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Considerations on Quality Assurance/Quality Control and
Sample Security
A Simon1 and G Gosson2
ABSTRACT
An important requirement in every geological quality control program is
that the identity and grades of the control samples (duplicates, certified
reference materials (CRMs), and blanks) must remain ‘blind’ to the
analytical laboratory. Once the entity to be controlled is aware of relevant
details of the control process, such as the identity of the control samples,
the objectivity may be lost and the control may no longer be completely
valid.
Whereas the blind insertion of field duplicates and coarse blanks can
be easily conducted at site, simultaneously with the sampling process, the
rest of the control samples should be inserted into the batches during or
after sample preparation and prior to assaying, in order to ensure a proper
assessment of precision, accuracy and assay contamination, independent
of the internal quality control of the laboratory.
Such a procedure raises the concern that blind insertion of crushed or
pulverised material in sample batches prior to assaying could represent a
breach in the chain of custody principle, as samples would have to be
temporarily returned to the custody of a non-laboratory person in charge
of the insertions.
In this seemingly conflict scenario, what should we give up? Do we
maintain the strict chain of custody, knowing that the laboratory will be
aware of the identity of some of the control samples, or that some
duplicates will not be true same-batch duplicates? Do we ignore chain of
custody issues to maintain the anonymity of the control samples and
insert blind same-batch duplicates, CRMs and blanks? Is it possible to do
blind insertions without breaching the chain of custody?
Current NI 43-101 and JORC requirements, as well as real-world
QA/QC and sample security practices, are discussed in light of AMEC’s
approach to the solution of this apparent dilemma.
INTRODUCTION
On 18 February 1997, Freeport McMoran Copper and Gold
(Freeport) announced the intention to acquire the world-class
Busang gold deposit, discovered by Bre-X Minerals (Bre-X) in
Kalimantan, Indonesia. Two weeks later, on 1 March, a Freeport
team initiated an intense due diligence exercise. As a result of
new drilling, resampling, assaying, Bre-X staff interrogation and
mineralogical tests, the biggest mining scam ever perpetuated
was quickly revealed after 19 days of careful independent audit.
The conclusions of the Freeport team were later confirmed by
Strathcona (Jones et al, 1998).
The Freeport audit team identified an intricate salting
program: drill core was transported in bags by boat to a remote
Bre-X office, where the bags were opened and salted with
alluvial gold according to the available geological logs by
company personnel. After tampering, the bags continued their
way to the laboratory.
The Bre-X affair had immediate repercussions in the mining
and investing community. In April 1997, only a few weeks after
the fraud was exposed, the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) and
the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) established a joint
task force, aimed at setting new standards for mineral exploration
and mining companies. The task force consulted representatives
of the exploration and mining companies, domestic and foreign
1. AMEC International (Chile) SA, Avenida Apoquindo 3846, Las
Condes, Santiago, Chile. Email: armando.simon@amec.com
2. AMEC Americas Limited, Suite 400 - 111 Dunsmuir Street,
Vancouver BC V6B 5W3, Canada. Email: greg.gosson@amec.com
Sampling Conference Perth, WA, 27 - 29 May 2008
regulators, and independent specialists. Their final report
included a series of thoroughly documented recommendations
aimed at improving the reliability of reporting by the exploration
and mining industry (TSE-OSC, 1999). Soon after that, Canadian
National Instrument 43-101 (NI 43-101) replaced the outdated
National Policies 2-A and 22, and from time to time NI 43-101
has been subsequently updated (Canadian Securities
Administrators, 2005a).
Canadian exploration and mining organisations must comply
with NI 43-101 requirements when disclosing mineral resources
or reserves. Similarly, observance of NI 43-101 rules is
frequently adopted by other international companies. AMEC has
developed its quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) policy,
and its approach to the analysis of QA/QC data, in compliance
with NI 43-101 (Canadian Securities Administrators, 2005a),
Canadian Institute of Mining, Metallurgy and Petroleum’s
(CIM’s) best practice guidelines for exploration (Canadian
Institute of Mining, Metallurgy and Petroleum, 2004) and
estimation of mineral resources and mineral reserves (Canadian
Institute of Mining, Metallurgy and Petroleum, 2003, 2005),
JORC guidelines (JORC, 2004), Society for Mining, Metallurgy
and Exploration, Inc (SME) guidelines (Society for Mining,
Metallurgy and Exploration, Inc, 1999), and from over 20 years
experience on literally hundreds of development projects.
INTERNATIONAL CODES, QA/QC AND
SAMPLE SECURITY
Technical reports written under the specifications of NI 43-101
and its related documents, Companion Policy 43-101CP
(Canadian Securities Administrators, 2005b), and Technical
Report Form NI 43-101F (Canadian Securities Administrators,
2005c), should indicate whether a Qualified Person (QP) has
verified the data on which this information is based, including
sampling, analysis and tests. Sample security procedures should
also be described in detail.
Equivalent international regulations also address some of these
issues. A JORC-compliant report should thoroughly describe the
nature, quality and appropriate selection of sampling and
analytical procedures, as well as the quality control and sample
security procedures (JORC, 2004).
Furthermore, the final report of the Mining Standards Task
Force (TSE-OSC, 1999), set up in response to the Bre-X scam,
recommends that a certain number of selected sample pulps or
the entire batch be retrieved from the laboratory, assigned new
sample numbers and resubmitted to the same laboratory, and that
the same pulps be sent to another laboratory to obtain
comparative assays.
The Toronto Stock Exchange Company Manual (TSE, 2002)
states that if the property is one of the company’s material
properties, the company must also disclose any independent
sampling or audit programs that have been or will be undertaken,
by whom, and what their qualifications are. Data verification
programs undertaken should be disclosed, including sampling
methods, location and number of samples, and comparisons with
the company’s own results.
Similarly, the TSX Venture Exchange Mining Standards
Guidelines (TSE, 2005) include statements on the way that
handling of analytical results should be addressed. In particular,
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A SIMON and G GOSSON
specific details of any unusual or non-standard sampling,
preparation or analytical procedures must be made by the issuer
and must include results of a duplicate set of samples processed
by industry standard procedures for comparative purposes.
QUALITY CONTROL –
DEFINITIONS AND PRINCIPLES
Quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) are the two
major components of any quality management system. According
to ISO’s definition, QA is ‘the assembly of all planned and
systematic actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that a
product, process, or service will satisfy given quality
requirements’, and QC refers to ‘the operational techniques and
activities that are used to satisfy quality requirements’. QC
includes the quality assessment, or ‘the system of activities to
verify if the quality control activities are effective’ (Van Reeuwijk,
1998). While QA deals with prevention of problems, QC aims at
detecting them, in the event that they occur.
Rogers (1998) states that quality assurance policies and quality
control procedures in mineral exploration involve continuous
monitoring of work processes and information flows, in order to
ensure precise, accurate, representative, and reliable results, and
to maximise data completeness (SMST, 2006). In the same line,
quoting the Vancouver Stock Exchange Mining Standards
Guidelines, Bloom (1999) writes that ‘quality assurance
programs should be routinely implemented as part of any
exploration program that is generating analytical results. Such a
program should verify the validity of sample collection, security,
preparation, analytical method and accuracy’.
In practical terms, geological quality control procedures are
intended to monitor precision and accuracy of the assay data, as
well as possible sample contamination during preparation and
assaying (Sketchley, 1999; Smee, 1999; Long, 2000).
Precision
ISO 3534-1 (ISO, 1993) defines precision as ‘the closeness of
agreement between independent test results obtained under
stipulated conditions’. According to Taylor and Kuyatt (1994),
repeatability conditions are fulfilled when the tests use same
procedure, with the same observer, the same measuring
instrument, under the same measurement conditions, in the same
location, and are repeated over a short period of time.
Precision in geological exploration can be related to three
main steps in the process of collecting analytical data: sampling
(sampling precision), subsampling (subsampling precision) and
assaying (analytical precision). Each of these are assessed
through different types of duplicate samples, but in either case,
according to the definition, the original and the duplicate
samples should consider similar sampling intervals and similar
sampling and sample preparation procedures, and be assayed at
the same laboratory, with the same analytical techniques, the
same equipment, the same reagents and the same personnel.
Such ideal situation can only be attained if the original and the
duplicate samples are included in the same batch.
Accuracy
The concept of accuracy is closely linked to the concept of ‘true
value’. The ‘true value’ is a theoretical concept, not an actual
measurement. All measurements have an uncertainty (error)
attached to them, and thus cannot provide the ‘true value’.
Furthermore, different samples of the lot will have different
concentrations of the element being measured, and this contributes
additional uncertainty to the ‘true value’ of the material’s grade.
In the mining industry, accuracy is measured through certified
reference material (CRMs), which are usually prepared from
natural materials, or metallurgical concentrates and tailings.
136 Perth, WA, 27 - 29 May 2008
When establishing the grade of these materials, the true value is
never known; however, under very controlled conditions, the
grade or ‘best value’ of a particular element in a CRM can be
established with a sufficient level of confidence, usually
corresponding to the 95 per cent confidence level, through
multiple measurements at a series of certified and reputable
laboratories.
By inserting CRMs in sample batches, it is possible to
compare, indirectly, the performance of any particular laboratory
to the performance of many other reference laboratories and,
therefore, to assess the possible existence of bias between that
particular laboratory and the consensus of other laboratories.
An additional way to assess the accuracy of a laboratory is by
comparing its results to the results of another laboratory. By
submitting to a reference laboratory a portion of the pulp
samples that were assayed at the original laboratory, it is possible
to establish the bias between the two laboratories. This method
should be complementary to the use of CRMs. The combination
of both methods leads to a more representative quantitative
appraisal of the accuracy.
Contamination
Contamination is measured through blank samples, which are
barren samples on which the presence of the elements
undergoing analysis has been confirmed to be below the
detection limit. Blank samples can be submitted as coarse blanks
(with fragments >1" diameter) inserted into the sample stream
prior to preparation, or as pulp blanks, pulverised barren material
which is inserted after the preparation has taken place and before
the actual assay is conducted. In order to be effective, the blank
samples should always be inserted after highly mineralised
samples.
QUALITY CONTROL VERSUS SAMPLE
SECURITY
Problems with sampling programs and databases are seldom the
result of an individual’s (or group of individuals’) dishonest
attempt to hide or falsify certain facts, but rather unintentional
errors or bias introduced by improper sample collection, sample
preparation and assaying.
Internationally certified and competently managed laboratories
have their own internal QC protocols, and the assay certificates
commonly include the results of at least some of the internal
laboratory QC. However, most laboratories will only reveal those
checks that pass their internal controls, but not the failures.
Results of batches that fail laboratory QC are re-run, and the
re-run results, along with new passing QC results, are reported.
Thus, the disclosed laboratory QC provides a picture of what the
laboratory considers acceptable performance, rather than a direct
measurement of its quality.
Independent measurements of the data quality are typically
poorer than the QC reported by the laboratory, because they may
detect some instances of poor performance that slip through the
laboratory QC. How different these results are depends upon how
effective the laboratory QC was at eliminating poor performance.
Thus the external QC provides an assessment of the efficacy of a
laboratory’s QC, as well as an independent assessment of the
data quality.
Neuss (1998), Rogers (1998), Vallée (1998), TSE-OSC (1999),
Sketchley (1999), Long (2000), Sinclair and Blackwell (2002),
Lomas (2004), JORC (2004) and other qualified sources
recommend that comprehensive geological quality control
protocols be implemented independently of the internal protocols
used by the laboratories. AMEC regards sole reliance on the
internal laboratory QC as unacceptably poor practice.
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 CONSIDERATIONS ON QUALITY ASSURANCE/QUALITY CONTROL AND SAMPLE SECURITY
Whereas most internationally recognised laboratories follow
rigorous QC protocols, there are hundreds, or perhaps thousands
of private and government laboratories, including in the first
place the mine laboratories, analysing geological samples
elsewhere. AMEC’s direct experience is extensive in revealing
deceptive practices by laboratories generally considered to be
‘professional’. Regardless of the intentions of laboratory
management or laboratory owner management, the incidence of
poor sample preparation practices and unreported blank,
duplicate and CRM failures is higher than some sampling
consultants would choose to believe.
The need for blind insertions
An important requirement in every QC program is that the
identity and grades of the control samples must remain ‘blind’ to
the analytical laboratory (Rogers, 1998; TSE-OSC, 1999; Long,
2000). Once the entity to be controlled is aware of relevant
details of the control process, as the identity of the control
samples, the objectivity is lost, the control may no longer be
valid, and can consequently be called into question. This puts in
doubt the Qualified Person’s ability to ensure that assay precision
and accuracy are acceptable to support resource estimates.
The purpose of the blind insertion of control samples is to
prevent the laboratory from identifying the control samples, or at
the very least, their nature and sought values, so that an objective
and independent assessment of precision, accuracy and
contamination can be conducted.
Whereas the blind insertion of field duplicates and coarse
blanks can be easily conducted at site, simultaneously with the
sampling process, the rest of the control samples should be
inserted into the batches during or after sample preparation and
prior to assaying, in order to ensure a proper assessment of
precision, accuracy and contamination, independent of the
internal quality control of the laboratory. Unless sample
preparation and assaying take place at different laboratories or
facilities, this operation would be impossible without the
participation of non-laboratory personnel.
To give up or not to give up – that is the question
The above consideration raises the concern that blind insertion of
crushed or pulverised material in sample batches prior to assaying
could represent a breach in the Chain of Custody principle. This is
a potential issue, because the samples would be temporarily
returned to the custody of a non-laboratory person in charge of the
insertions, even if this occurs within the laboratory premises.
In this apparent conflict scenario, some unavoidable questions
arise. What should we give up? Do we maintain the strict chain
of custody, knowing that the laboratory will be aware of the
identity of the control samples, or that duplicate samples will not
be true same-batch duplicates? Do we forget about the chain of
custody, maintaining the anonymity of the control samples and
inserting same-batch duplicates? Is there a way to do proper
insertions without breaching the chain of custody? As a matter of
fact, what custody and chain of custody mean?
Chain of custody procedures should be followed to provide a
documented, legally defensible record of the custody of samples
from collection through analysis. For the Washington State
Department of Ecology (WSDE, 2007):
a sample is considered to be ‘in custody’ if it
meets at least one of the following conditions:
• the sample is in someone’s physical possession
or view,
• the sample is secured to prevent tampering, or
• the sample is secured in an area restricted to
authorised personnel.
Sampling Conference Perth, WA, 27 - 29 May 2008
The United States Environmental Protection Agency defines
the Chain of Custody as ‘an unbroken trail of accountability that
ensures the physical security of samples, data, and records’
(Environmental Protection Agency, 1998). This definition has to
do with secure traceability. According to this definition,
respecting the chain of custody implies that it should be known
and documented who has custody of a sample at any particular
moment. As long as this principle is followed, the chain of
custody concept is respected.
AMEC is aware that the possibility of sample tampering is the
main concern in case of breaches of the chain of custody.
However, it should be noticed that with the exception of the
moment when the sample bags are secured, the chain of custody
procedure by itself does not prevent tampering. In the event that
tampering occurs, the chain of custody record only allows the
identification of the place and conditions where it occurred,
making it more risky for the perpetrators and, therefore, less
likely to occur.
Even with today’s careful approach to sample security, there
are multiple opportunities when companies and laboratories do
not have direct custody of the samples. Here are some examples:
• Samples are taken on site, and are submitted for preparation
and assaying to another location (city, country or continent)
by various means (horse, water buffalo, truck, bus, train,
plane, mail or courier), using company personnel or various
contractors (individuals, laboratories or other contractors).
Neither the company nor the laboratories have control over
the samples during a relatively large period of time.
• Samples are prepared on site by company personnel or by a
special contractor or by laboratory personnel, and are
submitted for assaying to another location (city, country or
continent) by various means (horse, water buffalo, truck, bus,
train, plane, mail or courier), using company personnel or
various contractors (individuals, same laboratory, another
laboratory or other contractors). Neither the company nor the
laboratories have control over the samples during a relatively
large period of time.
• Samples are prepared by a laboratory facility in one location
and submitted for assaying to another facility of the same
laboratory in the same location or in another location (city,
country or continent) by various means (truck, bus, train,
plane, mail or courier) using laboratory personnel or various
contractors (individuals, laboratory, other contractors).
Neither the company nor the laboratories have control over
the samples during a relatively large period of time.
• Samples are prepared by a laboratory facility in one location
and submitted for assaying to another facility of another
laboratory in the same location or in another location (city,
country or continent) by various means (truck, bus, train,
plane, mail or courier) using laboratory personnel or various
contractors. Neither the company nor the laboratories have
control over the samples during a relatively large period of
time.
In spite of the fact that potential tampering opportunities exist,
all those situations are customarily accepted with little concern
because chain of custody forms are signed when custody
changes.
The most dangerous tampering, and the most difficult to catch,
can occur right at the camp, before the samples reach the
preparation laboratory. This is what happened at Busang, and
was one of the reasons that made the Bre-X tampering so
difficult to be detected (Jones et al, 1998). It should be noticed
that, to AMEC’s best knowledge, this is the only type of
tampering that has been recognised in the published fraud cases.
In the event that partially or fully prepared samples are tampered
at the laboratory, the simplest audit process should readily
identify the transgression.
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A SIMON and G GOSSON
Forbidding project personnel access to prepared samples
before they are assayed, in order to insert blind controls, would
imply that projects cannot perform on-site preparation of
samples using project personnel, as they have access to the
sample pulps prior to assaying by the commercial laboratory.
However, this practice is employed by many companies on many
projects, and is widely accepted. It would make little sense to
argue that companies may insert blind controls in batches of
sample pulps if they prepare them, but cannot perform the same
task if they do not prepare them.
Currently used blind insertion procedures
The following methods are currently being used by some
exploration and mining companies to avoid sample handling by
non-laboratory personnel:
• Laboratory is provided with a box of controls for insertion
into each batch. These typically consist of a random
sequence of blanks, CRMs, and/or previously-assayed
sample pulps that have been renumbered. These are not blind
in the sense that the laboratory knows that these are control
samples, but if four or five different CRMs are used and
many pulp duplicates are included, the laboratory will be
unable to guess values for particular samples. However, there
are no same-batch duplicates. Therefore, the proper
assessment of analytical precision is not possible. For that
reason, AMEC does not consider it to be best practice.
• A portion of returned pulps, including assayed CRMs,
duplicates and blanks, are rebagged, relabelled and
resubmitted to the original laboratory. These may also be
submitted to a check assay laboratory. The system is easy to
implement. However, same-batch duplicates are not inserted,
which prevents the proper assessment of analytical precision.
For that reason, AMEC does not consider it to be best practice.
Recommended blind insertion procedures
The QP is entitled to follow or to accept practices based on
criteria that are generally accepted by the industry, or that can
reasonably be justified on scientific or technical grounds
(Canadian Institute of Mining, Metallurgy and Petroleum, 2004;
JORC, 2004). In addition, as the quality control process should
be sufficiently transparent to prevent any suspicion of improper
behaviour or actions, an essential requirement is that the events
should be adequately documented. AMEC suggests various blind
insertion procedures, as follows:
1. Using one laboratory for preparation and insertion of the
control samples, and another laboratory for assaying. This
increases sample preparation costs, but same-batch
duplicates are inserted, blind insertion of control samples is
achieved, and there is no inclusion of non-laboratory
personnel in the chain of custody. This procedure can be
considered as best practice.
2. Using trained personnel independent of the exploration or
mining company, with no vested interest in the project, to
do the blind insertions within the laboratory premises. This
process should be well documented, and a chain of custody
form should be filled and signed every time that the sample
custody is changed. In addition, these insertions should not
be done in secrecy, but instead with enough laboratory
personnel oversight to lessen the opportunity for large-scale
sample tampering. This adds costs to the analytical
procedure, but same-batch duplicates are inserted, blind
insertion of control samples is achieved, and there is no
inclusion of non-independent persons into the process
while the samples are at the analytical laboratory. There is
no breach of the chain of custody. Insertions are not done in
total secrecy, but with enough laboratory personnel
138 Perth, WA, 27 - 29 May 2008
supervision to prevent large-scale sample tampering. This
procedure can be considered as best practice.
3. Using a trained person from the company to do the blind
insertions at the laboratory premises. A chain of custody
form must document when the samples are temporarily in
the custody of the person performing the blind insertions,
and when the samples with the insertions are returned to the
custody of the laboratory. In this case, same-batch
duplicates are inserted, and the blind insertion of control
samples is achieved. There is no breach of the chain of
custody. Insertions are not done in total secrecy, but with
enough laboratory personnel supervision to prevent
large-scale sample tampering. Due to the direct intervention
of a person from the company, this procedure can be
considered as acceptable, particularly for mining
operations, but not best practice.
The last two procedures (2 and 3) should take place within the
laboratory premises, and with the knowledge and authorisation
of the company and the laboratory manager or responsible
person. Alternatives to these approaches are as follows:
4. Preparing two identical envelopes from every pulp sample,
so that the person in charge of the blind insertions retrieves
the second-envelope set, prepares new envelopes with
duplicates, standards and pulp blanks, numbers those
samples, and delivers them to the laboratory to be added to
the batch. This is a costly procedure, but same-batch
duplicates are inserted, blind insertion of control samples is
warranted, and there is no breach of the chain of custody. A
new form should be signed, though, because new samples
are introduced in the batch. If a person independent from
the project is in charge of the blind insertion, this procedure
can be considered as best practice. In the event that a
person from the company is in charge of the insertions, this
procedure can be considered as acceptable, but not best
practice.
5. Requesting that a percentage pulp samples be split, among
them the pulps to be duplicated, and that new envelopes be
prepared with duplicates, standards and pulp blanks,
renumbering the control samples, and delivering them to
the laboratory to be added to the batch, together with the
unused pulp samples. This is a costly procedure, but
same-batch duplicates are inserted, the blind insertion of
control samples is achieved. To maintain the chain of
custody a form should be signed. If a person independent
from the project is in charge of the blind insertion, this
procedure can be considered as best practice. In the event
that a person from the company is in charge of the
insertions, this procedure can be considered as acceptable,
but not best practice.
In AMEC’s opinion, all five methods are practical and
sufficiently adequate to be deemed as acceptable.
In projects where AMEC is retained by an exploration or
mining company for the independent, ongoing review of a
quality control program, a trained AMEC employee is in charge
of the blind insertion of control samples at the laboratory
premises, with authorisation of company and the laboratory
manager. Control samples are repackaged in pulp pouches
identical to those used for unknown samples, supplied by the
laboratory on the spot, and chain of custody forms are filled by
the AMEC and the laboratory representatives at the time when
sample custody changes. AMEC does not recommend nor accept
that samples be retrieved from the laboratory premises before
assaying for the insertion of blind control samples or for any
other purpose.
Additional measures are recommended to reduce the
tampering vulnerability of rock samples used in resource
estimations. Among them:
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 CONSIDERATIONS ON QUALITY ASSURANCE/QUALITY CONTROL AND SAMPLE SECURITY
• maintaining increased security between drill rig and sample
shipment;
• recording who has access to particular samples between
collection and shipping, and maintaining a secure copy of
that record through the life of the project; and
• employing an outside agency, with no vested interest in the
project, to maintain custody and security over samples from
one or more drill hole ‘twins’ prior to important company
milestones.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
AMEC recommends that geological QC programs include the
blind insertion of control samples. On the consideration that the
quality control process should be sufficiently transparent to
prevent any suspicion of improper behaviour or actions, AMEC
suggests various blind insertion procedures:
• Using a laboratory for preparation and insertion of the
control samples, and another laboratory for assaying. This
procedure can be considered as best practice.
• Using a person independent of exploration or mining
company, with no vested interest in the project, to do the
blind insertions within the laboratory premises. This process
should be well documented, and a chain of custody form
should be filled and signed every time that the sample
custody is changed. In addition, these insertions will not be
done in secrecy, but instead with enough laboratory
personnel oversight to lessen the opportunity for large-scale
sample tampering. This procedure can be considered as best
practice.
• Using a person from the company to do the blind insertions
within the laboratory premises. A chain of custody form
should be filled and signed every time that the sample
custody is changed. In addition, these insertions will not be
done in secrecy, but instead with enough laboratory
personnel oversight to lessen the opportunity for large-scale
sample tampering. This procedure can be considered as
acceptable, but not best practice.
Alternatives to the two last approaches are as follows:
• Preparing two identical envelopes from every pulp sample, so
that the person in charge of the blind insertions retrieves the
second-envelop set, prepares new envelopes with duplicates,
standards and pulp blanks, numbers those samples, and
delivers them to the laboratory to be added to the batch. A
new form should be signed, because new samples are
introduced in the batch. If a person independent from the
project is in charge of the blind insertion, this procedure can
be considered as best practice. In the event that a person from
the company is in charge of the insertions, this procedure can
be considered as acceptable, but not best practice.
• Requesting a few random pulp samples, among them the
pulps to be duplicated, and preparing new envelopes with
duplicates, standards and pulp blanks, renumbering the
control samples, and delivering them to the laboratory to be
added to the batch, together with the unused pulp samples. A
form should be signed. If a person independent from the
project is in charge of the blind insertion, this procedure can
be considered as best practice. In the event that a person from
the company is in charge of the insertions, this procedure can
be considered as acceptable, but not best practice.
Additional measures are recommended to reduce the
tampering vulnerability of rock samples used in resource
estimations. Among them:
• maintaining increased security between drill rig and sample
shipment;
Sampling Conference Perth, WA, 27 - 29 May 2008
• recording who has access to particular samples between
collection and shipping, and maintaining a secure copy of
that record through the life of the project; and
• employing an outside agency, with no vested interest in the
project, to maintain custody and security over samples from
one or more drill hole ‘twins’ prior to important company
milestones.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors would like to acknowledge the contribution of Harry
Parker, Larry Smith, Scott Long and Ted Eggleston, who provided
numerous elements of discussion and valuable suggestions during
preparation of this paper.
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43-101, Standards of Disclosure for Mineral Projects, Canadian
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(QA/G-5), Environmental Protection Agency. PA/600/R-98/018
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Sampling Conference