
seen as actor and causal agent. Second, the lack of a discernible cause for
plans and impulses, combined with an inability to trace the processes by which
they come about, gives rise to the feeling that such plans, intents, and impulses
are freely made by the actor's self. The sense of free will gives rise to the
philosophy of free will and belief in the existence of free will. This is
distinguished from the notion that the existence of freedom gives rise to the
sense of free will (Langer, 1983). We believe that a model of conditioning will
replace free will as the basis for explanations of b~havior. Our account of the
free will phenomenon provides an alternative to the philosophical accounts
that beg the psychological question.
Table 2
Periods of Form of Political Manner in Means of Form of Form of Develop-
Society political unit which power production religion knowledge mental stage
power is transmitted ofscientiJic
explanations
a/behavior
Hunter Leader Band Prowess Hunting, Magic Counting, Concrete

Gatherer gathering, oral
Kohlberg 2/3
use of stone narrative,
tools knowledge
of seasons
Village Chief Village Seniority Proto- Animism Larger Abstract

Strength agriculture counts,
Kohlberg 3
Wisdom aphorisms,
drawings
Early High Leader. Small Genealogical Early Totems, Very early Consolidated
Culture civil and cities and Succession Agriculture animistic arithmetic, abstract
religious beginning gods, rules
Kohlberg 3
of states celestial exchange,
gods, priests specializ-
ation of
knowledge
into crafts,
informal
astronomy
Archaic Kings Small Genealogical Middle Polytheism, Writing, Formal
High Territory, Succession Period organized history,
Kohlberg 3/4
Culture Exclusive Acclamation Agriculture ritual, beginnings
appearance of real
of sacerdotal calendar,
cast that arithmetic
practices
divination,
ancestor
worship
Table 2 (continued)
Periods of Form of Political Manner in Means of Form of Form of Develop-
Society political unit which power production religion knowledge mental stage
power is transmitted of scientific
explanations
of behavior
Empires, Simple Empire, Genealogical Bronze age Monotheism, Systematic Consolidated

States Empire Inclusive succession Iron age organized arithmetic, Formal
Rulers Tribute Male religion, astronomy Kohlberg 3/4
States primogeniture sacerdotal
cast
monopolizes
relationship
to divinity
and to
scripture
Early Ruler of Nations Estates with Pre- Monotheism, Modern Systematic

Modernity Nation- indirect industrial organized calendar, Kohlberg4
states with representation religion, algebra,
Subordin- sacerdotal analysis,
ate cast, analytic
Parliament possibility of geometry,
and individual- Newtonian
Judiciary, ized relation physics,
to divinity mechanism
and to
scripture,
progress of
seculariz-
ation and
unbelief
Modernity Elected Federal Democratic Industrial Separation of Modem Consolidated

Leaders Nations of elections with Church and mathematics, Systematic
with Indepen- direct State Evolution, Kohlberg 4
Indepen- dent States representa- Behavioral and
dent tion psychology, Transitional
Parliament Universal biology, to meta-
and suffrage Chemistry sytematic
Judiciary Kohlberg 5
Post- Nation- Groups of International Post- Religion is Meta- Meta-

modernity states Nations conferences industrial, entirely a mathematics, systematic
reliquish of world information matter of Metalogic, Kohlberg 5
some leaders or age individual Open and
sovereignty delegates conscience. dynamic
for the International systeIllli,
good of tribunals Field and
world World Bank quantum
peace, physics,
internation- Quantitative
alorder, Analysis of
and stable behavior
economy
Table 3
Stages of Developmental How events are Techniques for analyzing From centered to decentered
Society stage of packaged events explanations of events
Behavioral
Science
Late Hunter- Concrete events occur in Constructing The self (one's self or another
Gatherers Kohlberg 213 sequences chronologically ordered self) is perceived as the cause of
narrative representing events. Events that cannot be
multiple forms of stimuli traced to other selves are
and responses. nonetheless explained as being
caused by a natural agency to
Counting of responses which one has attributed the
qualities of a self.
Villages Abstract Sequences of Comparing counts Dualism. One perceives oneself

Kohlberg 3 events conform to as both a physical and mental
recognizable being. Thus, one can reflect on
patterns or norms. the self as an entity distinct from
the body. Intention and behavior
can be perceived as divergent.
The inexplicable is accounted
for by the existence of
supernatural beings with human
or animal qualities, beings that
can act in the world, either in
their purely mental form or by
temporarily assuming a physical
shape.
Early High Consolidated Tbe amount of an Comparing sizes, amounts, One perceives causes as not
Culture Abstract event is important and qualities only one's luck, physical and
as cause, e.g., the mental prowess, but also one's
size of a sacrifice spiritual devotion and station in
life. The social order and one's
own behavior can be perceived
as divergent.
Archaic High Formal Events are viewed Comparing number of The occurrence of behavior can
Culture Kohlberg 3/4 as causes or responses to particular be demonstrated empirically,
effects of other stimuli to total number of without reference to the self that
events. Causality responses to determine has "willed" that behavior to
and sequentiality proportions and rates of occur. The existence of mental
are no longer response events (feelings, impulses) can
considered also be inferred from behavior
identical. and the conditions under which
they occur.
Empires, Consolidated Events were seen Rewarding behavior The existence of mental events
States formal as somewhat Eliciting responses within that carmot be inferred from
independent of reflexes. The stimulus is behavior and the observable
one another. One seen as the cause of the situation and that of behavior
set of rules could responses. that cannot be explained by a
address the same person's "intentions" or "will"
behaviors in an are perceived as problematic.
inconsistent way. Generally, an external agency
The multiple such as nature, god(s), or the
functions of devil is required to explain such
events are mental events or unintentional
inexplicable behavior.
Table 3 (continued)
Stages of Developmental How events are Techniques for analyzing From centered to decentered
Society stage of packaged events explanations of events
Behuvioral
Science
Early Systematic Events maybe Respondent conditioning. Systems codifying the rules by
Modernity Kohlberg4 inscribed within Neutral stimuli, when which mental events are
specific domains, followed by eliciting stimuli, devised; similar systems
each of which is come to elicit responses codifying the rules by which
governed also. physical events are also devised.
according to a These systems are not complete
specific set of in that systems explaining
rules. mental events do not explain
somatic component of mental
experience, while systems
explaining physical events
cannot account for mental
events (although the physical
substratum of mental activity
may be inferred). Divine
intervention is still available as
an explanation of the
inexplicable.
Mid Consolidated Events may be Establishing systems of Early systems of contingencies
Modernity systematic described within a relations between as external to the individual, as
wide domain. reinforcement contingencies Adam Smith, Malthus. What
There are general and response rates. was seen to be magical and
rules that govern inexplicable and temporal
Observing changes in
observation and (miraculous, interventions by
response rates that result
data collections. higher powers, etc.) now is seen
from a change in
as part of a dynamic lawful
reinforcement contingencies.
system.
Late Transitional to There is a Studying the processes Darwin unites the mental and
Modernity metasytematic recognition that whereby performances are physical systems by explaining
context and acquired, modified, and the mental in terms of the
Kohlberg 5
meaning of events maintained within a single physical.
interact. domain.
Post- Meta- Events are seen as Constructing multiple Systems codifying the rules by
modernity systematic viewable from interpretations of the process which mental or behavioral
multiple contexts. of performance acquisition, events occur can be generalized
Kohlberg 5
The method of modification, and to more than just one organism.
observation and maintenance within a single Computers are used to generate
the result are seen domain. models of how such systems
to interact, work.
replacing the
contextualism.
The propenies of Generalizing models of the
dynamic process of performance
processes are acquisition, modification,
built into and maintenance to multiple
supersystems domains.
Post-Post Paradigmatic Systems of Studying the effects on Computers are now true
Modernity observation are behavior of occurrences of analogues of the systems which
Kohlberg 6
seen to be general sets of events in they model, for they employ
ultimately various changing stacked neural nets. Computer-
inconsistent. contingencies. generated models no longer
Principles of need to be static and are able to
Combing supersystems
particle-wave learn from and adjust
which explain acquisition
duality and themselves to the systems that
and change, with steady-
quantum they model in real time.
state petfonnance across
mechanics, and
multiple measures such as
relativism.
single events, latencies, local
and overall rates, and
probabilities.
PERIODS IN CULTURAL EVOLUTION AND THE CORRESPONDING

DEVELOPMENT STAGE OF A SCIENCE OF BEHAVIOR
Table 2 illustrates the periods of cultural evolution and their corresponding

stages in the General Stage Model of the development of behavior analysis.
The rows correspond to periods of cultural evolution and the corresponding
stage of a science of behavior. The columns correspond to the different
domains of culture. Within any period of cultural evolution, there are large
differences in the stage of actions in the various domains. For example,
manufacture of specialized tools requires formal operations. The tools are
empirically tested to see which produce the best results. The invention of tools
takes place during the earliest periods of cultural evolution before the
invention of writing. In the absence of writing, one does not expect that
arithmetic could have advanced to the stage of formal operations, because
arithmetic operations have non-stage requirements such as keeping track of
large sets of numbers and the results of calculations.
CULTURAL EVOLUTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS
Late Foraging
Culture:
During the last of the paleolithic period, the unit of social organization for the
Cro-Magnons (Homo Sapiens Sapiens) was the band, a nomadic group whose
social organization reflected the division of labor between hunters and
gatherers and the beginnings of a social hierarchy (leaders and followers). The
band became increasingly proficient at foraging and hunting, activities that
became systematized. Certain places, far away as well as close, were visited
regularly at the same time of the year.
Decentering:
At this stage, people saw how events that affected others also affected
themselves. Their notion of causality included the coordination of their own
behaviors with those of others. They saw how their own behavior affected
others and vice versa. They constructed and named nonobservable agents
(animism).
Science of Behavior (Concrete):

Paleolithic cultures recorded events in single, chronologically ordered
narratives. This allowed for the representation of multiple forms of stimuli and
responses and for the counting of responses. The emergence of narrative
traditions supported an extensive local culture, including descriptions and

explanations of human and animal behavior both in language and art. These
all required concrete stage actions.
Village
Culture:
The unit of social organization was the tribe, a group of individuals who
traced their lineage to common ancestors. In tribal society, social hierarchy
was less fluid than at the previous stage, and leadership was decided by
seniority and birth, rather than by strength or prowess. Tribes tended to settle
in villages. The collection of grain created some dispersement of villages and
specialization of activities within villages. In the beginning of the proto-
agriculture period about 18 thousand years ago, there was intensive use of
wild resources. Areas were burned to clear trees and brush in order to attract
grazing animals and game. Tough-stalked seeds were more likely to be
collected than windblown seeds because they could be harvested. Such
relatively rare tough-stalked seeds could only be spread by being collected and
processed by animals or, in the case of grains, people. Some grains were still
collected by seed beaters, but such practices did not lead to selection and
domestication.
Decentering:
The notion that a person possesses traits, personality, or style existed at the
abstract stage. People discriminated whether they belonged to a particular
group (the tribe) and communicated group membership through dress, styles,
and conformity to norms.
Science of Behavior (Abstract):

Behaviors were explained by the properties of the people performing them
(goodness, evil, avarice).
Early High Culture

Culture:
Some villages grew into relatively large-sized cities 14,000 and 11,000 years
ago with the advent of agriculture. This happened independently in each
civilization. Although there was commerce before, it greatly expanded.
Groups became quite large with different degrees of affiliation between units
and subunits, leading to the development of a society. Specialized roles came
into being (e.g., those of tool maker, hunter, gatherer, food preparer, artisan,
and religious personage).
Decentering:
There existed the notion that each person possessed a place within the social
order. Some people were closer to the leader and gods. People discriminated
whether they belonged to a branch and level of society (the tribe) and
communicated group membership through dress, styles, and conformity to
norms.
Science of Behavior (Consolidated Abstract):

With the growth of production the rate at which work was accomplished and
value of items for trade became firmly established. The rate of responding was
used to represent the behavioral outcomes, and counts could be compared to
one another. This is indicative of the abstract stage. The language of the self
developed. This language was generalized and normative. Nonobservable
agents in the world were attributed properties comparable to those that people
attributed to one another. These nonobservable agents were sometimes deified.
Similarly, the nonobservable attributes within people were called names such
as "spirit," "soul," or "psyche." These were names for the god within oneself.
Events could be explained in terms of the theories that organized the asser-
tions that people made about persons and nonobservable events at this stage.
These were early forms of organized religion (polytheism).
Archaic High Period

Culture:
The archeological record suggests the emergence of writing around 8,000
years ago, 6000 B.c. in North Africa and the Middle East. The archeological
records for India and China are not as complete as for the Nile River Valley
and Mesopotamia. With writing, the comprehensive arithmetic required by
trade developed. With the rise of agriculture, the demands on the calendar to
predict precisely when to plant gave rise to astronomy. Written history
developed. Pictorial and written narrative recorded not only chains of events
but interpretations of their source.
In the period of Archaic High Culture, writing, simple arithmetic, and
rudimentary rules for argument in the narrative became necessary. Buildings
dedicated to the needs of commerce required drawings. War required the
design of armaments and conveyances including ships and chariots. The city-
state not only embodied culture but became the major creator and repository
of such culture. Questions of religion became central to not only local
government, but war. Out of design, architecture, and astronomy, geometry

emerged, becoming a major endeavor of the elect. The geometers of Greece
developed representations of triangles, squares, and other polygons. Straight-
edge and compass constructions abounded. This early form of operationalism
is also embodied in modern behavior analysis.
Decentering:
The occurrence of behavior could be demonstrated empirically, without
reference to the self that has "willed" that behavior to occur. The existence of
mental events (feelings, impulses) could also be inferred from behavior and
the conditions under which they occurred.
Science of Behavior (Formal):

At the fonnal stage, one observed the emergence of techniques for comparing
number of responses to particular stimuli to total number of responses for the
purpose of determining proportions and rates of response. People began to
take an interest in how to get others to be more productive, how to train them,
and how to distribute the vastly greater wealth. The first contracts were
drafted. These in turn lead to economics and law and, in behavior analysis,
behavioral contracting.
Empire States, IDgh Period

Culture:
Some city-states became the centers of larger empires that exacted tribute
from their neighbors. The culture of the dominant city-state spread, while at
the same time assimilating the cultures of its neighbors. The dominant city-
state rewarded compliant neighbor states while violently punishing its enemies
through acts of organized aggression (war). The accumulation of wealth in
empires made possible the investment of more resources in perfecting the
instruments of war and in promoting the arts, organized religion, and the early
sciences. Calendars, writing, history, systematic arithmetic, and astronomy all
developed during this period.
The disciplines that developed in the early empire period became formal-
ized, producing the systematic geometry of Euclid and Pythagoras, among
others. Aristotle (1935; Ross, 1977) formalized Socrates's syllogistic
argument in the narrative. Arabs introduced the algebraic period.
Decentering:
The existence of mental events that could not be inferred from behavior and
the observable situation, and behavior that could not be explained by a
person's "intentions" or "will" were perceived as problematic. Generally, an

external agency such as nature, god(s), or the devil was required to explain
such mental events or unintentional behavior. The distinction was made
between appearances and reality.
Generally, Aristotle (1935; Ross, 1977) is credited with being the first to
make the firm distinction between sensory data (experienced external events)
and internal data (one's thoughts, dreams, visions, etc.). Because he depended
primarily on his senses, Aristotle carefully described external events in a way
that was prone to cornmon illusions. His experience of the world when
combined with logic was the source of his explanation. He is credited with
being the father of the experiment.
Science of Behavior (Consolidated Formal):

At the consolidated formal stage, the behavior-analytic notion of rewarding
behavior developed. The idea of "operant-conditioned behavior" existed
before the term "operant conditioning" was invented. In this tradition, the
control of behavior by events that occur subsequent to it is analyzed experi-
mentally. Operant conditioning treats the offer of reward as a discriminative
stimulus, whereas the effectiveness of rewards should not be assumed but has
to be established through operant conditioning.
The study of operant-conditioned behavior belongs to a tradition whose
exponents include Plato (1979) and Aristotle (1935; Ross, 1977). The simple,
but wrong, law of effect, namely, that people act for rewards, is formal-stage.
According to this law, the promise of reward (inducement) controls behavior.
In fact, such inducements corne to control behavior only after they are
followed by appropriate responses and resulting reinforcement. The truer law,
namely, that people will do the something more often or more likely if
rewarded, is not formal but systematic. This is a three-part contingency.
Early Modernity
Culture:
Relationships among people became more abstract. They were mediated by
printed media and were less dependent on face-to-face interactions. Public
opinion developed as a moral force in political life, a force that could be
manipulated by individuals while at the same time transcending them. The
empires and kingdoms that flourished at the previous stage of social develop-
ment now developed into nation-states governed by hereditary rulers and
subordinate parliaments and judiciaries. The continuity of a single political
regime was important in the development of some nation-states such as France
or England, while other nation-states such as Germany and Switzerland
remained for a long time very loose confederations. Gradually, the nation-state
came to be unified under a single government and a common language,
religion, and culture. This process of unification took hundreds of years and
was not accomplished without a great deal of political oppression.
Whereas empires exacted tribute from their neighbors, nation-states funded
their expansion by establishing tributary colonies in more distant places.
Economic exchanges occurred within each modern nation-state and among
modern nation-states. These exchanges were far more complex than at the
previous stage. Early in the history of nation-states, corporations developed
as instruments for pooling economic resources and sharing risk. Lending with
interest also developed. Mathematical sciences had to be downward-
assimilated by large numbers of people in order to manage the complex
financial transactions now required.
Decentering:
Systems codified the rules by which physical events were devised as illus-
trated by Copernicus (Kuhn, 1962, 1972, 1971), Galileo Galilei (1656, 1936,
1656, 1936, 1991), and Newton (1968). Somewhat similar systems codified
the rules by which mental events were devised as illustrated by Descartes
(1988, 1993, 1994), Spinoza (1883), Leibniz (1920), and later Locke
(Rickaby, 1906; Riley, 1982). These systems were not complete in that
systems explaining mental events did not explain the somatic component of
mental experience, while systems explaining physical events could not
account for mental events (although the physical substratum of mental activity
could be inferred). Divine intervention was still available as an explanation of
the inexplicable. Descartes presented us the body-soul duality, which is the
antecedent of the modern mind-body duality. But at the same time, by
asserting that animals did not have souls, he opened up the possibility that
humans (as animals) might not have souls either.
There is evidence to suggest that Descartes was covertly a materialist and
that his dualism was an invention whose purpose was to appease the Church:
The body-soul duality does not occur in Descartes' writings until after the trial
of Galileo. He has been described by his contemporary Bossuet as being
extremely fearful of Church censure. His primary reason for introducing the
duality may have been to provide a proof of the immortality of the soul that
would appease the doctors of the Sorbonne. In order to solve the problem of
how the soul and the body were joined, Descartes argued that the pineal gland
in humans is the place where the mind and the body intersect. Such an
intersection was necessary to account for the soul's influence on the body's
movements, yet how could a substance without mass or extension influence
a substance that did possess these qualities? Descartes' dualism limited the
power of material science to explain mental events or spiritual science to

explain physical events.
Science of Behavior (Systematic):

At the systematic stage, the Cartesian theory of the reflex developed (see
Canguilhem, 1977). Here, as in respondent conditioning, a stimulus causes
responses. Descartes (1664) argued that animals were governed entirely by
reflexes and other automatic processes. Humans, insofar as they were
continuous with animals, were also governed by reflexes. But humans were
thought to have a soul and therefore a mind. Only in Descartes's garden did
the statues of humans urinate when one stepped on a certain flagstone. Perhaps
he applied the concept of the reflex to humans as well.
Although the technique of operant conditioning developed at the previous
stage, the change in stage of decentering (from consolidated formal to
systematic) had an impact that must now be explained. In the Early Modern
period, the tradition of operant conditioning continued with Adam Smith
(1776, 1784), Bentham (1825, 1830), and Mill (1967a, 1967b, 1906).
According to Adam Smith, economic goods (our valued outcomes) were under
the control of market forces. Behaviors were selected by the market. Theories
of human behavior based on enlightened self-interest developed (Bentham,
Smith). These theories were generally mentalistic, being predicated on the
existence of the will. However, they also shed light on social processes such
as the market that cannot be understood in purely mentalistic terms. Mill
formulated explicit laws of reward and punishment.
Mid Modernity
Culture:
Economic production became increasingly mechanized. Later, the mechaniza-
tion of agriCUlture and the perfection of pesticides and modem methods of
irrigation made possible the accumulation of large surpluses of comestible
resources. Subsistence agriculture was replaced by larger farms that produced
for the market. Large numbers of people left agriculture to work in cities in
factories. Social relations, which were already more abstract than at the
previous stage, now came under the control of the contingencies of the
marketplace.
Decentering:
Early systems of contingencies were treated as external to the individual.
What was seen to be magical, inexplicable and temporal (miraculous inter-
ventions by higher powers, etc.) now was seen as part of a dynamic lawful
system. In such a system, one unites the mental and physical systems by
explaining the mental in terms of the physical.
Marx (1974) developed an economic theory that describes how modem
capitalism has transformed social relations. It addressed such phenomena as
commodity fetishism and other forms of social alienation. Marxist economics
did not shed completely the baggage of more mentalistic theories such as that
of Adam Smith. Nonetheless, it is clear that mentalistic constructs such as will
and enlightened self-interest were not so essential to Marx's economic theory
as they were to that of Adam Smith. Also, Marx's theory of history replaced
the world-historic individual and culture with economics as the driving force
of historical change.
Influenced by the notion in Adam Smith (1776, 1784) and Malthus (1803),
according to which human behavior is selected by the market, Darwin (1855;
1897) generalized this principle of selectionism to the animal and plant
kingdoms. Darwin's theory of natural selection was completely decentered.
Darwin showed that man is an animal and descends from apes. Thus, the
Cartesian theory of the reflex could now be applied to man. He also showed
that animals, including man, are not the result of an act of divine intervention
but of evolution, which has a scientific basis. This moved man much closer to
material science.
Darwin's theory constituted a radical innovation for three reasons: a)
Darwin presented evolutionary evidence establishing the fact that human
thought and action are continuous with animal thought and action; b) Also,
Darwinian selectionism, in contrast with Aristotelian thought, was anti-
teleological: The notion of survival of the fittest was only a description of
what occurs, rather than the final purpose of what occurs. Darwinian selec-
tionism was also opposed to the utilitarian notion that human and animal
behavior have a purpose: the pursuit of rewards and punishments, a pursuit
that leads to the attainment of the good. From Darwin's perspective, nature
was a completely open-ended system in which such purposiveness played no
part; c) Finally, Darwin's theory brought together four distinct paradigms:
biology, ecology, animal behavior, and geology. This synthesis constitutes a
superparadigm and is a cross-paradigmatic task. Out of Darwin's superpara-
digm, three new, interrelated paradigms were created: paleontology, evolu-
tionary biology, and ethology. It is this achievement that makes it possible for
studies of animal behavior to illuminate human behavior.
Science of Behavior (Consolidated Systematic Stage):

At this consolidated systematic stage, the quantitative analysis of behavior
developed. In this technique, one studies systems of relations between
reinforcement contingencies and response rates, and observes changes in

response rates that result from a change in reinforcement contingencies.
The tradition of respondent conditioning develops out of the extensive study
of reflexes begun by Descartes, continues into the Mid-Modern period with
the physiologists Bekhterev (1913, 1933), Sharrington (1904, 1906, 1933),
Pavlov (1927; Windholz, 1986a, 1986b, 1987, 1989), and continues to the
present through psychologists Watson (1913, 1919, 1925), Hull (1951, 1952),
Spence (1956), and others. In respondent conditioning, presenting the subject
a neutral stimulus followed by eliciting stimuli comes to elicit responses.
Respondent conditioning is used to analyze the control and transfer of control
by events that precede behavior.
The techniques developed at the previous stage, but the change in stage of
decentering had an impact on the techniques: the mentalistic baggage was
eliminated. The tradition of operant conditioning continued into the Mid-
Modern period with Darwin, Thorndike (1905,1932, 1965), Hull, Skinner and
Skinner's descendants, who all eschewed mentalism. Skinner (1938) and
Konorski (1967; Konorski, Miller, 1937) differentiated operant and respon-
dent conditioning. At the end of his scholarly career, Pavlov proposed that
although all learning involves the formation of associations, the organism's
adaptation to the environment is established through conditioning, and the
accumulation of knowledge is established by trial and error (Windholz, 1987).
The Quantitative Analysis of Behavior first emerged after the 1920s, when
psychological approaches to antecedent and subsequent control became more
quantitative. The Quantitative Analysis of Behavior, as we know it today,
solved a problem that could not have been solved without systematic opera-
tions. This discipline treated the rate of responding and the change of rate of
responding as related to reinforcement and stimulus conditions. Because
stimulus control (Lashley 1960; Pavlov, 1927; Hull, 1951, 1952; Skinner,
1935, 1937, 1938) is related to reinforcement conditions, two independent
variables predict a pattern of bebavior. The coordination of two such relation-
ships is the hallmark of the systematic stage (the stage when the quantitative
analysis of behavior becomes a discipline in its own right).
Late Modernity
Culture:
Large changes in the economic life of the postindustrial West occurred. The
manipulation of information (discriminated operant, tacks, etc.) replaced the
manipUlation of materials by hand. Services expanded over manufacture.
Agriculture was reduced to 5% of the economy. Educational demands
escalated to overwhelm supply. The world markets unified to a great degree.
The transmission, storage, and processing of information became computer-

ized. The society increasingly stratified as to attained education and compe-
tence in communication.
Decentering:
Mental systems could be modeled by physical systems. Artificial intelligence
came into being.
The machines that provided the first modem models were switches, as used
in telephone networks. These embodied some of the properties of the stimulus
and response. Closing one switch could act as a stimulus for activating a
second switch (relay). One could arrange relays so that, once activated, they
would stay activated. They "learned." In attempts to automate production and
calculation, the behavior of human beings was being supplanted by machines.
Thus, the field of artificial intelligence grew up to produce intelligent
functioning explicitly.
During the 1960s, as computers became cheaper, simulation studies and
"stat rats" became more widespread. Simulation models were developed as an
alternative to algebraic and propositional models. The algebraic and proposi-
tion models were easy to test. But they were models of general static or
steady-state activity. For example, acquisition and other dynamic changes in
schedules of reinforcement rate of change was path-dependent, as in the case
of melioration. Algebraic solutions have not yet developed, partially because
of problems of finding solutions to sets of non-linear equations. They also did
not model the possible neural substrate that produced the behavioral regulari-
ties that are observed at the molar level.
Along with the power of simulations, a set of problems arose that led to an
explicit view of what a model is (Coombs, Dawes, and Tversky, 1970).
Although statistics had been developed to test algebraic and propositional
models, the method of validation for simulations requires more than the
estimate of how close the simulation comes to a real-world case, where the
parameters from the real world to be used in the simulation case have been
previously estimated. Such an exploration is metasystematic because it reflects
on the properties of systems.
How do we know that a simulation models reality? First, the degree to
which simulation models produce behavior that matches that which the
modeled tasks demand provides an indication of the accuracy of the simula-
tion. This is a rule to which all work in artificial intelligence adheres. Second,
as with all models, simulation models are checked by seeing if they make
unique predictions outside of the immediate situation that they model,
predictions that can be checked empirically. This is especially useful when the
models provide foresight rather than hindsight. Third, the degree to which
simulations represent the constraints as to how the biology, physiology, and

psychology work can also be checked. Fourth, such simulation models can be
transformed into actual predictive models by estimating certain parameters of
observed behavior and using the simulation to predict other parameters of
behavior in experimental situations.
In all cases the models are designed to account for the maximal amount of
variance found in a number of experimental situations to which the processes
described by any given one of those models apply. The models should not
produce any systematic deviations from the data. Some parameter estimates
should be the same regardless of the situation. The adequacy of a model can
be tested by examining how well that model fits the data or by comparing
obtained data to the theoretically simulated values. These methods are to be
contrasted with the testing of relatively simple hypotheses. Because the
models can be quite complex, however, only portions of them are tested by
single sets of studies. As in other areas of science, looking for the generality
of a formulation has made these models more testable. Independent routes of
verification are possible because of the increased scope of the models. It is
essential that models make unique predictions that can be checked empirically.
Science of Behavior (Transition to Metasystematic):

The Quantitative Analysis of Behavior soon was in transition to the
metasystematic stage. In the period extending from the 1930s through the
1950s, quantifiable measures, such as response probability and latency, were
introduced. Mathematical models of response probability and latency were
developed by Hull and his descendants--Spence (1956), Bush and Mosteller
(1955), and Logan (1955, 1960, 1978), among others such as Estes (Bush and
Estes, 1959; Neimark and Estes, 1967), who is influenced by both. Both
Hullian and Skinnerian groups carried out some parametric studies in the
tradition of psychophysics. Exemplifying this development, the Hullians
carried out elaborate quantitative studies. By the early 1960s mathematical
psychology had developed to the point where it could deal with problems from
a number of domains. In each domain, explicit mathematical models were
proposed for the processes by which performances were acquired, modified,
and maintained within that domain. Although the models generated a number
of experiments, they were of limited generality.
Post-Modernity
Culture:
Chaos theory, modem probability theory, non-linear dynamic and neural
networks, Minsky's (1968; Minsky and Papert, 1969) Perceptron, Grossberg's
(1971a, 1971b, 1974, 1987) Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART), Rumelhart

and McClelland's (1985; McClelland, Rumelhart, and the PDP Research
Group, 1985) were introduced. Simple cybernetics was replaced with complex
theories of robotics. Artificial intelligence was replaced with neural nets and
other associative systems. The result of all of this was the modern non-linear
open-systems period. Evolutionary ideas increasingly played a role in cultural
evolution (e.g., Boyd and Richerson, 1982, 1985; Dawkins, 1982), political
science (Plott, 1967, 1971; Plott and Levine, 1978), and economics (Arrow,
1951).
Decentering:
Systems codifying the rules by which behavioral events occur could be
generalized to more than just one organism. Computers were now true
analogues of the systems which they modeled, for they employed stacked
neural nets. Computer-generated models no longer needed to be static, and
were able to learn from and adjust themselves to the systems that they
modeled in real time.
Science of Behavior (Metasystematic):

At the metasystematic stage, the proficiency of constructing multiple
interpretations of the process of performance acquisition, modification, and
maintenance within a single domain developed. Models of the process of
performance acquisition, modification, and maintenance were generalized to
multiple domains.
This development occurred in the Quantitative Analysis of Behavior in the
late 60s, when general models were introduced in both the Hullian and
Skinnerian traditions. Counters made simple the recording rate of responding
as well as just its occurrence. This gave rise to what are referred to as models
of behavior in behavior analysis (e.g., Chung and Herrnstein, 1967;
Herrnstein, 1961, 1970; Nevin, 1969, 1981). "Models of Behavior" now
generally refers to the fact that theoretical issues are represented by quantita-
tive models. An analysis is not a matter of fitting arbitrary functions to data
points. Rather, each parameter and variable in a set of equations represents
part of a process that has both a theoretical and an empirical interpretation.
Quantitative analysis has forced researchers to represent explicitly their
notions and to be economical in the number of parameters that must be
estimated. The matching law, a model of maintained rate of performance, is
one example of a supersystem (metasystematic) from the analysis-of-behavior
tradition. The Rescorla-Wagner (1982) model of acquisition processes, an
event-based supersystem (metasystematic), is an example from the Hullian
tradition. These models represent effects of interactions of environmental and
behavioral events. Because neither model requires otherwise, the possibility

exists that both the organism and the environment modify each other. The
rules of such interaction may be represented by an arithmetic that accounts for
the results from a large class of studies. These general models integrated
multiple systems but not each other.
Post-Post Modernity
Culture:
The unbounded optimism of the modem period is dashed at first by cracks in
the fabric of math, logic, and physics. Heisenberg's (Price, Chis sick, and
Heisenberg, 1977) uncertainty principle, particle-wave duality, and Godel's
(1931) incompleteness theorem made it clear that the hope of a complete
mathematics, in which a proper set of axioms would lead to all mathematical
truths, was premature. Attempts to integrate Einstein's general theory of
relativity with Planck's quantum mechanics have failed so far. Systems of
observation, such as particle-wave duality, were seen to be ultimately
inconsistent. Limits to scientific inquiry were proposed (Holton, 1978, 1979).
Extensions led to non-computability notions such as Arrow's welfare theorem
(Arrow, 1951) that a pie could not be fairly divided among three people.
Decentering:
The cosmology of the Big Bang Theory (Lemaitre and Berger, 1984; Peebles,
Schramm, Turner and Kron, 1994), the cooling of the earth, the future
expansion of the sun all placed humans on a very small planet (earth)
surrounding a small star (sun), far out in the edge ofthe Milky-Way galaxy in
an expanding universe whose fate remains a mystery. Culture has been
seriously fractured.
Science of Behavior (Paradigmatic):

At this paradigmatic stage, the effects on behavior of occurrences of general
sets of events in various changing contingencies might be studied. Also, the
proficiency of combining supersystems which explain acquisition and change
with steady-state performance across multiple measures such as single events,
latencies, local and overall rates, and probabilities will develop.
The Quantitative Analysis of Behavior has yet to reach this stage. Models
of acquisition that yield the regularities in steady-state performance have not
been developed. Such an integrated model would deal with how each
occurrence of events in a contingency affects behavior. Because each model
is a supersystem, an integrative model requires a new paradigm.
CONCLUSION
Behavior analysis has now divided into two subdisciplines. Practitioners are
often mentalists, whereas the scientific continue to expand and deepen the
behavioral framework. As scientific behavior analysis broadens and deepens,
it should be possible to deal with the applied issues without resorting to
cognitive and mentalistic notions. The main thesis of this chapter is that
behavior analysis, while in its practical aspects it appeals to a wide swathe of
psychologists, in its scientific anti-mentalism it continually fights the illusion
of free will. The illusion competes with a scientific psychology based on
functional, experimental, and quantitative analyses of behavior, one devoid of
"the ghost in the machine" (Koestler, 1968). Overcoming the illusion requires
decentration in the scientific culture at large and within psychology. Such
decentration will be selected for and reinforced. This will occur in the face of
Aristotelian everyday explanations of events, just as it has in the physical and
biological sciences.
Department of Psychiatry
Harvard Medical School
Massachusetts Mental Health Center
Boston, Mass.
NOTE
* We thank Drs. Miriam Chernoff and Patrice Marie Miller for their work on stage and
evolution on which the beginning of the paper is based and Dr. Margaret Ellis Miller for her
editorial help.
REFERENCES
Aristotle (1935). From Natural science, Psychology, The Nicomachean ethics. New York, NY:
Odyssey Press.
Arlin, P. K. (1975). Cognitive development in adulthood: A fifth stage? Developmental
Psychology, 11, 602-606.
Arlin, P. K. (1977). Piagetian operations in problem finding. Developmental Psychology, 13,
247-298.
Arlin, P. K. (1984). Adolescent and adult thought: A structural interpretation. In M. L.
Commons, F. A. Richards, and C. Armon (Eds.), Beyondformal operations: Vol. 1. Late
adolescent and adult cognitive development. (pp. 258-271). New York: Praeger.
Arrow, K. J. (1951). Social choice and individual values. New York: John Wiley.
Bekhterev, V. M. (1913). Objektive Psychologie oder Psychorejlexologie: die Lehre von den
Asoziationsrejlexe. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner
Bekhterev, V. M. (1933). General principles of human reflexology: an introduction to the

objective study of personality. London: Jarrolds.
Bentham, J (1825). The rationale of reward. London, Published by John and H. L. Hunt.
Bentham, J (1830). The rationale of punishment. London, R Heward.
Boyd, R, and Richerson, P. J. (1982). Cultural Transmission and the Evolution of Cooperative
Behavior. Human Ecology Forum, 10, 325-351.
Boyd, R R., and Richerson, P. J. (1985). Culture and the Evolutionary Process, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Bush, R., and Estes, W. K. (Eds.) (1959). Studies in mathematical learning theory. Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford University Press
Bush, R R., and Mosteller, F. (1955). Stochastic models for learning. New York: Wiley.
Canguilhem, Georges (1977). Laformation du concept de reflexe aux XV/Ie et XVll/e siecles.
Paris: J. Vrin.
Case, R (1985). Intellectual development: Birth to adulthood. Orlando Florida: Academic
Press.
Cavalli-Sforza, L. L., Feldman, M. W., Chen, Kuang-Ho, and Dornbusch, S. M. (1982). Theory
and observation in cultural transmission. Science, 218,19-27.
Chernoff, M. C., Miller, P.M, and Commons, M. L. (In preparation). The relationship of
changes in subsistence strategies, social organization, and moral stages to developmental
stage.
Chung, S., and Herrnstein, R J. (1967). Choice and delay of reinforcement. Journal of the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 32, 101-120.
Commons, M. L., and Hallinan, P. W., with Fong, W., and McCarthy, K. (1989). Intelligent
pattern recognition: Hierarchical organization of concepts and hierarchies. Quantitative
analyses of behavior. Vol. 9. Computational and clinical approaches to pattern recognition
and concept formation (pp. 127-153). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Commons, M. L., and Richards, F. A (1984a). A general model of stage theory. In M. L.
Commons, F. A. Richards, and C. Armon (Eds.), Beyondformal operations: Vol. 1. Late
adolescent and adult cognitive development (pp. 120-140). NY: Praeger.
Commons, M. L., and Richards, F. A (1984b). Applying the general stage model. In M. L.
Commons, F. A Richards, and C. Armon (Eds.), Beyondformal operations: Vol. 1. Late
adolescent and adult cognitive development (pp. 141-157). NY: Praeger.
Commons, M. L., Krause, S. R, Fayer, G. A, and Meaney, M. (1993). Atmosphere and stage
development in the workplace. In J. Demick and P. M. Miller (Eds.), Development in the
workplace (pp. 199-220). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Commons, M. L., and Rodriguez, J. A (1990). "Equal access" without "establishing" religion:
The necessity for assessing social perspective-taking skills and institutional atmosphere.
Developmental Review, 323-340.
Commons, M. L., Trudeau, E. J., Stein, S. A, Richards, F. A, Krause, S. R (in press). The
existence of developmental stages as shown by the hierarchical complexity of tasks. Devel-
opmental Review. 8(3), 237-278.
Coombs, C. H., Dawes, R. M., and Tversky, A (1970). Mathematical psychology: An
elementary introduction. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
Darwin, C. (1855). On the origin of the species. London: Murray.
Darwin, C. (1897). Expressions of the emotions in man and animals. New York: D. Appleton.
Day, W. F. (1983). On the difference between radical and methodological behaviorism.
Behaviorism, 11(1),89-102.
Day, W. F. (1992). Radical behaviorism: Willard Day on psychology and philosophy. Reno,
NV: Context Press.
Day, W. F. (1995). On certain relations between contemporary philosophy and radical
behaviorism. In J. T. Todd and E. K. Morris, (Eds.). In Modern perspectives on B. F.
Skinner and contemporary behaviorism. Contributions in psychology, 28 (pp. 75-84).

Greenwood Press/Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport, CT.
Dawkins, R. (1982) The Selfish Gene. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Dennett, D. C. (1988). The intentional stance in theory and practice. In R. W. Byrne and A.
Whiten (Eds.). Machiavellian intelligence: Social expertise and the evolution of intellect in
monkeys, apes, and humans (pp. 180-202). Oxford, England: Clarendon Press/Oxford
University Press.
Dennett, D. (1991). Three kinds of intentional psychology. In R. Boyd, P. Gasper, and 1. D.
Trout (Eds.). The philosophy of science (pp. 631-649). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Descartes, R. (1664). Traite de l'homme. Paris: Angot
Descartes, R. (1988). The existence of material things: The real distinction of mind and body.
In L. T. Benjamin Jr. (Ed.). In A history of psychology: Original sources and contemporary
research (pp. 36-43). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
Descartes, R. (1993). Meditations onfirst philosophy infocus. London: New York: Routledge.
Descartes, R. (1994). Discours de la methode: pour bien conduire sa raison et chercher la
verite dans les sciences (Discourse on the method: of conducting one's reason well and of
seeking the truth in the sciences: a bilingual edition and an interpretation of Rene Des-
cartes' philosophy of method). South Bend, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
Fischer, K. W., Hand, H. H., and Russell, S. (1984). The development of abstractions in
adolescents and adulthood. In M. L. Commons, F. A. Richards, and C. Armon (Eds.).
Beyondformal operations: Late adolescent and adult cognitive development (pp. 43-73).
New York: Praeger.
Galilei, G. (1656, 1936). Opere, v. 1, 1656. Milano-Roma: Rizzoli.
Galilei, G. (1656, 1939). Opere, v. 2, 1656. Milano-Roma: Rizzoli.
Galilei, G. (1991). Dialogues concerning two new sciences. Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books.
GOdel, K. (1977). Some metamathematical results on completeness and consistency; On formal
undecidable propositions of Principia Mathematica and related systems I; On completeness
and consistency. In 1. Heijehoort (Ed.), From Frege to Godel: A source book in mathemati-
cal logic 1879-1931. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977 (Originally published
1930,1931,1931, respectively.)
Grossberg, S. (1971a). On the dynamics of operant conditioning. Journal of Theoretical
Biology, 33, 225-255.
Grossberg, S. (1971b). Pavlovian pattern learning by nonlinear neural networks. Proceedings
of the National Academy of Science, 68, 828-831.
Grossberg, S. (1974). Classical and instrument learning by neural networks. In R. Rosen and
F. Snell (Eds.), Progress in theoretical biology, Volume 3, New York: Academic Press.
Grossberg, S. (Ed.). (1987). The adaptive brain, Volume 1. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science
Publishers.
Hermstein, R. J. (1961). Relative and absolute strength of response as a function offrequency
of reinforcement. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 4, 267-272.
Hermstein, R. J. (1970). On the law of effect. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior,
13: 243-266.
Holton, G. J. (1979). Limits of scientific inquiry. In G. 1. Holton and R. S. Morison (Eds.). The
Twentieth-century sciences; studies in the biography of ideas. (pp. 382-422). New York:
Norton
Hull, C. L. (1951). Essentials of behavior. New Haven, Yale University Press.
Hull, C. L. (1952). A behavior system: An introduction to behavior theory concerning the
individual organism. New Haven, Yale University Press.
Inhelder, B., and Piaget, J. (1958). The growth of logical thinking from childhood to adoles-
cence: an essay on the development offormal operational structures. (A. Parsons and S.
Milgram, Trans.). New York: Basic Books (originally published, 1955).
Koestler, A. (1968). The ghost in the machine. New York, Macmillan.
Konorski, J. (1967). Integrative activity of the brain. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Konorski, J., and Miller, S. (1937). On two types of conditioned reflex. Journal of General
Psychology, 16,264-272.
Kuhn, T. S. (1962, 1972). The structure of scientific revolutions (Second Edition). Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Kuhn, T. S. (1971). The Copernican revolution. Planetary astronomy in the development of
Western thought. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Langer, E. J. (1983). The psychology of control. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
Lashley, Karl S. (1960). The neuropsychology of Lashley: Selected papers. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Leibniz, G. W. F. von, (1920). The early mathematical manuscripts of Leibniz; translated from
the Latin texts published by Carl Immanuel Gerhardt with critical and historical notes.
Chicago, London: The Open Court Publishing Company.
Lemaitre, G., and Berger, A. (1984). The Big bang and Georges Lemaitre: Proceedings of a
symposium in honour of G. Lemaitre fifty years after his initiation of big-bang cosmology,
Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, 10-13, October, 1983. Boston, Dordrecht, Hingham, MA:
Reidel, distributed by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Logan, F. A. (1955). Behavior theory and social science. Yale University Press.
Logan, F. A. (1960). Incentive: How the conditions of reinforcement affect the performance of
rats. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Logan, F. A. (1978). Systematic analyses of learning and motivation. New York: Wiley.
Malthus, T. R. (1803). Essay on the principle of population. London.
Marx, K. (1974). Das Kapital: A critique ofpolitical economy. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
McClelland, J. L., Rumelhart, D. E., and the PDP Research Group. (1985). Parallel distributed
processing: Explorations in the microstructure of cognition: Vol. 2. Psychological and
biological models. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Mill, J. S. (1967a). Essays on economics and society. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Mill, J. S. (1967b). Analysis of the phenomena of the human mind. New York: A. M. Kelley.
Mill, J. S. (1906). Utilitarianism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Minsky, M. (1968). Semantic information processing. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Minsky, M. L. and Papert, S. (1969). Perceptrons: An introduction to computational geometry.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Morris, E. K. (1992). The aim, progress, and evolution of behavior analysis. Behavior Analyst,
15(1),3-29.
Morris, E. K. (1993). Behavior analysis and mechanism: One is not the other. Behavior Analyst,
16(1),25-43.
Neimark, E. D., and Estes, W. K. (1967). Stimulus sampling theory. San Francisco:
Holden-Day.
Nevin, J. A. (1969). Signal detection theory and operant behavior. [Review of D. M. Green and
J. A. Swets, Signal detection theory and psychophysics]. Journal of the Experimental
Analysis of Behavior, 12,475-480.
Nevin, J. A. (1981). Psychophysics and reinforcement schedules: An integration. In M. L.
Commons and J. A. Nevin (Eds.), Quantitative analyses of behavior: Vol. I. Discriminative
properties of reinforcement schedules (pp. 3-27). Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
Newton, I. (1968). The mathematical principles of natural philosophy. London: Dawson.
Pascual-Leone J. (1970). A mathematical model for the decision rule in Piaget's developmental
stages. Acta Psychologica, 32, 301-345.
Pascual-Leone, J. (1976). On learning and development, Piagetian style: II. A critical historical
analysis of Geneva's research programme. Canadian Psychological Review, 17 (4).289-297.
Pascual-Leone, J. (1980). Constructive problems for constructive theories: The current
relevance of Piaget' s work and a critique of information-processing stimulation psychology.
In R. Kluwe and H. Spada (Eds.), Developmental models of thinking (pp. 293-296). New
York: Academic Press.
Pascual-Leone, J. (1984). Attention, dialectic, and mental effort: Towards an organismic theory
of life stages. In M. L. Commons, F. A. Richards and C. Armon (Eds.), Beyond formal
operations: Vol. 1. Late adolescent and adult cognitive development (pp. 182-215). New
York: Praeger.
Pavlov, I. P. (1927). Conditioned reflexes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Peebles, P. J. E., Schramm, D. N., Turner, E. L., and Kron, R. (1994). The evolution of the
universe. Scientific American, 271(4), 52-58.
Plato (1979). The works of Plato, viz. Hisfifty-five dialogues and twelve epistles. New York:
AMS Press
Plott, C. R. (1967). A notion of equilibrium and its possibility under majority rules. American
Economic Review, 57, 787-806.
Plott, C. R. (1971). Recent results in the theory of voting. In M. D. Intrilligator (Ed.). Frontiers
of quantitative economics (pp. 109-127). Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Plott, C. R., and Levine, M. E. (1978). A model of agenda influence on committee decisions.
American Economic Review, 68, 146-160.
Price, W. C., Chissick, S. S., and Heisenberg, W. (1977). The Uncertainty principle and
foundations of quantum mechanics: Afifty years' survey. New York: Wiley.
Rachlin, H. (1976). Introduction to modem behaviorism. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
Rachlin, H. (1992). Diminishing marginal value as delay discounting. Special Issue: Behavior
dynamics. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 57, 407-415.
Rachlin, H. (1994). Behavior and mind: The roots of modem psychology. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Rescorla, R. A, and Wagner, A R. (1972). A theory of Pavlovian conditioning: Variations in
the effectiveness ofreinforcement and non-reinforcement. In A H. Black and W. F. Prokasy
(Eds.), Classical conditioning, Vol. 2. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Rickaby, Joseph (1906). Free will andfour English philosophers: Hobbes, Locke, Hume and
Mill. London: Bums and Oates.
Riley, P. (1982). Will and political legitimacy: A critical exposition of social contract theory
in Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Ross, D. (1977). Aristotle. London: Methuen.
Rumelhart, D. E., McClelland, J. L., and The PDP Research Group. (Eds.). (1985). Parallel
distributed processing: Explorations in the microstructure of cognition: Vol. 1. Foundations.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Sherrington, C. S. (1904). Address to the physiological section. Cambridge, London: The
Association (British Association for the Advancement of Science. Transactions. Section 1).
Sherrington, C. S. (1906). The integrative action of the nervous system. New York: Scribner.
Sherrington, C. S. (1933). The brain and its mechanism. Cambridge University Press.
Smith, A (1776, 1784). An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. Dublin:
Whitestone; London: Printed for A Strahan; and T. Cadell.
Skinner, B. F. (1935). The generic nature of the concepts of stimulus and response. Journal of
General Psychology, 12, 40-65.
Skinner, B. F. (1937). Two types of conditioned reflex: A reply to Konorski and Miller. Journal
of General Psychology, 16,272-279.
Skinner, B. F. (1938). The behavior of organisms: An experimental analysis. New York:
Appleton.
Spence, K. W. (1956). Behavior theory and conditioning. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.
Spinoza, B. de, (1883). Ethic: demonstrated in geometrical order and divided into five parts,
which treat I. of God; II. of the nature and origin of the mind; III. of the nature and origin
of the affects; IV. of human bondage, or of the strength of the affects; V. of the power of the
intellect, or of human liberty. London: Trubner.
Thorndike, E. L. (1905). The elements ofpsychology. New York, A. G. Seiler.
Thorndike, E. L. (1932). The fundamentals of learning. New York: Teachers College, Columbia
University.
Thorndike, E. L. (1965). Animal intelligence: Experimental studies. New York: Hafner Pub. Co.
Trivers, R. L. (1985). Social Evolution. Menlo Park, CA: Benjamin Cummings Pub. Co.
Watson, J. B. (1913). Psychology as the behaviorist views it. Psychological Review, 20, 158-
177.
Watson, J. B. (1919). Psychology from the standpoint of a behaviorist. Philadelphia: Lippincott.
Watson, J. B. (1925). Behaviorism. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc.
Werner, H. (1940). Comparative psychology of mental development. New York: Harper and
Brothers.
Wheelwright, P. (Ed.). (1935, 1951). Aristotle. New York: Odyssey Press.
Windholz, G. (1986a). Pavlov and the concept of association. Pavlovian Journal of Biological
Science, 21(1),12-15.
Windholz, G. (1986b). A comparative analysis of the conditional reflex discoveries of Pavlov
and Twitmyer, and the birth of a paradigm. Pavlovian Journal of Biological Science, 21(4),
141-147.
Windholz, G. (1987). Pavlov as a psychologist: A reappraisal. Pavlovian Journal of Biological
Science, 22(3), 103-112.
Windholz, G. (1989). The discovery of the principles of reinforcement, extinction, generaliza-
tion, and differentiation of conditional reflexes in Pavlov's laboratories. Pavlovian Journal
of Biological Science, 24(2), 35-42.
Zuriff, G. E. (1986a). Precis of behaviorism: A conceptual reconstruction. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 9(4), 687-699.
Zuriff, G. E. (1986b). Conceptual reconstruction: A reconstruction. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 9(4), 716-723.
Zuriff, G. E. (1995). Continuity over change within the experimental analysis of behavior. In
J. T. Todd and E. K. Morris (Eds.), Modem perspectives on B. F. Skinner and contemporary
behaviorism. Contributions in psychology, No. 28, 171-178. Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press.
JAY MOORE
The Basic Principles of Behaviorism
Systematic viewpoints in psychology are often characterized in terms of their

stances on the subject matter and methods of the discipline. In this regard,
behaviorism is often characterized as the viewpoint holding that the appropri-
ate subject matter for psychology is behavior, rather than mental/subjective
experience, and that the appropriate methods are those of the natural sciences,
rather than introspection (see Addis, 1982; Bergmann, 1956).
However, for most individuals, behaviorism means a great deal more than
simply a statement about subject matter and methods. An entire set of
collateral assumptions typically accompanies the position. For example, some
individuals assume that in order for psychology to be an "objective" science,
its subject matter should be only behavior, which is publicly observable and
amenable to intersubjective agreement, rather than mental/subjective experi-
ence, which is private and not amenable to intersubjective agreement.
Notwithstanding their concerns with objectivity, these individuals may well
assume that mental/subjective phenomena do exist, that they are not reducible
to objective phenomena, and that they playa causal role in behavior, at the
same time the individuals rule the mental/subjective phenomena out of direct
scientific consideration. In an effort to make their science complete, these
individuals then suggest that the appropriate way to consider the men-
tal/subjective phenomena in psychological science is indirectly, as inferred
constructs, rather than as directly observed phenomena. Of course, the inferred
constructs must be appropriately derived from publicly observable phenom-
ena, which is how their objectivity is ensured. Further, they must be parsimo-
nious, and they must "pay their way" by facilitating inductive systematization.
Consideration of such inferred constructs is presumably required for adequate
explanations in psychology, in the same way that constructs have played an
important role in advancing many other sciences (Zuriff, 1985, pp. 73-78).
Strictly speaking, however, constructs in psychology cannot be inferred on
the basis of just introspective verbal reports, but rather only on the basis of
behavioral data (for additional discussion of the role of verbal reports, see
Alston, 1972; Zuriff, 1979, 1980). The constructs then playa major role in the
development of theories. Theories evolve into laws, and the resulting network
of interlocking constructs, theories, and laws constitutes psychological
knowledge (see also Moore, 1981, 1990a).
41
42 Moore
Alternatively, other individuals embrace an entirely different set of

collateral assumptions. These individuals assume that psychology is concerned
with only one dimension, the dimension in which organisms interact with their
environments, because it is the only dimension that exists. Talk of a mental
dimension with subjective phenomena that differs from a physical dimension
with objective phenomena, or talk of using behavioral data to validate inferred
constructs from a mental or subjective dimension, is a legacy of traditional
assumptions about the causes of behavior that are cherished for extraneous and
irrelevant reasons (Moore, 1981, 1994; Skinner, 1945, 1953). Any question
regarding introspection concerns the processes by which statements descrip-
tive of internal states and conditions are acquired and maintained, and the
processes by which the introspected phenomena come to influence subsequent
behavior. Perhaps some parts of the one dimension are presently inaccessible
to others, but qualitatively different dimensions are not involved for that
reason. Theories and laws are important because they permit individuals to
interact effectively with nature, not because of their "logical" status. Speaking
critically of the first set of collateral assumptions, this alternative group of
individuals feels that those assumptions have misled the science of behavior
for decades, precisely because the assumptions are mistaken about the nature
of human knowledge.
Given such dramatically different assumptions about behaviorism, one
might legitimately wonder whether both are really concerned with the same
viewpoint in psychology. In any case, the present chapter will attempt to
secure a broader understanding of the nature and principles of behaviorism.
We will first review some matters relating to the historical development of
behaviorism. Then, we will extensively consider various conceptual matters
relating to the nature and principles of behaviorism, primarily from the point
of view of B. F. Skinner's radical behaviorism. Finally, we will examine more
precisely how radical behaviorism differs from alternative positions. (For
additional overview of the major features of Skinner's behaviorism, see
Delprato and Midgley, 1992, as well as a discussion of the work of Willard
Day in Moore, 1991). We begin with a review of the historical record.
THE HISTORICAL RECORD
Texts in the history of psychology typically identify the first quarter of the
twentieth century as the period of "the behavioral revolution." As most readers
undoubtedly know, at the beginning of the century, structuralism and
functionalism were the mainstream viewpoints, and psychology was domi-
nated by an interest in analyzing experience and specifying the contents of
The Basic Principles of Behaviorism 43
consciousness through introspection (see brief review in Moore, 1994).

However, introspection was problematic (Moore, 1994, pp. 281-283; Zuriff,
1985, chapter 2). It was unreliable and did not achieve what it claimed it did.
Moreover, it was private and not capable of direct intersubjective verification.
Consequently, by the end of the first quarter of the century, a more practical
interest in analyzing behavior and specifying its determinants through
experimentation had supplanted the earlier interest in consciousness. Although
Leahey (1992) has recently questioned whether the events during these years
should actually be called a "revolution," few dispute that the years witnessed
a significant reorientation in the subject matter and methods of psychology.
Indeed, retrospective analysis suggests that important events continued to
take place during the second quarter of the twentieth century as well (Koch,
1964; Moore, 1987). Thus, we argue that if we want to talk of a "behavioral
revolution," we may usefully consider the relevant events as actually taking
place in two successive phases.
Watson's Classical S-R Behaviorism and the First Phase of the

"Behavioral Revolution"
The first phase began with the publication of Watson's famous behavioral
manifesto (Watson, 1913; note that Schneider and Morris, 1987, p. 28, have
indicated that Watson was apparently the first to use the term "behaviorism,"
as well as such cognate terms as "behaviorist" and "behavioristic"). Watson's
behaviorism is generally designated as classical S-R behaviorism, to distin-
guish it at least chronologically from the various other forms that followed.
This form of behaviorism had its roots in post-Darwinian comparative
psychology (Boakes, 1984), American functionalism (O'Donnell, 1985),
reflexology (Boakes, 1984), American pragmatism (O'Donnell, 1985; Zuriff,
1985), and the "objective" American philosophy of such figures as R. B.
Perry, E. B. Holt, and E. A. Singer (Smith, 1986).
As classical behaviorism developed, its guiding assumption was that
behavior could be understood in terms of the stimulus-response reflex model,
in virtue of the relation between publicly observable behavior and publicly
observable variables in the environment. As Koch (1964) has noted, Watson's
classical behaviorism was "objective." He emphasized S-R associations and
learning. Although Watson was one of the most celebrated comparative
psychologists of his time, his classical behaviorism also emphasized environ-
mentalism over nativism. In addition, he emphasized peripheral, rather than
"centrally initiated" processes (Watson, 1913, p. 174), and he regarded
introspection as a method that was certainly irrelevant to an understanding of
44 Moore
behavior. For that matter, said Watson, most phenomena that contemporary
society thought were important, such as consciousness and images, were
nothing more than "the result of old wives' tales and monks' lore, of the
teachings of medicinemen and priests" (Heidbreder, 1933, p. 235).
Most scholars eventually judged classical S-R behaviorism as inadequate
to account for the whole range of human behavior. For one thing, stimuli and
responses were not always correlated in the way that classical behaviorism
required. For another, the S-R model does not easily accommodate how
individuals come to use subjective terms to describe various conditions inside
their bodies. Thus, a second phase of the "behavioral revolution" began during
the late 1920s and early 1930s.
Mediational S-O-R Neobehaviorism and the Second Phase of the

"Behavioral Revolution"
The significant event during the second phase was the rise of mediational s-o-
R neobehaviorism. Mediational S-O-R neobehaviorism was characterized by
the appeal to mediating "organismic" variables that intervened between
stimulus and response, in an effort to account for the difficult problems that
classical behaviorism could not satisfactorily explain (Koch, 1964).
These intervening phenomena are unobserved, and are perhaps unobserv-
able, even in principle, by anyone. They are entities, acts, states, mechanisms,
or processes that are inferred on the evidence of publicly observable behavior.
They are presumed to "underlie" behavior, and to reside in a dimension that
differs from the dimension in which the behavior takes place, such as a neural,
psychic, mental, SUbjective, conceptual, or even hypothetical dimension.
One of the first mediational neobehaviorists was R. S. Woodworth (e.g,
Woodworth, 1929), who explicitly proposed an S-O-R formulation. The "0"
was meant precisely to accommodate such organismic variables as motives,
response tendencies, and purposes, which were presumed to determine the
effects of environmental stimuli. The learning theorists of 1930s, 1940s, and
1950s followed with an ever-expanding set of "intervening variables," no
longer necessarily related to Woodworth's original sense of "organic states."
For example, the learning theorist E. C. Tolman formalized the introduction
of "intervening variables" into psychology (see Smith, 1986, p. 116 ff.).
Tolman's variables, such as expectancies and cognitive maps, were couched
in the language of cognition. Habit strength and reaction potential in the Hull-
Spence system, as well as diffuse emotional responses of fear, relief, disap-
pointment, and hope in Mowrer's, are all further examples, although they are
couched more in the language of stimulus and response.
This general approach to behaviorism continues to dominate thinking in

psychology, although it takes many different forms. For example, one of its
currently most popular forms is cognitive psychology. In this regard, Leahey
(1994) has recently argued that cognitive/information-processing psychology
is the next step in the evolution of mediational neobehaviorism, rather than its
revolutionary successor, as is commonly thought:
Infonnation-processing psychology is a fonn of behavioralism. It represents a continuing
conceptual evolution in the psychology of adaptation .... Perhaps to those involved, the
revolt against S-R psychology was a scientific revolution; but viewed against the broader
framework of history, the revolt was a period of rapid evolutionary change, not a revolu-
tionary jump. (p. 317)
To be sure, the specific theoretical entities advanced by contemporary

cognitive psychologists are far more elaborate than those advanced 40 or 50
years ago by mediational neobehaviorists, but the question is whether the
entities are different in kind. The point of view taken here is that they are not.
(For additional development of this point, see Moore, 1992, 1995b.)
B. F. Skinner and Behavior Analysis
In any event, other forms of behaviorism also emerged during the second
phase of the behavioral revolution. One of the most notable was the behavior-
ism of B. F. Skinner (see Day, 1980). This form of behaviorism is now known
as "behavior analysis." Its practitioners are known as "behavior analysts."
As it evolved, behavior analysis developed three components as well as a
"philosophy of science" that provided an underlying conceptual framework for
the associated scientific activity. The first component is the experimental
analysis of behavior, which is the systematic context for research in psychol-
ogy, both inside the laboratory and out. The second is the applied analysis of
behavior, which is the systematic application of behavioral technology and
principles in the world outside the laboratory. The third is the conceptual
analysis of behavior, which is the philosophical, theoretical examination of the
subject matter and methods of behavior analysis, as well as those in other
forms of psychology.
The philosophy of science that guides behavior analysis is called "radical
behaviorism." The term "radical" implies a thoroughgoing behaviorism
(Bower and Hilgard, 1981, p. 169), rather than a form which argues that
certain psychological phenomena can only be regarded as inferences on the
evidence of publicly observable behavior, if they are given any status at all
(Schneider and Morris, 1987; Skinner, 1945; see also Moore, 1994, pp. 283-
285).
46 Moore
Radical behaviorism is particularly concerned with epistemology, that is,

with understanding the nature and limits of knowledge. The concern with
epistemology extends in turn to concerns with verbal behavior, the relation
between verbal behavior and knowledge, and the nature of the intellectual
activity that underlies science (Moore, 1984a).
Although radical behaviorism and behavior analysis may be regarded as
neobehavioristic in the chronological sense that they arose at about the same
time as did mediational neobehaviorism, the basic principles of radical
behaviorism differ markedly from those of the classical and mediational s-o-
R neobehaviorism reviewed elsewhere (see Catania and Hamad, 1988, for
numerous examples of the differences). Accordingly, radical behaviorism has
a lot to say about the way other viewpoints approach a science of behavior,
and especially about a viewpoint called "methodological behaviorism." Let us
now examine some conceptual features of the various viewpoints.
THE NATURE AND PRINCIPLES OF RADICAL BEHAVIORISM
Fundamental Statement
From the perspective of radical behaviorism, a person is first of all an

organism, a member of a species and a subspecies, possessing a genetic
endowment of anatomical and physiological characteristics, which are the
product of evolution. The organism becomes a person as it acquires a
repertoire of behavior by virtue of the circumstances to which it is exposed in
its lifetime. The behavior it exhibits at any moment is under the control of a
current setting. The person is able to acquire such a repertoire through the
processes of operant and respondent conditioning, which are also part of its
genetic endowment (from Skinner, 1974, p. 213).
Basic Principles of Radical Behaviorism
Given the preceding statement, the basic principles of radical behaviorism

may be expressed as follows.
Behavior is a subject matter in its own right. Radical behaviorism regards
the interaction between organism and environment (i.e., behavior) as a subject
matter in its own right. In particular, behavior is not regarded as important
because it provides epistemologically valid grounds for speaking about causal
entities from a different dimension, which must be measured if at all in
different terms or operationally defined with respect to publicly observable

phenomena.
Private events are an important part of the behavioral, rather than mental
dimension. Most of the variables with respect to which the human organism
behaves, and no doubt other organisms as well, are publicly observable.
However, not all the relevant variables are intersubjectively verifiable. Private
phenomena, accessible only to one individual, may be important in the control
of behavior. Nevertheless, they need not be approached as theoretical
inferences about causal phenomena from another dimension, such as the
"mental" dimension, simply because they are not accessible to more than one
person. The private phenomena may be incorporated at the behavioral level
as either stimuli or responses, in the same way that public stimuli and
responses are incorporated. Some private phenomena are felt conditions of the
body (e.g., pains), whereas others are covert forms of behavior that exercise
stimulus control over subsequent behavior (Moore, 1980). In some instances,
these covert forms of behavior are identified in everyday language by such
terms as "thinking," "problem solving," "recalling," and "imagining." The
important questions are (a) how do they develop, and (b) how do they enter
into the contingencies that influence subsequent behavior (Moore, 1980, 1994,
1995a). Thus, these private stimuli do not cause behavior in the sense that the
inferred entities of mediational neobehaviorism are presumed to cause
behavior. They are simply part of the environmental context in which behavior
occurs (Hayes and Brownstein, 1986). They are not always present. Even
when they are present, they do not always influence behavior. When they are
present and do influence behavior, some circumstances are responsible for
their doing so.
hnportantly, consideration of private events means that radical behaviorists
can say quite legitimately that they "do not believe there is a world of
mentation or subjective experience that is being, or must be ignored" (Skinner,
1978, p. 124). The difference is that these experiences are regarded as
behavioral, rather than mental. (For additional discussion of mental and
cognitive terms, see Skinner, 1989a, 1990).
Selection by consequences is the significant causal mode. Radical behav-
iorists embrace the Darwinian metatheoretical principle of selection by
consequences as a causal mode, and apply it comprehensively to the life
activities of organisms (see Catania and Hamad, 1988, pp. 11-76). This
selection occurs at three levels. The first is the phylogenic level, where
contingencies of survival select basic morphological characteristics and
patterns of innate behavior. The sciences of neurophysiology and ethology are
explicitly concerned with phenomena selected at this level.
48 Moore
The second is the ontogenic level, where contingencies of reinforcement

select components of an organism's repertoire during its lifetime. The science
of psychology is explicitly concerned with phenomena selected at this level.
A contingency of reinforcement is the systematic relation among antecedent
circumstance, the response, and a reinforcing consequence. The contingency
of reinforcement is the fundamental unit of analysis for behavior of this sort,
which is called "operant" behavior. A contingency is schematically depicted
as follows:
SD: R ==> SR+
This notation suggests that a discriminative stimulus ( SD ) sets the occasion
( : ) for a response ( R ) to produce (==> ) a reinforcing consequence ( SR+ ).
Most behavior analysts are interested in operant behavior, and in an analysis
of the contingencies responsible for operant behavior, rather than the derived,
actuarial effects of those contingencies within a population (Johnston and
Pennypacker, 1993; Sidman, 1960).
The third level is the cultural level, where higher-order contingencies select
cultural practices via their role in contributing to the survival of the culture.
The science of cultural anthropology is explicitly concerned with phenomena
selected at this level.
In sum, behavior is a function of (a) an individual's genetic endowment, as
contingencies of survival select behavioral and morphological characteristics
during the lifetime of the species; (b) an individual's material environment, as
such factors as contingencies of reinforcement select the behavior of the
individual during its lifetime; and (c) an individual's sociallcultural environ-
ment, as sociaVcultural contingencies select broader practices affecting the
survival of the group to which the individual belongs.
Anti-mentalism. Radical behaviorism is also staunchly anti-mentalistic. In
simplest terms, mentalism has two components (Day, 1969a, p. 501). The first
consists in appealing to inner causes when trying to explain the origin of
behavior (Moore, 1981, 1990a). Dualism, in which the mind (or some
phenomenon in the nonphysical, nonmaterial dimension) is presumed to cause
behavior (which is in the physical, material dimension), is probably the most
common form of mentalism, but a variety of other forms are possible.
Examples of these inner causes include the various entities, acts, states,
mechanisms, or processes that are the stock in trade of traditional psychology.
The second component is the implicit assumption that the aforementioned
phenomena operate in a neural, psychic, "mental," subjective, conceptual, or
hypothetical dimension that differs from the behavioral dimension (Moore,
1981, 1990a). Thus, mentalism also brings with it an implicit commitment to
a bifurcation of the world into physical and mental realms or domains. Such
commitments tend to create various digressions into ontological matters,

dealing with which is notoriously difficult:
It is a little too simple to paraphrase the behavioristic alternative by saying that there is
indeed only one world and that it is the world of matter, for the word "matter" is then no
longer useful. Whatever the stuff may be of which the world is made, it contains organ-
isms (of which we are examples) which respond to other parts of it and thus "know" it
in a sense not far removed from "contact." Where the dualist must account for discrepan-
cies between the real world and the world of experience. and the Berkeleyan idealist be-
tween different experiences, the behaviorist investigates discrepancies among different
responses. (Skinner, 1969, pp. 248-249)
In any case, radical behaviorists feel most forms of contemporary psychol-

ogy are mentalistic by the definition above, especially positions derived from
mediational neobehaviorism, by virtue of their appeal to the mediators from
a mental dimension. Contemporary cognitive psychology is a decidedly
unselfconscious example of a mentalistic orientation, but not the only one.
Any form of psychology that satisfies this definition is mentalistic. Of course,
just saying "mental" words is not by itself mentalistic. Rather, what makes a
given statement mentalistic is appealing to mental phenomena as causes in the
explanation of the behavior.
Pragmatism. Radical behaviorism also adopts a pragmatic orientation
toward such matters as truth, values, and ethics. These matters are assessed in
terms of contingencies affecting the lives of individuals. These contingencies
operate across short and long periods of time, for individuals, for the so-
cial/cultural group to which the individual belongs, and for the species to
which the individual belongs.
Absent from radical behaviorism is any rigid claim that "Truth" is deter-
mined by testing a hypothesis in an experiment that involves random assign-
ment of subjects and inferential statistics. Radical behaviorism adopts a
pragmatic theory of truth, wherein truth is a matter of successful working in
everyday life (Hayes and Brownstein, 1986). Indeed, radical behaviorism is
extraordinarily libertarian when it comes to alternative verbal practices (cf.
Mahoney, 1989). As Skinner said,
We may quarrel with any analysis which appeals to ... an inner determiner of action, but
the facts which have been represented with such devices cannot be ignored. (1953, p.
284)
No entity or process which has any useful explanatory force is to be rejected on the
ground that it is subjective or mental. The data which have made it important must, how-
ever, be studied and formulated in effective ways. (1964, p. 96)
Interpretation is especially important in connection with a pragmatic

orientation. For the radical behaviorist, interpretation is the making sense out
of events when those events cannot be further investigated. A representative
statement is found in Skinner's (1974) own writing:
50 Moore
Obviously we cannot predict or control human behavior in daily life with the precision
obtained in the laboratory, but we can nevertheless use results from the laboratory to
interpret behavior elsewhere .... [A]II sciences resort to something much like it .... [T]he
principles of genetics are used to interpret the facts of evolution, as the behavior of sub-
stances under high pressures and temperatures are used to interpret geological events in
the history of the earth. (pp. 228-229)
Interpretation plays a large role in radical behaviorism. Skinner stated his

most important book was Verbal Behavior, precisely because it was "an
exercise in interpretation rather than a quantitative extrapolation of rigorous
experimental results" (1957, p. 11). Most everyday functioning, of course,
involves a considerable degree of interpretation, because the knowledge
claims of everyday life simply are not typically the result of conducting
carefully controlled experiments. Rather, they are the result of applying what
has been learned elsewhere to beneficial effect. That is, they are the result of
interpretation.
Verbal behavior and scientific explanations are behavioral, rather than
logical phenomena. Skinner (1957, pp. 1-2) defined verbal behavior as
behavior that is reinforced through the mediation of other persons. Verbal
behavior is regarded as operant behavior, and is to be given the same analysis
as any other form of operant behavior. In particular, it does not give special
evidence of underlying mental processes or subjective phenomena. Verbal
behavior is also not amenable to the early associationistic, S-R model of
classical behaviorism. Rather, as operant behavior, verbal behavior is analyzed
in terms of the underlying contingencies. In particular, the special verbal
behavior in science, for example, the verbal behavior that is involved in
theorizing and explaining, is to be analyzed in the same behavioral terms as
other forms of verbal behavior (Skinner, 1957, chap. 18).
Our culture should actively promote practices that increase the quality of
life for its citizens. Radical behaviorism advocates a certain "behavioral
activism" in the culture. Our culture is threatened with war, overpopUlation,
degradation of the environment, and no doubt other possibilities too calami-
tous to contemplate. Importantly, the problems may be construed as behav-
ioral problems. If they are behavioral problems, then a behavioral technology
can be brought to bear on them, according to known behavioral principles.
Indeed, it would be unfortunate if a behavioral technology was not brought to
bear on them. A culture that cannot instill the importance among its citizens
of addressing the threats to its survival will probably not survive. Perhaps the
very survival of our culture depends on carrying out these steps.
METHODOLOGICAL BEHAVIORISM
We may now consider another viewpoint in what is conventionally regarded

as behaviorist thought, "methodological behaviorism." In brief, methodologi-
cal behaviorism is the formally developed epistemological basis for the
fundamental behaviorist position on the subject matter and methods of
psychology (Day, 1976, 1980; Moore, 1981, 1989, 1990a). The principal
thesis of methodological behaviorism is that in order for psychology to be an
objective and meaningful science, psychology can be concerned only with the
relation between publicly observable behavior and publicly observable
behavioral, physiological, and environmental variables of the past and present.
In particular, psychology cannot be concerned with mentaVsubjective
experience, and it cannot use introspective reports. Two corollaries are (a) that
behavior can be adequately explained without appeal to "mental" terms, and
(b) that any use of mental terms is meaningful only to the extent that the terms
are related to publicly observable behavior.
Consequently, the mature form of methodological behaviorism involves the
following characteristics:
1. That scientific knowledge is different from, and is intrinsically superior
to, common sense knowledge, by virtue of being derived from publicly
observable phenomena.
2. That scientific knowledge is gained from carefully controlled experi-
ments which test predictions from hypotheses and evaluate results using
impartial tests of statistical inference; replication, reliability, and gener-
alizability are the central issues in evaluating the validity of the results.
3. That scientific knowledge involves constructing logical domains, within
which the logical properties of symbolic entities and mathematical formulae
are to be established; hypotheses derived from manipulation of these symbolic
entities evolve into theories, theories evolve into laws, and deductions from
the laws may be taken as explanations of the event under consideration.
4. That in order for the elements of the scientific endeavor to be admissible
into the body of science, psychologists must be able to specify the publicly
observable techniques for securing and expressing those elements.
5. That those elements consist of publicly observable independent (stimu-
lus) variables and publicly observable dependent (response) variables.
Two additional characteristics are relevant. Recall that neobehaviorists
added mediating organismic variables to the S-R conceptual framework of
classical behaviorism. These mediating or intervening variables were not
necessarily publicly observable. How were they to be treated? The answer is
as inferred constructs, derived from publicly observable phenomena. Thus, we
can add the final two characteristics:
52 Moore
6. That the elements may also include any mediating organismic (interven-
ing/hypothetical) variables, provided that they are "operationally defined" in
terms of publicly observable stimuli or responses.
7. That causal processes are to be accommodated according to a linear chain
model, S ~ 0 ~ R, where the middle term identifies the operationally
defined, mediating organismic variables.
As is evident, methodological behaviorism and mediational neobehaviorism
are tightly linked: The mediating organismic variables are the various inferred
entities, acts, states, mechanisms, or processes that mediational neobehav-
iorism argued were necessary for adequate explanations in psychology. If the
mediating organismic variables in an explanation are not publicly observable
- and they are not for virtually every scientific statement after classical S-R
behaviorism, then methodological behaviorism supplies the necessary logical
validity to the scientific endeavor by requiring that those variables be treated
as one or another form of logical or theoretical construct that is derived from
behavioral data. Finally, note that Zuriff (1985, p. 69) identifies a causal role
of these intervening variables: They "mediate causality" by bridging the
temporal gap between independent and dependent variables.
Methodological behaviorism is the dominant position in contemporary
behavioral science. As Bergmann (1956) said in his canonical statement on
methodological behaviorism, "Virtually every American psychologist,
whether he knows it or not, is nowadays a methodological behaviorist" (p.
270). Because mediational neobehaviorism and cognitive psychology are
tightly linked (Leahey, 1994), cognitive psychology is linked to methodologi-
cal behaviorism as well. George Mandler, a prominent cognitive psychologist,
echoes Bergmann's methodological behaviorism in the following passages:
[N]o cognitive psychologist worth his salt today thinks of subjective experience as a da-
tum. It's a construct .... Your private experience is a theoretical construct to me. I have
no direct access to your private experience. I do have direct access to your behavior. In
that sense, I'm a behaviorist. In that sense, everybody is a behaviorist today. (from Baars,
1986, p. 256)
We [cognitive psychologists] have not returned to the methodologically confused posi-
tion of the late nineteenth century, which cavalierly confused introspection with theoreti-
cal processes and theoretical processes with conscious experience. Rather, many of us
have become methodological behaviorists in order to become good cognitive psycholo-
gists. (Mandler, 1979, p. 281)
Methodological behaviorism exerts its impact via the methodology and

resulting theories that are part of contemporary psychology, by virtue of the
epistemological assumptions described above. One does not take courses
specifically titled "Methodological Behaviorism 101." Rather, nearly all of
what is taught in personality theory, social psychology, learning theory,
perception, cognitive psychology, etc., is taught from a mediational neobe-
haviorist perspective and is predicated on the orthodoxy of methodological

behaviorism, as it is described above. The data base that constitutes contempo-
rary thought in these fields emerges from the resulting investigative efforts,
given those assumptions.
Methodological Behaviorism and Ontology
In principle, methodological behaviorists strive to remain neutral on such

ontological matters as monism, materialism, or dualism. They simply contend
that whatever one proposes must ultimately be decided in terms of publicly
observable data. In this way, methodological behaviorists hold their inferred
constructs, theories, and explanations are meaningful because they are
objectively and empirically linked to the world of physical events.
In practice, however, the issue is not so clear. From the outset, many
methodological behaviorists believed that the inferred phenomena really were
from a "mental" dimension and really did exist. In fact, many methodological
behaviorists embraced their position precisely because it allowed them to
retain mental concepts but appear to be "scientific" about it, which they could
not be if they practiced introspection. For example, Bergmann (1956) is
widely regarded as the archetypal methodological behaviorist. Bergmann
rejected the metaphysics of "interacting minds," but the interaction was what
he rejected, not the dualistic ontology of mental and physical, of mind and
body. Bergmann adopted a version of psychophysiological parallelism that
fully endorsed minds and mental phenomena that were qualitatively different
from publicly observable behavior. To do otherwise was "silly," and "a lot of
patent nonsense" (Bergmann, 1956, p. 266). Indeed, Natsoulas (1984) points
out that Bergmann (a) admits mental episodes that are different from physical
episodes (p. 52), (b) admits mental causes for behavior (p. 63), and (c)
concedes that mental variables may legitimately be invoked to explain
behavior (p. 64). Moreover, Natsoulas (1983) discusses extensively "the mind-
body dualism of methodological behaviorism" (p. 13) and how methodologi-
cal behaviorism considers "conscious content to be mental as distinct from
physical" (p. 5). Thus, methodological behaviorism is committed at the very
least to a position known as "epistemological dualism," where two dimensions
are assumed in the knower, if not in the known (see also the discussion of
epistemological dualism in Boring, 1950, p. 667; Smith, 1986, pp. 116 ff.,
especially p. 130). In short, methodological behaviorism hardly guarantees
that science is free from one sort of ontological commitment or another. It is
simply another form of mentalism, and the mistake is not to recognize it as
such (for further development of this point, see Koch, 1964, e.g., "I think that
54 Moore
for ... methodological variants of behaviorism (and I am not convinced that the
methodological variety is quite so 'uncontaminated' with metaphysics as
stereotype would have it), the following can be said: These are essentially
irrational positions ... which cannot be implemented without brooking self-
contradiction" [po 6]).
RADICAL BEHAVIORIST CONCERNS ABOUT MENTALISM AND

METHODOLOGICAL BEHAVIORISM
As readers no doubt suspect by this time, the first interpretation of behavior-

ism offered at the beginning of this chapter is that of methodological behav-
iorism. In contrast, the second is that of radical behaviorism. Radical behav-
iorists argue that methodological behaviorism is based on an entire series of
mentalistic beliefs about (a) the nature of verbal behavior, (b) the relation
between verbal behavior and knowledge, and (c) the role of theories in
knowledge and explanation. What are these mentalistic assumptions, and
where do they come from? The answers are to be found in a critical review of
the history of psychology, or indeed, the intellectual history of Western
civilization (Day, 1980; Moore, 1990a, 1992). In brief, radical behaviorists
argue that mentalism began thousands of years ago, when individuals
fundamentally misinterpreted such phenomena as dreams and perception.
Mentalism was then institutionalized as Western culture developed. Today,
mentalism is strongly entrenched in various societal and cultural institutions
that are cherished for incidental reasons. Our religious and judicial systems are
but two examples of such institutions.
Radical behaviorists further argue that methodological behaviorism
crystallized during the 1930s, when psychologists realized that Watson's S-R
classical behaviorism did not actually provide an adequate alternative to the
study of the contents of consciousness through introspection. Thus, neobe-
haviorists began to modify Watson's S-R formulation by inserting intervening,
organismic variables, thereby spawning mediational neobehaviorism. The
question was how to remain scientifically respectable in the process.
Operation ism and Theoretical Terms
Although the entire story is quite complex, suffice it to say at this point that
the principles of operationism (as in "operational definitions"; Bridgman,
1927), which was developing in physics, and "logical positivism," which was
developing in philosophy (see Smith, 1986), seemed to provide the required
respectability. Under the auspices of operationism and logical positivism, two

kinds of scientific terms were recognized: observational terms and theoretical
terms. Observational terms were first-order terms referring to the standard
physical attributes or properties of objects and events. In contrast, theoretical
terms were higher-order constructions, "operationally defined" in terms of the
scientist's observations and procedures.
As the scene played out, two kinds of theoretical terms were then recog-
nized: intervening variables and hypothetical constructs (MacCorquodale and
Meehl, 1948). Intervening variables were exhaustively reducible to the
publicly observable variables from which they were derived. These terms
involved no hypothesis as to the existence of other, unobserved entities or
processes. Intervening variables did not admit "surplus meaning." (Note that
some writers, including MacCorquodale and Meehl who were apparently
following Tolman's original terminology, also use "intervening variable" to
refer to any theoretical term; to avoid terminological confusion, we use
"theoretical term" as the overarching, generic term and "intervening variable"
as the first of the two specific sorts of theoretical terms; the original sense of
operational definition was that of the intervening variable.)
MacCorquodale and Meehl then proposed a second sort of theoretical term,
which they called a "hypothetical construct." Hypothetical constructs were not
exhaustively reducible to the publicly observable variables from which they
were derived. These terms were taken to refer to an existing but currently
unobserved process or entity. Because they were thought to refer to processes
or entities that actually existed, hypothetical constructs did admit "surplus
meaning." (Again, to avoid terminological confusion, we use "hypothetical
construct" as the second of the two specific sorts of theoretical terms.)
After a period of uncertainty, neobehaviorists came to regard most
mediating organismic variables in their S-O-R model as theoretical terms, and
ultimately as hypothetical constructs. For example, consider the following
passage from Tolman (1949):
I am now convinced that "intervening variables" to which we attempt to give merely
operational meaning by tying them through empirically grounded functions either to
stimulus variables, on the one hand, or to response variables, on the other, really can give
us no help unless we can also imbed them in a model from whose attributed properties
we can deduce new relationships to look for. That is, to use MacCorquodale and Meehl's
distinction, I would abandon what they call pure "intervening variables" for what they
call "hypothetical constructs," and insist that hypothetical constructs be parts of a more
general hypothesized model or substrate. (p. 49)
The result was the mature form of methodological behaviorism that now
dominates contemporary psychology. Note that question has already been
raised as to whether these mediating theoretical terms were "mental" in nature,
given the latitude afforded by interpreting them as hypothetical constructs. If
56 Moore
so, then question may legitimately be raised as to whether methodological

behaviorism really differs from mentalism, and whether mediational neobe-
haviorism really differs from cognitive psychology (Moore, 1989, 1992;
Natsoulas, 1984).
Why are these matters troublesome to radical behaviorists? Closer analysis
suggests that much research activity in contemporary psychology is at best a
kind of sophisticated census-taking, where traditional psychologists study
behavior engendered in our culture by common contingencies, but then do not
attribute the behavior to the contingencies. Instead, in the fashion of "folk
psychology," traditional psychologists attribute the behavior to some under-
lying neural, mental, or conceptual "cause," which takes the form of the
mediating variable. At issue is whether the resulting theories of behavior are
incomplete and vague, obscure important details, allay curiosity by getting us
to accept fictitious way stations as explanatory, impede the search for relevant
environmental variables, misrepresent the facts to be accounted for, falsely
assure us about the state of our knowledge, and lead to the continued use of
scientific techniques that should be abandoned, for example, because they are
wasteful (e.g., Catania and Hamad, 1988, p. 102). If the answers to the
questions above are in the affirmative - and for radical behaviorists they are,
then positions linked with methodological behaviorism, such as mediational
neobehaviorism, actually interfere with effective prediction, control, and
explanation of events, notwithstanding arguments to the contrary. They
interfere precisely because they lead investigators to search for things in
another dimension. That is, they do not lead investigators to analyze contin-
gencies operating in the behavioral dimension (Moore, 1990a).
THE CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF BEHAVIOR
As suggested by the review above, perhaps the greatest differences between

radical behaviorism and other forms of psychological thought associated with
methodological behaviorism lie in the (a) respective conceptions of verbal
behavior and (b) respective conceptions of the verbal activities that are taken
to constitute a causal explanation of behavior. Let us now examine these
differences.
Traditional vs. Radical Behaviorist Conceptions of Verbal Behavior
The distinction between observational and theoretical terms in traditional

psychology owes its origin to a reference theory of meaning and logical
analyses of verbal behavior. An observational term is taken to refer to some

entity that can be "observed" by anyone, by virtue of its primary qualities.
However, individuals obviously speak about other qualities and attributes of
their environment. What is the referent of these qualities and attributes?
According to the traditional view, it must be something internal and unobserv-
able, constructed by and existing solely for the individual in question. Because
the referent is created internally, it is designated as a "theoretical term." As a
theoretical term referring to some construct that is not publicly observable, its
meaning must be established through operational definition and logical
analysis. Worth noting is that this whole position is predicated on the notion
that words are things that refer to other things. If those other things are not in
the intersubjectively verifiable world, then the other things must be creations
of the speaking individual, in the "subjective" world of that individual. The
problems with mentalism and epistemological dualism are extensive here.
As Day (1969b, p. 319) noted, the traditional conception assumes that the
chief function of language is to identify the Platonic nature of the thing spoken
about. It assumes that any time we do speak, the words we use are things that
refer to other things in the world at large that have actually been declared as
metaphysically real and permanent, by virtue of the inherent qualities that give
the things their identities. We then attempt to search out and isolate the things
talked about, instead of approaching the problem behaviorally.
The radical behaviorist looks instead to the contingencies that control the
verbal behavior in question. The radical behaviorist asks simply whether the
language in question manifests "control by ordinary language habits, extensive
chains of familiar intraverbals, and one or another preconception about the
inherent nature of scientific explanation" (Day, 1969b, p. 323)? If so - and
radical behaviorists argue that it is so for much of traditional psychology,
radical behaviorists are suspicious of the explanatory effort.
Alternatively, is the verbal behavior in question controlled by environ-
mental variables, perhaps including environmental variables within the
speaker's skin? If so, then a significant starting point begins for an explanation
of the event in question (see additional discussion in Moore, 1981, 1984a,
1984b).
The magnitude of the distinction between radical behaviorism and tradi-
tional viewpoints in psychology is not often appreciated. In particular, on the
radical behaviorist view, scientific terms are not things that stand for,
symbolize, or refer to objects in the environment or some subjective dimen-
sion unique to the scientist. A given instance of verbal behavior may be under
the discriminative control of an object, but no scientific term is a thing or
construct that stands for, symbolizes, or refers to another thing. By all rights,
the statement that a scientific term is a construct that symbolizes or refers to
58 Moore
an another thing ought to be just as odd as the statement that a pigeon's key
peck to a lighted response key is a construct that stands for or refers to the
light; that the statement perhaps does not sound as odd is ample testimony to
the pervasiveness of nonbehavioral approaches to verbal behavior ("Attempts
to derive a symbolic function from the principle of conditioning '" have been
characterized by a very superficial analysis .... Modern logic, as a formaliza-
tion of 'real' languages, retains and extends this dualistic theory of meaning
and can scarcely be appealed to by the psychologist who recognizes his own
responsibility in giving an account of verbal behavior", Skinner, 1945, pp.
270-271). A scientific term is simply an instance of behavior that is under the
discriminative control of its antecedent setting, just as the pigeon's response
is an instance of behavior that is under the discriminative control of its
antecedent setting. The meaning of a scientific term for the speaker derives
from the conditions that occasion its utterance. The meaning for the listener
derives from the contingencies into which the term enters as a discriminative
stimulus (Moore, 1995a). Importantly, radical behaviorism does not distin-
guish between observational and theoretical terms. Radical behaviorism is
therefore not concerned with the difference between theoretical terms of any
interpretation, such as whether a given term is an intervening variable or a
hypothetical construct (Moore, 1992; cf. MacCorquodale and Meehl, 1948;
Zuriff, 1985). Rather, radical behaviorism is concerned with the contingencies
that are responsible for a given instance of verbal behavior, and the contingen-
cies into which the verbal artifact subsequently enters.
Nature of Causal Explanation According to Traditional Approaches
Harre (1970) and Block (1980) exhibit representative traditional positions on

the nature of causal explanation. First, consider Harre (1970):
Scientific knowledge consists of two main kinds of infonnation.
1. Knowledge of the internal structures, constitutions, natures, and so on of things
and materials, as various atoms and galaxies, for these are what persist.
2. Knowledge of the statistics of events, of the behavior of persisting things and
materials. In this way we discern patterns amongst events. In an explanation we show
how the patterns discerned amongst events are produced by the persisting natures and
constitutions of things and materials. (p. 125)
Similarly, consider Block (1980), who identifies a mode of explanation "that

relies on a decomposition of a system into its component parts and the way the
parts are integrated with one another" (p. 171). Clearly, a time-honored aspect
of causal explanation is consideration of two sorts of data: (a) the various
characteristics of the elements of the phenomenon, and (b) the observable

behavior of the phenomenon as a whole.
This approach to scientific explanation is widespread in psychology.
Consider the following quotes from Wessells, who addresses the relation
between cognitive and behavioral psychology as he sees it:
[T]he principal aim of cognitive psychology is to explain behavior by specifying on a
conceptual level the universal, internal structures and processes through which the envi-
ronment exerts its effects. (Wessells, 1981, p. 167)
The trouble is, for cognitivists, functional relations between environment and behavior
are not explanatory ... No amount of order among observables will satisfy the desire to
discover the internal processes through which the environment influences behavior.
(Wessells, 1982, p. 75)
Wessells here subscribes to the traditional pattern of explanation in the fashion

of Harre and Block. Presumably, Wessells intends to distinguish cognitive
psychology from behaviorism on the basis of such statements. However, if the
statements are intended to promote such a distinction, the statements are off
the mark because by virtue of its commitment to hypothetical constructs,
mediational neobehaviorism never restricted itself to publicly observable
phenomena. Thus, the statements are just as true of mediational neobehav-
iorism as of cognitive psychology. Consider the following passage from
Kimble (1985):
Even in Watson's day there were those, most notably Tolman, who attempted to bring
mentalistic-sounding concepts back into psychology by means of what amounted to op-
erational definitions. In a general way, the operational point of view did nothing more
than insist that terms designating unobservables be defined in ways that relate them to
observables. From there it proceeded to a further insistence that concepts defined in this
way must have a relationship to behavior. In this way these concepts became intervening
variables, ones that stand between observable antecedent conditions on the one hand and
behavior on the other. The diagram below serves to summarize this point:
Antecedent - Mentalistic - Behavior
Conditions Concepts
Independent- Intervening - Dependent
Variables Variables Variables
Obviously, there is nothing in this formula to exclude mentalistic concepts. In fact,
the whole point of it is to admit unobservables. (p. 316)
Readers will recall that Hull (1943) appealed to an "oscillation factor" (pp.
304 ff.) and "afferent neural interactions" (pp. 349 ff.), and Tolman (1948) to
"cognitive maps," none of which are merely small-scale facsimiles of publicly
observable behavior. Thus, Wessells' statements about the importance of
internal processes apply equally well to mediational neobehaviorism, and both
positions are thoroughly in keeping with the traditional explanatory view
described earlier. The conclusion is that cognitive psychology and mediational
60 Moore
neobehaviorism are of a kind, in that they both exhibit the same traditional
explanatory position derived from methodological behaviorism.
Wessells (1981, pp. 167-168) states that very great differences exist
between cognitivists and behaviorists regarding goals and conceptions of
explanation, and that in order to achieve extensive cooperation between
behaviorists and cognitivists, these differences will have to be reconciled.
Wessells' point is well-taken, but merits clarification. From the radical
behaviorist perspective, both mediational neobehaviorism and cognitive
psychology are derived from a set of assumptions about the subject matter and
methods of psychology that are not related in any significant way to the
relation between behavior and the circumstances in which it occurs ("I shall
not go into my own reasons for the popularity of cognitive psychology. It has
nothing to do with scientific advances but rather with the release of the
floodgates of mentalistic terms fed by the tributaries of philosophy, theology,
history, letters, media, and worst of all, the English language", Skinner in
Catania and Hamad, 1988, p. 447). Rather, they are related to inappropriate
metaphors, culturally established patterns of speech, and so on, none of which
are appropriate from a strict scientific perspective. Much of Skinner's later
writing was concerned with elucidating the prevalence of this form of stimulus
control over the verbal behavior called "cognitive" (Skinner, 1989a, 1990).
Thus, from the perspective of radical behaviorism, both cognitive psychology
and mediational neobehaviorism are forms of scientific verbal behavior that
are too much controlled by extraneous considerations. The very great
differences lie between radical behaviorism on the one hand, and traditional
psychology, as exemplified by both mediational neobehaviorism and cognitive
psychology, on the other (see also Hineline, 1984, p. 98; Marr, 1983, p. 12;
Moore, 1983; Schnaitter, 1984, p. 7).
In short, legitimate question may be raised as to whether methodological
behaviorism is genuinely a behaviorism, or whether it is just another version
of mentalism, disguised in different clothing (see also Leahey, 1994, pp. 138-
139). As Skinner (1945) noted in a famous passage:
It is agreed that the data of psychology must be behavioral rather than mental if psychol-
ogy is to be a member of the Unified Sciences, but the position taken is merely that of
'methodological' behaviorism .... [Methodological behaviorism] is least objectionable
to the subjectivist because it permits him to retain 'experience' for the purpose of 'non-
physicalistic' self-knowledge. The position is not genuinely operational because it shows
an unwillingness to abandon fictions. (pp. 292-293)
The Nature of Causal Explanation According to Radical Behaviorism
To be sure, radical behaviorists have their own view of causal explanation

(Moore, 1981, 1984a, 1990b). Radical behaviorists argue that two questions
are clearly relevant:
1. What are the features of the world with which the person interacts?
2. How does the person's body work when it interacts with those features
of the world?
Nevertheless, these two questions are different. An answer to one does not
constitute an answer to the other. The first question is of concern to psychol-
ogy. The second is of concern to physiology (see also Moore, 1990b, pp. 474-
476). Therefore, given the division of labor within a science of behavior, the
best contribution that a genuine behaviorism can make is a functional
explanation that involves, as appropriate, the analysis of (a) the contingencies
of survival that have selected the physiological and innate behavioral
characteristics through the evolution of the species, and (b) the contingencies
of reinforcement that have selected (i) a behavioral repertoire during the
lifetime of the individual and (ii) the practices of the culture in which the
individual lives. Such explanations describe uniformities in those contingen-
cies across many different circumstances, using a minimum number of terms.
The foregoing should not be taken to imply that any mention of unobserved,
internal phenomena pertaining to the behaving organism is irrelevant. For
example, the section on private events described how phenomena accessible
to only one individual may be relevant in a science of behavior, but the role
played by these private events is not the initiating causal role attributed to the
mental events of traditional psychology. Some of these phenomena are
behavioral, such as (a) the processes associated with verbal reports of bodily
states and (b) the emission of covert behavior that then contributes to the
stimulus control over subsequent behavior. As indicated earlier, control by
these private events is not inevitable, any more than control by public events
is inevitable. They are not part of every behavioral event, and they exert their
effect only by virtue of prior circumstances. They sometimes influence, but
they never initiate. When they influence, they do so by virtue of a preceding
developmental history (Catania and Hamad, p. 486). In any case, unobserved,
internal phenomena are not endowed with efficient power to cause behavioral
events to occur, and the process of causal explanation does not consist of
appealing to such phenomena.
Other phenomena are physiological and relate to the second of the two
questions above. These phenomena concern the two unavoidable gaps in a
behavioral account. The first gap is between behavior and the variables of
which it is a function, as the behavior takes place. The second gap is between
62 Moore
the experiences of an organism in its surrounding circumstances and any

resulting changes in its behavior, as the behavior is observed in the future.
Information about the events that take place during these gaps will be
provided by physiologists, rather than psychologists, although psychologists
will inform the physiologists what to look for.
As Skinner (1953, 1969, 1974, 1989a) has suggested, information about a
current inner state might even be preferred. When we can directly observe the
current state of an organism, we can predict behavior on the basis of that state.
When we can directly generate or change a state, we can use it to control
behavior.
However, only the science of physiology can fill those two gaps. In doing
so it provides additional information that will guide efforts to predict and
control behavior. It is not necessary for a more valid account of behavior as
a process. The following selection from Skinner (1989b) illustrates the radical
behaviorist perspective:
No account of what is happening inside the human body, no matter how complete, will
explain the origins of human behavior. What happens inside the body is not a beginning.
By looking at how a clock is built, we can explain why it keeps good time, but not why
keeping time is important, or how the clock came to be built that way .... Only when we
take ... histories into account can we explain why people behave as they do.
[N]othing is being ignored. Behavior analysts leave what is inside the black box to those
who have the instruments and methods needed to study it properly. (pp. 24-25)
Behavior analysis and physiology provide mutual and reciprocal support for
each other; physiology does not provide the logical grounds for validating
behavior analytic explanations. Behavior analysis and a theoretical behavioral
neuroscience are therefore complementary sciences. Behavior analysis gives
neuroscience a direction, just as the early science of genetics gave the study
of the gene its direction (Catania and Hamad, 1988, p. 470). Physiological
information, such as how an organism has been changed by interactions with
its environment, can compensate for a possibly inadequate behavioral
specification of those interactions. At issue is whether cognitive psychology
as it currently is practiced is such a legitimate, theoretical neuroscience. For
Skinner (1978), the answer is clearly not: "cognitive constructs give physiolo-
gists a misleading account of what they will find inside" (p. 111).
The Theoretical Stance of Radical Behaviorism
An important point is that radical behaviorist concerns about methodological

behaviorist explanations do not tum simply on the extent to which an
approach is deemed "theoretical." Radical behaviorism is not opposed to

theories in principle. As Skinner (1972) has said,
Behavior can only be satisfactorily understood by going beyond the facts themselves.
What is needed is a theory of behavior .... Whether particular experimental psychologists
like it or not, experimental psychology is properly and inevitably committed to the con-
struction of a theory of behavior. A theory is essential to the scientific understanding of
behavior as a subject matter. (pp. 301-302)
Rather, theories are regarded as verbal behavior. They are occasioned by

certain antecedent conditions, and reinforced by certain other conditions
(Skinner, 1957, chapter 18). As Zuriff (1985) puts it, a theory is
a formulation using a minimal number of terms to represent a large number of experi-
mental facts .... As the theory develops, it integrates more facts in increasingly more
economical formulations. Theoretical concepts thus merely collate observations and do
not refer to nonbehavioral processes. A Skinnerian theory is, therefore, a simple, compre-
hensive, and abstract description of a corpus of data. (p. 89)
Such theories function as a form of discriminative stimulation that guides

future action through either (a) direct manipulation of environmental events
or (b) action when direct manipulation is not feasible, as in some cases of
prediction and interpretation. Always at issue are the contingencies governing
the verbal behavior regarded as explanatory (Moore, 1990a, pp. 25 ff.).
What radical behaviorism does reject is the traditional view of theories as
formal statements that appeal to causal events and entities in other dimensions,
with observational and theoretical terms, where the latter are operationally
defined as either intervening variables or hypothetical constructs (cf. Zuriff,
1985, chaps. 4 and 5). In particular, radical behaviorism rejects the sorts of
mentalistic theories that appeal to unobserved events and entities that take
place somewhere else, at some other level of observation, in a different
dimension (neural, psychic, "mental," subjective, conceptual, hypothetical),
where those entities must be described in different terms (Skinner, 1950). It
further rejects the assumption that causal explanation in psychology, and
psychological knowledge in general, consists in framing such theories. Indeed,
radical behaviorism argues that the assumption that psychological knowledge
necessarily consists in the formulation of such theories is a further illustration
of the same mentalistic problem.
Radical Behaviorism, Internal Entities, and Dispositions
In general terms, a disposition is usually regarded as some physical property,

inherent in an object, by virtue of which a given set of circumstances is likely
to cause some event to take place concerning that object (Quine, 1974, p. 8).
Hocutt (1985) has recently discussed the status of dispositions in causal
64 Moore
explanations by examining the question of why a magnetized bar attracts iron

filings:
One might hold that a bar's being magnetic causes it to attract iron filings .... However,
a behaviorist thinks that view a little too crude to capture the complicated truth. On his
view, we ought not to say that magnetism causes the bar to attract iron filings; rather, we
ought to say that the bar's attracting iron filings is one manifestation of its being mag-
netic ... We ought to say this because, strictly speaking, there is no such entity as mag-
netism; there are just magnetic entities. So, the cause, strictly so-called, of the bar's at-
tracting filings is not its "magnetism" but either the process (e.g., of shooting electricity
through it) that made it magnetic or the proximity of the filings. If we wish, we may say
that the magnet attracts iron filings because it is magnetic, but there would be little clear
sense in saying that its magnetism causes it to attract iron filings .... [I]t is inaccurate to
say that the arrangement of its molecules causes the bar to attract filings. Rather, what
causes the bar to attract iron filings, given that it is magnetic, is our placing it close to the
filings ... (pp. 93-94)
In this passage, Hocutt nicely makes the requisite argument. He does not reject
the relevance of information about the inner state; note that he acknowledges
the importance of that information by saying "given that it [the bar] is
magnetic." He maintains a balance between internal and relational sorts of
information by indicating that the answer to the question of why the bar
attracts iron filings is to be found in an analysis of its external circumstances:
by being placed in proximity to the filings. The answer is not to be found by
appealing to an internal entity called "magnetism."
How does all this relate to dispositions and the kind of explanations
advocated in radical behaviorism? The dispositional analyses of famous
English analytic philosopher Gilbert Ryle are sometimes equated with
behaviorism, but radical behaviorists find fault with Ryle's (1949) endorse-
ment of explanations taking the form "the glass broke when the stone hit it,
because it was brittle" (p. 50). The statement is perhaps acceptable as an
illustration of a simple descriptive statement, but the difficulty comes when
one pursues a causal explanation. The risk is that invoking the disposition of
"brittleness" will make brittleness just another internal entity that causes
publicly observable events. Radical behaviorists suggest that an answer to the
question of why the glass broke ought more properly to take the form, "given
that the glass was brittle, it broke because it was hit by the stone." This
locution has the virtue of identifying the cause of the brittleness as the
molecular structure of the glass, or the manufacturing processes that are
responsible for that structure. It then identifies the cause of the glass's
breaking as being hit by the stone (see Hocutt, 1985, pp. 93-94).
With respect to psychology, radical behaviorists fmd fault with explanations
taking the form, "the pigeon pecked the key when it was exposed to the
contingency, because it was hungry." As before, the statement is perhaps
acceptable as an illustration of a simple descriptive statement, but the
difficulty comes when one pursues a causal explanation. The risk is that
invoking the disposition of "hunger" will make hunger just another internal
entity that causes publicly observable behavioral events. Radical behaviorists
suggest that an answer to the question of why the pigeon pecked the key ought
more properly to take the form, "given that the pigeon was hungry, it pecked
the key because it was exposed to the contingency." This locution has the
virtue of identifying the cause of the pigeon's being hungry as the establishing
operation of food deprivation, or the changes in blood glucose resulting
therefrom. It then identifies the cause of the pigeon's key peck as being
exposed to the contingency. Consequently, psychological explanations in
radical behaviorism reflect more pragmatic concerns with the spatio-temporal
elements that participate in contingencies, with respect to which the causal
explanation is more properly sought.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Why should the differences between radical behaviorism and traditional

psychology be such great cause for concern? Perhaps the primary reason
relates to the culture. At issue is whether the various forms of traditional
psychology on the contemporary scene, such as mediational neobehaviorism
and cognitive psychology, are essentially conformist doctrines that support the
decidedly mentalistic, if not dualistic, institutions and practices that prevail in
our Western culture (Skinner, 1971). Alternative cultural practices that will
improve the quality of life need to be implemented. However, to do so means
that the cultural obstacles supported by traditional psychology must be
overcome.
Skinner (1969) once suggested that
Behaviorism, as we know it, will eventually die - not because it is a failure but because
it is a success. As a critical philosophy of science, it will necessarily change as a science
of behavior changes, and the current issues which define behaviorism may be wholly
resolved. (p. 267)
At issue is whether psychology can ever be behavioristic enough to achieve

this end, given the strength of the mentalistic tradition of methodological
behaviorism in contemporary society.
University of Wisconsin
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, USA
66 Moore
REFERENCES
Addis, L. (1982). Behaviorism and the philosophy ofthe act. Nous, 16, 399-420.
Alston, W. P. (1974). Can psychology do without private data? Behaviorism, 1,71-102.
Baars, B. J. (1986). The cognitive revolution in psychology. New York: Guilford
Bergmann, G. (1956). The contribution of John B. Watson. Psychological Review, 63, 265-276.
Block, N. (Ed.). (1980). Readings in philosophical psychology, Vol. 1. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Boakes, R. A. (1984). From Darwin to behaviourism. Cambridge, England: Cambridge
University Press.
Boring, E. G. (1950). A history of experimental psychology. New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Bower, G., and Hilgard, G. (1981). Theories of learning (5th ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall.
Bridgman, P. W. (1927). The logic of modem physics. New York: Macmillan.
Catania, A. c., and Harnad, S. (1988). (Eds.). The selection of behavior: The operant
behaviorism of B. F. Skinner: Comments and controversies. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Day, W. F., Jr. (1969a). On certain similarities between the Philosophical investigations of
Ludwig Wittgenstein and the operationism of B. F. Skinner. Journal of the Experimental
Analysis of Behavior, 12,489-506.
Day, W. F., Jr. (1969b). Radical behaviorism in reconciliation with phenomenology. Journal
of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 12, 315-328.
Day, W. F., Jr. (1976). Contemporary behaviorism and the concept of intention. In W. J. Arnold
(Ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation, 1975 (pp. 65-131). Lincoln, NE: University of
Nebraska Press.
Day, W. F., Jr. (1980). Historical antecedents of modem behaviorism. In R. W. Rieber and K.
Salzinger (Eds.), Psychology: Theoretical-historical perspectives (pp. 203-262). New York:
Academic Press.
Delprato, D. J., and Midgley, B. D. (1992). Some fundamentals of B. F. Skinner's behaviorism.
American Psychologist, 47,1507-1520.
Harre, R. (1970). The principles of scientific thinking. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Hayes, S. c., and Brownstein, A. J. (1986). Mentalism, behavior-behavior relations, and a
behavior-analytic view of the purposes of science. The Behavior Analyst, 9, 175-190.
Heidbreder, E. (1933). Seven psychologies. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Hineline, P. N. (1984). Can a statement in cognitive terms be a behavior-analytic interpretation?
The Behavior Analyst, 7, 97 -100.
Hocutt, M. (1985). Spartans, strawmen, and symptoms. Behaviorism, 13,87-97.
Hull, C. L. (1943). Principles of behavior. New York: Appleton-Century.
Johnston, J. M., and Pennypacker, H. S. (1993). Strategies and tactics of behavioral research
(2nd ed.). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Kimble, G. (1985). Conditioning and learning. In S. Koch and D. E. Leary (Eds.), A century of
psychology as science (pp. 284-320). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Koch, S. (1964). Psychology and emerging conceptions of knowledge as unitary. In T. W.
Wann (Ed.), Behaviorism and phenomenology (pp. 1-45). Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Leahey, T. (1992). The mythical revolutions of American psychology. American Psychologist,
47,308-318.
Leahey, T. H. (1994). A history of modem psychology (2nd ed). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall.
MacCorquodale, K., and Meehl, P. (1948). On a distinction between hypothetical constructs and
intervening variables. Psychological Review, 55, 95-107.
Mahoney, M. (1989). Scientific psychology and radical behaviorism: Important distinctions
based in scientism and objectivism. American Psychologist, 44, 129-138.
Mandler, G. (1979). Emotion. In E. Hearst (Ed.), The first century of experimental psychology
(pp. 275-321). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Marr. M. J. (1983). Memory: Metaphors and models. Psychological Record, 33,12-19.
Moore, J. (1980). On behaviorism and private events. Psychological Record, 30, 459-475.
Moore, J. (1981). On mentalism, methodological behaviorism, and radical behaviorism.
Behaviorism, 9, 55-77.
Moore, J. (Ed.). (1983). On cognitive and behavioral orientations to the language of behavior
analysis: Why be concerned over the differences? Psychological Record, 33, 3-30.
Moore, J. (1984a). On behaviorism, knowledge, and explanation. Psychological Record, 34, 73-
97.
Moore, J. (1984b). On the tactful specification of meaning: A review of Harre and Lamb's The
encyclopedic dictionary ofpsychology. Journal of Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 41,
387-395.
Moore, J. (1987). The roots of the family tree: A review of four books on the history and nature
of behaviorism. Psychological Record, 37, 449-470.
Moore, J. (1989). Why methodological behaviorism is mentalistic. Theoretical and Philosophi-
cal Psychology: Bulletin of Division 24, 9, 20-27.
Moore, J. (1990a). On mentalism, privacy, and behaviorism. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 11,
19-36.
Moore, J. (1990b). On the "causes" of behavior. Psychological Record, 40, 469-480.
Moore, J. (1991). A retrospective appreciation of Willard Day's contributions to radical
behaviorism and the analysis of verbal behavior. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 9,97-104.
Moore, J. (1992). On private events and theoretical terms. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 13,
329-346.
Moore, J. (1994). On introspections and verbal reports. In S. C. Hayes, L. J. Hayes, M. Sato,
and K. Ono (Eds.), Behavior analysis of language and cognition (pp. 281-299). Reno, NV:
Context.
Moore, J. (1995a). Radical behaviorism and the subjective-objective distinction. The Behavior
Analyst, 18, 33-49.
Moore, J. (1995b). Some historical and conceptual relations among logical positivism,
behaviorism, and cognitive psychology. In J. T. Todd and E. K. Morris (Eds.), Modem
perspectives on B. F. Skinner and contemporary behaviorism (pp. 51-74). Westport, CT:
Greenwood.
Natsoulas, T. (1983). Perhaps the most difficult problem faced by behaviorism. Behaviorism,
13,1-26.
Natsoulas, T. (1984). Gustav Bergmann's psychophysiological parallelism. Behaviorism, 12,
41-69.
O'Donnell, J. M. (1985). The origins of behaviorism. New York: New York University Press.
Quine, W. V. O. (1974). The roots of reference. LaSalle, IL: Open Court.
Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. New York: Barnes and Noble.
Schnaitter, R. M. (1984). Skinner on the "mental" and the "physical." Behaviorism, 12,1-14.
Schnaitter, R. M. (1987). Behaviorism is not cognitive and cognitivism is not behavioral.
Behaviorism, 15,1-11.
Schneider, S. M., and Morris, E. K. (1987). A history ofthe term Radical Behaviorism: From
Watson to Skinner. The Behavior Analyst, 10,27-39.
Sidman, M. (1960). Tactics of scientific research. New York: Basic Books.
68 Moore
Skinner, B. F. (1945). The operational analysis of psychological terms. Psychological Review,

52,270-277,291-294.
Skinner, B. F. (1950). Are theories ofleaming necessary? Psychological Review, 57, 193-216.
Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behavior. New York: Macmillan.
Skinner, B. F. (1957). Verbal behavior. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Skinner, B. F. (1964). Behaviorism at fifty. In T. W. Wann (Ed.), Behaviorism and phenome-
nology (pp. 79-97). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Skinner, B. F. (1969). Contingencies of reinforcement. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Skinner, B. F. (1971). Beyondfreedom and dignity. New York: Knopf.
Skinner, B. F. (1972). Cumulative record (3rd ed.). New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Skinner, B. F. (1978). Reflections on behaviorism and society. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall.
Skinner, B. F. (1987). Upon further reflection. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Skinner, B. F. (1989a). The origins of cognitive thought. American Psychologist, 44, 13-18.
Skinner, B. F. (1989b). Recent issues in the analysis of behavior. Columbus, OH: Merrill.
Skinner, B. F. (1990). Can psychology be a science of mind? American Psychologist, 45,
1206-1210.
Smith, L. D. (1986). Behaviorism and logical positivism. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press.
Tolman, E. C. (1948). Cognitive maps in rats and men. Psychological Review, 55,189-208.
Tolman, E. C. (1949). Discussion (from interrelationships between perception and personality:
A symposium). Journal of Personality, 18,48-50.
Watson, J. B. (1913). Psychology as the behaviorist views it. Psychological Review, 20,
158-177.
Wessells, M. G. (1981). A critique of Skinner's view of the explanatory inadequacy of cognitive
theories. Behaviorism, 9,153-170.
Wessells, M. G. (1982). A critique of Skinner's views on the obstructive character of cognitive
theories. Behaviorism, 10, 65-84.
Woodworth, R. S. (1929). Psychology. New York: Holt.
Zuriff, G. E. (1979). Covert events: The logical status of first person reports. Psychological
Record, 29, 125-133.
Zuriff, G. E. (1980). Radical behaviorist epistemology. Psychological Bulletin, 87, 337-350.
Zuriff, G. E. (1985). Behaviorism: A conceptual reconstruction. New York: Columbia
University Press.
RICHARD GARRETT
Epistemology
It was with a great deal of pleasure that I accepted the invitation to write a
chapter on the behavioral perspective on epistemology. B. F. Skinner's
contribution to my own philosophical work in epistemology and to my
thinking about other matters is considerable. However, it was not long after
I was into the project that I realized there were certain factors that made it
somewhat complicated. For one thing, although Skinner was for some time
working on a book on epistemology with a linguist by the name of Pere Julia,
Skinner apparently abandoned the project when Julia returned to Spain and,
therefore, he (Skinner) never published anything directly in the field of
epistemology. Skinner's contribution to epistemology, therefore, is only
suggested in his work, especially his work on verbal behavior. And as we shall
see even with respect to his work in the field of verbal behavior the episte-
mologist cannot profitably swallow Skinner's work whole, but must refine it,
modify it and, in some cases, criticize it.
In order to evaluate even this indirect and suggestive contribution of
Skinner's, it will be helpful to begin by stating the central goal or purpose of
epistemology as it is understood by most epistemologists: As responsible
thinkers we all want to hold a belief if and only if it is true. The central goal
of epistemology is, therefore, to help us distinguish truth from falsity. But
truth and falsity are concepts that only apply to knowledge which is of a
distinctively human kind. Thus, a real duck may mistakenly respond to a
decoy duck as though it were a real duck and pay with its life for doing so. We
might describe such a response as "inappropriate" or "misguided," but never
as "false" or "not true." However, if a person were similarly fooled and said
(pointing to the decoy) "Look, there's a duck" (meaning a "real duck"), then
it would be quite natural to describe that person's response as "false" or "not
true". So only verbal responses of the right kind are described as "true" or
"false." And only humans make these kind of responses. It follows that
epistemology, since it is primarily concerned with truth, is primarily con-
cerned with certain kinds of verbal behavior or (if you assume that such verbal
responses express propositions) with propositional knowledge. And such
knowledge is of a distinctively human kind. If Skinner's work has any
significance for epistemology, therefore, it is most likely to be found in his
69
70 Garrett
work on verbal behavior, which is almost entirely contained in his book,

Verbal Behavior. Skinner himself well understood this as the following
statement clearly indicates.
One of the ultimate accomplishments of a science of verbal behavior may be an empirical
logic or a descriptive and analytic scientific epistemology (Skinner, 1957, p. 431).
Since truth is a concept of central importance to epistemology and since the

most important contribution of Skinner's work to epistemology arises from its
implications for the analysis of truth and related concepts, an account of truth
and related concepts will make an ideal starting point.
THE ANALYSIS OF TRUTH
In Science And Human Behavior, Skinner tells us that "knowledge is a

repertoire of behavior". He clarifies this comment as follows:
Usually, however, knowledge refers to a controlling relation between behavior and dis-
criminative stimuli. The response may be skilled, but we are concerned primarily with
whether it will be made upon the proper occasion. Thus, skilled movements are needed
in driving a car, but knowing how to drive a car is making the proper responses at appro-
priate times (Skinner, 1953, p. 408).
Skinner's point is that having knowledge is not simply a matter of having

a response as a part of your repertoire, but in emitting it under the appropriate
circumstances. A pigeon's ability to peck a lever, for example, is not in and
of itself knowledge, at least not of the sort educators are primarily concerned
about. But pecking a lever when and only when a light is on is knowledge. For
pecking under such conditions reflects a knowledge of the world, between
times when the light is on and times when the light is not on and so times
when the response will be reinforced and times when it will not be reinforced.
Skinner goes on to further clarify matters by adding "Most knowledge
acquired in education is verbal." Thus, a young child who says "There's a cat"
when and only when there is a cat nearby also has knowledge, in this case a
knowledge of what is and what is not a cat. Both the pigeon and the child have
knowledge in the sense of having responses (actual and potential) that occur
only in the appropriate circumstances. However, only the child's response is
verbal and so only the child's response can be said to be true or false and is
therefore of central concern to the epistemologist.
In Verbal Behavior, Skinner (1957, pp. 81-146) calls verbal responses such
as the child's utterance ''There's a cat", tacts. For, Skinner notes, it is through
such verbal responses that language makes its "contact" with the environment
or world. Tacts are established by the verbal community by reinforcing
Epistemology 71
speakers for emitting the appropriate verbal response when and only when the
right sort of object or referent is present. In the case of the young child's
response "There's a cat", this would be when and only when a cat is present.
In this way the speaker learns to emit the response in the presence of the right
sort of object or referent. Skinner describes the right sort of referent as the
respected referent, meaning that it is the kind of referent in the presence of
which the response will be respected or reinforced by the verbal community.
The properties belonging to such a class of referents are the means by which
they can be discriminated and so they are called the respected properties,
meaning they are the properties belonging to the respected referents.
When Skinner invited me over to his office at Harvard to discuss my theory
of truth with him, he wondered where I had gotten the notion of 'respected'
referents and 'respected' properties. When I told him that I had gotten the term
from his book Verbal Behavior, he seemed surprised. Evidently he had
forgotten his use of this term in the text (see Skinner, 1957, p. 92) where he
uses it to describe the properties upon which reinforcement depends. Thus, a
child may be reinforced with approval for calling a brown dog a dog, even
though reinforcement in no way depends upon the dog's being brown. Thus
the property brown is not among the respected properties for saying "dog". In
contrast, those properties that dogs have in common and which enable us to
distinguish them from other animals are among the respected properties for
calling something a dog. Skinner uses this distinction to explain how tacts can
function as metaphors. Metaphors arise, when nonrespected properties take
control, as when Jill says that "Jack is a porcupine" because "it hurts to get
close to him". (Skinner presents his analysis of metaphors on pages 92-99 of
Verbal Behavior).
Skinner does not concern himself with a detailed explanation of how to
relate his analysis of verbal behavior to such important semantic notions as
meaning, reference or truth. Yet, Skinner concedes that such a project is
possible:
We could no doubt define ideas, meanings, and so on, so that they would be scientifically
acceptable and even useful in describing verbal behavior (Skinner, 1957, p. 9).
"Useful", indeed. Such an undertaking is essential (as we shall see), if we

are to understand Skinner's indirect contribution to epistemology at all.
Fortunately, Skinner leaves enough clues in fragmentary comments here and
there to help make the task easier. Thus, in commenting on meaning, Skinner
leaves us with the following very helpful clue:
Technically, meanings are to be found among the independent variables ... When some-
one says he can see the meaning of a response, he means he can infer some of the vari-
ables of which the response is usually a function (Skinner, 1957, p. 14).
72 Garrett
In the case of tacts, the respected referents and the respected properties are
the independent variables of which the response is "usually" a function. Thus,
in the case of the tact "cat", the objects or referents are usually cats, because
cats are the respected referents of such tacts i.e. the referents upon which
reinforcement of the tact "cat" is dependent. The class of cats, therefore, may
be taken to be the extensional meaning of the tact "cat", while cat-making
properties (or those properties by means of which cats can be discriminated)
may be taken to be its intensional meaning.
When we talk about the referent of a tact, we must distinguish between an
actual referent and a respected referent. For these are not always the same
thing. Thus, if a child calls a small dog a "cat", the actual referent is the dog,
while the usual or respected referent is a cat.
Noah Chomsky criticized Skinner's notion of a tact, arguing that a person
may properly utter a noun (such as "cat") even when the usual or respected
referent is not present. Thus, Jones' response "The cat I had as a boy was
wonderful" is perfectly "respectable" (or in order) even though its referent (the
cat Jones had as a child) is long gone. So Chomsky is correct in saying that
nouns, such as "cat", can be uttered in the absence of their referent. But
Chomsky's criticism fails, for it is not correct to equate a tact with a noun. On
Skinner's analysis, Jones' response "cat" in the above example, is not a tact,
but what Skinner calls an interverbal (or possibly what Skinner calls an
echoic, depending on what prompted Jones to speak of his cat).
Chomsky (1964) wrote a highly influential (but seriously flawed and
misinformed) review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior, in which he uses the
proper nouns 'Eisenhower' and 'Moscow' as examples of nouns that are not
always used as tacts! But whether it is a proper noun or a common noun we
are talking about, a tact is only a subclass of the entire set of responses that
constitute a noun for Skinner. In fairness to Chomsky, it must be said that
Skinner himself at some points is careless and writes as if a tact and a noun
were the same thing, though it is very clear that they can't be the same thing
and that Skinner knows this.
Consider the statement ''There's a skunk in our basement." If the speaker
is actually looking at the skunk (in the basement), then the response "skunk"
is a tact. But suppose the speaker is just passing on what she heard her
husband say when he yelled (from the basement) "Ah, a polecat is down
here". In this case, the stimulus prompting the wife's response "skunk" is the
husband's response "polecat" (a rough synonym for "skunk"). So in this case
the wife's subsequent response "skunk" is classified as an intraverbal and not
as a tact (Skinner, 1957, p. 71-80). For she is responding to her husband's
response "polecat" and not directly to the skunk itself. If on the other hand the
Epistemology 73
husband had said "skunk" so that the wife's response merely echoed her
husband's response, then her response "skunk" would be classified as an
echoic (Skinner, 1957, pp. 55-65). So what is a noun? A noun is the entire
class of responses, entailing tacts, intraverbals and echoics (depending on
what prompts the response). Thus, all three occurrences of the response
"skunk" (as a tact, as an intraverbal and as an echoic) belong to the noun
"skunk". Moreover, when we speak of the meaning of the noun "skunk", it is
always the usual or respected referents of the tact "skunk" and their properties
that we are talking about. For tacts, since they make the contact with the
world, give intraverbals and echoics their meaning as well. Thus, the meaning
of "skunk", whether it occurs as a tact, intraverbal or echoic, remains the
same: The extensional meaning or proper reference of the noun "skunk" is the
class of skunks while the intensional meaning of the noun "skunk" is the
skunk-making properties. Hence, it is through tacts (through language's
contact with the world) that language acquires the kind of meaning that is
relevant to truth and so to epistemological reflection.
We can define a statement in terms of the above notions. Let us simply say
that a statement is any class of sentence utterances or inscriptions whose
predicates have the same meaning and same actual reference. Thus, the
responses "John is a bachelor", "John is an unmarried male adult" and
"Mike's brother is a bachelor" are all instances of the same statement,
provided the actual referent is the same person John and the predicates
"bachelor" and "unmarried male adult" have the same meaning for all three
responses. In contrast, the sentence "John sat on his case" uttered twice, where
"case" first means the same as "brief case" and later where "case" means the
same as "legal case", entails two distinct statements. For the two utterances
are talking about different kinds of cases. The one is a physical object used for
carrying things and the other is a process that takes place in a court oflaw.
We are now ready to talk about truth. Here again, Skinner's remarks are
only suggestive, but nonetheless helpful. Speaking of special conditions
affecting stimulus control, Skinner makes indirect reference to truth in the
following passage:
When the correspondence with a stimulating situation is sharply maintained ... we call
the response "objective," "valid," "true," or "correct" (Skinner, 1957, p. 147).
What is Skinner talking about here? The context in which these words occur
make it very clear. Consider, the response "skunk". If Mike describes a black
dog as a "skunk", then stimulus control has not been sharply maintained. For
when stimulus control is sharply maintained, then skunks and not dogs or
anything else will elicit the tact "skunk". Such sharp stimulus control is
74 Garrett
important to listeners when they need to act upon what others say. For
example if Wilson incorrectly applies the tact "cool" to a wire that is really
"hot" (or electrified) the mistake could cost his listener, Smith, her life. If we
reflect on all of this, we can see in what sense a tact mayor may not be true.
Thus, the tact "skunk" in the statement "There is a skunk" will result in truth
just in case the actual referent has the respected properties. That is, just in case
the actual referent is one of the respected referents for applying the term
"skunk" and so is in fact a skunk. Even when "skunk" occurs as an intraverbal
or an echoic, the same rule holds. For the meaning is the same in all cases.
Thus, if the speaker is simply passing on someone else's words (as an echoic)
when they say ''There is a skunk in our basement", the actual referent will still
be whatever prompted the original tact and its meaning will still be the same
respected properties. Hence, if the tact is true, the echoic will also be true. And
the same would be the case if the response were the intraverbal "polecat"
prompted by the original tact "skunk." For here too, actual referent and
meaning (or respected properties) would remain the same.
Weare now ready to define truth as follows:
A statement is a true if and only if the respected properties of its predicate terms corre-
spond to the properties belonging to its actual referent or referents.
We can see how, according to this definition, the statement "John sits" can
be true. John is the actual referent of "sits." So if some of John's properties
correspond to (or are identical with) the properties respected by the verbal
community for using the tact "sits", then the statement is true. But if there is
no correspondence (or identity) between these respected properties and some
of John's properties, then the statement "John sits" is not true.
The above definition of truth is a correspondence theory of truth of sorts.
However, unlike all past correspondence theories, which talk about a
correspondence between statements (or responses) and the world (a fact etc.),
this theory talks about a correspondence between the respected properties
governing the use of the predicates and some of the properties belonging to
the statement's actual referent or referents, e.g. a correspondence between the
respected properties associated with the tact "skunk" and some of the
properties of the thing the speaker is actually referring to. Moreover, to say
that the two sets of properties correspond is simply to say that they are
identical with one another. This sort of correspondence, unlike that specified
by all past theories, is quite easy to understand. For one set of properties may
certainly be identical with another.
It is worth noting that this definition works for all statements, regardless of
their form. Consider the relational statement"John is taller than Mary". In this
Epistemology 75
case, the referent of the predicate "taller than" is the ordered pair John-Mary.
According to the above definition of truth, the statement "John is taller than
Mary" is true if and only if the respected relational property for applying
"taller-than" to ordered pairs is identical with one of the relational properties
belonging to the ordered pair John-Mary. In plain words, John must be taller
than Mary.
General statements such as "All humans have toes" is likewise covered by
our definition of truth. In this case the actual referents (which is the entire
class of humans) must have the respected properties governing the predicate
"have toes". If the properties each human has includes the respected properties
for saying "has toes" (if all humans have toes), then the general statement is
true. Otherwise, it is not true.
To see how the analysis applies to existential statements, let us first
consider a statement of a similar form, e.g. "There are some dogs in the living
room." We can interpret this statement as a statement about the living room,
as saying about the living room that it has some dogs in it. Accordingly, if the
living room (which is the actual referent) has the respected property for saying
"has some dogs in it", then the statement is true. But if none of the living
room's actual properties correspond to that respected property, then the
statement is false. With respect to the statement "There are no dogs in the
living room," the exact opposite is the case. If none of the living room's
properties correspond to the respected properties for saying "has some dogs
in it", the statement is true. But if there is such a correspondence, then the
statement is not true.
Existential statements can be analyzed in the same way. Only in the case of
existential statements, the actual referent is the entire world (viz. everything
that exists), rather than the living room. Thus, saying "There are some dogs"
is the same as saying "There are some dogs in the world" or "The world has
some dogs in it." This statement will be true if and only if one of the proper-
ties ofthe world (which is the actual referent) is identical with the respected
property for saying "has dogs in it." For the negative existential, "There are
no dogs," things are again just the opposite. If the world fails to have the
respected property for saying "has dogs in it", then the negative existential
"There are no dogs" is true. But if the world has that property, it is not true.
We come now to the most important class of truths so far, theoretical truths.
But to understand how such truths are possible, we first need to consider how
fiction is possible. Essentially, it is a matter of composition. The response
"man" and the response "horse" both occur as tacts. So each has its own well
established set of respected properties. If I put the two together and speak of
a "horse-man" or "a creature that is half horse, half man" each retains its
76 Garrett
separate meaning, but now they are joined to produce a set of respected
properties unlike anything anyone has ever seen or experienced. Indeed,
because we believe that no such things exist (that the world has no horse-men
or centaurs in it), we speak of such things as "fictions." Yet the meaning of
such fictional responses can be made just as clear as the separate prior
meanings out of which we compose them.
The very same process of composition is entailed in the construction of
theoretical entities. Consider the word "atom" as the ancient Greeks used that
word. According to their theory, atoms were described as indivisible,
colorless, odorless, imperceptible, particles with certain geometric shapes etc.
Hence, what they did is take words such as "particle", "geometric shape",
"colored", "divisible", etc. which can occur as tacts (and so have respected
properties governing their use) and combined them in various ways (in the
case oftacts such as "color", the predicate "not colored" was used to produce
"colorless") and composed a set of meanings that apply to nothing anyone had
ever seen. So the verbal processes of arriving at the concept of a centaur and
the verbal processes of arriving at the concept of an atom are essentially the
same. And the same verbal processes are the basis of our present day concep-
tion of an atom or any other theoretical entity you care to talk about. The
essential difference between a fictional concept, such as a centaur, and a
theoretical concept, such as an atom, is that most of us believe that there are
no centaurs, while certain scientific realists (at least) believe that there are
things such as atoms and the respective parties, moreover, also believe they
are justified in holding their respective beliefs.
Consider, then, the statement "There are atoms" which on our analysis
becomes ''The world has atoms in it." If the world has the respected properties
for saying "has atoms in it", then that statement is true. But if none of the
world's properties correspond to those respected properties, then that
statement is not true. We know what that statement means and so understand
it.
What is true about atoms is no less true about centaurs. Thus, the statement
"Centaurs exist" or "The world has centaurs in it" is true if and only if the
world has the respected properties for saying "has centaurs in it". Whether we
believe it or we have evidence or justification for believing it or not is entirely
beside the point. The statement has just as much meaning as the statement that
atoms exist. And in both cases the truth of the statements is an entirely
objective affair, utterly divorced what anyone believes or has evidence or
justification for believing. The above analysis of meaning, reference and truth,
therefore, entails the complete and strict separation of truth and justification
or warrant.
Epistemology 77
The above theory of truth, though not developed by Skinner,is rightly seen
I think as something to which he contributed very greatly. For it follows quite
naturally, if not strictly, from his analysis in Verbal Behavior and it is
impossible to imagine it without that analysis. It is ironic, therefore, that it
should be the primary basis for criticizing many claims that Skinner made on
behalf of behaviorism and on behalf of a "scientific epistemology." These
criticisms will be developed in detail below. Suffice it for present purposes to
explain the fundamental point: Skinner believed that there are no basic
differences between humans and lower organism and this assumption is the
ultimate basis of all of his other claims on behalf of behaviorism and scientific
epistemology. It is ironic, therefore, that his own analysis in Verbal Behavior
(which he rightly regarded as his most important work) should prove this
assumption to be false. For as we have seen humans are capable of thinking
(and in some cases perhaps even knowing) about worlds (fictional and
theoretical) that are utterly abstract and utterly beyond all sense experiences.
And this is something which other animals apparently cannot do, as far as we
know at present. As we shall see, this makes for very profound differences
between humans and other animals, differences that Skinner's behaviorism
never adequately took into account.
THEORIES OF BELIEF JUSTIFICATION
Since the time of Plato, philosophers have held that knowledge (of the
distinctively human kind) is true, justified belief Edmund L. Gettier (1963)
has posed counter examples to this account of knowledge. But Gettier's
counter examples are only challenges to the sufficiency of these three
conditions of knowledge and not to their necessity. Most epistemologies
assume, therefore, that these three conditions are necessary and I believe that
this is in fact right.
It is not hard to see why the condition of justification, no less than truth is
insisted upon. Suppose, for example, someone (call her Shirley) suddenly
believed that there are centaurs as a result of taking a drug that induced her to
have visions of centaurs. We may assume that Shirley was just hallucinating,
that no one else present at the time saw any centaurs. Under such conditions
we would not say that Shirley was at all justified in holding onto her belief.
Still, it could happen that in fact there are centaurs, say on a planet orbiting a
star one hundred light years away. Shirley's belief would, on that account, be
true in spite of the fact that she had no good evidence or reason to believe it
78 Garrett
is true. Intuitively, I think all (or at least most) people would not count such
a true belief (without any justification for it) as knowledge.
This is common practice and it is sound practice. For our goal is not simply
to believe what is true, but also to avoid believing what isjalse. And this is a
reasonable goal, since we not only need to have truth but also must avoid
falsehood. For falsehoods can get us into all kinds of trouble - even cost us
our lives or the lives of others. It makes very good sense, therefore, for the
verbal community to require that people justify their beliefs, that they have
good evidence or reasons for their beliefs. Because to have good evidence or
reasons to believe something means having something that guarantees or
ensures you that the belief is true. To be entirely without justification for what
you believe is therefore to place yourself at great risk of believing what is
false and all of the bad consequences that can follow from that (not only for
you but for others as well). The verbal community, therefore, has a heavy
stake in ensuring that its members do not embrace falsehoods needlessly or
frivolously and so, wisely, refuses to dignify (or reinforce) true beliefs with
the title knowledge unless there is adequate justification for the belief in
question.
Constructing an adequate theory of justification is one of the central tasks
(if not the central task) of epistemology. The ultimate task of such a theory,
moreover, is to modify our present practices or rules concerning evidence or
reasons in order to improve those practices. For the remainder of the paper, I
want to consider to what extent Skinner's work in Verbal Behavior has
contributed or might contribute to this search for an adequate theory of
justification.
In Verbal Behavior, Skinner offers us an account of how epistemological
or methodological inquiry arises:
... (1) some kinds of verbal behavior ... prove to have important practical consequences
for both speaker and listener (2) the community discovers and adopts explicit practices
which encourage such behavior ... (3) the practices of the community are then studied and
improved ... (Skinner, 1957, p. 430).
(1) The kinds of verbal behavior of which Skinner speaks that have
"important practical consequences for both speaker and listener" are true
statements. Such statements are important, according to Skinner, because both
speaker and listener can act effectively upon them, which they cannot do in
the case of false statements. (2) The "explicit practices which encourage such
behavior", moveover, are the principles of logic and the canons of science
according to Skinner. (3) Finally, such principles and canons have, in the past,
been the object of study in the philosophy of logic and the philosophy of
science as well as in traditional epistemology (which significantly overlaps the
Epistemology 79
other two fields). Thus we can see that it is with the third step that what
Skinner calls "scientific epistemology" comes into play. Moreover, let us note
that the function of scientific epistemology is not (according to Skinner)
simply to study the existing practices of the community but to improve them.
Hence, the kind of epistemology Skinner envisioned was not simply descrip-
tive (and explanatory), but normative.
We can see then that Skinner believed that a scientific epistemology that is
normative (that can improve the truth seeking practices of the community) is
possible. And let us not forget that such a scientific epistemology is "One of
the ultimate accomplishments of a science of verbal behavior", according to
Skinner. We can see, then, that Skinner's own estimate of his contribution to
epistemology is considerable. For if Skinner is right in making these claims,
then his work in verbal behavior will be the basis of a scientific approach to
epistemology - something that until now has been a part of philosophy, not
science. And that would be no small contribution to the field. It would indeed
be comparable to the contributions of Descartes, Hume and Kant.
But are these claims of Skinner's correct? That is the question we need to
focus upon and that will occupy us for the remainder of this chapter. In order
to show that Skinner may have been mistaken in making these claims, I shall
consider two issues which clearly seem to undermine them: The first concerns
the realism/anti-realism debate over science and the second entails what
philosophers have called "the naturalistic fallacy."
THE REALISM/ANTIREALISM DEBATE
Thanks to science, we know how to build a rocket that can go to the moon,
how to construct a nuclear war head, how to grow bigger strawberries, how to
reduce our chances of having a heart attack and many things more. We may
sometimes feel this knowledge is a very mixed blessing. Nonetheless, I think
all but the most skeptical of skeptics would concede that the natural sciences
have indeed given us such technical knowledge by means of which we can
control and predict our non-human natural environment. Beyond that point,
however, there is little agreement concerning the knowledge science yields.
Skinner and others have claimed that an equally impressive technology of
human behavior was also possible, but this remains a highly controversial
issue. Whatever you may think about that controversy, however, the important
controversy for our purposes arises when scientific realists make the stronger
claim that science (natural and behavioral) can give us a knowledge of the
world as it truly is.
80 Garrett
Now every sane person admits that there is an external world and the very
vast majority would agree that we know and don't simply believe that there is
an external world (full of people, trees, clouds and the like). But if you ask
what a person, tree or cloud truly is, you get different answers. Many scientific
realists, for example, reject the common man's views on these matters. For the
common or unreflective view holds, for example, that these things are red,
white and blue Gust as they appear), while scientific realists say they are really
what science says, namely, colorless swarms of molecules in motion. Who is
right? According to anti-realists, no one can say who is right here. For neither
our raw senses nor our scientific constructions (based upon our sense
experiences) can be relied upon to tell us what things are truly like. They point
out that we have no way of comparing either our perceptions or our scientific
conceptions with things as they truly are in themselves. Hence, the anti-realist
claims, science can help us to predict and control the world, but it cannot
reveal to us what the things in the world are like in themselves.
So, on the one side, we have the scientific realists. On the other, we have
the anti-realists. I shall not concern myself with which side is right nor with
which side has the better argument. It is quite clear that people with solid
credentials (in both science and in philosophy) are on both sides of this debate
(and in many positions in between). I wish here to simply point out that it
seems rather clear that this is a debate that science by itself cannot possibly
resolve. For if on the one hand science simply assumes that it can give us a
knowledge of things as they truly are, that would be sheer dogmatism; while
if on the other scientific arguments are constructed to show that science can
give us a knowledge of things as they truly are, then such arguments will
necessarily beg the question (since they would assume the very assumption
that has been called into question).
This I think poses a serious problem with any attempt to establish a purely
scientific epistemology, such as Skinner envisions. The problem is this: A
purely scientific epistemology would have to defend the claim that it yields a
genuine knowledge of what can and what cannot be known in science and
elsewhere. But since it would be a part of science, it could not (for the reasons
given above) establish its own claim to have such knowledge nor the claim
that the various parts of science contain knowledge of things in themselves.
Its authority would, therefore, have to be established in part at least by
arguments and considerations that are external to it and more fundamental
than science taken by itself. In short, a scientific epistemology would have to
rest in part at least upon a more fundamental, non-scientific, philosophical
epistemology from which it derived its credentials. Hence, at best a scientific
epistemology would have to rest upon a philosophical epistemology.
Epistemology 81
It might be tempting to try and get around this argument, by claiming that
the problem only arises if you assume a foundationalist theory of justification.
Thus, if we assume a holistic or coherence theory of justification, there would
be no need to have a distinct philosophical epistemology upon which scientific
epistemology rests. But this escape from the above dilemma won't work. For,
if you subscribe to a holistic or coherence theory of justification, you must in
the first place present arguments in defense of such a theory and it is hard to
see how these could arise from any special, empirical science such as Skinner
has in mind. Moreover, an argument in defense of a holistic or coherence
theory of justification would necessarily be a fundamental part of normative
epistemology. Finally, holism has the effect of blurring the borders between
science, common sense and philosophy to such an extent that the holist should
probably replace the "scientific" vs "unscientific" distinction with the
'justified" vs "unjustified" distinction. For if holists are right, all justified
beliefs ought to be counted as a part of "science" such that what is "scientific"
and what is "justified" could no longer be distinguished. This would make all
disciplines that can claim to entail 'justified" beliefs a part of science, but still
not establish a special, empirical epistemology such as Skinner was interested
in.
If the above reflections are basically correct, then we just are not going to
get a "scientific" epistemology, not as a special, empirical branch of a science
of verbal behavior nor as a branch of any other special science.
SKINNER AND THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY
There is yet another deeper way of seeing why epistemology cannot become
just another branch of science. As Skinner rightly notes, epistemology is not
content to merely describe and explain our truth seeking practices, it is also
interested in "improving" them, with making them better. This is indeed the
central task of epistemology. Put another way the central task of epistemology
is not to tell us what we actually do (or why), but to tell us what we should do
as responsible truth seekers. Epistemology at the core is a normative disci-
pline, not a descriptive or explanatory discipline. And this poses a problem for
any attempt to construct a special empirical science of epistemology. For it is
generally believed by both scientists and philosophers that norms (since they
tell us what we should do) can never be inferred from statements of fact (i.e.
descriptions and explanations) provided by the empirical sciences. Albert
Einstein, for example, argued that "science can only ascertain what is, but not
what should be" (Einstein, 1954, p. 45). The philosopher G. E. Moore (1903)
82 Garrett
described such inferences from what is (or a fact) to what should be (or a
norm) as committing the "naturalistic fallacy".
Skinner agrees that this assessment of things is correct with respect to
sciences such as physics, biology and nearly all other sciences; but argues that
a science of operant reinforcement is an exception (Skinner, 1971, p. 97). For
a science "concerned with operant reinforcement", Skinner contends, "is a
science of values" (Skinner, 1971, p. 99). Skinner supports this contention by
arguing that what people value and call "good" are things or events they find
positively reinforcing and that things they find aversive (or negatively
reinforcing) are disvalued and called "bad" (Skinner, 1971, pp. 99-102). And
he similarly proposes to analyze norms in terms of reinforcement. Thus,
Skinner argues that a norm such as "you should tell the truth" can plausibly
be translated as "If you are reinforced by the approval of your fellow men, you
will be reinforced when you tell the truth" (Skinner, 1971, p. 107).
Skinner is well aware that there are those who would still object and insist
that his analysis commits the naturalistic fallacy. In anticipation of such
criticism, Skinner considers the following argument, formulated by the
philosopher Karl Popper:
In face of the sociological fact that most people adopt the nonn "Thou shalt not steal,"
it is still possible to decide to adopt either this nonn, or its opposite; and it is possible to
encourage those who have adopted the nonn to hold fast to it, or to discourage them, and
to persuade them to adopt another nonn. It is impossible to derive a sentence stating a
nonn or a decision from a sentence stating a fact; this is only another way to saying that
it is impossible to derive nonns or decisions from facts (Skinner, 1971, p. 108).
Popper's critical point is that even if most people support the norm ''Thou
shalt not steal," (and if, therefore, they would not approve of anyone who
steals) it is still possible (meaning it may still be reasonable) to "adopt either
this norm, or its opposite." Popper is saying in other words that thefact that
a norm is accepted by most people tells us nothing about the rightness or
validity of that nonn, that you can't logically or reasonably infer the rightness
or validity of a norm from any facts about who follows it.
Skinner's counter-argument to Popper runs as follows:
The conclusion is valid only if indeed it is 'possible to adopt a nonn or its opposite.' Here
is autonomous man playing his most awe-inspiring role, but whether or not a person
obeys the nonn 'Thou shalt not steal" depends upon supporting contingencies, which
must not be overlooked (Skinner, 1971, p. 108).
Skinner's central point here is that we are not autonomous and so can't
"adopt a norm or its opposite" in the way Popper's argument assumes. What
he means in saying this is that whether or not a person follows such a norm is
a function of that person's history of reinforcement (due to others) and not of
Epistemology 83
logical reasoning or rational deliberation. If Skinner is right in saying this,

then Popper's conclusion fails in the sense that it is irrelevant. For if our
history of reinforcement alone (and not our rational deliberations at all) are
what led us to follow this or that norm, it is pointless to tell us (as Popper
does) that the rightness of a norm does not logically follow from the fact that
most people follow it.
But is Skinner correct in arguing that our rational deliberations don't (or
can't) led us to adopt some norm? Clearly not. Consider, for example, the
principles of logic. They are norms and they are arrived at by rational
deliberation. For a system of deductive logic begins with self-evident
principles and constructs the entire system from them. Rational deliberation,
moreover, plays a role in the legislation of civil law. Arguments are advanced
pro and con the merits of the legislation in question when laws are enacted.
Some of the arguments are good ones and some are bad ones and if we are
careful and discerning, we can frequently discriminate which are the good
ones from which are the bad ones, and vote and act accordingly. And what is
true in the case of the norms of deductive logic and legal norms is no less true
of moral and ethical norms. We can, for example, frequently recognize good
and bad arguments in support of the contention that stealing or lying are
morally wrong. And that too is rational deliberation. Indeed, if rational
deliberation could not affect our behavior, all of science, including a science
of operant reinforcement, would be utterly impossible. For scientific research
is governed by rational deliberation.
We must conclude, therefore that Skinner's attempt to undermine Popper's
argument entirely fails. It seems clear, moreover, that Popper is quite correct
in claiming that you cannot infer the validity or rightness of a norm from the
fact that it has been adopted by most people. The principles of logic again are
an example. The principles of logic do not describe how people actually
reason, but rather how people must reason or should reason, if they want to
reason effectively (which is to say if they want to infer only true and not false
conclusions from true premises). The same also holds for legal and moral
norms. The fact that slavery was legal and morally accepted by many persons
in the United States a hundred and fifty years ago scarcely establishes the
validity or rightness of those norms, even at that time. If indeed we could not
distinguish between a norm that is simply accepted by most people and one
that is valid or right, we could not speak of progress and talk of reform or
improvement in these areas would be nonsense. Nor would it make any sense
for people to debate the merits of a norm of logic, law or morality, if there was
never any difference between a norm's validity and its being accepted by most
people. For if we wanted to determine its validity, in that case, we would
84 Garrett
merely need to find out what most people accept and that would be our
answer. And this would clearly be absurd. Hence, Popper is certainly correct
in arguing that the validity or rightness of a norm does not follow, logically,
from the fact that most people accept it.
In point of fact, what Skinner says elsewhere, shows that in practice he
agrees with Popper on this point. In Beyond Freedom and Dignity, Skinner
defmes a culture as a set of practices, many which involve various economic,
religious, political, legal and moral norms (Skinner, 1971, p. 121). Moreover,
it is quite clear that Skinner's primary concern in that book is to analyze,
evaluate and improve our current cultural practices (including many of the
currently existing norms). And Skinner believes that his analysis provides us
with good reasons (i.e., good arguments) for adopting the new practices and
norms, arguments that show these changes would help us to deal more
effectively and wisely with the " ... great problems of the world today ... ".
Some of the great problems he mentions include, "over population, the
depletion of resources, the pollution of the environment, and the possibility of
a nuclear holocaust ... "(Skinner, 1971, p. 131). His central claim is that we
can only deal with these problems if we approach them with a science of
operant reinforcement which can show us not only how to change behavior,
but what changes to make as well. In short the new practices and norms are to
be derived (inferred) from the application of a science of operant reinforce-
ment to these great problems. Hence, it is clear that Skinner assumes that the
norms currently supported by most people are not valid or right and also that
the way to construct better ones is through an application of a science of
operant reinforcement to the problems we face.
There is a tension, a confusion, an inconsistency, here, one that lies at the
very core of Skinner's thinking: On the one had, he talks as if rational
deliberation has no important role to play in the determination of our behavior.
On the other hand, his analysis of operant reinforcement and its application to
our present problems represents his own attempt to utilize rational delibera-
tion as a means of changing behavior. For unless he can actually construct
good arguments to convince the right people to utilize this new science, all of
his work is in vain. This tension runs throughout all of Skinner's work
(including his analysis of verbal behavior). The underlying source of this
tension is his behaviorism i.e. his attempt at every juncture to suppress the role
of the mind as a determinant of human behavior. His reason for wanting to
suppress the role of the mind, moreover, is his (mistaken) belief that to grant
a significant role to the mind is to disqualify psychology as a science. In
Science And Human Behavior, for example, Skinner (Skinner, 1953) states
that "the fundamental principle of science ... rules out final causes" and that
Epistemology 85
"this principle of science is violated when it is asserted that behavior is under

the control of an 'incentive' or 'goal' which the organism has not yet achieved
or a 'purpose' which it has not yet fulfilled." This led Skinner to early on
adopt the following position:
Instead of saying that a man behaves because of the consequences which are to follow
his behavior, we simply say that he behaves because of the consequences which have
followed similar behavior in the past. This is of course, the Law of Effect or operant con-
ditioning (Skinner, 1953, p. 87).
Explaining operant behavior in terms of "the consequences which have

followed similar behavior in the past" works fine when we are dealing with
non-human organisms - for such organisms lack the kind of verbal repertoire
which enables them to pursue truth. Hereafter, I shall refer to a verbal
repertoire that enables an organism to pursue the truth as a truth functional
language. Let me digress a bit: Humans have a verbal repertoire in virtue of
which they can make statements (or verbal responses that can be classified as
true or false) and they can frequently determine which of their statements are
true and which are false. The analysis of truth above (derived in large part
from Skinner's own analysis of verbal behavior) implies that we are capable
of making statements about things that don't exist (e.g. unicorns) or that may
exist but can't be directly observed (e.g. electromagnetic fields, black holes
etc.). We can now add to this listjitture events. Thus, the weather report may
accurately describe tomorrow's weather before it occurs and this description
of tomorrow's weather can causally affect our behavior today.
In some cases the events that will occur in the future will happen no matter
what we do. This is the case with the weather, for example. Thus, in the case
of the weather there is nothing for us to do but to adjust ourselves to it.
However, many future events only take place because of what we do before
they occur. This is not only true for us humans, but for all creatures. But the
difference between us and other creatures is that it is clear that we can
represent such future events to ourselves, while it is not at all clear that other
animals can do so - at least not in the way we can. For we can make state-
ments about future events and then reason and deliberate over the truth of
these statements and act accordingly. Thus, someone can say to Jones (or
Jones can say to herself) "Go west young woman! That is where the good life
is to be found." We can indeed represent various future possibilities, debate
with ourselves and others about their various merits and choose from among
them and act upon our choice. When we do so, our behavior is being deter-
mined by future events or, to speak more accurately, by our current represen-
tation ofpossible jitture events. The possible future event we choose to act on,
moreover, is our goal or purpose (a final cause). To the extent that we
86 Garrett
determine our goals by means of good arguments, we may be said to be

rational. There is nothing either mysterious or unscientific about this. But it
clearly distinguishes us from other animals. Aristotle was, therefore, quite
correct in describing us as rational animals. For we are the only animals
capable of pursuing truth, of producing arguments (and distinguishing good
ones from bad ones), of being motivated by future events (our purposes or
goals) and of distinguishing good purposes from bad ones in the way we do.
Other animals, lacking a truth functional language, lack such rationality and
seem doomed to live only according to Skinner's law of effect. What is ironic
about all ofthis is that Skinner's own analysis of verbal behavior should have
led him to see that having the sort of verbal repertoire we have changes
everything and renders his attempt to suppress the role of the mind (his
behaviorism) entirely wrongheaded.
Back to the naturalistic fallacy. As we have seen we can represent future
events. We can indeed represent or think about our life as a whole and we can
consider various versions of life as a whole and debate which it would be
better or more meaningful to pursue. We can consider things that we currently
find reinforcing and ask if they are causing us to live a good life or the best
life we are capable of leading. We can even ask if this life is all that there is
and whether or not our world (or environment) and we ourselves are purely
physical or not. And answers we give to these questions (which ultimately
transcend science) will profoundly influence our conception of what a good
life is. It should be very clear, therefore, that the field of values and norms in
general lies out of reach of not merely physics or biology or most of the
sciences, but of all of the special sciences.
IMPLICAnONS FOR A "SCIENCE" OF EPISTEMOLOGY
Skinner's theory of reinforcement, purged of its behavioral underpinnings, has

its uses. But I believe that there is no hope that it (or any other empirical
science) will contribute significantly to the most crucial part of epistemology
- its normative core - which I take to be the theory of epistemic justification.
For a theory of epistemic justification must illuminate our way as truth seekers
and this in part is bound to raise some very profound questions about values
and the good life that lie beyond the scope of the special sciences. How
important, for example, is believing the truth in comparison with avoiding
falsehood? If we say that believing the truth is all that matters and that
avoiding falsehood matters not at all, then we should believe everything we
can. Or if we should only be concerned to avoid falsehood (and not worry
Epistemology 87
about truth), then we should believe nothing (as some skeptics have coun-
selled us). However, most people would no doubt say we should avoid both
extremes, that what we need is some sort of a balanced concern for both
believing what is true and avoiding what is false. But this leaves us with
questions about the right balance and a judgment concerning the right balance
between seeking truth and avoiding falsehood is ultimately a value judgment.
And it is a value judgment of a major order. For it is intimately bound up with
our conception of the place of things like science, ethics and religion in our
lives and so with what it is to live a good or meaningful life. Albert Einstein,
who appreciated the fact that the value of (scientific) truth cannot itself be
determined by science, commented:
... science can only be created by those who are thoroughly imbued with the aspiration
toward truth ... To this there also belongs the faith in the possibility that the regulations
valid for the world of existence are ... comprehensible to reason (Einstein, 1954, p. 46).
Einstein also understood that the quest for truth raises important questions
of value priorities and comments upon the difficulty of sorting out these
priorities in the following passage:
... it is no easy task to determine clearly what is desirable and what should be eschewed
... Should truth, for instance, be sought unconditionally even where its attainment and its
accessibility to all would entail heavy sacrifices in toil and happiness? (Einstein, 1954,
p.51)
This being true, it need not follow that the special sciences will not have an
impact upon our epistemological reflections, just as they always have since the
time of Descartes. To the contrary, we should expect their impact to be quite
profound at times, for this was certainly the case in the past. But this is a very
far cry from realizing a special, empirical science whose domain of inquiry is
normative epistemology. I think that that is a dream that will never become a
reality.
Where does all of this leave us with respect to Skinner's contribution to
epistemology? I see it somewhat as follows: First of all, Skinner's most
important work (as he himself stated) is his work on verbal behavior. If this
work and his work elsewhere (so far as it applies to humans anyway) is purged
of its behavioral assumptions and reinterpreted in a way that permits us to
better appreciate the role of the mind (or consciousness) as a determinant of
behavior, then Skinner's principles of reinforcement and his careful attention
to behavior, to its antecedents and its consequences can serve as a useful
corrective to much of the carelessness and obscurity that has resulted from an
over-emphasis upon the role of the mind. For reasons given, however, I doubt
that his principles or any psychology or any special science of any sort will
ever be able to give us a science of epistemology or contribute very directly
88 Garrett
to normative epistemology. However, epistemology also has a descriptive and

explanatory content e.g. assumptions about the mind and how it works - about
believing, remembering, thinking, perceiving, understanding, intuition etc.
And both clinical and experimental psychology are valuable sources for
testing out, clarifying and generating such assumptions. To the extent an
operant analysis proves useful in these areas, I see potential future contribu-
tions from Skinner's work to descriptive epistemology. But I would expect his
most important contributions to arise from the implications of his work on
verbal behavior, such as the analysis of truth presented at the beginning of this
chapter. For it is believing, remembering, thinking, understanding, perceiving,
intuition etc., so far as they entail or relate to distinctively verbal processes (of
a truth functional sort) that can ultimately illuminate our understanding of a
knowledge that is distinctively human. For knowledge of that sort entails
having a truth functional language. This is a more modest estimate than
Skinner's own estimate of his contribution to epistemology. But it is I believe
still very significant (with respect to descriptive epistemology) and considera-
bly more realistic.
Department of Philosophy
Bentley College
Waltham, Massachusetts, USA
REFERENCES
Chomsky, N. (1964). A review of B. F. Skinner's Verbal behavior. In N. Chomsky. The

structure of language. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Einstein, A. (1954). Science and religion. in Idea and opinions. New York: Crown.
Gettier, E. L. (1963). Is justified true belief knowledge? Analysis, 23, 121-3
Moore, G. E. (1903). Principia ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behavior. New York: Free Press.
Skinner, B. F. (1957). Verbal behavior. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Skinner, B. F. (1971). Beyondfreedom and dignity. New York: Bantam.
ERNEST A. V ARGAS
Ethics
Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be treating rather of matters
outside nature than of natural phenomena following nature's general laws. They appear
to conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom: for they believe
that he disturbs rather than follows nature's order, that he has absolute control over his
actions, and that he is determined solely by himself ... Experience teaches us no less
clearly than reason, that men believe themselves to be free, simply because they are con-
scious of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are deter-
mined; (Spinoza, 1632-1677, Ethics)
We struggle for justice and truth since we are instinctively equipped to see our fellow
beings happy.... Not only is the mechanistic conception of life compatible with ethics:
it seems the only conception of life which can lead to an understanding of the source of
ethics. (Loeb, 1858-1924, The Mechanistic Conception oj LiJe/
The two quotes above sound the theme for this chapter. There is nothing
supernatural about ethics. They are actions, and statements about actions. In
the analysis of these sorts of actions, the critical issue is what explains
behaviors called 'ethical'. How do they come about? They can be explained
by asserting an agent - an ego or self or more subtle stuff - that freely chooses
the action called ethical, or explained by examining the conditions under
which actions called ethical occur. If the latter, then the distinction between
"is" and "ought" - the way through which a so-called world of "fact" as
separate from that of "value" is addressed - is simply the distinction between
the conditions under which two forms of statements occur. The former
statement is no more "naturalistic" than the latter. Both are verbal relations
descriptive of events, but events with differing kinds of contingent controls.
Such contingency relations may have been produced by social shaping or
through biological shaping, or both. Social and biological processes jointly
affect ethical actions at the locus of the individual, the community, and the
population. But at any locality, it is the action deemed ethical that is the focus
of analysis and which requires an explanatory framework.
89
90 Vargas
AGENCY VERSUS CONTINGENCY
The traditional explanation for the action of an organism, especially that of a

human being, has been the conjuring of an agent responsible for that action,
directing or willing or deciding or choosing or intending it. What we hear and
read daily supplies many examples: "Just say 'No"'; "People choose to smoke
and therefore they are responsible for their cancer." Having such an agency
makes it easy to justify rewarding and punishing: "Adults have the right to
choose to smoke and should not be punished for exercising that right";
"People who choose to go on welfare should be kicked off." Such rewarding
and punishing activities do not have to go any further than what is presumed
to be the source of the action - the individual at which the correct or incorrect
action is located. Since it is recognized that an individual's body is not the
agency that propelled that individual's action but equally obvious that it is not
outside the body, the agent is located, somehow and somewhere, inside the
body, interlinked yet not any of its parts. Now a set of psychological assump-
tions takes over, ranging from the very crude to the very sophisticated. But all
amount to an agent capable of moral decision, of knowing right from wrong,
of choosing an ethical (or nonethical) course of action. And in this axiom of
agency lies the foundations for prior explanations of ethical behavior, as well
as their justifications in government, law, and religion.
But in a behavioral view, no agent is involved in the occurrence of any
action, including ethical ones. No agency wills, chooses, or intends a good or
bad act. No ego, no mind, no self, no I. Such an assertion apparently denies
what appears to be an obvious observation on anyone's part - the felt state of
one's own governance. But sensing an event in a particular way does not mean
it is that way. "Galileo '" commented on the fact that to accept the idea of a
moving earth one must overcome the strong impression that one can 'see' that
the sun is really moving" (Holton, 1973, p. 59).
A contingency explanation of an action offers an alternative account,
though a nonintuitive one. Actions, including ethical ones, are not explained
through means of an agency. Instead, the focus of analysis is on the contingent
relations between organismic actions and other events - physical, biological,
and behavioral. The study of contingency relations is not the study of
organisms nor of their physical and biological environments. Obviously an
organism is necessary for actions taking place in its internal and external
milieus. But it is meaningless to talk about an action taking place without a
condition in which that action occurs. Both body and milieu provide localities
at which actions occur. A body, in fact, is simply another milieu, and cannot
be asserted - in a functional analysis of independent and dependent variables
- as a causal force. Behavior is due to forces located where appropriate for
Ethics 91
analysis. Independent variables of any type of phenomena - physical (for

example, tone vibrations), physiological (for example, synaptic discharges),
or cultural (for example, religious beliefs) - may be of interest. Behavioro-
logical analysis accounts for the effects of these variables solely in terms of
their contingency relations to actions.
The behaviorologicae explanation of any action starts with the occurrence
of that action and its consequences. This relation (actually a relation between
a class of actions and subsequent consequences), called an operant, can be
labeled by its context, the events that occur before and after which contin-
gently control an operant, such as presentation of food, its significance defined
by its effects on actions; and by its properties, an observed characteristic of all
members of a class of actions, such as rate, its significance defined by the
pattern of an operant for a unit of time within a given context. Within the
system of relations of which the operant is a part, the labels given constitute
the interpretations that designate its meanings.
In interpreting the meaning of an operant, frequency is particularly
important. If a loan of money or food or clothing, easily available, is not
provided when requested, then the action may be called selfish - on a one time
occurrence. If the action frequently occurs, then the person paired with the
action is characterized as "selfish". The aggregate of whatever actions are
frequently paired with a person designates that person's character. It is on the
basis of frequency that a person's repertoire is characterized as "honest",
"trustworthy", and other such declarations of ethical behavior.
But providing an ethical label to the behavioral characteristics of someone
does not explain them. It categorizes the components of that person's
repertoire and makes it more possible, than in the absence of the observations,
to take effective action. If a person behaves nastily or dishonestly frequently,
then the person is not invited to social gatherings, loans are not made, and so
on. A label may be given to a person when a single action in which that person
engages is dramatic, for example, a husband who beats his wife once may be
called a "wife-beater". But typically, the action must occur more than once.
A remark may be called "witty", but a person is called "witty" only if he
frequently makes such remarks. Or a young person may embezzle some funds
and the incident forgiven; the individual might not be called a "thief' unless
the action were repeated. Such classification is the usual taxonomic assem-
bling of covariant characteristics at a particular location, and a necessary aid
to practical action. A problem only occurs when a label is used to explain what
was labeled, for example, so-and-so beats his wife because he is a wife-beater.
Furthermore, such pairing of action with organism does not imply a willful
agency anymore than it does with a mosquito persistently attempting to bite,
92 Vargas
though we do hold the mosquito responsible for its bad manners and take
appropriate action.
It should be noted that the condition, "easily available", was one of the
circumstances in assessing the meaning of the frequency of not providing help
when requested. The context of an operant, its preceding circumstances as
well as its postceding ones, determines whether it is labeled ethical, and if so
labeled, the kind of ethical relation it is. If someone is asked to give but has
nothing to share, the refusal is not designated as "selfish". If money is given
but at no real cost and the action taken only for notice, then the circumstances
of the giving restrain the label "generous". These controlling relations provide
the meaning of an ethics statement. Though the form of an action or a
statement may be used to exemplify a type of meaning or to infer its meaning,
the meaning of an action, including any verbal utterance, does not reside in its
topography. "You should not lie" has different meanings when uttered by a
parrot repeating, willy-nilly, what it has heard, than by a parent admonishing
a child who has not been truthful, or than by an undercover agent to another
for whom these are the code words for duplicity. Cutting someone with a knife
may be an act of helping or hurting depending on circumstances and conse-
quences. The meaning of an action, including a verbal one, resides in how that
action relates to other events, either coming after or before or both. And if
events make an action probable, then their relation not only constitutes a
controlling one but the properties of the independent variables begin to explain
the characteristics of the dependent action.
It is a framework of explanation that gives meaning to behavior, including
that denoted as "ethical". Nothing inherent in a form of behavior defines it as
"ethical". Forms of behavior may be denoted by terms that describe actions
within the framework of physics. Their meaning is physicalistic. Movement,
pull, push, and so on, are defined by displacement and other relations to
physical events. The physical topography of these actions and their inherent
physical relations are taken for granted, that is, as givens, and so these do not
contribute to the meaning given within a behaviorological framework. 3 But
depending on contingent social circumstances and consequences, these same
action forms now mean sneak, tip-toe, crowd-in, and so on. The same
topography of actions with different controls signifies a different meaning.
Even the agency approach to provide meaning to the topography of an action
does so by the psychological properties of the inferred agency, for example,
by what it "intends". The intending organism does not have to be a human for
such an agency explanation. It can be a baboon engaged in duplicity. The
contingency controls are put inside as part of the governing agency (Skinner,
1975). Such interpretation, either from an inferred controller of behavior or
from its controlling conditions, has been made for some time. "Therefore
Ethics 93
when thou doest thine alms, do not sound a trumpet before thee, as the
hypocrites do in the synagogues and in the streets, that they may have glory
of men" (Matthew, Chapter 6, p. 8). The topography of an action, then, means
little. From piety to pietism, the labeling of ethical actions goes beyond their
form and considers their contingent controls, those from consequences and
those of circumstances.
BREEDING AND UPBRINGING
That the meaning of a behavioral relation deemed ethical ensues from the
controlling contingencies over it immediately leads to the question: Where do
these controls come from? Are their origins in biology or society? Is it
breeding that dictates altruistic behavior or is it upbringing? As poetically put:
Are our considerations for others woven into the very fabric of our being? Or
does society begin with a moral tabula rasa on which it inscribes its moral
codes? Or like those arguments addressing capacity versus capability, is this
a false nature-nurture dichotomy? Is there, instead, a subtle interaction
between what nature sets and what nurture shapes? What put the ethical
actions in place that immediate contingencies evoke? And even further back,
how did those controlling contingencies come about?
The problem posed of the origin of ethical action resembles a series of
Chinese puzzle boxes. Systems of contingencies are nested within other
systems. But a further complication arises. Not only are the systems intercon-
nected, but events within them reciprocally interact across systems, and
feedback from a nested set of controls may affect the larger set. In addition,
and mutually influencing each other, there are two concurrent sets of controls
over operant behavior: biological and social. Both sets of controls bear on the
focus of analysis and the unit of analysis. Though the focus of analysis is
always actions, more accurately operants (i.e. the contingent relations between
a class of actions and other events), the unit of analysis is the locus at which
these contingency relations occur: the individual, the community, or the
population. The interpretation of ethical operants accommodates either a
social or biological analysis at the unit level at which it is made.
At the unit level of the individual repertoire within an ethical community,
an immediate society directly shapes ethical operants. Such ethics shaping is
so easily observed, the point scarcely needs arguing. "That's a good boy" are
some of the earliest words heard by a child. Even earlier are the hugs and
kisses that follow approved behavior. The family, the school, the church and
mosque and temple, immediate and distant government, big and small
business, the police and the military, close neighbors and casual strangers, all
94 Vargas
teach and train as well as enforce and enhance actions deemed ethical. Such
shaping starts with the first day - many parents ignore crying to teach the first
requisite of duty, restraint under the impulse of need; and persists to the last
day-some communities condemn suicide as an indulgence, a sinful action
violating an edict of a god (at one time, unsuccessful suicides were revived,
tried, and put to death.) Any of a number of "ought" and "should" imperatives
start, and stay, in the immediate network of the actions of other individuals.
The meaning of those imperatives is local. It is embedded in the controlling
actions of an ethical community that directly contact the activities of the
individual.
An individual is an opportunity for a given cultural tradition to persist. It
does so through the repertoire of the individual. It is this repertoire that is the
life force of a culture, not the person. Cultural selection - in the form of the
actions of others - operates on the variability of ambiguous and diffuse actions
of the very young to soon shape operants with specific ethical import. The
details and outcomes of such shaping for different societies, and communities
within societies, at particular times and places is given by a vast anthropologi-
cal, historical, and sociological literature. The effects of such shaping relate
to the welfare of others - honesty, kindness, and generosity benefit the
recipient as much or more than the giver. Operants thematically group due to
their second order consequences, and are labeled accordingly. Duty, obliga-
tion, and service are taught to the individual. Marcus Aurelius lists, in almost
poignant fashion, the credit due to others for the shaping of his ethical
conduct.
1. Courtesy and serenity oftemper I first learnt ... from my grandfather Verus.
2. Manliness without ostentation I learnt from what I have heard and remember of my
father.
3. My mother set me an example of piety ...
4. To my great-grandfather lowed the advice to ...
5. It was my tutor who ... encouraged me not to be afraid of work, to be sparing in my
wants, ...
6. Thanks to Diognetus I learnt not to be absorbed in trivial pursuits; ...
7. From Rusticus, I derived the notion that my character needed training and care, ...
8. Appollonius impressed on me the need to make decisions for myself instead of de-
pending on the hazards of chance, ...
9. My debts to Sextus include kindliness '"
to. It was the critic Alexander who put me on my guard against unnecessary
fault-finding.
11. To my mentor Fronto lowe the realization that malice, craftiness, and duplicity are
the concomitants of absolute power; ...
12. Alexander the Platonist ... saying that no one ought to shirk the obligations due to
society on the excuse of urgent affairs.
13. Catalus the Stoic counselled me never to make light of a friend's rebuke, even when
unreasonable, ...
14. From my brother Severns I learnt ...
15. Maximus was my model for self-control ...
Ethics 95
16. The qualities I admired in [the emperor Antoninus Pius, his adoptive father] were
his lenience, ...
17. [U]nder my father the Emperor I was cured of all pomposity, and made to realize
that life at court can be lived without royal escorts, robes of state, illuminations,
statues, and outward splendour of that kind ... (Aurelius, trans. 1964, pages 35-44)
The effects of shaping the ethical character of a repertoire, such as that of

Marcus Aurelius, do not channel into a one-way corridor. Each individual
repertoire feeds back into the patterns of action that shaped it. It becomes part
of those patterns as the means by which other repertoires are shaped. "And of
his equestrian statue which stands in the Piazza Campidoglioi in Rome Henry
James has written that 'in the capital of Christendom, the portrait most
suggestive of a Christian conscience is that of a pagan emperor'" (as stated by
Staniforth, p. 23, in his Introduction to Aurelius's Meditations). A dense web
of behavioral relations envelops individual repertoires which on their part
become part of that web.
Dependent on the variability tolerated and the strength of the driving
contingencies, actions at the level of the individual repertoire maintain or
change the dominant value pattern of an ethical community. This observed
effect is reflected in our oldest literature. In Sophocles's Antigone, Antigone
and Creon maintain two conflicting ethical standards. Both standards occur
side by side and neither standard calls for a change in the practices of the
community. The same effect is also reflected in the newest newspaper
headline. Dr. Jack Kevorkian's efforts to help individuals end their lives,
challenges - perhaps inadvertently, unlike Antigone's challenge to Creon - the
legal strictures of what may be a prevailing ethical ethos or what may be one
community's ethical values imposed upon another's. What happens at the unit
level of the individual repertoire is what the immediate community shapes and
in tum shapes it.
Individual repertoires provide sources for future social development since
each repertoire results from a unique confluence of social and biological
factors. On occasion, such a joining of effects produces a behavioral source
that, combined with the proper circumstances, effects large changes in the
actions of others. (The effect can occur indirectly. Darwin's work on evolution
- a scientific theory presumably not relevant to the security of the state - was
resisted in part precisely because it was seen to undermine necessary religious
foundations for moral prescriptions, and subsequent social order.) Sources are
celebrated with a name: Aristotle, Buddha, Mohammed, Hume, Marx, Darwin,
Skinner, and other eponyms for certain cultural traditions.
Describing and labeling a behavioral source does not imply a governing
agency within the unique locus designated "Antigone" or "Darwin"; simply
a dynamic interaction between a repertoire at the unit of the individual and
those others of its immediate community. Historians are sensitive to this
96 Vargas
interaction, and attempt to tie down as exactly as they can what happened and
who said this or that at a specific time and place to account for the unique
actions labeled with the name of an individual. They unravel the social DNA
that produces a particular ethical stance as reflected, perhaps, in a striking
incident or dramatic document. "We hold these truths to be self-evident; that
all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their creator with certain
inalienable rights; ... " The Declaration of Independence is widely seen as
Thomas Jefferson's greatest stroke of the pen. The text, however, reflects the
efforts of many intertwining repertoires, each expressive of a different
consideration. As Ellis (1995) puts it, "a cacophony of human voices" made
"eighty-six substantive or stylistic changes in Jefferson's draft" and "about
one-quarter of the original text was excised" (p. 60). The task to write the
Declaration of Independence had been given to a committee headed by John
Adams. Adams turned the task over to Jefferson since he was the greater
stylist and was seen as less radical than Adams, thus lowering the critical
scrutiny for the document. The committee, primarily Adams and Franklin,
made only a few changes in the first draft - "replacing 'sacred and undeniable'
truths with 'self-evident' truths, for example" (p. 61). It was during the
following debate over the Declaration that substantial changes were made
reflecting the colonists' various positions in their relations to Britain, to King
George ill, and to slavery. For example, the difference of opinion was such
that "Jefferson subsequently claimed ... that certain factions in the Congress
blocked his effort to make a principled moral stand against slavery and the
slave trade" (p. 62, sentence reordered). Jefferson blamed the delegates from
South Carolina and Georgia. But as Ellis emphasizes, the passage excised
"explicitly condemned only the slave trade ... Jefferson knew from his
experience in the Virginia legislature that many established slave owners in
the Tidewater region supported an end to slave imports because their own
plantations were already full and new arrivals only reduced the value of their
existing slave plantations. For most Virginians, ending the slave trade had
nothing whatsoever to do with ending slavery" (p. 62). In short, the Southern-
ers did not disagree over slavery, but over whether to end the slave trade. As
Ellis says, "The great text was drafted in a specific context" (p. 60).
Exactly so. Actions at the unit level of the individual repertoire interpreted
as ethical must be understood - that is, explained, by their contingency
relations to other events - within the circumscribed compass of a given social
system at a particular time and place: a legislative meeting, a corporate firing,
a legal indictment, a clinical treatment. The controlling contingencies by an
ethical community over actions of the individual repertoire and between the
individual repertoire and its social context occur as if that social system were
Ethics 97
insulated. Change or stability of ethical values in a social system due to

intrinsic factors can be addressed without consideration of extrinsic forces.
There is a plague of wickedness rife in this city, destroying all the laws of morality; in-
deed most of them are by now a dead letter, and while morality withers wickedness
flourishes like a well-watered plant. Wickedness is the cheapest thing you can find
around here; you can pick a peck of it for nothing; there are far too many people who
think more of pleasing a few friends than what is best for the majority. Thus what is de-
sireable takes second place to interest, and interest is everywhere a confounded plague,
and an obstacle to private and public good (Plautus, 1964, p. 165).
Is this a fulmination on the den of inequity known as Washington, D. C. by an

Oral Jeremiah out of the wasteland of radio? No. It is an indignant lament by
Megaronides, an elderly gentleman in a play by the Roman playwright Plautus
in the second century B.C.E. Such commentary can be made by anyone within
his or her own system of values. With regard to interpreting the outcomes of
controlling circumstances, the microcontingency analysis of a particular set
of ethical activities of an individual - Antigone or Kevorkian, at a particular
time and place - ancient ''Thebes'' or modem America, occupies a closed
conceptual space.
At the unit level of the community, however, an additional set of contingent
relations must be brought into play. Where do the controlling contingencies
of an ethical community within a social system come from? No social system
is insulated from its surrounding biological and physical world. Extrinsic
events affect the inner social machinery of a given community through, as it
were, its semipermeable barrier of consistent activity interacting with material
conditions.
"Before the late 1700' s there was probably no settled community in which at least
nine-tenths of the population were not directly engaged in tillage ... Under such circum-
stances any lasting change in climate, soil fertility, technology, or the other conditions
affecting agriculture would necessarily modify the whole of society: population, wealth,
political relationships, leisure, and cultural expression" (White, Jr., 1962, p. 39).
For example, a change to a warmer, drier climate resulting in a reduced flow

of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and eventual soil salinization destroyed the
agricultural base of the ancient Mesopotamian civilization of Subir and led to
its abandonment (Issar, 1995). No less so than with a society'S ethical
injunctions: Eventually, ambient events dictate them to greater or lesser
degree.
Leslie White (1959) puts the matter starkly and simply while describing or
inferring the contingencies responsible for what is construed as proper action:
It has sometimes been argued that the ethical advance of mankind can be measured by
the different evaluations placed upon human life ... Unfortunately most discussions of
this thesis are not very realistic. They tend to overlook the reasons for homicide in prelit-
erate cultures. It is not lack of a "moral sense" that causes a mother to smother her new-
98 Vargas
borne babe, but lack of food. The same reason applies to the killing of old folks. Tech-
nological control over circumstances is weak and inadequate in many primitive cultures,
and habitats are occasionally niggardly and harsh. Many times on low cultural levels
there is not enough food for all and the group is faced with starvation. But who is to die?
Not the able-bodied breadwinners, for if they starve the whole group will perish. The
non breadwinners, therefore, the young and helpless, on the one hand, or the old and fee-
ble, on the other, must be denied food. If it is a choice between young and old, the latter
must be denied, for unless babies are fed, the tribe will not be perpetuated. The old peo-
ple have already lived their lives and will die soon anyway. Therefore in times of famine
it may become a moral obligation to kill the old in order to feed the young, and it is
sometimes felt to be more than merciful to kill them outright than to allow them to die
by inches. (p. 221)
These sorts of pressures are not restricted to exotic, woe-be-gone commu-

nities on the razor's edge of survival. Even rich, powerful societies face the
implications of their material conditions and the contingent impact of these
conditions on matters of ethical import.
The nation may find that it cannot do all it would like for everybody, whether the old or
the plague patient, and it may need the flexibility to address the questions: "What are the
priorities? If forced to, how can we best use each medical insurance dollar? Should we,
for instance, try to underwrite extremely expensive operations for the elderly, or when
the odds against full recovery are not very good?" (Grant, 1993, p. 3).
The ethical issues over euthanasia are being compelled by an improved

medical technology that keeps people alive longer therefore increasing the
costs of suffering as well as fiscal costs, and by a diminishing resource base
in relation to the popUlation that must be sustained by it.
Any of a variety of ethics can be traced back to the material conditions upon
which they are contingent. Harris (1977), for example, argues that following
the intensifying of agriculture, depleting of resources, and crowding of
population it became improper, tabooed even, to eat meat, or to eat certain
kinds of meat. Activities may become tabooed, ethical injunctions backed by
religious stricture, when they severely threaten the group's welfare.
Between 7,000 and 2,000 B.C .. , .there was a sixtyfold increase in the human population
of the Middle East. Extensive deforestation accompanied the rise in population ... Shade
and water, the natural conditions appropriate for pig, became progressively more scarce,
and pork became even more of an ecological and economic luxury (Harris, 1974, p. 44).
Destroying the pigs' habitat lowered the energy efficiency of converting

vegetable matter into meat matter. For Jews and Moslems, eating pigs became
tabooed when food stuffs, such as grains, that could have gone to humans had
to be fed to pigs. In Hindu society, it became unethical to eat zebu cows when
they became the essential ingredient for its survival. The zebu provided milk,
pulled plows, and in their hump stored nourishment that would get them
through the dry season between monsoons.
Ethics 99
Hindus and Westerners alike see in the meat-eating taboos ofIndia a triumph of morals
over appetite. This is a dangerous misrepresentation of cultural processes. Hindu vege-
tarianism was a victory not of spirit over matter but of reproductive over productive
forces (Harris, 1977, p. 229).
Too many people with too few resources changed a meat eating culture to one
where cattle became an object of worship. For many of the same reasons, a
current society may began to proclaim it wrong to destroy wildlife habitats
and for the sake of biodiversity may began to protect or even venerate certain
kinds of wildlife.
To point to the connection between ethical actions and physical and
biological material conditions, both past and current, is not to argue that there
is an inevitable, and simple, one-way relationship between them. Behavior is
a material condition also. Once in place it can continue to exert an influence
long after the disappearance of the physical and biological factors that
generated it. Speaking loosely (with teleological overtones), contingency
schedules have been designed in which an organism no longer gets what it
worked for, and works long and hard to get nothing. An organism may even
work to get something it typically avoids, such as electric shock. A behavioral
homology in human action is gambling behavior, but there are others, easily
observed in the "field", from everyday personal relations to institutional
actions. Actions deemed ethical may be engaged in though their consequences
may be disastrous and even foreseen as such. Other contingent consequences
may have their play.
Taboos also have social functions, such as helping people to think of themselves as a
distinctive community. This function is well served by the modern observance of dietary
rules among Moslems and Jews outside of their Middle Eastern homelands" (Harris,
1974, p. 45).
Hindus could import beef to New Delhi and Jews could order pork at a posh
restaurant in New York, but do not. Once the cake of custom is frosted legally
and religiously, its ingredients take on new significance and hard-set persis-
tence.
In American society in the United States, there occur an extraordinary
variety of "family partner" relationships, sometimes occupying the same
household, sometimes not, sometimes involving the same sex, sometimes not.
There are monogamous relations; these may be long lasting or may be serial.
There are polygamy and polyandry; one of the partners may be in a legal
arrangement but the others not, or none may be. Religions sanction only a few
forms of the current relationships. But the "partner" arrangements may be seen
as "good" by all involved since contingencies not only may involve sexual
pleasure, but include, more pertinently, emotional, social, and financial
supports. Only one type is legalized thus extending community control over
obligations and the transfer of property. But all could be. Why not? A "legal"
100 Vargas
family could consist of a busy professional woman who has had one or two
children and a husband who likes to putter around the house and take care of
the kids, another husband who is a workaholic, likes to make money, and
spends most of his time at the office, and a third husband who puts in a modest
amount of time in his work, enjoys community affairs, and can always be
counted upon for a social outing. There may be more or fewer husbands, or
the sexual division may be reversed, or these relations may occur within one
sex. Sexual access is not the primary reason for a family relationship and
families are not only breeding units as the number of childless and of older
aged families attests. The variability of family units in American society
points to the variability of controlling contingencies, all exerting control
coming down from the past and coming up in the present.
In the primitive peasant world ... one wife at a time was all that the bulk of the world's
population could support, even though their religion permitted them more. Indeed, it was
the primitive nature of peasant economy which gave the family, as we know it, its wide
diffusion and its remarkable continuity (Plumb, 1973, p. 148) ... But what we think of as
a social crisis of this generation - the rapid growth of divorce, the emancipation of
women and adolescents, the sexual and educational revolutions, even the revolution in
eating which is undermining the family as the basis of nourishment ... are the inexorable
result of the changes in society itself ... And there is no historical reason to believe that
human beings could be less or more happy, less or more stable (Plumb, 1973, pps.
151-152).
And, for their circumstances, their practices less or more ethical.

Though verbal injunctions maintain certain ethical patterns of conduct long
after ambient circumstances produced them, eventually they are altered when
radical changes in circumstances modify the contingent relations between
actions and other events. What was happening around the Mediterranean a few
thousand years ago still exerts its influence in the commended observance by
some of a particular family type, and concurrently the rise of light muscle,
information, and service industry, the new means of accessing and transferring
wealth, and the shift from mechanical to chemical means of increasingly
effective contraceptive devices prompts and promotes other family practices,
also increasingly seen as ethical. What was right and what was wrong altered
radically in all institutional spheres and for all classes of individuals as
Western societies exploited their world more effectively through science and
technology, and through new patterns of social organization. Mechanization
of power changed the cost and technology of human labor and thus demoted
the ethical propriety of slavery. (In early American society it was given
biblical sanction.) Decentralization of control changed the effects of exposure
to social and natural contingencies and thus promoted the importance of the
variability of repertoires. (The presumed advantage of certain economic
systems is the greater degree to which contact with contingent consequences
Ethics 101
direct work efforts.) Though suffused with every political principle of current
American society, in fifth century (B.C.E.) Athens it was not thought that
women should engage in political life. It was a clear "ought not to do". What
was said then about the rights of citizenship has not changed in any significant
way. Who has those rights has. Rights and other ethical injunctions work only
through behavior at the individual level shaped by an ethical community in
that community's setting. (Who has a right makes no sense without others to
support the claim.) These settings, in tum, are dictated by past and present
social and material conditions. On their part, these conditions interact with the
biological characteristics of the species.
At the unit level of the population, biological material undergirds the
formation of cultures. Obviously most populations of organisms cannot
produce the interlinked repertoires called "culture". It is equally obvious that
without certain characteristics of nervous system and anatomical structure, a
culture would not be possible. No one argues, even those concerned about
animal rights, that a soul has been infused into the young of a cockroach - but
perhaps if it could talk? But a more specific inquiry is necessary: To what
degree is a portion of a human culture due directly to its biological substrate?
With respect to ethics, a pertinent question is whether ethical action, of
whatever kind and at whatever strength, may be part at least of the biologi-
cally provided repertoire of the human species, or any other species for that
matter.
Again, a typical response to this possibility has been to posit an agent,
imbued with moral sense, that is, as Spinoza puts it, removed from the
"kingdom of nature". This mind stuff is not of the body although it resides in
it to oversee both its and the body's conduct. But if the mind agency and all
its homuncular surrogates are dispensed with, then the origins of actions,
including those deemed ethical, must lie elsewhere. The alternative "else-
where" for these origins resides in contingent circumstances and consequences
that both affect, and are an effect of, actions. But the impact of consequences
and the circumstances that initiate them may occur not only during the lifetime
of an individual or community. The consequences of actions may also occur
over the lifetime of a species. Natural selection operates not only on anatomy
and physiology, but on behavior.
All animals behave. All animals acquire a portion of that behavior biologi-
cally. To differing degrees, a given repertoire, from simple reflexes to more
complex bundles of activities, is already in place for any member of a
particular species. For some, salivating; for others, farming aphids. An aspect
of that repertoire is its sociability, the degree to which an animal's activities
complements or enhances the activities of another member of its species.
These activities may be designated broadly as cooperating, protecting,
102 Vargas
feeding, mating, and so on, and more specifically as child rearing, nest
building, fungus gardening, and so on. With respect to the return from energy
expenditure, actions may be described economically as costly or profitable.
With respect to the welfare of other members of the species or of the kin
group, these same actions may be designated as unethical or ethical.
Ethical acts are not restricted to the human species. Other species exhibit
activities such as altruism. A prairie dog may yelp a warning of a predator,
calling attention to itself and getting killed but saving other members of its
group. Various types of birds, such as night hawks, wood ducks, prairie
warblers, short-eared owls, and Australian blue wrens, engage in distraction
displays that protect their young by attracting predators from them to the
displaying bird (Wilson, 1975). Such activities, and their labeling as ethical,
call into question the exclusivity of human ethical acts. More than that, they
imply some degree of biological origin - through natural or even sexual
selection - to ethical action.
To imply that ethical action may have some degree of biological origin has
been and will continue to be resisted. The typical way of dealing with the
problem of naming biologically shaped activities ethical is to define such
labeling out of contention. Two assertions are made, one depending on agency
and the other on the use of language. Though the form of an activity may be
the same in the human species as in another, the first assertion argues, through
interpretation, that the activity is of a different kind, one that depends upon a
moral sense or moral agent (though moral sense is a type of agency itself). If
the topography of action is the same in the human and nonhuman, then it is
ethical in one case and not in the other due to the presence of the moral sense
or agent inferred in the one and not the other. Kant asserts that only man
engages in ethical action, and bases his assertion on the agency within.
Though the assertion begs the question, the contention of an underlying
agency cannot be disproved by argument, only eventually by arranging
circumstances so that independent variables, of whatever sort, account for the
behavioral form in question. 4
The second assertion made is that ethical actions or ethical statements are
not amenable to a naturalistic interpretation because "ought" statements are
of a different kind than "is" statements. But such a definition of the terms
"ought" or "is" is one within a given set of language rules. A particular
scheme of linguistic analysis declares that entire disciplines, such as sociobi-
ology, cannot address ethical questions since "ought" statements are not "is"
statements. This formalistic assertion pretends there are no origins to what
people say and what people do. It would approve of only the moral geometry
its axioms dictate. But such a geometry is a closed one, and inevitably
tautological. We cannot get far in attempting to explain what people say and
Ethics 103
do by examining dictionary definitions. As stated earlier, when the controls

and consequences of actions, their contingency relations to other events, are
the same then those actions have the same meaning, regardless of differing
topography or unit location.
To the degree, then, that similar contingency controls are in place, certain
kinds of social actions called "ethical" are part of the biological heritage of the
human organism. How this works is not yet firmly established. Such complex
actions would not be simple reflexes like salivation. Yet all human beings,
regardless of their culture, share emotional states, such as anger or affection,
upon which, starting from rather diffused and varied behavioral concomitants,
cultures elaborate very complex social topographies. "Where art thou
Romeo?" may require a Shakespeare, but the plaintive cry is not possible
without teenagers Romeo and Juliet and their enthusiastic glands. The human
tendency to bond, for any of a number of reasons including smell and taste,
may easily be the starting point of many concerns labeled as "ethical". A
starting point, not a finished behavioral product: For example, it is difficult to
ignore the biological foundations of sexual behavior, yet concurrently the
great variety of sexual practices within and across societies display no one
proper norm of so-called "human nature" that is biologically dictated. But the
biological substratum provides the starting raw material - in the human
species for example: two sexes, the female typically smaller than the male,
continual state of "heat" for both males and females, sexual stimulation that
occurs between and within sexes, and so on - for the social relations that
eventually ensue from social and material conditions. The ideal nuclear family
- what is ethical as some prescribe based on the "Judeo-Christian" tradition
- father, mother, daughter, and son, with father in charge and mother emotion-
ally nutrient, would be quite different if the human female laid a large clutch
of eggs to be hatched by the sun. In this sense, Wilson's (1978) position is
well taken: "Some variability in human social behavior has a genetic basis,
and, as a consequence, at least some behavior is genetically constrained" (p.
xi).
The boundaries of what is "genetically constrained" (a rather conservative
phrase) may be quite broad, and the links to the biologically provided raw
material of ethical behavior quite evanescent, but the relation is one of
biological contingency not determinism. Intelligent behavior has a biological
component, but it is a stretch to assert that the skill of cabinet making or of
viola playing is genetically programmed and thus destined. The only claim
asserted here - an almost timid and traditional one, but one that excludes a
special human nature - is that biological factors belong to the set of contin-
gencies, along with behavioral ones, that bear on the operants labeled
"ethical" .
104 Vargas
How they bear is not uniform. Biologically driven contingencies do not

necessarily override the behavioral contingencies that characterize a particular
culture. Biological contingencies may conflict or accord with behavioral ones.
The ethics of reproductive behavior is intensely shaped in every culture and
certainly accommodates biological imperatives. Yet variability of sexual
behavior occurs, in many societies even counter to a cultural ethic of mating
partners being breeding partners. It may be that at the population level, sexual
predilection that does not result in breeding more members of a group may
serve to maintain at least a built-in check on overburdening its resource
environment. On the other hand, the biological impetus may complement a
cultural celebration - also driven, in part, by resource scarcity - of celibacy
and institutional isolation that in effect draws males and especially females
from the breeding pool.
There yet remains the central issue as to the specificity of biological
governance of ethical action. (It will be emphasized again, as noted above, that
we are not talking about the nature of humans, or any other animal, but of a
particular type of action and what may control it). Wilson, earlier in 1975 in
Sociobiology was more uninhibited than later in his 1978 statement on the
relation between biological factors and ethical actions:
"In the opening chapter of this book, I suggested that a science of sociobiology, if cou-
pled with neurophysiology, might transform the insights of ancient religions into a pre-
cise account of the evolutionary origin of ethics and hence explain the reasons why we
make certain moral choices instead of others at particular times" (1975, p. 129).
It was this kind of statement that led all sorts of folks to say all sorts of
things about Wilson that did not sound quite as virtuous as the virtues they
were defending. But Wilson's theory is no more extravagant (and seemingly
less) in its biological "determinism" than the psycholinguistic theory claiming
that humans are hardwired for language. A speech action, however, seems no
less complex and as influenced by an immediate community as that of an
ethical action. Yet a great deal of work proceeds, without hissy-type fussbudg-
eting over it, to try to discover the evolutionary background and the current
neurological correlates of verbal action - including, presumably, what is said
and written about ethical matters. No claim is made by Wilson (and according
to Dawkins, 1986, it would be a hopeless ambition) to find a specific smoking
gene behind a particular moral act triggered by a singular stimulus. The fuss
appears to be an outcome of the misplacement on the focus of inquiry and its
cause, especially, in a sense, to have no cause - only a moral agent freely
making a conscious and intentional choice. But if the focus remains on a class
of operants, defined as ethical, then any of a set of factors may bear on any
member occurring. For example, it typically is not deemed right (and therefore
under the purview of ethical inquiry) to assault someone with foul language,
Ethics 105
especially at a public gathering. Behavioral factors may be the cause. Another

cause may be a specific physiological disorder, for example, Tourette's
Syndrome. The topography of the action is the same. But, it is contingent on
different factors. That causes can be ascertained for it does not mean that it is
less immoral or less unethical, that is, deemed less wrong; only that if these
causes differ, then treatment will also. (Butler plays with this theme in
Erewhon.) Ethical inquiry has a long history of looking for causes, and what
those proffered imply for public policy.
THE THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF ETHICS AND VERBAL BEHAVIOR
Axiological inquiry examines the meaning of ethical terms. However ethics

may be defined, they are engaged in as verbal behavior. The human organism
expresses ethics statements in print, gesture, or speech. Headlines scream that
fetuses have rights. A person who is deaf signs to another individual, "No one
has the right to abuse children". A woman will assert to her companion, "I
have a right to my own body". Ethics statements can be analyzed like any
other behavior that is verbal. And analyzed they have been.
What sorts of statements are these that have been analyzed, and by
inference, the conduct to which they refer? In the dynamic interaction and
flow of behavioral relations, the same behavioral topography serves as the
occasion for a variety of reactions and interpretations. British Gas PLC, while
laying off twenty-five thousand workers on the basis of cost-cutting to
increase its economic efficiency, raised the chief executive officer's salary
hundreds of thousands more, 76% over its base (Flynn and Nayeri, 1995). The
action may be seen as an exercise of power by those with access to the
financial resources of the firm. The action may be justified as economically
rational since it could be argued that the chief executive is worth the additional
cost to the frrm and if not paid those additional hundred of thousand of dollars
more may be lost to a competitor. The action may be said to be "not fair".5 In
efforts to understand the foundations of ethical conduct, it is exactly terms
such as "fair" that are analyzed by ethical theories.
Through the deconstruction of terms such as "good" or "ought" or "right",
axiological theories attempt to give the basis for ethical action in word or
deed. 6 The variety of these theories is extensive enough so that small taxono-
mies categorize them by primary and secondary features. What matters here,
however, is not the distinction between, say, cognitive and noncognitive
theories, and even further, between intuitionist and naturalist theories, but
rather the fact that these theories attempt to provide the reasons for ethical
conduct. They attempt to describe what it is, and why it happens. Even
106 Vargas
intuitionist theories (theories that assert that moral terms denote nonnatural
states that can only be understood by direct intuition) provide a framework of
explanation that is to a small degree behaviorological, certainly largely
psychological: A property of the human organism, intuition, immediately
apprehends the meaning of "good" or of "ought" or of "right".
Thus, axiological theories are not prescriptive. They are descriptive.
Axiological analysis of ethics terms, such as "good", or statements such as,
"All men have inalienable rights", examines, as it were, the atomic meaning
of these ethical terms and statements, the point to which no further analysis
can go lest the analysis become tautological. Interestingly enough, the division
of axiological theories by the reasons they give for ethical terms and state-
ments resembles the division of controls over primary verbal behavior (For a
contingency analysis of speaking, writing, and gesturing, see Skinner, 1957).
For example, most "rights statements" are mands. They specify a set of
conditions that are, roughly speaking, rewarding to the speaker.7 Though the
rationales provided for ethical behavior depend upon the action of an agency
(intuitions are "grasped" so something "grasps" them), traditional axiological
analysis overlaps confusedly and haphazardly with behaviorological analysis.
Regardless of the confusion due to different words and assumptions, such
overlap can be expected. After all, what has been examined for a long time is
what is said, gestured, or written on ethical concerns, and even with agencies
posited to provide motives, such as "intention", the categories of reasons for
verbal behavior are finite. It is on the issue of agencies that a traditional
axiological analysis and a current behaviorological analysis part company.
The meaning of terms such as "fair", "good" or "justice" is not provided by
what an agency perceives, thinks, or intends, but by contingent relations
between actions, circumstances, and consequences shaped by a verbal
community whose behavior in tum is shaped by its historical, material, and
biological conditions.
Since verbal behavior is shaped by a verbal community so that it mediates
the effect of other behavior, consequences - socially direct and induced - in
given settings shape and maintain verbal relations. Such contingent meaning
can be exemplified by a closer look at the term "ought". It can have any of a
variety of meanings depending on circumstances. "Ought" can denote
preference and thus be a form of mand. "You ought to do such and such" may
mean that "I prefer or I want you to take a particular action". A husband may
say to his wife, "You ought to quit smoking", clearly a use of "ought" that
specifies an action that would please the husband; a type of mand. But "ought"
may also mean "I predict". A physician looking at an X-ray of the lungs
showing smoking damage may say, "This ought to get worse if smoking
continues". If based on circumstances that currently evoke the statement, then
Ethics 107
this statement is a tact. The physician does not prefer a damaging outcome.
Even statements such as "You ought to quit smoking" or "you ought to quit
eating fats" may not denote preference. The physician may just be stating
probable outcomes based on current evidence. Of course, there is nothing to
preclude dual control over a statement so that the "ought" reflects both a
preference and a prediction.
In the usual axiological unpackaging of the meaning of the term "ought",
a false dichotomy is posed between "is" and "ought" statements. The
distinction between the two terms, and the statements that use them, is made
by definition. Such a distinction ignores the meaning given by what governs
their being said. An "is" term may also denote ethical obligation, as does the
first type of "ought". The second type of "ought" statement constitutes a
scientific statement. It attempts to predict from a current set of circumstances
what the probable outcome may be. If by moral injunction, certain foods are
not to be eaten or cattle to be killed or wives to be coveted, then predictions
are implied, and often made explicit, about results from maintenance or
violation of the injunction. This type of verbal behavior is under the same type
of controls, perhaps not as exact, as that which predicts whether a particular
payload ought to reach the moon. The ethical injunction and the formula
injunction will both be enforced by their consequences, the practical outcomes
of a prior prediction. The circumstances that initiated those injunctions may,
for purposes of immediate control over what is recommended and predicted,
no longer be present. Verbal behavior prior to events, such as a scientific
formula, denote how events ought to occur. Much of the science that is
learned, just like much of the ethics that are learned, is learned in the absence
of what gave rise to those science (or ethics) statements. Connections can be
traced back to the conditions that initiated the tact statements in the first place.
But as anthropologists demonstrate so well, connections to conditions can be
traced for ethics statements as well.
Ethics statements and their analysis, the entire philosophy and practical
discourse of ethics, is then an early form of behavioral science. First, there is
an attempt to identify the causes of ethical actions and statements. The cause,
and therefore source, of ethical actions and statements is said to be either
native givens that humans apprehend directly or the material circumstances
that humans encounter. Intuitionists and naturalists are the convenient
categories into which these theorists are grouped by philosophers. But both are
"naturalist" in that both give factors from which ethical actions and statements
spring. And both are "intuitionist" in that the factors responsible for ethical
behavior consist of psychological assumptions through which even material
circumstances are transformed; the assumptions posit essential attributes of the
human being. They give "human nature" its "nature". Second, any science-
108 Vargas
the framework of explanatory statements covering a domain of phenomena -

prompts and justifies engineering applications of its subject matter. A similar
effort occurs with ethics. It is the most salient aspect of ethics statements.
They attempt to provide the best course of action. Such "best action" recom-
mendations are demonstrated by the work of ethicists regarding, for example,
abortion or euthanasia. In any case, they are guidelines for effective or
approved action (another form of effective action, at least socially), and what
is "right" deemed so by relating that action back to the explanatory framework
of ethical behavior. God wants "it" so, or "it" is the optimal costlbenefit
outcome for the group.
ETHICS AND PuBLIC POLICY
Though examples have been given of ethics statements and actions, no

analysis has been given of the intrinsic merit of any ethics position. Is it best
to keep a life support system going or to pull the plug? Should experiments
involving a great deal of pain on infrahuman animals be conducted if people's
lives will be saved? Even more to the point, no criteria have been offered by
which one ethics position may be chosen over an alternative. What criteria do
we use to decide whether to legalize drugs, allow abortion, execute criminals,
paddle schoolchildren? Within the framework of the immediately prior
behaviorological analysis, such recommendations are not applicable.
Two types of ethics statements and acts can be distinguished: To begin
with, there is the activity of many actions and statements labeled "ethical".
Within this broad array of ethic acts and words, are various themes: the rights
of the individual versus the rights of the group, the sanctity of tradition versus
the benefits of variability, the privacy of ownership versus the welfare of the
commons. This type of ethics, descriptive of the rush and pell mell of action
and statement on what is proper, may be labeled Ethics-l (E I). In contrast, the
prior behaviorological analysis may be labeled Ethics-2 (Ez). It looks for the
causes primarily in the form of contingent circumstances, both social and
biological, over what is said and done in EI.8
Axiological theories, as well, whether "intuitionist" or "naturalist", attempt
to provide the reasons for the ethical themas labeled E I. Many of these
axiological theories depend on an underlying agent and the particular
psychological characteristics given to it. But in a behaviorological analysis,
no agency, persona, or self decides or freely chooses an ethical course of
action. Choices are not encountered; although alternative conditions may
allow the possibility of a range of actions. An action will be educed, however
slightly, along one alternative rather than another by the combined interaction
Ethics 109
of the push of history and the pull of consequence. Those conditions "decide"
the vectored outcomes of actions. If for those activities, reasons are given,
especially as justifications, such verbal behavior is also emitted under certain
controls. If it is stated on the basis of scientific evidence that "biodiversity is
good", that statement is controlled by contact with a particular biological
world and a certain cultural tradition.
Axiological theories were, as stated earlier, an early form of behavioral
science. No more than a behaviorological one, in themselves these theories
cannot provide the justification for an ethical course of action or for favoring
one type of an ethic thema over another. These theories simply address what
drives those ethic themas, and if it is selection by consequences, for example,
then under certain conditions, certain themas will occur and will have a
rationale provided for them. Within the framework of their underlying axioms,
the ethic themas provide their own justifications. Ethic themas, as articulated,
are closed verbal systems espoused by various ethical communities.
Contending ethical communities imply preferred outcomes when they state
what is ethical. If pressed to justify what is said to be ethical, those who
espouse the theories point to the benefits and the costs of meeting or refusing
demands. But the calculus of costs and rewards is not economic, though such
a rationale may be used. It is emotional and ideological. What is deemed
ethical is justified in a number of ways - the sanctity of a tradition, the rights
of the individual, the benefit to the community, the demands of a religious
dogma, and other equally viable reasons. These drum the paraded proofs that
an action is ethical.
How that "ethical" action and "ethical" assertion got to be there in the frrst
place differs from how it is sanctioned. For justification, causality is not an
issue. Propriety is. The assertion that it is unethical to abort a human fetus
rests on a set of justifications, primarily religious. Within the system of
justifications for this ethic, the cause is already known; "a deity ordained
them". The assertion that it is unethical to force a woman to bear what is
unwanted rests on a set of justifications, primarily philosophical. Their
warrantability relies on assertions regarding intrinsic political and property
rights, including individual choice over the property of one's body. Each
thema of ethic statements is closed to the other. Their axioms are mutually
exclusive.
Unresolvable ethics conflicts are exactly that; they cannot be resolved.
Creon asserts that the security of the state depends on his enforcing the
nonburial of those who attacked the city, not exempting any, especially those
of immediate family. Antigone exclaims that on the basis of religious and
family duty she must bury her brother, one of the attackers. Both parties are
right. While a behaviorological analysis may illuminate why a particular
110 Vargas
ethical stance is advanced, that is, it addresses the conditions under which
certain ethical actions and words take place and are preferred, it does not, and
cannot by nature of the analysis, favor a particular course of action. It may be,
for example, as has been argued, that survival is the highest ethic. But that is
not a scientific statement. (It may be called a humanistic one.) A scientific
analysis may reveal whether survival mayor may not occur, but the statement
itself expresses a preferred outcome. The possibility of slavery or of life under
a different moral order may animate a policy of nonsurvival such as the Jewish
community pursued at Masada.
A scientific analysis may provide the reasons, or causes, for a preference,
but not the justifications. It may, through analysis of possible outcomes, show
clearly what will occur, but that simply adds another factor prompting what
action may be taken. The analysis of causes, E2, derives its value within an
ethics thema, E\, that adjusts those facts into preferences. "Is" statements
become "ought" statements. In some cases they may formally differ, but have
the same meaning due to similar controls over topographically differing verbal
behavior. But as well, and as earlier said: Under differing control the same
formal kind of verbal statement, a statement presented as a fact for example,
may be one of value - an apparent tact may be a mand. "Causes" reveal
differing kinds of behavior. One set of causes arises from the circumstances
that individuals and groups encounter, and another set of causes arises from
what has been said about those circumstances and encounters. The second set
of statements may continue to be said even when the circumstances that
originally led to them no longer linger. These statements are true, or equally
important, valid, as long as they derive correctly from their premises.
Depending on the set of reasons that stood as premises, it can be either wrong
or right to kill others. There is no way of adjudicating between ethical themas.
A behavioral or biological science can clarify, but cannot provide a rationale
that is itself ethical. If deemed so, it is only in terms of one of the ethic
themas.
Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dignity provides a case in point. A much
misunderstood book, it was presumed to argue against freedom and dignity.
It was, however, much the other way. Skinner contended that the basis on
which the values of freedom and dignity were supported were no longer viable
due to what behavioral science currently revealed. Further, without under-
standing what controlled behavior, terms such as "freedom" and "dignity"
disguise other meanings and could become stalking horses for forms of control
that people would enjoy to their long-run disadvantage. "War is Peace" was
the slogan that justified conflict in Orwell's 1984, and around the same actual
calendar years, war missiles were touted as "peace keepers". Critics of
Skinner's position, which they saw as an attack on the ethical values of
Ethics 111
Western culture, seemed not to go beyond the title, a catchy phrase created by
the publisher, not the author. What the book argued against was the frail
dependency on inner man to sustain the values held so dear. The book actually
went beyond its science base to promote ethical themas that Skinner, in large
part, shared with his critics.
Attempts to derive ethical values from biological science, especially
evolutionary theory, have also come to grief. An immediate difficulty is that
ethical outcomes justified on the basis of evolutionary processes makes those
processes purposive. Evolutionary science is the science of "hig-
geldy-piggeldy" (John Herschel's contemptuous but ironically accurate phrase
on Darwin's theory of evolution), and though what occurs is lawful, it does
not occur for a specific outcome. Outcomes may be predicted, but the
phenomena whose understanding allow for the prediction are themselves
valueless. From the same data base and from the same evolutionary principles,
radically different conclusions can be reached from within different ethical
themas. Population growth for some is a promise of greater economic wealth;
for others, an impending ecological disaster. And so, similar events such as
abortion, availability of contraceptive devices, number of children borne by
a woman, are given different ethical labels. As stated by T. H. Huxley in his
Romanes Lecture back in 1893, (quoted by Dobzhansky, 1962): "cosmic
evolution may teach us how the good and evil tendencies of man have come
about; but, in itself, it is incompetent to furnish any better reason why what we
call good is preferable to what we call evil than we had before" (p. 341).
The distinction between explaining and justifying an ethical action is often
a subtle and narrow one, especially since justification of an ethical action may
call for some degree of understanding of the context in which the action is to
take place. This is especially the case in situation ethics, a particular kind of
ethic thema.
The morality of an act is a function of the state of the system at the time the act is per-
formed - this is the fundamental tenet of "situation ethics". It deprives us of the comfort
of simple dogmatic directives like "Thou shalt not kill elephants". Directives become
conditional: ''Thou shalt not kill elephants if ... ". Killing an elephant may be moral this
year, indeterminate two years from now, and immoral in five years. It is the state of the
system, that is determinative (Hardin, 1973, p. 134).
Other ethic themas disagree with this position. As Hardin points out, the
Jains of India believe that all killing is immoral, regardless of circumstances.
The point here is that a scientific analysis of the two ethical positions cannot
establish who is right, only how such statements came to be made. To justify
an action differs from predicting or explaining that action. A scientific
analysis provides clarity, not the rationale for the triumph of an ethical thema.
An ethic thema may triumph either through the exercise of social power or
through a change in the material conditions of life (Neither excludes the other
112 Vargas
and both may work concurrently or at odds end). A particular ethic becomes
public policy through social power exercised at the ballot box, in the school
room, through mob action, from the barrel of a gun, with the click of a
keyboard, by the switch of a microphone. All these means are used, for
example, by the anti-abortion foes. That some means may be unethical has
rarely disturbed any group attempting to put in place what it considers to be
ethical. A rationalization is as ready as a rationale. A change in material
conditions also makes a given ethic applicable. If death arrives frequently at
an early age and resources arise abundantly with enough people to exploit
them, then a high breeding rate is valued. If most people last for a long time
and the carrying capacity of an environment gets close to its margin of
exhaustion, then a low breeding rate is seen as best. We thus come full circle
with respect to an analysis of ethic themas. Describing their controlling
contingencies, either social or material, provides the meaning of ethics actions
and statements - why these sorts of behaviors are there.
CONCLUSION
Ethical behavior results from overlapping sets of contingencies. The starting

point of its analysis is an operant labeled "ethical", a class of actions deemed
kind, considerate, helping, or the like, and thus so labeled due to a context in
which the welfare of others is at issue. Such operants are designated as
"ethical" at whatever locus they may occur. The locus at which the class of
ethical actions occurs may be the individual, the community, or the popula-
tion. Within each category of individual, community, or popUlation, a specific
individual and community and population can be characterized by its pattern
of ethical actions. These patterns at all three loci are due to the forces that bear
on them. These forces are behavioral, biological, and physical. They operate
concurrently on any given ethical action for any specific entity at any locus.
With respect to any action for any entity, for a particular type of analysis only
a single type of force may be deemed pertinent. For example, if the ethic
examined is "altruism" then the analysis may be concerned with how such
activity is transmitted institutionally or the analysis may be concerned with
how it is transmitted genetically. Of course, the analysis may attempt to sort
out how all forces bear concurrently on ethical actions, and the problems of
sorting out contribution and interaction are as fierce as those in the similar
attempt with intelligent actions. Presumably a bell curve of more or less
altruism could be described for any defined population and the issue then
joined as to how much was nurture and how much nature.
Ethics 113
As if the analysis of an ethical action as a vectored product of a number of

concurrent and overlaying sets of forces were not complex enough, three other
factors have to be taken into account. The ethical action becomes as well a
behavioral force in itself and affects other behavioral, biological, and physical
forces bearing on it. Behavioral and other forces engage in reciprocal and
feedback interaction with each other, and claiming the priority of a particular
force as the genesis of ethics caters to a dubious debate. (Any point in the
interaction, therefore, is as correct a place to start an analysis as any other.)
Finally, both the ethical actions and the events to which they are causally
related are changing, not necessarily uniformly, over time. What then is
causally important at one time point of the interaction is not so important at
another.
If more is to be done than simply speculate, and to do so by conveniently
introducing an agency as a deus ex machina with just the properties needed to
allow a particular interpretation of ethical actions, then eventually the
characteristics of ethical actions must be linked quantitatively to the properties
of contingency conditions.
Vargas and Associates

Morgantown, West Virginia, USA
NOTES
1. The quote from Spinoza is from Body, Mind, and Death (pp. 144-148) edited by Antony
Flew, and the original source is Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, translated by R. H. M. Elwes. The
quote from Loeb is found in Garland Allen (1975) Life Science in the Twentieth Century,
and the original source is Jacques Loeb (1912), The Mechanistic Conception of Life.
2. A number of scientists in a variety of disciplines pursue the contingency analysis of
behavioral relations. "Behavioro10gy" is simply the most unambiguous disciplinary label,
for under other disciplinary labels explanatory frameworks other than a contingency analysis
also preoccupy their professionals. For further discussion see Vargas (1994).
3. Taken for granted does not mean never investigated; for example, even the seemingly simple
act of a pigeon's "pecking" movement has been found to consist of different components
under differing contingency control (Allan, 1992, 1993). Such an analysis facilitates the
study of the neurological events that also figure in the control of each action component, and
of how the two sets of controls, physiological and behaviorological, interact with each other
with respect to a given action.
4. It happened that way in biology. The rise of the experimental method supported by and
supporting philosophical materialism eventually displaced the idealism so prominent in
many areas of biology - "such as embryology, taxonomy, comparative anatomy, evolution,
and animal behavior. In embryology idealism showed itself as the preformation theory. In
taxonomy idealism showed itself in the doctrine of types and the immutability of species.
In comparative anatomy idealism blossomed in the early nineteenth century as the doctrine
of types, the idealistic morphology of Cuvier and Owen. In evolution idealism was visible
in neo-Lamarckism, the doctrine of orthogenesis and all theories claiming a directionality
114 Vargas
and purpose (teleology) in evolutionary development. And, in the study of behavior (animal
and human), idealism was rampant in the form of anthropomorphism, a strong reliance on
instincts to explain the origin of all "basic" behavior patterns, and the ideas of a basic
"human nature". All this idealism was to give way, ... " (Allen, 1975, pp. xix-xx) The
reliance of ethical action upon a soul or moral agent asserts a basic human nature. For the
implausibility of the sameness implied in the notion, "human nature", see Hull, 1989,
chapter l.
5. The verbal protest of an injustice may take a variety of forms. "At the company's annual
meeting in late May, union members trotted out a 350-pound pig named Cedric ... " (Flynn
and Nayeri, 1995, page 41). Guess the chairman's first name.
6. The literature on ethics and on ethical theories is vast. An excellent entry is provided by
three articles, one in the Encyclopedia Britannica written by Alan Gewirth, 1978, and two
others in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy written by Raziel Abelson and Kai Nielson, 1967,
and Kai Nielson, 1967. For a review of some features of ethical theories within a behavioris-
tic formulation see Vargas (1982).
7. It is difficult to get more exact technically without getting unduly elliptical or turgid. If an
action is emitted and followed by an event that increases the probability of the action
(actually, the probability of the set of actions of which the action is a member), then what
occurs to that set of actions is described by the term "reinforced". "People" are not rein-
forced, rather it is "behavior" which is reinforced. Further, the incrementing consequence
must be immediate, not an event that will occur in the future. Many rights statements
demand a preferred future state of affairs. Clearly, since that event has not yet occurred, it
cannot affect the current statement. Other immediate consequences, such as an approving
audience, maintain or increase the making of the statement. Furthermore, schedule effects
impact verbal behavior as they do all other behavior, so even if no consequence of relevance
follows a particular statement, it and many others like it may be emitted frequently and for
some time. For a more detailed analysis of rights statements see Vargas (1973).
Examples where people are agents, for example, "speaker" or "husband", should also be
seen as nontechnical paraphrases. This communication strategy is a common one, though
it can lead to misunderstanding. Obviously, for example, genes are not selfish, as the title
of Dawkins's well-known book dramatically exclaimed though not for literal reasons.
8. The notion of ethics themas and the distinction between EI and E2 borrows from Holton's
(1973) scheme of themas in science.
REFERENCES
Abelson, R. and Nielsen, K. (1967). History of ethics. In The encyclopedia ofphilosophy (Vol.
3, pp. 81-117). New York: Macmillan and The Free Press.
Allan, R. W. (1992). Technologies to reliably transduce the topographical details of pigeons'
pecks. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, and Computers, 24, 150-156.
Allan, R. W. (1993). Control of pecking response topography by stimulus-reinforcer and
response-reinforcer contingencies. In H. Philip Zeigler, and Hans-Joachim Bischof (Eds.),
Vision, brain, and behavior in birds (pp. 285-300). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Allen, G. E. (1975). Life science in the twentieth century. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Aurelius, M. (1964). Meditations. (M. Staniforth, Trans.). Middlesex, England: Penguin Books.
(Original work second century A.D).
Dawkins, R. (1986). The blind watchmaker. New York: Norton.
Dobzhansky, T. (1962). Mankind evolving. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Ethics 115
Ellis, J. J. (1995, July-August). Editing the Declaration. Civilization, 58-63.

Flynn, J., and Nayeri, F. (1995, July 3). Continental divide over executive pay. Business Week,
40-41.
Gewirth, A. (1978). Ethics. In The new encyclopedia Britannica (Vol. 6, pp. 976-978). Chicago,
IL: Encyclopedia Britannica.
Grant, L. (1993, October). Demography and health care reform. NPG Forum, 1-6.
Hardin, G. (1973). Exploring new ethics for survival: The voyage of the spaceship Beagle. New
York: Penguin Books.(First published by the Viking Press, Inc., 1972)
Harris, M. (1974). Cows, pigs, wars, and witches: The riddles of culture. New York: Random
House.
Harris, M. (1977). Cannibals and kings. New York: Vintage Books.
Holton, G. (1973). Thematic origins of scientific thought: Kepler to Einstein. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press
Hull, D. L. (1989). The metaphysics of evolution. Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press.
Issar, A. S. (1995, July-August). Climatic change and the history of the Middle East. American
Scientist, 350-355.
Matthew, St. (1994). Chapter 6, The new testament. In The holy bible (King James version).
London: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published seventeenth century)
Nielson, K. (1967). Problems of ethics. In The encyclopedia of philosophy (Vol. 3, pp.
117 -134). New York: Macmillan and The Free Press.
Plautus, T. M. (1964). The Rope and other plays. (E. F. Watling, Trans.) Middlesex, England:
Penguin Classics. (Originally written between 254 B.C.E, and 184 B.C.E.)
Plumb, J. H. (1973). In the light of history. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company.
Skinner, B. F. (1957). Verbal behavior. Boston, MA: The B. F. Skinner Foundation.
Skinner, B. F. (1971). Beyondfreedom and dignity. New York: A. A. Knopf.
Skinner, B. F. (1975). The shaping of phylogenic behavior. Acta Neurobiologiae Experimen-
talis, 35, 409-415.
Vargas, E. A. (1973). Rights: A behavioristic analysis. Behaviorism, 3,178-191.
Vargas, E. A. (1982). Hume's "ought" and "is" statement: A radical behaviorist's perspective.
Behaviorism, 10, 1-23.
Vargas, E. A. (1986). Intraverbal behavior. In R.N. Chase, and L. J. Parrott (Eds.), Psychologi-
cal Aspects of Language (pp. 128-151). Springfield, IL.: Charles C. Thomas,
Vargas, E. A. (1994). Behaviorology and the other behavioral sciences. Behaviorology, 17-28.
White, L. A. (1959). The evolution of culture. New York: McGraw-Hill.
White, L. Jf. (1962). Medieval technology and social change. London: Oxford University Press.
Wilson, E. O. (1975). Sociobiology. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press.
Wilson, E. O. (1978). Foreword. In Caplan, A. L. (Ed.), The sociobiology debate (pp. xi-xiv)
New York: Harper and Row.
JON S. BAILEY AND ROBERT J. WALLANDER
Verbal Behavior
Verbal behavior is behavior that is reinforced through the mediation of other people, but
only when the other people are behaving in ways that have been shaped and maintained
by a verbal environment or language. [Skinner, 1986, p. 121]
Skinner coined the term "verbal behavior" to expand his learning theory to
complex forms of behavior (i.e., logic, grammar, literature, thinking, and
scientific behavior). Verbal behavior was distinguished from simple environ-
ment-based "operant" behavior by the requirement that it was, "effective only
through the mediation of other persons" [Skinner, 1957, p. 1]. This class of
"mediated" behaviors included normal vocal speech, but also any other
vocalizations, gestures, or written words; indeed any form of behavior that
might be thought of as a fonn of "communication" was included in Skinner's
verbal behavior system. The mediation by another person was thought of as
so significant, a special analysis was deemed necessary.
Unfortunately, Verbal Behavior (Skinner, 1957) was not widely read or
analyzed in enough depth to have a meaningful impact on emerging areas of
psychology and related fields. The text was difficult to read, except by the
most intrepid, dedicated, and thoroughly trained behaviorists (McPherson et
ai., 1984) and its implications apparently escaped even those who were able
to endure the challenging writing style. Worse, the work was unmercifully
critiqued by a leading cognitive psychologist with his own axe to grind
(Chomsky, 1959) and the critique was apparently more widely read than
Verbal Behavior itself. If Skinner's classic work had been more easily
digested, widely disseminated and more readily embraced, the so called
"cognitive revolution" may never have occurred. Skinner provided a method
of analyzing complex human behavior (read "higher cognitive processes") that
was sweeping, convincing, and entirely consistent with his then well-accepted
behavioral model; a novel "cognitive" paradigm based on entirely different
principles (the information processing model) was unnecessary. Put most
simply, Skinner was three decades ahead of his time in wanting to understand
and explain complex human behavior and the so-called "higher mental
processes" such as thinking, planning and decision making but his extraordi-
nary achievement went virtually unnoticed. Indeed, even in the '90s, although
Skinner is mentioned prominently in most introductory psychology texts, no
mention is made of the work or Skinner's interest in such phenomena.
117
118 Bailey and Wallander
By taking the analysis of behavior into the realm of higher cognitive

processes and private events, Skinner was taking a giant intellectual risk.
Having convinced his many followers that behavior was the subject of this
new science, he now had to convince them to include events inside the
organism that were essentially invisible and unmeasurable. Skinner (1969)
noted that, "an adequate science of behavior must consider events taking place
within the skin of the organism, not as physiological mediators of behavior,
but as part of the behavior itself." (p. 228). With the use of this conceptual
scheme, he was able to realize an ambition of his new behaviorism (often
referred to as "radical" behaviorism) and offer an analytical system which
would essentially account for private events and serve as a useful tool to those
who wish to analyze complex human behavior. If behavior analysts were to
cultivate a science of behavior, useful to all concerned with understanding and
affecting behavior, they needed to extend their analytical and investigative
methods to all behavioral events, even those which present problems of
observation (Parrot, 1984).
With the publication of Verbal Behavior, radical behaviorists could treat
private events (such as thinking) as behaviors which are observable to one
person, and are controlled by the same stimulus-response relations as other
behaviors (Hake, 1982). Hence, the major issue for this radically different
approach is that private events should not be ignored, because to do so would
severely restrict the content of behavior analysis and discourage innovation of
new methods.
A difficulty arises when one attempts to invoke private phenomena in causal explanations
without some plausible specification of the process by which the private phenomena ac-
quired their functional role. To do so without such a specification is to offer at best only
a spurious explanation of behavior. (Moore 1984, p. 14)
Hence, the verbal behavior perspective seeks to analyze the functional role
of what is commonly referred to as language and communication. Fundamen-
tal to this new approach - the radical behavioral approach - is the assumption
that the vast majority of human behavior, including verbal behavior, is shaped
and maintained by positive and negative consequences. In the case of verbal
behaviors, the consequences are provided by a second party, a listener, rather
than by the natural environment. Designated "the audience" this second party
or listener, plays a key role in setting the occasion for verbal responses on the
part of the speaker. Common phenomena such as the politician who has very
different speeches for each special interest group, or the teenager who has one
vocabulary for her parents and a completely different one for her peers, are
explained by pointing out that such groups of "listeners" reinforce certain
specific classes of responses in their presence (e.g. labor groups may applaud
Verbal Behavior 119
strong pro-union comments; teenage peers often reinforce the use of street
slang).
Verbal behavior, then, is included in the deterministic world view of
behaviorism [Skinner, 1971] and deserves special treatment by virtue of the
need to account for how and why a listener might shape the behavior of the
speaker. The interaction of speaker and listener constitutes a compound
dynamic which results in elaborate and diverse behaviors by each party. In this
chapter, we will outline and analyze the key philosophical points encompass-
ing this most complex and misunderstood form of behavior including the
origin and motivation of verbal behavior. We will also discuss Skinner's
treatment of "understanding" , the behavioral analysis of "thinking" and
review some relevant contemporary research in verbal behavior.
Verbal behavior is a type or subset of operant behavior. What makes verbal
responses different are the contingencies which affect them (i.e., the antece-
dent events and consequences which follow). In nonverbal contingencies, the
behavior is related directly [mechanically, temporally, or geometrically] to its
results [Lee, 1984]. If a person is arranging a room for a slide show, for
example, it is necessary to dim the lights and close the window shades for
optimal viewing. Flipping light switches and pulling blinds will be automati-
cally reinforced by the subsequent improved visual contrast of the slides on
the screen as shown in Figure 1.
SO R
SR+
Speaker Slides
PEAKER Too bright turns off can be
room lights seen
Figure I. Non-verbal schema for speaker behavior where the room is too bright for the slides
to be seen and he turns off the lights; being able to view the slides is a reinforcer for the
turning-off behavior.
When verbal contingencies are introduced, however, the situation becomes

somewhat more complex. In this case, rather than flipping switches or pulling
shades, the speaker may ask a member of the audience to carry out these tasks.
If the chosen person can respond to the language, and is so disposed he may
comply. The speaker in this case is reinforced by the resulting dimming of the
room but via the behavior of the listener who complied with the request. If this
sort of presentation happens repeatedly, the requests of the speaker will in all
likelihood, change from an explicit request, "Could someone please tum out
the lights and pull the shades?" to perhaps a head nod or making a pointing
gesture toward the windows or light switch.
Skinner (1957) asserts that a response like this becomes verbal when it is
first strengthened by another's mediating behavior. The motioning response
became verbal since it was reinforced by the shade-pulling behavior of a
listener. Hence, vocally requesting (which one may argue requires more
effort) is no longer necessary to achieve the desired outcome and will
therefore gradually drop out. This constitutes shaping of behavior beyond its
original topography (i.e., a spoken request). The "drift" of behavior from an
explicit statement to a head-nod illustrates how verbal behavior is more than
mere vocalizations or written words. Verbal behavior is the field of study
interested in understanding all such phenomena. This level of understanding
is approachable by studying how behavior is shaped and maintained by the
..
behavior of another person (i.e., the listener) as shown in Figure 2.
0
ST_1
PEAKER Too
bright
R
Speaker
says.
"Could
R
'Thank you
veIYmuch.
• SR+
Slides
can be
someone Now to begin seen
room please the show."
turn out
~
the
Initial Speaker/ llghts?"
Listener Encounter
l
R R
LISTENER
Listener 'You're
turns off welcome."
..
lights
0
ST_2
SPEAKER Too
bright
R
Speaker
nods
toward
R
''Thank you
very much.
Now to
• SR+
Slides
can be
room light seen
begin
!
switch
the show."
t
Advanced
Speaker/Listener
Exchange
R R
LISTENER
Listener "You're
turns off welcome."
lights
Figure 2. Verbal behavior schema for speaker-listener interactions during an initial encounter
[T-l] and during a later exchange [T-2]. In the top panel the speaker requests a member of the
audience to tum off the lights and this verbal episode is reinforced when the slides can be seen.
In the bottom panel, at an advanced stage of interactions, the speaker needs to merely nod
toward the light switch in order for the speaker to tum off the lights.
Verbal Behavior 121
THE EVOLUTION OF VERBAL BEHAVIOR
Direct observation of the actual process of evolution of species is not possible

due to the extraordinary time frames necessary to see the variations. However,
noting minor differences between species and distinct contingencies between
environments ought to enlighten us as to how reproductive advantages of
verbal behavior could result in selection of a species and its members.
Philosophically speaking, verbal behavior does not evolve. However, language
almost certainly did not suddenly emerge from a single genetic mutation.
Rather, it is much more likely that subtle, gradual changes in the environment
occurred in combination with minute genetic alterations of existing physical
systems. The evolution of "language," like other features, no doubt occurred
in stages. Incremental changes in environments occur and existing species
adapt and remain if certain behaviors are in the repertoire. Through a genetic
change, a sensitivity to operant conditioning, the ability of verbal behavior to
be shaped probably increased the effectiveness of human species and would
therefore be selected (Skinner, 1986). This made possible selection of certain
behaviors into a new realm in which individuals were capable of benefiting
from (and therefore reinforced by) other humans' behavior.
The human vocal musculature was most likely selected for survival in
human species initially for reasons other than operant communication. When
unconditioned reflexes became operantly conditionable, the potential
repertoire of responses expanded greatly. For example, if an infant cries from
hunger (presumably an unconditioned response to internal pain stimuli), this
increases the likelihood that the infant will receive attention from parents or
caregivers nearby, as shown in Figure 3. If the infant is in discomfort from
some other source (e.g. being wet, or in pain), infant's crying can be rein-
forced with attention from others and hence increases in the future in situa-
tions of "need for attention." The transformation from an unconditioned
response to one shaped and maintained by operant variables is crucial in this
scenario. As this previously unconditioned response becomes operantly
reinforced by another organism, the new verbal behavior increases the survival
of the infant. As the child experiences novel environments, the new verbal
behavior may adapt and change. The child may generalize to many more
sounds than those initiated by the original stress and may also exhibit these
responses in the presence of other adults or caregivers. In a more global
manner, that increased effectiveness of the individual member of a species
increases the survivability of members of his/her species.
For example, crying out as an unconditioned response to the stimulus of a
predator may have increased the survival of a clan. Sounds are effective in the
dark, across great distances, and capable of fine-grained discriminations to the
SR-
ReHef
from
pain
~D
~aregiVer
Infant R _ ...~SR
operant Other
ehungry Crying forms
crying ebored of
ethirsty rein-
eafraid force
ment
Figure 3. In the top panel, an infant's reflexive crying due to internal pain stimuli results in
relief via caregiver; over time the caregiver becomes an SD for other "operant" verbal
responses.
ear from minute variations by a speaker (Skinner, 1986). The infinite range of
oral expression is certainly responsible for human advancement far beyond
any other species. As group living became increasingly intricate, the circum-
stances requiring coordinated action became increasingly different.
Language activities in the earliest stages of development presumably
included only simple gestures. These behaviors would have been useful in
situations in which both speaker and listener were in direct visual contact with
the events for which cooperation was required. Gesturing would undoubtedly
expand to the point of including speaking which precisely matched particular
features of the nonverbal environment. Speaker actions of this sort would
allow for greater, more efficient and effective action on the part of listeners
(Parrot, 1984). Behaviorists do not view speaking as the only medium for
verbal behavior, but the many advantages of vocal responses are probably
accountable for its dominance as a means of communicating.
Verbal Behavior 123
WHY IS VERBAL BEHAVIOR MORE THAN JUST "LANGUAGE"?
Since verbal behavior is more than merely language, how "language" relates
to our current analysis must be made clear. Skinner (1969) asserts that
language is not words, utterances, or sentences intended to communicate
ideas. Language for him consists of the reinforcing practices of a verbal
community which maintain the behavior of speakers within that community.
These reinforcing practices are unique to each community and evolve over
time according to the changing needs of the members of the community. An
individual may be a member of several different verbal communities simulta-
neously as elaborated in the following example.
In sailing, for example, the vocabulary of special ships hardware, sail
rigging, shifting wind, and changing weather conditions become especially
important. Crew members will be reinforced only for "coming about" under
certain unique conditions and their need to "let go the lee line", "haul in the
main" move to "starboard" and "hike out" establishes clear stimUlus-response
chains of behavior. If a ship's captain has to deal with her daughter's emo-
tional problems while at sea, another special language will be necessary to
communicate feelings and exchange personal views and resolve important
personal issues. In the galley, a third "language" is necessary for the cooking
crew to work fluidly and efficiently in meal preparation using the propane
fueled equipment found there. In each case, the practices of each verbal
community have a purpose or function which can only be deduced from the
reinforcing practices of the specific members. Distributing crew weight
properly while ''tacking'' takes on unusual significance on a small craft in high
wind, for example, but in light breezes the contingencies change completely.
Novice crew will need to learn these different responses perfectly in order to
receive reinforcers from the captain. The need to make fine differentiations
among weather conditions is apparent when the implications for stability and
safety of a small craft are taken into account since moving too slowly or
quickly about the craft could easily result in capsizing. Further, the truncated
sentences, the need for commands to be repeated by the crew before being
executed, and the captain's usual insistence on immediate and total obedience,
without argument, all relate to the serious danger of errors (environmental
contingencies) made in carrying out exacting maneuvers at sea. Verbal
behavior, then, is about these contingencies and how they affect human
behavior interactions.
Behaviorism is not entirely concerned with accounting for "language".
Rather, a scientific account is the focus of the analysis of verbal behavior. "An
assumption of behavior analysis is that it is a natural science: lawful relations
will result, the relations will be consistent with those of other natural sciences,
and its methods will be consistent with other natural sciences." [Hake, 1982,
p. 21]. A traditional account of language typically does not have as its goal
scientific understanding (Place, 1981a). The widespread notion that grammar
is the core of verbal activity overestimates the importance of grammar and
fails to appreciate the multiple causation of units of analysis at issue (Skinner,
1957). An adoption of this doctrine, "form before function," commits one to
analyzing sentences (and parts thereof), leads to a concentration on the
"response" part of a contingency, and indirectly supports a view that such
responses can be analyzed as objects themselves. The behaviorist's functional
analysis is designed to correct this misunderstanding. A formal-theoretical
account is helpless before the ominous questions of why verbal behavior
occurs when it does and why it has the form it does on each occasion. For
example, language is not "foreign" because one has never experienced its
"words." A language is only foreign because one has not learned the reinforc-
ing practices of a distant or novel community. One may not have ever been
exposed to circumstances in which certain discriminative stimuli (words) are
followed by specific responses which will be reinforced in that verbal
community.
The "radical" behavioral approach to verbal behavior, therefore, is
functional in that it asks, "How did the reinforcing practices of this community
evolve such that this particular response would be reinforced at this time?".
This is in contrast to the traditional formal analysis offered by linguists and
psycholinguists. Glenn (1983, p. 47) insightfully reminds us, "Skinner insists
that the form of verbal behavior does not tell us much. What people say is not
the issue; why they say it is." It was Skinner's conviction that asking "why"
questions would lead to a better understanding of cultural practices than the
"how" questions. In large part, the form of a particular response was irrele-
vant. The motivation for the response was the key element and this could only
be understood through an analysis of cultural contingencies not formal rules
of grammar.
Consider a young person who has been referred to a vocational counselor
for being unable to hold a job. After the latest altercation and firing, the
counselor would naturally question the youth about the incident. A response
to the question, "What did your supervisor do that made you so upset?" might
yield, "He made me so mad I felt like punching him out." The latter response
describes the person's prepotent behavior (mad, punching) rather than the
supervisor's behavior. If the counselor focused on the form of that response
alone, he might erroneously conclude that this was just another example of
this young man's inability to control his temper or his failure to respect an
authority figure. The counselor could also press this youth to give more
details, but sometimes pressing clients into more specific responses is
Verbal Behavior 125
counter-productive (e.g., resorting to further descriptions of events which are

irrelevant). Instead, afunctional strategy (which behavior analysis stresses)
would examine the entire verbal episode (e.g., antecedent stimuli, the
speaker's history with other supervisors as well as this particular supervisor,
the speaker's response in this particular case, as well as the listener's re-
sponse). The events at work evoke descriptions of the person's own behavior,
rather than descriptions of the actual events themselves. This might be due to
a history of being reinforced by a community of very sympathetic peers who
cared little for the actions of others surrounding their friend (again, an avenue
for investigation made possible by the functional approach). "What happens
to you at work?" should evoke the more specific and functional response,
"The boss kept changing assignments on me. I would just get one thing started
and he would come rushing in demanding to know why something else wasn't
done." To overcome this debilitating cycle, the counselor must break the
well-established pattern of environmental events evoking reactions to the
person's own behavior. Initially, the job counselor could teach the youth a
specific set of coping responses. For example, it might be advisable for the
person to meet briefly with his boss to establish the priorities for work each
day. Learning to observe others in the environment for clues as to how to
handle the boss might also be in order. Finally, the youth might be taught how
to reinforce the supervisor, ["Thanks for explaining that to me. Now I
understand."] as well as prompt the boss for feedback ["Could you look at this
and tell me if you think I have it right? I really don't want to make any
mistakes on this."] Building a new history of reinforcement for responses to
the work environment should teach the person to focus on those elements
which are important to keeping a job. Acquiring skills involving shifting work
requirements, possible mood swings by the supervisor, and a question-asking
repertoire to clarify work priorities should begin to give the youth some sense
of control over his work environment and, as a side effect, reduce anxiety and
possible aggression (Glenn, 1983).
WHAT MOTIVATES VERBAL BEHAVIOR?
In the previous section on "language" we argued that formal approaches to

analyzing verbal behavior cannot address the question, "Where does verbal
behavior originate?" The intention of outlining a behavior analytic perspective
on "communicating" was to answer just such a question reliably. More than
just how certain consequences condition behavior, afunctional account ought
to provide psychologists and related professionals with an accurate explana-
tion of events which set the occasion for verbal responses. In its most simple
form, when one is asking about origination, one is really asking, "What
motivates this behavior?"
A standard elementary classroom is replete with examples which can be
used to illustrate this point. Often students are referred to a school psycholo-
gist or behavior specialist for "disruptive behavior" which, upon close
examination turns out to be entirely verbal in nature. A student may, for
example, constantly interrupt the teacher with irrelevant questions. The job of
the behavior analyst at this point is to analyze the behavior and provide a
treatment for the problem. A good place to begin is to determine the relation-
ship between the presenting behavior and the times when it occurs. In other
words, the "frame" one must fill becomes: a) what are the antecedent
conditions?, b) the nature [frequency, intensity, rate] of the response?, and c)
consequent event(s) which appear to affect the behavior? The response is clear
from the outset: constantly interrupting the teacher with questions. Data
collection over a few days may reveal that after almost every question,
attention from the teacher (e.g., "I already covered that ... please go back to
your desk.") follows. This may lead the behavior analyst to investigate how
much attention is provided for appropriate behavior [i.e. sitting in seat, hand
raising, paying attention to directions]. If little attention seems to be provided
for proper behavior, it is reasonable to assume that the motivating factor for
pestering questions is a lack of attention in general.
In its most basic relationship, an antecedent condition which directly
motivates behavior is called an "establishing operation"; a term which roughly
translates as "motivation." An establishing operation has a twofold effect: 1)
it alters the ability of a consequence to reinforce responses and, 2) it alters the
likelihood responses will occur which have been reinforced by a particular
consequence (Michael, 1993). In the classroom example, passage of a length
of time without attention to that child: 1) increases attention (positive and
negative) as an effective reinforcer for inappropriate questions and 2)
increases the likelihood (or probability) of such questions when time passes
without attention. One could inform the student that it is very inappropriate to
get attention in this way, but telling a student he is bad for wanting attention
will probably not reduce the wanting (i.e., affect the establishing operation).
Admonishing a student in this manner may even serve to disguise the asking
or result in the misbehaving student avoiding the adult altogether. "Functional
communication training" is an approach to treating unwanted behavior such
as inappropriate questions. This type of training has been emphasized as an
effective and humane strategy for overcoming challenging behavior. (For
information in greater detail on this topic, see Reichle and Wacker, 1993).
Instead of merely punishing these questions with a variety of negative
consequences (e.g., sarcastic comments, time out, loss of privileges) an
Verbal Behavior 127
educated professional employing a verbal behavior analysis could attempt to

approach the problem as a lack of attention for appropriate behavior. We
assume it is reasonable for a student to desire attention, as in the case of
difficult assignments or being bothered by peers; or, the student may have
never learned an appropriate response for obtaining an adult's attention. In
such a case, the student is in need of functional communication training in
which an appropriate response is taught in the presence of an establishing
operation such as long stretches without attention. With repeated practice, the
passing of time without attention should come to make attention a strong
reinforcer for appropriate means of obtaining attention, such as raising one's
hand. In addition, the passing of time without attention should evoke hand
raising (the second feature of an establishing operation).
When an establishing operation (e.g., passage of time without attention) is
shown to be the antecedent condition for a verbal response, the verbal
response is classified as a mand. A person can be described as "manding"
water when the person is thirsty and requesting a drink with the statement,
"Could I please have a drink, I'm thirsty." Of course, a person probably would
only make such a response when he could not get it himself, in the presence
of others, and possibly only when water is obviously available. This raises the
issue of stimulus control. Basically, this type of control describes a correlation
between how often certain consequences have followed behavior in a given
set of circumstances. If a person has reliably been given water in the presence
of others, and when water is available, such conditions will provide a strong
likelihood that a person will mand water when thirsty in those circumstances.
A graphic illustration of this concept from the classroom example is shown in
Figure 4.
Passage of a long period of time without attention would likely constitute
a powerful establishing operation which makes attention a powerful reinforcer
and would evoke some sort of behavior such as unnecessary, pestering,
questions but if the stimulus condition of the presence of a particular teacher
who has been regularly paired with the reinforcer of attention is missing, the
behavior will most likely not appear. The difference in responding due to the
presence or absence of specific conditions constitutes discriminative stimulus
control. An example from Layng and Adronis (1984) is relevant here:
E.O.
Establishing
Operation
SD • R
Stimulus Response Reinforcer
Conditions
'MAN'D"
E.O.
Increasing
passage
of time
with no
reinforcement
SD • R
Inappropriate .. , can't
questions answer that
directed at the question right
teacher now.....
Figure 4. In the top panel the establishing operation provides the motivation and the stimulus
sets the occasion for the response. In the bottom panel the e.o. is the increasing passage of time
with no reinforcement plus the student seeing the teacher. This stimulus sets the occasion for
the student to ask her a question. The teacher inadvertently reinforces this behavior by
providing some brief attention.
Consider a young man who, on a regular basis over a period of years, picks fights with
the meanest and strongest people he can find. Each fight lasts until either one of the two
is knocked unconscious, or somebody else stops the fight. This particular behavior pat-
tern appears quite disturbing and bizarre. Its costs are obvious, in the multiple injuries
both given and received, the price of medical attention, and so on. In addition, society
often imposes either psychological treatment or criminal penalties on people who behave
this way chronically. However, the behavior appears less bizarre, indeed eminently sensi-
ble, when we are told the young man's name is Leonard, Holmes, Cooney, Rossman, or
Ali, and learn that the prize money for a single fight may exceed the average behavior
analyst's life earnings! (p. 140-141)
Stimulus control is easy to discern in this example. In the boxing ring, a

repertoire of aggressive behavior is followed by characteristic consequences
Verbal Behavior 129
for which a prize-fighter has a long history . In any other setting, the conse-
quences are quite different, and as a result, quite different behavior patterns
should emerge. Relating to our earlier example of the disruptive student,
classrooms other than the one the referral came from may report no trouble
from that child. Closer investigation of those classrooms may reveal that no
attention is ever provided to the student for the bothersome behavior and that
considerable attention is given for appropriate behavior. As such, this alternate
environment has developed its own stimulus control and as a result, different
behavior patterns emerge (e.g., on-task, manding attention with a properly
raised hand, etc.).
Stimulus control is an important concept to the functional account of
behavior because most complicated verbal responses have no direct relation-
ship to establishing operations. Instead, a different set of circumstances sets
the occasion for the behavior. Tacts are responses which "make contact with"
the physical world and Skinner believed tacts to be, "the most important of
verbal operants because of the unique control exerted by the prior stimulus
(Skinner, 1957, p.83). In order for tacting to develop it is necessary for both
speaker and listener at some point in time to simultaneously experience the
same stimulus ( in the following case we shall use cloudy skies). During this
time [T-1 in Fig. 5 below] the listener may prompt the appropriate response
on the part of the speaker. Tacting has not occurred on the part of the speaker
yet, however. At some later point in time the listener requires information
about weather conditions but cannot actually see the sky and so asks the
speaker, "So, what do you think? Rain today?" The speaker responds, "Looks
like it to me. It's very cloudy out today and the wind is picking up." This
response is then reinforced by the listener saying, "Thanks, I guess I'd better
grab an umbrella before I leave."
This entire episode depends on the initial shared experience of speaker and
listener. Without this the listener would have no reason to value the response
of the speaker. Obviously, other complications can arise as well which make
the circumstances not only of the weather but of the relationship between
speaker and listener critical to the nature of the speaker's response. If the
speaker is under pressure to give a response, even though he can't see very
well out the window, he may cover all bases with, "Well, it's hard to say,
maybe, maybe not. You might want to prepare for rain." Or, if the speaker
wanted to see the listener get drenched he could say, "Naw, I don't think it's
going to rain. You won't need an umbrella today." In this case the motivation
on the part of the speaker needs to be analyzed closely. The listener may, for
example, have done something harmful to the speaker recently thus contrib-
uting to the perverse advise. Tacts are primarily of value to listeners and they
count on speakers to engage in appropriate behavior. Since it is primarily to
r--o -> R
&;.1
SPEAKER Cloudy ''Yes, it "
sure is,
skies do you
outside
t
think it
Initlal Speakerl will

Listener EncoWlter
_"
R
S~IOUdY--!·" "It R
LISTENER skies sure is ''Yes, I
cloudy can feel it
- outside outside." coming."
Figure 5. In the top panel at Time-l both listener and speaker can see the cloudy skies; the
listener prompts and teaches the speaker what this means in terms of weather prediction. In the
bottom panel at Time-2 only the speaker can see the cloudy skies and is asked by the listener
for a report. The speaker then "tacts" the response and is reinforced by the listener.
their benefit, listeners bear the burden of establishing proper conditions for
both the acquisition of speaker responses as well as for proper motivation on
the part of the speaker. Rather, this class of verbal responses falls more
appropriately under the heading of behavior under the stimulus control of
specific antecedent conditions - i.e., tacting.
An additional concept which must be mastered to understand this collection
of responses is the "generalized conditioned reinforcer." Often this term is
mistakenly explained as, "a consequence which effectively reinforces many
different kinds of responses." An accurate conception of the conditioned
reinforcer is "an event which follows behavior and which is capable of
reinforcing that behavior because it has been paired with another effective
Verbal Behavior 131
reinforcer." For example, frequent flyer coupons can be used to reinforce

airline selection because the coupon is redeemable for free travel. If that prize
has lost its effect (e.g., the coupon has expired), the coupon would cease to
function as an effective consequence for behaviors. A generalized conditioned
reinforcer is an event which follows some behavior and which has been paired
with several effective reinforcers. For example, money may be exchanged for
many other reinforcers and is therefore very effective as a reinforcer. It is not
the ability to reinforce so many responses that makes money powerful, it is the
ability to be exchanged with so many other items of value or activities that are
enjoyed.
As a specific relationship between an establishing operation and a single
conditioned reinforcer is broken down by pairing it with multiple establishing
operations, the generalized conditioned reinforcer emerges. As establishing
operations have less of a direct effect on behavior due to several such
conditions being paired with a single conditioned reinforcer, the control of
verbal behavior by establishing operations weakens and antecedent stimuli
exert greater command as controlling variables. Said another way, when a
conditioned reinforcer is effective as a consequence for behavior because it is
paired with only one or few other reinforcers, the control exerted by the
relevant establishing operation is direct and strong. However, when a
conditioned reinforcer is paired with several other reinforcers, the control
exerted by anyone establishing operation is weak. As such, the stimulus
conditions which are paired with the likelihood of earning a reinforcer come
to have greater control over the behavior than establishing operations. Figure
6 demonstrates this point.
As previously emphasized, the behavioral perspective supports a functional,
rather than a "form-before-function" account of behavior. However, when
discussing the collection of verbal operants under the control of discriminative
stimuli, the form of the response is what distinguishes one subclass from
another. This further classification of responses accentuates the functional
analysis rather than replaces it, as will be shown. These subclasses are tacts,
intraverbals, textuals, and echoics. The form of the response as it relates to the
antecedent stimulus which gave rise to it, decides how the response is to be
identified.
The tact is a verbal response which is evoked by a non-verbal stimulus. In
other words, the controlling variable which gives rise to the verbal response
is a part of the physical environment. For example, the antecedent stimuli for
a tact may be objects ("doors"), dimensions of objects ("heavy" or "smooth"),
the behavior of objects ("crumbling" or "shifting"), relations of properties
among objects ("larger"), amount of objects or events (" eight"), or complex
temporal relations among events ("it's late!"). The response, "It is going to
E.O. paired with only one reinforcer

-
E. O.
Establishing
•
Operation
S D_ - -> R SR+
Stimulus Response Reinforcer
---
Conditions
E.O. paired with several reinforcers

~
E.O·1
E.O~
E.03
E.04
• •
SD
Stimulus R
---
SR+
Conditions
Response Reinforcer
Figure 6. In the top panel the establishing operation plays a more prominent role in producing
the response since there is only one e.o. In the bottom panel. the stimulus conditions present are
more significant since several different e.o.s are involved with the reinforcer.
rain,", for example, to a non-verbal stimulus (e.g., moisture in the air, dark
clouds in the sky) constitutes a "tact". The speaker in this case is naming a
characteristic of cloud or weather conditions, possibly in reaction to a question
from someone who themselves cannot see outside. The tact is an important
part of human behavior because so much of the inter-relating among people
involves extending each other's contact with the environment.
A weather forecaster, emits verbal responses to conditions which special-
ized instruments measures for her. These verbal responses to the physical
environment are initially taught by a meteorologist by providing reinforcement
contingent on correct responses to certain stimuli. We train members of our
culture to use a common set of words or responses to tact physical features of
the environment so that we can benefit from their assessment when we can not
do so ourselves. If all people in a culture or community emitted the same tacts
to non-verbal stimuli, the world in which humans live would be a better place
to live. Unfortunately, responses to non-verbal stimuli vary.
This inexactness is the result of the differential reinforcement available
from different listeners. For example, if two friends are browsing an antique
shop and one inquires, "Is that dresser an antique?" The friend may say in
front of the shop owner, "No, not really." The informed friend may wait until
Verbal Behavior 133
the shop-owner (a listener/audience) is out of earshot to report the actual

value. "That dresser is a Queen Anne original, and greatly under-priced.
You'd be getting a great deal." The speaker made two different responses to
the same non-verbal stimuli (e.g., the style and craftsmanship ofthe piece, the
quality of the surface). The reinforcement of gratitude from a friend was not
available equally in both circumstances for the same response, resulting in the
two totally different responses.
The inexactness of tacting in the antique shop seems fairly innocuous.
However, inexact tacting can be quite debilitating. A common referral for
psychological service involves a client reporting chronic pain when no clear
physiological condition exists. The client is said to rarely give the same
answer to the same question twice. A verbal response is untrue if the form of
the response changes with alternating "audiences." The functional approach
impels us to investigate the antecedent conditions and it is revealed that
different people asking the same question are given different responses. So if
the person is asked, "How do you feel?" and describes his/her own health
differently to bosses, peers, and others asking that same question, that
response is clearly under control of varying audiences rather than the actual
physiological conditions he or she is experiencing. Hence, a conclusion is
drawn that inaccurate tacting is occurring. Inaccurate tacting may be reduced
or eliminated by providing reinforcement only for accurate responses. For
example, a doctor's examination reveals no physical basis for the problem. As
such, the person is granted peer approval for statements such as, "I am healthy
and capable of working."
Intraverbals
A great deal of verbal behavior involves responding directly to other verbal

stimuli. Engaging in heated conversations, providing personal information on
a job application, and participating in political debates are all examples of
verbal responses to verbal stimuli. When we are discussing operants in these
categories, the variable exerting the most influence in evoking verbal behavior
is the antecedent stimulus, much like the functional relationship of the tact.
However, the difference between the tact and other verbal operants under
strong stimulus control is that in the latter cases, the antecedent stimuli are
themselves verbally-produced.
A verbal response in which the antecedent event setting the occasion for a
response is another verbal stimulus, but which has no point-to-point corre-
spondence, is an intraverbal response. For example, saying, "Fine, thanks,"
in response to the verbal stimulus, "How are you?" constitutes intraverbal
R[SO]
1:::-"
"How are
SPEAKER
D /-,.\
LISTENER
~
Ustener
R[SO]
"Fi
is ne,
Present how are
you?"
SPEAKER Flag,
R [SO] R °
"I pledge "... and to / "one nation
classroom, allegianye the republic under god,
teacher ~to the for which for liberty,
prompt flag ... " it stands ... " and Justice
for all."
Figure 7. In the top panel the intraverbal episode beginning when the speaker sees the listener
and says, "How are you?". This response serves as a stimulus for the response, "Fine, how are
you?" on the part of the listener. The verbal episode is completed with the speaker responding
to this stimulus with the response, "Can't complain." In the bottom panel in response to a
prompt from the teacher a student begins the Pledge of Allegiance, the initial response then
serves as a stimulus for the next response and so on until the pledge is completed.
behavior. Indeed, any strings or chains of verbal responses which cue each
other are intraverbal. Poems, pledges and songs are often learned as chains of
intraverbals where early phrases serve as stimuli for latter ones as shown in
Figure 7.
Obsessive verbal behavior may be a case of intraverbals gone awry. A
person repeating the verbal chain over and over, "I'm worthless. I can't do
anything. I don't deserve to live. It's all my fault. Nobody likes me. I'm
worthless ... " is essentially caught in a trap of verbal stimuli with no contact
with external stimuli. Explaining to the person that they do have friends who
like them will be unlikely to have any effect; as will providing any other form
of rational input. The most effective strategy here would be to first recognize
the problem as excessive intraverbalizing. Next, an attempt to discover some
way to break up the chain of behavior should be pursued. By presenting
stimuli that will compete with the emission of this chain, the therapist may
begin to make some headway with such a patient. Thus, the therapist may
teach the patient to say, in response to the initial stimulus, "I'm worthless ...
but I can learn to improve my skills; I can learn by asking questions; I can
Verbal Behavior 135
learn by watching, and I can learn by thinking of new solutions." (Glenn,

1983)
A child's social interaction, including conversations, songs, stories, and
other verbal play, also involves intraverbal behavior. Weak or delayed
intraverbal responding may affect a child's ability to engage in proper social
behavior. There may be several reasons why the acquisition of intraverbal
skills should be closely monitored by parents, pediatricians, and preschool
teachers before children enter kindergarten. Few behavior analysts are
employed to study normal language development or develop methods of
enhancing the rate of normal language acquisition. This may be an oversight
with serious implications as data is accumulating which supports the utility of
Skinner's concepts [e.g., Sundberg, San Juan, Dawdy, and Argiielles, 1990.].
It is possible that the failure to acquire an intraverbal repertoire at a typical
rate may be related to the development of some degree of abnormal social
behavior observed at a later time. Socially inappropriate behaviors which are
observed in kindergarten classes may be reduced or avoided altogether by
directly shaping intraverbal skills at an early age (Partington and Bailey,
1993).
Textuals
A type of verbal response which does have point-to-point correspondence with

its antecedent stimulus, but is not in the same response mode is textual
behavior. For example, an optometrist asking a patient to read an eye chart
sets into motion a set of responses in which letters of the alphabet have
corresponding, one syllable responses. If the responses are incorrect, the
doctor may make a clinical diagnosis of impaired vision. When a child is
reading from a book, as shown in Figure 8 the vocal responses share elements
of correspondence to the letters on the page, but are not in the same sensory
mode, and therefore constitute textual behavior.
Echoics
When an antecedent stimulus sets the occasion for a verbal response and the
stimulus and responses have point-to-point correspondence, and are in the
same sense modality, the response is called echoic. For example, repeating
every word perfectly from a set of stated instructions is echoic in that
antecedent stimuli and the responses they evoke are both in the speaking
modality and each component of the spoken information is parallel. Reciting
r-"D
S SD SD SD SD
Text Once UP\ a time
ma~\jf \R \R \R
~PEAKER Opens "Once" "upon" "an "time"
- book
Figure 8. In textual responding there is a point-to-point correspondence between the visual

stimulus and each response, i.e. each printed word is a stimulus for a vocal response.
marriage vows by repeating words after a minister constitutes echoic behavior

because the corresponding phrases are identical. This particular practice,
shown in Figure 9, may have evolved due to the understandable social and
personal pressures of the occasion where, without the vocal prompts, the
parties involved could make embarrassing, and very public, mistakes.
Each of Skinner's terms for verbal operants have individual applications.
However, applying the concept of different operant relations based on the
relation between the antecedent controlling variable and the response can have
more global and very useful applications. For example, Hersh (1990)
employed Skinner's classification system to make comparisons between
classrooms serving several students with learning disabilities. Students
identified as having a specific learning disability spent at least part of their day
in a regular classroom setting; transfer of appropriate behaviors from the
special education setting was therefore critical. Unfortunately, specific
programming for maintenance and transfer of skills from one class to another
r-"'D
SPEAKER S SD
"I ... " "take this "to be my law- "to have
~ /\ ~~=?e/dand~hOld"
LISTENER R
- " I Diana"
R/R\
"take this "to be my law-
R
"to have
man" fully wedded and to hold ... "
husband"
Figure 9. In echoic responding there is point-to-point correspondence between a verbal stimulus

and a response on the part of the listener; i.e., as the minister says each phrase of the marriage
vows they are repeated by the bride.
Verbal Behavior 137
was not part of the special education or regular education program. For
behavior to transfer and be maintained to and from the special education
setting to the regular classroom, it became necessary to identify and analyze
contingencies of reinforcement occurring in mainstreamed classrooms,
including the behavior and skills that are required for regular classroom
success.
Without empirical knowledge of skills and behaviors required for regular
classroom success, attempts to prepare students for mainstreamed placements
were based on assumptions about what skills were needed. Identifying and
analyzing skills and practices necessary for success in the mainstream setting
necessitated an examination of the interactions that occur between students
and teachers. The researchers defined teacher-to-student interactions according
to Skinner's classification system of verbal operants. Data was also collected
on the amount and type of reinforcement provided for student responses to
various verbal stimuli from teachers or instructional aides. A summary of the
results in the three classrooms indicated the behaviors expected of students
and the consequences which followed these behaviors were not the same in
the three settings. Differences were evident not only in the number of
responses the student had to produce, but also in the kind of responses. For
example, in the resource classroom, more than 80 percent of the tasks required
textual behaviors. This was true of just over 50 percent of the tasks in the two
mainstream classes. A final difference that was evident from the data was the
type of consequence for student responses to instructional mands in the
resource room: the students had little difficulty discriminating which tasks
"counted" - they all did. Few instructions were given to the students which
were not monitored by the teacher. In the mainstream settings, the converse
was true. Most tasks did not count. More than 60 percent of the responses by
both students to the instructional mands were unobserved by the teacher. The
observation and recording of verbal interactions allowed for a data-based
decision for matching students to classes most like the one for which they
were receiving resource services (Hersh, 1990).
The empirical approach permitted such decisions to be made with informa-
tion which went beyond attitudes and expectations. While other observation
instruments have been developed, few have enabled an analysis of
teacher-student interactions while defining the behavioral and environmental
events in observable terms. This study indicated that the verbal operants as
described by Skinner (1957) can provide the very specific data upon which
placement and/or programming must be based.
Sundberg, San Juan, Dawdy, and Argtielles (1990) attempted to understand
the phenomena of differently affected abilities in individuals who sustain a
traumatic injury to the brain. For example, a person experiencing traumatic
brain injury may not be able to name an object, though that person will be
capable of asking for it (i.e., manding the object); or, that person may be able
to name the object, but be unable to repeat the name after someone else, or
read it from a text as the person once was able to do. By approaching this
differential responding with Skinner's classification system, Sundberg et al.
(1990) sought to explore the possibility that a person experiencing such an
injury may have only some of the types of verbal operants impaired at the time
of damage. Such a finding would support Skinner's assertion in Verbal
Behavior (1957) that these different verbal operants are learned and main-
tained separately. In other words, a response of a given form may no longer
be under the control of one functional relation, although it is still under the
control of another. The results of this study demonstrated a clear separation in
the strength of the operants tested.
These findings could have implications for the diagnosis and treatment of
individuals suffering from aphasia. For example, if a specific repertoire can
be identified as being weak, then an intervention can be designed to directly
strengthen that repertoire. Both of the subjects in Sundberg et. al.' s study
could easily emit echoic and textual responses, but they had great difficulty
emitting correct tact, mand, and intraverbal responses. For example, one
subject could echo the word "binoculars", point to them when asked to,
pantomime how to use them, and read the written word. However, the same
subject could not say, "binoculars" when asked to name them (tact), or ask for
them when needed (mand) , or correctly talk about them in conversation
(intraverbal). Perhaps the most interesting findings were that tacts were
acquired in a more rapid manner than mands.
Although these results were unexpected, since previous research with the
developmentally disabled had shown mands were acquired faster than tacts,
an unexpected implication resulted. The data collected in Sundberg et al. study
may simply demonstrate some of the differences between the developmentally
disabled and those suffering traumatic brain injury. This means that a global
approach to speech therapy for all experiencing speech and language difficul-
ties may not be appropriate. An approach which tailors therapy to each
specific deficit may be necessary. Skinner's division of verbal behavior into
separate operant classes appears to provide such a level of individually
designed therapy.
LISTENING AND UNDERSTANDING
Listening and understanding are most often discussed in the general context
of "perception", not verbal behavior (Parrot, 1984). The purpose of a func-
Verbal Behavior 139
tional account of verbal behavior is to depart from a general context approach

and achieve specific comprehension of individual processes which comprise
complex human behavior. It follows then that listening and understanding can
be analyzed as concurrently occurring phenomena.
Listening
Verbal behavior encompasses much more than mere vocalizing and hearing.
For example, deaf persons responding to each other's "signing" is interactive
listening and speaking, but simply not in a vocal mode. A functional way to
define listening is the act of a person mediating reinforcement to a speaker. In
other words when a person is providing the consequence for a verbal response
(Le., extending a speaker's contact with an environment), he or she is
listening. Listening is a separate class of behaviors which share the feature of
reinforcement mediation.
To grant listening an independent analysis is to distinguish listening as a
behavior of powerful potential. The way in which a person listens to a speaker
can have a great impact on the verbal behavior of the speaker. Consider
studies performed in the 1950's (Greenspoon, 1955) in which a subject and an
experimenter were seated as in an interview situation. The experimenter
provided signs of approval such as a head nod or smile contingent on a
selected property of verbal behavior. Data collected on chosen elements of
verbal behavior (e.g., plural nouns) demonstrated a clear and systematic
increase in the chosen feature. The increase in one facet of verbal behavior
occurred without the subject being aware of it. As a result of a planned
listening strategy, the verbal behavior of a speaker was significantly altered.
The ability to have such an effect on a speaker's behavior, whether intentional
or not, is not to be taken lightly.
Recently, some therapists have been charged with aiding their clients in
fabricating stories of childhood abuse (Frontline, 1995). One would have to
wonder why a therapist would ever intentionally bring a client through the
traumatic experience of feeling the emotions of an abuse victim. However, the
evidence from the studies on deliberate shaping of verbal behavior must be
taken into account and can be used to analyze the possible outcome. Green-
spoon (1955) studied listeners who provided contingent reinforcement based
on a preplanned strategy. But what would happen if the same phenomenon
were occurring in a person whose special listening was unplanned? If a
therapist strongly believed that a client could benefit from revealing a history
of abuse, might not that professional unintentionally prompt and reinforce
responses about abuse (whether the abuse occurred or not) with consequences
such as looks and comments of sincere attention or simple probing questions

or head-nods? If such were the case, a therapist might unknowingly shape
descriptions of abuse which never occurred. The power of listening, as a
behavior of reinforcement mediation, needs to be recognized for its ability to
shape and maintain specific verbal behavior. A well-informed, ethi-
cally-concerned therapist, aware of this possibility, could carefully monitor his
or her own listening behavior or ask a colleague to do so to prevent favoring
one specific type of response. By identifying listening as a distinct behavior,
one may track and explain bizarre, hannful, and counter-productive phenom-
ena such as the unintentional guiding of a client's verbal behavior. This
unfortunate situation is diagrammed in Figure 10.
R[SD] R[SD] R[SD]

"I lived in a small 'Well. he would "I don't
SPEAKER town, my mother always come in exactly
(Patient) worked the night to my room and remember
~l \~:( \~{ \/
shift... " put me to bed ... " that ... "
LISTENER
(Therapist) about your about your father kissed you good-
early and how he treated night. where did
childhood?" you when your mom he touch you?"
was at work ... "
Figure 10. A behavioral model of repressed memories suggests that the listener, in this case a
therapist may unconsciously present stimuli which prompt a certain class of responses on the
part of the patient. Here, the therapist prompts the patient to "remember" how her father treated
her as a child. When she is unable to remember certain evidence this may serve as a reinforcer
to the therapist who has a theory that child abuse memories are repressed. This shaping of
verbal behavior continues beyond the panel.
Understanding
One of the most important functions of verbal behavior is to promote mutual

"understanding" between speaker and listener. In a behavioral interpretation,
little is gained by saying that one person "communicated" to the other, or that
the listener "got the point". What is understanding? Is there a behavioral
account for this important process?
Skinner deals extensively with understanding by pointing out that we know
that a listener has understood a speaker when the listener can engage in an
Verbal Behavior 141
appropriate response. A speaker can tell that a listener has understood a joke
by laughing at the appropriate times, for example, or asking a key question
where some information was left out. Understanding is not simple repetition
of the speaker's words by the listener. Nor is it is a matter of the listener
agreeing by head nodding or smiling. A listener may be said to "understand"
a speaker when he can emit an equivalent response under approximately
equivalent conditions. Teachers, after presenting new information, often are
guilty of asking, "Do you understand?" Then, when no one indicates to the
contrary they assume they have delivered their message. It is only later when
an exam reveals that the students did not "understand" that the faulty assess-
ment becomes apparent.
Teachers following the precepts of verbal behavior would be inclined to
present their information and then ask the student several revealing questions
about the material to see if they can generate roughly equivalent responses,
perhaps even "in your own words". In training students to read thoroughly and
learn rapidly from text materials teachers will usually give similar advice. "As
you read each paragraph, summarize the main points in your own words. As
you finish each page, rehearse what you've learned by pretending to explain
it to someone else."
We assume that interdependence became increasingly complex as human
societies matured and increased in population. With this diversification, a
repertoire of simple gestures would naturally expand into verbal repertoires
of great size and diversity. Listening as a behavior class would have expanded
equally as speaker-listener relationships grew. The increase in ways a speaker
and listener might interact probably resulted in greatly expanded benefit to
members of verbal communities. However, the increase in size of listening
repertoires also resulted in difficulties of understanding. As we shall see,
mediating reinforcement is not always automatic.
The development of the functions of verbal stimuli underlies the concept of
understanding for which an account is necessary in our functional approach.
Listening and understanding are related phenomena, but are not identical.
Where listening is the actual mediation of reinforcement, understanding
involves an ability to mediate reinforcement based on the congruity of
variables controlling verbal behavior on the part of speaker and listener.
Understanding should be interpreted neither as a repertoire of potential
behavior nor as any kind of physical entity. Understanding is a state (i.e., set
of circumstances) existing between speaker and listener in which both are able
to complete verbal episodes by a listener mediating reinforcement.
A speaker's verbal responses are the result of certain controlling variables
existing in "sufficient strength" to evoke behavior (e.g., establishing opera-
tions plus specific stimulus conditions). This sufficient strength can be thought
of as a probability that a response will occur. After all, the purpose of our
functional account is to be able to predict when verbal behavior will occur, or
to affect verbal behavior by altering the circumstances which give rise to it.
For example, vendors at sporting events may increase drink purchases by
increasing the amount of salt in their popcorn. Salt ingestion is an establishing
operation which: a) increases the ability of drinks to reinforce responses and,
b) increase the likelihood of those responses. This latter effect is here
represented in the vendor altering the rate of consumer manding behavior by
altering the conditions which give rise to it (i.e., the establishing operation of
salt ingestion). Such speaker manding behavior would typically take the form,
"Hey, beer over here!" The point is that when the response [mand] occurs, a
controlling variable existed in sufficient strength to produce the verbal
behavior. Simply sitting in the sun on a warm day in the summer can also
serve as an establishing operation that will increase the likelihood that sports
fans will visit the concession stand during the seventh inning stretch.
The speaker-listener relationship involves interplay in what is termed the
"total verbal episode." In such an episode, the role of speaker and listener
switch back and forth when mediated reinforcers come to act as stimuli for
further responding on the part of other persons who are present. In other
words, verbally produced stimuli become controlling variables in the form of
antecedent stimuli which strengthen behavior on the part of others participat-
ing in a verbal interchange. In this total verbal episode, the probability of a
response from the speaker is high as an establishing operation of thirst is
exerting influence as a controlling variable. The response is made under
appropriate stimulus conditions (e.g., at a concession booth, a cashier present)
and this response sets the occasion for listening behavior, that is, providing a
reinforcer in a specific manner to the speaker. The speaker in turn provides a
generalized conditioned reinforcer of, "thanks."
If a speaker makes a request and a listener is not capable of mediating
reinforcement for that response, the listener is misunderstanding the speaker.
When speaker and listener are incapable of completing a verbal episode, one
or both may engage in extra behavior to achieve "an understanding." This
extra behavior, shown in Figure 11, performed by either a speaker or listener
(e.g., point to desired items, write answers out for the listener, use different
terminology) involves altering the influence of controlling variables. When
controlling variables exist at similar levels in listener and speaker, a state of
"understanding" exists in which probability of necessary responses for
successful reinforcer mediation are high.
Verbal Behavior 143
EO
SPEAKER Warm
Customer) day at
Fulton
Stadium,
Atlanta
LISTENER
SD
(Vendor) Sight
stand.
Figure 11. A behavioral analysis of "misunderstanding" begins with the visiting Braves fan
spotting the concession stand and asking for a "pop" - an unknown verbal stimulus for the
vendor from Atlanta. This stimulus prompts the clarifying response, "A what?" from the
vendor, which then serves as stimulus for, "You know, a Coke, a Pepsi". Understanding occurs
when the vendor produces the much needed drink for the hot and thirsty Braves fan.
THINKING AS VERBAL BEHAVIOR
What factors contribute to one author's writing style versus another? Why do
people declare one set of attitudes, but behave in opposite ways from their
stated views? Skinner emphasized the utility of a well-organized system by
observing, "An account of verbal behavior is not complete until its relation to
the rest of the behavior of the organism has been made clear. This can be done
conveniently by discussing the problem of thinking." (Skinner, 1957, page
433) Therefore, in taking the radical behaviorist perspective and analyzing
thinking as private stimuli, responses, and consequences, a meaningful
explanation of complex human behavior emerges.
Behavior analysts are frequently misunderstood to discount private behavior
entirely. This is, in part, due to their opposition to assigning a causal role to
invisible processes. In addition, the experimental analysis of behavior
traditionally focused on direct observation of responding which is defined
mechanically and recorded automatically. Even so, behavior which occurs
within a person's skin is very much within the domain of an operant perspec-
tive. The mere fact that some activity occurs within the skin does not mean
that the activity can only be considered as within the domain of physiology.
For that matter, if an attempt is made to bring private behavior into the domain
of psychology, it need not be invoked as a physiological cause of behavior.

Behavior analysis is interested in the causal role of private events and the
verbal behavior framework permits an analysis founded in a reliable method-
ology (Perone, 1988).
An analysis of thinking places private phenomena in a causal role of
behavior through participation as discriminative stimuli, with each response
producing stimulation that can act as stimulus conditions for further respond-
ing. Private stimuli acquire this discriminative stimulus control by virtue of a
special history of public reinforcement for responses to private stimulation
from members of a verbal community. For example, we all learn to describe
pain in various ways which assist others in treating it. A pediatrician asks a
child, "Is your pain sharp or is it a dull, throbbing pain?" If the listener (Le.,
the child) in such a verbal episode cannot answer the a question (refer to
"understanding" section), the speaker (i.e., the pediatrician) may engage in
extra prompting or teaching behavior, "If your pain is focused in one area and
doesn't come and go, we call it a 'sharp' pain." The child may then say, "Yes,
I do have a sharp pain right here." This permits the physician to skip certain
diagnostic steps (an example of the utility of verbal behavior). In this scenario,
the listener has received reinforcement for the response to private stimulation.
At another time, this person may state, "I have a sharp pain," when experi-
encing similar kinds of private stimulation. Although a relatively simple
example, this demonstrates how people learn from others to respond to
stimulation which affects only themselves. (Moore, 1984)
Similar to how pain can set the occasion for behavior, one's private
behavior comes to function as a source of discriminative stimulation in the
same way one's public behavior may come to act as a source of discriminative
stimulation (e.g., open a door, observe what is on the other side). When one
engages in a private response, a stimulus is produced at the covert level. At
that point the person may respond privately, publicly, or not respond at all to
the stimulus conditions generated by the private behavior. For example, when
a child needs assistance in finding her lost book, her father might model
problem-solving behavior such as getting her to retrace her recent where-
abouts out loud. Father prompts his daughter, "Cassidy, let's think of the
places you've been since you had your book last. Where were you last?"
Cassidy could then begin a series of responses about where she has been
recently. When a likely location has been reached (verbally) where the book
might be, the father can go with the child to look for the lost item. Finding the
lost book would naturally reinforce this type of problem solving behavior. As
this behavior becomes mastered, the same behavior may occur with only one
person present. The child may at this point play the role of speaker and listener
residing within the same skin. Cassidy may respond to an absence of another
Verbal Behavior 145
SPEAt,CER R[SD] R[SD] R[SD] S R+
ew/ \ I \
(CassIdy) "Now, where 'Then I took 'That's where 'There
~ 0 did 1 leave my my bag outside they are dummy, you are."
N' headphones?" to the porch out on t h prch."
e?
load up my
;~e /rayons."
Lost D '\
head- R[S ] R[SD] R
phones "Let's see, I "I took out my Goes to
....... got home from headphones so the
Tumbling Tots they wouldn't get porch
LISTENER and 1 had them messy."
(Cassidy) in my bag."
Figure 12. In this verbal episode the speaker, 5-yr old Cassidy, is also a listener as she tries to
remember where she left her headphones. The establishing operation is a new tape she wants
to listen to but when she looks in her gym bag it is not there. This serves as a stimulus for a
problem-solving response where she tries to recall where she last saw her headphones. Finding
the missing headphones is a reinforcer for the problem-solving episode.
missing item (e.g., headphones for her Walkman) with a series of verbal
responses that trace a path (i.e., hallway, kitchen, door, porch). When a
location in that chain which seems most plausible for the headphones to be,
the speaker's response (e.g., "porch") may be reinforced by the same person
as listener (e.g., "That's right, I left them on the porch!) This interplay of
responding and stimulation, as shown in Figure 12, permits further responses
and stimulation which constitute private verbal behavior or "thinking."
Why, then, does behavior occur at the covert level? There are several
important reasons why thinking may have evolved in a manner which
permitted a person to generate stimulation to the exclusion of his or her
environment. All behavior occurs for the first time at an intensity which is
greater than is needed for a reinforcer to follow. As a response is repeated,
however, the topography of the behavior will be shaped until the minimum
effort required to earn a reinforcer is established. Overt verbal behavior,
shaped and maintained by a verbal community, may only be needed on
particular occasions by the speaker as his own listener. If the minimum effort
required to produce a reinforcing consequence is at the covert level, then it
follows that the intensity of responding will gradually reduce until a public
behavior becomes private.
The effect of punishment of verbal behavior is an additional factor to be
taken into account. Various setting events can make the probability of verbal
responses very strong. However, emitting those responses in the presence of
a particular audience may result in an aversive consequence following the
behavior. As such, behavior may still occur at a covert level and produce a
positive consequence and escape the punishment which would occur if a
response was made overtly. For example, contestants on a game show
involving trivia questions are awarded points for coming up with answers
before their competitors. If an answer is not immediately evident to a player,
that person may need to engage in a series of private verbal responses, each
generating stimulation which increases the probability of the speaker as his or
her own listener engaging in a successful response (i.e., answer). If the game
show host asks the question, "What year did Lyndon Johnson end his term as
President?" If the question does not evoke the answer immediately, a
contestant must prompt other responses which can generate a stimulus that
will evoke the correct answer. For example, a contestant might think, "He
became President in 1963 following the assassination of John Kennedy and
served one year ... he was then elected and served one term ... five years in
office after 1963 would make January 20, 1969." At that point, the contestant
can give the correct answer, "Lyndon Johnson left office in 1969." Engaging
in this series of responses at the overt level could increase the probability that
other contestants would give a correct answer. Therefore, responding is
performed at the covert level which avoids the punishing consequence of a
competitor providing the answer fIrst. The effect of punishment is to drive the
intensity of responding to a covert level to avoid a negative consequence while
still achieving a reinforcer (i.e., coming up with the correct answer).
Thinking, as a sequence of verbal responses in which a speaker acts as
hislher own listener, remained with humans as a feature which provided
advantages. Humans do not have to react instantly to stimuli in an environ-
ment in a reflexive manner. Rather, private behaviors in which stimuli are
manipulated and combined with other stimuli produce a stimulus condition to
which highly effective behavior then occurs. From the example with the lost
keys, one could react to the situation immediately and without thinking. This
would involve searching all areas for the keys until they were discovered.
Thinking permits a person to behave in a vastly more efficient way, retracing
steps privately and going straight to the most likely location. Engaging in a
series of private responses permits highly effective behavior. Behaving in
ways signifIcantly more efficient than mere reflexivity is most likely responsi-
ble for human advancement so far beyond other species.
Self-editing
Verbal behavior with great benefIt to a speaker is referred to in behavioral

terms as "self-editing." Consider when certain variables exist in adequate
Verbal Behavior 147
strength, verbal behavior is evoked. A person's learning history may have

included punishment for particular responses in the presence of a particular
audience (either an individual or several persons). If those responses are the
ones for which probability is high, due to the exerted control of potent
antecedent variables, then a conflict exists. The speaker solves this conflict in
an interesting manner which constitutes self-editing. For example, a child may
make an indelicate remark in front of grandparents at dinner, such as, "I hate
creamed carrots!" The child's parent corrects the child with statement like,
"Donnie, you know we don't talk like that at the dinner table." At a later time
when certain variables set the occasion for a verbal response on the part of a
child (e.g., serving a food that the child does not like), the child may respond
to the presence of a parent who punished brash remarks about food by
rejecting a verbal response about the food and making up an excuse instead.
Therefore, rejecting a verbal response ("I hate creamed carrots!") reduces the
conditioned aversive stimulation generated by it and this rejection behavior
and generation of a new response is reinforced by the consequences of
avoiding both the carrots and the punishment as shown in Figure 13.
A person engages in "editing" as an extra behavior at a time when verbal
behavior is otherwise strong. For example, a relative at a family reunion may
remember and wish to reminisce about a departed uncle. Stimulus conditions
(e.g., photos and other relatives) make the probability that this verbal behavior
will occur very high. However, the presence of the uncle's widow makes
conversation about the departed uncomfortable for those present. As such, any
overt responses about the uncle are aversive. When the verbal behavior
becomes strong as it normally would, the likelihood of punishing conse-
quences for that behavior also becomes probable. Conversation about the
departed is now aversive. Anyone present acting as a speaker may engage in
the extra behavior known as "editing" whereby responses about the departed
are rejected.
When complex processes such as editing are examined, the real value of
verbal behavior analysis emerges. So much of what we do is not evident to
other persons. Often when someone is observed to be sitting idle, he or she
may respond to the question, "What are you doing?" with, "Nothing, I was
just thinking." This is an accurate description (i.e., self-tact) of a person's
overt/public behavior. However, when a person is thinking, he or she is
engaging in behavior of great benefit. He or she may be examining responses
for their potential effect on other speakers (i.e., pleasant versus aversive),
engaging in a series of verbal responses which will produce a response of
great importance to others (e.g., developing instructions for the quickest way
to arrive at a desired location), or merely responding in private for personal
pleasure (e.g., imagination). All of this behavior has remarkable significance,
!
Early in learning history
o streng~ R produces ~ S R·
~eamed
carrots
"I hate
creamed
Excused from
table by
+ carrots!" parents
Parents
Current situation
SO streT!9thens ~ R produces ~ Sp
Creamed "I hate "Donnie. we don't
carrots creamed talk like that here!"
+ carrots!" Donnie eats the
Parents dreaded creamed
+ carrots.
Grand Parents
Later In child's li e
SO
+
Parents
Figure 13. In the top panel Donnie avoids eating the creamed carrots by protesting, "I hate
creamed carrots!" and being excused from the table. In the middle panel, with grandparents
present the parents punish this same response and make Donnie eat the detested vegetable. In
the bottom panel, in the future, given the presence of both parents and grandparents, Donnie
engages in self-editing, weighing his history of negative reinforcement and punishment. He
then emits a novel response that is likely to avoid the carrots and the punishment from his
parents.
yet is frequently portrayed as a small factor or link in a chain of other public

behavior. Skinner developed the radical behavioral approach of verbal
behavior analysis to create a reliable system for examining this level of
complex behavior. He was not merely setting about to classify another type of
operant behavior in the manner that botanists categorize species of plants.
Rather, Skinner was trying to offer psychology, science, and other communi-
cation disciplines, a powerful means for improving human interaction of
which editing plays a major role.
Verbal Behavior 149
The Autoclitic
Is it possible to say things which are followed by pleasing or desired conse-

quences, but for which punishment is likely due to the reaction of a particular
listener/audience? The answer is, "Yes." This type of extra behavior is
referred to in behavioral terms as an autoclitic. "One form of editing which
involves an obvious process of review and revision consists of emitting the
response but qualifying it with an autoclitic which reduces the threat of
punishment." (Skinner, 1957, p. 377). Having rejected a response through
editing, speakers may nevertheless make a remark after modifying it with an
autoclitic that will reduce the likelihood or even amount of punishment which
would follow a response. For example, an office manager who needs to
provide corrective feedback to a subordinate says to a secretary who is also
present, "We need a few minutes alone to discuss a private matter." The
supervisor could merely tell the secretary to leave, but that could make for an
uncomfortable situation in which he or she is now seen as blunt or pushy.
Instead, a desired outcome may be achieved (i.e., the departing of another) in
a manner which is not punished. Antecedent variables may exist in sufficient
strength to evoke the response, "I need you to leave us alone for a while" but
those variables may combine with the antecedent of a subordinate employees
who have reacted to such statements with resentment in the past. The final
product is a series of editing responses that allows the speaker to reject the
blunt response in favor of another which will be reinforced, both by removal
of the aversive response and by removal of an unwanted person.
Even though autoclitics permeate so much of human behavior, they are
often taken for granted and summarized as "good social skills." A verbal
behavior framework provides a clear perspective of "charisma," "diplomacy,"
and other entities which are often referred to as inborn traits. By viewing
autoclitic behavior as learned responses rather than internal entities, behavior
analysts and other professionals can assist people be more effective in relating
with others as an audience.
Some may feel that all this "private responding" talk is just a restatement
of "internal processes." However, taking such a shortcut in labeling these
phenomena interfere with their functional analysis (which in tum limits
effective impact should treatment or teaching become necessary). "A better
case can be made for identifying thinking with behaving which automatically
affects the behaver and is reinforcing because it does so." (Skinner, 1957, page
438). While the analysis of thinking is not an easy one to grasp, it does have
much potential for the interpretation, prediction, and control of private
phenomena. As has been demonstrated, a position on privacy is important in
a causal analysis of behavior and can be very useful. By addressing thinking
as private responses, private stimuli, and private consequences, understanding

complex human behavior becomes very possible within the operant frame-
work of analysis.
CONCLUSION
Skinner wrote his classic work Verbal Behavior to take behavior analysis in
a new direction. He clearly intended for his intellectual successors to expand
the then very well accepted behavioral approach to the analysis of higher
cognitive processes. The book is a complex, consistent, and comprehensive
analysis of the most intricate forms of human interaction and Skinner often
referred to it as his most important work. His insight that the role of the
listener is pivotal to the development of language or other forms of communi-
cation and that it is this second party that sets the occasion for the complexity
of subsequent interactions has unfortunately been largely underappreciated in
behavior analysis and almost completely ignored by the rest of psychology
and philosophy.
In addition, we believe that Skinner predated the so-called cognitive
revolution in his analysis of memory, thinking, planning, reasoning, problem
solving, and abstraction. By expanding his typology of mands, tacts, echoics,
and intraverbals, he was able to present a coherent theory, extended to the
speaker as listener, in such a way that it was perfectly reasonable to account
for all of these "cognitive" processes.
Experimental studies based on Skinner's conception are relatively recent
and fairly few in number. However, the need for a data-based understanding
of this complicated realm of behavior have never been more timely. New
techniques for studying private events are now being employed which
coincide with the strict methodology of the experimental analysis of behavior
(see Ericsson and Simon, 1993) even though they were developed by
cognitive psychologists with apparently no awareness of Skinner's seminal
text.
Clinical psychologists need effective guidance in assisting their clients to
overcome complicated interpersonal problems (e.g., Glenn, 1983); society is
increasingly dependent on "information". Hence, improving behaviors related
to the development and transference of "information" are crucial. In general,
psychology as a relatively young discipline needs to adopt a more functional
rather than formalistic approach to "communication" and "language".
Behavior analysis has already initiated this critical shift by adapting its
methods to the analysis of verbal behavior.
Verbal Behavior 151
In this chapter we have attempted to present an overview of these issues in

such a way that the interested reader may then tackle the primary work Verbal
Behavior itself. In addition, we hope we have whetted the appetite of some
readers to the possibility of both the application needs and the research
possibilities that await them. We particularly recommend to readers The
Analysis of Verbal Behavior as the only peer-reviewed journal dedicated
specifically to the study of this fascinating topic.
Florida State University
Tallahassee, Florida, USA
REFERENCES
Chomsky, N. (1959). Verbal Behavior by B. F. Skinner. Language, 35,26-58.

Ericsson, K.A. and Simon H.A. (1993). Protocol Analysis: Verbal reports as data. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Glenn, S.S. (1983). Maladaptive Functional Relations in Client Verbal Behavior. The Behavior
Analyst, 6,47-56.
Greenspoon, J.(1955). The reinforcing effect of two spoken sounds on the frequency of two
responses. American Journal 0/ Psychology, 68,409-416.
Hake, D.F. (1982). The Basic-Applied Continuum and the Possible Evolution of Human
Operant Social and Verbal Research. The Behavior Analyst, 5, 21-28.
Hersh, S.B. (1990). A description of teacher-student verbal interactions in a resource room
versus regular classrooms. The Analysis o/Verbal Behavior, 8, 101-112.
Layng, T.J.L. and Adronis P.T. (1984). Toward a functional analysis of delusional speech ad
hallucinatory behavior. The Behavior Analyst, 7, 139-156.
Lee, V. L. (1984). Some notes on the subject matter of Skinner's Verbal Behavior. Behaviorism,
12(1),29-40.
Lee, V.L. (1987). Radical Behaviorism and Behavior analysis: A review of Behavior Analysis
and Contemporary Psychology, Edited by Lowe, Richelle, Blackman and Bradshaw. The
Behavior Analyst, 10,95-101.
McPherson, A., Bonem, M., Green, G., and Osborne, J.G. (1984). A citation analysis of the
influence on research of Skinner's Verbal Behavior. The Behavior Analyst, 7, 157-167.
Michael, J. (1993). Establishing Operations. The Behavior Analyst, 16, 191-206.
Moore, J. (1984). On privacy, causes, and contingencies. The Behavior Analyst, 7,3-16.
Partington, J.W. and Bailey, I.S. (1993). Teaching intraverbal behavior to preschool children.
The Analysis o/Verbal Behavior, 11,9-18.
Perone, M. (1988). Laboratory Lore and Research Practices in the Experimental Analysis of
Human Behavior: Use and Abuse of Subjects Verbal Reports. The Behavior Analyst, 10,
95-101.
Parrot, LJ. (1984). Listening and Understanding. The Behavior Analyst, 7,29-39.
Place, U. T. (1981a). Skinner's Verbal Behavior I: Why we need it. Behaviorism, 9,1-24.
Reichle, J. and Wacker, D. P. (1993). Communicative alternatives to challenging behavior:
integrating functional assessment and intervention strategies. York, PA: The Maple Press
Co.
Skinner B. F. (1957). Verbal Behavior. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Skinner B. F. (1969). Contingencies of Reinforcement: A Theoretical Analysis. New York:

Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Skinner B. F. (1971). Beyond Freedom and Dignity. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Skinner B. F. (1986). The Evolution of Verbal Behavior. Journal of the Experimental Analysis
of Behavior, 45, 115-122.
Sundberg, M.L., San Juan, B., Dawdy, M., and ArgUelles, M. (1990). The acquisition oftacts,
mands, and intraverbals by individuals with traumatic brain injury. The Analysis of Verbal
Behavior, 8, 83-99.
STEVEN C. HAYES, KELLY G. WILSON,
ANDEL~ABETHV.G~ORD
Consciousness and Private Events
One of the most important philosophical criticisms leveled at behaviorism is

that it lacks the tools required for an analysis of the fIrst-person perspective
(Malcolm, 1963, see Day, 197711992; Lycan, 1990; Rorty, 1994). If this
criticism were valid, it would indeed be a grave, if not fatal, flaw. No
psychological perspective, not even the behaviorism of John Watson, has yet
been able to argue compellingly against consciousness and experience.
Most contemporary behaviorists, however, believe that this criticism is
unjustifIed. In the present paper, we argue that not only does contemporary
behaviorism allow for the first person perspective, it also offers a pragmatic
means by which to understand and impact such experience. As such, behavior
analysis may have much to contribute to the psychology of consciousness.
Understanding how this contradiction could occur requires an understand-
ing of history. We need look no further than the birth of behaviorism.
THE BIRTH OF BEHAVIORISM AND THE ELIMINATION OF INTROSPECTION
Behaviorism was originally a movement against consciousness as the subject

matter of psychology and introspection as the method of its investigation
(Watson, 1924, pp. 2-5). Fifty years of introspective research at Wurzburg and
elsewhere "had resulted in no large interesting systematic body of knowledge"
(Boring, 1950, p. 642).
Watson instead claimed behavior as the scientifIcally legitimate subject
matter of psychology, and named his approach "behaviorism" on that basis.
He defIned "behavior" entirely by its form: behavior was muscle movements
and glandular secretions (Watson. 1924, e.g., p. 14). From his perspective, all
activities of the organism could be reduced to these events, and thus he
embraced a kind of peripheralist, metaphysical behaviorism. Few followed
Watson in this step, even at the time.
But Watson took another step which continues to be followed by many to
this day: even if mental or other non-movement activities existed, they could
not constitute the subject matter of a scientific psychology because public
agreement as to their occurrence was impossible (a kind of methodological
behaviorism). For Watson, scientifIc legitimacy was an issue of public
153
154 Hayes, Wilson, and Gifford
observability. Issues traditionally explored via introspection were thus

conceived in more "objective" terms. For example, thinking was conceived as
small laryngeal movements, emotion as glandular activity, and sensation as
discrimination (Boring, 1950). Now the link between environmental input and
behavioral output was not obtained by asking the subject; it was inferred from
publicly accessible observation.
The methodological behavioral criticism of introspectionism came from the
admiration of biology, physics and other hard sciences, and was influenced by
the philosophical operationism of the times, especially as the behavioral
movement gained steam. Watson and other early behaviorists had concluded
that one of the hallmarks of progressive sciences was that observations were
publicly verifiable. In a sense, methodological behaviorism was overtly
dualistic: the world may be composed of two kinds of stuff, and science could
only study one of the two kinds directly.
But there was nothing to prevent the second kind of stuff from being
studied indirectly, and for that reason the "inner" world did not stay out long.
As Boring (1950) points out, Watson himself did not reject verbal reports of
"internal" processes, so long as the content of the reports were publicly
verifiable. Indeed, Watson was the first researcher ever to use continuous talk
aloud procedures to study thinking and problem solving (1920), a procedure
now considered to be on the cutting edge of cognitive psychology (Ericsson
and Simon, 1993). Some, such as Tolman, rejected verbal reports as a "dodge
by which to smuggle consciousness in through the back door" (Hilgard, 1948,
p. 185). But most researchers seemed to conclude that the methodological
behavioral objection to the introspectionists could be satisfied if consciousness
and its emotional and cognitive contents were included indirectly, according
to "the rules of objective psychology, in which mental processes are examined
by inference, not by direct examination" (Hebb, 1968, p. 468).
Fairly quickly, a variety of mediating mental or physiological processes
located inside the organism were being inferred from overt events. Almost
immediately, S-R psychology was really more properly S-O-R psychology,
because inferred events verbally located in the organism became a significant
object of study. Even Tolman, who tried to limit his inferences to mere
shorthand terms for publicly observable events, could conclude "we believe
in the course of learning something like a field map of the environment gets
established in the rat's brain" (1948, p. 192). Hull (1943) also hypothesized
mediating events - drive, habit strength, reaction potential - constructed in
elaborated mathematical form and hypothesized in terms of neurophysiology.
By the middle of the twentieth century the remaining resistance to a study
of mental mediators was a continuing concern about self-report. In a bow to
the behavioral tradition, emerging as it did in reaction to introspectionism,
observation ofthe organism's verbal behavior was largely excluded as a basis

for inference. Hilgard, for example, suggests that "behaviorists differ
somewhat among themselves as to what may be inferred in addition to what
is measured, but they all exclude self-observation (introspection) as a
legitimate scientific method" (1948, p. 49). Conversely, observation of an
organism's nonverbal behavior was fully acceptable as a means to the
understanding of mental life.
This was the dominant trend in behavioral psychology, although there was
another line of thought that was little appreciated outside of its group. This
alternative approach was similar to the behavioral mainstream in its use of the
language of stimulus and response, but strikingly different in its basic
philosophical assumptions and thus in its conclusions about the place of self-
observation in science (Verplanck, 1954). The fundamentally pragmatic and
contextualistic quality of B. F. Skinner's radical behaviorism led him to a
different perspective on operationism and the methodology of science.
SKINNER'S OPERATIONISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATE EVENTS
Skinner differed in remarkable ways from most of his behaviorally-oriented

contemporaries. He did not reject the popular operational sensibility, but took
it in a very different direction. The distinction between Skinner's operationism
and the operationism of mainstream psychology was most apparent in his
contribution to the symposium on operationism organized by E. G. Boring in
Psychological Review in 1945. In his paper on "The Psychological Analysis
of Operational Terms," Skinner described the failure of operationism to offer
a good definition of a definition (1945). Inasmuch as the sine qua non of
operationism is the operational definition, this shortcoming was no small
matter.
Unlike the dualistic, realistic, and mechanistic approach of most other
behaviorists of the time, Skinner's operationism was thoroughly - one might
say radically - pragmatic. The key to Skinner's analysis of the term definition
(and indeed his whole approach not only to verbal behavior, but to behavior
in general) is summed up in the following: "Meanings, contents, and refer-
ences are to be found among the determiners, not among the properties, of
response" (p. 372).
Skinner suggested that in order to understand the meaning of a term, we
need to know its functional relation to antecedent and consequent stimulation.
In other words, we needed to understand the context, both current and
historical, that gives rise to the verbal behavior (or indeed any behavior) being
analyzed. Thus, the problem of defining any term, including "definition"
itself, is the problem of detailing the conditions under which that particular bit
of verbal behavior is emitted.
For Skinner the psychologically meaningful unit was always the act-in-
context. A decontextualized act was meaningless. The distinction between
scientific observations and other kinds, if there was to be one, could only be
found in the contingencies controlling the observation, not in the form of the
observation or in its similarity to the observations of others (e.g., public
agreement).
By applying the three-term contingency analysis to all instances of
scientific verbal behavior, Skinner moved the work of defining terms and
making scientifically legitimate observations from a rational and logical
matter into a pragmatic and psychological matter. Indeed, what is radical
about Skinner's radical behaviorism is that it applies the same analysis of
behavior to both the subjects in an experiment as well as to the activities,
including verbal activities, of the scientists performing the experiment
(Day,196911992). This is "radical" not in the sense of being drastic, fanatical,
or extreme, but in the alternative senses of the term: it is a position that is
basically, fundamentally, comprehensively, and to the root "behavioral."
Private Does Not Mean Subjective Nor Mental
Skinner's approach to verbal behavior has profound implications for the place
of private events in psychological science. Traditional operationists must
assess the truthful use of a term by examining the correspondence between the
term and some operation. The only way to check this correspondence was to
show that public agreement could be reached about the presence or absence
of the operation and show that the term varied accordingly. Since the
community cannot have direct access to private events, these events can only
be inferred.
Skinner was interested in whether the verbal behavior of interest was
controlled by particular stimulus events and a general history of reinforcement
for speaking under the control of those events, as opposed to control by
audience factors, states of reinforcability, and so on. If it was, the observation
was scientifically valid, even if no one else agreed. If it was not, it was not
scientifically valid, even if everyone else agreed. One man alone could come
to valid conclusions about the relationship between the earth and the sun;
while many men could agree that the sun revolved around the earth.
This approach makes an unusual distinction between the subjec-
tive/objective continuum (which Skinner he thought to be of fundamental
scientific importance), the private/public dimension (which he thought was not
fundamental), and the mental/physical dimension (which was important).

Observations could be private and objective (scientifically legitimate) or
public and subjective (scientifically illegitimate), depending upon the
contingencies controlling the observations. But private did not mean "non-
physical": "the difference is not in the stuff of which the private world is
composed, but in its accessibility" (Skinner, 1972, p. 191) and "the distinction
between public and private is by no means the same as that between physical
and mental" (1945, p. 294).
Public subjective observations are readily demonstrated. The reader could
show the following words for about one-half second to several other people
and then cover them:
Paris in
the
the spring
Ask the people shown the words to write down what they read. Usually over
90% will write "Paris in the spring." If interrater reliability were the metric for
"objectivity" we would have to conclude that the observation that the words
"Paris in the spring" occurred was a scientifically valid observation.
From a radical behavioral point of view, however, these observations are
subjective. They are controlled by individual histories that do not focus on
direct contact with the words seen. "Paris in the spring" is a familiar phrase
while "Paris in the the spring" is not. It is unusual to see words such "the, the"
repeated in sentences. Because these contingencies are a significant source of
the observation, the observation is scientifically illegitimate, even though
highly "reliable."
Similarly, we can readily arrange observational conditions in which
motivational factors control the observation. A group of teenagers looking for
a famous rap star who is known to be in town may all agree the person they
saw driving past was the star, but the agreement could come not from a
common contingency that brings verbal behavior under the control of contact
with visual stimulation, but from common sources of reinforceability and
audience factors. Speaking loosely, all the teenagers "want to see the star."
Furthermore, when friends apparently do see the star, they quickly agree so as
to be part of the group.
Skinner rejected methodological behaviorism because he did not believe
that public agreement provided assurance of proper contingency control. As
in the examples above, it is easy to find instances where whole groups of
observers are similarly influenced by irrelevant historical factors, motivational
states, audience factors, and other subjective conditions.
If what is at issue in any scientifically-valid observation are the contingen-
cies controlling the observation, then "public and private events are observ-
able, if they are observable at all, in much the same way" (Day, 197111992,
p. 165). Radical behaviorism "does not insist upon truth by agreement and can
therefore consider events taking place in the private world within the skin. It
does not call these events unobservable" (Skinner, 1974, p. 16). In defining
science by way of contingency analysis, Skinner thus opened up behaviorism
to the very thing the originator of behaviorism was trying so hard to eliminate:
Introspective observations of private events. It is only by historical accident
that such a revised position was called "behavioral" at all.
Consider the following example. A boy in grade school says "Mom, I have
a terrible stomach ache." Suppose the verbal observation occurred because a
math test is scheduled. The observation is then "subjective," not because it is
about something inside, but because it is controlled by states of deprivation or
aversive stimulation. Suppose instead the observations have occurred because
of a long history of shaping verbal responses to come under the control of
painful stimulation. Now the observation is "objective." It is not possible to
tell the difference merely by the location of the referent of the talk. Privacy
does not mean "subjective." Nor does a lack of public agreement. The last
person on earth could do science even though no one would be there to agree
with the scientist.
What is the actual empirical criteria for a scientifically valid observation,
in the absence of public agreement? Assessing this was not a matter of
correspondence but of successful working. Skinner's operationism is satisfied
when, by manipulation of contingencies based on the verbalization, we are
able to predict and control the emission of the given response. In other words,
the pragmatic truth criterion of behavior analysis is met in its highest form by
the experimental analysis of behavior.
In a fundamental sense, Skinner's approach is not part of the tradition of
"behaviorism" at all. Since all psychological activities that are contacted in a
scientifically valid manner are subject to analysis, radical behaviorism rejects
both methodological behaviorism and Watsonian metaphysical behaviorism
- which were the main and defining streams of behaviorism for its first
decades.
Skinnerians did not move rapidly to investigations of thinking and feeling
for another reason, however. Skinner felt that an understanding of private
events was not necessary for a scientific understanding of overt activity
(Skinner, 1953). We will argue that there are reasons to believe that he was
mistaken.
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF PRIVATE EVENTS
How is it that the verbal community can arrange contingencies for the
"correct" emission of responses in which the antecedent stimulus conditions
(the private events) are not accessible to both the teacher and the learner of the
verbal response? Skinner rightly points out that "differential reinforcement
cannot be made contingent upon the property of privacy" (1945/1972, p. 378).
Skinner (1945/1972) suggests four means by which the verbal community
may shape conventional verbal response patterns to private stimuli.
First, many instances of private stimulation are highly correlated with
publicly accessible stimuli. For example, a skinned knee or a bump on the
head are publicly observable stimuli that are well correlated with pain. Thus
as we bring the child's response "that hurts" under the antecedent control of
these public events, the response also comes under antecedent control of the
well correlated private event. We can teach a range of responses, because there
are well correlated ranges of pUblic/private events. We shape "it hurts a little"
in the presence of a tiny scrape. We shape "it hurts a lot" in the presence of a
compound fracture.
In a second and similar way, the verbal community may gain access by
publicly observable responses that are likewise well correlated with private
events. A tooth may show no outward signs of damage (a publicly observable
stimulus correlated with a toothache), but by tapping gently on each tooth in
turn, we might eventually come to one that causes the patient to flinch more
than the others. Flinching, in this context, is a publicly observable response
that is well correlated with a toothache.
A third means by which the verbal community may shape responses to
private events occurs in the case of reporting one's own behavior. When the
behaviors are overt, the verbal community bases reinforcement on their
observation of the learner's behavior. Skinner speculates that the such verbal
responses may also come under the control of private stimuli well correlated
with the response. So, for example, I may be able to tell you whether my hand
is being held aloft even if I am in a room that is so totally dark that I cannot
see my hand. My report has been shaped under conditions where a wealth of
proprioceptive stimulation was also present. Skinner suggests that these
proprioceptive stimuli may eventually exert almost complete control over
verbal responses. Skinner also suggests that we may learn to make appropriate
verbal reports in the presence of overt behavior that recedes in magnitude to
a non-publicly observable form. An example of this might include rehearsing
lines of a play aloud, eventually leading to rehearsing them in thought.
The fourth and final means suggested by Skinner is through stimulus
induction, or by what he calls "transfer." In these instances he suggests that
responses to public stimuli may be metaphorically applied to privately felt

states. He offers as examples terms such as agitated, ebullient, and depressed.
Skinner suggests that this latter method of differentiation is particularly
imprecise, owing to the intrinsic imprecision of metaphor.
PRIVATE EVENTS AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS
Although behavior analysis embraces private events as a legitimate subject

matter for psychology, it rejects attributing causal status to them. This
rejection is made according to the truth criteria of the position. To understand
this it is necessary to understand the philosophical basis of behavior analysis.
We will need first to step back and uncover basic views about the goals of
science, the nature of truth, and the ontological or pragmatic status of causes.
We have laid out these issues in more detail elsewhere (e.g., Hayes, 1993;
Hayes and Brownstein, 1986; Hayes and Hayes, 1992; Hayes, Hayes, and
Reese, 1988; Hayes and Wilson, 1993, 1995), but will briefly review them
here.
The Metaphilosophy of Stephen Pepper
The philosophical basis of behavior analysis can be understood from the point
of view of the philosophical categories constructed by Stephen C. Pepper
(1942). Pepper's idea was that humans philosophize on the basis of certain
common-sense models - or "root metaphors" - and that the understanding
achieved in this manner is then metaphorically applied to the world. He
delineated four kinds of philosophical system or world view on the basis of
what he called their "root metaphors" and their truth criteria, namely:
Formism (e.g., Plato); Organicism (e.g., Hegel), Mechanism (e.g., S-R
learning theory) and Contextualism (e.g., James). These world views, he
argued, were orthogonal to each other because their assumptions differed so
greatly that meaningful discourse among them was impossible.
Mechanism and methodological behaviorism. The root metaphor of
mechanism is the machine. A machine (such as a lever) consists of discrete
parts (e.g., a fulcrum and lever), a relation among these parts (e.g., the lever
must sit atop the fulcrum), and forces to make the parts operate (e.g., pressing
down on one end of the lever produces a precisely predictable force at the
other end). If we wished to understand a machine, we would need to disas-
semble it and identify the parts, relations, and forces that constitute it and its
operation. Note also that when the machine is disassembled, the parts remain
unchanged despite their independence from the rest of the machine. In other
words, a spark plug is a spark plug whether screwed into a cylinder or sitting
on the kitchen table.
The archetype of mechanistic psychology is S-R learning theory, and its
descendent, information processing. Indeed, all of the descendants of
methodological behaviorism seem to be based on a mechanical metaphor that
takes stimuli, responses, cognitions, and other parts of a psychological event
to be discrete parts, related to each other by "mechanisms," and animated by
forces (e.g., information, drives). The existence of such parts in the world is
assumed: our job as theorists is simply to find ways to "take the cover off'
(literally, to dis-cover them) so that they can be seen. The parts are further
assumed to retain their nature when isolated from the whole. Accordingly,
mechanists often make use of research preparations that isolate hypothesized
components so that they may be studied out of context (e.g., sensation is
studied as a means to understand perception).
The goal of mechanistic research is the development of a model of the
machinery that is assumed to exist. If such a model is shown to correspond to
a range of relevant observations (especially if it is predictively verified or
falsified) then it is said to be true. Hypothetico-deductive theorizing is a
classic example of this correspondence-based strategy, and mechanistic
psychologies gravitate toward it.
Contextualism and radical behaviorism. Contextualistic philosophizing is
quite different. In contextualism, the root metaphor is the historically situated
action, alive and in the present, such as "going to the store" or "making
dinner." Actions such as these are whole units involving an action in and with
a context. In the world of common-sense, it is not possible to separate "going
to the store" into distinct units. For example, the fact that a person is walking
to the store does not mean that the action is walking, while the home that was
left behind or the store that is approached are separate. "Going to the store" is
all of these working together. Further, even this occurs in a context (e.g.,
"needing something from the store," or "having money to buy things," or
"knowing where the store is" or "being an organism that eats"). Thus, the
event constituting the focus of analysis from a contextualistic standpoint is
abstracted from an ever widening circle of possible events. The most trivial act
may lead to a concern with the whole universe.
What keeps analysis from being overwhelmed by the need to become ever
more inclusive is that analysis is taken to be an activity that itself has a context
and a purpose. Thus, analysis need be taken only to the point at which its
purpose is achieved. Insofar as a way of speaking achieves its purpose, it is
"true." Skinner was quite clear on this point, claiming that scientific knowl-
edge "is a corpus of rules for effective action, and there is a special sense in
which it could be 'true' if it yields the most effective action possible .... (A)
proposition is 'true' to the extent that with its help the listener responds
effectively to the situation it describes" (Skinner, 1974, p. 235).
We have argued elsewhere that the underlying philosophical position of
behavior analysis can be viewed as a form of pragmatism or contextualism
(Biglan and Hayes, 1995; Hayes, 1993; Hayes, Hayes, and Reese, 1988). Like
all forms of pragmatism, functional contextualism takes effective action to be
the goal of science. It is distinguished, however, by its specific goals: the
prediction and influence of behavior (where behavioral prediction and
influence are treated as two aspects of a unified goal).
Willard Day traces the root of pragmatism to Protagoras and his famous
aphorism "Man is the measure of all things" (see Day, 198011992, p. 18). For
the pragmatist, the impossibility of knowing any objective absolute reality (the
province of ontology) is embraced through accepting the located and concrete
subjective (Rorty, 1982). William James says:
For the one, those intellectual products are most true which, turning their fact towards the
Absolute, come nearest to symbolizing its ways of uniting the many and the one. For the
other, those are most true which most successfully dip back into the finite stream of feel-
ing and grow most easily confluent with some particular wave or wavelet. Such conflu-
ence not only proves the intellectual operation to have been true (as an addition may
'prove' that a subtraction is already rightly performed), but it constitutes, according to
pragmatism, all that we mean by calling it true. Only in so far as they lead us, success-
fully or unsuccessfully, back into sensible experience again, are our abstracts and univer-
sals true or false at all. (1909/1967, p. 100)
Instead of emphasizing hypothetico-deductive theories aimed at describing

unobservables, pragmatists construct theories designed to accomplish specific
purposes. Skinner says, "in the history of logic and science we can trace the
development of a verbal community especially concerned with verbal
behavior which contributes to successful action" (Skinner, 1957, p. 418).
Unlike all other world views, however, the truth criterion of contextualism
must be to arrive at something else: The goals of the analysis. "Serious
analysis for [the contextualist] is always either directly or indirectly practical
.. , If from one texture you wish to get to another, then analysis has an end, and
a direction, and some strands have relevancy to this end and others do not, and
.. , the enterprise becomes important in reference to the end" (Pepper, 1942, pp.
250-251). Any goal may be embraced, but the analytic practices useful in
terms of one goal may not be useful for another (Hayes and Brownstein,
1986). Thus, contextualistic psychologies may differ widely depending on
their goals.
Behavior analysis is a psychological variety of what has been termed
"functional contextualism" (Biglan and Hayes, 1995; Hayes, 1993). "Func-
tional contextualism" was coined to distinguish positions having an instru-
mental character from more descriptive forms of contextualism that seek

simply an understanding of participants in an interaction (e.g., Rosnow and
Georgoudi, 1986). The behavior analytic form of contextualistic behaviorism
has as its goals the prediction and influence of organismic interactions in and
with a context. It seeks empirically-based analyses that achieve all of these
goals jointly (not anyone in isolation) with precision (a restricted set of
constructs apply to any particular event), scope (a wide number of events can
be analyzed with these constructs), and depth (analytic constructs at the
psychological level cohere with those at other levels).
The goals and truth criteria of science are logically pre-analytic. They
provide a context for the interpretation of data and therefore cannot be reduced
to a simple empirical question. These are matters of the philosophical
assumptions researchers bring to their work. We cannot justify one set of
assumptions over another. We can, however, make explicit the assumptions
we are taking and the impact they produce on our scientific work. This is why
the decades-long debate between advocates of cognitive social learning and
behavior analytic perspectives shows no sign of ending. Each side in this
debate produce arguments that are only compelling to the camp producing
them. Their different assumptions and purposes lead to different analyses and
interpretations, not because each side is rigid but because each side is
behaving consistently given their philosophical stance.
The Non-Causal Status of Private Events
Many have mistakenly characterized the refusal to bestow causal status on

private events as a rejection of the events themselves (e.g., Mahoney, 1989).
Indeed introductory, and even more advanced psychology texts are filled with
this mistaken characterization (Todd and Morris, 1992). The non-causal nature
of private events, however, comes from an entirely different source.
First, behavior analysis is an a-ontological position. Second, causality is
viewed as merely a valuable way of speaking in certain contexts. Third, this
way of speaking does not apply to private events.
Ontology. From a thoroughgoing behavioral viewpoint, the world is
assumed to be "real" (one could just say as Skinner did that we assume the
"one world" and be as accurate), but there are no grounds upon which to assert
the ontological reality of any specific event in the world. This is because any
statement about anything is itself an action that is situated in a context, and
appreciating that context is itself another action, ad infinitum. The action of
analysis - of identifying events - cannot step outside of the world and evaluate
it. "Realness" is not a thing that has causal properties over behavior, or that
can be viewed independently of behavior. Thus ontological claims are

illegitimate in any truly pragmatic position, because such claims always
reduce themselves to some form of correspondence to a directly known world.
We cannot step outside of the world and view our acts of analysis as direct
avenues to anything. They begin and remain as situated actions.
Causality as a way of speaking. When an event can be shown to lead to the
accomplishment of analytic goals, pragmatists are willing to use the term
"causality" as a way of speaking (cf. Mach, 1883/1953, p. 447). If speaking
is always ultimately pragmatic, then we must examine any truth claim not in
terms of its reality basis but in terms of its utility. For example, causal talk can
orient the listener to what needs to be done to change an event. When someone
says "the spark caused the explosion" this is by way of saying "avoid sparks
if you wish to avoid explosions." However, since the scientific goals are
different, a "cause" for one need not be a "cause" for the other.
Private events as causes if influence is a goal. If a researcher wants a kind
of explanation that can be used directly to both predict and influence the
phenomenon of interest, no dependent variable of psychology can ever be said
to be a cause of another dependent variable of psychology. If change is part
of the goal of scientific activity, then independent variables, by definition,
must be manipulable at least principle. Dependent variables cannot be directly
manipulated and therefore cannot be directly used as a source of psychological
influence.
The rejection of the causal efficacy of private events thus has nothing to do
with a rejection of their importance. Nor does it spring from a dogmatic belief
that the relationship between environmental events and psychological actions
is one-way - it is not, as the very term "operant" denotes (such behavior
operates upon the environment). Environment varies with behavior just as
much as behavior depends on environment, but this does not mean that
behavioral "causes" are equivalent with environmental causes. Environmental
causes can in principal lead directly to both prediction and influence over the
psychological phenomenon of interest. Behavioral or cognitive or emotional
causes cannot. This is a philosophical issue, not an empirical one.
Given his philosophical assumptions, the following sentence would be a
scientifically appropriate statement for the cognitivist to make: "Chomsky
argued against Skinner's account because he thought it was wrong." The
statement is legitimate because prediction alone can be used to test it from this
philosophical perspective. Behavior analysts could not, given their assump-
tions, say the same and mean it as a scientific explanation. This causal relation
is rejected not because it refers to thinking, which is viewed as an entirely
legitimate target for analysis, but because it is a causal formulation that cannot
meet the analytic goals of behavior analysis. The job of the behavior analyst
would be to analyze the environmental events that cause (a) the thinking, (b)
the arguing, and most importantly (c) the relation between the two if such a
relation exists. From a contextual-behavioral view, private events, or any other
behavior for that matter, are not considered to be legitimate independent
variables, but are thoroughly legitimate dependent variables.
THE ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE EVENTS
Although private events were included in behavior analysis for philosophical

reasons, they have been largely excluded from empirical research within this
tradition. Why might this be so? We argue that the root of this failure to
develop a body of empirical work in this area has been the result of faulty
theoretical positions - particularly with respect to verbal behavior - combined
with a failure to pursue certain useful scientific methods in the analysis of
private events.
Skinner suggests that earlier forms of behaviorism, like the positions that
preceded it, "stopped short of a decisive positive contribution - and for the
same reason: it never finished an acceptable formulation of the 'verbal report,"
(1945/1972, p. 373). We believe that Skinner moved forward in this regard,
but that he too stopped short of an adequate analysis of the verbal report, and
therefore fell short of advancing a robust natural science formulation that
could "convincingly embrace the 'use of subjective terms'" (194511972, p.
373).
Consciousness
It seems useful to begin our analysis of this problem by making a few

distinctions. Before discussing the contents of consciousness, it seems
reasonable to describe what we mean by consciousness itself. At times we say
that a person or other organism is conscious and mean it only in the most
limited sense, as opposed to unconscious. A person who receives a sharp blow
to the head might be conscious, or unconscious, or partially conscious. We call
a person conscious in this limited sense on occasions when they are more or
less responsive to environmental stimulation. In addition, we may speak of
being conscious of this or that stimulus or property of a stimulus in the sense
of whether or not that event currently exerts stimulus control. This sense of
consciousness corresponds to what might in common sense language be
referred to as awareness or attention. The loquacious person might be
unconscious of the boredom of the audience in the sense of being unaware.
A more interesting sense of the word consciousness might more properly

be called self-consciousness or self-awareness. Some philosophers have
argued that "consciousness of our own mental state ... may then be conceived
of as ... selective behavior toward our own mental state" (Armstrong, 1980,
p.199). The special feature of this sense of consciousness is that the focus of
the stimulus control is on the organism itself. A high degree of self-awareness
can be accomplished with the members of a social-verbal community, and of
special interest for the present chapter is awareness of that set of stimulus
conditions to which only one individual has direct access - that is, private
events. Evidence of Skinner's interest in this domain are apparent from some
of his earliest writings, and we will begin our discussion of self-awareness and
the contents of that awareness with Skinner's thinking.
Know Thyself: The Behavior Regulatory Functions of Self-Knowledge
It is clear that from early on Skinner saw self knowledge produced by the
questioning of the verbal community as a special sort of consciousness.
I believe that all nonhuman species are conscious in the sense [that] .... They see, feel,
hear, and so on, but they do not observe that they are doing so .... a verbal community
asks the individual such questions as, "What are you doing?," "Do you see that?," "What
are you going to do?," and so on, an thus supplies the contingencies for the self-
descriptive behavior that is at the heart of a different kind of awareness or consciousness.
(1988, p. 306, c.f., 1953, emphasis added)
William James identified this direction when he said:

To deny plumply that 'consciousness' exists seems so absurd on the face of it - for unde-
niably 'thoughts' do exist - that I fear some readers will follow me no farther. Let me
then immediately explain that I mean only to deny that the word stands for an entity, but
to insist most emphatically that it does stand for a function .... That function is knowing
(191211967, p. 3-4) .... a given undivided portion of experience, taken in one context of
associates, plays the part of a knower, of a state of mind, of 'consciousness'; while in a
different context the same undivided bit of experience plays the part of a thing known,
of an objective 'content'. (191211967, pp. 9-10)
Using the example of seeing, Skinner points out that what is unique to our
definition of consciousness is not seeing per se, but rather that we "see that we
see." According to Skinner, "There are no natural contingencies for such
behavior. We learn to see that we are seeing only because a verbal community
arranges for us to do so" (1988, p. 286).
Furthermore, Skinner claimed that the self-awareness fostered by the verbal
community has adaptive advantage. Insight-oriented therapy approaches were
rejected soundly by the early behavior therapists (e.g., Wolpe and Rachman,
1960). However, leading radical behaviorists of the day (e.g., Skinner, Ferster)
never embraced this rejection with vigor, because a behavior analytic view
also emphasized the importance of self-knowledge.
Self-knowledge is of social origin. It is only when a person's private world becomes im-
portant to others that it is made important to him. It then enters into the control of the
behavior called knowing .... self-knowledge has a special value to the individual himself.
A person who has been "made aware of himself' is in a better position to predict and
control his own behavior. (1974, p. 31)
On the face of it, it seems obvious that self-knowledge would be useful.

Obviousness, though, is not the same as a behavioral analysis. Therefore, we
turn our attention to the last sentence in the preceding Skinner quotation and
ask: Why would self-knowledge put an individual in a better position to
predict and control his or her own behavior? Asked in a more technical way,
why would discriminations regarding one's own responding have behavior
regulatory functions over subsequent responding?
Unidirectional learning processes. Consider the following scenario. A
pigeon is given a choice between a very small amount of food immediately,
or a large amount delayed a few seconds. In these circumstances, pigeons will
choose the small, immediate reinforcer (Rachlin and Green, 1972). Suppose
we now teach the bird to "tell" which reinforcer was obtained (e.g., by
reinforcing some other response under the antecedent stimulus control of the
amount of access the bird just had to the food hopper). The bird is performing
an act of discrimination regarding its own behavior. However, we have no
reason to suppose that the bird will now behave differently when reintroduced
to the original choice preparation. Nor will that report be aversive. If the bird
"says" by later behavior "I just picked a small reinforcer" the functions of the
selection will not inhere in the self-report.
In fact, nonverbal organisms can readily be trained to report painful electric
shocks - the shock may have been aversive but the report is not because the
relation between the two is unidirectional. In a standard classical conditioning
paradigm involving a tone followed by a shock, the stimulus functions of the
shock inhere in the tone, but not visa versa. We know this because if we
reverse the order - shock - tone - we do not get elicitation upon presentation
of the tone. One way to speak of this is the transfer, or transformation of
stimulus function - where the stimulus functions of the latter inhere in the
former.
Classical conditioning is a largely unidirectional process. Backward
conditioning (in which the functions of the CS now adhere in the UCS as a
result of a CS - UCS temporal contingency) is at best extremely weak and
transient, if not nonexistent. Indeed, we can think of only rare instances in
which evolutionary advantage that would be provided by robust backward
conditioning. Catania (1984), for example suggests a case in which an
organism saw an unfamiliar predator only after an aborted attack. Backward

conditioning would indeed help in this case. However, strong backward
conditioning effects could in many more instances lead to the death of the
organism. hnagine if it were the case that the aversive properties of a detected
predator were classically conditioned to the hiding place to which the prey
retreated. The organism might be expected to flee the hiding place as they had
previously fled the predator - further subjecting them to predation.
Elements in operant learning require the same sort of temporal sequencing.
To acquire discriminative functions, a stimulus must precede the reinforce-
ment, not follow it. Similarly, a discriminative stimulus acquires conditioned
reinforcing functions because it reliably precedes food deliveries. The
ordering inherent in an operant conditioning paradigm cause some of the
stimulus functions of the food to inhere in the discriminative stimulus. Stimuli
that follow food deliveries do not become conditioned reinforcers. As a matter
of fact, we would expect, barring satiation, that the stimulus conditions
following a period of reinforcement delivery would take on conditioned
aversive, rather than appetitive functions, since these conditions reliably
precede the absence of reinforcement.
Function altering effects of self-report. Conversely, and for the same
reason, the reports in the pigeon choice example will not change the function
of the original choice, except to the extent that the stimulus functions of the
report might inhere in the choosing. But a non-aversive report will not make
selecting a small reinforcer aversive.
The situation is very different for a verbally competent human. The relation
between the event and the report is bidirectional. It is, in this case, aversive to
say "I picked the small one. Stupid me." If the self-report is aversive, then
behavior that precedes it can become so. In other words, verbal self-
knowledge can change the functions of what is known verbally.
Clinicians are persistently confronted with this phenomenon. Persons who
have experienced a traumatic event seem to re-experience the aversiveness of
the event in reporting the event. In fact, it is often very difficult to get victims
of trauma to discuss them at all. Ordinary classical or operant conditioning
procedures can not account for this transfer of aversive stimulus functions
from the former event (their trauma) to the latter (the report). The only
exception would be backward conditioning, which we have argued produces
transient and weak effects at best.
Bidirectional learning processes. One phenomenon that opens up potential
analyses of this bidirectional transfer of stimulus function is stimulus
equivalence. Many studies have demonstrated that when training is provided
sufficient to form an equivalence class, various psychological functions will
transfer among those stimuli, without regard to the sort of temporal ordering
required in classical and operant conditioning paradigms. Functions demon-

strated to transfer among members of an equivalence class include conditioned
reinforcing functions (Hayes, Brownstein, Devany, Kohlenberg, and Shelby,
1987; Hayes, Kohlenberg, and Hayes, 1991), discriminative functions (Hayes,
et al., 1987), elicited conditioned emotional responses (Dougher, Augustson,
Markham, Greenway, and Wulfert, 1994) and extinction functions (Dougher
et al., 1994), among others.
It follows that if words participate in equivalence relations with situations
that occasion them, we could expect some of the stimulus functions acquired
by the words to transfer to related events, and conversely some of the stimulus
functions of the related events to inhere in the words. This transfer of stimulus
functions given equivalence relation could occur regardless of temporal
ordering. If I tell you that citron is another name for a lemon, then I ask you
to imagine the taste when you bite into a citron, you do not need to have the
word citron precede the biting of a lemon in order for it to produce elicitation.
We have argued that the sort of bidirectional transformation of stimulus
function seen in stimulus equiValence - a sort of indirectly acquired stimulus
control- is the defining feature of verbal behavior. If verbal behavior involved
only simple discriminated operants, animal models of self-reporting would
have the same effects we see in human subjects, and this is simply not so.
Self-reporting sometimes has powerful psychological effects for verbally
competent humans, and this lies in sharp contrast to the effects of the same in
nonverbal organisms. Since the self-report alone does not produce this effect,
we must look further into the nature of verbal reports to what about them is
unique. To that topic we now turn.
RELATIONAL FRAME THEORY AND THE

DISTINCTIVENESS OF VERBAL EVENTS
Relational Frame Theory (RFT) is an operant account of the acquisition of

derived stimulus control, as is seen in stimulus equivalence. We believe that
RFT has profound implications for the analysis of language, cognition, and
other complex human behavior. A chapter on private events and consciousness
is not the place to develop the RFT account in detail. However, in broad
outlines it is as follows.
Suppose relating itself can be learned?
Relational Frame Theory (RFT) is an operant analysis. It begins with the

supposition that organisms can respond relationally to various stimulus events,
and further that performances such as stimulus equivalence can be analyzed
as generalized instances of this operant. This is not an entirely odd idea since
we know that non-arbitrary stimulus relations can be learned. For instance, a
rat can be trained to turn down the least brightly lit alley when given several
options. With sufficient history, the rat could negotiate a maze in which it was
required to respond to lights with different brightness than it had ever
experienced. In this instance, the rat is responding effectively based not upon
the absolute brightness of each alley, but upon the relation among the various
events.
In the maze example, the rat is responding to directly trained relations
among the formal properties of the events. The relation of "least brightly lit"
is arbitrarily applicable to the alleys of the maze. Any number of other
relations might be used as the basis ofthe contingency (e.g., the alley furthest
left, the alley with the largest opening, etc.). However, given an arbitrarily
applicable relation such as brightness, the relation among the alleys is not
itself arbitrarily applied. It is based upon the formal properties of the stimuli.
There is evidence, however, that verbally competent humans (and perhaps
other organisms) can learn to respond relationally to events where relations are
not only arbitrarily applicable, but also arbitrarily applied. So, for instance,
one might be taught, using non-arbitrarily applied examples, the relational
response "greater than."
To illustrate the potency of such flexible and indirectly acquired stimulus
control, consider the following example. Imagine that we trained two
contextual cues: one for selecting the largest of a set of stimuli, and one for the
selection of the smaller of a set of stimuli. We could train such a relation with
stimuli that actually vary along the dimension of size. The subject would be
confronted with a set of stimuli in the presence of the "select-the-largest" cue.
After a few trials, we would expect that the individual would perform with
100% accuracy with any new set of stimuli that vary along the dimension of
size. The same training could be provided for the "select-the-smallest" cue.
Eventually, we could expose the subject to stimuli that were all exactly the
same size in the presence of the largest/smallest cues, and arbitrarily reinforce
the selection of one over the other, and we would expect that the mutually-
entailed relation would emerge with no further training. So say we exposed the
subject to two stimuli A and B in the presence of the select-the-smallest cue,
and reinforced the selection of A. We could expect that if we then exposed the
subject to the same two stimuli, A and B, in the presence of the select-the-
largest stimuli, they would select B with 100% accuracy, and without direct
reinforcement for doing so.
Now imagine that we train 3 stimuli up using these cues and differential
reinforcement such that depending on the cue present, they will select A, B,
or C, such that A>B>C. If we now directly condition stimulus B to have a
reinforcing function in one context (say a screen color), and a punishing
function in another context (a different screen color), we could expect the
subject to work in an operant task to either produce or avoid A over C,
depending upon the screen color.
The relative reinforcing or punishing effects of A and C would be trans-
formed along the underlying trained dimension, and this transformation of
stimulus function would be under contextual control. Most importantly, this
transformation of stimulus function would occur without having any direct
experience with A or C being correlated with actual reinforcement or
punishment.
The Development of Arbitrarily Applicable Relational Responding
In fact, humans quickly learn to derived mutual relations among stimuli. If a

child as young as 16 months learns that event A goes with event B, it derives
(without explicit experimental training) that B goes with A (Lipkens, Hayes,
and Hayes, 1993). These elementary performances are combined into larger
and larger networks of derived stimulus relations. At least by 23 months,
human children taught that event A goes with B, and that event A goes with
C, will derive that B goes with C (Lipkens et aI., 1993; Devany, Hayes, and
Nelson, 1986).
In addition to equivalence relations, recent research has shown that many
such relations (what we call relational frames) can be learned and can be
combined into networks of great complexity (Dymond and Barnes, 1995;
Lipkens, 1992; Steele and Hayes, 1991). According to our analysis these
relational activities are learned, operant behavior produced by direct contin-
gencies, but they change dramatically how direct contingencies operate.
But what is relating in a psychological sense?
To respond relationally is to respond to some stimuli A, where the stimulus
functions present with respect to A are controlled by at least 4 factors:
1. the stimulus functions of another stimulus B (perhaps several stimuli),
2. a context that occasions a particular historically established relational
response,
3. a context that controls which functions transfer, in what direction, and
to what degree,
4. a transformation of the stimulus functions of stimulus A in accord with

the relation as specified by #2, and along some dimension as specified
by #3.
Properties of Derived Relational Responding
RFf has a different nomenclature because the language used among equiva-
lence researchers is too narrow when applied to other stimulus relations.
Symmetry applies to relations such as sameness, difference, and opposition.
However, if A is greater than B, we cannot say that B is therefore greater than
A, as would be implied by the term symmetry. RFf provides a technical
language to describe the psychological properties of relational responding that
is sufficiently general to allow for discussion of any number of arbitrarily
applicable relations.
Arbitrarily applicable relational responding involves the following
properties:
Mutual entailment. Mutual entailment refers to the derived bidirectionality
of some stimulus relations: it is a generic term for what is called "symmetry"
in stimulus equivalence. "Mutual entailment" applies when in a given context,
A is related to B, and as a result B is related to A in that context. The particu-
lar derived relation depends upon the particular specified relation. For
example, if you are told that A is better than B, you will probably derive that
B is worse than A. If you do, you are showing what we mean by "mutual
entailment. "
Combinatorial entailment. Combinatorial entailment refers to instances in
which relations showing mutual entailment combine, again under contextual
control. Combinatorial entailment is the generic term for what is called
"transitivity" and "equivalence" in stimulus equivalence. Combinatorial
entailment applies when in a given context, if A is related to B, and B is
related to C, as a result A and C are mutually related in that context. For
example, if I tell you that the consequence behind door number one is less
than the one behind door number two, and that the consequence behind door
number two is less than the consequence behind door number three, then a
mutual relation of less than/more than is entailed between door number one
and door number three, even though we have not trained this relation directly.
Transformation of stimulus function. A number of studies have shown that
stimulus functions transfer through the members of equivalence classes.
Transfer has been shown with conditioned reinforcing functions (Hayes et al.,
1987, Hayes, Kohlenberg, and Hayes, 1991), discriminative functions (Hayes,
et al., 1987), elicited conditioned emotional responses (Dougher et al., 1994)
and extinction functions (Dougher, et al., 1994), among others. RFf treats this
kind of phenomena as defining features of derived stimulus relations, but even
if other researchers do not wish to do so, this important area requires a
consistent and generally applicable language. A generic term is needed
because functions do not necessarily "transfer" through derived relations that
are not ones of sameness. Suppose, for example, someone else picks door
number two above and discovers $50. Now imagine three choices are offered
different subjects: door one versus door three; door one versus a novel door;
and door three versus a novel door. It seems likely that in general door three
will be approached while in general door one will be avoided. This is not
merely a "transfer" of functions: it is a transformation of stimulus functions
in which the functions of one event in a set of derived relations is changed
based on the functions of another event and the derived relation between them.
A "transformation of stimulus function" applies when there is a derived
relation between A and C, A has some psychological function that is selected
as relevant by the context, and the stimulus functions of C is changed based
on its relation to A and A's selected functions. If A and C are in an opposite
relation and A is a reinforcer, C may now be a punisher, for example. The
transformation of stimulus functions includes "transfer" but is not limited to
it if the derived relation sustains changes in the original stimulus function.
Clear evidence of such transformations of stimulus functions is only now
appearing, but the early evidence makes it obvious that reference to the
"transfer of stimulus functions" will not handle the generic case (Dymond and
Barnes, 1995).
Relational frames defined. The term "relational frame" is used to specify
a pattern of arbitrarily applicable relational responding involving mutual
entailment, combinatorial entailment and transformation of stimulus function.
RFT holds that this pattern of responding is established by a history of
differential reinforcement for producing such relational response patterns in
the presence of relevant contextual cues. Although the term relational frame
is a noun, it always refers to the situated act of an organism. That is, the
organism does not respond to a relational frame. It responds to historically
established contextual cues. The response is to frame relationally. Although
"framing relationally" may be preferred from a technical perspective, we will
use the less cumbersome noun form (cf., Hayes and Hayes, 1992 and Malott,
1991).
Derived stimulus relations lead to behavioral functions that are extremely
indirect. The psychological functions of an event in a relational network alter,
under some contextual control, the functions of other events in such a
network. Such transformations of stimulus functions have been shown in
many studies (e.g., Dougher et al. 1994; Dymond and Barnes, 1995; Hayes,
Kohlenberg, and Hayes, 1991). Such a transformation of stimulus function are

not limited to equivalence relations. They have also been demonstrated in
recent studies that trained relations of opposition (Lipkens, 1992; Steele and
Hayes, 1991), difference (Steele and Hayes, 1991), and greater thanlless than
(Dymond and Barnes, 1995; Lipkens, 1992). Given such relational respond-
ing, the functions of a given event are determined not just by the direct history
an individual has with this event, but also by how it participates in derived
relations with other events.
Additions to the Behavior Analytic Lexicon
In a relational frame account, verbal regulation is based upon operant

principles, but the resulting transformation of stimulus functions instantiates
a new behavioral principle because unlearned functions are now based on a
specific learned process (Hayes and Hayes, 1992). For example, while
discriminative control as a process need not be learned, the transformation of
discriminative functions through equivalence classes is dependent upon
relating as a learned process. The resultant stimulus function is not discrimi-
native in the normal sense - it is only discriminative-like.
In our approach, he word "verbal" is a technical term that refers to events
that have their functions because they participate in relational frames. For
example, verbal discriminative stimuli, verbal reinforcers, or verbal condi-
tioned stimuli are stimuli that have these behavioral functions as a result of an
arbitrarily applicable relational response. This nomenclature is suggested
because it seems consistent with the basic principles used in behavior analysis.
Behavior analytic principles describe not only the sort of behavior we should
see with respect to some stimuli, but also the history that established that
functional relationship. So it is with our suggested vocabulary.
IMPLICAnONS OF RELATIONAL FRAME THEORY FOR THE ANALYSIS OF

PRIV ATE EVENTS
If publicly observable stimuli, such as arbitrarily configured visual stimuli can

enter into a relation with other stimuli, there is no reason, in principle, that
private stimuli could not enter into such classes. In fact, DeGrandpre, Bickel,
and Higgins (1992) demonstrated that private stimuli resulting from drug
ingestion could participate in equivalence relations with arbitrarily configured
visual stimuli. Skinner's major contribution to the analysis of private events
was to demonstrate how the social-verbal community could circumvent the
privacy problem, and how through operant conditioning private responses and
private stimuli could come to have discriminative functions. What Relational
Frame Theory adds is the description of the means by which private stimuli
can come to participate in various relational classes, and thus describes the
means by which self-knowledge becomes useful.
Metaphor and the Discrimination of Private Events
Skinner posited that private experience is the product of discrimination

training by a social community. As we described earlier, he distinguished four
means by which such training might occur: correlation with interobservable
stimuli and/or responses, proprioceptive discrimination, recession of magni-
tude of public verbal behavior, and metaphorical extension. The ftrst three are
not dependent on a technical analysis of verbal training, relying instead on a
direct training history based on physically observable correlates. The ftnal
hypothesis, stimulus induction or transfer via metaphor, we argue is a verbal
process and thus relies on relational frames.
According to Skinner, metaphor is an extended tact, where unusual
properties of previously trained discriminative stimuli may adventitiously
control behavior (1957/1992). For example, the property of abruptly increased
heart rate in the private experience of lust is highlighted in the phrase, "He/she
takes my breath away." Feeling as if one's breath is being taken away - just
one adventitious property of being in proximity to an object of desire - might
assist in the discrimination of feelings of lust/love, e.g., "I get this pain in my
chest because I am infatuated with this person, therefore this is what it feels
like to be in love."
Skinner's analysis of verbal behavior rests on the assumption that human
verbal behavior is directly trained. In essence, nothing distinguishes verbal
behavior except the functional behavioral variables that influence someone
else to deliver consequences. In this analysis, the word "love" has meaning
only insofar as it acquires meaning through direct discriminative learning,
albeit in which the consequence is mediated by a trained audience. Relational
Frame Theory provides an alternative conceptualization.
Metaphor and Relational Frame Theory. Metaphor comes from the Greek
nouns meta (which, like the Latin preftx trans, refers to sharing, action in
common, or a change in place or order) and pherein. The latter means to bear
or carry and comes from the same root as the words reference and relation.
A metaphor is thus a "shared carrying," or an "in common relation." Thus
metaphorical relations are more complex than relations of reference (which
etymologically means to carry back as the same). They are not mere equiva-
lence classes. As its etymology suggests, metaphors are relations among

relations or shared relations (Lipkens, 1993; McCurry and Hayes, 1992).
More technically, in RFf terms they are derived relations of coordination
among sets of derived relations.
In analogy, for example, meaning is referred between an entire set of
relations and another set of relations (Lipkens, unpublished dissertation).
Where X is to Y as A is to B (or where the relation between X and Y is related
analogically to the relation between B and A) some of the functions of the
relation between X and Y transfer to the relation between A and B. For
example, if we are told that the moon is to the earth as 10 is to Jupiter, the
stimulus functions of the earth-moon relation, including relative mass, may
transfer to the lo-Jupiter relation. In a match to sample format, it has been
demonstrated that humans can derive analogies between both directly and
indirectly trained relations, and can derive relations between a set of relata on
the basis of an analogy (Lipkens, unpublished dissertation).
Just as words share some of the functions of their referents in simple frames
of coordination, metaphors bring entire sets of functions from one domain to
those of another. This has two effects. First, it can result in a rapid acquisition
of a subtle and fairly comprehensive set of new stimulus functions. Second,
it allows a kind of common sense testing of new knowledge in one domain
against the well established knowledge in another. For example, suppose a
panic disorder client is be told "struggling with anxiety is like fighting to get
out of quicksand." This simple sentence carry a rich set of meanings. It
suggests a number of things all at once: struggling with anxiety is dangerous,
the obvious thing to do with anxiety is not the right thing to do, the loss of a
fight with anxiety may come from the fight itself, the apparent "solution" is
the real problem, and so on. In addition, the truth of knowledge in one domain
(e.g., the best way to be safe in quicksand is to increase ones point of contact
by spreading out flat upon it) may increase the plausibility of suggestions
made in another (e.g., maybe the best way to deal with anxiety is to increase
ones point of contact with it by deliberate exposure).
Metaphor and private events. In Skinner's analysis private events can be
discriminated via metaphor unusual properties of previously trained discrimi-
native stimuli control behavior. In our analysis, metaphor brings a set of
derived relations to bear upon a new domain. Through this process new events
can be discriminated in a relational network, and old events may acquire
subtle new functions.
Suppose a person is told "1 want you to watch your thoughts. Imagine that
you are sitting by the side of a stream and your thoughts are written slogans
on leaves floating by in that stream. Do not chase them. Do not get wet. Just
watch them flow by." This metaphor asks the person to bring a verbally
known set of relations and functions in one domain to another. For example,
the person can relate the term "written slogan" to a short, punchy sequence of
words in the external environment. The metaphor asks the person to transform
that fuzzy set of private events called a "thought" into a short, punchy series
of written words. The "thought" may not have existed in this form at all, but
the metaphor may establish such a new function for a "thought." In a sense,
it may help create a "thought" when we mean by that (as we usually do in
psychotherapy for example) a sequence of words.
Similarly, the metaphor may establish new functions for the private event
it has helped construct. Verbal thoughts has many functions, but dispassionate
observation is not one of their more powerful functions. Entire disciplines
(e.g., meditation) have grown up to help establish other functions for private
events. The metaphor helps bring the function of dispassionate observation
without any attempt to control or change the event from one domain where
these functions already exist (watching leaves go by) to another where they do
not ("watching" thoughts "go by").
We are arguing that a technical account of metaphor makes better sense of
why so much of human language, especially as it applies to private events, is
metaphorical. Unlike Skinner's account, we do not need to suppose that this
relational process comes from fractional stimulus control based on primary
properties (as if thoughts really do as some attributes like leaves). Rather, the
sequence is reversed: the act of deriving a metaphorical relation brings those
properties into the related domain. Thus, RFT provides a new technical
account of the construction of emotions, thoughts, bodily sensations, inten-
tions, purposes, and other private events.
Purposes, Values, and Goals
Humans have great capacity to struggle with emptiness, meaninglessness, or

a lack of purpose; they may be afraid of death and what it implies for the
impermanence and long term uselessness of human existence; they may be
looking for a higher value than hedonism or simply getting through each day;
they may be weighing suicide as a reasonable alternative to hopelessness.
Writings in literature, philosophy and psychology have been filled for
millennia with discussions of such struggles. Such matters have often been left
to existential and humanistic theorists, but they are precisely the sort of richly
human topics that Skinner hoped behavior analysis could address.
Verbal and non-verbal purpose. Skinner, refuting charges that behaviorism
cannot deal with concepts such as purpose or intentionality, suggested that
"operant behavior is the very field of purpose and intention" (1974, p. 55).
What Skinner meant by "purpose" in this statement was not verbal purpose (in
the sense of "verbal" used here), but reinforcement.
A non-verbal organism is able to respond effectively to what it has
experienced directly, and generalizations based on the form of these experi-
enced events. First a tone was sounded, then a lever was pressed, then food
was eaten. Later, a tone was sounded, then a lever was pressed, then food was
eaten. A rat exposed to such a set of events has experienced an orderly process
of change from one act to another. The "hear tone-press lever-eat food"
relation is a temporal relationship that has been directly experienced by the rat.
As such a history accrues, the formal similarities organize these events into a
process of change among classes of events. When the rat now hears the tone,
it is a tone that reliably predicts that a lever press will be followed by food
being eaten.
One can say that the rat presses a lever "in order to get" a food pellet, as if
the future reinforcer is the purpose, but this is not meant literally. It would be
contrary to a naturalistic psychological account to suggest that the stimulus
event that controls the lever press is literally in the future. For a non-verbal
organism, the future we are speaking of is the past as the future in the present
(Hayes, 1992). That is, based on a history of change (the "past"), the animal
is responding to present events that have preceded change to other events. It
is not the literal future to which the organism responds - it is the past as the
future. This is the sense in which reinforcement provides a kind of "purpose."
Purpose is not the same in the context of arbitrarily applicable relational
responding. Temporal relations are part of a class of relations, such as cause-
effect, if ... then, or before ... after. These relations satisfy the criteria for
arbitrarily applicable relational responding. If we are told that "right after A
comes B," we derive that "right before B comes A." Similarly, if we are taught
directly that "right after A comes B" and "right after B comes C," we can
derive that "shortly after A comes C' or that "shortly before C comes A." If B
has functions (for example, if B is an intense shock), other stimuli may have
functions based on their derived relations with B. For example, A may now
elicit great arousal, while C may lead to calm.
Given the ability to frame events relationally, one would be capable of
responding to if ... then relations that have never been experienced directly.
The verbal relation of time is thus arbitrarily applicable: it is brought to bear
by contextual cues, not simply by the form of the related events. For example,
a person can be told "after life comes heaven," or "after smoking comes
cancer," or "after investing comes wealth." These change relations need not
be directly experienced for the human to respond with regard to such relations.
The relatedness of life and heaven, for example, is constructed - it is an
instantiation of a particular relational frame involving a temporal sequence.
For verbal organisms, purpose involves the past as the constructed future in
the present, where by "construction" we mean the verbal activity of relating
- a historically and contextually situated act. The "future" verbal organisms
"work towards" may thus encompass events with which the individual has no
direct history at all - only a verbal history. We will now consider a few
examples.
Meaninglessness. When a person is in an existential crisis, he or she will
often say things like: "Life is meaningless because everything that we
accomplish in life will be washed away. I will die, you will die, the sun will
die, the stars will all die, and the universe will collapse into an infinity dense
bit of matter the size of a pea. It is all a waste. What does it all mean? Why
should I do anything?"
The individual above has constructed a temporal relation in which death
and destruction is the ultimate outcome of everything. Indeed, the facts are
hard to argue with in a literal sense because we all participate in the same
verbal system that has ensnared the client. Most of us would agree that
physical systems do indeed decline with time, and that the universe itself will
either implode or expand infinitely and die out.
The psychological process leading to the individual's angst seems straight-
forward, from a verbal point of view. Consider the issue of personal death. We
are told even as young children that we will die. Weare taught what "death"
means, and the verbal concept "death" acquires many functions over time
(e.g., when mother cries about grandfather's death, it may frighten the child,
such that "death" has fear generating functions). We are also taught to
describe ourselves verbally, and early in language training we learn to speak
of ourselves as a verbal object. To construct the core of the client's argument
we need only added to these processes ("death" and "I" as equivalence
classes) a proper application of a before '" after relation ("After sometime I
will die.") such that the ultimate consequence of current activity is death and
destruction.
For some people, this construction of destruction as an ultimate conse-
quence can be almost incapacitating. Why? Surely death itself cannot be a
direct, functional consequence. It is not possible to experience death directly
and then behave, so death per se cannot be a normal reinforcer or punisher. It
might be argued that we contact death in others and that these experiences
generalize to ourselves in a normal manner, but a) it is not clear what formal
properties that death and life share such that we could generalize from the
experience of someone else's death to our own via stimulus generalization,
and b) many people struggle with existential dilemmas without first directly
experiencing the death of anyone else of importance to them.
Our hypothetical individual is not dealing with actual death, but death
verbally constructed. "Death" enters into relational classes, such that it
becomes a verbal consequence of importance that in turn alters the effective-
ness of other consequences. The impact of such rules depends upon the degree
to which they conflict with other functional rules. If, for example, a person has
constructed meaningful existence around the possibility of making permanent
contributions to the progress of the world, then the construction of ultimate
death and destruction can disrupt ongoing behavior guided by these "perma-
nent contribution" rules. The same process that allows us to know about
"permanent contributions" also leads us to learn that the universe will
ultimately decay. This is the core of the "human dilemma" - the capacity for
verbal meaning and meaninglessness are always two sides of the same coin.
Suicide. Once personal death is a verbal consequence of importance, rules
can be followed that give rise to it. It is interesting that there are no unequivo-
cal examples of suicide in non-verbal organisms, while approximately 12.6
per 100,000 persons in the United States commit suicide every year (Shneid-
man, 1985). Recently, a six-year old child whose mother was terminally ill
jumped in front of a train "to be with the Angels and Mommy" - even a 6 year
old could construct a future in which personal death could lead to verbally
desirable consequences.
To account for such behavior we require only that an if ... then verbal
relation is applied to verbal consequences with desirable functions. "Death"
can be in an iLthen verbal relation with "peace," "relief from pain," or "be
with Mommy." These verbal events in turn have functions. "Pain" and "relief
from pain" may have acquired functions both directly and through the
transformation of stimulus functions tied to direct events. Once such verbal
events have functions, these functions are available to other verbal events that
are related to them. In such a manner, "death" can acquire positive or negative
functions.
When rules are constructed that are linked to such purely verbal conse-
quences, they can function as a tracks just like tracks that are based on actually
contacted events. "If I jump in front of this train I will die and be with
Mommy in heaven" is the same kind of rule as "if I put a quarter in the
machine I will get a soft drink." The fact that the verbal consequence has not
been contacted is not important - it's functions are as part of a verbal
antecedent.
Suicide as a purposeful act, by this analysis, is always an instance of rule-
governed behavior (Hayes, 1992) because personal death can only ever be a
verbal purpose (never a non-verbal reinforcer or punisher). Such purely verbal
purposes are effective through their inclusion in rules.
The successful creation of meaning. The other side of suicide and mean-
inglessness is the acquisition of meaning. Psychotherapy methods designed to
help people find meaning are dominated by the work of the non-behavioral
therapists - existentialists, humanists, Gestalt therapists, and others. The
present analysis provides a behavioral way to understand their basic goals.
Behavioral approaches to help people find meaning could certainly be
generated. Our own therapeutic work - Acceptance and Commitment Therapy
- is centrally involved with the construction of meaning and purpose (Hayes,
1987, Hayes, Strosahl, and Wilson, in press, Hayes and Wilson, 1993, 1994).
How can this be done successfully?
The barrier to the successful creation of meaning in life is this: verbal
relations permit the construction of purposes, values, or goals that have
temporal extension and thus give guidance and direction - meaning - to life.
But these self-same verbal abilities confront the human unavoidably with
ultimate death and destruction.
This conundrum cannot be solved entirely within the realm of verbal events.
It does, however, seem solvable if we allow non-verbal activities to mix with
verbal activities in strategic ways. Let us begin by distinguishing a choice and
a decision. We will define choice as the verbally undefended selection among
alternatives. A pigeon faces two keys and pecks one. A choice has been made.
The pigeon presents no verbal defense of this action and indeed does not know
how to do so. We will define a decision as the verbally defended selection
among alternatives. It is a selection linked to a verbal analysis of its rightness.
"I did this because ... "
Verbal abilities do not eliminate non-verbal behavior. People learn to make
decisions, but they do not lose the ability to make choices. The healthy
selection of ultimate purposes can only be done as a choice. If done as a
decision, the logical network leads inexorably back to the reality of death and
the collapse of the universe. If I decide to work toward being a loving person,
and justify this goal because it will help others, I have to answer why helping
others is important given that all of these people will die soon enough anyway,
and that the world itself will die in the long term. Whatever verbal justification
I give can in tum be challenged in the same way.
Conversely, if I choose to work toward being a loving person, and refuse
to justify that choice verbally, I can have my cake and eat it - I can have the
great advantages of verbal purpose (providing a direction and meaning)
without its logical downside. This suggests a therapeutic method: help people
learn to choose values and goals, rather than to decide about them. That is
exactly what the existential and humanistic therapies try to do, but the effort
is tightly wrapped in mentalistic language - perhaps the behaviorists could do
even better if they got clear about the behavioral processes involved.
WHY BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS IGNORED PRIVATE EVENTS
Although Skinner (1945) proposed conditions for the scientific analysis of

private events, behavior analysis did not move to their empirical analysis. This
occurred for several reasons. Unlike mediational behavioral positions, there
was no need to find the "real" processes that were going on "underneath." In
addition, while a behavior analyst might include a private event in an analysis,
no behavior is a manipulable "cause" of behavior. In behavior analysis,
knowledge is tested by experimental analysis, not by mere inference.
Inference is a valid method of scientific explanation in cognitive psychol-
ogy (Oatley, 1993). For example, the ability to change and choose problem
solving strategies is explained by inferring the presence of an executive
function, where attentional and other resources are allocated (see Hayes,
Gifford, and Ruckstuhl, 1995, for a behavior analytic interpretation of this
concept). These inferred mechanisms are assumed to be causal in nature - are
given, in other words, the status of independent variables. Inference is thus
described as the process which controls emotional responding: "emotions
depend on inferences, albeit inferences that are often unconscious and
involuntary" (Oatley, 1993, p. 343).
These factors alone would not have lead to the dearth of research on private
events in behavior analysis. Two other factors were responsible: there was no
real need to do so theoretically, and there were no concrete functional analytic
methods of ascertaining the source of control over self-reports. Thus, what
Skinner gave with one hand he took with another.
There was no need to deal with private events because these responses were
due to contingencies that were isomorphic with those that produced overt
behavior. For example, if a rat is shocked in a box it will show "anxiety" and
it will jump. The anxiety is real enough, but jumping is not "caused" by
anxiety - rather both the jumping and the anxiety are caused by the shock.
One could study anxiety directly, but it is a) difficult, and b) will not add
anything to the analysis of overt behavior.
These points seem valid in the case of non-verbal organisms. But verbal
organisms are a different story. As humans learn to discriminate and talk about
private events, the occurrence of private events brings a separate set of
contingencies into the situation. For example, suppose a person is shocked in
a box. The person, like the rat, may both jump and feel anxious. But when the
person feels "anxious" and is aware of that feeling, the various rules learned
about anxiety (it is bad; it means you are weak; it must be resisted; this could
hurt my health) are brought into the situation. The combination of the situation
and the emotion brings still other rules into the situation (it is not fair to be
shocked; this is illegal; I am going to get that person for doing this). Thus,
what happens next in the world of overt behavior is not just a result of the
shock or one's history with shock. It is a result of that, plus all of the derived
stimulus functions and social/verbal contingencies engaged and by the
person's talk. In essence, it does matter what the person "feels" and "believes"
not because these mediate overt behavior but because the contingencies that
control overt behavior in a verbal organism become far more complex.
A final factor contributing to the early behavior analytic failure to develop
a powerful analysis of private events was the apparent lack of a practical
method to study them. The methods for arranging contingencies for accurate
self-reports provide a partial solution in the area of publicly observable
domains (e.g., Sobell, Bogardis, Schuller, and Leo, 1989), but they seem not
to be convincing in the private domains. We have argued elsewhere that a
method now exist for the private domain as well: the "Silent Dog" method
(Hayes, 1986; Hayes and White, under submission).
In the Silent Dog method, subjects report their thoughts continuously while
engaging in the task of interest (Ericsson and Simon, 1984, 1993) and verbal
protocols are taken. The following methodological controls are then added:
1. it must actually be shown that performance on a task with concurrent
talk-aloud is functionally indistinguishable to performance without this
verbalization.
2. it must be shown that task performance is functionally altered in a
consistent manner whenever talk-aloud instructions require a disruption
of the on-going stream of self-talk.
3. it must actually be shown that task performance is functionally altered
in a consistent manner when talk-aloud protocols are provided to per-
sons engaged in the same task and that this effect is due to the specific
verbal content of the protocol.
If all three kinds of controls are used, and the pattern of results is as
described, then the original performance can be said to be governed by self-
rules and the talk-aloud protocols can be treated as the functional equivalent
of these self-rules. In a functional sense, we can say that we know what
persons were thinking privately. A defense of the logic of these controls can
be found elsewhere (Hayes, 1986; Hayes and White, under submission).
CONCLUSION
How might psychological science best approach consciousness and private

experience? We follow Skinner in concluding that the most fruitful avenue is
pragmatic, naturalistic, and linguistic. According to Rorty (1990):
The link between a holistic philosophy oflanguage and this naturalistic ... attitude is the
view that to understand something is to discover its lawlike relations to other things. The
view that understanding x is a matter offinding lawlike regularities which tie its behavior
in with the behavior ofy, z, and so on (rather than a matter of contemplating it in isola-
tion, penetrating into its inner nature, finding its intrinsic properties, and the like) is the
familiar legacy of Galileo's substitution of a law-event framework of scientific explana-
tion for Aristotle's thing-nature framework. Galileo's example taught us to be wary of
the notion of an intrinsic property of an entity, one which could not be viewed as a web
of relationships between that entity and other entities" (p. 124).
Freeing consciousness from the burden of innate or intrinsic properties does

not discredit it. Rather, defining consciousness from a naturalistic perspective
brings private events into the realm of the pragmatic. As Morowitz says: "To
underrate the significance of the appearance and character of reflective
thought is a high price to pay in order to honor the liberation of science from
theology by our reductionist predecessors several generations back. The
human psyche is part of the observed data of science. We can retain it and still
be good empirical biologists and psychologists" (1981, p. 42). From a radical
behavioral perspective, "retaining" consciousness requires that we contextu-
alize it: that we bring it into a web of relationships which allows us to
accomplish pragmatic goals. To do so, we must look to the interaction of the
organism and the environment in order to understand the functional meaning
of private experience. Contemporary analyses of verbal behavior offer such
a framework. Far from sterile reductionism, contemporary behavior-analytic
accounts offer a rich empirical approach to the analysis of complex human
functioning.
University of Nevada
Reno, Nevada, USA
REFERENCES
Armstrong, D.M. (1981). The nature of mind, and other essays. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press.
Bandura, A. (1995). Comments on the crusade against the causal efficacy of human thought.
Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 26, 179-190.
Biglan, A. and Hayes, S. C. (1996). Should the behavioral sciences become more pragmatic?
The case for functional contextualism in research on human behavior. Applied and Preven-
tive Psychology, 5, 47-57.
Boring, E. G. (1950). A history of experimental psychology. New York: App1eton-Century-
Crofts.
Catania, A. C. (1984). Learning (2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Day, W.F. (1969/1992).Radical Behaviorism in reconciliation with phenomenology. In S.

Leigland (Ed.), Radical behaviorism: Willard Day on psychology and philosophy (pp.77-
92). Reno, NV: Context Press.
Day, W.F. (197111992). Methodological problems in the analysis of behavior controlled by
private events: Some unusual recommendations. In S. Leigland (Ed.), Radical behaviorism:
Willard Day on psychology and philosophy (pp.165-175). Reno, NY: Context Press.
Day, W.F. (1977/1992).On Skinner's treatment of the first-person, third-person sentence
distinction. In S. Leigland (Ed.), Radical behaviorism: Willard Day on psychology and
philosophy (pp.73-76). Reno, NY: Context Press.
Day, W.F. (198011992). The Historical Antecedents of Contemporary Behaviorism. In S.
Leigland (Ed.), Radical behaviorism: Willard Day on psychology and philosophy (pp. 13-
58). Reno, NV: Context Press.
DeGrandpre, R J. and Bickel, and Higgins, S. T. (1992). Emergent equivalence relations
between interoceptive (drug) and exteroceptive (visual) stimuli. Journal of the Experimental
Analysis of Behavior, 58, 9-18.
Devany, J. M., Hayes, S. c., and Nelson, R O. (1986). Equivalence class formation in
language-able and language-disabled children. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of
Behavior, 46, 243-257.
Dougher, M. J., Augustson, E., Markham, M. R, Greenway, D. E., and Wulfert, E. (1994). The
transfer of respondent eliciting and extinction functions through stimulus equivalence
classes. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 62, 331-351.
Dymond, S. and Barnes, D. (1995). A transformation of self-discrimination response functions
in accordance with the arbitrarily applicable relations of sameness, more than, and less than.
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 64, 163-184.
Ellis, H. C. and Hunt, R R (1983). Fundamentals of human memory and cognition (3rd ed.).
Dubuque, IA: William C. Brown.
Ericsson, K. A., Simon, H. A. (1984). Protocol analysis: Verbal reports as data. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Ericsson, K. A., Simon, H. A. (1993). Protocol analysis: Verbal reports as data (rev. ed).
Hayes, S. C. (1986). The case of the silent dog: Verbal reports and the analysis of rules. A
review of K. Anders Ericsson and Herbert A. Simon's "Protocol analysis: Verbal reports as
data." Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 45, 351-363.
Hayes, S. C. (1987). A contextual approach to therapeutic change. In N. Jacobson (Ed.),
Psychotherapists in clinical practice: Cognitive and behavioral perspectives (pp. 327-387).
New York: Guilford.
Hayes, S. C. (1992). Verbal relations, time and suicide. In S. C. Hayes and L. J. Hayes (Eds.)
Understanding verbal relations (pp. 109-118). Reno, NV: Context Press.
Hayes, S.c. (1993). Analytic goals and the varieties of scientific contextualism. In S.c. Hayes,
L.J. Hayes, H.W. Reese, and T.R. Sarbin (Eds.), Varieties of Scientific Contextualism (pp.
11-27). Reno, NY: Context Press.
Hayes, S. C. and Brownstein, A. J. (1986). Mentalism, behavior-behavior relations and a
behavior analytic view of the purposes of science. The Behavior Analyst, 9, 175-190.
Hayes, S. c., Brownstein, A. J., Devany, J. M., Kohlenberg, B. S., and Shelby, J. (1987).
Stimulus equivalence and the symbolic control of behavior. Mexican Journal of Behavior
Analysis, 13, 361-374.
Hayes, S.c., Gifford, E.V., and Rukstuhl, L.E. (1996). Relational Frame Theory and a
Behavioral Approach to Executive Function. In G.R Lyon (Ed.), Attention, Memory, and
Executive Function (pp. 279-305). Baltimore, MD: Brookes Publishing Co.
Hayes, S. C. and Hayes, L. J. (1992) Verbal relations and the evolution of behavior analysis.
American Psychologist, 47, 1383-1395.
Hayes, S. C., Hayes, L. I., and Reese, H. W. (1988). Finding the philosophical core: A review
of Stephen C. Pepper's World Hypotheses. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behav-
ior, 50, 97-111.
Hayes, S. C., Kohlenberg, B. K., and Hayes, L. I. (1991). Transfer of consequential functions
through simple and conditional equivalence classes. Journal of the Experimental Analysis
of Behavior, 56, 119-137.
Hayes, S. C., Strosahl, K., and Wilson, K. G. (In press). Acceptance and Commitment Therapy:
Understanding and Treating Human Suffering. New York: Guilford.
Hayes, S. c., and White, D. (Under submission). Protocol analysis and the "Silent Dog" method
of analyzing the impact of self-rules.
Hayes, S. C. and Wilson, K. G. (1993). Some applied implications of a contemporary behavior-
analytic account of verbal events. The Behavior Analyst, 16, 283-301.
Hayes, S. C. and Wilson, K. G. (1994). Acceptance and Commitment Therapy: Undermining
the verbal support for experiential avoidance. The Behavior Analyst, 17, 289-303.
Hayes, S. C. and Wilson, K. G. (1995). The role of cognition in complex human behavior: A
contextualistic perspective. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 26,
241-248
Hebb, D. O. (1968). Concerning imagery. Psychological Review, 75, 466-477.
Hilgard, E. R. (1956). Theories of learning (2nd ed.). New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Hilgard, E.R. (1948). Theories of learning. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Hollon, S.D. and Kendall, P. C. (1980). Cognitive self-statements in depression: Development
of an Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 4, 383-395.
Hull, c.L. (1943). Priniciples of behavior: an introduction to behavior theory. Appleton-
Century-Crofts.
James, W. (1912 and 190911967). Essays in radical empiricism and A pluralistic universe.
Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith.
Lipkens, R. (1992). A behavior analysis of complex human functioning: Analogical reasoning.
Unpublished doctoral dissertation available from the University of Nevada, Reno.
Lipkens, G., Hayes, S. c., and Hayes, L. I. (1993). Longitudinal study of derived stimulus
relations in an infant. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 56, 201-239.
Lycan, W.G. (1990). Mind and cognition: A reader. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.
Mach, E. (188311953). The economy of science. In P. P. Wiener (Ed.) Readings in philosophy
of science: Introduction to the foundations and cultural aspects of the sciences. New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons. (Original work published in 1883 in Die mechanik in ihrer
entwicklung historisch-kritisch dargesteUt)
Mahoney, M. I. (1989). Scientific psychology and radical behaviorism: Important distinctions
based on scientism and objectivism. American Psychologist, 44, 1372-1377.
Malott, R. W. (1991). Equivalence and relational frames. In L. I. Hayes and P. N. Chase (Eds.),
Dialogues on verbal behavior (pp. 41-44). Reno, NV: Context Press.
McCurry, S. M., and Hayes, S. C. (1992). Clinical and experimental perspectives on metaphori-
cal talk. Clinical Psychology Review, 12, 763-785.
Morowitz, H.I. (1981). Rediscovering the Mind. In D.R. Hofstadter and D.C. Cennett (Eds) The
mind's I: Fantasies and reflections on self and soul. New York: Basic Books.
Oatley, K. (1993). Social construction in emotions. In M. Lewis and I.M. Haviland (Eds.)
Handbook of emotions (pp. 341-352). New York: Guilford.
Pepper, S.c. (1942). World Hypotheses. (pp. 280-348). Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press.
Rachlin, H., and Green, L. (1972). Commitment, choice, and self-control. Journal of the
Rorty, R. (1982). Consequences of Pragmatism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Rorty, R. (1994). Consciousness, Intentionality, and the Philosophy of Mind. In R. Warner and
T. Szubka (Eds.) The Mind-Body Problem (pp. 121-127). Cambridge MA: Blackwell.
Rosnow, R. and Georgoudi, M. (1986). (Eds.), Contextualism and understanding in behavioral
science. New York: Praeger.
Shneidman, E. S. (1985). Definition of suicide. New York: Wiley.
Skinner, B. F. (1945/1972). The operational analysis of psychological terms. Reprinted in
Cumulative record: A selection of papers (pp. 370-384). New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts. (Originally published in Psychological Review in 1945)
Skinner, B.F. (1957) Verbal behavior. New York: Appleton-Century Crofts.
Skinner, B. F. (1988). Behaviorism at fifty. As reprinted in A. C. Catania and S. Harnad (Eds.),
The selection of behavior (pp.278-292). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Smith, L. D. (1986). Behaviorism and logical positivism: A reassessment of the alliance.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Sobell, M., Bogardis, J., Schuller, R., and Leo, G.!. (1989). Is self-monitoring of alcohol
consumption reactive? Behavioral Assessment, 11,447-458.
Steele, D. L. and Hayes, S. C. (1991). Stimulus equivalence and arbitrarily applicable relational
responding. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 56, 519-555.
Tolman, E. C. (1948). Cognitive maps in rats and men. Psychological Review, 55, 189-208.
Todd, J. T. and Morris, E. K. (1992). Case histories in the great power of steady misrepresenta-
tion. American Psychologist, 47, 1441-1453.
Verplanck, W. S. (1954). Burrhus F. Skinner. In W. K. Estes, S. Koch, K. MacCorquodale, P.
H. Meehl, C. G. Mueller, W. S. Schoenfeld, and W. S. Verplanck (Eds.), Modem learning
theories. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Watson, J. B., (1920). Is thinking merely the action oflanguage mechanisms? British Journal
of Psychology, 11,87-104.
Watson, J. B. (1924). Behaviorism. New York: Norton.
Wolpe, J. and Rachman, S. (1960). Psychoanalytic "evidence:" A critique based on Freud's case
of Little Hans. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 131, 135-148.
BRUCE WALLER
Free Will, Determinism, and Self-Control
Touring the behaviorist contributions to free will would appear to require a

very brief excursion. In Beyond Freedom and Dignity B. F. Skinner asserts
that:
It is in the nature of an experimental analysis of human behavior that it should strip away
the functions previously assigned to autonomous man and transfer them one by one to
the controlling environment (1971, p. 198).
And in Walden Two Skinner leaves no doubt concerning his opinion of free
will:
I deny that freedom exists at all. I must deny it - or my program would be absurd. You
can't have a science about a subject matter which hops capriciously about. Perhaps we
can never prove that man isn't free; it's an assumption. But the increasing success of a
science of behavior makes it more and more plausible (1948, p. 245).
To make matters worse, Skinner attacks not only Mom but also apple pie:
along with freedom, he trains his sights on democracy. Again, Walden Two's
Frazier:
Then I say that democracy is a pious fraud .... In what sense is it 'government by the
people'? ... Voting is a device for blaming conditions on the people. The people aren't
rulers, they're scapegoats. And they file to the polls every so often to renew their right
to the title (1948, pp. 262-3).
Small wonder, then, that Skinner and behaviorism are commonly castigated
as enemies of freedom. The remarks of Douglas Bethlehem are typical in both
tone and content:
Walden Two and Beyond Freedom and Dignity are about the dreariest in the long line of
totalitarian advocacy and apology .... Basically, Skinner takes the totalitarian position
which justifies all illiberal regimes: 'I know what is good for you, and if you disagree or
want to do things differently you are to be disregarded and coerced/controlled as either
a fool or a knave' (Bethlehem, 1987, p. 93).
Such venomous attacks are understandable but unjustified. Despite his

provocative assertions, Skinner is in fact a fierce champion of both freedom
and self-governance. His view is clear in a remark recorded in his notebooks:
Beyond Freedom and Dignity was a misleading title. It suggested that I was against free-
dom and personal worth. I did not advocate imposing control; control existed and should
be corrected .... If acting for the good of the group is positively reinforced, people will
189
190 Waller
feel as free and worthy as possible. I am in favor of that. It is the best way to promote
government by the people for the people (1980, p. 5).
What Skinner opposes - and exposes - are shams posing as freedom and
democracy that control in hidden, underhanded, and detrimental ways while
they pretend to serve freedom and democracy.
In the United States prohibitively expensive election campaigns (that
restrict who can be a viable candidate) are bankrolled by wealthy individual
and corporate interests. Thus "elected representatives" are almost exclusively
members of the wealthiest 5% of the citizenry and act on behalf of themselves
and their class and their wealthy contributors. In such circumstances it is
embarrassingly trite to note that our "democracy" is not government by and
for the people. (It is not even a tyranny of the majority, since the vast majority
are denied significant influence.)
Establishing genuine democracy - real government by and for the people
- is no easy matter. Skinner notes that smaller communities are more
promising environments for promoting greater individual influence on and
access to government: in such communities people have direct access to their
leaders, their concerns and protests are immediately felt by those leaders, there
are fewer and smaller disparities of wealth and power, leaders live and work
within the community (rather than insulated by walled communities, private
country clubs, exclusive schools, and closed resorts) and so directly experi-
ence the effects of their policies. In short, if we wish to have more effective
control over our own government we must design environments that maximize
such control, rather than mouthing slogans that hold in place coercive and
exploiting systems. Skinner suggests (1978, p. 8) that such environmental
design to achieve genuine government of the people by the people might start
with face-to-face influence among people holding similar (egalitarian) powers
of control and counter-control. Such suggestions are hardly the full answer,
but they are better than trying to pass off oligarchy as democracy.
Skinner condemns the elitist impostor and supports real self-government;
and in similar manner Skinner champions freedom while condemning the
sham freedom that constricts genuine opportunity. When Skinner opposes
"freedom", he is opposing two false conceptions of freedom. First, he is
opposing the freedom of caprice or chance, as in "you can't have a science
about a subject matter which hops capriciously about". Philosophers may
consider this a strawman attack on an antiquated notion of freedom. Even the
libertarians - who typically demand a mysterious freedom that breaks and
transcends the natural causal sequence - do not suggest random or capricious
choices, but instead claim creative choices that operate within a relatively
narrow range. Still, the notion of freedom tied to randomness (or even chaos)
has had its supporters. Epicurus made free-will a random swerve of atoms,
Free Will, Determinism, and Self-Control 191
Dostoyevsky (1864/1961) embraced madness; more recently, Robert Kane

(1985) has suggested a more sophisticated account of nondeterminist free will
that incorporates randomness within a system of rational decision making. In
any case, Skinner rejects such a random-capricious conception of free will; but
then - with some notable exceptions - so have most free will advocates.
It is the second rejected notion of free will - the "miracle-working inner
man", the homunculus - to which Skinner gives the most attention. And that
is a view of free will that remains alive and flourishing, both within and
without philosophy.
Free will involves creative choices that transcend causal history: that
position has many champions, including C. A. Campbell:
I submit, therefore, that the self knows very well indeed - from the inner standpoint -
what is meant by an act which is the self s act and which nevertheless does not follow
from the selfs character .... The 'nature' of the self comprehends, but is not without
remainder reducible to, its 'character'; it must, if we are to be true to the testimony of our
experience of it, be taken as including also the authentic creative power of fashioning and
re-fashioning 'character' .... Reflection upon the act of moral decision as apprehended
from the inner standpoint would force him [the determinist critic of libertarian free will]
to recognise a third possibility, as remote from chance as from necessity, that, namely,
of creative activity, in which (as I have ventured to express it) nothing determines the act
save the agent's doing of it (Campbell, 1974, p. 177).
Campbell is a classical source for open and unapologetic appeal to the

miracle-working self that guarantees libertarian free will, and similar views
have contemporary champions. 1 So the Skinnerian behaviorist attack on
miracle-working inner forces is not aimed at a strawman.
Nonetheless, Skinner sometimes appears to ignore the major body of free
will philosophy. As the philosopher Terry Smith states, Skinner:
... never gives serious consideration to the possibility that ethical principles such as free-
dom and responsibility are compatible with naturalism. There is quite a substantial body
of philosophical literature making a case for this position, and Skinner simply ignores it
(Smith, 1994, p. 226).
Skinner attacks those who equate free will with chance (a small and
unrepresentative segment of free will proponents); and he attacks those who
openly espouse a miracle-working mind or spirit that sets human free will
apart from the natural world (a larger group, but still atypical among contem-
porary philosophers). But Skinner seems to have little to say about the
compatibilists, who hold that free will and moral responsibility are compatible
with determinism (or in current forms, compatible with naturalism: free will
needs no miracles). And compatibilism is the overwhelmingly favored
position of contemporary philosophers, and has been for decades; indeed,
versions of compatibilism have been prominent in both philosophy and
theology for many centuries. Thus Skinner appears to be fighting a skirmish
192 Waller
against scattered small bands of libertarians while ignoring the advance of the
main compatibilist army.
However, such appearances to the contrary, Skinner's behaviorist argu-
ments are a powerful attack on contemporary compatibilism. In order to hold
onto moral responsibility (what Skinner calls "dignity") compatibilists must
retain deep elements of creative special choice: choice that defies explanation
and escapes examination, special choice contrived to justify special assign-
ments of reward and punishment. And thus Skinner's attack on dignity - his
attack on moral responsibility - is a direct assault on the soft center of the
contemporary compatibilist position on free will and moral responsibility.z
David Hume is the classical source for modern compatibilism, and his work
has the virtue of demystifying free will:
By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the de-
terminations of the will; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to
move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to
every one who is not a prisoner and in chains. (Hume, 174811902)
Hume's classic compatibilism is also a classic case of ignoring the more

complex and less obvious controls of behavior. This compatibilist short-
sightedness occurs even among the most subtle contemporary compatibilists
when they attempt to preserve moral responsibility within a naturalist system.
Consider Frankfurt's philosophically famous attempt to justify holding a
willing addict morally responsible without appeals to miraculous acts of
willing or choosing. Frankfurt uses the powerful example of an addict who is
addicted to drugs (and thus will inevitably take drugs) but who has freedom
and moral responsibility because he approves of his addiction. He has, as
Frankfurt phrases it, "the will he wants to have" (1971, p. 15). But on deeper
examination, Frankfurt's account raises tough questions that it cannot answer:
Why does the willing addict favor drug addiction? Attempts to answer such
questions undermine the willing addict's moral responsibility and reveal the
shallowness of philosophical compatibilism.
Frankfurt (like most contemporary compatibilists) is uncomfortably aware
that deeper probes into an individual's history raise doubts concerning moral
responsibility. To block such probes Frankfurt suggests that one might whole-
heartedly identify with a particular sort of will in such a way that the identifi-
cation "reverberates" through all the various levels of willing (Frankfurt,
1971, p. 16). Such decisive reverberating willing is a desperate but unsuccess-
ful solution. I might "will" so strongly that I refuse to consider further
questions concerning whether this is the sort of will I really want ("I desire
drugs, I like desiring drugs, I decisively approve of my drug addiction, and
that's that"); and such decisive willing may thus block any deeper questions
for the willing individual. But others may question my decisive willing, and
those questions swiftly erode naturalist-compatibilist grounds for moral

responsibility. Those deeper moral-responsibility-destroying inquiries remain
possible unless the addict's decisive commitment involves a miracle-working
free will: an uncaused cause that transcends causal history and invalidates
causal inquiry. But the decisive willing that naturalist-compatibilists (such as
Frankfurt) propose is not the miraculous variety. To suppose that compatibilist
decisive willing can halt the inquiry into the causal contingencies that
undermine moral responsibility is to treat compatibilist willing as if it were
miracle-working rather than naturalist free will. Thus the behaviorist study of
the deeper causal-environmental history that shapes all behavior and character
(including that of the willing addict) is a powerful challenge to compatibilist
attempts to save moral responsibility.
Unlike most compatibilists, Daniel Dennett acknowledges that holding
people morally responsible requires a refusal to look deeply into their
histories; but Dennett attempts to defend the compatibilist myopia:
Once again, the utility of a certain measure of arbitrariness is made visible. Instead of
investigating, endlessly, in an attempt to discover whether or not a particular trait is of
someone's making - instead of trying to assay exactly to what degree a particular self is
self-made - we simply hold people responsible for their conduct (within limits we take
care not to examine too closely). And we are rewarded for adopting this strategy by the
higher proportion of "responsible" behavior we thereby inculcate (Dennett, 1984, p. 164).
Certainly one can develop some positive "responsible" behavior through

blame and reward and the crude practices of holding people morally responsi-
ble; but such crude techniques are hardly the optimum means of developing
either virtuous or free individuals. Instead of blaming those who fail- while
taking care not to look too closely into their environmental histories - it is
more useful to study their histories in careful detail to discern precisely the
environmental nuances that enhance or destroy "responsible" free behavior.
Counselling that we should not look too closely because we shall lose the
dubious benefits of moral responsibility is like suggesting that we should not
look through a microscope to study the exact nature of viruses and more
precise ways of controlling them because we might discredit folk remedies.
Refusal to look deeply at environmental histories results in ignorance of the
forces that destroy energy and perseverance and genuine freedom. Thus those
who have no real opportunity are condemned - they are morally responsible
- and the measures that would enhance their freedom and opportunity are
neglected. By holding individuals morally responsible we ignore their vast
differences in educational, social, and family histories and pretend that
everyone has an "equal opportunity" to win reward or suffer punishment. This
reaches its apex among the miracle-working libertarians: we have miraculous
powers of free will that can transcend our environmental histories and
empower success no matter what forces shaped and molded us; so why bother
194 Waller
with improving environments? One child receives a wonderful education,

superb medical care, a loving home, an environment that stimulates and
reinforces exploration and effort; another child has a terrible education, poor
health care, abuse and neglect, and grows up in circumstances that punish
curiosity and extinguish effort; but since both children are equipped with
indomitable powers of free will that can triumph over the most adverse
environments (or can fail in the most advantageous circumstances) their
histories are trivialized and we are excused from efforts to provide equal
opportunities and from obligations to correct debilitating early environments.
Rather than promoting genuine freedom and opportunity, libertarian and
compatibilist efforts to save moral responsibility promote blindness to and
neglect of the most important developmental factors, as well as crude - and
fundamentally unfair - shaping of behavior through "just deserts".
Such moral responsibility short-sightedness neglects the most effective
enrichment of freedom and obscures the genuine threats to freedom. Daniel
Dennett ridicules the fear of control by "peremptory puppeteers", "malevolent
mindreaders", "nefarious neurosurgeons", and Cartesian demons (1984, pp.
6-10). But exorcising such philosophical fantasies is no protection against
threats to freedom from real controllers who are becoming increasingly
sophisticated. As Skinner enumerates some of the controllers already
operating:
The charlatan, the demagogue, the salesman, the ward heeler, the bully, the cheat, the
educator, the priest - all who are now in possession of the techniques of behavioral engi-
neering (Skinner, 1948, p. 256).
And the greatest danger is from those who manipulate desires and interests
and activities in subtle ways that do not prompt escape behavior. Skinner gives
the example of the industrialist who discovers how to keep employees
working hard and "willingly" without their knowledge that they are being
pulled along paths that ultimately will be detrimental:
In the incentive system known as piece-work pay, the worker is paid a given amount for
each unit of work performed ... This so-called "fixed-ratio" schedule of reinforcement
can ... be used to generate a great deal of behavior for very little return. It induces the
worker to work fast, and the ratio can then be "stretched" - that is, more work can be
demanded for each unit of pay without running the risk that the worker will stop working.
His ultimate condition - hard work with very little pay - may be acutely aversive (Skin-
ner, 1971, pp. 34-35).
Thus the main dangers are not from heavy-handed punitive controls nor
from imaginary "puppeteers", but rather from real forces that produce (what
Skinner calls) "the happy slave". As Skinner insists:
A second comment seems more appropriate: "It is better to be a conscious slave than a
happy one." The word "slave" clarifies the nature of the ultimate consequences being
considered: they are exploitative and hence aversive. What the slave is to be conscious
of is his misery; and a system of slavery so well designed that it does not breed revolt is
the real threat (Skinner, 1971, pp. 39-40).
The happy slave is precisely the problem that philosophical compatibilism

is least equipped to handle. If one is acting as one wishes to act - in David
Hume's classic statement, if one is not in chains - then one is free. What
Skinner recognizes is that the cleverly concealed chains ignored by the
compatibilists are real and dangerous threats to freedom.
Deeper behaviorist causal-environmental inquiries undercut another
standard compatibilist prop for moral responsibility: will power and effort-
making. James Rachels offers the most impressive compatibilist case for
effort-making as grounds for just deserts:
.. , there are those in whom the capacity for effort has not been extinguished. Among
those, some choose to work hard, and others, who could so choose, do not. It is true of
everyone in this latter class that he is able, as Rawls puts it, "to strive conscientiously."
The explanation of why some strive, while others don't, has to do with their own choices
(1978, p. 158).
The deeper answers to why one works harder or tries more persistently or
"chooses to strive" have been studied by behavioral scientists, but the answers
are neither easy nor obvious, and that has caused problems. As Michael
Mahoney and Carl Thoresen (1974) noted:
Unable to fully understand how and why some individuals are able to demonstrate self-
control in the face of very trying circumstances, we have attributed such behavior to will-
power, to some supernatural entity, or to an underlying personality trait. These ways of
thinking about the problem have unfortunately retarded understanding and discouraged
research. A vicious tautology or circularity has been created. The person who succeeds
in demonstrating self-control by resisting a major temptation - for example, the heavy
smoker who quits cold turkey - is often described as having willpower. How do we know
that he has willpower? Well, he quit smoking, didn't he? This circular route of observing
a self-regulative behavior, inferring Willpower, and then using the latter to "explain" the
former is an all too frequent journey in self-control discussions. We have not gotten be-
yond the behavior to be explained. Moreover, this tautology discourages further inquiries
into the factors affecting self-control (1974, pp. 20-21).
The capacity for dedicated effort (or the tendency to lethargy) is learned,
conditioned by one's environmental contingencies, controlled by the degree
of reward accompanying past efforts, shaped by whether earlier striving was
reinforced (and on what schedule of reinforcement) or instead extinguished.
And it hardly seems fair to credit or blame an individual- hold an individual
morally responsible - for such contingencies.
Behaviorists are often disparaged as short-sighted, concerned only with the
shallow observed behavior and neglecting the deep depths plumbed by
philosophers. But the opposite is the case. Libertarians pretend to look deeper,
but lose their way in appeals to mystery and miracles. Compatibilists assert
that they have found the roots of moral responsibility in choices and willing,
196 Waller
and that no deeper inquiry is appropriate. But behaviorists look longer and
harder: not into the mysterious and inexplicable well of decisive choice, but
deeper into the causal-environmental history that shapes real choices.
Suppose that a man - who "could succeed if he tried" - chooses lethargy,
sinking into indolence despite his considerable talents and abilities. The
compatibilist notes that he favors indolence over accomplishment, that when
he is given the opportunity and encouragement to accomplish something he
spurns the chance. Or consider a woman who stays with an abusive husband:
her friends arrange safe haven, she has the opportunity to escape, and all she
has to do is leave. Nonetheless, she stays and suffers. She made her own
choice, the compatibilist concludes, and is morally responsible for it. Both are
free, and both are morally responsible for their choices and the consequences.
In contrast, the behaviorist rejects all attempts to limit inquiries into how
learning history shaped behavior. Choices - including "final resounding
choices" and choices to "exert effort" - are seen as behavior largely shaped by
environmental histories, and those histories are the key to understanding the
choice behavior. Why is she staying with her abusive husband? She chose to,
the compatibilist replies. But of course she chose to; why did she make such
a choice? It doesn't matter, the compatibilist insists: she knows the situation,
she was offered the opportunity to escape, she chose to remain; so she is free,
she is morally responsible, and she deserves the consequences of her bad
choices.
But it does matter why she chooses to remain, and only a desperate effort
to save a final unexamined level for moral responsibility could lead one to
suppose such questions irrelevant or impossible. When the hiding place of
moral responsibility is exposed by deeper inquiry, the causes are clear and
important - and they banish moral responsibility (or as Skinner would say,
they destroy claims of special human "dignity").
The causes of effort-making and lethargy - and the factors that shape both
perseverance and passivity - have been carefully studied by behavioral
science, but it is not sUIprising that compatibilist advocates of moral responsi-
bility tend to ignore such studies. Effort (or lack of effort) is the product of
fortunate (or unfortunate) environmental history. When an act is positively
reinforced it is more likely to be repeated. When behavior is sometimes
positively reinforced (and sometimes not), that schedule of reinforcement
shapes "dedication" and perseverance. (If the reinforcement schedule is
"stretched" by requiring more and more behavioral repetitions for reinforce-
ment, the subject becomes deeply "dedicated" to that task.) Behavior repeated
without being followed by reinforcement is eventually extinguished. The
fortunate child who is given interesting but not impossible challenges is often
(but not invariably) positively reinforced for her efforts, and becomes steadfast
in pursuit of solutions; the child whose tasks are too easy learns to make an
effort, but does not learn perseverance; and the child whose projects are too
difficult experiences no positive reinforcement and learns lethargy. When
dedicated effort is scrutinized it is very often found to be the effect of good
fortune in environmental history rather than an inexplicable source of dignity
and moral responsibility.
In contrast to the diligent, the individual who "won't even try" is blamed
and reviled. The student who gives up after one look at a difficult problem
gets little help and less patience: "I can't help you if you won't even try!" But
examination of how individuals develop and lose the ability to make an effort
(how "learned helplessness" develops) should reform our view that effort (or
failure to exert effort) can justify moral responsibility and just deserts.
Instead of stopping with shallow moral responsibility "explanations" for
lethargy, Martin Seligman (and other behavioral scientists) have probed
deeper into the causes of lethargy and learned helplessness. A dog develops
learned helplessness when subjected to inescapable shock. If the dog is then
placed in a shuttle box (in which it could escape the shock by jumping to a
different chamber) the dog runs about for a few seconds then gives up: it lies
down and whines helplessly. When the dog is next placed in the shuttle box
it makes even less effort to escape. In contrast, a dog that has not been
subjected to such inescapable shock races about until it leaps the barrier; in
later tests it learns to leap the barrier more quickly, and eventually leaps prior
to the shock. If a week passes between imposing a single inescapable shock
and being placed in a shuttle box, then the dog tends to escape normally. But
if the dog receives several sessions of inescapable shock prior to being placed
in the shuttle box, then the dog's inability to escape the shock persists. After
repeated sessions of inescapable shock, followed by sessions in a shuttle box
in which the dog "could escape if it tried" but instead accepts the shock
passively, the dog will be profoundly helpless in avoiding shock. When the
barrier is removed, the dog will not go to the other side to avoid shock. If the
dog is called to the other side - even offered food - it will not respond.
(Seligman, 1975, pp. 21-27,46)
The parallels with human learned helplessness are clear. The woman who
passively accepts her husband's brutal beatings may seem almost to "deserve"
them: "She knows what is going to happen, yet she won't make any effort to
leave. We have offered her a place to live, and encouraged her to leave, but
she won't help herself." While we might naively think that after repeated
beatings the woman would finally learn to escape, in fact the opposite is the
case: repeated inescapable suffering teaches helplessness rather than escape,
passivity rather than resolve. When we discover that the woman was an
abused child, we may be even more amazed: how could she stay with a brutal
198 Waller
husband after the terrible experiences of her childhood? But when we look
more closely at the effects of that early childhood conditioning, there is
nothing surprising about the learned helplessness that persists in adulthood.
She "chooses" to give up, of course; at this point she deeply prefers making
no escape efforts, and may make a "final resounding choice" to embrace her
abusive situation.
When a student gives up after one failed effort, it is tempting to conclude
that she could and should try harder: "I had a problem that I couldn't solve on
the first try, but I kept trying, and so should she; it's her own fault for giving
up too easily." But studying the details of learned helplessness reveals that
some of the supposedly similar circumstances were in fact profoundly
different. A dog with no history of inescapable shock escapes energetically
and effectively when placed in a shuttle box, while a dog that has been
subjected to repeated inescapable shocks gives up and cowers. An observer
who sees only the shuttle box behavior might conclude that their situations are
similar, and that since one escaped the other should also. When we observe the
difference between our own perseverance and another's quitting, we observe
only that we both are responding differently to failure, and we forget the
deeper environmental history: our failure was preceded by many persever-
ance-shaping successes while the other's failure was the latest in a string of
frustrating and lethargy-shaping failures.
Repeated futile efforts to obtain a reward or avoid pain shapes helplessness
and lethargy. Receiving rewards independently of efforts teaches the same
lesson (Seligman, 1975, pp. 23-37). Thus whether one learns effort-making or
helplessness (and whether one learns a deeply-entrenched or shallow perse-
verance, or a profound or mild degree of helplessness) is a function of the
effects of one's past efforts. And the effects of our efforts depend on the
situation in which those efforts were exerted: whether in an environment that
rewards efforts or one in which efforts have no effect, in the presence of a
delighted and responsive parent or in a situation of neglect, in fertile or barren
soil. But whether an individual's early environmental history positively
reinforced effort is not something for which the individual can fairly be
blamed or rewarded. In short, whether one now makes an effort depends on
the effects of earlier efforts - effects that were positive in some cases, futile
or aversive in others, but in any case were the good or bad fortune of the
effort-maker and are not grounds for moral responsibility.
Self-control is another traditional prop for miracle-working accounts of
freedom: one triumphs over (or succumbs to) temptation or sloth by an
exercise of self-control. It is not something you can see in someone else, C. A.
Campbell emphasizes: you must look inwardly. And when you introspect, you
have no doubt that it is really "up to you" to choose either way. Some exert
effort, exercise self-control, and excel; others withhold effort, succumb to

temptation, live lethargically, and fail; and there is nothing left to do but give
the triumphant their justly deserved reward and the failures their justly
deserved condemnation. Since the process occurs in secret, no further
questions can be asked nor causal history examined. You either exert self-
control or you don't, and there's an end to it. There is no better way to save
miracle-working autonomy. There is also no better way to keep the real
environmental shaping forces hidden and unstudied and thus to hobble
development of genuine freedom.
Behavioral research shines a light into this dark corner. Instead of con-
demning "lack of will power", behaviorists study how self-control develops,
how it is stultified, and how it can be enhanced. Martin Seligman effectively
demonstrated how profound helplessness and hopeless lethargy are shaped.
Recent work by Howard Rachlin and other behaviorists has demystified self-
control and led to a broader understanding of how cognitive faculties actually
function in strengthening self-control. The initial behavioral work (with
pigeons rather than humans) gave the clue to understanding (without mystery
or excessive cognitive complications) the effective elements in self-control
(Rachlin and Green, 1972). Behavioral studies of self-control examine how
self-control is shaped under many different circumstances, and they study self-
control in pigeons as one means of gaining empirical knowledge of the
patterns and processes that shape self-control. But behaviorists do not confine
their studies to the pecking of pigeons and the shuttle-box behavior of dogs.
Behavioral scientists3 have studied - following insights gained in the animal
learning laboratories - how complex cognitive behavior involving contracts
and rule-following may strengthen self-control, and have also examined the
specific environmental conditions that make such contracting more or less
effective. By determining that self-control worked more effectively when the
commitment to delaying gratification was made at a time well before the
opportunity to receive immediate (but lesser) reward instead of later (but
larger) reward, behaviorists have been able to explain how cognitive commit-
ment or contracting before the onset of temptation can be an effective means
of self-control: it prevents succumbing to immediate (but less beneficial)
temptations. Furthermore, such studies have led to a broader and deeper
understanding of human behavior: Rachlin's recent work on self-control
(1989, pp. 177-184; 1993; 1995, pp. 115-120) emphasizes the patterns - both
developmental and social- that shape and prompt self-control behavior, and
demonstrates that understanding free (and unfree) behavior requires studying
not only the specific behavior and the narrow environment, but also demands
larger and longer molar views of behavior and of environmental setting and
history.
200 Waller
Behaviorists examine minutely and without limit the environmental forces

that shape much of our behavior; they recognize and integrate higher-level so-
called cognitive capacities into empirical studies of behavior; they post
effective warnings against genuine threats to freedom; and finally, they offer
better methods for enhancing freedom and self-control. Why, then, does
behaviorism prompt attack and distrust? One reason is that the behaviorist
attack on moral responsibility challenges an entrenched system of privilege
and inequity. Universal possession of miraculous free will gives us all equal
opportunity; so we who become wealthy and powerful deserve our rewards,
while those who are impoverished or imprisoned also receive their just
deserts. But while this is one powerful force opposing behaviorism and
holding the freedom-curtailing system of moral responsibility in place, it is not
the only one. There is also a fear of the misuse and abuse of behaviorist
knowledge of environmental control: the fear that behavioral science will
become a system of intentional behavioral intervention, and all persons will
be manipulated and minutely controlled by therapists/rulers who determine
how they should be shaped. The world becomes a large behavioral hospital,
with everyone divided into behavioral therapists and micro-managed patients.
Such fears may strike behaviorists as falling into the same implausible
category with Dennett's peremptory puppeteers; nonetheless, the fears should
not be surprising. The sharp probes of behavioral science puncture the myth
and mystery of moral responsibility; and denial of moral responsibility is
popularly associated with denial of reason and self-control and the ability to
direct one's own life. When moral responsibility is the rule - when everyone
competent is assumed to be morally responsible - then denial of moral
responsibility is based on defect. Those who lack moral responsibility are
insane or possessed or demented. If you are not morally responsible then you
are incompetent; if incompetent, then a fit subject for therapeutic treatment;
and since incompetent, you cannot give or withhold consent: you are treated
whether you want it or not. Thus when behavioral scientists attack moral
responsibility it is often perceived as an attack on freedom and a conspiracy
to class everyone as defective subjects for coerced treatment. 4
Skinnerian behaviorism denies all moral responsibility, but not because
everyone is defective or incompetent. On Skinner's view no one is ever
morally responsible, no matter how rational and competent and self-controlled
they may be. Moral responsibility is rejected because it requires miracles and
mysteries (or at the very least, a myopic refusal to probe deeply into environ-
mental learning histories). That does not imply universal insanity or incompe-
tence, nor does it imply that everyone should be coercively treated by
behavioral therapists; indeed, it does not suggest brutal coercive treatment
even for those who do fail to live competently or lawfully within society.
Willard Gaylin raises the spectre of the behaviorist denying moral responsi-
bility and individual competence, and thus planning brutal and degrading
"treatment" programs for prisoners:
While conditioning is a less dramatic fonn of behavior modification than, for example,
psychosurgery, it should concern us no less, especially when the federal government is
preparing programs designed along Skinnerian lines. Inevitably these experiments are to
be undertaken in the prisons, those unfailing institutions of failure, where each new in-
dignity is traditionally presented as an act of grace (1973, p. 48).
Abusive ''therapy'' [in the form of psychosurgery, drugs and aversive forms
of "behavior modification" (e.g., punishment)] is a genuine danger, and
behaviorists have raised alarms concerning such threats (Skinner, 1984, pp.
334-336). But belief in "human dignity" and moral responsibility is no
safeguard. As Gaylin notes, such coercive "therapy" methods are usually
proposed for prisons: institutions based on retribution and just deserts and
moral responsibility.
Brutal and demeaning methods of coercing behavior are most likely when
those on whom they are imposed are cast as inferior or flawed, or as so
fundamentally different from us that "ordinary" restrictions are suspended.
And rather than behaviorists, it is those who believe in moral responsibility
who are more likely to consider violators "sick" or "different" or even
"monstrous". Ascriptions of moral responsibility require restrictions on
inquiries into the morally responsible individual's history (to prevent
discovery of environmental histories that undercut claims of moral responsi-
bility). Thus when the criminal acts in a vicious manner, quite different from
the way we act - and moral responsibility obscures the causal background -
then the criminal seems different from us: so different that our sympathies are
suppressed. And the alienation produced by the sense of radical difference is
exacerbated by increased fear. Criminal behavior may be frightening in the
best of circumstances; when insistence on criminal moral responsibility limits
causal inquiries and makes the criminal seem mysterious and capricious, then
criminal behavior becomes terrifying.
In contrast, the behaviorist regards the criminal not as some monster who
inexplicably and mysteriously chooses evil over good. Instead, the criminal
is seen as potentially shaped by different social-environmental contingencies,
probably involving small initial differences amplified through cumulative
reinforcement processes. This deeper perspective on the shaping of criminal
behavior reduces strangeness and relieves fear, and the behaviorist concludes
that there are no fundamental differences between the vicious and the virtuous:
"There but for a few differences in environmental contingencies go I." Thus
the behaviorist perspective enhances respect and concern for all individuals,
202 Waller
while the obscuring curtain of moral responsibility is more likely to license

brutal mistreatment.
Behaviorists have been persistent and perceptive in discovering and
warning against the deeper environmental influences that undermine freedom.
and have also offered specific and workable ways of enhancing free will
through effective self-control and environmental modification. These
accomplishments notwithstanding, framing a positive integrated naturalist-
behaviorist account of free will has proved difficult. The initial tendency was
to ignore free will, consigning it to the realm of mentalistic miracle-working
homunculi. But as behaviorists have begun to take free will more seriously,
there is a tendency to treat it as a special power: neither miraculous nor
mysterious, certainly, but still requiring higher-level cognitive powers that
make free will uniquely human. For example, Howard Rachlin starts from
ingenious and revealing research into self-control and from there builds a
sophisticated behaviorism that effectively integrates rule-following with a
broad molar view of complex behavior (Rachlin, 1974, 1988, 1989, 1994,
1995; Rachlin and Green, 1972). But when he offers (as he calls it) a "tenta-
tive conception of freedom" (1989, p. 271) he suggests that: "You are free to
the extent that you can predict your own behavior better than other people can
predict it." Rachlin illustrates thus:
As a parent relinquishes control of a child's behavior, it becomes less and less possible
to predict the child's choices by observing or asking the parent and more and more possi-
ble to predict the child's choices by observing or asking the child. At some point the child
becomes better able to predict his or her behavior than any observer, whether a parent or
not. At that point, the child may be said to be free (1989, pp. 271-272).
Self-knowledge and self-control (and Rachlin's research on those subjects)

are certainly important in enhancing freedom; but the valuable cognitive
powers of prediction and self-knowledge are not the definitive conditions of
freedom, as one of Rachlin's own illustrations demonstrates. In arguing that
introspection is not really a report (much less an accurate report) of an internal
process, Rachlin suggests that perhaps:
Introspection is a prediction of the introspectionist's own overt behavior, and introspec-
tions are wrong when they predict behavior incorrectly. So when I say that I hate junk
food and yet eat a lot of junk food, my wife is correct when she says, "No you don't, you
love junk food." We believe so strongly that our introspections are true because we do
not want to believe that other people can predict our own behavior better than we can (as
my wife often predicts mine) (1989, p. 253).
But the predictability of Rachlin's junk-food eating behavior is at most a

symptom, not the real problem. When my desire for junk food is freedom-
constricting, it is not because someone else can predict my junk food eating
behavior better than I. If the junk food craving is a problem, it does not
become less so merely because my cognitive powers enable me to know more

than anyone else about the control junk food exerts over me.
Weare the products of our environments, and controlled by them. A
Laplacean demon with full knowledge of that controlling environment - and
of our environmental histories - could predict our behavior better than we
ourselves can. But the problem with prediction is not from omniscient gods
or demons, but rather from humans who predict our behavior by constraining
it within narrow limits. They predict successfully not because they have vast
knowledge of our environment and how that environment shapes and
stimulates us, but instead because they can significantly restrict the environ-
ment we experience and the range of responses we can make. The prediction
is a byproduct of the real problem: the restricted environment and responses.
Higher-level cognitive powers - including predictive powers - are not an
essential condition for behavioral freedom. Instead, the behaviorist account of
freedom must start with the environment that shapes us. Behaviorists
acknowledge and emphasize that we are largely shaped by our environment;
but such environmental control must be recognized as the essential foundation
for freedom, not an impediment. If freedom required escaping environmental
control (or escaping the potential know ledge of that controlling environment)
there would be no freedom, since there is no escaping environmental contin-
gencies. But such escape would not be freedom in any case; to the contrary,
the escape would condemn one to isolation and ineptness. Freedom is in the
capacity and opportunity to respond effectively to our environment with a rich
range of behavior that has been shaped for success in that environment. When
we are manipulated by environmental shaping that masks the real environ-
mental contingencies (as in cigarette advertising, or piece-work) then we
cannot respond effectively to our environment. When our range of responses
is circumscribed (as happens to the dog that learns helplessness or the wife
who learns submissiveness) then our freedom diminishes with our range of
options.
Freedom, then, lies not in escaping but rather in enhancing environmental
control and the range of behavioral responses. This approach to freedom
preserves a basic behaviorist principle, drawn from Darwinism, that is too
easily forgotten in the rush to study higher-level cognitive capacities: the
principle of continuity between human behavior and the behavior of other
species (Skinner, 1963, pp. 951-952; Skinner, 1938, p. 4). Thus free will is not
(as traditionally conceived) the uniquely human power that sets us apart from
the beasts. Freedom is found in the capacity to respond to a rich range of
environmental contingencies with an effective repertoire of responses, and
such freedom is not exclusively human. We have greater freedom as the
effective controlling contingencies and potential responses become richer;
204 Waller
freedom is constricted as they become more impoverished. Cognitive self-

awareness and rule-following may expand freedom, but so also do better
hearing, swifter foot speed, and keener smell.
The value of "keeping our options open" - the value of a variety of
effective learned responses to a richly varied environment - runs deep in our
history. Kavanau (1967) noted that feral white-footed mice occasionally select
the "wrong" maze path after they have successfully learned the path that
provides food. This is not capriciousness or stupidity, but (as Kavanau came
to recognize) instead a beneficial behavioral pattern for foraging animals: they
explore alternative paths in case new food sources suddenly appear, old food
sources disappear, or predators block old routes. Both mice and men want to
keep their options open, want alternative responses available for a changing
world. There is nothing mystical or mysterious in this pursuit of freedom. It
is a deeply ingrained motive that survives for its usefulness: it keeps white-
footed mice apprised of changing resources, keeps scientists trying new
hypotheses even when the current theory seems more immediately promising
(Kuhn, 1962), and keeps poets spinning new rhymes (Skinner, 1972). As
Popper (1963) pointed out (and as white-footed mice remind us), our errone-
ous paths and pursuits are not always bad5 . Making freedom dependent on
such cognitive capacities as prediction or higher-level reflection obscures the
deep roots and basic value of animal free will.
With a positive behaviorist account of free will the contributions of
behavioral science can be seen in a clearer light. Not only do behaviorists alert
us to freedom- (alternative) constricting influences (such as the dangers of the
happy slave), but also offer positive effective means of enhancing alternatives
and expanding behavioral options. Skinner's emphasis on making long-term
contingencies effective in shaping behavior is a way of opening a wider range
of behavioral options. Howard Rachlin's work on self-control is another
important step in this freedom-enhancing behavioral work: instead of being
controlled by only the immediate contingencies, animals can expand their
behavioral options by learning to respond to additional later contingencies.
Complex reinforcement schedules (Ferster and Skinner, 1957) make less
prominent contingencies effective. Rule-governed behavior greatly expands
the possibilities, and opens a broader range of responses to richer stimuli: rules
can be tied to more distant and less consistent contingencies. Self-knowledge
and language capacity are not conditions of free will, but they are important
enhancements of freedom that expand the environmental contingencies to
which one can effectively respond and enrich the response repertoire. Thus
behavior controlled by rules and remote contingencies and self-control is
important to behaviorists, and enriching such behavior contributes to free will;
but it remains an enrichment and enhancement of a freedom that can and does
exist without rules and reasons.
As a positive account of freedom the behavioral approach is superior to
those offered by most contemporary philosophers. Rather than bemoaning
environmental control, behaviorists emphasize strengthening the subtlety and
scope of environmental stimuli and enlarging the range of potential response
behavior. Rather than turning to libertarian mysticism, behaviorists study the
real environment and how we develop effective and wide-ranging responses
to it. And rather than adopting the short-sighted compatibilist view (that treats
the willing addict and submissive wife and contented piece-worker as "having
all they could wish for in the way of freedom" merely because they are doing
as they deeply wish), behaviorists are vigilant in watching for the less obvious
environmental shaping that constricts and constrains the individual's range of
options and thus destroys freedom. And finally, rather than the myopic,
ineffective, and unfair use of retribution and just deserts and moral responsi-
bility, behaviorists point the way to a more just and equitable and effective
method of enhancing a rich variety of free behavior in a supportive and
stimulating environment: beyond dignity and moral responsibility toward a
richer freedom.
Department of Philosophy
Youngstown State University
Youngstown, Ohio, USA
NOTES
1. See Richard Taylor (1974), Roderick Chisholm (1964/1981), and Charles Taylor (1976).
2. The true focus of Skinner's attack is recognized by some of its targets. Rom Harre clutches
the special powers of the agent precisely to preserve the special privileges of moral respon-
sibility, and he understands that to be the core of Skinner's critique:
For my part I find the moral stance implicit in the Skinnerian terminology not just
unacceptable but demeaning since it cuts at the root of that which distinguishes human
societies from all other forms of organic association, namely the willingness of men and
women to take moral responsibility for their actions. (Harre, 1988, p. 247)
3. For examples, see Kanfer, 1975; Kanfer, Cox, Greiner and Karoly, 1974; Kanfer and Karoly,
1972; Karoly and Kanfer, 1974; Kanfer, 1977; Catania, Shimoff, and Matthews, 1989;
Hayes and Hayes, 1989; Hayes, Zettle, and Rosenfarb, 1989; and Zettle and Hayes, 1982.
4. The view that denial of moral responsibility must be based on defect and thus entail denial
of competence is almost universally accepted among philosophers. P. F. Strawson claims
that we deny moral responsibility when we see someone "as warped or deranged or compul-
sive in behaviour or peculiarly unfortunate in his formative circumstances" (196211974, p.
9). Dennett (1984, p. 157) associates the denial of moral responsibility and just deserts with
the assumption that one is "deluded, deranged, or radically ignorant in one way or another".
206 Waller
According to C. S. Lewis, if one is not morally responsible - not deserving of retributive

punishment - then that is:
to be classed with infants. imbeciles. and domestic animals. But to be punished,
however severely, because we 'ought to have known better,' is to be treated as a
human person made in God's image. (Lewis, 1970)
Similar views are expressed by Andrew Oldenquist (1988, p. 467), Jeffrie Murphy (1979,
pp. 109-110), and Bernard Williams (1985, p. 194). Even John Hospers - perhaps the best
known philosophical opponent of moral responsibility - seems to base his universal denial
of moral responsibility on the supposed universality of subconscious drives that compromise
rationality (Hospers, 1961).
5. For more on this evolutionary approach to epistemology, see Popper, 1972; Campbell, 1960;
and Campbell, 1974. The affinities of this approach to behaviorism (as well as the behavior-
ist contribution to this view of epistemology) can be seen in Skinner, 1972, pp. 353-355;
Skinner, 1974, pp. 68, 223-224; and Skinner, 1981.
REFERENCES
Bethlehem, D. (1987). Scolding the carpenter. In S. Modgil and C. Modgil, (Eds.). B. F.

Skinner: Consensus and controversy (pp. 89-97). New York: Falmer Press.
Campbell, C. A. (1957). On selfhood and Godhood. London: George Allen & Unwin.
Campbell, D. T. (1960). Blind variation and selective retention in creative thought as in other
knowledge processes. Psychological Review, 67, 380-400.
Campbell, D. T. (1974). Evolutionary epistemology. In P. A. Schilpp (ed.) The philosophy of
Karl Popper. La Salle, IL: Open Court.
Catania, c., Shimoff, E., and Matthews, B. A. (1989). An experimental analysis of ru1e-
governed behavior. In S. C. Hayes (Ed.), Rule-governed behavior (pp. 119-150). New York:
Plenum Press.
Chisholm, R. (196411981). The Lindley lecture, given at the University of Kansas; as reprinted
in J. Feinberg (Ed.) Reason and responsibility (3rd Edition, pp. 391-397). Encino, CA:
Wadsworth.
Dennett, D. C. (1984). Elbow room. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dostoyevsky, F. (1864/1961). Notesfrom underground. Translated by Andrew R. MacAndrew.
New York: New American Library.
Ferster, C. B. and Skinner, B. F. (1957). Schedules of reiriforcement. New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts.
Frankfurt, H. G. (1971). Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. Journal of Philoso-
phy, 68, 5-20.
Gaylin, W. (1973, October). Skinner redux. Harper's Magazine, 48-56.
Harre, R. (1988). Psychology as moral rhetoric. In A. C. Catania and S. Hamad (eds.) The
selection of behavior: The operant behaviorism of B.F. Skinner: Comments and conse-
quences (pp. 245-248). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Hayes, S. c., and Hayes, L. J. (1989). The verbal action of the listener as a basis for rule-
governance. In S. C. Hayes (Ed.) Rule-governed behavior (pp. 153-190). New York: Plenum
Press.
Hayes, S. c., Zettle, R. D., and Rosenfarb, I. (1989). Rule-following. In S. C. Hayes (ed.) Rule-
governed behavior (pp. 191-220). New York: Plenum Press
Hospers, J. (1961). What means this freedom? In S. Hook (Ed.). Determinism andfreedom in
the age of modern science (pp. 126-142). New York: Collier Books.
Hume, D. (1748/1902). Of liberty and necessity. In L. A. Selby-Bigge (Ed.) Enquiry concerning

human understanding. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kane, R. (1985). Free will and values. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Kanfer, F. H. (1975). Self-management methods. In F. H. Kanfer and A. P. Goldstein (Eds.).
Helping people change (pp. 309-355). New York: Pergamon Press.
Kanfer, F. H. (1977). The many faces of self-control, or behavior modification changes its
focus. In R. B. Stuart (Ed.) Behavioral self-management (pp. 1-48). New York:
BrunerlMazel.
Kanfer, F. H., Cox, L. E., Greiner, 1. M., and Karoly, P. (1974). Contracts, demand characteris-
tics and self-control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 30, 605-619.
Kanfer, F. H. and Karoly, P. (1972). Self-control: A behavioristic excursion into the lion's den.
Psychological Reports, 18, 79-85.
Karoly, P. and Kanfer, F. H. (1974). Effects of prior contractual experience on self-control in
children. Developmental Psychology, 10, 459-460.
Kavanau, J. Lee. (1967). Behavior of captive white-footed mice. Science, 155,1623-1639.
Kuhn, T. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press.
Lewis, C. S. (1970). The humanitarian theory of punishment. In Undeceptions. London: Curtis
Brown.
Mahoney, M. J., and Thoresen, C. E. (1974). Self-control: Power to the person. Monterey, CA:
Brooks/Cole.
Murphy, J. G. (1973/1979). Marxism and retribution. In Retribution, justice, and therapy.
Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel.
Oldenquist, A. (1988). An explanation of retribution. Journal of Philosophy, 85,464-478.
Popper, K. (1963). Conjectures and refutations. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Popper, K. (1972). Objective knowledge: An evolutionary approach. London: Oxford
University Press.
Rachels, J. (1978). What people deserve. In J. Arthur and W. H. Shaw (Eds.) Justice and
economic distribution. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Rachlin, H. (1974). Self-control. Behaviorism, 2, 94-107.
Rachlin, H. (1988). Molar Behaviorism. In D. B. Fishman, F. Rotgers, and C. M. Franks (eds.)
Paradigms in behavior therapy: Present and promise. New York: Springer.
Rachlin, H. (1989). Judgment, decision, and choice: A cognitive/behavioral synthesis. New
York: W. H. Freeman.
Rachlin, H. (1992). Teleological behaviorism. American Psychologist, 47, 1371-1382.
Rachlin, H. (1993). The context of human and pigeon choice. Behavior and philosophy, 21, 1-
17.
Rachlin, H. (1994). Behavior and mind: The roots of modern psychology. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Rachlin, H. (1995). Self-control: Beyond commitment. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18, 109-
159.
Rachlin, H. and Green, L. (1972). Commitment, choice and self-control. Journal of the
Seligman, M. E. P. (1975). Helplessness: On depression, development, and death. San
Francisco, CA: W. H. Freeman.
Skinner, B. F. (1938). The Behavior of organisms. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.
Skinner, B. F. (1948). Walden two. New York: Macmillan.
Skinner, B. F. (1963). Behaviorism at fifty. Science, 140,951-958.
Skinner, B. F. (1971). Beyondfreedom and dignity. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Skinner, B. F. (1972). A Lecture on "having" a poem. Cumulative record, 3rd Edition. New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
208 Waller
Skinner, B. F. (1974). About behaviorism. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Skinner, B. F. (1978). Human behavior and democracy. Reflections on behaviorism and society
(pp. 3-15). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Skinner, B. F. (1980). Notebooks. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Skinner, B. F. (1981). Selection by consequences. Science, 213, 501-504.
Skinner, B. F. (1984). A matter of consequences. New York: New York University Press.
Smith, T. L. (1994). Behavior and its causes. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic
Press.
Strawson, P. F. (1962/1974). Freedom and resentment. In Freedom and resentment and other
essays (pp. 1-25). London: Methuen.
Taylor, C. (1976). Responsibility for self. In A. Rorty (Ed.) The identities ofpersons. Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press.
Taylor, R. (1974). Metaphysics (2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Williams, B. (1985). Ethics and the limits ofphilosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Zettle, R. D., and Hayes, S. C. (1982). Rule-governed behavior: A potential framework for
cognitive-behavioral therapy. In P. C. Kendall (ed.) Advances in cognitive-behavioral
research and therapy (vol. 1, pp. 73-118). New York: Academic Press.
ROGERSCHNAITTER
Some Criticisms of Behaviorism
Although rooted in the nineteenth century and before, it was not until 1913,
with Watson's publication of his famous paper, "Psychology as the behaviorist
views it," that behaviorism gained a name and recognizable public identity.
Since this inception behaviorism has been subjected to a more or less
continuous stream of criticism. During the roughly two decade period of the
late 1950s through the late 1970s this criticism assumed the proportions of a
full-blown assault when in its headier moments an almost Manichean
construction of theoretical debate arose. The more energetic rhetoric of this
period seemed less thoughtful than moral, with the purpose of bringing about
the destruction of the behaviorist evil and the hegemony of the cognitive good.
Following this period of high fervor the critique of behaviorism has over the
past two decades subsided significantly, the critics for a variety of reasons
having come to the opinion that the battle had been won. The dominant view
- that is, the view among the cognitive cognoscenti - now appears to be that
behaviorism has been sufficiently marginalized to pose no continuing threat.
Consequently what one does tend to find in the current literature is the odd
historical reference, to Chomsky or whomever, rather than anything much
new. The period of vigorous criticism has substantially passed.
Although today's critical material lacks interest because of its tired
repetition, in some instances an entirely new phenomenon catches the eye. A
striking example can be found in Howard Gardner's recent piece in The New
York Review of Books. In this 1995 essay Gardner spent the entire first section
- five substantial paragraphs in aH- rehashing for yet one more time Chom-
sky's review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior from thirty-six years before:
... Skinner was the most respected experimental psychologist in the world and the leader
of the influential behaviorist movement ... Chomsky ... had just turned thirty and was
already teaching linguistics at MIT ... In thirty tightly reasoned and scathing pages, he
subjected nearly every facet of Skinner's book to criticism and much of it to ridicule ...
[the review] was to topple behaviorism and itself become a new orthodoxy" (Gardner,
1995, p. 32).
What is so striking about Gardner's piece is not simply that it takes

Chomsky's work of 1959 to be the definitive criticism of the behaviorist
position, but that Gardner so facilely elevates historical events to the status of
myth, where matters of fact, detail, and accuracy no longer count. What have
become important to Gardner are the confrontation's mythic dimensions: that
209
210 Schnaitter
the boy Chomsky picked up a stone and with a mighty blow slew the giant
Skinner, who tumbled to the ground and never rose again.
One imagines that these mythic tellings serve important ritual functions in
socializing new members to the cognitive tribe. But anyone with a serious
interest in the conceptual problems and philosophical controversies surround-
ing behaviorism would be better served by returning to Skinner's book to find
out just what was originally said, to Chomsky'S review to determine what
Chomsky thought he had read, and to MacCorquodale (1970), Richelle (1976),
Andresen (1990), and others for commentary on the degree to which Chomsky
was actually mounting criticisms of Skinner or was simply using Skinner's
book as a springboard from which to launch a diatribe against "a mixture of
odds and ends of other behaviorisms and some other fancies of vague origin"
(MacCorquodale, 1970, p. 83). Such pursuits continue to reward those who
take the time to carefully explore the original terrain rather than relying on
current myth and oral tradition.
The critique of behaviorism, then, passed through a "golden age" and it is
that period to which I return in these remarks. Concerning this period, were
one simply to catalog the criticisms of behaviorism the list no doubt would be
of great length. In its entirety what the list would consist of I really do not
know. MacCorquodale, considering just the criticisms from Chomsky's
review of Verbal Behavior, boiled the arguments down to three. Skinner, who
framed his 1974 book About Behaviorism as a response to criticism, listed
twenty. Neither of these lists is entirely satisfactory, although MacCorquo-
dale's abstract from Chomsky is more useful than Skinner's which is of
uncertain provenance. In what follows I make no pretense to a comprehensive
catalog of this critical history. The project is a more limited consideration of
three central themes from the peak era of behaviorist criticism.
In surveying the historical critical landscape, it is striking how steadfastly
behaviorism has managed not to reform itself. One might speculate that a
behaviorism without eighty years of criticism would be little different from the
behaviorism of today. Indeed, certain potential difficulties have been virtually
ignored by the behaviorist community. Later I will go on at length about the
problem of intentionality. In a nutshell, the intentional argument says it is
impossible to explain any interesting bit of behavior without use of a content-
bearing idiom, and inasmuch as behaviorism eschews the content-bearing
modalities, behaviorism thus fails. E.g., to account adequately for the behavior
of a squirrel gnawing at a nut it is necessary to make use of a construction of
the general form that the squirrel is gnawing at the nut because it believes
there to be a nutmeat within the shell. "Believes" is the intentional attitude,
and the "that clause" is its content, to wit, "there is a nutmeat inside." This
Some Criticisms of Behaviorism 211
argument (which is encapsulated here) has received insufficient attention from

behaviorists.
At least one reason for the lack of adequate response to challenges as in the
argument from intentionality might be a genuine lack of acquaintance with the
substance of these positions. Criticism, after all, is usually unpleasant. It tends
to annoy. Perhaps for this reason Skinner often commented that he didn't read
his critics. Andresen casts light on Skinner's motives by reference to an
unpublished letter from Skinner to S. Murray:
"I have never actually read his long review of Beyond Freedom and Dignity though 1
have read three answers to it none of which the New York Review would publish. 1 have
never been able to understand why Chomsky becomes almost pathologically angry when
writing about me but 1 do not see why 1 should submit myself to such verbal treatment.
If 1 thought 1 could learn something which might lead to useful revisions of my position
1 would of course be willing to take the punishment, but Chomsky simply does not un-
derstand what 1 am talking about and 1 see no reason to listen to him" (Andresen, 1990,
p. 162).
In this light the practice of not reading one's critics is more than under-
standable; yet it can blunt the effectiveness of the responses that inevitably
must be made. In About Behaviorism, Skinner lists twenty criticisms from an
unidentified variety of sources. But the criticisms are presented less as serious
arguments than as one-liners: e.g., "It ignores consciousness, feelings, and
states of mind;" ... "it does not attempt to account for cognitive processes;" ...
"it has no place for intention or purpose." These critical points are presented
not as arguments but as observations or comments. To charge that behavior-
ism "... is indifferent to the warmth and richness of human life ... " would
count as a criticism in most people's eyes, but a criticism of what sort? It is
closer to the criticism one would find in a theater review than in philosophical
discourse. The answer to this kind of thing is to enumerate the counter-
evidence, or to offer argument which is as facile as the criticism: "those who
understand the theory or history of music do not find music therefore any less
enjoyable ... " In writing his book Skinner certainly had the right to define his
own material, but all too often About Behaviorism does not address what
serious critics would take to be the heart of their concerns.
Perhaps further light can be shed on the limitations of Skinner's list by
considering it to be metonymical. That is to say, the "it" of the criticisms can
be glossed as "Skinner" as easily as by "behaviorism," as in "Skinner does not
attempt to account for cognitive processes." In his enumeration Skinner was
characterizing, as much as anything, the criticisms of his own writings, many
of which no doubt had stung him in the surge of popular criticism following
his immediately preceding book, Beyond Freedom and Dignity. But it is
hazardous to identify "behaviorism" with "the writings of B. F. Skinner," as
some have done. For example Day's proposal that "Radical behaviorism is the
212 Schnaitter
effect that Skinner's thought happens to have on the behavior of other people"
(1980, p. 101) is simply unworkable. According to Day's standard even a
critic like Chomsky would count as a radical behaviorist. "Newtonian"
mechanics is Newtonian only by historical accident but it is mechanics by
virtue of its content. Similarly behaviorism can and should be defined without
reference to Skinner despite the fact that he is its major architect.
THE MEANING OF BEHAVIORISM
Indeed what is "behaviorism?" Moore (this volume) makes it clear that

behaviorism is a multitude of things. Over the last century the term has meant
different things to different people. Thus, when criticisms have been offered,
the critic has tended to have in mind as a target only a part of this historic
array. Since behaviorism shows such great diversity, criticism of one variant
will not necessarily apply to another. Behaviorism is not a monolithic
conceptual edifice, but instead a rambling New England farmhouse of a
structure, addition attached to addition, remodelled, renovated, wings tom
down and the preservationist's eye required to recapture its past.
To put a finer point on it, one might say that behaviorism can less be
defined than characterized. Indeed it might be said that there is no such thing
as "behaviorism," but instead a congeries of behaviorisms. These behav-
iorisms coexist amid a plethora of other psychological theories, which include
the mentalisms, the neurosciences, the phenomenologies and the hurnanisms
of one sort or another. Perhaps what gives the behaviorisms a common name
is less a defming feature than a family resemblance. As in any family not
every member shares every feature with every other member. But between any
two members of the behaviorist family a greater number of features are shared
than between a behaviorism and a non-behaviorist position. Many of these
behaviorisms can be associated with the names of theorists who devised them:
Watson, Guthrie, Skinner, Hull, Tolman, Spence, Kantor, etc.
This family resemblance approach with its Wittgensteinian flavor is best
illustrated by Zuriff in Behaviorism: A Conceptual Reconstruction (1985).
Zuriff s book must certainly rank among the most impressive of all the books
written about behaviorism, and it contains much material relevant to the topic
of this essay. Its family resemblance characterization of behaviorism is too
broad, too inclusive for present purposes, however. The family is not a
harmonious one. Indeed, a major schism divides the behavioristic family.
Some criticisms of behaviorism which are perfectly on target for one side of
the family do not fit the other side of the family at all, and vice versa. Some
commentators would argue (perhaps persuasively) that the family name is
misleading, with one side of the family possessing more resemblance to the
outsiders than to the other side of the family. One side is inclined not to
defend the other side of the family from criticism. In fact behaviorists of one
ilk are often among the most vigorous critics of the other side of behaviorism.
I will use the unqualified term behaviorism from this point forward to stand
for the position generally known as "radical behaviorism." References to any
other type of behaviorism will be distinguished with a qualifier, e.g., "meth-
odological behaviorism" or "Hull's behavioristic theory." What radical
behaviorism should be called, and whether or not it should even be called
behaviorism, has been discussed elsewhere in the psychological literature. Lee
adroitly summarizes this discussion (1988, pp. 79-84).
Consequently the position must be narrowed, a task more than adequately
accomplished by Moore (this volume). In short, what we are after is the
position he calls behavior analysis, with its experimental, applied, and
conceptual dimensions. The foundational philosophical position is called
radical behaviorism. Moore has emphasized that the entire project of behav-
ioristic psychology is undertaken within the single and self-consistent
dimensional system of behavior interacting with environment, without
reference to events taking place at some other level, on some other plane, or
in some transcendent conceptual realm. Most fundamentally and as its very
name implies, behavior is what behaviorism is about. Behavior is not simply
data; nor is it a symptom of an underlying mental state, nor is it a mere index
of events taking place at som,e other place or in some other dimensional
system. Behavior is genuinely the subject in its own right. A given instance
of behavior is taken to be explained when its occurrence is shown to stand in
a functional relationship to one or more aspects of the environmental context
in which the behavior has been occurring. The primary causal mode of the
analysis is selection by consequences.
The research paradigm currently employed to investigate selection by
consequences is not necessarily a permanent fixture. The character of research
can change over time. Thus behaviorism leaves open the development of new
and possibly yet to be conceived research paradigms or patterns of investiga-
tion. For example the current experimental analysis of behavior is substan-
tially an animal research paradigm. Operant conditioning as now employed in
the animal research laboratory seems inappropriate for addressing phenomena
such as language, perhaps the quintessential concern of a human psychology.
Occasionally a unique methodology such as that developed by Willard Day's
"Reno Group" springs up, robustly behavioristic but hardly an application of
the operant conditioning paradigm (see, e.g., McCorkle et al., 1985). Identifi-
cation of behaviorism with the operant research paradigm would exclude such
innovative new methodologies. The commitment is to the more basic features
214 Schnaitter
of behaviorism per se rather than to any currently popular research method or

technique.
Behaviorism comes into sharper focus by contrasting it with alternative
theoretical perspectives. A schematic can be helpful at this point. The
following depiction follows the "box-and-arrow" pattern popularized by
cognitive theory, and as such may not be fully appreciated by behaviorists.
Nonetheless it can help clarify the relation between organisms, their environ-
ments, and the various causal connections within which they are embedded.
Output 01 Input to
environment environment
Causal structure of the
environment
Stimulation Behavior
'------I.~I
Input to
Causal structure of the
organism Output of
1
organism organism
Figure 1. A simplified model of the relations between the causal structures of the organism and
the environment. The arrows should be interpreted as indicating the direction of causal
influence.
The model has the advantage of emphasizing the dynamic interaction of the
behaving organism and the environment within which it is situated. The
organism itself, not just the organism's behavior, is actually included in the
scheme. The fact that the environment is a complex causal structure whose
outputs are stimuli (rather than being an undefined source of stimulation)
makes clear that in order to achieve an understanding of behavior this causal
structure requires its own analysis. The scheme also acknowledges that
environmental stimulation does not evoke or elicit behavior directly but via
the causal structures internal to the subject. Just as a variation in environ-
mental causal structure will alter the nature of the organism-environment
interaction, so will any variation in the causal structure of the organism.
Organismal causal structure might vary due to species membership, age, prior
experience, etc.
"A man, viewed as a behaving system, is quite simple. The apparent
complexity of his behavior over time is largely a reflection of the complexity
of the environment in which he finds himself." Behaviorism is almost unique
among the various approaches to psychology in its commitment to the analysis
of the complexity of the environment. For most psychologies the environment
is hardly more than a convenient instrument with which to probe the inner
workings of the mind or nervous system. The individual is rarely considered
within a complex, ongoing environmental context. Yet occasionally another
research paradigm does appear which shares the behaviorist's detailed interest
in the environment. Gibson's direct realist approach to perception is a case in
point (Gibson, 1966). And of course it is an even greater surprise to find a
cognitive psychologist with the stature of Herbert Simon making the statement
with which this paragraph began (Simon, 1982, p. 65).
Relative to a given causal structure of the environment an organism of
reasonably stable internal causal structure will settle into some type of steady
state interchange with that environment. Within the schema of Figure 1, a
relation can be expressed between any given pattern of environmental inputs
and behavioral outputs, which can be referred to as a mapping relation. The
mapping of environmental inputs onto behavioral outputs is not a project over
which behaviorists have a proprietary right. Psychologists of any persuasion
can and do study these mappings, with varying degrees of rigor. Of greater
interest is what one does with such mappings once they are established. A
mapping relation of environmental input onto behavioral output can be pure
description, absent any significant theoretical content. It may be expressed, for
example, purely as a mathematical function. It does not necessarily include
variables or constructs of either the intervening or hypothetical kind as once
defined by MacCorquodale and Meehl (1948). Of interest is what one further
does with a pure mapping relation.
One approach to the mapping relation is to picture it in as direct a way as
possible. The interest in picturing a relationship between behavior and
environment with the minimum of interpretive machinery led Skinner to
develop the cumulative record, the most exhaustive published catalog of
cumulative records being found in Schedules of Reinforcement by Ferster and
Skinner (1958). Ironically although it was his 1957 book, Verbal Behavior,
which inflamed the opposition, within the behavior analytic community it was
Skinner's 1958 book which proved to be problematic. The book is a great
sprawling accumulation of data with few systematic ideas. And although
similar (though much more brief) pieces of research were published in the
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior in its early years, the
cumulative record died a quiet death and has been rarely seen for two decades
or more. Both Day (1980) and Skinner (1976) have commented on the demise
of the cumulative record. Replacing the cumulative record, functional
relationships are now depicted graphically, responding as a dependent variable
a function of some environmental condition as independent variable. Often
these functional relationships are given an even more abstract description by
mathematically fitting curves to the data points. The approach converges with
216 Schnaitter
the covering law model of scientific explanation, although the nomological

expressions may be locally constrained in their applicability. These mathe-
matical expressions relate inputs to outputs of the organism, and in this sense
address the causal structure of the organism. They cannot be construed as
designs of such causal structures, but instead are generalized characterizations
of the performance of the subject organism whose causal microstructure is
unaddressed.
We walk a narrow ridge here. For some, arrival at covering laws is not only
a Good Thing, it is the necessary condition for achieving status as a science.
For others, however, it is a Bad Thing because only that which is reducible to
physics is susceptible to covering law description and for various reasons the
Important Things in Life (e.g., falling in love, getting partnered by one's firm,
finding an affordable apartment on the Upper East Side) are by their nature
nonphysical and irreducible and hence incapable of expression in covering
laws. About these opposing views two points will be made. First, under the
simplifying conditions of an experimental analysis it is certainly possible to
demonstrate regularities in human and animal conduct. A huge literature on
these regularities already exists and this material cannot be evaporated by a
theoretical argument. Whether these regularities should be described as
functional relationships, covering laws, or nomic generalizations is a matter
of complete indifference about which others may argue if they wish. Second,
it should be recognized that much of the interesting material in human
behavior - verbal behavior in all of its manifestations being the prime example
- is the result of " ... the convergence of many concurrent and interacting
variables in the natural environment, which does not sustain the experimental
separation and detection of the relevant component variables" (MacCorquo-
dale, 1970, p. 85). However it turns out, an effective analysis of verbal and
perhaps other areas of complex behavior will not look much like the analysis
that is currently coming out of operant conditioning labs.
THE CONTRAST WITH COGNITIVE!INFORMATION-PROCESSING THEORY
A temptation which for some psychologists has been all but irresistible is
to unpack mapping relationships by moving inside the subject. The mapping
relation can be decomposed by a series of steps or stages, making use of
hypothetical and functional models of internal processes until ultimately the
hypothetical models become so fine grained as to converge with neural
processes. The cognitive, information-processing approach is succinctly
described in the following material, first more formally by Palmer and Kimchi
and then by Dennett in his inimitable style.
Any complex (nonprimitive) infonnational event at one level of description can be speci-
fied more fully at a lower level by decomposing it into (1) a number of components, each
of which is itself an informational event, and (2) the temporal ordering relations among
them that specify how the infonnation "flows" through the system of components.
(Palmer and Kimchi, 1986, p. 47)
A flow chart is typically the organizational chart of a committee of homunculi (investi-
gators, librarians, accountants, executives); each box specifies a homunculus by pre-
scribing a function without saying how it is to be accomplished (one says, in effect: put
a little man in there to do the job). If we then look closer at the individual boxes we see
that the function of each is accomplished by subdividing it via another flow chart into
still smaller, more stupid homunculi. Eventually this nesting of boxes within boxes lands
you with homunculi so stupid (all they have to do is remember whether to say yes or no
when asked) that they can be, as one says, "replaced by a machine." One discharges
fancy homunculi from one's scheme by organizing annies of such idiots to do the work.
(Dennett, 1978, pp. 123-4)
Behaviorism - the behaviorism of this essay - disavows the decomposi-

tional pursuit, although mediational behaviorists such as Oark Hull did pursue
an early version of it. In a series of papers authored in the early 1930s Hull
developed a remarkable theory of internal causal processes consisting of
chains of covert stimuli and responses (e.g., Hull, 1930, 1931). He considered
the approach capable of accounting for all the higher mental processes. To
behaviorists, the Hullian project was of a kind with the cognitive, information
processing strategy. The difference is that the modern mentalist builds the
mental model on information processing concepts rather than on the hook-
and-eye stimulus-response chains that Hull employed. This is indeed a
difference, but Hull's work preceded the availability of information processing
models and one imagines that were he alive and working today he would be
developing information processing models with gusto.
BEHAVIORISM'S VIEW THAT THE ORGANISM IS A Locus
Thus, the model of Figure 1 has much to offer in clarifying the distinction
between the pursuits of behaviorism on the one hand, and cognitivism and
other internalist strategies on the other. With that said, however, behaviorists
are likely to find the model less than fully congenial. Hineline (1992, p. 1284)
expresses the source of this unease in the contrast he expresses as follows:
"Behavior is the interaction between organism and environment; and the
organism is a locus where behavior and environment interact." Whereas the
model of Figure 1 illustrates the first in Hineline's pair of claims, it less
adequately captures the second. And although behaviorism recognizes the
truth of the first, it is in fact the second of Hineline's claims that expresses
behaviorism's working tactic. The organism is surely present but is treated as
218 Schnaitter
a locus, the point of intersection where behavior and environment interact.

Although not what is traditionally meant by an S-R psychology, behaviorism
is even less an S-O-R psychology. By so prominently featuring the causal
structure of the organism, Figure 1 might be interpreted to mean that an S-O-R
scheme is required in the analysis of behavior. Another notation moves closer
to Hineline's second claim.
Table 1. Categories of environmental and behavioral event expressed at three levels of analysis
Functional Categories SE1TING ACT
Physical Events stimulation movement
Underlying Mechanisms sensory motor
neurophysiology neurophysiology
Table 1 approaches the distinctions among event types through differing

levels of analysis. In the highest level which consists of functional categories,
acts and settings are identified generically, functionally, relationally. Of most
interest to the behaviorist is the behavior consisting of achievements. In
ordinary parlance, these are actions. Actions are individuated by the context
of occurrence: to "hit a home run" is neither to attain a specific kind of mental
state nor to express an intention. It is to achieve an effect which qualifies as
a home run by virtue of mechanical and spatial consequences of movement
which meet conventional criteria found among "the rules of the game." A
given mental state is neither necessary nor sufficient for hitting a home run.
A batter sent to the plate with instructions to hit a sacrifice fly might homer
completely unintentionally, and the mighty Casey struck out despite the
strongest of intentions to do otherwise.
Actions are the types of which biomechanical movement patterns (and in
some cases their immediate physical consequences) are tokens. Settings are
related functional categories of which specific configurations of physical
stimulus energy are instances. Physical stimulation and biomechanical
movements occur at the intermediate level of specification. At the lowest level
of interest, environmental stimulation activates the sensory neurophysiology,
whereas activation of the motor neurophysiology underlies the motor
response. These underlying mechanisms of stimulus and response are
susceptible to rigorous analysis by the neurophysiologist. Although expressed
as levels of analysis, it should be noted that categories within the various
levels cannot through any obvious means be reduced to the categories of the
underlying levels. Functionally defined acts are not reducible to mechanical
movements and movements are not reducible to their neurophysiological
causes. The categories at each level are simply about different kinds of things.
Nonetheless each level stands in a clear and definite relation to what lies
above or below. From this view, the organism is the substrate on which setting
and act play out. This is the significance of the claim that the organism is a
locus.
MECHANISM AND REDUCTIONISM
Among the most common criticisms of behaviorism are that it is mechanistic

and reductionistic. Critics feel this case is obvious prima facie while behav-
iorists find it groundless. Perhaps we can find the key to these opposing views.
Reductionism consists of taking a phenomenon which appears at one level of
observation and decomposing it into phenomena which take place at a lower
level, e.g., when one says that the stuff in a bottle of Evian is H20 one is
making a reductive claim, in this case accounting for a phenomenon of
ordinary experience by reference to chemistry. Any approach which moves
from occurrent behavioral phenomena in the direction of nerve cells thus
would appear to be reductionistic, no matter how fancily garbed the theoretical
language. Thus, to a behaviorist, cognitive psychology rather than behavior-
ism is reductionistic.
The same point can be made for mechanism. Mechanism means machine-
like, but there is little in behaviorism that can plausibly be claimed to treat the
individual like a machine. It is hard to understand how an approach which has
nothing to say about the internal, causal structure of the subject can be said to
treat that structure as a mechanism. It is true that behaviorism's analysis of
causal structures of the environment sometimes takes on a mechanistic,
machine-like quality, particularly as developed in the laboratory study of
schedules of reinforcement, but that is the environment and not the subject.
Furthermore, the behaviorist's mapping of environmental inputs onto
behavioral outputs hardly counts as mechanism. At its most precise the
mapping is expressed mathematically, not mechanically. Equations are not
machines. By contrast computers are machines, and information processing
models of internal causal states are models of machines. Dennett's homunculi
become increasingly machine-like as they converge with neurology: in his
words, when simple enough they can be "replaced by a machine." Behavior-
ism does not move down the decompositional pathway but stays at the level
of the mapping relationship. In this way behaviorists would argue that
behaviorism is neither reductionistic nor mechanistic. Cognitive psychology
is both.
The cognitive psychologist would object to the claim that cognitive
psychology is reductionistic and mechanistic on the ground that, no matter
how simplified, no information-processing design fixes the physical (e.g.,
220 Schnaitter
neurological) structure that can realize it. In fact, it would be argued, any
infonnation-processing design can be instantiated by a multiplicity of physical
structures. Whether this objection is sophistry or not the reader can decide.
Behaviorism has its own means of moving away from the mapping relation.
Rather than entering into a cycle of internal decomposition, behavioral
analysis takes an historical turn. A functional relation is necessarily grounded
in history, either in the past experience of the subject or in its evolution as a
species. When posed with the question regarding any observable mapping of
stimulus onto response, "why does this relationship hold?" the behaviorist
turns to ontogeny and phylogeny. That is, a mapping holds due to the
individual's ontogenetic history of interaction with environmental causal
structures; and due to the individual's species' history or evolution. If the
individual in question is an experimental subject with a documented history
of interaction with its environment, the relevant ontogenetic history is
descriptive and factual. Where species membership and evolution are called
into play the discussion blends with evolutionary biology.
INNATENESS
Another objection to behaviorism requires only passing comment. This is the

charge that behaviorism is nothing but a learning theory and is thus incapable
of accounting for features of behavior which are innate or native to a species.
The charge does not hold up because Figure I' s model won't work in the
absence of a "causal structure of the organism." Were there no causal structure
to the organism then the causal structure of the environment would interact
with itself, requiring no organism at all! And although the causal structure of
the organism can be significantly conditioned by prior experience, such a
structure can't be built out of thin air: it must start with a given, which is the
innate causal structure of the organism. Furthermore the behavioral model of
Figure I is perfectly capable of addressing species where behavior is com-
pletely controlled by inherited propensities. Behaviorism has no bond with
nurture in preference to nature, as these are simply different sources of the
control of behavior. To what extent human language is given by nature rather
than acquired through experience continues to be debated, even within
developmental linguistics. On this score if human language ultimately proves
to be closer to bird whistles than whistling Dixie, the phenomena can be
acknowledged for what they are. Unfortunately, critics have sometimes
become so confident in attacking the straw man of nurture that they will not
relent even when behaviorists have patiently pointed out, "this simply isn't our
position" (Todd and Morris, 1992).
PERSISTENT CONCERNS
Let me now return briefly to the reductionism/mechanism charges. There is

of course a sense in which behaviorism might be called both mechanistic and
reductionistic, although the use of these terms would be idiosyncratic. Because
behavior rather than "the mind" is taken by behaviorists to be the subject
matter of psychology, it might be claimed that mental processes such as
thoughts, memories and perceptions are "reduced" to behavior. But the focus
on behavior is not a reduction in the standard sense developed by philosophers
of science (e.g., Nagel, 1961, chapter 11 and elsewhere). To begin with, the
folk psychology in which mental concepts are found is not a formal theory
capable of reduction, but an informal and inexact set of terms, concepts, and
idioms from everyday life. It lacks sufficient rigor to be reduced. A better way
to express the concern of the critic is to say that behaviorism simplifies the
complexities taken for granted in ordinary life, and perhaps in the process
overlooks something of importance. Insofar as mechanism is concerned,
behaviorism's causal treatment of behavior-environment interactions (to
which mental predicates have been "reduced") threatens the concepts of
personal autonomy and freedom of the will. The description of behavior as if
it were a direct function of environment without opportunity for influence
from the subject within makes the causal linkages too direct for comfort.
Have these concerns validity? To a degree. Skinner was fond of the
expression "translated into behavior," as if what we have are two language
communities and a translation between them. Although it isn't correct to refer
to these translations as reductions, they certainly are moves toward elimination
of the mental language. Skinner believed his way of expressing things was
superior. The critic's argument is better made, then, not by arguing that
behaviorism is reductionistic, but instead that mental predicates are inelimi-
nable from psychological discourse. This argument will be considered at
greater length in the following section on intentionality.
The worry over mechanism is linked to the fate of mental predicates. If
mental predicates are intractable to the eliminative efforts of behaviorism, then
the mentalist no doubt has little worry that behaviorism will eventually show
all behavior to be under the tight functional control of the environment. Even
if mental predicates can be eliminated, however, the behavioral analysis,
necessarily being external and historical, leaves temporal gaps in the account.
This important issue is pursued further in the section on the problem of the
stimulus independence of behavior.
With these introductory remarks completed, we can now move on to the issues
which are the main concern of this paper.
222 Schnaitter
1. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM
Behaviorism has set for itself a problem and a constraint on the nature of an
acceptable solution. The problem is to devise an account of behavior as a
function of environmental influence - whether in the immediate context or in
the history of the individual or the species. The constraint is that solutions
must be expressed in terms of variables operating "at the same level" as the
events to be accounted for. Strategies which posit explanatory processes
occurring at some other level, in some other dimensional system, as would be
the case where the causal structure of the organism is decomposed, are
disallowed.
Within extraordinarily broad limits the scientific community tolerates
investigators specifying as appropriate for investigation virtually any problem
whatsoever. As long as a potential problem is coherently expressed and
susceptible to empirical study it would not be questioned a priori. The fact that
behaviorists have chosen behavior as a subject matter worthy in its own right
is in this respect unproblematic and needs no further comment. The constraints
on explanation that behaviorism has imposed on itself have been the subject
of critical comment, however. Flanagan summarizes these concerns as
follows.
What makes [Skinner's] theory behavioristic is really only an attitude; it consists of a
certain epistemological conservatism that remains from his early operationistic and posi-
tivistic days. Unfortunately this attitude keeps Skinner from fully deploying his regulative
materialistic metaphysic to propose an in-depth analysis of the rich terrain of cognitive
processes, of human emotion, of thought and belief, and in general, of the organism-
from-within ... his theory continually seems to be biting its own tongue. (Flanagan, 1988,
pp.89-90)
The decade of the 1930s marked the hegemony of behavioristic systems as

well as the authoritative zenith of logical positivism and operationism. The
three positions intersected with one another. People read each other's work;
talked to one other. In some cases influence occurred. In others a flash of
recognition of a convergent line of thought. Something was in the air. It must
have been electric. It must have been a kind of Camelot atmosphere, a heady
confidence that the epistemological puzzles were finally beaten and now the
world would come to order. Everything from World War II to Thomas Kuhn
brought an end to that foolish optimism. But the delusion must have been
exhilarating while it lasted.
Skinner did not escape unscathed. Some of his writings from the 1930s do
show the influence of both logical positivism and operationism. However, a
careful reading beginning in that earliest decade of his career suggests that any
influences from those sources were superficial and transitory. Nonetheless
Skinner and the behaviorist position he articulated were robustly positivistic,
if one can find the right positivist. It turns out to have been Ernst Mach of the
nineteenth century, not Schlick or Camap or Hempel of the twentieth. This
influence may have resulted in an epistemological conservatism, as Flanagan
asserts, but it followed another source and has a character not well enough
appreciated today.
In order to differentiate between the epistemological heritage of behavior-
ism and logical positivism, briefly consider the logical positivist program. The
goal of logical positivism was to devise a rational reconstruction of scientific
knowledge, built around the verificationist theory of meaning. The positivists
accepted the distinction between the analytic (that which is necessarily true)
and the synthetic (that which is contingently true). Science was the construc-
tion of systems of synthetic propositions. A statement was meaningful if it
could be verified (that is, if its truth value could be established through
observation). All statements which were neither analytic nor verifiable were
deemed to be nonsense. Related to the verificationist principle was the
doctrine of physicalism. Physicalism was the position that all statements
should be made in a pure and objective observation language, the best
example of which was the language of physics. Since this language was the
bedrock for expressing all empirical statements, any statement expressed in
other terms (as might be the case in psychology) ultimately must be reducible
to physical language. Hence the unity of the sciences, and the necessity of
reduction.
Whereas logical positivism addressed the meaning of sentences, operation-
ism as developed by Bridgeman concerned the meaning of concepts. The
operationist position maintained that the meaning of a concept is synonymous
with the corresponding set of operations. Most often these are operations of
measurement, and the canonical illustration is that of length: operationally,
length means nothing more than the operations of the measurement of length,
such as placing a meter stick beside an object and reading off the value.
Ernst Mach hardly would have agreed with any of this, either the logical
positivist or the operationist positions. Rather than devising a rational
reconstruction of scientific knowledge, Mach's treatment of science began
with an historical treatment of the origins of physical concepts in the experi-
ences of everyday life. The Medieval stonemason was less interested in the
metaphysics of eternity than in building a church steeple that would not fall
down. Science for Mach began in the practical concerns of practical people,
adjusting to the world and working effectively within it. From this context
Mach developed his principle of economy, according to which science is the
economical description of facts. Smith (1986, p. 268), who presents an
exceptional summary of Mach and Skinner's relation to him, quotes the
following from The Science of Mechanics.
224 Schnaitter
Economy of communication and of apprehension is of the very essence of science ... In

the beginning, all economy had in immediate view the satisfaction simply of bodily
wants. With the artisan, and still more so with the investigator, the concisest and simplest
possible knowledge of a given province of natural phenomena - a knowledge that is at-
tained with the least intellectual expenditure - naturally becomes in itself an economical
aim, but though it was at first a means to an end, when the mental motives connected
therewith are once developed and demand their satisfaction, all thought of its original
purpose, the personal need, disappears.
Thus for Mach science exhibits the economy of biological adaptation in the
satisfaction of basic needs.
Mach was as well a phenomenalist. That is to say, Mach took all matters of
fact to originate in sensory experience. Although alien to the twentieth century
mode of scientific thought, phenomenalism was prominent in the nineteenth
century where for example chemistry, due to its reliance on spectrographic
analysis, was once defined as the science of color (Blackmore, 1972). Under
such a construal ontology becomes less committed to the physical, and the
position of neutral monism was popular. "In Mach's neutral monism, the
elements that are related in the descriptive laws of science are pure experi-
ences that are neither mental nor physical but neutral givens" (Smith, 1986,
p. 34). Neutral monism maintains that the substance of the world is of a single
kind but does not force a claim as to the exact character of that kind.
Skinner's epistemological views follow naturally from Mach's. Fundamen-
tally for Skinner knowledge is action (Schnaitter, 1987). One knows about
some portion of the world to the extent that one has a repertoire of effective
action regarding it. Like Mach, Skinner sees no demarcation between
scientific knowledge and knowledge acquired in daily life, a position also
characterizing American pragmatism. Effective action can be taken relative
to what is experienced in the world, but little of merit can be done based on
what is invisible, imaginary, or fictional. Mental events are often invented to
give the illusion of explanation. Invented mental events range from Freud's
theory of the unconscious to the mental mechanisms of contemporary
cognitive psychology. Fictional mental events are to be contrasted with private
events, those events which occur covertly or within the skin and are real but
not public.
When Skinner (1945) decried "the arid philosophy of truth by agreement"
it was methodological behaviorism he had in mind. His main point was that
by relating itself to the verificationist and operationist constraints on accept-
able data language, methodological behaviorism ruled frrst person phenomena
out of psychology. In contrast Skinner clearly stated an interest in the person
"from within." Yet through such assertions as "I contend that my toothache is
just as physical as my typewriter," Skinner did not make his sense of the
person within as clear as necessary. Typewriters are intersubjectively

verifiable objects of the external world, and if toothaches are no different then
it is not clear why he would disagree with the verificationist program of
methodological behaviorism. On the other hand Skinner also retreats from the
physicalist gesture when he afftrms his belief in "one world." At this point he
may have in mind something closer to the neutral monism of Mach. Skinner's
monism is materialistic, but with a difference. Materialism does not necessar-
ily commit one to asserting that the world is made up of nothing but the things
out of which the predicates of contemporary physics are formed. Were this
true then the score in last night's Cubs game would be a transcendental fiction,
not to mention toothaches as first person phenomena and sensings, yearnings,
and idle thoughts of every kind.
Logical positivism was perhaps the ultimate expression of foundationalist
epistemology, wherein empirical knowledge was presumed to be built on the
intersubjectively verifiable and the physically reducible. Since its heyday,
however, everything epistemological has moved in the opposite direction. And
in contrast to logical positivism, Skinner's epistemology is non-foundational
and compatible with these recent trends in post-foundationalist epistemologi-
cal thought. Skinner deeply distrusts facile appeals to human rationality.
Within his framework no product of thought can assure certainty about
anything. But at the same time neither is Skinner's fallibilism the product of
simple cultural relativism. He is impressed less with the differences among
systems of understanding than with their common accountability to those
natural circumstances within which all actions occur, whether blindly or
knowingly. As he once cryptically remarked, the human situation is that of a
dog on a dark plain. I
The persistent concern raised about non-foundational epistemologies is that
they are relativistic. Relativism is potentially insidious because, if knowledge
claims are not subject to an independent and universal standard, it would seem
to be impossible to make judgements as to the worth of any particular claim.
But Skinner's epistemology is no more relativistic than it is foundationalist.
Relativism is prevented through the regulative effects of selection by conse-
quences. Any knowledge claim is subject to a natural evaluative process
resulting from the consequences of acting on that claim. Selection by
consequences is a sort of naturalistic Popperian falsificationism: bad ideas get
selected out by virtue of adverse consequences, although successful ideas are
not thereby "true" in any absolute sense. All one can say of them is that they
work, at least over the range through which they have been applied. What
makes Skinner's position non-foundational is that he makes no attempt to
articulate a selective criterion which nature universally applies to knowledge
claims. Skinner would take this to be a hopeless, useless pursuit. Knowledge
226 Schnaitter
claims are too diverse and nature too multifarious to allow a simple formula
of selection.
Thus the sympathies of behaviorism are not with logical positivism or with
operationism as is so often charged, but with Mach's earlier positivism, with
American pragmatism and the truth criterion of effective working, and even
to a degree with the more radical post-modem critical modes. Behaviorists
have found the pragmatic and hermeneutic views of Rorty to be congenial (see
the critical response to his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature), and
Andresen (1990) has gone so far as to identify certain commonalities with the
work of Foucault and Derrida. Taken as a whole, then, Skinner's does not
appear to be a tongue-biting epistemology as Flanagan charges, but a position
that is contemporary, unique, and powerful.
2. THE PROBLEM OF THE STIMULUS INDEPENDENCE OF BEHAVIOR
If behavior is a function of the environment, and a behavioral analysis

establishes the probability of response by reference to configuration of the
stimulus array, then for every response one would want to see a relevant
stimulus: not identified after the fact, but predictively, before the behavior,
and sufficient to distinguish the likelihood of one response from another. It has
often been said, however, that human behavior in natural contexts is substan-
tially free of direct environmental influence. Behavior is too often novel, or
creative, or autonomous and free, Chomsky complains in section three of his
1959 review.
A typical example of 'stimulus control' for Skinner would be the response to a piece of
music with the utterance Mozart or to a painting with the response Dutch. These re-
sponses are asserted to be 'under the control of extremely subtle properties' of the physi-
cal object or event. Suppose instead of saying Dutch we had said Clashes with the wall-
paper, I thought you liked abstract work, Never saw it before, Tilted, Hanging too low,
Beautiful, Hideous, Remember our camping trip last summer?, or whatever else might
come into our minds when looking at a picture (in Skinnerian translation, whatever other
responses exist in sufficient strength). Skinner could only say that each of these responses
is under the control of some other stimulus property of the physical object. If we look at
a red chair and say red, the response is under the control of the stimulus 'redness'; if we
say chair, it is under the control of the collection of properties (for Skinner, the object)
'chairness', and similarly for any other response. This device is as simple as it is empty.
Since properties are free for the asking ... the word 'stimulus' has lost all objectivity in
this usage. Stimuli are no longer part of the outside physical world; they are driven back
into the organism. We identify the stimulus when we hear the response. (Chomsky, 1959,
p.31)
Chomsky is running together at least three related claims. Perhaps most

generally he argues that stimuli can not be identified in naturalistic, human,
linguistic settings. What is a person likely to say when standing before The
Nightwatch in the Rijksmuseum? Clearly such naturalistic cases pose a

problem not nearly so much in evidence when considering the possible
response of a food-deprived pigeon confronted with an illuminated response
key in an operant conditioning chamber where it has been trained. Study of
highly constrained situations as occurs within the operant conditioning
paradigm may instill a false sense that the whole world operates with the
causal transparency of the operant conditioning context.
Furthermore, Chomsky gives a reason why in these naturalistic settings
identification of the relevant stimuli prior to occurrence of the behavior which
the stimulus occasions is impossible: "We cannot predict verbal behavior in
terms of the stimuli in the speaker's environment, since we do not know what
the current stimuli are until he responds" (Chomsky, 1959, p. 32). Thus
identification of the stimulus is post hoc. Chomsky accuses Skinner of
circularity in the identification of stimuli.
Chomsky also claims that the behaviorist characterization of stimuli is not
objective. Chomsky would prefer that stimuli be specified "objectively," in the
language of physics, independently of the response of any individual. For
example an apple described by its mass or volume would be given an
objective description, as would a chair described in terms of its rather complex
solid geometry or by its position and momentum. An apple described by its
mass falls seamlessly under mechanical laws and thus mass is an objective
property for describing an apple. On the other hand, to describe an apple as a
food object on the grounds that it is a member of a class of objects that a
hungry subject places in its mouth, chews up, and swallows is not to describe
the apple objectively. The description of the apple as a member of a class of
food objects does not specify the object according to its projectable physical
properties. "Food" does not designate a property of matter over which
physical laws extend. Chomsky argues that the functional, behavior-dependent
specification of the stimulus is vacuous.
That the only categories available to behaviorism are physical categories is
assumed by virtually all critics in the cognitivist community. One finds it
again and again in the cognitive discussion of behaviorism. Pylyshyn develops
this orthodoxy with greater rigor than Chomsky.
It is true that such things as "beliefs" are derived from past experiences (perhaps even
from experiences that were "reinforced"). Thus one might think this story could be retold
using behavioral terms. The behavioral story, however, is not equivalent to the cognitive
one - for an important reason. In the behavioral story past experiences must be classified
in terms of a particular, objective taxonomy, a taxonomy that partitions classes of histo-
ries according to the physical properties of stimuli and behaviors. The way histories must
be partitioned in order for them to correspond to states of knowledge, however, requires
that we be capable of speaking of such things as the meaning of a sentence, or the inter-
pretation the person placed on a certain stimulus, or the action intended by a certain be-
havior that formed part of the history. Unless the history leading to a particular functional
228 Schnaitter
state is categorized this way, we cannot use it to explain why someone does what he does
Most non-behaviorists believe that the reason behavior is stimulus-free is that what peo-
ple do depends to a great extent on what they believe at the moment, how they perceive
a situation at the moment, on what they think will be the consequences of various behav-
iors, and so on. This stimulus-independence is not capricious or stochastic; it is merely
governed by different principles ... If we attempt to describe human behavior in terms of
physical properties of the environment, we soon come to the conclusion that, except for
tripping, falling, sinking, bouncing off w~ls, and certain autonomic reflexes, human be-
havior is essentially random. Yet we know that human behavior, if described in cognitive
terms, is highly regular and systematic. And that, of course, is not very good news for
behaviorism. (Pylyshyn, 1984, pp. 8,12)
This is a devilish clever argument. According to Pylyshyn, the behavioral

story must categorize stimulus and response in fully objective, physical
language susceptible to expression in the laws of physics. Although he gives
no reason for this claim, perhaps it is because Pylyshyn sees the alternative to
the fully objective language of physics as the subjective categories of
mentalism, which behaviorism disavows. Pylyshyn's second premise is that,
beyond such "behaviors" as tripping, falling and bouncing off walls, human
behavior can't be accounted for via physical categories. So, he concludes,
behaviorism is incapable of accounting for human action.
Chomsky's interesting variant on this argument is to complain that Skinner
fails to conform with the physical description imperative. This is one of the
oddest stratagems to be found in the critical literature because, according to
the second premise of Pylyshyn's argument, such conformity would doom
Skinner's project to failure. Skinner is faulted for not jumping off the cliff
toward which Chomsky has pointed him! Such rhetorical tomfoolery has
completely captivated two generations of cognitivists.
In any event, however, Chomsky was not the first to discuss the problems
of the stimulus. Eight years earlier Lashley had published an important paper
on the problem of serial order in behavior (Lashley, 1951). In contrast to
Chomsky's sweeping condemnation of behaviorism's treatment of the
stimulus, Lashley's arguments were specific and detailed. Lashley presented
numerous examples where a stimulus chain could not account for the serial
ordering of a series of individual responses. For example, consider the finger
movements of a concert pianist as she ripples through an arpeggio in one of
Liszt's more arduous works. How are the finger movements organized and
controlled? One possibility might be that the pianist sees the first note of the
arpeggio on the score and in consequence strikes the appropriate key. The
sound of the first note then serves as a stimulus for the performer to make the
second keystroke. And so on and so forth. Presumably the hopelessness of
such an analysis is apparent, but to further drive home the problem Lashley
went on to point out that the time for neural conduction from brain to muscle
was longer than the interval between notes in the performance of the arpeggio.
Thus, Lashley concluded it is impossible for the stimulus consequence of each
elemental response to serve as the evocative stimulus for the subsequent
response element. The neuromuscular system just isn't fast enough to support
the observable performance.
Lashley was also among the first to draw attention to the combinatorial
problem of serial order, which is of particular significance in language.
Neither individual speech sounds nor words nor sentences have an intrinsic
order as would seem to be required in a serial associative chain, e.g., the p, t,
and n of cap, cat, and can cannot be regulated associatively by ca, with which
indifferently each word begins. Similarly,friend and fogey cannot both be
serial associations to He is an old - . The ordering of language seems to
require "the existence of generalized schemata of action which determine the
sequence of specific acts, acts which in themselves or in their associations
seem to have no temporal valence" (Lashley, 1951, p. 188).
Through such examples Lashley argued that many serially ordered
phenomena occur independently of element-by-element stimulation. Among
ideas current in psychology at the time, Lashley's specific charge was that S-R
associative chaining is incapable of accounting for these serial order phenom-
ena. Since behavior does exhibit serial order effects, however, some higher-
order process or mechanism must provide the organization to such behavior.
A further variant on the argument for the stimulus independence of
behavior has been the claim that the environments in which certain behaviors
have been acquired are insufficient to account for the features of those
behaviors. This argument is prominent in developmental linguistics, where it
is argued that the environmental context in which language is learned is
always "impoverished" relative to the rich linguistic competence which every
speaker normally displays. Therefore, it is claimed, language is not learned in
any conventional sense, but instead is largely innate (e.g., Pinker, 1994).
In sum, many different versions of the stimulus-independence argument
have been raised. Because of the many different versions of the argument, the
response is necessarily an extended one.
Lashley's arguments can be addressed straightforwardly. The target of these
criticisms was mediational behaviorism. Within the mediational approach, the
theory of stimUlus-response chains had been offered to account for serially
ordered behaviors. The theories were not based on observation and experi-
mental control but were, in fact, speculative. In most cases the purported
controlling stimuli were not environmental but were the proprioceptive and
kinesthetic stimulation produced by behavior itself. Such stimulation seemed
in exactly the right place to serve as the stimulation required for the next
muscular contraction contributing to a complex performance. Such stimuli
230 Schnaitter
occur "inside the skin," as Skinner was inclined to say, and are resistant either
to observation or experimental control. The S-R associative chain theory
decomposed observable molar processes by offering a theory of the underly-
ing mechanism. Behaviorists don't do that, and the criticism doesn't hold.
But how, one might ask, does behaviorism account for serial order?
Behaviorism faces special problems and limitations in approaching the
problem of serial order. Temporality requires that events controlling other
events precede them, resulting in a left-to-right ordering of stimulus and
response. In order not to be swallowed by the difficulties that Lashley
identified, behaviorism must have resources in its causal analysis to transcend
this left-to-right ordering. Several such causal modes can be identified.
(1) Behaviorism treats behavior as a functional, achievement class. If
'closing the door' is the response, then it is this achievement that shows an
orderly relation to the environment, not necessarily the component movements
which underlie the achievement. The achievement may be a relatively molar
class of behavior, made up of many component movements which display a
serial ordering. Since these individual movements are not the material which
shows an orderly relation to environmental variables, the serial order effects
at this level of analysis are not addressed. In other words, behavior may show
serial order effects at a level of analysis to which behavior analysis does not
extend. If this level is of special interest, then we have a limitation on behavior
analysis. Functional response classes are often built up through experience,
however. For a novice at the piano each note may be a single achievement, but
for the accomplished pianist it may be an entire phrase. Relatively large
chunks of verbal behavior sometimes occur as a unit as in certain idioms,
phrases, and even whole sentences which have been "committed to memory,"
as one says.
(2) Some environmental causes are active over an entire series of responses.
These conditions control a serial property not via a serial mechanism per se
but via a superordinate process. For example experimental subjects respond
rapidly on ratio schedules of reinforcement. Under ratio schedules reinforce-
ment rate is a function of response rate: as response rate goes up, so does
reinforcement rate. Thus, responding tends to be rapid. The controlling
variable is understood to be the response-controlled effect of reinforcement
rate. The rate of an event is a molar, temporally integrated phenomenon. As
a causal regulator of behavior it superordinates over sequences of behavior
rather than serving as an element in a sequential, left-to-right chain. This
illustrates a broader causal principle.
(3) Multiple controlling variables can be simultaneously active. Any
situation allowing choice would be a case in point. In an experimental
situation a press of the left lever may produce food according to one set of
conditions; a press on the right lever may produce water according to another
set of conditions. That is to say, the causal structure of the environment may
be complex and multiform. Serial phenomena will emerge out of the interac-
tion of these simultaneous contingencies. In the verbal situation a given setting
may make a wide range of responses probable. A red chair in the furniture
store might raise the probability of responses such as "red," "chair," "comfort-
able looking," "would go nice in the living room," "do you like it?," etc. All
of these things can't be said simultaneously. Consequently to say anything at
all is to choose among alternatives. Choice thus results in an ordering, but
something further must happen to ensure more than a random result.
(4) The most intriguing behavioral proposal for a serial ordering process is
the 'autoclitic.' Although this process was proposed by Skinner in his analysis
of verbal behavior (Skinner, 1957), the basic process may have wider
applicability. The autoclitic consists of verbal behavior which is under the
control of other verbal behavior, prior to emission of any verbal behavior. An
example is the easiest way to explain this difficult concept. A red chair may
evoke the primary verbal responses "chair" and "red." These are the raw
materials out of which an utterance will be formed. The autoclitic is a
response not to the red chair but to these primary verbal responses. Skinner
would say that "is" in the statement "The chair is red" is a relational autoclitic
which organizes and relates the primary verbal responses "chair" and "red."
The autoclitic thus gives order and structure to the utterance. Although the
autoclitic theory needs systematic development to be a successful tool in
accounting for serial order, it is a provocative alternative to systems of rules
as seen in generative grammars and other cognitive proposals.
The deep question raised by the autoclitic is whether grammar is an
antecedent cause of ordering, or is a property of the effect of an ordering
process. In cognitive psychology and psycholinguistics grammar is a cause of
the syntactic properties of verbal behavior. For the behaviorist, grammar is
evidenced in the verbal behavior itself and is to be classified among the effects
of other, antecedent processes which are not necessarily themselves gram-
matical in nature. The autoclitic is potentially one such ordering process.
These, then, are four of the means through which behaviorism can address
serial order, among many others. In short, the problem of serial order is not a
unique kind of problem, but a problem like any other dimension or aspect of
behavior: just one more thing to be accounted for.
Each of Chomsky's three charges needs to be separately addressed. First
consider the question of the "objectivity" of the stimulus and the response in
behavioral descriptions. Chomsky considers it a major fault that Skinner fails
to physically specify the stimulus for much verbal behavior? Pylyshyn, on the
232 Schnaitter
other hand, argues that a physical taxonomy of stimulus and response fails to
categorize human actions. Something needs clarification.
Chomsky is correct that behaviorism does not employ physical categories
of stimulation and response. Pylyshyn is wrong about this. On the other hand
Chomsky seems to think that behaviorism ought to be committed to the
objectivity of physical categories. On this count he is wrong, and Pylyshyn is
right about the limitations of such a commitment. Behaviorism's basic
category, the operant, is functionally specified, not physically specified. The
operant is a class of behavior defined by a common effect. This takes careful
explanation. Recall for a moment the model of behavior sketched in Figure 1
above, where the causal structure of the subject was placed in interaction with
the causal structure of the environment. The light switch on the wall of a room
is an example of an environmental causal structure. It is a completely
objective, physical device attached on one side to the electrical distribution
grid of a power plant a distance away and on the other side to a nearby light
bulb. A person entering the room is said to 'turn on the light' but may do so
in an indefinitely large number of ways, including moving the switch with the
fingers, rubbing one's back against it (as might be done if one's hands are
full), or even through bizarre movement forms such as lifting the switch with
the tongue or standing on one's hands and flipping the switch with the toes.
These movements cohere into a class due to a common effect. Virtually
everything that people do attains a functional identity in this way.
The laboratory analysis of behavior is built on this truth. Consider the
example of a lever-press in the operant conditioning situation. The environ-
ment is constructed in such a way that a lever on the front of the chamber can
be depressed to the point that an electrical switch is closed. This switch
operates circuitry which can be arranged to deliver consequences of interest
to the organism, such as pellets of food. The lever and associated electrical
and dispensing apparatus can be given a complete physical description,
including the mechanics of the lever's operation, the required force vectors,
etc. This physical description, however, says nothing about behavior. A rat
which has learned to lever-press in this context will make a variety of
movements which bring it in contact with the lever. The movements of the rat
might also be given a bio-mechanical description. However, the causal
structure of the environment is indifferent to the subtleties of the neuromus-
cular events taking place within the rat. The lever will be closed only if a force
of a certain magnitude is applied to it, and nothing about muscular contrac-
tions, limb trajectories, or biomechanical topographies need be specified. The
behaviorist observes this interaction as a third party. What the behaviorist sees
are occurrences of instances of a category of behavior defined by a common
achievement, outcome, or consequence. The consequence is objective and the
elements of the class of behaviors are objective, but as a class the movement
of the rat is not an objective physical category (cf. Zuriff, 1985).
Thus the operant is a junctional, not a physical, category. Skinner's
argument in Verbal Behavior is that language operates this way, too. "Pass the
salt," "Salt please," and "Could you hand me that thingamajig with the white
stuff in it" cohere into a response class within a certain environmental context
because they are capable of evoking a common effect. As Pylyshyn would
say, the class has no projectable physical property, it cannot enter into
physical laws.
These examples make clear that categories of action are not intrinsic
properties of the response. Actions are coordinate relations between move-
ment and effect. Pressing a lever, winning a foot race, asking for salt,
christening a babe, even scratching one's nose are actions in which a variety
of bio-mechanical events either count or do not count as an act of the specified
kind according to external conditions or criteria. Where those conditions are
set by the physical environment, as in the case of pressing a lever, the criterion
can be given a physical description. Many acts are social, however, where a
social act is best defined as any case in which the individuation of the
response class of individual A is a product of the differential response of
individual B. Consider Figure 1 again, but conceive of it as describing two
individuals, each serving as the "causal structure of the environment" for the
other. In this situation we have no wedge of accessible physical structure for
defining response classes. This may be a sad fact from the point of view of the
wistful physicalist, but it is a fact nonetheless.
Some behaviorists may continue to believe that they operate within the
traditions of "objective" data language, all concepts expressible within the
"physical thing language," etc. In doing so they manifest a legacy of logical
positivism. Thus they are leery of the kind of argument just developed, seeing
the only alternative to the physical as the mental, dualistic, spooky, ghostlike.
Such a fear is unwarranted. One can believe that everything is physical
without being committed to the belief that every kind of thing is a physical
kind. The former position is called token-identity physicalism, while the
position that all kinds or types of thing are physical would be type-identity
physicalism. The former does not entail the later. These distinctions were first
drawn to differentiate among various theories of mind, but they have been
generalized to non-mental categories as well. Consider the example of the type
'clock.' We might agree that every token of the type - every individual clock
- can be given a well-formed physical description. Yet it is impossible to give
a physical description to the type 'clock' itself, that is, the category of which
every conceivable clock is a member. Such a category would include candies,
water jugs, sand-filled hour-glasses, escapement and electronic clocks,
234 Schnaitter
sundials, and so on and so forth. Yet the concept of clock can be defined as "a
device for telling time," a functional rather than a physical specification.
The example of the concept of 'clock' can be used to illustrate the manner
in which behaviorism defines the stimulus. Any individual stimulus can be
given an objective, physical description. However, the categories to which
organisms respond can only be determined empirically, by observing the
effect that individual stimuli have on the behavior of the subject. If the subject
responds similarly to a set of stimuli that set is by definition a stimulus class,
whether the class coheres under a physical description or not. Thus an infant,
a child, and an adult could be shown groups of objects, including clocks and
non-clocks, and asked to categorize them accordingly. The resulting classes
might differ considerably from individual to individual. That may not be
pretty, but it happens to be the way things are. The stimulus class can only be
determined empirically, not defined a priori by reference to shared physical
properties.
Chomsky charges that the functional identification of stimulus classes is
vacuous. Presumably by vacuous he means that such an approach to identifi-
cation of stimulus classes is circular. But the procedure I have sketched for
mapping out the stimulus class 'clock' is not circular. What would be circular
would be to employ the class as an explanation of the classification: some-
thing like "the reason the child didn't count the sundial as a clock was because
it wasn't in the child's clock category." Such an explanation wouldn't be
enlightening. But behaviorists are disinclined to explain anything in the usual
sense. The epistemological views of behaviorism restrict it to what others
would call pure description.
The charge of vacuity via circularity has a long history. The main response
to it came from Meehl (1950), who made the argument that the reinforcement
concept was not circular, despite the bootstraps methodology required to
identify reinforcers, due to the trans-situationality of reinforcers so identified.
Although developments in reinforcement theory since the publication of
Meehl's paper make certain caveats necessary (Schnaitter, 1978), the
substance of his argument holds. Charges of circularity in regard to identifica-
tion of the setting stimulus and behavior can be answered in parallel.
Another theme Chomsky uses to great rhetorical effect concerns the
problem of accounting for naturally occurring events through application of
scientific principle. Science is caught in the middle: on the one hand, odd
phenomena from ordinary experience are presented to the scientist as test
cases for the adequacy of the science. If the scientist refuses to offer an
account in the absence of the opportunity for careful empirical study, the
science is criticized for being irrelevant to the phenomena of everyday life. On
the other hand, a scientist who does speculate on the nature of phenomena
from ordinary experience is accused of scientism. Chomsky correctly

expresses doubt that one can accurately predict what someone will say
standing before a painting for the first time. But that isn't the point. No
scientist can predict what phenomena will occur in a situation where nothing
is known about the causal factors at work. The point is, can an analysis which
is known to be effective in a controlled situation cast light on a situation which
otherwise might be entirely opaque? Clearly, Chomsky didn't think Skinner
could do so, although others might disagree with him.
In any event, Chomsky does not play fair in his test cases. When one looks
at a red chair does one say "red," or "chair"? The example makes it seem as
though non-psychotic adult humans wander through their environment
uttering "chair!", "red!", or "vacuum cleaner!" more or less at random.
Naming of objects and properties normally takes place in a context. "I like that
red chair, but do you think it might clash with the carpet?" might be said
between persons selecting items in a furniture store. It is much less likely to
be said by someone in an art museum viewing an interior by de Hooch.
Although without further information we will not be able to predict the
specific form of response, the causes of much verbal behavior can be plausibly
reconstructed from rich contexts. Chomsky in his own work, however, focuses
on examples of utterly decontextualized, constructed verbal behavior such as
his famous "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously," a string with no more
significance than any concatenation pulled from a hat.
Chomsky would also seem to beg the question concerning gaps in the
historical, functional analysis of behavior. As Moore points out (this volume),
the historical and descriptive project of behaviorism necessarily results in
temporal gaps in the analysis. The gaps may be between the stimulus and the
response, and between past experience with a contingency and current
exposure. Whenever observing a subject for the first time during one of these
gaps, there just isn't anything to see insofar as controlling variables go. No
theory - Chomskian, cognitive, neurophysiological- can do better. Short of
mind reading, no psychological framework can penetrate the causal influences
on a person picked at random in undisclosed circumstances and make an iron-
clad prediction of what will happen next. Why then does this fact count as a
devastating strike against behaviorism? For one reason only: because
Chomsky said it.
Finally, just a brief comment on the charge that the stimulus environment
is too impoverished for children to acquire language according to behaviorist
principles. It is quite amazing to learn from the cognitivists, including
Chomsky, what these principles are. Chomsky says "it is simply not true that
children can learn language only through 'meticulous care' on the part of
adults who shape their verbal repertoire through careful differential reinforce-
236 Schnaitter
ment ... " (Chomsky, 1959, p. 42). One might gather from this quotation that
Skinner had proposed what Chomsky here denies, including the expression
'meticulous care,' with its meticulously misleading punctuation. Neither the
general proposition nor the specifically emphasized words can be found in
Verbal Behavior.
Here and in many other places critics have charged behaviorism with
twisting, distorting, mangling and forcing the phenomena of everyday life into
a false conformity with an a priori system of inflexible principles. This is an
absolutely amazing perspective on the behaviorist program. The most
important behaviorist principle I am acquainted with is getting to the bottom
of things and finding out what is what. It should be clear to everyone that
being born a human gives a powerful advantage in acquiring language, just as
being hatched an eagle gives a powerful advantage in learning to fly. Species
membership does not scare behaviorists off.
Very few behaviorists do work in the area of language acquisition, and
quite probably there is much that a behaviorist can learn from the most recent
findings in this area of investigation. What a behaviorist would caution
against, however, is something similar to that with which it has been charged:
an a priori view of the nature of language may tum into a self-fulfilling search
for just those pieces of evidence required to buttress what has already been
decided upon.
3. THE INTENTIONALITY PROBLEM
When ordinary people are asked for ordinary accounts of what they are doing
and why, they resort to expressions such as I need to talk to Joe, and I believe he
is probably home about now so it is probably a good time to call. Superficially
these expressions appear unexceptional, but on closer examination they contain
a feature frrst noted by the scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages, namely,
the fact that the mental phenomena in such expressions make reference to, or are
directed upon, an object or a content. In the illustration the mental state of desire
designated as a "need" is directed upon an object which is the condition of
satisfaction of that need, namely, ''to talk to Joe." The mental state of belief also
has a content, in this case "he is probably home about now." To desire or to
believe are to adopt different mental modes which stand in a relation to their
respective contents. This, at any rate, is how the problem of intentionality is
traditionally expressed and it has been widely discussed in this way since
Brentano made the strong claim that the intentional is the mark of the mental
(Brentano, 1874).
Brentano's claim might have passed as an observation of slight import had it

not been for a further point, namely that mental phenomena appear to be the only
phenomena in the world which are characterized by intentionality (or in the
scholastic tum of phrase, by the intentional inexistence of an object). That is to
say, physical phenomena are not similarly directed on an object. Additional
properties of the intentional help make this clear. The contents of intentional
states do not necessarily exist ("I believe in the existence of manticores;" and "I
do want my own manticore so very, very much"), a feature that logicians call the
failure of existential generalization. Furthermore, the facts that Lois Lane
believes she is in love with Superman and Superman is really Clark Kent do not
converge to make it true necessarily that Lois Lane believes she is in love with
Clark Kent, for she may be unaware of Superman's true identity. This is the
problem of referential opacity. Whereas mental predicates fail at existential
generalization and demonstrate referential opacity the physical generally do not.
Consequently Brentano concluded that intentionality was the demarcation
between the mental and the physical.
If Brentano' s thesis is correct, then it would appear that psychology stands
outside the physical world and psychological phenomena cannot be explained by
reference to it. This consequence of intentionality has not gone unnoticed, and
various tactics have been proposed to defeat it. One tactic might be to establish
that mental predicates are analyzable as dispositional predicates. To believe that
Kansas City is in Missouri, it might be claimed, is to manifest a disposition
expressible as a set of if/then relations between contextual conditions and
specifiable behaviors. lllustratively, if asked "Where is Kansas City located?",
the believer of the proposition that Kansas City is in Missouri should be disposed
to answer, "In Missouri;" and if he is told to point out Kansas City in an atlas,
then he will likely tum to the map of Missouri; etc. This essentially was Ryle's
move in The Ghost in the Machine (Ryle, 1948; also see Schnaitter, 1985).
The entire dispositional program fell on irreversibly hard times, however,
when it became clear that the specification of all the iflthen conditionals required
for each dispositional analysis of a psychological predicate was effectively
endless (Chisholm, 1957). But worse than that, even if all the if/then conditionals
could be spelled out, they only held conditionally on indefinitely many other
psychological predicates, e.g., even if the belief that Kansas City is in Missouri
disposes one to say "Missouri" in response to the query about the location of
Kansas City, one is so disposed only if one understands the English language,
desires to tell the truth, believes the question was asked sincerely, etc. According
to the proposal each one of these further predicates would then require a
dispositional analysis, effectively multiplying the endless by the everlasting.
Intentionality, by this account, is a closed circle.
238 Schnaitter
The magnitude of this problem would be hard to overstate. What we have is

a demonstration that intentional predicates are not reducible to dispositional
predicates. Successful reductions map complexity onto simplicity, but attempts
at dispositional reductions work the other way. A dispositional expression of the
belief that Kansas City is in Missouri requires an indefinitely large conjunction
of iflthen conditionals.
A somewhat related observation is that all intentional states are linked together
and must be taken as a whole. The meaning of any given intentional ascription
in some way presupposes a background of all the other intentional states and
contents which characterize the individual in question. One way to formulate this
analysis would be to claim that it is impossible to hold one (and only one) belief.
Stich (1983) gives the example of a person suffering from advanced Alzheimer's
disease. When queried about the fate of President McKinley the person correctly
states that he was assassinated. When asked for the meaning of 'assassination' ,
the identity of President McKinley, or any other question, the person is unable
to answer. Would we want to say, then, that the person does actually believe that
McKinley was assassinated? Most people would be inclined to disagree. To
believe at all is to believe many related things, and it is impossible to hold a
single belief. ill this sense intentional states are holistic.
The confluence of these various claims about intentionality has led many if not
most philosophers to conclude that the intentional is indeed a necessary property
of the mental and that intentional predicates are indispensable in psychological
descriptions. Hence the intentional is ineliminable.
Now, if all this is true then it would seem to be very bad news for behavior-
ism For from this perspective psychology must be robustly intentionalistic or it
will be sadly beside the point As Searle has put it, ''what we want from the social
sciences and what we get from the social sciences at their best are theories of
pure and applied intentionality" (Searle, 1984, p. 85). But behaviorism is widely
considered to be incompatible with the intentional stance. Human behavior is
infused with intentionality, not just in the primary beliefs and desires which drive
given actions, but in the interrelated network of supporting beliefs and desires.
Behaviorism, rather than recognizing this complexity, has been accused of
masking it. Dennett (1978) famously elaborated on the distortions of the operant
conditioning paradigm.
Skinner's experimental design is supposed to eliminate the intentional, but it merely
masks it. Skinner's non-intentional predictions work to the extent they do, not because
Skinner has truly found non-intentional behavioral laws, but because the highly reliable
intentional predictions underlying his experimental situations (the rat desires food and
believes it will get food by pressing the bar - something for which it has been given good
evidence - so it will press the bar) are disguised by leaving virtually no room in the envi-
ronment for more than one bodily motion to be the appropriate action and by leaving
virtually no room in the environment for discrepancy to arise between the subject's be-
liefs and the reality. (Dennett, 1978, p. 15)
Thus intentionality is a serious problem deserving from the behaviorist a

prolonged and serious response. Purely dismissive gestures are insufficient.
While Quine argues for the elimination of intentional idioms on the grounds that
they cannot be reduced to physical language (Quine, 1960), Quine's tactic is that
of the logician and the behaviorist cannot follow. At the very least behaviorists
should consider the problem of intentionality to be a most interesting case of
verbal behavior, not to be dismissed but to be explored and understood. The
standard behavioristic line that the mental is the fictional is just not good enough.
Yet. there is no reason to expect of behaviorism or for behaviorism to expect
of itself an immediate and definitive analysis of the problem of intentionality.
The problem has been recognized for centuries and so far no one has been able
to arrive at such an analysis. Why should behaviorism be expected to succeed in
a few aphoristic turns of phrase where others have fallen short? Furthermore, the
final answer will most certainly invoke not only the convergence of many
interacting variables in the natural environment both concurrent and historical
which require recognition of the temporal gaps in functional relationships, but
also the coincident occurrence of private events which can occur as part of the
general constellation of phenomena identified by the intentional idioms.
With that said, perhaps we can muster our courage and tentatively begin to
chip away at the intentionalistic edifice, looking for points of entry which might
hold promise for further investigation. Perhaps the situation is not quite as
overwhelming as the mentalist would have it.
To begin with, reconsider Dennett's charge that the operant conditioning
paradigm "masks" intentionality. This is a strange thing to claim. The phenom-
ena of rat intentionality seem all too apparent to Dennett: he describes the rat as
desiring food, believing that pressing the lever obtains food, etc. What is possibly
masked about this, when these very phenomena are what the situation is meant
to analyze? One would think instead that Dennett might laud the operant
paradigm for simplifying the clutter of an ordinary rat's life and drawing out its
central intentional features. One could as well charge that Galileo's simple
experiments with balls rolling down inclined planes masked the forces that make
things fall instead of making them more clear.
Dennett's attack on the operant conditioning situation focuses on the limited
response possibilities of that situation and the uncomplicated motor response
required to achieve an instance of the response class. E.g., "suppose a mouse
were trained, in a Skinner box with a food reward, to take exactly four steps
forward and press a bar with its nose; if Skinner's laws truly held between stimuli
and responses defmed in terms of bodily motion, were we to move the bar an
inch farther away, so four steps did not reach it. Skinner would have to predict
that the mouse would jab its nose into the empty air rather than take a fifth step"
(Dennett. 1978, p. 14). Clearly, Dennett's study of Skinner did not get to Chapter
240 Schnaitter
1, where the functional definition of response is presented. Skinner's (operant)

laws do not hold between stimuli and bodily motions, and have never been meant
to. By going off on this tangent Dennett misses the relevant criticism from the
point of view of the intentional stance, where it might be argued that the operant
conditioning situation does not allow expression of the holism of intentionality.
But if rats have a holistic range of belief and desire the operant conditioning
chamber will not take it away, anymore than a police state interrogation under
blazing lights can cause the hapless victim to suddenly believe only one thing.
The possibility that the selection by consequences paradigm captures the core
features of intentionality has been suggested previously. Day (1980) devoted
three pages to a discussion of intentionality, and as far as I know was the first to
make an interpretation along this line. Ringen's (1976) somewhat earlier paper
is also quite useful, but it will not be reviewed here. Ringen's central task was to
consider Skinner's operant behaviorism relative to Taylor's (1964) distinction
between mechanistic and teleological explanations of behavior. According to
Ringen's analysis, Skinner's conception of operant behavior as a category
individuated by its consequences does have the necessary conceptual resources
for an analysis of action and purpose, according to Taylor's conditions. In this
regard Taylor was wrong in arguing that Skinner's behaviorism is mechanistic.
Ringen distinguishes between Taylor's analysis and that of intentionalists and
treats the later position only briefly.
In order to appreciate Day's position one has to return to a feature of Bren-
tano's treatment of the mental which has been relatively neglected by the
contemporary intentional philosophers. In the history of psychology Brentano is
known foremost as an act psychologist. For Brentano, mental events were acts
directed on objects. Perception was not the display of a perceived content to the
appreciative mind, but an activity of the mind directed on an object. To perceive
that the sky is blue is to perform some sort of mental action whose object is the
blueness of the sky. 3 Following from this formulation Day suggests the following
translation of Brentano' s position into a statement about behavior: ''The content
of action points to something outside itself within the framework of the act, and
behavior can never be reduced to movements capable of adequate description in
purely physical terms" (Day, 1980, pp. 216-217). From this Day apparently
concludes that overt actions individuated by their reinforcing consequences as
in the operant category make such actions intentional, just in Brentano's sense.
Herein lies the intentionality of behaviorism.
Day's position seems confused. Intentional states are such things as beliefs,
desires, hopes, fears, perceivings, longings, and opinions. Intentional states are
sometimes spoken of as the propositional attitudes. That is, every intentional
state can be expressed as a proposition held in a psychological attitude. Thus, one
can believe that the window is open, desire that the door be closed, hope that one
has the opportunity to read a book, fear that the letter will be mailed, etc. But
actions such as opening a window, closing a door, reading a book, or mailing a
letter are not themselves expressible as propositional attitudes. These actions
might be perfonned to realize the content of an intentional state, but they are not
to be identified with intentional states (or acts) themselves. Furthennore, operants
would appear to be neither holistic nor members of a closed conceptual circle.
It is not clear how operants could fail the test of existential generalization or
exhibit the problem of referential opacity. In fact, operant behavior appears not
at all like what either Brentano or contemporary intentionalists have in mind by
an intentional act or state.
Baum and Heath (1992) move in a somewhat different direction. They point
out some of the ordinary uses of the intentional idioms, in cases such as this: "A
person who is seen carrying an umbrella is said to believe it is going to rain and
then is said to carry the umbrella because of the belief. An acceptable explanation
for Skinner would point to a preceding event like hearing a weather report or
seeing clouds in the sky, rather than an inner belief' (Baum and Heath, 1992, p.
1313). They go on to suggest that intentional idioms are invoked when one is
looking for an immediate cause of some behavior. They claim that the intentional
idiom fails at identifying a cause, however, because it superfluously restates the
(third person) observation. Worse yet it is an explanatory fiction since the
original observation, paraphrased as an intention, is then used to explain the
original observation.
This analysis doesn't seem quite right. If the intentional explanation is as
vacuous as Baum and Heath say then it should be resistant to evaluation. But
intentional explanations are extraordinarily easy to test. Suppose we see a
gentleman walking down the street with an umbrella. We need only inquire, "I
suppose you are carrying that umbrella because you believe it is going to rain,"
to have our query either confirmed or discontinned as in, "Not at all, this
umbrella has a poison dart in its tip and I'm off to assassinate the Prime
Minister." One can learn a great deal about the intentional through ordinary
inquiries of this kind. Furthennore the intentional idiom is not a restatement of
the third person observation in another fonn. Believing it is going to rain and
carrying an umbrella are entirely different kinds of things.
The problem with Baum and Heath's analysis cuts deeper than this, however,
for it is clear that they take intentional idioms to be a tool primarily for third
person attributions. But intentionality concerns the sources of behavior and the
intentional idioms are a means of first-person expression of these sources. If a
person is carrying an umbrella and is asked what it is being carried for the person
does not have to ask someone else to tell him what he is doing. The person
simply says, "I'm afraid it might rain today." Intentionality concerns what the
person with the umbrella is doing with his umbrella and the manner in which the
242 Schnaitter
person can respond to what he is doing. It is only secondarily related to the

explanatory practices of a third person questioning what the person with the
umbrella is doing. And in any event intentional states are not conventionally
given as the causes of behavior but as the reasons for it.
Skinner approaches the first person case through his discussion of private
events. A small but important world exists within the skin, he says, and these
phenomena must be addressed in their own right. Through this move Skinner
distinguishes himself from the position of methodological behaviorism which
recognizes a world within the skin, but due to epistemological considerations
finds it inadmissible to incorporate consideration of this inner world into a
scientific view of behavioral phenomena. Unfortunately, Skinner's position on
private events is unclear. He appears to acknowledge the fundamental fact of
privacy which is that first person psychological phenomena are by their nature
accessible only to the person who is the locus of their occurrence. That is to say
if I am in pain the pain I feel is necessarily my pain and nothing you can do will
ever make it your pain. Skinner seems to say this at times. At other times he says
that private events are covert (rather than overt) stimuli and responses, even
going so far as to imply that covert stimuli require their own sensory nerve
endings to be detected and that covert responses are nothing but tiny muscle
twitches. But sensory nerve stimulations and muscle twitches are not intrinsically
first person phenomena, they are susceptible to third person observation albeit
with a certain amount of physiological instrumentation and the cooperation of the
subject. I have discussed these and other difficulties with Skinner's position in
"Skinner on the 'mental' and the 'physical'" (Schnaitter, 1984).
If Skinner really means by privacy only the relative difficulty of third person
access to events within the skin, then he is a garden variety physical reductionist
and his position becomes quite uninteresting. On the other hand if he means that
private events are intrinsically first person phenomena, then he sets himself apart
from the physical reductionist position while remaining true to his materialistic
metaphysics. When a person listens to a piece of music the auditory cortex is
excited in various complex patterns. It is "like something" to be this part of
nature under these conditions, in a way quite distinctly different from being the
part of nature which is the phonograph producing the sounds the listener hears.
This subjective ontology is neither mysterious, transcendental, dualistic nor
hypothetical. It is just the way things are, a fact that everyone knows naively and
can confirm at any moment of their waking lives. Only confirmed physicalists
argue that there are no such things as subjective phenomena and everything in the
world is in principle susceptible to third person, intersubjective verification (the
position here is related to Searle, 1992). I would prefer to believe that Skinner's
view of private events recognizes the first-person ontology of the subjective.
Certainly I would argue that nothing important to behaviorism makes this

interpretation problematic.
Although private responses to the sources of behavior can lead to intentional
expressions, our lack of access to the privacy of animals means that reference to
intentional states in animals must be wholly inferential. Everything we know
about animals comes from third person observation. Thus, Dennett's plaint that
the Skinner box masks the intentional is just bad science. It is quite incredible
that anyone would argue that one can better understand animal behavior by
talking about systems of animal belief and desire inferred from a wholly third
person perspective than in terms of the comprehensive analysis which has
resulted from careful observation of behavior and its conditions, both in the
animal behavior lab and in field studies of various sorts.
The reason that Dennett can so easily invoke the intentional as an explanation
of the behavior of animals is that within his analysis the intentional is unrelated
to the first-person point of view. For Dennett, intentionality devolves into armies
ofhomuncular mechanics internally tinkering out the coin of rationality. In one
way or another this is the position taken throughout cognitive science today.
Everything turns out to be another computation over a representation. This is the
real reductionist position in psychology, taking occurrent first person phenomena
and reducing them to various homunculi, flow charts, and information processing
contraptions. On the contrary the behaviorist position is that private events
associated with seeing, believing, remembering, hoping, and fearing are real
occurrences known by direct acquaintance; they are not hypothetical, inferred or
fictional. Underlying these events is the physiological substrate of the nervous
system. Nothing about this requires the intermediation of mind designs, flow
charts, information processing or any of the other imaginary devices so promi-
nent in cognitive theory.
Behaviorism thus stands in a natural relationship to phenomenology, a point
made many years ago by Day (1969). Indeed this relationship is entirely natural
for a position whose epistemological commitments follow from the work of
Mach, whose positivism took a distinctly phenomenalistic turn. But we must not
forget behaviorism's broader picture of adaptation to the external world.
Whatever these private events are, they stand related to the causal processes of
the environment in which the subject finds himself. Humans have evolved in
such a way that they manifest these phenomena presumably for reasons related
to the processes of evolution.
We can move beyond generalities, however, to a tentative behavioral
interpretation of the intentional idioms. In Skinner's terms a statement that "I
believe it is going to rain" is the tact (with possible supplementary sources) "it
is going to rain," modified by the autoclitic "I believe." As an autoclitic the
response "I believe" is a response following from the tact "It is going to rain,"
244 Schnaitter
rather than a response directed toward the tact. The direction of the causal
relation of stimulus control is from setting stimulus to response and the tact
serves as the stimulus for the autoclitic response. Consequently "belief' is neither
a reference to a proposition nor a psychological attitude directed onto it but a
secondary verbal effect of the probabilistic property of the primary descriptive
response. A person expressing the belief will speak according to the forgoing
verbal analysis; on other occasions the verbal behavior will be raised incipiently
but will not be overtly expressed (although it might be reported at some later time
as in "Yesterday I thought it was going to rain"); and at other times no occasion-
ing variables for the verbal behavior will be present and the entire set of material
recedes to a dispositional condition.
Searle (1983) says that, because beliefs can be true or false, they have a "mind
to world" direction of fit. Direction of fit is a logical relation, but the behavioral
analysis of the intentional is causal. Skinner argues that "belief' is an autoclitic
controlled by the strength of a tact, and the tact is under the discriminative
control of properties of the world. The tact "it is going to rain" is controlled by
a subset of properties probabilistically associated with rain: dark clouds,
unfavorable weather report, etc. If it does not rain then the consequences do not
support the original discrimination. For Searle this result falsifies the belief, a
logical relation with vague implications for a causal analysis. Alternatively, the
behaviorist would say that when it fails to rain the tact as discriminative verbal
behavior goes unreinforced. Non-reinforcement will have causal effects on future
discriminative behavior, and the subject will be changed by the interaction even
if just slightly. In this sense the behavioral analysis tells a causal story explicating
Searle's logical relation of mind to world direction of fit.
To the philosopher this interpretation of intentionality will seem oversimpli-
fied, and perhaps it is. Yet it is a beginning of a naturalistic account of the
intentional, and I hazard a guess that the general form of this programmatic
sketch can be extended to make good sense of much that has traditionally fallen
under the topic of the intentional.
The story I have just told is but half a story, however, and in many ways the
less important half. The thing that behaviorism offers is a way of relating
intentional private events back to adaptation to the world. In this regard Baum
and Heath end up at just the right point: with an historical pattern of causal
explanation. Whereas I would say of the gentleman carrying the umbrella that
when he states his belief that it may rain he is simply pulling the cork from the
bottle and pouring a draught of his current internal state, Baum and Heath are
right in judging that the internal state has causal antecedents of a kind with the
morning weather report, the appearance of dark and stormy clouds overhead, etc.
They are quite right in their emphasis on historical explanation. We can and must
get back to the world again, where all things psychological begin. The Achilles'
heel of formal internalist information-processing theories of mind is that they

offer no viable account of content. Information processing systems perfonn
meaningless syntactic operations over unintetpreted tokens of the formal system
(cf. Haugeland, 1981). What then provides the semantics - the meaning, the
content - of the mental tokens in the computation of thought? The answer is easy
enough to find: since meaning can't originate inside the fonnal system, it has to
originate outside it. That is the environment. Here enters the causal theory of
meaning.
Fodor, one of the brightest among the very bright thinkers in the cognitive
science/philosophy of mind alliance, has over the years been developing a causal
theory of content. In 1990 he proposed a set of ideas that, by a tenuous thread,
Fodor attributes to - - Skinner! Hardly a version behaviorists will abide, but
some convergence no matter how slight. My point, then, is that behaviorists
should not retreat from the interesting problem of intentionality but should
vigorously participate in the ongoing conversation. Far from having nothing to
say or being limited to reductionist or eliminative nostrums, the behaviorist has
rich resources to bring to bear on this enduring puzzle of the human condition.
CONCLUSION
Behaviorism is a mode of thought concerning the nature of human and animal

living-in-the-world which is extemalist, naturalistic, contextual, biological,
descriptive, and functional. The critics of behaviorism have by and large taken
an intemalist, essentialist, information-theoretic, and structural point of view. The
simplest way to summarize the criticisms is to say that the critics do not like any
of the things that behaviorism stands for, and believe that all the properties of
their own point of view are superior. No wonder the sparks have flown! Such
criticism will not soon subside. Nonetheless behaviorists believe in what they are
doing and will continue to believe in it, for good reason. The solid virtues of
behaviorism may still eventually be widely recognized, despite the current
fascination of some with the internalist, essentialist alternative.
Behaviorists are confident for good reason. We only need remind ourselves
that internal mechanisms of any kind exist to serve our fonn of life, our way of
getting on in the world. External conditions are primary and controlling; internal
operations are derivative, subsidiary, and serving. Organisms of all sorts must fit
themselves to the world or die; the world is under no reciprocal obligation to fit
itself to persons, minds, thoughts, intentional states, or computational metaphors.
To think otherwise is to fly in the face of all we know about the origins and
fundamental nature of life; only those who have drunk far too deeply from the
Cartesian spring are subject to such intoxication. A decade or more ago, when
246 Schnaitter
musing along these lines, I wrote the little meditation with which this paper
concludes.
After they had been racing for a time and he was well ahead, the Hare said to
himself, "Why should I exert myself with all this disgusting worldly effort? Let
me rest under yonder shady tree, and exercise my true mettle, the agility of my
mind." And so in the heat of midday Hare lay down under the shady oak and
soon was fast asleep.
The slow tortoise plodded listlessly down the hot, dusty road. "I've lost the
race for certain," he said to himself as the midday sun became warmer still. "That
Hare is fleet offoot and I am just a dull old Tortoise. Surely I must lose." And
so the Tortoise, discouraged with his prospects, allowed his mind to wander off
to more satisfying things, like lunch, and lettuce sandwiches. Thusly he was
engrossed when, plodding on in the scorching sun, he heard the hoopla, and felt
a laurel wreath slip over his brow.
"What - what is this? I've won?" he said in amazement. "Why, I'd forgotten
all about the race. Where is Hare? Has he not bounded over the fInish line before
me? There must be some mistake."
And shortly Hare did awake from his slumbers, most pleased with himself, for
he had dreamed of a glorious victory. Thus he hopped proudly down to the fInish
line, intent to claim his prize. But there stood Tortoise, all bewreathed.
''Tortoise, what is this?" the Hare exclaimed, perplexed. "I just experienced
the most wonderful mental state establishing that I won the race. Yet here you
stand, wearing the laurel wreath!"
"I know, dear Hare," said Tortoise, morosely. ''The road was hot and dry and,
when I realized you must have won, all I could think of was lettuce sandwiches.
Then the hoopla started and everyone said that I had won. Its such an enonnous,
embarrassing mistake."
"Hah!" said Hare, indignantly. "That proves you can't have won. What have
lettuce sandwiches to do with winning? You weren't in the proper mental state
to win."
"Yes, Hare, you are right," said the abject Tortoise. ''They only thought I won,
this crowd of rustics who made the hoopla, because of me fInishing fIrst and all.
I would have made the same mistake had you not instructed me, some time back,
on how the mental state is all the thing and what actually happens isn't worth a
fIg. This rabble fell in error because they lack philosophy!"
"Just so," said Hare, sniffing disdainfully. "Now I'll relieve you of that victory
adornment, if you please," and niftily he lifted the wreath from Tortoise's brow
and placed it on his own.
"We ain't awardin' nothin' for no mental state, mate," gruffed a particularly
unkempt member of the polity. "We give the wreath to him what won the race
the way we sees it!"
So the rabble set out in pursuit of Hare, whose fleetness eventually fell just
one step short, and most unwillingly he yielded up the laurel wreath to those who
put it back on Tortoise's modest brow.
After that the crowd went home. And more pleased they were to find that hare
was served for dinner.
NOTES
1. A number of years ago I participated in a symposium on Skinner's unpublished Sketch for

an epistemology which he had written sometime in the early 30' s. Skinner was the discuss-
ant, and before the symposium began I took the opportunity to ask him if he had any idea
of the source of the expression "dog on a dark plain" which can be found there. Was this his
own metaphor or was it of literary origin? He didn't recall, but immediately quoted the
closing lines of "Dover Beach,"
And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alanns of struggle and flight
Where ignorant armies clash by night.
I then asked him about the dog, to which he mused on the possibility that it might have
something to do with dogs' sensory capacities. This seemed unpromising and I countered
by proposing that the dog might be an allusion to Pavlov, indicating that the orderliness of
behavioral processes is our only means for finding our way on that "dark plain" of human
ignorance. Apparently he assented to my interpretation as he used it a short time later in his
remarks.
2. This argument simply refuses to die. Fodor (1981, p. 252) lauds Chomsky for showing the
fatuousness of Skinner's approach and then concludes "What would be interesting - what
would have surprised Grandmother - is a generalization of the form fl. is the discriminative
stimulus for utterances of 'pencil' where fl. is a description which picks out pencils in some
projectable vocabulary (e.g., in the vocabulary of physics)." This remark among many others
expresses the affinity between Chomskyan mentalism and the physical reductionist program
of logical positivism. Indeed, Chomsky has gone so far as to suggest that language will
ultimately be accounted for by physical law per se and not by any selective processes, either
Darwinian or Skinnerian in nature.
3. A leading intentional philosopher like Searle talks not of mental acts but of intentional states
which consist of the mind assuming a psychological mode directed onto a representational
content (Searle, 1983). If I understand correctly, this would not be Brentano's position
because a psychological mode is not an act.
REFERENCES
Andresen, J. T. (1990) Skinner and Chomsky thirty years later. Historiographia Linguistica,
17, 145-165. Reprinted in (1991) The Behavior Analyst, 14,49-60.
248 Schnaitter
Baum, W. M. and Heath, J. L. (1992). Behavioral explanations and intentional explanations in

psychology. American Psychologist, 47, 1312-1317.
Blackmore, J. T. (1972) Ernst Mach: His work, life, and influence. Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press.
Brentano, F. (1874) Psychologie vom empirischen standpunkt. Vienna.
Chisholm, R. (1957). Perceiving: A philosophical study. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Chomsky, N. (1959) Review ofB. F. Skinner's Verbal behavior. Language, 35,26-58.
Day, W. F. (1969) Radical behaviorism in reconciliation with phenomenology. Journal of the
Day, W. F. (1980) The historical antecedents of contemporary behaviorism. In R. W. Reiber
and K. Salzinger (Eds.). Psychology: Theoretical and historical perspectives (pp. 203-262).
New York: Academic Press.
Day, W. F. (1983). On the difference between radical and methodological behaviorism.
Behaviorism, 11,89-102.
Dennett, D. (1978) Brainstorms. Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books.
Ferster, C. B. and Skinner, B. F. (1958) Schedules of reinforcement. New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts.
Flanagan, O. (1988) The science of the mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fodor, J. (1981) Representations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fodor, J. (1990) A theory of content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gardner, H. ( 1995) Colorless ideas sleeping furiously. New York Review of Books, 42,5,32-38.
Gibson, J. J. (1966) The senses considered as perceptual systems. Boston, MA: Houghton
Mifflin.
Haugeland, J. (1981) Mind design. Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books.
Hineline, P. N. (1992) A self-interpretive behavior analysis. American Psychologist, 47, 1274-
1286.
Hull, C. (1930) Knowledge and purpose as habit mechanisms. Psychological Review, 36, 498-
511.
Hull, C. (1931) Goal attraction and directing ideas conceived as habit phenomena. Psychologi-
cal Review, 38, 487-506.
Lashley, K. S. (1951) The problem of serial order in behavior. In L. A. Jeffress, (Ed.), Cerebral
mechanisms in behavior (pp. 112-146). New York: Wiley.
Lee, V. L. (1988) Beyond behaviorism. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
MacCorquodale, K., and Meehl, P. (1948) On a distinction between hypothetical constructs and
intervening variables. Psychological Review, 55, 95-107.
MacCorquodale, K. (1970) On Chomsky's review of Skinner's Verbal Behovior. Journal of the
Mach, E. (1883) The science of mechanics. LaSalle, IL: Open Court.
McCorkle, M. E., Mercier, D., and Spooner, D. (1985, May). The Reno Group: Their methods,
analyses and results. Symposium presented at the annual meeting of the Association for
Behavior Analysis, Columbus, OH.
Meehl, P. (1950) On the circularity of the law of effect. Psychological Bulletin, 47, 52-75.
Nagel, E. (1961) The structure of science: Problems in the logic of scientific explanation. New
York: Harcourt, Brace and World.
Palmer, S., and Kimchi, R. (1986) The information processing approach to cognition. In T.
Knapp and L. Robertson (eds.), Approaches to cognition: Contrasts and controversies (37-
77). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Pinker, S. (1994) The language instinct. New York: W. Morrow and Co.
Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1984) Computation and cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Quine, W. V. O. (1960) Word and object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Richelle, M. (1976) Formal analysis and functional analysis of verbal behavior: Notes on the
debate between Chomsky and Skinner. Behaviorism, 4, 209-221.
Ringen, J. (1976) Explanation, teleology, and operant behaviorism: A study of the experimental
analysis of purposive behavior. Philosophy of Science, 43, 223-253.
Rorty, R. (1979) Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Ryle, G. (1948) The concept of mind. New York: Barnes and Noble.
Schnaitter, R. (1978) Circularity, trans-situationality, and the law of effect. Psychological
Record, 28, 353-362.
Schnaitter, R. (1984) Skinner on the "mental" and the "physical". Behaviorism, 12, 1-14.
Schnaitter, R. (1985) The haunted clockwork: Reflections on Gilbert Ryle's The concept of
mind. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 43, 145-153.
Schnaitter, R. (1987) Knowledge as action. In S. Modgil and C. Modgil (Eds.), B. F. Skinner:
Consensus and controversy (pp. 57-68). Philadelphia, PA: Falmer.
Searle, J. R. (1983) Intentionality: An essay in the philosophy of mind. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Searle, J. R. (1984) Minds, brains and science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Searle, J. R. (1992) The rediscovery of the mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Simon, H. A. (1982) The sciences of the artificial. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Skinner, B. F. (1945) The operational analysis of psychological terms. Psychological Review,
52,270-277,291-294.
Skinner, B. F. (1957) Verbal behavior. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Skinner, B. F. (1971) Beyondfreedom and dignity. New York: Knopf.
Skinner, B. F. (1974) About behaviorism. New York: Knopf.
Skinner, B. F. (1976) Farewell, my lovely! Journal
of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 25, 218.
Smith, L. D. (1986) Behaviorism and logical positivism: A reassessment of the alliance.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Stich, S. P. (1983) From folk psychology to cognitive science: The case against belief.
Taylor, C. (1964) The explanation of behaviour. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Todd, J. T., and Morris, E. K. (1992) Case histories in the great power of steady misrepresenta-
tion. American Psychologist, 47, 1441-1453.
Watson, J. B. (1913). Psychology as the behaviorist views it. Psychological Review, 20, 158-
177.
Zuriff, G. E. (1985) Behaviorism: A conceptual reconstruction. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Subject Index
abstract stage, 24 Big Bang Theory, 34

abstraction, 150 biological contingencies, 104
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, 181 biological determinism, x
actual referent, 72
Adaptive Resonance Theory, 32 Cartesian demons, 194
altruism, 102, 112 Cartesian dualisms, xiii
American functionalism, 43 Cartesian mechanism, 11
American pragmatism, 43, 224 causal-environmental history, 196
American Psychological Association, 1,3, causal explanation, 61
4,6 centaurs, 78
animistic world view, 9 chaos theory, 32
antecedent conditions, 63, 127 childhood abuse, 139
antecedent stimuli, 131 citation analysis, 7
antecedent stimulus, 135 classical behaviorism, 43
antecedent variables, 149 classical conditioning, 167
anti-mentalism, 48 clinical psychologists, 2
anti-realists, 80 cognition, 169
aphasia, 138 cognitive capacities, 200
archaic high culture, 24 cognitive maps, 44
artificial intelligence, 31, 33 cognitive psychologists, 2
Association for Behavior Analysis: An cognitive psychology, 3, 52, 65
International Association, x cognitive revolution, xii, 117, 150
attention, 4 cognitive theory, 243
audience, 118 combinatorial entailment, 172
autoclitic, 149,231,243 compatibilism, 192
autoclitic response, 244 compatibilists, 191, 193, 195
autonomous man, 82 complex reinforcement schedules, 204
axiological inquiry, 105 computers, 4
axiological theories, 106, 108, 109 concrete stage, 13
conditioned reinforcing functions, 169, 172
backward conditioning, 168 consciousness, 18, 153, 165, 166, 169, 184
behavior analytic perspective, 125 consolidated formal stage, 26
Behavior and Philosophy, x consolidated systematic stage, 29
behavior modification, 3 contextualism, 161, 162
behavior specialist, 126 contextualistic behaviorism, 163
behavior therapy, 3 contingencies, 119
behavioral homology, 99 contingency explanation, 90
behavioral manifesto, 43 contingency of reinforcement, 48
behavioral revolution, 42, 43, 44 controlling environment, 189
behavioral stage theory, 9 correspondence theories, 74
behaviorological analysis, 91, 108 cultural anthropology, 48
Berkeleyan idealist, 49 cultural contingencies, 9
bidirectional learning processes, 168 cultural selection, 94
251
252 Subject Index
culture, 10 I European Association for Behaviour

cumulative record, 215 Analysis, x
cumulative reinforcement processes, 201 euthanasia, 98
evolution, 50, 121
Darwinism, 203 evolutionary science, III
Declaration of Independence, 96 experimental analysis of behavior, x,213
democracy, 189, 190 explanatory fiction, 241
dependent variable, 164 extensional meaning, 72, 73
derived stimulus relations, 171, 173 external world, 80
descriptive epistemology, 88 extinction functions, 169
determinism, 104, 191 extrinsic events, 97
differential reinforcement, 132
discriminated operant, 30 fallibilism, 225
discrimination training, 175 falsificationism, 225
discriminative control, 57, 174 feeling, 158
discriminative functions, 168, 169, 172, folk psychology, 221
175 formal stage, 25
discriminative stimulation, 144 foundationalist epistemology, 225
discriminative stimuli, 70,131,175 fractional stimulus control, 177
discriminative stimulus, 168 freedom, 190,193,200,202,203
discriminative stimulus control, 144 free will, 9, 18, 189, 191, 192, 200,202,
disposition, 63 204
dispositional program, 237 functional account, 125
dogmatism, 80 functional analysis of behavior, 235
dualism, 48, 53 functional approach, 133
dualist, 49 functional communication training, 127
functional contextualism, 162
echoic responding, 136 functional response classes, 230
echoics, 72-74,131,135,150 functional strategy, 125
ecology, xiii functionalism, 42
economic theory, 29
editing, 147 General Stage Model (GSM), II, 12,22
elicited conditioned emotional responses, generalized conditioned reinforcer, 130,
169, 172 131
environmental control, 203 generative grammars, 231
environmental histories, 193,201 genetic endowment, xi, 46
environmental modification, 202 genetics, 50
epistemological conservatism, 222, 223 gesturing, 122
epistemological dualism, 53 grammar, 124
epistemology, 69,71, 87
equivalence, 172 hedonism, 177
equivalence classes, 169, 174 hierarchical complexity, 12
equivalence relations, 169 higher cognitive processes, 118
establishing operations, 126, 127, 131, 141 Hindu vegetarianism, 99
ethic themas, 109, 111 history of psychology, 1
ethical acts, 102 homuncular mechanics, 243
ethical behavior, 112 homunculi, 202
ethical standards, 95 homunculus, 191, 217
ethics statements, 107 human dilemma, 180
ethology, 47 hypothetical constructs, 55
hypothetico-deductive theories, 161, 162
Subject Index 253
imagining, 47 mands, 127, 138, 142, 150

inference, 182 mapping relation, 215,216,220
inferred constructs, 41 Masada, 110
information processing, 161,217,243 matching law, 33
inner man, 111 materialism, 53,225
insight-oriented therapy, 166 meaning, 181
instructional mands, 137 meaninglessness, 179
intentional idioms, 239,243 mechanism, 219,221
intensional meaning, 72, 73 mechanistic psychology, 161
intentional states, 238 mediating organismic variables, 52
intentionality, 177, 210, 244 mediating variables, 4
internal mechanisms, 245 mediational behaviorism, 229
interobservable stimuli, 175 mediational neobehaviorism, 47, 52, 54,
interrater reliability, 157 59,60,65
intersubjective verification, 43 mediational S-O-R neobehaviorism, 44
intervening phenomena, 44 memes, 16
intervening variables, 44, 55 memory, 4,150
intraverbals, 72,73,131,133,150 mental predicates, 221
intraverbal skills, 135 mentalism, 53, 54, 228
introspection, 43, 202 mentalistic explanation, 11
introspectionism, 154 mentalistic language, 181
introspective observations, 158 mentalists, 35
introspective research, 153 Mesopotamian civilization, 97
intuitionist theories, 106 metaphor, 175,177
intuitionists, 107 metaphorical extension, 175
metaphorical relation, 177
Jews, 98 metaphors, 176
Journal ofAbno171UJ1 and Social Psychology, metasystematic stage, 14,32,33
3 methodological behaviorism, 53, 160, 161,
Journal ofApplied Behavior Analysis, x, 3 46,51,52,54,56,60,154,213,225
Journal of Comparative and Physiological modem logic, 58
Psychology, 2 monism, 53
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 2 moral injunction, 107
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of moral responsibility, 194, 196,201,202
Behavior, x, 3, 215 Moslems, 98
Judeo-Christian tradition, 103 motivation, 126
justified beliefs, 81 mutual entailment, 172
language, 123, 169 natural selection, 10 1

language acquisition, 236 naturalism, 191
law of effect, 85 naturalistic fallacy, 82, 81, 86
learned helplessness, 197 naturalists, 107
libertarian mysticism, 205 neural networks, 32
libertarians, 192, 193, 195 neurophysiology, 47
linguists, 124 neutral monism, 224
listener, 118 non-verbal behavior, 181
listening, 139 nonverbal contingencies, 119
logical positivism, 54, 55, 222, 223, 225, normative epistemology, 87
226,233
long-term contingencies, 204 objectivity, 231
ontogenic level, 48
254 Subject Index
ontogeny, 220 quantitative analysis of behavior, 30

ontological claims, 164
ontology, 53, 163,224 radical behaviorism, 213
operant conditioning, 30,85, 121 ratio schedules of reinforcement, 230
operant research paradigm, 213 rational deliberation, 84
operationism, 54, 55, 155, 222, 223, 226 reasoning, 150
organic states, 44 recalling, 47
organism-environment interaction, 214 reductionism, 219
reflexes, 28
paradigmatic stage, 15,34 reinforcement mediation, 139, 140
Pavlovian processes, xiii relational frame, 171, 173
perception, 4, 138 Relational Frame Theory, 169,170,175
phenomenalism, 224 relativism, 225
phenomenology, 243 representations, 4
phenomenonological explanations, 10 respected properties, 71
philosophical epistemology, 81 respected referent, 71,72
philosophy, ix respondent conditioning, 30
phylogeny, 220 root metaphors, 160
physicalism, 223, 233 rule-following, 202
physicalists, 242 rule-governed behavior, 180
pineal gland, 27
Platonic nature, 57 S-O-R psychology, 218
point-to-point correspondence, 135 S-R behaviorism, 43, 44
polyandry, 99 S-R psychology, 218
polygamy, 99 schedules ofreinforcement, 215,219
pragmatism, 49,162 school psychologist, 126
preoperational stage, 13 Science and Human Behavior, 70
prepotent behavior, 124 scientific arguments, 80
presentism, 9 scientific epistemology, 77, 79, 80, 81
principle of economy, 223 scientific knowledge, 58
Principles of Psychology, 3 scientific psychology, 17
principles of reinforcement, 87 scientific realists, 80
private events, 1,47, 118, 158, 159, 163, selection by consequences, 47, 240
164, 165, 169, 174, 176, 177, 182, 183, selectionism, 29
239,242 self-awareness, 166
private experience, 175 self-consciousness, 166
private phenomena, 118 self-control, 198, 199,200,202,204
private responses, 175 self-editing, 146
private stimuli, 143, 175 self-knowledge, 167,202,204
private verbal behavior, 145 self-report, 168
probability theory, 32 self-tact, 147
problem solving, 4,47,150 short-term memory, 4
prompting stimulus, 72 signing, 139
propositional knowledge, 69 silent dog method, 183
proprioceptive discrimination, 175 simulation models, 31
psycholinguistics, 231 skepticism, xii
psycholinguists, 124 slavery, 96
Psychological Review, 2,6 social power, 112
public agreement, 158 Society for the Quantitative Analysis of
public policy, 108, 112 Behavior, x
purpose, 177 sociobiology, 102, 104
Subject Index 255
stage of performance, 12 thinking, 47,118,143,144,145,146,149,

stimulus class, 234 150, 158
stimulus control, 60,73,127-130,166 three-term contingency analysis, 156
stimulus equivalence, 172 topography, 120, 145
stimulus function, 169,174,180 total verbal episode, 142
stimulus induction, 159, 175 transformation of stimulus function, 172,
stimulus relations, 170 173
stimulus-response chains, 123, 229 transitivity, 172
stimulus-response reflex model, 43 traumatic brain injury, 138
stimulus-response relations, 118 truth functional language, 85
strawman, 191
strawman attack, 190 uncertainty principle, 34
structuralism, 1,42 understanding, 140
subjective ontology, 242 unidirectional learning processes, 167
subjective phenomena, 42
suicide, 180 Verbal Behavior, 50,69,70,71,72,77,78,
symmetry, 172 215,233
synthetic propositions, 223 verbal behavior, 4,117,121,123,124
systematic stage, 14,28 verbal communities, 123
verbal community, 70, 159, 166
taboos, 99 verbal conditioned stimuli, 174
tabula rasa, 93 verbal contingencies, 119
tact, 70,72,73,129,131,150,243,244 verbal discriminative stimuli, 174
tacting, 130 verbal operants, 138
talk-aloud protocols, 183 verbal reinforcers, 174
technical knowledge, 79 verbal stimuli, 141
teleological explanations, 240 verbal thoughts, 177
teleology, xiii verificationist principle, 223
temporality, 230 vitalism, xiii
textual behavior, 135 vocal musculature, 121
textual responding, 136
textuals, 131 will power, 195
The Analysis o/Verbal Behavior, 151 World WarII, 6
The Ghost in the Machine, 35
theories of mind, 245 zebu cows, 98
theory of justification, 81
Name Index
Abelson, R., 114 Brentano, F., 236, 248

Addis, L., 41,66 Bridgman, P. W., 54,66
Adronis, P. T., 127, 151 Brownstein, A. J., 47,49,66, 160, 169,
Allan, R. W., 113, 114 185
Allen, G. E., 113, 114 Bursztajn, H. 12
Allen, K. D., 7 Bush, R., 32,36
Alston, W. P., 41,66
Andresen, J. T., 210, 211, 226, 247 Campbell, D. T., 191, 198,206
Arguelles, M., 137,152 Canguilhem, G., 28, 36
Aristotle, 13,25,26,35 Caplan, A L., 115
Arlin, P. K., 17,35 Case, R., 12, 36
Annon, c., 35,36,37,39 Catania, A. C., xv, 46, 47, 56, 60, 61, 62,
Annstrong, D. M., 184 66,167,184,205,206
Arnold, W. J., 66 Cavalli-Sforza, L. L., 36, 16
Arrow, K. J., 33, 35 Cezanne, xii
Augustson, E., 169,185 Chase, P. N., xv
Aurelius, Marcus., 94, 115 Chen, 16,36
Chernoff, M. C., 17,36
Baars, B. J., 52, 66 Chisholm, R., 205, 206, 248
Bailey, J. S., xiv, 135, 151 Chis sick, S. S., 34, 39
Bandura, A., 184 Chomsky, N., 72,88,117, 151,226,227,
Barnes, D., 171,173,174,185 236,248
Baum, W. M., 241,248 Chung, S., 33, 36
Bekhterev, V. M., 30,35,36 Commons, M. L., xiv, 11, 12, 17,35,36,
Bentham, J., 28,36 37,38,39
Berger, A, 34, 38 Comte, x
Bergmann, G., 41,52,53,66 Coombs, C. H., 31,36
Bethlehem, D., 189,206 Cox, L. E., 205,207
Bickel, W. 174,185
Biglan, A., 162, 184 Darwin, c., 29, 36
Bischof, H., 114 Dawdy, M., 137, 152
Bjork, D., xi, xiv, Dawes, R. M., 31,36
Black, A. H., 39 Dawkins, R., 16,33,37, 115
Blackmore, J. T., 224,248 Day, W. F., Jr., 9,36,48,51,54,57,66,
Block, N., 58, 66, 184 153,156,158,162,185,211,215,240,
Boakes, R. A, 43, 66 243,248
Bogardis, J., 183, 187 DeGrandpre, R. J., 174,185
Bonem, M., 151 Delprato, D. J., 42, 66
Boring, E. G., 53,66, 153, 154, 155, 184 Dennett, D., 11,37,216,217,238,239,
Bower, G., 66 248
Boyd, R. R., 36 Dennett, D. C., 194,205,206
Boyd, R., 33, 36 Demick, J., 36
Braque, xii Descartes, R., 27,28,37
257
258 Name Index
Devany, J. M., 169, 185 Guralnick, D. B., ix, xiii, xiv

Dinsmoor, J. A., 3,7 Gutheil, T. 12
Dobzhansky, T., 111, 115
Dornbusch, S. M., 16, 36 Hake, D. F., 124, 151
Dostoyevsky, F., 191,206 Hallinan, P. W., 36
Dougher, M. J., 169,173,185 Hand, H. H., 12, 37
Dymond, S., 171,173,174,185 Hardin, G., 111,115
Hamad, S., xv, 46, 47, 56, 60, 61, 62, 66
Einstein, A., 82,87,88 Harre, R., 58, 66, 205, 206
Ellis, H. C., 185 Harris, M., 98,99, 115
Ellis, J. J., 96, 115 Hart, B., xi, xiv
Elwes, R. H. M., 113 Haugeland, J., 248
Ericsson, K. A., 150,151,183,185 Hayes, L. J., xiv, xv, 67, 160, 162, 169,
Estes, W. K., 32, 36, 38, 187 173,174,185,186,205,206
Eysenck, H. J., 3,7 Hayes, S. c., xv, 47, 49, 66, 67, 160, 162,
169, 171,173, 174, 176, 180, 181, 183,
Fayer, G. A., 36 184,185,186,187,205,206,208
Feldman, M. W., 16,36 Heath, J. L., 241,248
Ferster, C. B., 166,204,206,215,248 Hebb, D.O., 154, 186
Fischer, K. W., 12, 37 Heidbreder, E., 1,44,66
Flanagan, 0., 222,248 Heijehoort, J., 37
Flew, A., 113 Heisenberg, W., 34, 39
Flynn, J., 105, 114, 115 Herrnstein, R. J., 33, 36, 37
Fodor, J., 245,247,248 Hersh, S. B., 136,137,151
Fong, W., 36 Higgins, S. T., 174,185
Fowler, R. D., 6, 7 Hilgard, E. R., 186
Frankfurt, H. G., 192,206 Hilgard, G., 66
Friman, P.c., 7 Hineline, P. N., 60,66,217,248
Hocutt, M., 63, 64, 66
Galilei, G., 27,37 Hogan, R., 6, 7
Gardner, H., 209,248 Hollon, S. D., 186
Garrett, R., xiv Holt, E. B., 43
Gaylin, W., 201,206 Holton, G., 90, 114, 115
Georgoudi, M., 163,187 Holton, G. J., 34,37
Gettier, E. L., 77,88 Hospers, J., 206
Gewirth, A., 114, 115 Hovland, C. I., 2,7
Gibson, J. J., 215,248 Hull, c., 217, 248
Gifford, E. Y., xiv, 185 Hull, C. L., 30,37,59,66,154,186
Gilgen, A. R., 6,7 Hull, D. L., 115
Glenn, S. S., 124, 125, 135, 150, 151 Hume, D., 192, 207
Godel, K., 34, 37 Hunt, R. R., 185
Goodall, K., 3, 7
Goodheart, E., xiv Inhelder, B., 9, 11,37
Grant, L., 98, 115 Issar, A. S., 97, 115
Green, D. M., 38
Green, G., 151 Jacobson, N., 185
Green, L., 167,186,199,202,207 James, W., 162, 166, 186
Greenspoon, J., 139, 151 Johnston, J. M., 48,66
Greenway, D. E., 169, 185 Julia, P., xv
Greiner, J. M., 205, 207
Groosberg, S., 32,37 Kane, R., 191,207
Name Index 259
Kanfer, F. H., 205, 207 Markham, M. R., 169, 185

Kaplan, J., xiv Marr, M. J., 60,67
Karoly, P., 205, 207 Martin, G., 3, 7
Kavanau, J. L., 204,207 Marx, K., xiv, 29, 38
Keller, F. S., 5, 7 Matisse, xii
Kendall, P. C., 186 Matthew, St., 115
Kerwin, M. L. E., 7 Matthews, B. A., 205,206
Kimble, G., 59, 66 McCarthy, K., 36
Kimchi, R., 216,217,248 McClelland, J. L., 33,38,39
Kluwe, R., 39 McCorkle, M. E., 213,248
Koch, S., 43,44,53,66, 187 McCurry, S. M., 176,186
Koestler, A., 38 McPherson, A., 151
Kohlenberg, B. K., 174,186 Meaney, M., 36
Kohlenberg, B. S., 169,185 Meehl, P., 55,58,67,187,215,234,248
Konorski, J., 30,38 Mercier, D., 248
Krasner, L., 3, 8 Michael, J., 126, 151
Krause, S. R., 36 Midgley, B. D., 42,66
Kron, R., 34, 39 Mill, J. S., 28, 38
Kuang-Ho, 16, 36 Miller, P. M., 17,36
Kuhn, T. S., 27,38,204,207 Miller, S., 30, 38
Minsky, M., 32,38
Langer, E. J., 18, 38 Modgil, C., 206
Larzelere, R., 7 Modgil, S., 206
Lashley, K. S., 30,38, 228, 229, 248 Monet, xii
Layng, T. J. L., 127, 151 Moore, G. E., 82, 88
Leahey, T., 43,45,52, 60, 66 Moore, J., xiv, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48,
Leary, D. E., 66 51,54,56,57,58,60,61,63,67,144,
Lee, V. L., xv, 119, 151,213,248 151
Leibniz, G. W. F. von., 27,38 Moore, M. H., 3, 8
Leigland, S., xv, 185 Morison, R. S., 37
Lemaitre, G., 34, 38 Morowitz, H. J., 184,186
Leo, G. J., 183, 187 Morris, E. K., 36, 38, 40, 43, 45, 67, 163,
Levine, M. E., 33, 39 187,220,249
Lewis, C. S., 206, 207 Mosteller, F., 32, 36
Lipkens, G., 176,186 Mueller, C. G., 187
Lipkens, R., 171,174,186 Murphy, J. G., 206,207
Lipsey, M. W., 3, 7
Loeb, J., 89, 113 Nagel, E., 248
Logan, F. A., 32, 38 Natsoulas, T., 53, 56, 67
Lycan, W. G., 153, 186 Nayeri, F., lOS, 114, 115
Lyon, G. R., 185 Neimark, E. D., 32, 38
Neisser, U., 3,7
MacCorquodale, K., 55,58,67,187,210, Nelson, R. 0., 185
215,216,248 Nevin, J. A., 33, 38
Mach, E., x, 164, 186,248 Newman, B., xv
Mahoney, M., 49,67 Newton, I., 27,38
Mahoney, M. J., 163, 186, 195,207 Nielson, K., 114, 115
Malcolm, N., 153
Malott, R. W., 173,186 Oatley, K., 182, 186
Malthus, T. R., 29, 38 Oldenquist, A., 206, 207
Mandler, G., 52, 67 Ono, K., 67
260 Name Index
Osborne, J. G., 151 Ross, D., 13, 25, 26, 39

O'Donnell, 1. M., 43,67 Ruja, H., 3, 8
Rukstuhl, L. E., 185
Palmer, S., 216,217,248 Rumelhart, D. E., 32, 33, 38, 39
Papert, S., 32, 38 Russell, S., 12,37
Parrot, L. J., xv, 118, 122, 138, 151 Ry1e, G., 64,67,237,249
Partington, J. W., 135, 151
Pascual-Leone, J., 12,38, 39 Sagal, P. T., xv
Pavlov, I. P., ix, xiv, 30, 39 Sakamoto, J., xii, xv
Pear, J., 3, 7 Salzinger, K., 66
Peebles, P. J. E., 34, 39 San Juan, B., 137, 152
Pennypacker, H. S., 48,66 Sarbin, T. R., 185
Pepper, S. c., 160, 162, 186 Sato, M., 67
Perone, M., 144,151 Schnaitter, R. M., xiv, 60, 67, 224, 234,
Perry, R. B., 43 237,242,249
Piaget, J., 9, 11,37 Schneider, S. M., 43, 45, 67
Picasso, xii Schoenfeld, W. N., 5,7
Pinker, S., 229, 248 Schoenfeld, W. S., 187
Place, U. T., 124, 151 Schramm, D. N., 34, 39
Plato, 26, 39 Schroeder, D., 6, 7
Plautus, T. M., 97,115 Schuller, R., 183, 187
Plott, C. R., 33, 39 Schweitzer, J. B., xiii, xiv
Plumb, J. H., 100, 115 Searle, J. R., 238,242,244,247,249
Poincare, x Seberhagen, L. W., 3, 8
Popper, K., 204,206,207 Seligman, M. E. P., 197,198,207
Price, W. C., 34, 39 Shelby, J., 169, 185
Prokasy, W. F., 39 Sherrington, C. S., 30, 39
Pylyshyn, Z. W., 228,248 Shimoff, E., 205, 206
Shneidman, E. S., 180,187
Quine, W. V. 0., 63,67,239,248 Sidman, M., 48, 67
Simon, H. A, ISO, 151, 183, 185,215,
Rachels, J., 195,207 249
Rachlin, H., xv, 9,39,167,186,199,207 Singer, E. A, 43
Rachman, S., 166,187 Skinner, B. F., ix, x, xi, xiii, xiv, xv, 4, 8,
Reese, H. W., 160, 162, 185, 186 30,39,42,45,46,47,49,50,58,60,
Reichle, J., 126, 151 62,63,65,68,70,71,72,73,78,8284,
Renoir, xii 85,88,92, 106, 115, 117, 118, 119,
Rescorla, R. A, 33, 39 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 129, 137, 138,
Richards, F. A., 11, 17, 35, 36, 37, 39 143, 149, 151, 152, 157, 158, 159, 162,
Richelle, M., 210,249 165,166,175,177,182,187,189,190,
Richerson, P. J., 33,36 194,203,204,206,207,208,215,224,
Rickaby, J., 27,39 231,248,249
Rieber, R. W., 66 Smith, A, 28, 29, 39
Riesman, D., 7,8 Smith, D. L., 187
Riley, P., 27,39 Smith, L. D., 44, 53, 68, 223, 224, 249
Ringen, J., 240, 249 Smith, T. L., 191,208
Risley, T. R., xi, xiv Sobell, M., 183, 187
Rodriguez, J. A., 12,36 Sonnert, G., 12
Rorty,R., 153,162,183,186,187,249 Spada, H., 39
Rosenfarb, I., 205, 206 Spence, K. W., 2, 8, 30, 32, 40
Rosnow, R., 163, 187 Spinoza, B. de., 27, 40, 89, 113
Name Index 261
Spooner, D., 248 Wacker, D. P., 126, 151

Staniforth, M., 95, 115 Wagner, A R., 33, 39
Steele, D. L., 171, 174, 187 Wakita, M., xii, xv
Stein, S. A, 36 Wallender, R., xiv
Stich, S. P., 249 Waller, B., xiv
Strawson, P. F., 205,208 Wann, T. W., xv, 66, 68
Strosahl, K., 181, 186 Warner, R., 187
Sulzer-Azaroff, B., xiii, xiv Watanabe, S., xii, xv
Sundberg, M. L., 137, 152 Watson, I. B., 1,8,30,40,43,68, 153,
Swets, I. A, 38 187,249
Szubka, T., 187 Werner, H., 9,40
Wessells, M. G., 59,60,68
Taylor, c., 205, 208, 240, 249 Wheelwright, P., 11,40
Taylor, R., 205, 208 White, D., 183, 186
Thoresen, C. E., 195,207 White, L., Ir., 97,115
Thorndike, E. L., 30, 40 White, L. A, 97, 115
Thyer, B. A., ix, xv Wiener, D. N., xiii, xv
Todd, I. T., 36,40,67, 163, 187,220, Williams, B., 206, 208
249 Wilson, E. 0., 102,104,115
Tolman, E. C., 2, 55,59,68, 187 Wilson, K. G., 160, 181, 186
Trivers, R. L., 40 Windholz, G., 11,30,40
Trudeau, E. I., 36 Wolpe, J., 166, 187
Turner, E. L., 34, 39 Woodworth, R. S., 44, 68
Tversky, A., 31,36 Wright, G. D., 3, 8
Wulfert, E., 169, 185
Ullman, L. P., 3, 8
Zeigler, H. P., 114
Vargas, E. A, xiv, 113, 114, 115 Zettle, R. D., 205, 206, 208
Verplanck, W. S., 155, 187 Zuriff, G. E., xv, 9, 40, 41, 43, 52, 58, 63,
68,212,233,249

The Philosophical Legacy of Behaviorism PDF

Transféré par

Informations du document

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

The Philosophical Legacy of Behaviorism PDF

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

THE PHILOSOPHICAL LEGACY OF BEHAVIORISM

SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.

The philosophicallegacy of behaviorism I edited by Bruce A. Thyer.

Printed an acid-free paper

Ali Rights Reserved

When I undertook the editing of this book I approached a fellow faculty

is clear that there is considerable overlap between the subject matter of

4. These mechanisms of learning exert their influence through the physical

learning factors in favor of pwported intrapsychic dynamics. For the sociobi-

an immediate one is an important skill, crucial to success in life. How is this

work at expanding the explanatory power of empirically-based learning

Bjork, D. (1993). B.F. Skinner: A Life. New York: Basic Books.

RECOMMENDED FuRTHER READINGS

The story as told by cognitive psychologists is that behaviorism had come

processing and storing of information," was elected President of the American

be bothered by the responsibilities of science. Although some people grow up

Dinsmoor, J. A. (1983). Observing and conditioned reinforcement. Behavioral and Brain

The Origins of Behaviorism

from the self as god, embracing instead polytheistic or monotheistic religions

WHAT IS BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS?

Behavior analysis treats events as data. Events are potentially detectable

nonological explanations. This requirement means that if one observes a

THE DEVELOPMENTAL MODEL

4a 10-12 3 IlIa Variables, Asserts a third-persou or neutral other by

5a 18+ 4 Post- Systems Discriminates behavioral framework of other as

5b 20+ 4/5,5,6 Metasystems Compares, contrasts, transforms and synthesizes

6. ? 6 Paradigms Recognizes independently-constructed

named ("milk"). This is the only form of explanation available to early

objects allow systems to be compared and contrasted in terms of their

WHY THE STAGE OF AN INVENTOR OF CULTURE AND THE STAGE OF

Individual and cultural development have a straightforward relationship to one

LEVEL OF SUPPORT AND STAGE DEMAND

The way that we locate the highest stages of individuals is by examining

culture. The invention of scientific culture by an individual required the

FACTORS THAT IMPEDED THE DEVELOPMENT OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND

will as a cause of behavior interfere with our developing a scientific psychol-

Hunter Leader Band Prowess Hunting, Magic Counting, Concrete

Village Chief Village Seniority Proto- Animism Larger Abstract

Empires, Simple Empire, Genealogical Bronze age Monotheism, Systematic Consolidated

Early Ruler of Nations Estates with Pre- Monotheism, Modern Systematic

Modernity Elected Federal Democratic Industrial Separation of Modem Consolidated

Post- Nation- Groups of International Post- Religion is Meta- Meta-

Villages Abstract Sequences of Comparing counts Dualism. One perceives oneself

PERIODS IN CULTURAL EVOLUTION AND THE CORRESPONDING

Table 2 illustrates the periods of cultural evolution and their corresponding

CULTURAL EVOLUTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS

Science of Behavior (Concrete):

traditions supported an extensive local culture, including descriptions and

Science of Behavior (Abstract):

Early High Culture

Science of Behavior (Consolidated Abstract):

Archaic High Period

government, but war. Out of design, architecture, and astronomy, geometry

Science of Behavior (Formal):

Empire States, IDgh Period

person's "intentions" or "will" were perceived as problematic. Generally, an

Science of Behavior (Consolidated Formal):

power of material science to explain mental events or spiritual science to

Science of Behavior (Systematic):

Science of Behavior (Consolidated Systematic Stage):

reinforcement contingencies and response rates, and observes changes in

The transmission, storage, and processing of information became computer-

simulations represent the constraints as to how the biology, physiology, and